Ideological crisis and its Russian specificity. The Crisis of Classical Ideologies at the Turn of the 19th-20th Centuries

CRISIS AND COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET IDEOLOGY

The ideological state of people and society as a whole is formed under the influence of many factors, and not just ideology. And chief among them is their experience. Everyday life.

Soviet people knew the shortcomings of their society as well as Western observers. Moreover, they experienced them in their own skin. Therefore, the state of discontent was common for them at all levels, from the cleaner, who was unhappy that the workers were spitting and throwing cigarette butts on the floor, and ending with the General Secretary of the CPSU, who was dissatisfied with the fact that the workers did not stop drinking vodka, did not want to to strengthen labor discipline and raise labor productivity, without which society could not move as quickly towards full communism as we would like. However, only under certain conditions was this general discontent directed against the communist social system and played the role of one of the factors in its (system) collapse.

In the post-Stalin years, a crisis situation began to grow in the Soviet ideological sphere. A complex of factors, both internal and external, played a role in its generation.

Soviet society entered the stage of mature communism ("developed socialism"). The Soviet people, through their experience and on the basis of common sense, were convinced that there would be no heavenly communism, which they were promised by the classics of Marxism. They understood the following fundamental truth of our era: what they had was real communism. The ideological picture of Soviet society began to be perceived by people as a blatant lie, as a fraudulent disguise of an unattractive reality. The demoralizing effect of this turned out to be strong not because people realized the shortcomings of real communism (they became familiar), but because reality did not live up to the promises of the leaders and ideologists of society.

In the Khrushchev years and the first years of Brezhnev's rule, further, a comprehensive criticism of Stalinism began in all strata of Soviet society. This criticism gradually developed into criticism of the Soviet communist system in general. This happened within Soviet society, one might say, for internal needs. What broke out and became known in the West was only a small fraction of this critical epidemic. The extreme manifestation of this epidemic was the dissident movement, "samizdat" and "tamizdat". Stalin's "vulgarization" of ideology was also criticized, which gradually developed into a disdainful attitude towards ideology in general. Even in the circles of the ideologists themselves and party leaders involved in ideology, they began to be ashamed to appeal to ideology and refer to it. Countless articles and books appeared within the framework of ideology and in near-ideological spheres, in which, however, ideology was slighted or ignored altogether, in best case she got off with a few meaningless quotes and references. Even the former ardent Stalinists were captured by this epidemic, often ahead of the "innovators" (for opportunistic reasons, of course). Crowds of all sorts of "theoreticians" rushed into the realm of ideology, i.e. losers, graphomaniacs and careerists from various sciences, who literally flooded the ideology with fashionable ideas and buzzwords. And all this was done under the sauce of the creative development of Marxism. Moreover, these creators themselves in their narrow circles mocked the Marxism they developed. They imagined that they were making a spiritual revolution, only out of necessity hiding behind the interests of Marxism. In fact, they could not produce anything other than unbridled verbiage. However, they did damage to the ideology, having rewards and praise for this.

Herculean efforts were made in the Soviet Union to impress Soviet people with certain ideas about the West and develop in them immunity to the corrupting influence of the West. This pernicious influence is not fiction Soviet propaganda and the KGB. It was a real fact of Soviet life, and a fact of the highest degree. In the post-Stalin years, the West began to exert a huge influence on the ideological state of Soviet society, and the influence was precisely pernicious, demoralizing, weakening Soviet society from within. A special study is needed in order to find out how the Soviet Union benefited from communication with the West after the lifting of the "Iron Curtain" and how much damage it was caused by the influence of the West. But now the following is indisputable. The West became a permanent factor in the daily life of Soviet society. For the first time, Soviet ideology faced a serious adversary that threatened its power over society. When the Soviet leaders, while allowing peaceful political coexistence with the West, ruled out peaceful ideological coexistence, they thus adequately assessed the danger of Western influence on the ideological state of Soviet society. This danger could not be overcome by measures of repression alone. Soviet ideology had to show how capable it was by its own means of overcoming the disease of "Westernism" that had already penetrated deeply into Soviet society.

But the main factor that gave rise to a trend towards a crisis in the ideological sphere is the Cold War, which began immediately after the end of World War II and is basically an ideological war.

The West has always occupied a significant place in Soviet ideological life, that is, in its ideological teaching, in the operation of the entire system of indoctrination of the population, and in the ideological state of the country's population. In ideological teaching, this is primarily Lenin's teaching about imperialism as the highest and last stage of capitalism and about the inevitability of the victory of communism throughout the world. Soviet party leaders and professional ideologists "developed" Lenin's teachings further, taking into account the fact of the formation of the socialist camp and the split of the world into irreconcilable social systems. They did this in strict accordance with the canons of ideology: they verbally dissected modernity in such a way that it began to look like a confirmation of Lenin's plans, and dressed the doctrine itself in verbal clothes, giving it the appearance of enduring relevance. Here we have a typical example of an ideological attitude to reality: the latter is not directly reflected in the minds of a certain category of people engaged in ideology or absorbing it, but through an artificial verbal grid. The task of this ideological grid is to denigrate the enemy, to ennoble oneself.

