5th Guards Tank Army in WWII Fifth Guards Tank Army

5th Guards Tank Army formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included the 3rd Guards. and 29th tank corps, 5th guards. mechanized corps, 994th light bomber aviation regiment, artillery and other formations and units.

February 22, 1943 Directive of the NPO of the USSR No. 1124821 on the formation of the 5th Guards by March 24 in the Millerovo area. tank army.

March 4, 1943 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 211 / org by the commander of the Southern Front and the 5th Guards. tank army on the urgent resupplying of the 3rd Guards. tank corps with personnel, weapons, vehicles and other property. This was due to the difficult situation of the Red Army in Kharkov.

March 8, 1943 Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to the representative of the Headquarters Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Guards. tank army on the transfer from 23 hours on March 8 of the 3rd Guards. tank corps at the disposal of Marshal Vasilevsky for use in the defense of Kharkov. Subsequently, after the approach of new forces to the Kharkov area from the Headquarters reserve, the 5th Guards was ordered. transfer the tank army to the command of the commander of the Southwestern Front.

March 19, 1943 Headquarters Directive No. 46076 to the commander of the 5th Guards. tank army on the concentration of army troops by the end of March 24 in the area of ​​​​Pukhovo station, Rybalchino, Evdakovo station, Khrestiki, Kolomeitsevo.

April 6, 1943 Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 46100 on the formation by April 30 of the Reserve Front under the command of Lieutenant General M. M. Popov. The front included the 2nd reserve, 24th, 53rd, 66th, 47th and 46th, 5th guards. tank army.

May 21, 1943 Order of the commander of the 5th Guards. tank army on the introduction of the “Brief Instructions on Certain Issues of the Combat Use of Units and Formations of the 5th Guards. tank army in connection with the partial redistribution of tanks and artillery in army units.

July 5 - 23, 1943 - participation of the 1st (until July 14), 2nd and 5th Guards. (since July 12) tank armies in the Kursk strategic defensive operation. During the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - 23), its troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards. tank and 2nd tank corps, in the oncoming tank battle in the Prokhorovka area, they stopped the advance of the enemy strike group and inflicted significant damage on it.

July 6, 1943 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 12941 to the commander of the 5th Guards. tank army to include the 18th tank corps in its composition, without changing its location.

August 3 - 23, 1943 - participation of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies in the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation (code name "Commander Rumyantsev").

September 8, 1943 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 40727 to the commander of the Steppe Front and the 5th Guards. tank army on the withdrawal of the army (18th, 29th tank and 5th guards mechanized corps, 53rd division guards tank, 1st guards motorcycle, 678th howitzer artillery, 76th guards. mortar, 1529th and 1549th self-propelled artillery, 689th anti-tank artillery regiments, 6th anti-aircraft artillery division, 994th detachment aviation communications regiment) to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by the morning of September 10 in the area of ​​Dergachi, Peresechnaya, Yards.

October 3, 1943 Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 30211 on the transfer from October 7 to the troops of the Steppe Front of the 5th Guards. tank army.

October 15 - December 9, 1943 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army in combat operations in the Krivoy Rog direction.

January 5 - 6, 1944 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army in the Kirovograd offensive operation.

January 24 - February 17, 1944 - participation of the 1st, 2nd (from February 11), 5th Guards. and the 6th tank armies in the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation.

March 5 - April 17, 1944 - participation of the 2nd, 5th Guards. and the 6th tank armies in the Uman-Botoshansk offensive operation.

During these ongoing operations, the troops of the army fought about 500 km; participated in the defeat of large enemy groupings in the areas of Kirovograd and Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the crossing of the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the liberation of the cities of Kirovograd (January 8), Zvenigorodka (January 28) and Uman (March 10).

May 27, 1944 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 293747 by the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 5th Guards. tank army about sending an army as part of the 3rd Guards. and the 29th tank corps with all parts of reinforcement and combat support, service establishments and army rear services by rail to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the army was included in the 3rd Belorussian Front.

June 23 - 28, 1944 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army in the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation.

Since July 26, formations and units of the army have been conducting offensive battles in order to complete the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reach the borders of East Prussia.

July 28 - August 28, 1944 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army (until August 3) in the Kaunas offensive operation.

August 3, 1944 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 204228 to the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky about the transfer of the 5th Guards. tank army subordinate to the commander of the 1st Baltic Front.

August 8, 1944 - the release of Marshal of the armored forces P. A. Rotmistrov from the post of commander of the 5th Guards. tank army, the appointment of Lieutenant General t / m M.D. Solomatina.

August 18, 1944 - appointment as commander of the 5th Guards. tank army Colonel-General t / v V. T. Volsky.

October 5 - 22, 1944 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army in the Memel offensive operation.

