During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. Operation received code name"Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd SS Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with armored reserves Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th tank army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, the forces of the two fronts carried out counter-barrage preparation with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle from the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical mistakes of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers on July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles on July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 143,950 people on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they considered the losses of their front at 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

- For the period from July 5 to 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th armies of the enemy in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops on August 11 cut railway Kharkov-Poltava, August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.

- On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945) were also not successful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:

- It was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the East. With her failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - S. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Differences in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500,000 killed, wounded and captured, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht for July-August 1943 throughout Eastern Front lost 537,533 men. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500,000 look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war years did not consider the Soviet military reports about German losses to be true. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to the lower headquarters: “Looking through the daily results of the day on the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly overestimated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) has been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center, to crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense, and then go on the counteroffensive. Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis organized the mass production of new medium and heavy tanks, increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to the total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses incurred in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to carry out a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the Orel and Belgorod regions to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass. For the implementation of the operation near Kursk, called "Citadel", the enemy concentrated huge forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, including. 16 tank, Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group "South" (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft were part of the enemy strike groups. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - the Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The offensive of the German fascist troops against the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, was countered by the Soviet command with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops for 10-12 km. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, the Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day in the area railway station Prokhorovka was the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to wear out and bleed the enemy strike groups with a deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was assigned to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's offensive from the side of Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, the task was to repel the enemy’s offensive from Belgorod. The Steppe Military District was deployed in the rear of the Kursk ledge (since July 9 - the Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of the Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Operational Group "Kempf" of the Army Group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most probable direction of action for the main enemy forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary ones. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the expected enemy strike made it possible to create high densities in the zone of the 13th Army (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of the front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy offensive could be in the directions of Belgorod, Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. In contrast to the Central Front, the armies of the first echelon received wide lines of defense. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of the front, and taking into account the means located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of the front.

On the basis of our reconnaissance data and the testimonies of the prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of that day on the Voronezh and central fronts, artillery counter-preparation planned in the fronts and armies was carried out. As a result, she managed to delay the enemy's offensive for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol grouping of the enemy, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow on Olkhovatka, and auxiliary ones on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional stamina. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, advanced several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrier detachments to the main strip, and the front commander - howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive tank counterattacks, in cooperation with rifle units and artillery, halted the enemy's advance. On this day, fierce battles unfolded in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting operations of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions, his attacks were not successful.

Having determined the direction of the main efforts of the enemy, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A. G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Army and the 19th Panzer Corps went over to the defensive behind the second lane, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; the main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th guards, the 69th army and the 1st tank army.

Having not achieved success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy on the morning of July 7 launched an attack on Ponyri, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day, she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then, with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade, launched a counterattack and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10 against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted its reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of the Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

Against the troops of the Voronezh Front, the enemy launched a general offensive also on the morning of July 5, inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army on Oboyan, and the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting took on a particularly fierce character in the Oboyan direction. The commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I. M. Chistyakov, in the first half of the day put forward part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade to the front line of defense. By the end of the day, the troops of this army had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main strip of our defense was broken through only in separate sections. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to force the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and capture a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he advanced to the second line of defense the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army. In addition, the army was reinforced by front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. On the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met with powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only by the end of the day did he manage to wedge into the second lane of our defense.

In the Korochan direction that day, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main line of defense, but his further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the line of attack, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, by bringing fresh reserves into battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks rushed to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd tank corps, advanced from the reserves of the Stavka to the Prokhorovka area, as well as the active actions of the 2nd and 17th air armies. On the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack inflicted on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy's 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, greatly facilitated the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. To help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, the front command promptly put forward part of its artillery. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were aimed, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. By the joint efforts of the ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Dead Head" (Totenkopf), Kursk, 1943.