In the Brezhnev years, the West brought down on Soviet society a powerful stream of information (rather disinformation) about life in the West, Western culture (rather, mass pseudo-culture), ideology, propaganda of the Western way of life and criticism of the Soviet way of life. And I must say that he found a favorable situation here. The Soviet ideological apparatus was unable to resist him. None of the efforts of the Soviet counter-propaganda and punitive organs (including the jamming of Western radio stations and arrests) could stop this offensive by the West on the souls of the Soviet people. The latter, especially the educated and privileged strata, experienced such an influence from the West that not only Soviet, but also pre-Soviet Russian history had not known until now. It turned out that the Soviet people had no protective immunity against such influence.

The West, through numerous channels, bursting into the inner life of Soviet society, inflicted on it such psychological and ideological damage as Soviet society had to face for the first time. The West dealt a blow to the fundamental principles of ideology about the advantages of the Soviet system and way of life over the Western one. The West contributed to the shift of people's interests towards purely material needs and temptations. The West has greatly contributed to the flourishing of corruption in the ruling strata of society, up to the very highest.

The negative phenomena of real communism became the object of grandiose anti-communist propaganda in the West and in the Soviet Union by the West. Capitalism has not left the stage of history, as predicted by Marx and Lenin, but has become stronger and, in this period of history, seems to have won the competition with communism. The Soviet Union was in economic recession, while the capitalist West experienced unheard-of prosperity. Soviet people began to see there promised by the communists earthly paradise. The system of higher spiritual and moral values, which the Soviet ideology sought to instill in the Soviet people, turned out to be inadequate. real qualities people and their conditions of life. The system of Western values, reinforced by the temptations of the Western way of life, fell upon humanity with unprecedented force, including the Soviet people in its sphere of influence. And they rushed from one extreme to another, becoming the most malleable object of an ideological and psychological attack from the West.

The West in the imagination of the Soviet people was rapidly turning into the greatest temptation. The propensity for a critical attitude towards everything one's own, envy of everything alien, as well as the impunity of countless actions that in one way or another harmed Soviet society, completed the set of reasons that made the ideological crisis of Soviet society inevitable.

As a result of the anti-communist coup in the Gorbachev-Yeltsin years, all the main pillars of the Soviet social order were destroyed. The Soviet state ideology was simply discarded. The gigantic army of Soviet ideologists capitulated without a fight. She just vanished like she didn't exist at all. But instead of the liberation from the tyranny of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism promised by the reformers and their Western manipulators, a state has come in which the word "lawlessness" is more appropriate than in relation to other aspects of the country's social organization.

A powerful, unrestrained stream of Western ideology poured into Russia. With astonishing speed, he mastered most of the mass media, which, as in the West, became a kind of "Vatican" of Westernism. The Western system of values ​​has found extremely favorable ground in Russia. Western mass culture, which is an instrument of the ideology of Westernism, began to conquer the souls of Russians, especially of new generations. An unbridled revival of religions began, and above all Orthodoxy, which began to behave almost like a state religion. It enlisted the support of the highest authorities and persistently entered the struggle for the souls of the Russians. The former convinced atheists from the party apparatus and from the highly educated intelligentsia turned into equally convinced believers with lightning speed and contributed to church building with the same enthusiasm with which their predecessors in the twenties and thirties did it to church destruction.

Although the Soviet ideology was abolished as a state and generally obligatory one, it left a deep imprint in the minds of many millions of Russians, in culture, in education, in political parties, and so on. It makes itself felt in the need for an ideology that unites the population into a single society and serves its system of power and control, as well as in the need for a single state ideological mechanism. Attempts to satisfy this need can be seen in the search for a "national idea", in the composition of all kinds of doctrines, in policy statements, in the desire to create a "party of power".

Marxism-Leninism is still alive as an ideology communist parties. But it is unlikely to again become such a significant social phenomenon as it was not so long ago. Of course, if some upheavals occur in the world, and humanity finds itself in a state similar to that which took place during the years of the birth and rise of Marxism, then it will be possible to revive Marxism as an ideology of the former scale. But the likelihood of this is negligible. The evolution of mankind has gone in such a direction that it is pointless to count on it. Moreover, from the point of view of the intellectual state, Marxism cannot count on the success in the twenty-first century that it had in the past.