November 29, 1944 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 298111 by the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and the 5th Guards. tank army to send the army (3rd guards and 29th tank corps, 47th mechanized brigade, army reinforcements and rear units) by rail to the reserve of the Headquarters of the High Command.

January 14 - 26, 1945 - participation of the 5th Guards. tank army in the Mlavsko-Elbing offensive operation. The army troops, introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the zone of the 48th Army, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, by the morning of January 19 they defeated the garrison defending it and, developing the offensive in the direction of Elbing, on January 25 they reached the Frisches-Haff Bay (Vistula ), cutting the main communications of Army Group Center.

February 9, 1945 Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 11022 on the transfer by 24.00 on February 10 from the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the 3rd Belorussian Front of the 50th, 48th, 5th Guards. tank armies.

February 28, 1945 Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 12733 to the commander of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the transfer of the 5th Guards. tank army as part of the 29th tank corps, 47th division. mechanized brigade and all army units from the 3rd Belorussian Front into the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

In early April 1945, the army, together with the attached 98th rifle corps and the 1st Polish tank brigade, fought to eliminate the remnants of German troops in the area of ​​the mouth of the Vistula River, where they celebrated Victory Day. She was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

For successful military operations, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief 17 times expressed gratitude to the troops of the army, 11 times the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, saluted the guardsmen. Many units and formations were awarded military orders, they were given the honorary titles of Znamensky, Kirovograd, Korsun, Dniester, Minsk, Kovno, Molodechno, Vilna, Tannenberg.

After the end of the war, the army was renamed the 5th mechanized and withdrawn to the territory of Belarus. The headquarters is located in Bobruisk.

As part of the active army:

• from 07/10/1943 to 09/09/1943
• from 10/07/1943 to 05/31/1944
• from 06/23/1944 to 12/19/1944
• from 01/08/1945 to 05/09/1945

It was formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of the directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units. The main divisions of the army have changed throughout its existence. As a rule, it consisted of two or more guards tank corps and one or more guards mechanized corps.

According to the military doctrine of the Red Army of that time, the main role of tank armies was to develop the success of large offensive operations. When an enemy line of defense was breached (usually by a shock or combined army), the tank army rushed into this breakthrough, attacking rear units and central communication centers, thereby disrupting the interaction of enemy troops. The distances covered by a tank army were supposed to be several hundred kilometers.

In 1943, the army played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk, taking part in the oncoming battle at Prokhorovka. During this period, the army was subordinate to the Steppe Front and included
18th Tank Corps (commander - Major General of Tank Troops Boris Sergeevich Bakharov);
29th tank corps;
2nd Panzer Corps;
5th Guards Mechanized Corps;
32nd motorized rifle brigade (commander - Colonel Mikhail Emelyanovich Khvatov, until June 28, 1943, the acting brigade commander was his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Aleksandrovich Stukov);
110th tank brigade (commander - Colonel Ivan Mikhailovich Kolesnikov);
170th tank brigade (commander - lieutenant colonel Vasily Dmitrievich Tarasov);
181st Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Alekseevich Puzyrev);
36th Tank Breakthrough Regiment
29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29orb)
78th separate motorcycle battalion (78omtsb)
115th separate engineer battalion (115osapb)
292nd mortar regiment (292minp)
419th separate communications battalion (419obs)
1000th anti-tank artillery regiment (1000iptap)
1694th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (1694zenap)
repair and other rear services of the corps

With a total approximate number of tanks of 850 units.

In early 1944, the army took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In the spring of 1944, she took part, as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in the Uman-Botoshansk operation.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to develop success during the summer offensive of the Soviet troops during Operation Bagration. The formation was put on the offensive after breaking through the enemy defenses by the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, during which they completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Further, the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. The heavy losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the commander of the army, Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Rotmistrov, was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

At the end of 1944, during the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the 3rd German Tank Army, resulting in the encirclement of German troops in the Memel area.

At the beginning of 1945, the army as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front (hereinafter referred to as the 3rd Belorussian Front) took part in the East Prussian operation. In the course of its advance towards Elblag, the army cut off the German troops defending in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, forming the so-called. "Heiligenbeil cauldron".

From the end of the war until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 5th Guards Tank Army was stationed in the Belarusian Military District.

COUNTERSTRIKING OF THE 5TH TANK ARMY NEAR VORONEZH

Major General A.F. GOLOBORODOV

based on the materials of the journal "Military Thought" No. 4 of 04/04/1993, pp. 42-48 "THIS event has passed 50 years. Voronezh direction and now retains its importance for the practice of military art, as it has not been sufficiently studied and reflected in the literature.