In the offensive of the enemy, a crisis was clearly ripe. Therefore, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, chairman of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and General N. F. Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army, General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the aim of finally defeating the enemy grouping that had penetrated. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events unfolded in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod-Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, task force "Kempf ") and counterattacking Soviet troops (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Aviation support of the enemy's strike force was carried out by the aviation of the "South" army group. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were made). During the day of the battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having not reached the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (moved up to a maximum of 35 km on the southern face of the Kursk salient) went on the defensive.

July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The Hitlerite command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe Fronts, proceeded to pursue the enemy, and by the end of July 23, they had mainly reached the line, which they occupied by the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989

The Orlovsky ledge was defended by the troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They numbered 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two lanes with a total depth of 12-15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communications and a large number of armored firing points. In the operational depth, a number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol grouping of the enemy was instructed by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy grouping into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Orel.

The Western Front (commanded by General V. D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow by the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroy them; part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, to surround and destroy the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy; deliver an auxiliary strike with the troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow by the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil region to Orel, and the auxiliary one - by the forces of the 61st army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the enemy grouping that had penetrated north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing a strike on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, to complete the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol ledge.

The preparation of the operation in the fronts was carried out taking into account the fact that for the first time they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses and develop tactical success at a high pace. To do this, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the battle formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies as part of one or two tank corps, the offensive was planned to be carried out day and night.

For example, with a total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone of 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and means was achieved on a 14-kilometer breakthrough sector, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average density of artillery in the area of ​​the army breakthrough reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. Whereas the offensive lines of divisions in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. New in comparison with the counter-offensive at Stalingrad was the fact that the battle order of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was built, as a rule, in two, and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the strength of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic in the use of artillery was the creation in the armies of artillery groups of destruction and long-range action, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The schedule of artillery preparation in some armies began to provide for a period of sighting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, regiments of self-propelled artillery were included in the tank groups of direct infantry support (NPP), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. At the same time, in some armies, NPP tanks were attached not only to rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps formed mobile army groups, and tank armies were to be used for the first time as mobile front groups.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th air armies (commanded by Generals M. M. Gromov, N. F. Naumenko, S. I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and as well as long-range aviation.

The following tasks were assigned to aviation: to cover the troops of the shock groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; to suppress the centers of resistance at the forefront and in the nearest depth and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; with the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; to ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in the operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counteroffensive was preceded by a large preparatory work. In all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large stocks of material and technical equipment were created. A day before the offensive in the fronts, reconnaissance in combat was carried out by advanced battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after a powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By the middle of the day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments, separate tank brigades, broke through the enemy’s main line of defense and crossed the Fomin River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical zone, in the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Panzer Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing the strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, by the middle of July 13, they completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense.

After the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the forward detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and advanced here the 25th Tank Corps transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled the enemy's counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command reinforced the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army on the move was brought into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to finally defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Stavka reserve (commander General V. M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Panzer Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days, she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through the intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. By its actions, the 4th Panzer Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of the city of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps), in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation, were transferred to the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st guards tank corps brought into battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, by the end of July 13, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they met fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to accelerate the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commander General P.S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th air armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the line of Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo and, repelling strong enemy counterattacks, broke through his defenses on the Oleshnya River by the end of the day. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the enemy's Mtsensk grouping. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army struck at the Stanovoi Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day, she was handed over to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts forced the enemy to withdraw part of the forces of the Oryol grouping from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the counteroffensive of the troops of the right wing of the Central Front. By July 18, they restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, the troops of three fronts engulfed the enemy's Oryol grouping from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, in an effort to avert the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. The Soviet troops began to pursue. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and liberated it by the morning of August 5. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having mastered Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18, they reached the line Zhizdra, Litizh. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 bypass around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​​​the headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to cut the opposing enemy grouping into two parts with powerful blows from the troops of the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts, subsequently deeply cover it in the Kharkov region and destroy it in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, auxiliary, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow by the troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th army from the area northwest of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, the auxiliary - by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area southeast of Belgorod to western direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was provided, respectively, by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S. A. Krasovsky and S. K. Goryunov. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

The command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, in order to achieve success in breaking through the enemy's defenses, resolutely massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. So, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in the armies, but also in the corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were supposed to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in military art.

Tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to act in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodulov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev, and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation, go to the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support for the introduction of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support of each tank army, one assault and one fighter aviation division was allocated.

In preparing the operation, it was instructive to misinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false concentration of troops, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

The peculiarity was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind the wrecked enemy tanks, the fighters are moving forward, the Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the troops of the fronts, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first position of the enemy. With the introduction of the second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To build up the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12-26 km deep, thereby separating the enemy's Tomarovsk and Belgorod centers of resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy's resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and defeated the nearest operational reserves, the main strike force of the Voronezh Front, on the morning of the second day of the operation, proceeded to pursue the enemy.

On August 4, the troops of the 1st Panzer Army from the Tomarovka region began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th tank and 3rd mechanized corps, having reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by the middle of the day on August 6. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Panzer Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing enemy resistance centers from the west, attacked Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy's strong defense center Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov grouping. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing the offensive in a southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift blow on the move, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy's escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary grouping of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy on August 4, by the end of the next day took Belgorod by storm, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the front of the breakthrough of our troops reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of up to 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the line of Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I. A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tankers, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repulsing the fierce attacks of the Nazis, who were trying to capture them alive. In two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army had reached the line of the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began to regroup in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front by this time approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov grouping, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Dead Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Panzer Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. A tank battle ensued. In the course of it, the enemy pressed the formations of the 1st Panzer Army by 3-4 km, but could not break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards Armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. She conducted reconnaissance and conducted operations to disrupt railway and road transport the Nazis, assisted the combined arms and tank armies in repelling the counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy's counterattack from the south to Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka region with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this grouping of the enemy, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st tank army from the Bogodukhov region, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. By the end of August 19, these forces, by strikes on the enemy's flanks, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrskaya group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched an assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect the German heavy tank "Panther" knocked out on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km to the south and south-west, came close to the enemy's Donbass grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed in the city and region (according to incomplete data) about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war, about 160 thousand people were deported to Germany, destroyed 1600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, the Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and took an advantageous position to go on a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended for us with an outstanding victory. Irreparable losses were inflicted on the enemy, all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov regions were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment for our troops to go over to the offensive. It began in conditions when the main strike groups of the Germans suffered huge losses and in their offensive a crisis was determined. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts advancing in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This made it impossible for the fascist German command to carry out regroupings of troops in areas dangerous to it.

The success of the counter-offensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which had previously been created in the Kursk direction and were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through a well-prepared, in-depth enemy defense and the subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by forward battalions.

In the course of the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repulsing counterattacks by large enemy tank groupings. It was carried out with the close cooperation of all branches of the armed forces and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and crush his advancing troops, the fronts and armies part of the forces went over to a tough defense while delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy counterattack grouping. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and means of reinforcement, the tactical density of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2-3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from one-echelon to deep-echelon battle formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counter-offensive near Kursk, methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks increased compared to the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front. However, when breaking through a strong defense in depth of the enemy, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps have become the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of uniform composition have become the echelon of developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a pre-prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant losses of tanks, to the weakening of tank formations and formations, but in the specific conditions of the situation it justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they are effective tool support for the advance of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars increased significantly in the direction of the main attack; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of attack support was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge ledge was formed on the line of the Soviet-German front between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was informally called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc, the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups "Center" and "South" were located.