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Grade 11. "General history XX-beginning 21st century"

1	The world at the beginning of the 20th century The formation of an industrial society. Scientific and technological progress in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. The problem of periodization of scientific and technological revolution. Cycles of economic development of Western countries in the late XIX - mid XX centuries. From monopoly capitalism to a mixed economy.	know: Imperialism, colony, metropolis, modernization, industrial society, second industrial revolution, expansion. To reveal the essence of the modernization process, to characterize the manifestations of modernization in various spheres of European society at the beginning of the 20th century; Compare the experience of modernization in Europe and the USA; compile a synchronous table based on the results of the comparison. Classify countries according to the echelons of capitalist development. Identify and justify your position
2	Changes social structure industrial society.
3-4	First World War 1914-1918 The main stages in the development of the system of international relations in the late XIX - mid-XX centuries. World wars in the history of mankind. Socio-psychological, demographic, economic and political causes of the war.	Know/be able to: Define the concepts: territorial division of the world, imperialist war, positional war, pacifism, collective security system, Versailles-Washington system, League of Nations; Arrange the events of the First World War in chronological order. Productive and: Identify the main contradictions between world powers; To identify the causes of armed conflicts at the beginning of the 20th century; Based on the analysis of educational material, identify the causes of the war, outline the course of hostilities, determine the consequences of the First World War. Participate in the development of mini-projects on the topic
5	The crisis of classical ideologies at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. and search for new models community development. Social liberalism, social democracy, Christian democracy. Democratization of social and political life and development of the rule of law. Youth, anti-war, environmental, feminist movements. The problem of political terrorism.	Know/be able to: Outline the essence of socio-political trends: Marxism, revisionism, social democracy. Explain why the theory created by K. Marx became widespread in the 20th century; Distinguish between the concepts: "Marxism as a theory" and "Marxism as an ideology"; Explain the reasons for the revolutionary and reformist options for the formation of nation states.
6	Economic and political development of Western countries 1920-1930s. The evolution of property labor relations and entrepreneurship	Know: definition of concepts: Keynesianism, New Deal politics; a crisis Be able to: state the essence of political concepts: liberalism, social democracy, conservatism. Based on the analysis of documents and additional material, compiling comparison table « Political regimes industrialized countries in the first decades of the 20th century”; Explain the causes of the economic crisis of 1929-1933 and its consequences for Western countries, ways out of the crisis; Reveal the essence of the theory of D. Keynes, express a value judgment about the relevance of this theory for modern Russia
7	The historical nature of totalitarianism and authoritarianism of modern times. Fascism in Italy and Germany. Models of accelerated modernization in the XX century. Marginalization of society in the context of accelerated modernization.	Know/be able to: Define the terms: totalitarianism, fascism. Productive: - explain the reasons for the rise of the fascist movement in Italy and Germany in the 1920s-1930s; Explain the essence of the ideology of fascism; Compare the rise to power of Mussolini and Hitler; Determine how they differ. Explain why the totalitarian ideology has not found distribution in the most developed industrial countries; Conduct a sociological survey on the topic "The spread of fascist ideas in modern world»
8	Political ideology of a totalitarian type. State-legal systems and socio-economic development of society in conditions of totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships.
9	International relationships 1920-1930	Know/be able to: Name the causes of World War II. Productive: To reveal the causes of the Second World War, to determine whether they differed from the causes of the First World War; Characterize the diplomatic steps of the West in response to the aggressive actions of Germany, Japan, Italy, determine why they did not lead to the prevention of war
10-12	World War II 1939-1945 Socio-psychological, demographic, economic and political causes of the war.	Know/be able to: Arrange the events of World War II in chronological order. Characterize the situation on the eve of the war, highlight the goals of the warring parties; Analyze the periodization of the war according to the specified criteria; - characterize the relationship between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the tripartite alliance; Explain different points of view on the contribution of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to the victory over fascism.
13	Public consciousness and spiritual culture in the first half of the XX century. Formation of a non-classical scientific picture of the world . Technocracy and irrationalism in the public consciousness of the 20th century. Worldview foundations of realism and modernism .	Know/be able to: Name the main achievements of world culture in the first half of the 20th century. identify the most important changes in the spiritual life, culture of the countries of the world in the first half of the 20th century; Determine what problems reflected the development of philosophical, social thought. Participate in the development and presentation of the project on the topic
14	International relations in the second half of the 20th century .	Know/be able to: Define the terms "cold War, arms race, militarization Economy; Describe the main events of the "cold Wars" in chronological order Explain the conditions under which Determine the causes of international Crises of the period cold war»; Describe the events of the Cold War
15	Western countries in the second half of the 20th century . Features of modern socio-economic processes in the countries of the West and East. Systemic crisis of industrial society at the turn of the 60-70s. Periodization of NTR.	Know/be able to: Explain the relationship between economic Crises and models of social economic and political development.
16	Democratization of social and political life and development of the rule of law .	Know/be able to: Name new features of the political Development of European and American countries. - characterize the socio-political development of countries; in political development. - express value judgments about the prospects for the development of European and American countries
17	Discussion about the post-industrial stage of social development. Information revolution and the formation of the information society. Property, labor and creativity in the information society.	Know/be able to: Define terms: economic crisis, scientific and technological revolution, "welfare society", information revolution. To identify the causes, essence, consequences of scientific and technological revolution. Describe the main directions of scientific and technological revolution. Explain the features of the process of globalization.
18	Countries of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th century.	Know/be able to: Name the new features of the political and Socio-economic development of countries Eastern Europe in the 40-90s. Characterize the socio-political Development of countries; Identify and analyze new traits in political development. Express value judgments about the prospects for the development of European and American countries
19	Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the second half of the 20th century. "Newly industrialized countries" of Latin America and Southeast Asia: authoritarianism and democracy in political life, economic reforms. National liberation movements and regional features of the modernization process in Asia and Africa.
20-21	Globalization of social development at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Internationalization of the economy and the formation of a single information space . Integration and disintegration processes in the modern world.	Know/be able to: Define the concepts: globalization, global problems of our time. Describe the main problems of our time. Predict solutions global problems
22-23	Features of spiritual life modern society. Changes in the scientific picture of the world . Worldview foundations of postmodernism . The role of the elite and mass culture in the information society. Religion and church in modern public life. ecumenism. Reasons for the resurgence of religious fundamentalism and nationalist extremism in early XXI in.	Know / be able to: define the concepts: ecumenism, religious fundamentalism and nationalist extremism; Determine the relationship and features of the history of Russia and the world; Present the results of the study of historical material in abstracts, abstracts, reviews; Participate in discussions on historical issues, Formulate your own position on the issues under discussion.