As has been repeatedly noted, in the prewar years, Soviet military-theoretical thought professed progressive views and put forward the most advanced ideas regarding the use of armored forces in the course of hostilities. This was supported by appropriate organizational measures. By the beginning of the war, this type of troops in the Red Army was represented by mechanized corps and partially separate tank and motorized divisions. According to the wartime staff, the tank division had 375 combat vehicles (63 heavy KV tanks, 210 medium T-34s and 102 light T-26s and VTs), and the motorized division had 275 light tanks. Each corps consisted of two armored and motorized divisions. It had over 1100 combat vehicles. Unfortunately, by the time of the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on our country, most of these formations were poorly equipped, primarily with military equipment, in particular, 19% with heavy tanks and 11.2% with medium ones. Some regiments had no tanks at all.1

Mechanized formations, which possessed high mobility, fire power and great striking power, were intended to be used mainly in the offensive as a means of developing success in operational depth. In defense, they were planned to be used mainly for delivering counterattacks in order to destroy enemy groupings that had broken through and restore the situation.

In accordance with the operational mission, the vast majority of mechanized corps were concentrated in the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts. In the early days of the war, they, as a rule, were used to deliver counterattacks. However, they were often tasked with the defense of strategically important lines and facilities. The purpose of counterattacks was usually to defeat the invading enemy in cooperation with combined arms formations. The most significant were the counterattacks of the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps southwest of Siauliai, the 5th and 7th - southwest of Vitebsk, as well as five formations in the region of Lutsk, Dubno and Brody.

For a number of reasons, the mechanized corps (together with the covering armies) were unable to fully fulfill their assigned tasks. Nevertheless, on almost the entire Soviet-German front, significant forces of the Nazis were detained for some time, which led to a slowdown in their advance into the interior of the country.

During the first battles, tank and motorized formations suffered heavy losses, which the tank industry could not make up for (at that time, many factories were relocated to the east). Therefore, in August-September 1941, the mechanized corps were disbanded. Instead, separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions were created. Of course, it was a forced measure. Already the counter-offensive near Moscow showed that in order to carry out decisive offensive operations to a great depth and at high rates, it is necessary to have tank formations in combined-arms armies and fronts. By the spring of 1942, this issue was particularly acute. In addition, the capabilities of the industry for the production of tanks of this time increased. At the beginning of 1942, more than 20 tank corps were created in the country, and in the spring the formation of the 3rd and 5th tank armies began.

The 5th Panzer Army was formed in the Yelets area. The command of this association was assigned to Major General A.I. Lizyukov (Colonel P.I. Drugov was appointed chief of staff). The army initially included the 2nd and 11th tank corps, the 340th rifle division, the 19th separate tank brigade, as well as units (subdivisions) of military branches and special forces. In mid-June, remaining in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Efremov in readiness to launch a counterattack in the event of an enemy breakthrough in the Mtsensk direction.

However, the actual development of the event on the Soviet-German front made its own adjustments. On June 28, 1942, the German army group Weichs, supported by significant aviation forces of the 4th Air Fleet, went on the offensive in the Voronezh direction and broke through the defenses at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front. Having determined the direction of the main attack of the enemy, the Stavka on the same day reinforced the front with two tank corps of the South-Western Front and 17 TC of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. Front-line formations were also urgently advanced to the breakthrough site. There were enough forces to resist the enemy's attempts to develop the offensive. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief also had such confidence. I.V. Stalin told the commander of the Bryansk Front, General F.I. Golikov, and the chief of staff, General M.I. Kazakov: “Remember well. You now have over 1,000 tanks at the front, while the enemy does not even have 500 tanks. This is the first. And secondly, on the front of action of three enemy tank divisions, we have gathered more than 500 tanks, and the enemy has 300-350 tanks at most. Everything now depends on your ability to use these forces and control them ... ".

It was decided to strike a powerful counterattack in the interfluve of Tim and Kshen. To do this, the 1st and 16th tank corps were supposed to advance from the Livny area to the south, and the 4th, 24th and 17th tank corps were to meet them from the Stary Oskol, Gorshechnoye, Kastornoye area. However, by the end of June 29, 1942, the situation in this sector had changed dramatically. The enemy managed to expand the breakthrough along the front to 40 km and advance in depth to 35-45 km. In order to defeat the units of the 48th tank corps of the enemy that had broken through in the direction of Gorshechnoye, the Headquarters ordered the creation of a task force consisting of the 4.24th and 17th tank corps under the command of General Ya.N. Fedorenko. The first two formations were to strike at Stary Oskol to the north, and 17 tk from Kastornoe - in a southerly direction. At the same time, the front commander was preparing counterattacks of 1 TK from the Livny region to the south (along the railway), and 16 TK in a southerly direction from the Volovo region (along the eastern bank of the Kshen River). Unfortunately, this plan was not carried out either. Due to inconsistency in command and control of troops, a single tank strike did not work. Formations entered the battle at different times and in different areas.