Individual representatives of the highest German command circles suggested that the Wehrmacht go on the defensive, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring their own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk salient for striking. According to the plan, the German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

Unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht will advance in summer period 1943 was no big deal. The Kursk salient, extending for many kilometers into the depths of the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to switch to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The troops of the Red Army were supposed to hold back the onslaught of the Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then go on the counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After that, it was supposed to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In the event that the Germans decided not to advance in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, a plan was also created for offensive operations by forces concentrated on this sector of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and the Red Army began its implementation in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built solid. In total, 8 defensive lines were created with a total depth of about 300 kilometers. Great attention was paid to the mining of approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. Anti-tank artillery was not evenly distributed along the front, but gathered in the so-called "anti-tank areas" - localized accumulations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other's sectors of fire. Thus, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once was achieved.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, and 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

From the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, one should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and, consequently, the German command was able to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the desired concentration of troops in the breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943 the German army received enough in large numbers new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the troops (out of 90 built) and which, however, in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were competently used in right place.

At that time, new combat aircraft entered service with the German Air Force: Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use of the La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters by the Soviet Air Force took place.

On May 6-8, Soviet aviation, with the forces of six air armies, struck on a 1,200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov. The target for this strike was the airfields of the German Air Force. On the one hand, this really made it possible to cause some damage to both vehicles and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aviation suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.

In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railway lines, bridges, places of concentration of Soviet forces. It is worth noting that German aviation often acted more successfully. Claims in this regard were expressed by parts of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops failed to achieve serious damage and disruption of the communication routes of the Red Army.

Both commands - the Voronezh and Central Fronts - predicted the date of the transition of the German troops to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attacks were to be expected in the period from 3 to 6 July. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture the "tongue", which reported that on July 5 the Germans would launch an assault.

The northern face of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the beginning of the German offensive, at 2:30 in the morning the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 04:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to the reports of Soviet artillerymen, significant damage was inflicted on the German troops. However, it doesn't appear to have done much damage. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of the enemy's wire communication lines. In addition, now the Germans knew for sure that a sudden offensive would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

Aviation was supposed to support the Soviet troops in the process of countering an artillery raid, but due to the dark time of the day, all sorties were canceled. At 02:30 on July 5, the aviation units received a readiness directive from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, the fighter units had to be ready at dawn to repel possible Luftwaffe raids, and attack aircraft and bombers were ordered to be on alert by 6:00 in the morning.

Early morning Soviet fighters began to fight German bombers and attack aircraft. In the Maloarkhangelsk area, German Ju-88s, operating under the cover of Focke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. Pilots of the 157th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost the unit commander Hermann Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.

Until half past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front sector, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel the attacks of the Luftwaffe. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to take off in groups of 6-8 fighters: an organizational mistake made by the aviation command affected. This led to serious difficulties for the Red Army Air Force fighters. In general, on the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the mistakes mentioned above, the low experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.

On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps near Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st bomber division made sorties until the second half of the day, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan and other settlements. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed the positions of the Soviet troops. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by ground forces.

Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also in parallel to try to change the tactics of using aviation. Before the bombers, they tried to send large groups of fighters to "clear" the airspace. The commanders of air divisions and regiments began to receive more initiative in planning operations. But during operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with the set goals, without being distracted from the plan.

In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army made about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy casualties but did its best to provide adequate support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of the fighting, the army command changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive strikes against accumulations of enemy equipment and manpower. These blows have positive influence on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.

In the zone of operations of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), hostilities began on the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the outposts of the front and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern face of the Kursk salient, the fighting was much more intense and was accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 am on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the strike towards the settlement of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassky, the enemy practically managed to make a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, the Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the personnel of the units.

Air support for units of the Red Army on the southern face of the Kursk salient was carried out by the 2nd and 17th air armies. In the early morning of July 5, German aviation began bombing the combat formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. Departures of fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite significant damage on the enemy, but the losses of the Soviet troops were also high.

On July 6, German tanks stormed the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among other Soviet units, it should be noted the 291st assault and 2nd guards assault air divisions of the 16th air army, which for the first time used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy vehicles was described as "excellent".

The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of the Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th air armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th army. However, here, too, the command tried to adjust the tactics of using aircraft, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible, and strive with all its might to increase the effectiveness of the air forces. Apparently, these measures have achieved their goal. Increasingly, in the reports of the commanders of ground units, words began to appear that Soviet attack aircraft greatly facilitated the repulsion of German tank and infantry attacks. Fighters also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Thus, it was noted that only the 5th Fighter Air Corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 downed enemy aircraft.