Ideology is a system of values, attitudes and ideas that reflect people's attitude to politics, to the existing political system and political order, as well as the goals that politicians and society as a whole should strive for. The author of the term is the 19th-century French philosopher A. Destut de Tracy. So he called the doctrine of ideas that allow you to establish a solid foundation for political life.

Functions of ideology in the state: Orientation: Ideology includes basic ideas about society and the political system, about politics and power, helps a person navigate political life and carry out conscious political actions. Mobilization: Offering society a certain model (idea, program) of a more perfect state (system, regime), ideology thereby mobilizes members of society to bring them to life. Integrative: Ideology seeks to formulate national and nationwide values ​​and goals, offers them to society, uniting people on their basis. Depreciation (mitigating): By explaining and justifying the existing political system and political reality in the eyes of people, ideology thereby helps to relieve social tension and resolve crises when the government does not have material or organizational opportunities to influence society and citizens.

Classical ideologies of the 19th century. Liberalism An ideological and political trend in which the ideas of freedom are in the first place (primarily the freedom of entrepreneurship, the individual, rights and property), human rights and freedoms are protected, and the state intervenes in the economy is prohibited. The right of the oppressed to overthrow tyranny and oppression is postulated. D. Locke; Jean-Jacques Rousseau; D. Diderot

Classical ideologies of the 19th century. Conservatism An ideological and political trend postulating the protection of national and religious traditions, old foundations of life and denying the possibility of revolutionary changes in society F. Chateaubriand; J. de Maistre

Causes of the crisis of classical ideologies of the XIX century. Conservatism Represents the interests of the reactionary strata of society (large landowners, aristocracy, nobility) Liberalism Represents the interests of the capitalist strata of society (bourgeois, capitalists, merchants, etc.) Working classes, proletariat - ?

Ideologies of the 20th century Socialism Social Democracy Neoliberalism A doctrine based on the ideas of social equality and characterized by a negative attitude towards private property A doctrine based on the ideas of social justice and the redistribution of citizens' incomes A doctrine based on the ideas of liberalism of the 19th century. Government intervention in the economy

Ideologies of the 20th century Socialism A doctrine based on the ideas of social equality and characterized by a negative attitude towards private property. Originated in the middle of the 18th century. developed in the 19th century. in Europe as a reaction to the intensification of capitalist exploitation. A. Saint-Simon; C. Fourier; R. Owen; K. Marx; F. Engels

Ideologies of the 20th century Neoliberalism A doctrine based on the ideas of liberalism of the 19th century. State intervention in the economy is introduced. Occurs in the 30s. as a reaction to the global crisis of the first half of the 20th century. J. M. Keynes In Russia in the 1990s E. Gaidar pursued the economic policy of radical neoliberalism, the so-called. "Shock therapy"

Ideologies of the 20th century Social Democracy A doctrine based on the ideas of social justice and the redistribution of citizens' incomes. Recognizing private property in the economy, it attaches great importance to other forms of ownership (nationalized, municipal, cooperative) The principle of "social partnership" and "class cooperation" is proclaimed.

#ideology #crisis #russia #man #society

Annotation. in its classical forms everywhere is in a deep crisis, which has a number of reasons of a philosophical, economic, political nature. They also include the formation of virtual reality that really exists in the form of audiovisual images perceived by the senses. Modern ideology acquires a fragmentary-frame character, which makes external manipulative influence on it more accessible.

The conceptual basis of the modern dominant is libertarianism- a kind of "gluing" the ideas of legal universalism and market fundamentalism. The idea of ​​statehood carries many significant value connotations for Russian national identity, an important condition for the formation of national identity. It seems quite obvious that ideology in its classical forms is everywhere in a deep crisis, which has its own flavor in different parts of the world. In general, this crisis, in our opinion, is generated by a number of reasons.

Back in the 19th century, shortly after Destuth de Tracy introduced the concept of ideology into scientific circulation, the classics of Marxism, strange as it may seem now, attributed it to perverted, false forms of consciousness, believing that, in contrast to it, their theory is indeed strictly scientific. In the 50-60s. among technocrats, managers and other sincerely convinced, as well as other stakeholders the concept of de-ideologization, which still influences the minds of not only the inhabitants, has become widespread. In accordance with the positivist ideals of accurate, verifiable and instrumental knowledge, it was opposed to ideological restrictive attitudes and their corresponding mental programs of behavior, which, in particular, prevented the establishment of the principles of unlimited and serene consumption.

The weakening of the role of classical forms was facilitated by the split and crisis of its theoretical base - modern philosophy, the reduction of its influence on the conceptual and logical principles of formation. Claiming to be the leading modern trend, the philosophy of postmodernism - attractive in its own way - denies philosophical consistency, the very possibility of reliability, objectivity, such concepts as "fairness" or "rightness" and recognizes the relativity of any values ​​and the predominance of "non-rigorous thinking". Thus, postmodernism contributes to this weakening. At the same time, prominent representatives of postmodernism (J. Baudrillard, J. Deleuze and others) rightly draw attention to such an important phenomenon of our time as virtual reality. It is parallel to true reality, but unlike the latter, it is rather arbitrarily artificially formed and exists in reality in the form of audiovisual images perceived by the senses. Thus, it becomes possible to construct in the communication-information space many different worlds (to some extent real-virtual). This is the most important objective reason for the crisis of classical ideologies and their fragmentation. This effect is enhanced by changes in the perception of this "information", its visualization and clip character. (Some representatives of the mass media believe that if a fragment from the film is more than one minute in the thematic program, then the viewer will die of boredom). Thus, ideology becomes less and less conscious part of the worldview and more and more acquires a fragmentary-frame character, which makes external manipulative influence on it more accessible.

But this, nevertheless, does not cancel the orienting, programming and mobilizing role. For modern Russia, which experienced deep socio-economic upheavals at the end of the ΧΧ and the beginning of the ΧXΙ century, the problems of ideological certainty acquire special significance, actualized by the ideological split of the Russian elites, as well as by the dramatic Ukrainian geopolitical crisis and the acute ideological and informational confrontation that accompanies it. In this confrontation, the Western media demonstrate absolutely incredible, with the actual respect for freedom of speech, unanimity, solidarity and excellent orchestration. Suffice it to recall how, despite official statements and Russian media reports, Western news agencies in August 2008, for several days in a row, showing footage of the shelling of Tskhinval, they unanimously claimed that Russian artillery systems were firing.

From the point of view of the thoroughness of consideration, the problem of the ideological certainty of the development paths of modern Russia, in our opinion, should be addressed to the results of the period of reckless reform Russian society which turned out to be more than disappointing. Judgments about the reasons for such outcomes range from the opinion that their roots lie in the accumulation of long-standing problems of the Soviet era, which only appeared in full force in the process of liberalization, and, what could be worse, to Manichaean assumptions about selfish or (and) malicious intent of some internal or external forces. Any of these points of view contains, according to a preliminary assessment, in different proportions, of course, an object that deserves analytical consideration. But such a work is beyond the capacity of one author in full, especially since the subject itself has not yet emotionally cooled down for the most part and requires historical time for its maturation, although such work in various areas is already being actively carried out. However, regardless of the interweaving of the features of individual assessments of events that took place in Russia, the former republics of the USSR, and in other regions of the world, their conceptual basis is quite obvious.

This is libertarianism, a kind of “gluing together” of the ideas of legal universalism and market fundamentalism. Although they have different historical roots and a mismatched conceptual base, they completely complement each other and form a dual ideological structure. In the post-Soviet space, the ideas of market fundamentalism in their entirety at the state level were not officially proclaimed, but were implemented in their most radical form. Excluding a short post-default period, in power, despite the election results in State Duma, invariably there are adherents of these ideas. Market fundamentalism (Washington Consensus) is conceptually based on the postulate of an all-encompassing rational perfection of market mechanisms of regulation and management. The natural component of this is assumptions in the spirit of Laplacian determinism, which assume the existence of perfect information, an economic agent (some abstract autonomous person) in the form of a “perfect calculator”, etc., and the hypothesis that these assumptions approximate with negligibly small deviations from reality.

The essence of this is expressed briefly by Ludwig von Mises:“The power over the means of production, which belongs to the entrepreneurs and capitalists, can only be obtained with the help of the votes of the consumers, collected daily in the markets. … The wealth of successful businessmen is always the result of a plebiscite of consumers, and once deserved, this wealth can only be preserved if it is used in accordance with the requirements of consumers.” However, at the same time, he admits that the logic of the development of a market economy creates conditions for the constant concentration and centralization of capital and production, in which the strongest win, using their resources to add new plots and new resources to their living space. The regulatory role of consumers in a market economy is obvious, so this statement has a reason, which, however, like any general position, acquires concrete forms and real meaning only in a certain context: in a certain socio-psychological atmosphere and the institutional environment corresponding to it.

The immediate consequence of the stated theses is the conclusion: social institutions and their evolution are nothing more than a response to the demands of the universal market. From it, as is known, the consequences inevitably follow about the "excessive functions of the state", as well as other cultural phenomena that are superfluous on the field. market relations or even preventing the free play of rational (by definition) market forces. In countries with well-established developed market systems and social institutions, these rather strong idealizations can be accepted (with very significant reservations), bearing in mind that many traditional mechanisms social and, in particular, community, regional and state economic regulation are deeply rooted in the mass consciousness and are often no longer perceived as such. But still, it must be borne in mind that it has long been known in natural sciences the rule that natural interconnections of phenomena are possible only under certain conditions that determine the type of their implementation. These simple facts are often neglected when considering social processes. In Russia, the implementation of these theoretical schemes already at the first steps gave rise to a strange, but at the same time remarkable, conceptual opposition: freedom as opposed to justice. The content of these concepts is not in strict logical dependence.

However, it is clear that even formally understood lack of freedom, i.e. infringement of human rights is generally understood as injustice. In Russia, however, the opposition between freedom and justice has acquired real meaning. First, as a growing, in accordance with the principles of market fundamentalism, removal of the state from solving socio-economic problems, from caring for the bulk of its citizens, who, regardless of their previous merits, talents and inclinations, were left to their own devices. Secondly, this opposition was expressed in more broad sense: in the general disregard for the norms of law (extremely chaotic during the Yeltsin presidency) and morality, including the morality of business conduct.

The collapse of ideological bonds, large-scale migration movements in the post-Soviet space, the third emigration (this time mainly of skilled and highly skilled labor) from Russia. The stoppage and closure of many enterprises and the mass change of professions stimulated the processes of marginalization of significant segments of the population. “ Work ethic, - as O.N. Yanitsky, is lost in the mass of the population: well-being is brought by connections, acquaintances, luck, and finally, coercion and violence, but not everyday hard work. Creation as a fundamental form of social action and. consequently, as a sociological category, it loses its meaning.

In the conditions of the transitional period, the state, as a permanent actor in economic life, having the legitimate full powers of the predominant owner and basic powers of authority, becomes in it, regardless of abstractions, any theory, the main actor, which is clearly manifested in the course of adjustments " regulator” of market externalities and market failures. This role of the state was fully demonstrated with more or less success by most states when overcoming (for how long?) the financial crisis that began in 2009. The role of the state in the implementation, organization and support of infrastructure projects and innovation processes is also generally recognized. So, in particular, Eric Reinert notes that the Malthusian trap (decreasing returns) is overcome by moving to new industries with increasing returns, that is, to an innovative industry and an increasingly complex division of labor. At the same time, the state does not just cooperate with business, but takes on the role of “commanding heights” and deliberately makes innovation profitable. “The launch phase of new sectors requires massiveness, strenuous effort and a violation of the normal laws of the market. But this, he emphasizes, rules out the Washington Consensus.”

In this regard, one way or another, among others, the question arises of comparative characteristics different types property and, in the end, of course, about its nature. The ambiguity of the status of state (public) property in Soviet era, allowing specific individuals the disposal and use of property (without the right to own), occasion, gave rise to a moral and psychological justification for petty encroachments on it. It seems that this attitude to property has left an important imprint on the nature of Russian transformations. The problem of recognizing property rights (especially large private property) is one of the key problems in modern Russia. And although this problem is politically correct hushed up, its unresolved has an extremely negative impact on all major spheres of life in Russian society. As the first and second mayors of Moscow testify: “During Gaidar's forcible introduction of the market, a layer of owners arose, formed without a struggle in market competition, without public control. These entrepreneurs were alien to the main thing - entrepreneurial skills in production. But they were sophisticated in regard to bribing all participants in the division of state property: administrators, directors, policemen, prosecutors, judges, journalists, and so on. These entrepreneurs were alien to the very idea of ​​social responsibility to the state, society and citizens. They could not take on the burden of the revival of Russia. Without public recognition and internal conviction of the owners themselves that this property belongs to them, its legal status, based on the abstract principles of right-wing universalism, remains unsteady. The object field of property rights also needs this recognition: whether water, the banks of water bodies, fish in the ocean, a historical monument, etc. are objects of property. In general, without going into details and without generally denying its instrumental usefulness, it should be noted that among the main weaknesses of legal universalism is the ambiguity of the origin and sources of fundamental human rights.

The legal and, to an even greater extent, the moral and psychological uncertainty of its status provokes the “stripping of assets”, i.e. stealing from oneself, and is one of the reasons for its permanent redistribution. The development of a stable social structure in modern Russia requires the solution of a two-pronged task: the formation, firstly, of an effective, and secondly, a recognized owner. This task is among, I think, the most painful, delicate and overripe tasks of the state, designed to bring this process out of the “undercover” and criminal spheres into the public law field. The civilized form of solving this and other difficult tasks implies a dialogue between the authorities and society. In practice, however, as Mikhail Khodorkovsky writes in his first article in the newspaper Vedomosti, “a liberal environment is not at all necessary for money… Civil society more often hinders business than helps. For an entrepreneur ... it is much easier to negotiate with a handful of moderately greedy officials than to coordinate their actions with an extensive and capable network of public institutions. and, we add, with responsible domestic structures political power. Inevitably limiting the profits of individual corporations and entrepreneurs, these networks and structures, which historically and logically have as their mission not only economic tasks, but also the tasks of preventing social, environmental, moral, physical, etc. degradation.

The mission as a historical goal should be filled with ideological content, in contrast to the market - a technical mechanism that cannot be a goal in itself. Therefore, the solution of the tasks set by the missions, contrary to the principles of market fundamentalism, should not be aimed at making profit (the missions of different public institutions can and should differ, united by national meanings). Their solution rather requires the allocation of appropriate financial resources but at the same time they contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to economic and social progress in general. The effectiveness of the dialogue between the authorities and society in Russia, one of the main goals of which is to develop a consensus on national goals and acceptable means of achieving their ideological identity, is hindered by obvious circumstances. After the events of October 1993, the imbalance of the branches of power increased: the prevalence of closed structures of the executive bodies of state power (the presidential administration and the government) and the reduced position of representative authorities. The composition and policy of the government depend very little on the results of the elections. Non-public concentration of influential media in the hands of an extremely narrow group of people close to the highest officials country or to foreign patrons, makes it difficult information exchange authorities and society. Thus, the vast majority of the informative and meaningful signals of the Russian scientific community are simply ignored by them. So far, the media have only formally implemented the “feedback mechanism”. Although, in fairness, it should be noted that in recent years there has been noticeable, but clearly insufficient progress in this area. In Russia, the impact of the bulk of the population on power structures remains extremely insignificant and, to a very large, if not predominant, degree virtual. Surprisingly, but not by accident, due to different kind reasons not yet fully clarified, the process of the repeatedly proclaimed Russian modernization still reveals clear signs of the feudalization of economic life and social ties in general. So, in the economy, the dominant position is occupied by sectors that receive income of the rental type.

The unproductive, rental type of income prevails not only in the extractive industries, but also among a significant part of the modern directorate, which prefers the leasing of privatized areas and production capacities to the establishment of production. The struggle for the possession of natural resources, unique objects (for example, oil pipelines), for access to budget financial flows does not contribute to the corporate cohesion of representatives of large and part of the medium Russian business. This struggle rather encourages them to seek either the patronage of state power or, more effectively, direct complicity in it. The not-unsuccessful desire for symbiosis with the authorities, both at the federal level and even more frankly in the regions, makes it possible to implement one of the most important principles Russian economy: "privatization of profits and nationalization of losses". In the complex "power - business - the rest", primarily between its two first elements, a system of relations of personal dependence, obligations and patronage has developed (which existed in embryonic form even in the Soviet period), in many ways reminiscent of the vassal form of organization medieval society. With the existing suppression of the competitive environment within the country, such a system of social ties is relevant to the conditions and types of management of the leading economic complexes. From the external, behavioral side, for persons included in this system, a sign of belonging to it is high level non-productive spending, the exchange of expensive gifts, conspicuous consumption (mandatory, by the way, for the elite feudal society), which serves as fertile ground for jokes about the "new Russians".

A modern indicator of power (suzerainty) - along, of course, with traditional attributes such as armed escort and retinue - of a Russian businessman is the possession or control over one or another federal, and in the province over regional, mass media (media), which, as it were, take on themselves, in general, the functions of the “party of interests” that are not characteristic of them and their ideological justification and support and a means of combating competitors. Fundamental changes in the type of information and communication interactions between people entail, as many have noted, significant changes in the organization. social life. Even where there are well-established structures of civil society, there is a formation, in the words of Guy Debord, of a “society of the spectacle”. Especially in Russia, where the sum of the turmoil of hasty administrative-political and economic reforms, "devastation in the minds" and the revolution in the methods of communication, gives a cumulative effect.

Due to their properties, electronic media using complex audiovisual images are capable of creating a "hyperreality" that surpasses continual reality in its sensually perceived characteristics, and have a suggestive effect on the psyche of people. Thanks to this, as well as the speed of presentation and change of images, approaching the speed of their psychophysiological identification and memorization, the mass media overcome the barrier of consciously critical perception of the information provided. These properties make the media, which so far surpass social networks in terms of influence and set the agenda for them, the most effective tool for destroying or, conversely, shaping the country's ideological identity. Necessary condition the formation of this identity is a critical rethinking of libertarian ideas. At the same time, taking into account the fact that the idea of ​​statehood carries many significant value connotations for the Russian national identity, an important condition for the formation of national identity is the definite position of the leadership of the country, the country, taking into account national historical values ​​and modern interests of the main national and social groups population of Russia.

Bibliography

Mises L. background. Socialism. Economic and sociological analysis. M.: Sayatsakhu, 1994.

Yanitsky O.N. Sociology of risk. - M.: From LVS. 2003.

The crisis of communist ideology Differentiation of social and political thought.

It is an indisputable fact that, naturally, Gorbachev's perestroika contributed to the collapse of the communist ideology in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Socialism, as a kind of creature deprived of its habitual habitat, could not stand a breath of "alien" air - the introduction of even individual elements democracy. However, it must be taken into account that the course towards perestroika was announced in 1985 by the Soviet leadership “not from a good life” and, of course, not for the sake of the subsequent establishment of capitalism.

A quarter of a century earlier, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it seemed that the communist idea, seriously discredited by Stalinism, had gained a second wind thanks to the Khrushchev “thaw”. And the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the development of virgin lands, and the first space flights, and the “national liberation struggle” (with generous Soviet assistance) in the third world countries - all this was skillfully used by Soviet propaganda. The low standard of living was taken for granted by most of the population, barely recovered from the hardships of the war and post-war period and brought up in the spirit of “proletarian” asceticism. Local manifestations of public discontent, for example, in Novocherkassk (1962), not to mention the Hungarian (1956) and Czechoslovak (1968) events, were suppressed quite in a Stalinist way - cruelly and bloody - and information about them turned out to be the most strictly classified.

The "Iron Curtain" (an ideological barrier plus the "physical" closeness of borders) cut off the "countries of the socialist community" from the varied experience of the advanced Western states. Accordingly, the "camp of peace and socialism" lagged behind them in many parameters, primarily those that directly determine the standard of living. On the other hand, the development of communication technologies, the gradual increase in the number of all kinds of business and personal contacts with representatives of the capitalist countries contributed to the fact that the commodity-information flow from the outside corroded the notorious “curtain” more and more, disavowing the dogmas of Soviet propaganda about the “decaying West” and “undeniable advantages socialism." In the mass consciousness of citizens of the USSR and its satellites, especially among the youth, a secret cult is established, the idealization and fetishization of everything related to the West and the USA, whether it be literature, goods or political ideas. The ban on free access to information from developed capitalist countries (“jamming” of radio broadcasts, control over the import of printed publications, audio and video products, etc.) rather stimulated this process, according to the “forbidden fruit effect”, rather than hindered it.

The main "gravedigger" of the communist idea was the same social stratum that at one time played the main role in its approval - the intelligentsia.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the desire for rapid socio-political change led the most radical part of it to the idea that in order to build a kind of just society, violence is possible and even necessary. He who sows the wind will reap the storm: the most organized part of the radical intelligentsia - the Bolshevik elite - having come to power, will start beating all dissident brothers in the “stratum”. Things will come to the now well-known expression of Lenin: "The intelligentsia is not the brain of the nation, but shit." As a result, thousands of educated Russian people, even those who had previously sympathized with Bolshevism, began to spiritually and physically oppose it, and those of them who survived and ended up in exile founded anti-Soviet organizations and the corresponding press. An era has begun, according to Soviet terminology, of “renegades” who explain the truth about the Moscow regime to “naive” Western democracies and work to the best of their ability to corrupt it from the outside.

The exposure, albeit half-hearted, under the flag of “restoring socialist legality”, the cult of personality, undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev, somewhat improved the situation and even led to the formation of a galaxy of so-called. the sixties - intellectuals who believe in the "revival of Leninism", by which they understood a certain bright ideal, desecrated during the time of Stalin. However, the tragicomic attitude of the new leader of the USSR towards the intelligentsia and frank miscalculations in the economy and foreign policy (which are worth at least the “corn epic” and the sound of the notorious boot at a UN meeting) did not recruit the authorities of educated supporters.

Thus, the intelligentsia gradually became disillusioned with the Soviet regime: from the generation of the “sixties”, brought up by the Khrushchev “thaw”, which saw an alternative to Stalinism in some kind of “genuine Leninism”, to the radical intellectuals of the seventies and eighties with their “kitchen” free-thinking. so-called. dissidents were already openly anti-Soviet activities. Samizdat appeared, reflecting this latent, shadowy spiritual life, the work of thought independent of the official ideology. The concept of “intelligent person” included opposition to state power as an integral part.

So, in the socialist countries, a situation has developed when Marxism-Leninism has almost completely lost its influence on the masses, and the vast majority of the intellectual and political elite either were in secret opposition to it, or, in any case, did not think in strict accordance with the communist doctrine and did not ready to defend her. This meant a deep crisis of the communist idea. All its signs were already evident by the beginning of the 70s. The events that took place after 1985 can be considered its natural resolution.