By the end of July 2, the enemy wedged to a depth of 60-80 km. Its mobile units reached the Kastornoye - Stary Oskol railway and covered the left-flank formations of the 40th Army from the north, which continued to defend the main strip. By July 4, the enemy had reached the Don River (west of Voronezh). There was a clear threat of the capture of the city. In order to prevent this, the Headquarters handed over to the commander of the Bryansk Front, along with other combined arms formations, the 5th Tank Army, stationed in Efremov to deliver (together with the tank formations of the front) a counterattack on the flank and rear of the enemy advancing on Voronezh. To reinforce it, the 7th Tank Corps, which arrived in the Yelets region, under the command of Major General P.A. Rotmistrov, stood out. It was assumed that the immediate and decisive offensive of 5 TA to the flank and rear of the enemy would radically change the situation in the Bryansk Front.

In accordance with the directive of the Stavka and the decision of the commander of the 5th TA, the 7th tank corps with the attached 19th tank brigade in the first half of July 5 concentrated in the area of ​​Kamenka, Bolshaya Polyana, Vislaya Polyana and, striking in the direction of Ozerka, Vereika, Zemlyansk, should was to destroy the opposing enemy and capture Zemlyansk. The 11th Panzer Corps was tasked with striking in the direction of Visla Polyana, Kazinka, Nizh.Veduga, Nizh.Turovo and, in cooperation with the 7th Tank Corps, to capture the area of ​​Kazinka, Zatsepino, Dolgoe. At the same time, it was planned to go on the offensive of tank corps of front-line subordination.

The 7th TC was the first to concentrate in the initial area, and on the morning of July 6, 1942, it went on the offensive. In the area of ​​Krasnaya Polyanka there was an oncoming battle with units of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy. About 170 of ours and about the same number of enemy tanks entered the battle. By the end of the day, the enemy was thrown back over the river Kobylya Again. Our units crossed it in the Kamenka-Perekopovka sector, but were unable to build on their success further. First of all, this was due to the fact that units of 11 shopping malls, after unloading from the railway echelons, were only moving forward to the initial area.

On July 7, 1942, the 7th shopping mall resumed the offensive. Only the 59th Tank Brigade of the 11th Tank Corps entered the battle. The rest of the formations continued to advance and were introduced into battle as they approached. The uncertain actions of the 5th Panzer Army aroused the indignation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Her directive literally stated the following: “The 5th Panzer Army, having no more than one tank division in front of it, has been marking time in one place for the third day. Due to the indecision of actions, parts of the army got involved in protracted frontal battles, lost the advantage of surprise and did not complete the task.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

"Immediately begin to carry out the assigned task and categorically demand decisive action from the corps commanders, boldly bypass the enemy, not get involved in frontal battles with him, and by the end of July 9, go south of Zemlyansk to the rear of the grouping of German units operating against Voronezh" .

By the end of the fourth day of hostilities, the formations of the first echelon of the army broke the resistance of the enemy and, pushing him 4-5 km, went to the river. Dry Vereika, where they were stopped again. On the evening of July 9, the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps went on the offensive, and at dawn on July 10, heavy tanks of the 148th Tank Brigade entered the battle. After a five-hour battle, the enemy was driven out of Bol. Vereika. However, he constantly counterattacked, preventing the development of success. His aviation with impunity "processed" the battle formations of the corps. On the morning of July 10, the remaining forces of the 2nd Panzer Corps were introduced into the battle, but no significant results were achieved. It was on this day that General A.I. Lizyukov received Stalin's personal cipher telegram: "I ask you to explain why the order of the chief of the General Staff, and then the commander of the Bryansk Front, to occupy the Zemlyansk region at the time known to you, was not carried out." Unfortunately, the commander's explanation could not be found in the archive.

On July 12, 1942, the enemy, having regrouped his forces, launched a strong counterattack at the junction between the 7th and 11th tank corps. Parts of the 5th Panzer Army were forced to go on the defensive. In fact, the counterattack did not achieve its goal, did not justify the hopes that the Supreme High Command had placed on it. And immediately it was decided to disband the tank association. General A.I. Lizyukov tried to save the army. The text of his telegram has been preserved in the archives: “Moscow, Headquarters, Comrade Stalin. I beg you to temporarily suspend the disbandment of the 5th Panzer Army. You have one-sided information. Combat actions of troops are determined not by the number of kilometers traveled, but by the results of the battles. Order to check on the spot the entire course of the operation of our army. Lizyukov". Unfortunately, this appeal could not prevent the disbandment of the army. Its corps were transferred to the direct subordination of the front command. And General A.I. Lizyukov, appointed commander of the 2nd shopping mall, died in one of the subsequent battles.