On July 10, on the Kursk Bulge, bad weather. This drastically reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5s from the 193rd Fighter Regiment, who managed to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with cover from six Bf.109s. Enemy aircraft randomly dropped bombs and began to retreat to their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. A heroic feat in this battle was performed by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went to the oncoming ram of the Messerschmitt and died.

On July 12, at the height of the Battle of Prokhorov, the aircraft of both sides could only provide very limited support to ground units: the weather conditions continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties that day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. At the same time, there is no mention of destroyed Soviet tanks in the reports of German pilots. Subsequently, the air superiority on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the German 8th Air Corps had fallen to almost zero.

Start combat way Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

The defeat of the fascist German army near Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 shook the fascist bloc to its foundations. For the first time since the beginning of the Second World War, Nazi Germany, in all its inevitability, faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and the prestige in the eyes of the allies was seriously shaken. In order to improve Germany's internal political situation and prevent the disintegration of the fascist coalition, the Nazi command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive, it hoped to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops located on the Kursk salient, seize the strategic initiative again and turn the course of the war in its favor. By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in forces and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people by 1.1 times, in artillery - by 1.7, in tanks - by 1.4 and in combat aircraft - by 2 times.

The Battle of Kursk occupies the Great Patriotic War special place. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its bitterness and stubbornness of the struggle.

The goal of the Wehrmacht: the general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region. If successful, it was supposed to expand the front of the offensive and return the strategic initiative. To implement his plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike groups, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. Great hopes were placed on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter aircraft and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.

The purpose of the Red Army: the Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy strike groups in defensive battles, and then go on the counteroffensive.

The battle that began immediately took on a grandiose scope and was of an extremely tense character. Our troops did not flinch. They met the avalanche of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented stamina and courage. The offensive of the enemy strike groups was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to penetrate our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - 10-12 kilometers, on the Voronezh - up to 35 kilometers. Hitler's operation "Citadel" was finally buried by the largest oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka in the entire Second World War. It happened on July 12th. 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it from both sides. This battle was won by the Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks during the day of the battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.

On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of the war. Since that time, artillery salutes have constantly announced the glorious victories of Soviet weapons. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated.

Thus ended the Battle of the Kursk Fiery Bulge. During it, 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. The Nazi troops lost about 500,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 3,700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers, participants in the Battle of the Fiery Arc, were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended with a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Red Army.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk.

Type of losses	Red Army	Wehrmacht	Ratio
Personnel
Guns and mortars
Tanks and self-propelled guns
Aircraft

UDTK on the Kursk Bulge. Oryol offensive operation

Baptism of fire in the Battle of Kursk was received by the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, which is part of the 4th Tank Army.

T-34 tanks - 202 units, T-70 - 7, BA-64 armored vehicles - 68,

self-propelled 122-mm guns - 16, 85-mm guns - 12,

installations M-13 - 8, 76-mm guns - 24, 45-mm guns - 32,

37 mm guns - 16, 120 mm mortars - 42, 82 mm mortars - 52.

The army, commanded by Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, arrived at the Bryansk Front on the eve of the battles that began on July 5, 1943, and during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops was brought into battle in the Oryol direction. The Ural Volunteer Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Semenovich Rodin had the task of advancing from the Seredichi region to the south, cutting off the enemy’s communications on the Bolkhov-Khotynets line, reaching the area of ​​the village of Zlyn, and then saddling the Orel-Bryansk railway and highway and cutting off the escape route of the Oryol grouping of the Nazis to the west. And the Urals fulfilled the order.