However, it should be noted that the selfless actions of a number of brigades, battalions, companies and individual crews chained significant enemy forces to themselves. To repulse the army's attack, the fascist German command was forced to turn five divisions, including two tank divisions, to the north and use most of the aircraft. This weakened the enemy's pressure on Voronezh and frustrated his attempts to expand the breakthrough north of Voronezh along the Don.

In general, the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army, as well as the actions of the tank formations of the group of General Ya.N. Fedorenko that preceded it, ended in failure. What is the reason? It is quite clear that such a counterattack, which turned into an independent offensive operation for the army, had to be carefully planned. It was necessary to provide for the concentration of troops in the starting areas, clearly define tasks, organize interaction with artillery and aviation, establish command and control, and resolve a host of other issues, as is done when planning any operation. Meanwhile, the front headquarters practically withdrew from this. And until the end of July 3, the army commander did not receive a specific combat mission from the front command. The operational orientation of the army headquarters was not organized, information was not established. Having assessed the current situation, the Headquarters sent the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky, to the Yelets region. Previously, a telegram was sent to the front command and the commander of the 5th Panzer Army, which contained the task of a counterattack and a demand for its immediate preparation. At dawn on July 4, A.M. Vasilevsky arrived at the front command post. Having specified the situation, in the presence of the chief of staff of the front, General M.I.

Already after the war, with a certain degree of self-criticism, A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “I believe that the forces and means that the Bryansk Front had at its disposal were quite enough not only to repel the enemy offensive that had begun in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, but also to break the troops of the army group "Weichs" operating here. But, unfortunately, this did not happen because the front command failed to timely organize a massive attack on the flanks of the main enemy grouping, and the Headquarters and the General Staff, obviously, did not help him well in this.

It seems appropriate to give a more detailed explanation of why the intervention of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in the organization of the counterattack was required. Speaking about this, A.M. Vasilevsky refers to the former chief of staff of the Bryansk Front, General M.I. Kazakov, who wrote in one of his articles: “Who was supposed to organize this strike? - A.G.) was located in the Voronezh region, and all his attention was drawn to the defense of this direction.The front headquarters and Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov, who had just arrived to us, temporarily replacing the front commander at the main command post, could not to launch a counterattack by the 5th Panzer Army without the decision of the front commander. Seeing this situation, the General Staff took the initiative to organize a counterattack."

This explanation is quite logical. But a significant addition should be made to it. Without engaging in polemics with General M.I. Kazakov, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled that on July 2, 1942, when at the junction of the Bryansk and South-Western fronts there was a clear threat of an enemy breakthrough to the Don River and the capture of Voronezh, Headquarters, transferring the 60th and 6th armies from the reserve to the front for deployment to the west of the Don, it really obliged the commander of the Bryansk Front to take charge of the fighting in the Voronezh region. However, on the same day, the 5th Panzer Army was also transferred to the front to launch a counterattack. If the front commander himself could not personally organize and even more so direct the combat operations of the troops simultaneously in the Voronezh region and south of Yelets, then he should have instructed the headquarters to organize the reception and entry into battle of the 5th tank army, having previously announced his decision on a counterattack. "If for some reason this did not happen," A.M. Vasilevsky argued, "then the front headquarters was obliged to take it upon itself on its own initiative, reporting, of course, to the front commander on all decisions made."

At the same time, one cannot fail to say that the short stay of A.M. Vasilevsky at the headquarters of the front did not allow the organization of the counterattack to be brought to its logical conclusion.

Shortcomings in the organization of hostilities had a detrimental effect on the subsequent course and outcome of the operation. They began with the regrouping of the army, which: was carried out in a combined way. At the same time, rail transportation led to the loss of the surprise of a counterattack. Enemy aviation easily determined the areas of concentration of military equipment. Military journalist A. Krivitsky cites the words of the chief of staff of the army, Colonel P. I. Drugov, said by him in those tragic days: "The transfer of the army was extremely slow." For some reason, Lizyukov's proposal to move at night under its own power was rejected. They said: "We need to save fuel." The tanks were loaded onto railroad trains. Wasted precious time. In the very first hours of the march to the concentration area, "frames" hung over the columns. Soon the "junkers" of the enemy appeared. Our fighters were not. The direction of the army's movement is no longer a secret. She went towards failure ... ".

The results of the counterattack could have been more effective if it had been carefully prepared. It seems to us that although the situation at the beginning of July was acute and tense, it nevertheless did not justify bringing the army into battle piecemeal. However, this method was laid down in the requirements of the Headquarters. It is unlikely that any significant changes could have occurred in the situation if the counterattack had been delivered not on July 7, but on July 9-10, 1942. Some loss of time would no doubt be compensated by the effect that could be achieved by delivering a well-prepared powerful blow with all the forces of the army.

It is impossible not to take into account the fact that, with a significant strengthening of the front, the 5th Panzer Army did not receive sufficient artillery means necessary to suppress the enemy, and air defense means. The almost complete lack of air support played a particularly negative role in its failures.

A supporter of active actions A.I. Lizyukov demanded from the front command: "Cover us from the air, and we will do everything that is necessary." However, he had no support. “Enemy aviation,” A.I. Lizyukov told a correspondent, “does what he wants. My means of reinforcement are negligible. The pace of the operation from the very beginning was snail-like ... They tied me up with all guardianship, shouting: “Come on, come on ...” Well, I’m good too: I didn’t have the courage to argue to the end, to insist on my own, I went with the flow ... "6.

Thus, it was not possible to create a powerful strike core as part of a large tank formation, reinforced by artillery and reliably covered by aviation from the air, capable of developing an offensive at high rates. The scattered actions of the corps weakened the force of the blow. The enemy was able not only to repel the offensive, but also to launch a counterattack.

The tank corps acted inconsistently and were brought into battle piecemeal, as a rule, on the move, without sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain. Decisions were made by the commanders on the map without reconnaissance. Ironically, the river called Dry Vereika turned out to be a fairly wide water barrier with a swampy floodplain. The fords were not equipped, the bridges were blown up, the approaches were mined.

The unstable command and control of the actions of the tank corps also had an effect. One of the reasons is the unpreparedness of many commanders to put into practice the theoretical provisions that guided the Stavka and the General Staff when creating tank formations of this magnitude. The General Staff made a serious mistake by failing to organize proactive training of the command staff of the headquarters of the fronts, armies and tank corps on the use of large masses of tanks. The coherence of tank formations was also weak. As a result, a gap arose between the technical capabilities of the troops and the level of training of the leadership in the use of such powerful means of combat as tank corps and armies, which negatively affected their combat operations.

Among the failures of the 5th Panzer Army should also be attributed the incompleteness of the formation of formations and their preparation for combat operations. They entered the battle understaffed: they did not have the forces and means of reconnaissance, communications, and logistics required by the state. There was a lack of controls. As for military equipment, there were quite a lot of light tanks in service. For example, the KV and T-34 tanks made up no more than 60% of the regular number of combat vehicles, which reduced the ability of our units to fight enemy tanks.

The division of the Bryansk Front during the counterattack played a negative role. The Headquarters directive on this matter was issued on the night of July 8, 1942, in the midst of preparing a counterattack.

The memoirs of individual military leaders, in particular P.A. Rotmistrov, M.I. Kazakov, I.N. Chistyakov, contain a hint that General A.I. Lizyukov was not ready to lead such a large association as a tank army. However, it is not. In confirmation, it is appropriate, in our opinion, to cite the opinion of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. He wrote: “Speaking here about the 5th Panzer Army, I cannot but say a few warm words about its valiant commander, Major General A.I. Lizyukov. My personal meeting with him on July 4, 1942 was the first, but he was well known to the leadership of the Armed Forces as an energetic, strong-willed, fast-growing military leader. This allowed the Headquarters to place him at the head of one of the first tank armies being formed already in June 1942, entrusting him with the most important task.

Against the general background of the unsuccessful actions of the 5th Panzer Army, the courage and high skill of our soldiers cannot and must not fade. The Soviet troops received important lessons from which appropriate conclusions were drawn. Subsequently, the headquarters of the fronts, armies, and corps carefully studied the mistakes made in command and control. The fighting during the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army served as good material for theoretical analysis. At the same time, the growth of the combat skill of the troops provided a solid basis for achieving major operational results in the Stalingrad, Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh and Voronezh-Kastornensk operations that soon followed. 1 Since the beginning of the war, A.I. Lizyukov consistently commanded the 1st Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps. In the Battle of Moscow, he led the operational group of troops, renamed the 20th Army. In April 1942, he was entrusted with the formation of the 2nd Panzer Corps.

Literature:

1. TsAMO RF, f.96a, op.2011, d.26, l.Sh.
2. TsAMO, f.48a, op.1640, d.179, l.482.
3. T a m e, f.132, op.2642, d.2, l.83
4. Krivitsky A. I will never forget. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1964. - S.234. Military history magazine. - 1965. - No. 8. - P.7.
5. Krivitsky A. I will never forget. - P.233.
6. Military history magazine. - 1964. - No. 10. - P.39. "Ibid. -1965. - No. 8. - P.9. Krivitsky A. I will not forget forever. - С230.
7. Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. - Book 1. - M.: Politizdat, 1988. - S.220.

By order of the NPO of the USSR No. 57 of February 7, 1943, the 4th Tank Corps was transformed into the 5th Guards Tank Corps. In September 1945, on the basis of the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0013 dated June 10, 1945, the corps was reorganized into the 5th Guards Tank Division. Transformed by order of the NPO dated February 7, 1943 from the 4th Tank Corps for the exemplary performance of combat missions, stamina, courage, high discipline and heroism of the personnel shown in the Battle of Stalingrad. The corps included the 20th, 21st, 22nd Guards Tank and 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigades. Until February 16, 1943, the corps takes part in the Kharkov offensive operation, liberates Kharkov. From February 25, the 43rd part of the corps, in cooperation with the 309th rifle division, went to the Opishnia area, which created favorable conditions for the capture of Poltava. On March 5, 1943, the corps, having been subjected to a sudden attack by the enemy, retreats in an organized manner, leaving us. Gaivoron and Bolshaya Pisarevka. By April 22, 1943, the corps, being in the reserve of the commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front, was concentrated in the area south of Oboyan. Since 07/06/1943, it has been holding back the onslaught of the enemy at the turn east of the settlement. Yakovlevo, Pokrovka (Battle of Kursk). But the enemy breaks through the defense. On July 7-8, parts of the corps are engaged in heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction. Since July 10 - in the reserve of the commander of the Voronezh Front. On November 6, 1943, parts of the corps, in cooperation with the corps of the 3rd Panzer Army, captured the city of Kyiv. By order of the Supreme High Command of November 7, 1943, he was awarded the honorary name "Kyiv" for distinction in battles during the liberation of Kiev. In January 1944, the corps was included in the 6th (since September 12 - 6th Guards) tank army, in which it fought until the end of the war. At the end of January - February 1944, the corps takes part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Since March 6, 1944, participating in the Uman-Botoshansk operation, parts of the corps strike at the enemy stronghold Khrestinovka and then advance on Vapnyarka. The corps was especially successful in the summer of 1944 as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation and in the subsequent offensive in the central and western regions of Romania. Advancing at a high pace, formations and parts of the corps captured the cities of Byrlad (August 24), Tekuch (August 25), Focsani and Rymnikul-Serat (August 27), Buzeu (August 28) and others. On September 15, 1944, for successful actions in the battles for the cities of Rymnikul-Serat and Fokshany, the corps was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree. October 1944 - April 1945. as part of the army, which was part of the 2nd Ukrainian, from March 17 to the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the corps participates in the Debrecen, Budapest and Vienna offensive operations. By March 1, 1945, the corps from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was transferred to reinforce the 4th Ukrainian Front. Entering into participation in the Moravian-Ostrava operation, parts of the corps are intended to be used as the main forces of the mobile front group. In mid-April, the corps as part of the army was returned to the 2nd Ukrainian Front and took part in the final stage of the Bratislava-Brnov offensive operation. On April 26, 1945, for the exemplary performance of command assignments during the capture of the Hungarian city of Veszprem on March 23 and the valor and courage shown by the personnel, the corps was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The corps completed combat operations in Europe in the Prague operation in the Prague region. On May 17, 1945, for distinction in the battles during the liberation of Vienna (April 13), the corps was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree. In July 1945, the corps, along with other army formations, was regrouped to the Far East and in August, as part of the Trans-Baikal Front, participated in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. September 20, 1945 for differences in battles in the Far East during the breakthrough of the Manchu-Zhailaynur and Khalun-Arshan URs, overcoming the Great Khingan mountain range, the corps was awarded the Order of Lenin /////////////////////////////// No. 57 of February 7, 1943. The 4th Tank Corps was reorganized into the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The formations and units that are part of the 5th Guards. shopping mall, combined arms numbers were assigned by directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 36594 dated February 14, 1943. On February 6, 1943, the corps was included in the troops of the Voronezh Front (October 20, 1943 was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front). During fierce battles from July 6 to July 12, 1943, the corps was transferred from the OZEROVSKY, KALININO area to the ZORINSKY DVOR, ORLOVSKA area, and the next day to the MELOVE area. On January 21, 1944, the corps became part of the 6th TA of the 1st Ukrainian Front. On March 4, 1944, the corps became part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. From May 8 to August 20, 1944 and from November 1 to December 3, 1944, he was under staffing in the front reserve. On March 19, 1945, the corps was reassigned to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On April 18, 1945, it again became part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. In September 1945, on the basis of the order of the NCO of the USSR No. 0013 dated 06/10/1945, the corps was reorganized into the 5th Guards Tank Division.

“It was not possible to defeat the enemy west of Voronezh.
Lizyukov took the failure hard.
Everyone who saw him in those days says that outwardly he remained calm, but one can imagine what feelings overwhelmed the general.
On July 25, 1942, Lizyukov got into a tank and himself led the combat vehicles into the attack, intending to make a hole in the enemy’s defenses near the village of Sukhaya Vereika and withdraw the tank brigade from the encirclement. At the same time, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Tank Corps went on the attack. I must admit that this attack was carried out without proper preparation and the necessary cover. To do this, I repeat, we did not have the opportunity.
With excitement, I followed this attack from my CP. Batteries of the Nazis met the tanks with furious fire. The Germans, apparently, figured out the direction of the strike and pulled up large artillery forces in this area. One by one, our cars burst into flames. The tank, in which Lizyukov was located, pulled far ahead. But suddenly he seemed to stumble over an invisible barrier and froze motionless right in front of the Nazi trenches. Shells burst around him, dotted lines of tracer bullets crossed.
The tank didn't move. Now there was no doubt that he had been hit. Meanwhile, other cars, not having achieved success, firing back, retreated. The commander's tank was left alone in the territory occupied by the Nazis.
Please connect me with the commander of the 1st Guards Brigade, V. M. Gorelov.
“Organize a private counterattack!” Send a group of vehicles forward, cover them with fire, divert the attention of the enemy. By all means, evacuate the Lizyukovsky tank from the battlefield.
Soon a small tank group, under cover of fire, managed to approach the enemy trenches. One of the vehicles took Lizyukov's tank in tow and pulled it out from under fire.
The details of Lizyukov's death became known from the driver's story. Wounded, he made it safely to the rear. It turned out that Lizyukov's car was hit by a direct hit from an armor-piercing blank. The crew received an order from Major General Lizyukov to leave the tank.
The gunner-radio operator was the first to get out through the upper hatch, but was mowed down by machine gun fire. Lizyukov safely got out of the tank, but before he even took a step, a shell exploded nearby...
The body of Lizyukov with a broken head, in overalls and simple boots (he did not recognize other clothes) was taken to the rear. With pain in our hearts, we buried the brave general in a cemetery near the village of Sukhaya Vereika. Buried with full military honors.
Katukov M.E. On the edge of the main blow./ Literary notation V. I. Titova. - M .: Military Publishing, 1974
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“We failed to fulfill the assigned task of intercepting enemy communications that attacked Voronezh. The 5th Panzer Army was disbanded.
As the battles near Yelets showed, this gifted and brave military leader (A.I. Lizyukov) did not yet have experience in commanding a large tank formation. He needed help from the front command, connected with the organization of the offensive of tanks in very difficult combat conditions. environment. But this help, unfortunately, did not follow.
In addition, the lack of reliable support for tanks by artillery and aviation also played a role, as well as the fear that some tank commanders still had that the tanks would break away from the infantry of other formations interacting with them.
Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1984. - 272 p., 5 p. ill. — (Military memoirs). Circulation 100000.
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“An immediate and decisive blow by the 5th Panzer Army against the enemy rushing towards Voronezh could have dramatically changed the situation in our favor.
Her command, having no experience in driving such tank formations, at first acted not quite confidently, the front headquarters did not help him and, in fact, did not direct his work; there was no support from front-line reinforcements - artillery and aviation. Therefore, it was not possible to achieve a simultaneous powerful strike of tanks on the flank and rear of the enemy strike force.
The 5th Panzer Army did not complete the task.
A. I. Lizyukov is one of the first Heroes of the Soviet Union who received this title in the initial period of the war. Unfortunately, the described battles on the Voronezh land were the last in his glorious military activity. From July 6, 1942, he was in continuous battles, in the advanced orders of tank brigades. On July 24, Alexander Ilyich died heroically.
I involuntarily remember the entire Gomel Lizyukov family and bow before her: she gave the Fatherland two Heroes of the Soviet Union. This high rank was also awarded to the brother of Alexander Ilyich, Colonel Pyotr Ilyich Lizyukov, commander of the 46th Anti-Tank Fighter Artillery Leningrad Brigade, which fought as part of the 11th Guards Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which I then commanded. And he died a heroic death.
He gave his life for the Motherland and the third brother - Yevgeny Ilyich Lizyukov, commander of the partisan detachment named after Dzerzhinsky Minsk partisan unit.
Vasilevsky A. M. The work of a lifetime. Third edition. M., Politizdat, 1978. 552 p.; ill., maps. Edition 200

“According to the memorandum on the circumstances of the death of General Lizyukov with the testimony of the former deputy commander 89th tank brigade colonel of the guard N. V. Davidenko Davidenko Nikita Vasilyevich it is known that during the action of his brigade in this area a wrecked KV tank was discovered, on the armor of which was the corpse of regimental commissar Assorov, and about a hundred meters from the tank there was an unknown corpse in overalls with a crushed head. The duffel book of General Lizyukov was found in the overalls. By order of the Guards Colonel Davidenko, the specified corpse was delivered to his NP and buried near a grove, which is west of height 188.5. Soon the brigade from this area was forced to withdraw. There is no other information about the place of death and burial of General Lizyukov.
From Wikipedia.