On July 29, Lieutenant General Rodin set the task of the 197th Sverdlovsk and 243rd Molotov tank brigades: to cross the Nugr River in cooperation with the 30th motorized rifle brigade (MSBR), capture the village of Borilovo and then advance in the direction of the settlement Vishnevsky. The village of Borilovo was located on a high bank and dominated the surrounding area, and from the bell tower of the church it was visible for several kilometers in a circle. All this made it easier for the enemy to conduct a defense and hampered the actions of the advancing corps units. At 20:00 on July 29, after a 30-minute artillery preparation and a volley of guards mortars, two tank motorized rifle brigades began to force the Nugr River. Under the cover of tank fire, the company of Senior Lieutenant A.P. Nikolaev was the first to cross the Nugr River, capturing the southern outskirts of the village of Borilovo. By the morning of July 30, the battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, with the support of tanks, captured the village of Borilovo despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy. All units of the Sverdlovsk brigade of the 30th UDTK were concentrated here. By order of the corps commander at 10:30, the brigade launched an offensive in the direction - height 212.2. The assault was heavy. The 244th Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade, which was previously in the reserve of the 4th Army, graduated from it.

Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Petrovich Nikolaev, company commander of a motorized rifle battalion of the 197th Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

On July 31, in the liberated Borilovo, the heroically dead tankers and machine gunners were buried, including the commanders of tank battalions: Major Chazov and Captain Ivanov. The mass heroism of the corps soldiers, shown in the battles from July 27 to 29, was highly appreciated. Only in the Sverdlovsk brigade, 55 soldiers, sergeants and officers were awarded government awards for these battles. In the battle for Borilovo, the Sverdlovsk sanitary instructor Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova accomplished a feat. She rescued the wounded and, replacing the artillerymen who were out of action, brought shells to firing positions. A. A. Kvanskova was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and later for her heroism she was awarded the Orders of Glory III and II degrees.

Guards sergeant Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova assists the lieutenantA. A.Lysin, 1944.

Photo by M. Insarov, 1944. TsDOOSO. F.221. OP.3.D.1672

The exceptional courage of the Urals warriors, their readiness to carry out a combat mission without sparing their lives, aroused admiration. But the pain from the losses suffered was mixed with him. It seemed that they were too great in comparison with the achieved results.

A column of German prisoners of war captured in the battles in the Oryol direction, USSR, 1943.

padded German technology during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, USSR, 1943.

Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. It is one of the largest battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved in a fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge from both sides - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into the battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions that were on the Soviet-German front.

The ledge in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in the winter and in early spring 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group "Center" hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group "South" covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the belligerents consolidated on the achieved lines, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further actions.

Considering great importance Kursk ledge, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense here, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative, to achieve a change in the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, which received the conditional name "Citadel".

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", fighter "Focke-Wulf-190D" and attack aircraft "Henschel-129".

On the Kursk ledge, which had a length of about 550 km, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, who had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft, occupied the defense. To the east of Kursk, the Stepnoy Front, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the High Command, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 400 combat aircraft.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having timely and correctly determined the enemy’s plan, decided to switch to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which to bleed the shock groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive and complete their defeat. There was a rare case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for the offensive, chose from several possible best option their actions. During April - June 1943, a defense in depth was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

troops and local population about 10,000 km of trenches and communication passages were dug, 700 km of wire barriers were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2,000 km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Orel, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. The troops were delivered 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supplies.

Having data on the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out pre-planned artillery counter-preparation in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups. The enemy suffered tangible losses, his hopes for a surprise offensive were frustrated. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but the enemy's tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, crashed against the insurmountable stamina of the Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk ledge, he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky was black with smoke and dust. Corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto was the words: "Not a step back, stand to death!" German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns dug into the ground, were hit by aircraft, and were blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks, exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine-gun fire or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke through into the depths of the defense in one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks from an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the feat of the officer, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, the armor-piercer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 aircraft, junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with machine gun and machine gun fire, and the tanks were burned with Molotov cocktails and knocked out with grenades.

A bright heroic feat was performed by the crew of the tank, Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he operated was bypassed by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and members of his crew senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered the battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they let the enemy tanks into direct range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two "tigers" and one medium tank. But Shalandin's tank was also hit and caught fire. On a burning car, the crew of Shalandin decided to ram and crashed into the side of the "tiger" on the move. The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever enrolled in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by the pilot of the guard, Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Gorovets saw a large group of enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he could not inform the leader about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18 he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front, began to pursue and by July 23 they threw the enemy back to the line that he had occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation "Citadel" failed, the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops during the battles on the Oryol ledge showed mass heroism. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a stronghold southwest of the village of Vyatka on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th rifle regiment of the 129th rifle division, Lieutenant N.D. Marinchenko. Carefully disguised, he unnoticed by the enemy led a platoon to the northern slope of the height and from close range brought down a shower of fire from machine guns on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They ran, dropping their weapons. Capturing two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko's men opened fire on the enemy. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the settlement of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm guns of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly went over to counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov let German tanks 100 - 150 meters away and set fire to one of them with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was smashed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the arrows, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. On the evening of the same day, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow for the first time in honor of the troops that had liberated them.

By August 18, the Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on the Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts at that time were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repulsed the strong counterattacks of the enemy's tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended with a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date of August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Kursk went to the Soviet troops at a very high price. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. Strengthening and multiplying these traditions is the duty of every soldier of the Russian army.

The historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of milestones on the way to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of fascist Germany on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The feat of arms of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk?

Firstly, the Nazi army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state on your own crush the aggressor. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were defeated. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, together with the Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the pilots of the French Normandy squadron fought selflessly, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles.

The enemy's armored forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy's attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops suffered a complete collapse. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces on the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory near Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical change in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to completely abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army near Kursk. Some of them claim that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply keep silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and unintelligibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler's "miscalculations" and "fatal decisions", due to his unwillingness to listen to the opinion of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the groundlessness of such assertions. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the east,” admits the former Hitlerite Field Marshal, who commanded the group ar
Miy "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this regard, the Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. In the course of the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of the Nazi army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the Russian military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply echeloned, active, stable defense, conducting a flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means in the course of defensive and offensive operations.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side that had the strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went over to the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, after the defense, it was planned to switch to a decisive counteroffensive and develop a general offensive. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts large quantity mobile troops. It was achieved by carrying out artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break-in of the enemy's strong and deep defenses, cutting his grouping into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy's Kharkov defensive area.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy’s defense in depth was successfully solved by decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, close interaction with aviation , which carried out in full on the scale of the fronts an air offensive, which to a large extent ensured the high pace of the offensive of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and in the course of an offensive when repulsing counterattacks by large enemy armored groupings.

The active actions of the partisans contributed to the successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Striking at the rear of the enemy, they fettered up to 100 thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy. The partisans made about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand steam locomotives and defeated over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of great military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international prestige of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that fascist Germany was faced with inevitable defeat by the might of Soviet weapons. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for an early liberation were strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of resistance movement fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound effect on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops, faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence over its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army near Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army, facilitated the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on ruling circles USA and UK. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain, I.V. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: "Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front."

The victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military and economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured the victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In a fierce battle, such powerful sources of victories for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, faith in one's own strength and success were manifested with all their might. Soviet fighters and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, steadfastness and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the title of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also won thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of the home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army in huge quantities with perfect models of military equipment and weapons, surpassing the military equipment of Nazi Germany in a number of decisive indicators.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, fortitude and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President Russian Federation On April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory".

Before a lesson on this topic and during its conduct, it is advisable to visit the museum of a unit or unit, organize a viewing of documentary and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to speak.

In the opening remarks, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, to emphasize that a radical turning point in the course of the war ended here and a mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first issue, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides on different stages Battle of Kursk, emphasizing at the same time that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to tell in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of the soldiers of their kind of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in the national military history, to consider in more detail the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military publishing house. 1999.

2. Great Patriotic War Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: Short story. - m., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov v. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943//Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev