25.02.1943 - 09.05.1945

The 5th Guards Tank Army was formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units.

On April 6, the army became part of the Reserve Front (since April 15 - the Steppe Military District). Located in the area of ​​​​concentration southwest Stary Oskol, July 9 was transferred to the Voronezh Front.

During the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk, army troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, in an oncoming tank battle in Prokhorovka area stopped the advance of the enemy strike force and inflicted significant damage on it.

During the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation, acting as part of the Voronezh (from August 9 - Steppe) Front, the army, in cooperation with the troops of other armies, defeated a strong enemy grouping and advanced to a depth of 120 km.

On September 10, 1943, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, on October 7 - included in the Steppe (from October 20 - 2nd Ukrainian) Front, in which, in October - December, it fought to expand the bridgehead to the Dnieper River southeast of Kremenchug.

In the first half of January 1944, the army took part in the Kirovograd, from January 24 to February 17 in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya and from March 5 to April 17 Uman-Botoshanskaya offensive operations.

On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the army was included in the 3rd Belorussian Front, in which it participated in the Belorussian strategic operation. The formations and units of the army entered into battle on June 25 in the offensive zone of the 5th Army were defeated in the area Krupki advancing towards the reinforced 5th tank division of the enemy and went to the Berezina River north and south of Borisov.

After release Borisova(July 1) the army developed the offensive in the direction Minsk, Vilnius.

Since July 26, formations and units of the army have been conducting offensive battles in order to complete the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reach the borders East Prussia.

On August 17, 1944, the army was transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, from October 5 to October 22, it participated in the Memel offensive operation.

From January 8, 1945, as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front. From January 14 to 26 in the Mlavsko-Elbing offensive operation. Army troops introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the band of the 48th Army, by the end of the day reached the Mlavsky fortified area, by the morning of January 19, they defeated the garrison defending it and, developing the offensive towards Elbing, The 25th of January went to Frisches-Haff Bay (Vistula), cutting off the main communications of Army Group Center.

Since February 9, 1945, as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front, she participated in repelling counterattacks of the enemy, who was trying to push back Soviet troops off the coast of the Baltic Sea and restore their land communications.

Since February 28, 1945, as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front, together with the attached 98th Rifle Corps and the 1st Polish Tank Brigade, fought to eliminate the remnants of German troops near the mouth of the river. Vistula, where she met Victory Day.

On July 9, 1945, the field administration of the 3rd Belorussian Front was turned to the formation of the administration of the Baranovichi military district, the army was renamed the 5th mechanized army and withdrawn to the territory of the Byelorussian SSR, headquarters in Bobruisk.

Commanders:

• lieutenant general t/v Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich from February 22, 1943 to August 8, 1944
• Lieutenant General of the military military Solomatin Mikhail Dmitrievich from August 8 to August 18, 1944
• colonel-general of the c/v Volsky Vasily Timofeevich from August 18, 1944 to March 16, 1945
• major general t / v Sinenko Maxim Denisovichfrom March 16, 1945 to May 9, 1945

Member of the Military Council:

• major general t/v Grishin Petr Grigorievich April 20, 1943 to July 31, 1945
• Colonel Zakharenko Ilya Fedorovich May 13, 1943 to July 22, 1943
• Colonel Syromolotny Ilya Konstantinovich from July 22, 1943 to May 9, 1945

Compound :

• 4th separate Korsun communications regiment
• 117th separate repair and restoration battalion
• 142nd separate motor transport battalion
• 144th separate motor transport battalion
• 281st separate motor transport Vilna battalion
• 20th separate staff auto company
• 36th evacuation tractor company
• 2623rd Army Hospital slightly injured
• 82nd separate medical reinforcement company
• 1127th separate cable and pole company
• 30th supply station
• 58th Army Base
• 1528th Field Army Quartermaster Depot
• 2566th Field Army Food Depot
• editorial office of the newspaper "Forward For the Motherland"

Composition of the army from September to December 1944

as part of the 1st Baltic Front:

• 3rd Guards Tank Kotelnikovsky Red Banner Corps
• 29th Tank Znamensky Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Suvorov II Class Corps
• 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Korsunskaya Red Banner Order of the Suvorov Division
• 47th mechanized Dukhovshchinskaya Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree brigade - from October 1944
• 201st Independent Light Artillery Brigade - since August 1944
• 21st Motorized Engineering Order of Kutuzov Brigade - since August 1944
• 678th Howitzer Artillery Kirovograd Regiment RGK
• 689th anti-tank artillery regiment Molodechno RGK
• 76th Guards Mortar Regiment of Rocket Artillery
• 14th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Kovno Regiment
• 376th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Vilensky Regiment
• 1051st self-propelled artillery regiment - to October 1944
• 1st Separate Guards Red Banner Motorcycle Regiment
• 994th Znamensky Aviation Regiment
• 99th Pontoon Bridge Battalion - to October, from November to December 1944

PERSONNEL

Total: 41

Officers:

• guards Colonel Engineer Fedor Ivanovich Galkin, deputy on the technical side
• Art. lieutenant Gorokhov Arkady Nikolaevich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1918
• Art. Lieutenant Goryakov Gennady Aleksandrovich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1923
• major general t / v Zaev Dmitry Ivanovich, 1st Deputy Commander
• guards captain of a / t / s Zarubin Mikhail Vasilyevich, pom. head of the 58th AB, born in 1917
• major general t/v Kalinichenko Petr Ivanovich, chief of staff 12/30/1904 - 11/19/1986
• guards Major and / with Karpov Alexander Petrovich, Art. inspector of the financial department, born in 1904
• Colonel Kostylev Alexander Mikhailovich, head of the political department
• Art. Lieutenant Svetlitsky Vladimir Andreevich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1919
• captain Kurdyumov Sergey Fedorovich, commander of the repair company of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1913
• major general t/v Sidorovich Georgy Stepanovich, chief of staff 11/21/1903 - 05/06/1985
• guards Colonel Fedorov Alexey Fedorovich, head of the operational department of the headquarters, born in 1908
• Art. Lieutenant Yurov Mikhail Spiridonovich, head of the storage department of the 2566th PAPS, born in 1912

Ordinary composition:

• Corporal Andreev Nikita Gerasimovich
• foreman Boginsky Leonid Pavlovich, head of food supply of the 142nd OATB, born in 1905
• red Army soldier Borovik Pavel Pavlovich, apprentice electrician of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1929
• ml. Sergeant Vakula Fedor Trofimovich, storekeeper of fuels and lubricants of the 142nd OATB, born in 1914
• Corporal Dudchenko Semyon Kuzmich, turner of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1907
• red Army soldier Emelyanov Petr Petrovich, turner of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1914
• guards red Army soldier Ivanov Semyon Ivanovich, batteryman of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1913
• Sergeant Kozelsky Ivan Grigorievich, commander of the department of the 281st OATB, born in 1912
• red Army soldier Kudryashov Boris Grigorievich, driver-electrician of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1905
• Art. Sergeant Kuzmin Mikhail Gavrilovich, pom. platoon commander of the 281st OATB, born in 1914
• Sergeant Lapshov Vasily Nikonorovich, driver of the 142nd OATB, born in 1912
• ml. Sergeant Logvinenko Ivan Ivanovich, Art. electrician of the 117th ORVB, born in 1920
• Corporal Makarenko Nikolai Mikhailovich, messenger of the radio expedition of the 4th OPS, born in 1925
• red Army soldier Evgeny Petrovich Makeev, welder of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1925
• Corporal Mayatsky Grigory Dorofeevich, fitter of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1913
• Sergeant Mironov Alexander Vasilyevich, squad leader of the 1127th OKSHR, born in 1919
• Corporal Oger Ivan Petrovich, Art. clerk of the 1528th PAIS, born in 1906
• Corporal Pertsev Grigory Ivanovich, blacksmith-spring worker of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1914
• Art. Sergeant Alexander Petrovich Rasskazov, driver of the 281st OATB, born in 1908
• red Army soldier Salamatin Vasily Antonovich, electric and gas welder of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1911
• Corporal Salko Theodosius Ivanovich, fitter of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1907
• red Army soldier Skubko Nikolai Prokhorovich, tractor driver of the 36th ETR, born in 1913
• Red Army soldier Smirnov Ivan Ilyich, messenger of the telegraph expedition of the 4th OPS, born in 1925
• Corporal Kharchenko Petr Stepanovich, accountant of the 1528th PAIS, born in 1897
• Art. Sergeant Khutorny Nikon Prokofievich, driver of the 142nd OATB, born in 1909
• red Army soldier Chernenko Kuzma Ivanovich, head of the storage of the convoy and economic department of the 1528th PAIS, born in 1904
• ml. Sergeant Shalygin Georgy Grigorievich, fitter of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1911

If your family archive contains photographs of your relative and you send his biography, this will give us the opportunity to perpetuate the memory of a soldier, a participant in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

The feat that the soldiers performed during the defense and liberation of the Republic of Latvia led to Our Victory, and the memory of the people who gave their lives for this will not be forgotten.

Type Wars Participation in Marks of Excellence

5th Guards Tank Army (Battle of Kursk)- composition and commanders of units of the 5th Guards Tank Army (abbreviated 5 Guards TA ) during the Battle of Kursk. As part of the Steppe Front, the army was transferred to the Voronezh Front along with the 5th Guards Army Army for a counterattack in the Prokhorovka area in July 1943.

In the list of unit commanders, the first to be indicated are the persons who commanded this unit on July 5, 1943 and in the rank that they had at that time. For subsequent commanders, the rank that they had at the time of taking command of the formation is indicated.

Available photographs taken in different years of World War II are used, therefore visible insignia and awards may not correspond to the title and list of awards for July-August 1943. Cases where it is known for sure that the photograph was taken during the Battle of Kursk are indicated separately.

18th Panzer Corps (18 tk)

major general of tank troops

On July 26, a colonel took command of the corps. Bakharov was appointed deputy commander of the 9th tk(since November 1943 - commander of 9 tk).

Major General Bakharov died on July 16, 1944 during the Bobruisk offensive operation. He was buried in Bobruisk, a street in the city is named after him.
Egorov rose to the rank of major general. Author of military memoirs "With Faith in Victory".

On December 10, 1943, "in commemoration of the victory, the formations and units that distinguished themselves in the battles for the liberation of the city of Znamenka" were given the name "Znamensky". Among them are the 18th Znamensky tank corps and the 32nd, 110th, 181st brigades of this corps. (Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of December 10, 1943 No. 48).

32nd motorized rifle brigade (32 MSBR)

colonel

At the beginning of 1943, Khvatov was seriously wounded, and until June 28, 1943, acting. the brigade commander was his deputy lieutenant colonel Stukov (Oleynikov: Strukov L.A.). Due to a typo in the documents (June 28 became July 28), Colonel Khvatov is sometimes mistakenly not listed as a brigade commander during the battles near Prokhorovka.

110th tank brigade (110 tbr)

colonel

Oleinikov: lieutenant colonel?

170th tank brigade (170 tbr)

lieutenant colonel

Oleinikov: Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Kazakov?

181st tank brigade (181 tbr)

lieutenant colonel

Corps subordination units

36th Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36 tpp)

21 infantry tanks Mk IV "Churchill" and 3 armored vehicles BA-64

Other compounds

• 29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29 orb)
• 78th separate motorcycle battalion (78 omtsb)
• 115th separate engineer battalion (115 osapb)
• 292nd mortar regiment (292 minp)
• 419th separate communications battalion (419 obs)
• 1000th anti-tank artillery regiment (1000 iptap)
• 1694th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (1694 zenap)

29th Panzer Corps (29 tk)

major general of tank troops

25th tank brigade (25 tbr)

colonel

31st tank brigade (31 tbr)

colonel

32nd tank brigade (32 tbr)

colonel

53rd motorized rifle brigade (53 MSBR)

lieutenant colonel Lipichev N.P.

Corps subordination units

1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1446 glanders)

data

Other compounds

• 38th separate armored battalion (38 arr)
• 75th motorcycle battalion (75 mtsb)
• 108th anti-tank artillery regiment (108 iptap)
• 271st mortar regiment (271 minp)
• 363rd separate communications battalion (363 obs)
• 366th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (366 zenap)
• 747th separate anti-tank battalion (747 oiptdn)
• repair and other rear services of the corps

5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps (5 guards.mk)

major general of tank troops

Oleinikov: Major General of the military unit Sleptsov B.M. ?

10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10 Guards Mkhbr)

colonel Mikhailov I. B.

11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11 Guards Mkhbr)

colonel Grishchenko N. V.

12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (12 Guards Mkhbr)

colonel Borisenko G. Ya.

COUNTERSTRIKING OF THE 5TH TANK ARMY NEAR VORONEZH

Major General A.F. GOLOBORODOV

based on the materials of the journal "Military Thought" No. 4 of 4.04.1993, pp. 42-48 "THIS event has passed 50 years. Voronezh direction and now retains its importance for the practice of military art, as it has not been sufficiently studied and reflected in the literature.

As has been repeatedly noted, in the prewar years, Soviet military-theoretical thought professed progressive views and put forward the most advanced ideas regarding the use of armored forces in the course of hostilities. This was supported by appropriate organizational measures. By the beginning of the war, this type of troops in the Red Army was represented by mechanized corps and partially separate tank and motorized divisions. According to the wartime staff, the tank division had 375 combat vehicles (63 heavy KV tanks, 210 medium T-34s and 102 light T-26s and VTs), and the motorized division had 275 light tanks. Each corps consisted of two armored and motorized divisions. It had over 1100 combat vehicles. Unfortunately, by the time of the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on our country, most of these formations were poorly equipped, primarily with military equipment, in particular, 19% with heavy tanks and 11.2% with medium ones. Some regiments had no tanks at all.1

Mechanized formations, which possessed high mobility, fire power and great striking power, were intended to be used mainly in the offensive as a means of developing success in operational depth. In defense, they were planned to be used mainly for delivering counterattacks in order to destroy enemy groupings that had broken through and restore the situation.

In accordance with the operational mission, the vast majority of mechanized corps were concentrated in the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts. In the early days of the war, they, as a rule, were used to deliver counterattacks. However, they were often tasked with the defense of strategically important lines and facilities. The purpose of counterattacks was usually to defeat the invading enemy in cooperation with combined arms formations. The most significant were the counterattacks of the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps southwest of Siauliai, the 5th and 7th - southwest of Vitebsk, as well as five formations in the region of Lutsk, Dubno and Brody.

For a number of reasons, the mechanized corps (together with the covering armies) were unable to fully fulfill their assigned tasks. Nevertheless, on almost the entire Soviet-German front, significant forces of the Nazis were detained for some time, which led to a slowdown in their advance into the interior of the country.

During the first battles, tank and motorized formations suffered heavy losses, which the tank industry could not make up for (at that time, many factories were relocated to the east). Therefore, in August-September 1941, the mechanized corps were disbanded. Instead, separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions were created. Of course, it was a forced measure. Already the counter-offensive near Moscow showed that in order to carry out decisive offensive operations to a greater depth and at high rates, it is necessary to have tank formations in combined-arms armies and fronts. By the spring of 1942, this issue was particularly acute. In addition, the capabilities of the industry for the production of tanks of this time increased. At the beginning of 1942, more than 20 tank corps were created in the country, and in the spring the formation of the 3rd and 5th tank armies began.

The 5th Panzer Army was formed in the Yelets area. The command of this association was assigned to Major General A.I. Lizyukov (Colonel P.I. Drugov was appointed chief of staff). The army initially included the 2nd and 11th tank corps, the 340th rifle division, the 19th separate tank brigade, as well as units (subdivisions) of military branches and special forces. In mid-June, remaining in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Efremov in readiness to launch a counterattack in the event of an enemy breakthrough in the Mtsensk direction.

However, the actual development of the event on the Soviet-German front made its own adjustments. On June 28, 1942, the German army group Weichs, supported by significant aviation forces of the 4th Air Fleet, went on the offensive in the Voronezh direction and broke through the defenses at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front. Having determined the direction of the main attack of the enemy, the Stavka on the same day reinforced the front with two tank corps of the South-Western Front and 17 TC of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. Front-line formations were also urgently advanced to the breakthrough site. There were enough forces to resist the enemy's attempts to develop the offensive. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief also had such confidence. I.V. Stalin told the commander of the Bryansk Front, General F.I. Golikov, and the chief of staff, General M.I. Kazakov: “Remember well. You now have over 1,000 tanks at the front, while the enemy does not even have 500 tanks. This is the first. And secondly, on the front of action of three enemy tank divisions, we have gathered more than 500 tanks, and the enemy has 300-350 tanks at most. Everything now depends on your ability to use these forces and control them ... ".

It was decided to strike a powerful counterattack in the interfluve of Tim and Kshen. To do this, the 1st and 16th tank corps were supposed to advance from the Livny area to the south, and the 4th, 24th and 17th tank corps were to meet them from the Stary Oskol, Gorshechnoye, Kastornoye area. However, by the end of June 29, 1942, the situation in this sector had changed dramatically. The enemy managed to expand the breakthrough along the front to 40 km and advance in depth to 35-45 km. In order to defeat the units of the 48th tank corps of the enemy that had broken through in the direction of Gorshechnoye, the Headquarters ordered the creation of a task force consisting of the 4.24th and 17th tank corps under the command of General Ya.N. Fedorenko. The first two formations were to strike at Stary Oskol to the north, and 17 tk from Kastornoe - in a southerly direction. At the same time, the front commander was preparing counterattacks of 1 TK from the Livny region to the south (along the railway), and 16 TK in a southerly direction from the Volovo region (along the eastern bank of the Kshen River). Unfortunately, this plan was not carried out either. Due to inconsistency in command and control of troops, a single tank strike did not work. Formations entered the battle at different times and in different areas.

By the end of July 2, the enemy wedged to a depth of 60-80 km. Its mobile units reached the Kastornoye - Stary Oskol railway and covered the left-flank formations of the 40th Army from the north, which continued to defend the main strip. By July 4, the enemy had reached the Don River (west of Voronezh). There was a clear threat of the capture of the city. In order to prevent this, the Headquarters handed over to the commander of the Bryansk Front, along with other combined arms formations, the 5th Tank Army, stationed in Efremov to deliver (together with the tank formations of the front) a counterattack on the flank and rear of the enemy advancing on Voronezh. To reinforce it, the 7th Tank Corps, which arrived in the Yelets region, under the command of Major General P.A. Rotmistrov, stood out. It was assumed that the immediate and decisive offensive of 5 TA on the flank and rear of the enemy would radically change the situation in the Bryansk Front.

In accordance with the directive of the Stavka and the decision of the commander of the 5th TA, the 7th tank corps with the attached 19th tank brigade in the first half of July 5 concentrated in the area of ​​Kamenka, Bolshaya Polyana, Vislaya Polyana and, striking in the direction of Ozerka, Vereika, Zemlyansk, should was to destroy the opposing enemy and capture Zemlyansk. The 11th Panzer Corps was tasked with striking in the direction of Visla Polyana, Kazinka, Nizh.Veduga, Nizh.Turovo and, in cooperation with the 7th Tank Corps, to capture the area of ​​Kazinka, Zatsepino, Dolgoe. At the same time, it was planned to go on the offensive of tank corps of front-line subordination.

The 7th TC was the first to concentrate in the initial area, and on the morning of July 6, 1942, it went on the offensive. In the area of ​​Krasnaya Polyanka there was an oncoming battle with units of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy. About 170 of ours and about the same number of enemy tanks entered the battle. By the end of the day, the enemy was thrown back over the river Kobylya Again. Our units crossed it in the Kamenka-Perekopovka sector, but were unable to build on their success further. First of all, this was due to the fact that units of 11 shopping malls, after unloading from the railway echelons, were only moving forward to the initial area.

On July 7, 1942, the 7th shopping mall resumed the offensive. Only the 59th Tank Brigade of the 11th Tank Corps entered the battle. The rest of the formations continued to advance and were introduced into battle as they approached. The uncertain actions of the 5th Panzer Army aroused the indignation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Her directive literally stated the following: “The 5th Panzer Army, having no more than one tank division in front of the enemy, has been marking time in one place for the third day. Due to the indecision of actions, parts of the army got involved in protracted frontal battles, lost the advantage of surprise and did not complete the task.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

"Immediately begin to carry out the assigned task and categorically demand decisive action from the corps commanders, boldly bypass the enemy, not get involved in frontal battles with him, and by the end of July 9, go south of Zemlyansk to the rear of the grouping of German units operating against Voronezh" .

By the end of the fourth day of hostilities, the formations of the first echelon of the army broke the resistance of the enemy and, pushing him 4-5 km, went to the river. Dry Vereika, where they were stopped again. On the evening of July 9, the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps went on the offensive, and at dawn on July 10, heavy tanks of the 148th Tank Brigade entered the battle. After a five-hour battle, the enemy was driven out of Bol. Vereika. However, he constantly counterattacked, preventing the development of success. His aviation with impunity "processed" the battle formations of the corps. On the morning of July 10, the remaining forces of the 2nd Panzer Corps were introduced into the battle, but no significant results were achieved. It was on this day that General A.I. Lizyukov received Stalin's personal cipher telegram: "I ask you to explain why the order of the chief of the General Staff, and then the commander of the Bryansk Front, to occupy the Zemlyansk region at the time known to you, was not carried out." Unfortunately, the commander's explanation could not be found in the archive.

On July 12, 1942, the enemy, having regrouped his forces, launched a strong counterattack at the junction between the 7th and 11th tank corps. Parts of the 5th Panzer Army were forced to go on the defensive. In fact, the counterattack did not achieve its goal, did not justify the hopes that the Supreme High Command had placed on it. And immediately it was decided to disband the tank association. General A.I. Lizyukov tried to save the army. The text of his telegram has been preserved in the archives: “Moscow, Headquarters, Comrade Stalin. I beg you to temporarily suspend the disbandment of the 5th Panzer Army. You have one-sided information. Combat actions of troops are determined not by the number of kilometers traveled, but by the results of the battles. Order to check on the spot the entire course of the operation of our army. Lizyukov". Unfortunately, this appeal could not prevent the disbandment of the army. Its corps were transferred to the direct subordination of the front command. And General A.I. Lizyukov, appointed commander of the 2nd shopping mall, died in one of the subsequent battles.

However, it should be noted that the selfless actions of a number of brigades, battalions, companies and individual crews chained significant enemy forces to themselves. To repulse the army's attack, the fascist German command was forced to turn five divisions to the north, including two tank divisions, and use most of the aircraft. This weakened the enemy's pressure on Voronezh and frustrated his attempts to expand the breakthrough north of Voronezh along the Don.

In general, the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army, as well as the actions of the tank formations of the group of General Ya.N. Fedorenko that preceded it, ended in failure. What is the reason? It is quite understandable that such a counterattack, which turned into an independent offensive operation for the army, should have been carefully planned. It was necessary to provide for the concentration of troops in the initial areas, clearly define tasks, organize interaction with artillery and aviation, establish command and control, and resolve a host of other issues, as is done when planning any operation. Meanwhile, the front headquarters practically withdrew from this. And until the end of July 3, the army commander did not receive a specific combat mission from the front command. The operational orientation of the army headquarters was not organized, information was not established. Having assessed the current situation, the Headquarters sent the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky, to the Yelets region. Previously, a telegram was sent to the front command and the commander of the 5th Panzer Army, which contained the task of a counterattack and a demand for its immediate preparation. At dawn on July 4, A.M. Vasilevsky arrived at the front command post. Having specified the situation, in the presence of the chief of staff of the front, General M.I. Kazakov, he assigned the task to General A.I. Lkzyukov and on the same day, on the call of I.V.

Already after the war, with a certain degree of self-criticism, A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “I believe that the forces and means that the Bryansk Front had at its disposal were quite enough not only to repel the enemy offensive that had begun in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, but also to break the troops of the army group "Weichs" operating here. But, unfortunately, this did not happen because the front command failed to timely organize a massive attack on the flanks of the main enemy grouping, and the Headquarters and the General Staff, obviously, did not help him well in this.

It seems appropriate to give a more detailed explanation of why the intervention of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in the organization of the counterattack was required. Speaking about this, A.M. Vasilevsky refers to the former chief of staff of the Bryansk Front, General M.I. Kazakov, who wrote in one of his articles: “Who was supposed to organize this strike? - A.G.) was located in the Voronezh region, and all his attention was drawn to the defense of this direction.The front headquarters and Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov, who had just arrived to us, temporarily replacing the front commander at the main command post, could not to launch a counterattack by the 5th Panzer Army without the decision of the front commander. Seeing this situation, the General Staff took the initiative to organize a counterattack."

This explanation is quite logical. But a significant addition should be made to it. Without engaging in polemics with General M.I. Kazakov, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled that on July 2, 1942, when at the junction of the Bryansk and South-Western fronts there was a clear threat of an enemy breakthrough to the Don River and the capture of Voronezh, Headquarters, transferring the 60th and 6th armies from the reserve to the front for deployment to the west of the Don, it really obliged the commander of the Bryansk Front to take charge of military operations in the Voronezh region. However, on the same day, the 5th Panzer Army was also transferred to the front to launch a counterattack. If the front commander himself could not personally organize and, moreover, direct the military operations of the troops simultaneously in the Voronezh region and south of Yelets, then he should have instructed the headquarters to organize the reception and entry into battle of the 5th tank army, having previously announced his decision on a counterattack. "If for some reason this did not happen," A.M. Vasilevsky argued, "then the front headquarters was obliged to take it upon itself on its own initiative, reporting, of course, to the front commander on all decisions made."

At the same time, one cannot fail to say that the short stay of A.M. Vasilevsky at the headquarters of the front did not allow the organization of the counterattack to be brought to its logical conclusion.

Shortcomings in the organization of hostilities had a detrimental effect on the subsequent course and outcome of the operation. They began with the regrouping of the army, which: was carried out in a combined way. At the same time, rail transportation led to the loss of the surprise of a counterattack. Enemy aviation easily determined the areas of concentration of military equipment. Military journalist A. Krivitsky cites the words of the chief of staff of the army, Colonel P. I. Drugov, said by him in those tragic days: "The transfer of the army was extremely slow." For some reason, Lizyukov's proposal to move at night under its own power was rejected. They said: "We need to save fuel." The tanks were loaded onto railroad trains. Wasted precious time. In the very first hours of the march to the concentration area, "frames" hung over the columns. Soon the "junkers" of the enemy appeared. Our fighters were not. The direction of the army's movement is no longer a secret. She went towards failure ... ".

The results of the counterattack could have been more effective if it had been carefully prepared. It seems to us that although the situation at the beginning of July was acute and tense, it nevertheless did not justify bringing the army into battle piecemeal. However, this method was laid down in the requirements of the Headquarters. It is unlikely that any significant changes could have occurred in the situation if the counterattack had been delivered not on July 7, but on July 9-10, 1942. Some loss of time would no doubt be compensated by the effect that could be achieved by delivering a well-prepared powerful blow with all the forces of the army.

It is impossible not to take into account the fact that with a significant strengthening of the front, the 5th Panzer Army did not receive sufficient artillery weapons necessary to suppress the enemy, and air defense weapons. The almost complete lack of air support played a particularly negative role in its failures.

A supporter of active actions A.I. Lizyukov demanded from the front command: "Cover us from the air, and we will do everything that is necessary." However, he had no support. “Enemy aviation,” A.I. Lizyukov told a correspondent, “does what he wants. My means of reinforcement are negligible. The pace of the operation was snail-like from the very beginning ... They tied me up with all guardianship, shouting: “Come on, come on ...” Well, I’m good too: I didn’t have the courage to argue to the end, to insist on my own, I went with the flow ... "6.

Thus, it was not possible to create a powerful strike core as part of a large tank formation, reinforced by artillery and reliably covered by aviation from the air, capable of developing an offensive at a high pace, it was not possible to create. The scattered actions of the corps weakened the force of the blow. The enemy was able not only to repel the offensive, but also to launch a counterattack.

The tank corps acted inconsistently and were brought into battle piecemeal, as a rule, on the move, without sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain. Decisions were made by the commanders on the map without reconnaissance. Ironically, the river called Dry Vereika turned out to be a fairly wide water barrier with a swampy floodplain. The fords were not equipped, the bridges were blown up, the approaches were mined.

The unstable command and control of the actions of the tank corps also had an effect. One of the reasons is the unpreparedness of many commanders to put into practice the theoretical provisions that guided the Stavka and the General Staff when creating tank formations of this magnitude. The General Staff made a serious mistake by failing to organize proactive training of the command staff of the headquarters of the fronts, armies and tank corps on the use of large masses of tanks. The coherence of tank formations was also weak. As a result, a gap arose between the technical capabilities of the troops and the level of training of the leadership in the use of such powerful means of combat as tank corps and armies, which negatively affected their combat operations.

Among the failures of the 5th Panzer Army should also be attributed the incompleteness of the formation of formations and their preparation for combat operations. They entered the battle understaffed: they did not have the forces and means of reconnaissance, communications, and logistics required by the state. There was a lack of controls. As for military equipment, there were quite a lot of light tanks in service. For example, the KV and T-34 tanks made up no more than 60% of the regular number of combat vehicles, which reduced the ability of our units to fight enemy tanks.

The division of the Bryansk Front during the counterattack played a negative role. The Headquarters directive on this matter was issued on the night of July 8, 1942, in the midst of preparing a counterattack.

The memoirs of individual military leaders, in particular P.A. Rotmistrov, M.I. Kazakov, I.N. Chistyakov, contain a hint that General A.I. Lizyukov was not ready to lead such a large association as a tank army. However, it is not. In confirmation, it is appropriate, in our opinion, to cite the opinion of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. He wrote: “Speaking here about the 5th Panzer Army, I cannot but say a few warm words about its valiant commander, Major General A.I. Lizyukov. My personal meeting with him on July 4, 1942 was the first, but he was well known to the leadership of the Armed Forces as an energetic, strong-willed, fast-growing military leader. This allowed the Headquarters to place him at the head of one of the first tank armies being formed already in June 1942, entrusting him with the most important task.

Against the general background of the unsuccessful actions of the 5th Panzer Army, the courage and high skill of our soldiers cannot and must not fade. The Soviet troops received important lessons from which appropriate conclusions were drawn. Subsequently, the headquarters of the fronts, armies, and corps carefully studied the mistakes made in command and control. The fighting during the counterattack of the 5th Panzer Army served as good material for theoretical analysis. At the same time, the growth of the combat skill of the troops provided a solid basis for achieving major operational results in the Stalingrad, Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh and Voronezh-Kastornensk operations that soon followed. 1 Since the beginning of the war, A.I. Lizyukov consistently commanded the 1st Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps. In the Battle of Moscow, he led the operational group of troops, renamed the 20th Army. In April 1942, he was entrusted with the formation of the 2nd Panzer Corps.

Literature:

1. TsAMO RF, f.96a, op.2011, d.26, l.Sh.
2. TsAMO, f.48a, op.1640, d.179, l.482.
3. T a m e, f.132, op.2642, d.2, l.83
4. Krivitsky A. I will never forget. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1964. - S.234. Military history magazine. - 1965. - No. 8. - P.7.
5. Krivitsky A. I will never forget. - P.233.
6. Military history magazine. - 1964. - No. 10. - P.39. "Ibid. -1965. - No. 8. - P.9. Krivitsky A. I will not forget forever. - С230.
7. Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. - Book 1. - M.: Politizdat, 1988. - S.220.

It was formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of the directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units. The main divisions of the army have changed throughout its existence. As a rule, it consisted of two or more guards tank corps and one or more guards mechanized corps.

According to the military doctrine of the Red Army of that time, the main role of tank armies was to develop the success of large offensive operations. When an enemy line of defense was breached (usually by a shock or combined army), the tank army rushed into this breakthrough, attacking rear units and central communication centers, thereby disrupting the interaction of enemy troops. The distances covered by a tank army were supposed to be several hundred kilometers.

In 1943, the army played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk, taking part in the oncoming battle at Prokhorovka. During this period, the army was subordinate to the Steppe Front and included
18th Tank Corps (commander - Major General of Tank Troops Boris Sergeevich Bakharov);
29th tank corps;
2nd Panzer Corps;
5th Guards Mechanized Corps;
32nd motorized rifle brigade (commander - Colonel Mikhail Emelyanovich Khvatov, until June 28, 1943, the acting brigade commander was his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Aleksandrovich Stukov);
110th tank brigade (commander - Colonel Ivan Mikhailovich Kolesnikov);
170th tank brigade (commander - lieutenant colonel Vasily Dmitrievich Tarasov);
181st Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Alekseevich Puzyrev);
36th Tank Breakthrough Regiment
29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29orb)
78th separate motorcycle battalion (78omtsb)
115th separate engineer battalion (115osapb)
292nd mortar regiment (292minp)
419th separate communications battalion (419obs)
1000th anti-tank artillery regiment (1000iptap)
1694th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (1694zenap)
repair and other rear services of the corps

With a total approximate number of tanks of 850 units.

In early 1944, the army took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In the spring of 1944, she took part, as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in the Uman-Botoshansk operation.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to develop success during the summer offensive of the Soviet troops during Operation Bagration. The formation was put on the offensive after breaking through the enemy defenses by the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, during which they completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Further, the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. The heavy losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the commander of the army, Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Rotmistrov, was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

At the end of 1944, during the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the 3rd German Tank Army, resulting in the encirclement of German troops in the Memel area.

At the beginning of 1945, the army as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front (hereinafter referred to as the 3rd Belorussian Front) took part in the East Prussian operation. In the course of its advance towards Elblag, the army cut off the German troops defending in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, forming the so-called. "Heiligenbeil cauldron".

From the end of the war until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 5th Guards Tank Army was stationed in the Belarusian Military District.

Most likely, the decision of General P. A. Rotmistrov to advance on his own was affected by his own negative experience in the summer of 1942. At that time, in the 5th Tank Army of Major General A.I. Lizyukov, the tank corps transferred by rail were introduced into battle at the same time, which largely determined the overall failure of the counterattack. In addition, fears about the bombing of Rotmistrov's army formations on the march turned out to be unfounded. The German command concentrated the main efforts of aviation on direct support of the offensive of its troops. Therefore, unlike the mechanized corps showered with bombs in the summer of 1941, the 5th Guards Tank Army moved to the front, practically without being exposed to the enemy.

Another army from the Headquarters reserve, the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov, as already mentioned, received an order to advance to Prokhorovka on July 8, 1943. At that time, it included the 32nd and 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, which united six divisions: the 6th Guards Airborne, 13th Guards Rifle, 66th Guards Rifle, 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards Rifle, 97th Guards Rifle. Another formation (42nd Guards Rifle Division) was in the commander's reserve. The army received the task of advancing to the line of the Psel River by July 11 and taking up defensive positions, preventing the enemy from advancing to the north and northeast. The formations of the army of A. S. Zhadov had to go from 60 to 80 km on foot.

At this time, in the Prokhorovka direction, there was a struggle for the third defensive line. On the evening of July 9, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General Goth, sent order No. 5 to the troops, which, in particular, stated: “The 2nd SS TC is attacking the enemy southwest of Prokhorovka and pushing him to the east. He takes possession of the heights on both sides of the river. Psel northwest of Prokhorovka. To solve the task, the SS men used the same method as the formations of the 48th tank corps of General t / v von Knobelsdorf - concentrating efforts on a narrow section. Breaking through the front with a narrow wedge, followed by a breakthrough to the rear of the units of the 183rd Infantry Division defending in the Prokhorovka direction, on July 10, the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" managed to occupy the Komsomolets state farm. Further advance was stopped by our tanks from the 2nd Panzer Corps. In turn, units of the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division “Dead Head” (“Totenkopf”) managed to seize a small bridgehead on the northern bank of Psel by the evening of July 10 after a bloody struggle.

The next phase of the struggle followed on 11 July. The defense in the Prokhorovka direction began to be "built" from suitable reserves. The 58th motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd tank corps and the 9th guards airborne division were advanced to positions between Psel and the railway. The formations occupied the indicated positions from the march; an integral defense system was not organized. The 2nd Tank Corps, which was the "core" of the defense on the outskirts of Prokhorovna, consisted of 74 tanks (26 brigade - 3 T-34-76, 9 T-70; 99 brigade - 16 T-34-76 and 19 T-70; 169 brigade - 16 T-34-76, 7 T-70, 15 Guards Otp - 4 "Churchill"). At the same time, the corps of General A.F. Popov was scattered along the front and could not simultaneously bring all these 74 tanks into battle. The consequences of the development of the situation were quite predictable. Applying the same method of concentrating the strike force on a narrow front, the Leibstandarte managed to break through on July 11 along the railway to the Prokhorovka station and capture the Oktyabrsky state farm. It was possible to stop further advance and even force the enemy to move away from Prokhorovka by pulling the SS artillery units and rocket mortars that had broken through to the flanks.

At the same time, our artillerymen developed tactics that included several effective techniques at once, which made it possible to fight German tanks and motorized infantry.

When the German troops were accumulating forces for an attack southwest of Prokhorovka, bypassing the reserves put forward by our command (the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Combined Arms Army. - Note. ed.), the 315th regiment of guards rocket mortars of Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Ganyushkin fired volley fire (stretched in time) alternately with platoons and batteries for an hour. And all this time the enemy could not resume the offensive. According to Soviet data, the Katyushas set fire to and disabled 27 enemy tanks.

This tactically new method of firing proved to be quite effective. Under the fire of rocket-propelled mortars extended over time, the enemy's nerves often could not stand it and his forces retreated from the occupied territory. But most often on that day, the Katyushas had to shoot at direct fire, and in this case, special courage and special skill were required, and above all from the commanders of divisions, batteries, crews, their ability to aim and organize people for selfless actions, to ensure that under fire, quickly bring combat vehicles to an open combat position, aim them at the target in a matter of seconds and fire a volley. But the artillerymen and mortarmen could only temporarily delay the enemy. In order to turn the tide, it was necessary to bring into battle new, much larger reserves.

The situation was getting out of control of the Soviet command, and in order to save the situation, the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Combined Arms Armies hurried to the battlefield. Now their formations became the "framework of defense" in this sector, which is why the 2nd Tank Corps was transferred to the operational subordination of 5 TA. Also, Rotmistrov's army, in addition to regular guns, was attached to artillery formations and units from the reserve of the main command. Tanks covered as many as two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, apparently, the fear of German aviation was quite great. Now let's see what the 5th Guards Tank Army had at its disposal in the fight against the German steel avalanche.

This army association belonged to the tank armies of the second formation.

The creation of the 4th and 5th tank armies began on February 22, 1943, in accordance with the directive of the people's commissar of defense. This document stated: “In pursuance of the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 2791 of January 28, 1943, I order:

1. During the period of February-April, 1943, form two guards tank armies in composition and according to the state according to the list-proposal No. 1.

2. The deployment and terms of readiness of the guards tank armies should be established:

b) 4th Guards Tank Army - Kupyansk, Krasny Liman. Completion date April 15, 1943.

3. Include in the composition of the guards tank armies:

a) To the 5th Guards Tank Army: 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Corps, 29th Tank Corps, 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

b) To the 4th Guards Tank Army: 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, 23rd Tank Corps, 1st Guards Mechanized Corps.

It should be said that by the summer of 1943 the composition of the army had changed somewhat. When, according to the directive of the General Staff of July 6, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army was included in the Voronezh Front, it included: the 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 53rd Guards Tank, 1- 1st Guards Motorcycle, 678th Howitzer and 689th Guards Mortar Regiments, 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, 4th Communications Regiment, 377th Motorized Engineer Battalion, rear units of the institution.

As is already known, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops P. A. Rotmistrov was appointed commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Major General of Tank Troops P. G. Grishin was a member of the Military Council, and Colonel V. N. Baskakov was appointed chief of staff.

The two-corps organization (2 tank corps in the army), in accordance with which 5 TA was formed, no longer fully met the principles for the use (which had already developed in 1943) of tank armies. By the end of the war, almost all tank armies will have three tank corps. But in 1943, the understanding of the optimal staffing structure was only being formed, moreover, by trial and error.

By the beginning of the operation, the 5th Guards Tank Army, according to the state, included the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, as well as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps were attached to the army association. Both of the corps formations mentioned by the latter had already participated in the battles, therefore they had about 200 tanks, an "incomplete set" of artillery and other types of weapons. The artillery of the tank army, together with the reinforcement received (by order of the commander of the Voronezh Front, the 5th tank army was given the 114th and 522nd howitzer artillery regiments, the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment, the 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. - Note. ed.) consisted of one cannon brigade (in different documents, in the list of parts of attached artillery, the numbering of the regiments does not always coincide, but, apparently, the cannon brigade included the 93rd and 148th cannon artillery regiments: eighteen 122-mm A-19 artillery systems in each .- Note. ed.), three howitzer regiments, eight anti-tank artillery regiments, three mortar regiments, three rocket artillery regiments, and two anti-aircraft artillery divisions. Part of the artillery was attached to the tank corps, and the other part became part of the army artillery group.

Thus, before the start of the counterattack, the 5th Guards Tank Army, together with attached corps, included 501 T-34-76 medium tanks, 261 T-70 and 31 light tanks (as indicated in the document, 21 tanks are assigned according to the state. - Note. ed.) heavy infantry support tank MK IV "Churchill III / IV" British production. Total - 793 tanks.

The material part of the artillery consisted of 45 122-m guns, 124 artillery systems with a caliber of 76.2 mm, 330 45-mm anti-tank guns, 1007 anti-tank rifles, 495 mortars and 39 RS M-13 installations (the indicated amount of artillery did not include artillery equipment attached to the front .- Note. ed.).

The main striking force of the 5th Guards Tank Army was the medium tanks T-34-76 - the famous "thirty-four".

By the summer of 1943, our combat vehicles had lost their superiority over a significant number of German tanks and self-propelled guns - and not even over the "Tigers" with their most powerful 88-mm artillery systems 56 calibers long, but over medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H (except tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H, which were produced from April 1943 to May 1944, later versions (412 units) of the earlier modification Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.G. - Note. ed.) and StuG III Ausf.G assault guns equipped with the 75 mm Kwk 40 artillery system.

Let's evaluate the dueling capabilities of Soviet and German combat vehicles. The 75 mm Kwk 40 tank gun with a barrel length of 48 calibers quite confidently hit the T-34-76 tanks. According to Soviet data, the following distances (in meters) for a 75-mm armor-piercing projectile were the limit of through armor penetration (PSP) and, accordingly, dangerous tank damage:

Name of the armor protection element	PSP along the normal	PSP at a heading angle of 30 degrees
upper and lower sheets of the nose	800	200
board - top	less than 3000	300
board - bottom	less than 3000	800
forehead of the tower	less than 3000	less than 3000
side of the tower	less than 3000	less than 3000

From the above data, it follows that the T-34-76 turret armor was no longer a noticeable obstacle to German shells. The hull was confidently hit by a direct hit almost at a direct shot distance, however, at certain heading angles, the shells simply glided over the armor. 13% of 75-mm shells hit the hull with a ricochet.

The domestic 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun, on the contrary, could no longer destroy German armored vehicles head-on. Her shots did not pose a danger to heavy tanks of the Pz.Kpfw.VI (H) "Tiger" type, which were in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. 76, 2 mm armor-piercing shells could not penetrate thick, 100–200 mm frontal armor at all, and only occasionally from minimum distances hit side plates 80 mm thick made of ductile steel of medium hardness.

Our tankers did not have to meet the Ferdinands and Panthers on the Prokhorovsky field (out of 2772 German tanks and self-propelled guns operating on the Kursk Bulge, the Tigers, Panthers and Elefants / Ferdinands accounted for only 17% of the total number .- Note. ed.), but mass medium-class vehicles - Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and a significant part of the assault guns in 1943 entered the battlefield with frontal protection from 80-mm sheets of rolled steel of medium hardness, not too inferior in durability to the side armor of the Tigers. Soviet tankers could only rely on the possibility of shelling the weak sides of enemy vehicles, and even the Pz.Kpfw.IV turret, which, unlike the hull, retained 50 mm thick frontal armor.

The only hope for the crews of the T-34-76 tanks was the BR-354P sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer shells with a tungsten carbide core. They were put into service in April-May 1943. A small amount of such ammunition, according to the memoirs of M. E. Katukov, fell into the 1st Guards Tank Army before the Battle of Kursk. With armor penetration of 90 mm along the normal at a distance of 500 m, BR-354P (another version of UBR-354P may also be mentioned. - Note. ed.) could hit Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and StuG III assault guns in the forehead. Due to the coil form, the sub-caliber projectiles practically did not know ricochets and entered the armor at an encounter angle of only 10 °. Sometimes at short distances they could knock out a Panther and even a Tiger in the forehead. Whether there were such ammunition in the 5th Guards Tank Army, the author does not know.

In total, the tanks of all three SS Panzergrenadier divisions (1 SS Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2 SS Reich and 3 SS Totenkopf / Totenkopf) took part in the battle of Prokhorovka, as well as separate parts of the 11- 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

The material part of the panzergrenadier and tank divisions of the German troops that took part in the tank battle near Prokhorovka (data as of 1.07.43)

Name of connections	Pz.Kpfw.II	Pz.Kpfw.III			Pz.Kpfw.IV		Bef. Pz.	Fl.Pz.	Pz.Kpfw.VI	T-34	Total
		L/42	L/60	75 mm	L/24	L/48
1 pgd SS	4	3	10	-	-	67	9	-	13	-	106
2 pgd SS	1	-	62	-	-	33	10	-	14	25	145
3 pgd SS	-	-	63	-	8	44	9	-	15	-	139
11 td	8	11	51	-	1	25	4	13	-	-	113

This table does not contain quantitative materials on assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank self-propelled guns, but this does not change the general situation in any way. Everywhere (except for the "Leibstandarte"), "fours" and "Tigers" accounted for less than 50% of the tank fleet of the formations represented.

The rest of the German armored vehicles that the "thirty-fours" could meet in the battle of Prokhorovka: medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III (the most massive vehicles. - Note. ed.) and light Pz.Kpfw.II, self-propelled guns "on a moving carriage", half-tracked armored personnel carriers and cannon armored vehicles - were easily destroyed by 76.2-mm armor-piercing or even high-explosive fragmentation shells.

But the T-34-76 vehicles, in the case of a long tank battle, were inferior to the German "panzers" in terms of internal ergonomics, had worse and less convenient radio equipment and surveillance equipment (even the commander's cupola on the T-34-76 tanks appeared only in August-September 1943 .- Note. ed.), the “thirty-four” gearbox (more precisely, its switching) during marches and in battle greatly exhausted the driver. In general, a comparison of the capabilities of the T-34-76 tank with potential German competitors was not very pleasing - the "thirty-four" almost did not get rid of the "childhood diseases" of three years ago, but lost its main advantages - excellent armor protection and powerful weapons. As for the T-70 and MK IV Churchill IV tanks, as well as the SU-122 and SU-76 self-propelled guns, they were very specific vehicles for highly specialized tasks. Only heavy self-propelled guns SU-152 from the ADD group were “on the shoulder” of any targets, but there were negligible few of them (self-propelled guns).

In general, the SU-152 self-propelled guns were our dialectical response to the powerful German "Tigers" (heavy self-propelled guns "Elephant / Ferdinand" and tanks "Panther" were first used on the Kursk Bulge, so there was no way to familiarize yourself with the structure of captured vehicles, let alone fire at them no possibility. Note. ed.). Why dialectical? Yes, because such an ACS was designed and built by our specialists in just 25 days: a well-developed artillery system - a 152-mm ML-20 howitzer cannon, was placed practically unchanged on the tracked base of a KB-1C heavy tank.

Despite the tight deadline of the task, there was a competition, the favorite of which was the project of the venerable tank designer Zh. Ya. Kotin. According to his idea, the oscillating part of the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun was installed practically unchanged in a frame and, together with the ammunition load and the crew, was placed in a specially designed conning tower on the chassis of the “Kotinsky tank” KV. At the same time, the serial gun was almost not subjected to design changes, only the recoil devices and the location of the gun trunnions changed slightly. According to the Kotin project, the recoil force decreased and the length of the cradle was reduced, on which a reinforced clip with trunnions was installed. At the same time, the armor shield, in addition to protecting against shells, also served as a balancing element.

The most important issue that worried the developers the most was the possibility of placing such an artillery system on a tank chassis. Fortunately, the gun fit in, and even managed to place twenty 49-kilogram high-explosive shells and as many large cartridge cases for them, since the howitzer gun was a towed artillery system, with all the ensuing features of its combat use. Thus, the rate of fire of the self-propelled gun, as well as the ammunition load, were small. The initial velocity of the projectile - about 655 m / s - was also not high. But at such a speed, ammunition the size of a suitcase and weighing 43.56 kg destroyed the frontal parts of the armor of any tank of that time, and hitting the turret inevitably tore it off the shoulder strap. The dynamic impact was such that the crew of the enemy combat vehicle, if for some reason they did not receive “mechanical” damage, could no longer continue the battle for medical reasons (loss of consciousness, concussion, etc.). In addition to firing at tanks from a howitzer cannon, it was possible to fire along a hinged trajectory from closed positions. The latter indicator was probably the only one where our artillery self-propelled gun surpassed the Tiger in its capabilities, but in the conditions of a fleeting tank battle, the shortcomings of the domestic self-propelled guns were greatly leveled by the gigantic caliber of the artillery system, a well-developed and reliable artillery and tracked base, as well as the high qualification of the crews, which in the first half of the formation of self-propelled artillery units was staffed by artillery personnel, traditionally the intellectual elite of the Russian army.

The SU-152 design group under the general supervision of Zh. Ya. Kotin was created at the end of 1942 (it included 7 people: L. S. Troyanov, G. N. Rybin, K. N. Ilyin, N. N. Zvonarev, V. M. Seleznev, P. S. Tarapatin and V. I. Tarotko. Note. ed.), the ACS project was defended on January 2, 1943, and on January 25 of the same year, the finished SU-152 rolled out to the firing test site.

The speed of designing and building the self-propelled gun was amazing. Around the serial gun, delivered from factory No. 172 (Motovilikha) and standing on a pedestal, according to sketch drawings from plywood, they began to build a hull model in the maximum allowable dimensions. It was possible to ensure the rotation of the artillery system with a horizontal angle of rotation of 12 °, an elevation angle of 18 ° and a declination angle of 5 °. On the basis of "plywood patterns" they created drawings, and already on them they "dressed" the gun in armor.

Finally the prototype was ready in metal. It's time to put the cannon brought from Perm to its intended place. But then, during the assembly of the machine, it turned out that the gun did not pass through the opening left for him in the conning tower.

Have you seen your work? - Flashing his eyes, the chief designer of serial production N. L. Dukhov asked the blundered designer.

What will you do?

Cut live with a welding machine.

That's right, go ahead.

And he, turning, went to a group of military men and representatives of the people's commissariat, who were right there in the shop waiting for the assembly to be completed. To excited questions about what happened, what was the reason for the delay, N. L. Dukhov laughed it off:

Yes, we inserted the gun with the wrong end.

The tension disappeared, everyone understood that the mistake was fixable and there was no need to make a tragedy out of it.

January 25, 1943 came. At the training ground near Chelyabinsk, the first shots from the new artillery self-propelled gun were to be fired. Prepared to shoot blanks weighing 50 kg. The distance is only 80 m. A roaring shot sounded. The car jerked, even sat down a little, and rolled back a meter. At the same time, several balancers of the rollers reached the stops, but nothing broke anywhere, the chassis remained intact. The first success inspired people. Maybe that's why they laughed heartily at one engineer when, unexpectedly caught by the roar of a shot, he fell into a snowdrift.

Well, the first victim! - comrades joked about him.

This success was followed by heated discussions on the fire capabilities of the vehicle. The installation of such a powerful gun for direct fire was unusual. The representative of the Main Artillery Directorate, engineer-lieutenant colonel P.F. Solomonov, did not have the necessary calculated data to assess what the trajectory of a high-explosive fragmentation or armor-piercing projectile would be when fired at direct fire from a 152-mm howitzer. How long will a heavy projectile fly before it hits the ground? None of those present at the tests could determine this: all verified tables of firing in terms of range and dispersion ellipse from this gun were compiled only for mounted fire. Truly, the development team was on unbeaten paths! Their doubts could only be resolved during test firing at a special range. Such a landfill existed in the Chelyabinsk region.

They started shooting with blanks at plywood shields measuring 2x2 m. The first shot from 500 m. Excellent hit! The second shot from 800 m. Also a hit. They shoot at 1000 m, at 1200 m - the result is the same - an exact hit on the shield! Could not resist, shouted: "Hurrah!"

The success of the tests meant that the new SU-152 self-propelled guns could hit enemy tanks with direct fire from a considerable distance and fire at the embrasures of enemy bunkers and bunkers, while the crew would be covered behind a powerful frontal armor shield. But the rate of fire was still low: 3-4 rounds per minute. The optimal range of a direct shot was 890 m. Armor penetration at an angle of 90 °: from 500 m - 105 mm, from 1000 m - 95 m.

The optical sight had to be set as it was: vertical aiming - by combining the crosshairs in the sight and on the plywood shield. For the fastest training of crews, this is even good - the preparation is the simplest. A typical approach of the national design school.

At the test site, the testers had the opportunity to try out a new self-propelled gun in shooting at a captured tank. Speaking about this, Zh. Ya. Kotin recalled how one of the shells, hitting the turret, completely demolished it from the hull of a German tank.

So we forced the Nazi beasts to take off their hats in front of our gun, - said one of those present.

A few days after the designers had eliminated the shortcomings noticed by the military representatives, the State Commission signed a report with recommendations on the adoption of the 45-ton SU-152 self-propelled artillery mount. On this occasion, there is a modest mention in the “History of the Great Patriotic War”: “On the instructions of the State Defense Committee, a prototype of the SU-152 self-propelled artillery mount was designed and manufactured at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk within 25 days, which went into production in February 1943” . These machines were mass-produced at the Kirov plant for a whole year.

The successful design and rapid production of the new machine was successful for the designers and manufacturers due to the most severe unification of most parts of the machine and weapons - all the main parts were taken from serial samples. This simplified the coordination of work with many allied factories supplying armor, weapons, sights, motors, electrical equipment and entire components and assemblies.

Recalling one of the battles with the participation of the Kotin SU-152s, a former member of the Military Council of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General N.K. Popel, told how a wedge of German tanks broke through our defenses. Heavy vehicles, having crushed the anti-tank battery on the move, broke out into the open. They were met by self-propelled gunners ... “From above, from the crest of the hill, they hit 152-mm guns, each shell not only breaking through the armor, but making huge gaping holes, turning the tank around as if it were cardboard,” N. K. Popel wrote. - Of the forty Nazi tanks that broke through, eight returned.

They returned and brought to the fascist troops the news of a new terrible weapon of the Russians.

Unfortunately, there were few such self-propelled guns in the 5th Guards Tank Army, or rather, in the artillery group attached to it - there were 11 such vehicles in the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment. And little is known about their use.

The heavy tanks MK IV Churchill IV, which were in service with the 15th and especially the 36th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiments, were very specific vehicles.

British military theorists divided their combat vehicles into cruisers and infantry support. The heavy Churchills belonged to the latter and had very powerful armor (forehead - 101, side - 76, stern - 64, roof - 15-19, bottom - 19, tower - 89 mm. - Note. ed.), but a small speed - no higher than 27 km / h.

Imagine such a moving 40-ton (combat weight - 39.574 tons) "safe", armed with a 57-mm (6-pound) MK III cannon with a barrel length of 42.9 calibers. Her armor-piercing projectile left the barrel at a speed of 848 m / s and could penetrate 81 mm thick armor at a distance of 450 m (with a plate tilt of 30 °). A more advanced version of the 57-mm artillery system - MK V had a length of 50 calibers and an initial speed of 898 m / s, which, under the same conditions, made it possible to penetrate 83-mm armor. Ammunition "Churchill" was 84 artillery rounds and consisted only of armor-piercing shells; high-explosive fragmentation, necessary to support the infantry, was not available at all. But in this particular case, especially in the conditions of a tank battle, in which the 15th and 36th separate breakthrough tank regiments participated, this was not so important.

Thus, it turned out that the "thirty-fours" and "Churchills" were close in their dueling characteristics in relation to the tanks and assault guns of the enemy, with the exception of the "Tigers". Only the T-34-76 was more versatile, especially when escorting infantry, and the Churchills, with their extremely thick armor, were advantageous to use in (relatively) close tank combat, which, in general, was subsequently done.

The 122-mm self-propelled guns SU-122, which were available in mixed self-propelled artillery regiments, could quite successfully destroy medium and heavy tanks and assault guns of the enemy, but the light self-propelled guns SU-76 and T-70 tanks in the battle on Prokhorovka field were not better meddle: the first - because of weak armor, and the second - because of weak weapons.

To confirm my words, I will give the following example. The head of the political department of the 26th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Geller, in one of his reports noted the skill of the commander of the T-70 light tank from the 282nd Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Illarionov:

“In the battles of 12.7.43 Comrade. Illarionov knocked out the Tiger tank, and then set it on fire with 3 shells on board.

Theoretically, this would be possible if the T-70 gun opened fire on the "Tiger" from a distance of half a meter, and even then it was necessary to find an appropriate place in the side armor. Most likely, the German "troika" or "four" were destroyed by Illarionov, which for a tank of this type was simply an excellent result.

The forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the formations and units attached to it were approximately equal in dueling capabilities to the German tank group. Against better quality Pz.Kpfw.IVs and StuG IIIs, we could put up more numerous T-34-76s, SU-122s and Churchills, and SU-152s could easily cope with the Tigers.

But a real war is not a duel with rapiers, the winner is the one who maneuvers better, uses aviation and artillery as support, and finally, who has better trained crews, junior and middle-level commanders. There would be a desire.

But there was a desire. Both ordinary soldiers and generals, and maybe even marshals, were eager to “knock” with the German tankers. We have something like that in our blood, and how could such a gigantic state be put together without an indefatigable national character.

The terrain on which the 5th Guards Tank Army was to attack was rugged, had many ravines, gullies and small river barriers (Solomatinka, Vorskla, etc.). The most significant obstacles to the enemy's advance in the direction of Kursk were the rivers Psel and Seim.

By forcing the Psel River, the enemy in this direction received freedom of maneuver, while at the same time falling under cut-off fire from the line of the Seim River. Consequently, for an unimpeded attack on Kursk, the enemy simply needed to capture this water barrier as well, or "cover behind barriers with the front to the northeast."

Separate sections of the terrain were completely open, did not have trees or shrubs, which made it possible for aviation to freely destroy the infantry and armored vehicles of the opposing side.

The presence of a large number of heights, mounds and settlements contributed to the success of defensive battles. Such conditions significantly delayed the advance of our troops in the event of an enemy withdrawal, but, in turn, played a positive role in the success of the defense against the Germans in the first days of the operation on the Kursk salient.

Locality (even in those years. - Note. ed.) had a wide network of dirt and country roads, which was the most important condition for the movement and rapid concentration of troops, as well as the smooth operation of rear units.

The general nature of the terrain allowed for a wide maneuver of large tank formations, which contributed to the deployment of a major tank battle here.

The total distance of the upcoming march was determined at 200–220 km.

By decision of the army commander, the march of the corps was carried out along two main routes.

Formations and units of the army set out for the new concentration area at 01.30 on July 7, 1943. Fearing bombardments, the tank army made the most of the night. The movement was organized as follows:

a) Advance Detachment (in some documents it is referred to as a reserve detachment. - Note. ed.) under the command of Major General Trufanov (deputy commander of 5 TA. - Note. ed.) as part of the 1st separate Red Banner Guards Motorcycle Regiment, 53 Guards. tp, 689 iptap, one battery 678 gap moved along the route Ostrogozhsk, Krasnoye, Bolotovo, Chernyanka. By noon on July 7, this group advanced to the Protochnaya, Krasnaya Polyana line, ensuring the exit and concentration of army corps.

b) The 29th tank corps with an anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 6th anti-aircraft artillery division, moving along the route of the forward detachment, reached the Saltykovo, Sergeevka, Bogoslovka, Volkovo, Dubenka area by the end of the day on July 7.

c) The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky mechanized corps, which was also covered by a regiment of anti-aircraft guns from the 6th anti-aircraft artillery division, having the main route Karpenkovo, Alekseevka, Verkhososensk, Novy Oskol, Korostovo, by the morning of July 8, had completed its concentration in the Verkhnee-Atamanskoye, Korostovo area , Sorokino.

d) The 18th Panzer Corps set out from the Rossosh region at 10.30 on July 7 and by the morning of July 8 completed its concentration in the Ogivnoye, Konshino, Krasnaya Polyana, Olshanka regions.

e) The 76th Guards Mortar Regiment and the 768th Howitzer Artillery Regiment concentrated in the area of ​​the Orlik settlement.

Thus, the army corps, having made marches of 200–220 km in a day, concentrated in the indicated area by the morning of July 8, 1943.

The dimensions of the concentration area along the front were 40–45 km, and in depth 30–35 km.

At 01.00 on July 9, a combat order was received: “By the end of 9.7, go to the area of ​​Bobryshevo, Bolshaya Psinka, Charming, Aleksandrovsky, Bolshiye Seti with the task of being ready to repel the attacks of the advancing enemy.”

During the day of July 9, the troops of the 5th TA again marched and, having traveled another 100 km during the daytime, concentrated in the rear of the 5th Guards Army, which by this time was already fighting.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshevo, Nagolnoe, Bolshaya Psinka. By the morning of July 10, two brigades took up defense along the northern bank of the Psel River in the Zapselets (claim.), Vesely sector. The 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, together with the 104th Anti-Tank Regiment, was located at the Zapselets-Lip line (17 km southeast of Oboyan); The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, together with the 1447th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, occupied the line of Lip (claim), Vesely (claim), Kurlov; The 12th mechanized brigade concentrated in the forest northwest of Upper Olshanka (Vyshnyaya Olshanka); The 24th Guards Tank Brigade, together with the 285th Ministry of the Regiment, were in Bolshaya Psinka. The corps headquarters was located in the Nagolnoye settlement.

By 2300 on July 9, the 18th Tank Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Verkhnyaya Olshanka, Kartashovka, Aleksandrovsky, Prokhorovka and took up the defense of the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade with the support of the 1000th Anti-Terrorist Regiment and the 298th Minpolka along the Vesely line, high. 226, 6, Mikhailovka, southern outskirts of Prokhorovka, Quiet Padina.

The 29th Panzer Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Chernovetskaya, Vikhrovka, Svino-Pogorelovka, Zhuravka.

The mobile detachment of Major General Trufanov (in the previous composition) was advanced to the Oboyan region to the mouth of the Zapselets River. This battle group was tasked with: "... to prevent the enemy from reaching the northern bank of the Psel River, and to hold the occupied line, as well as the city of Oboyan until the troops of the Voronezh Front approach."

The 678th howitzer regiment and the 76th guards regiment of the RS concentrated in Ploskoye and Kolbasovka in readiness to support the actions of the 5th mechanized and 18th tank mechanized corps.

Thus, the army troops made a total march of 320–350 km within three days, which averaged 100–115 km per day. Thanks to the thoughtful organization of the march, the troops arrived in these areas on time. This made it possible to immediately organize a defense by part of the forces of 5 TA and begin preparing for the upcoming offensive.

At the same time, it should be noted that our armored vehicles, especially the "thirty-fours" produced at factories in the first half of 1943, for a number of organizational and technological reasons, were not adapted to such long marches "without MTBF" and often failed . "God have mercy", and enemy aircraft, as already mentioned, did not bomb tank columns, but breaking vehicles were either towed or repaired "according to a temporary scheme" so that they somehow "hobbled" to the starting area. In 18 TCs, out of 187 tanks available at 22.00 on July 8, 104 vehicles or 55.6% of the entire fleet remained on the march. Due to technical malfunctions, the 29th Tank Corps "lost" 13 units of armored vehicles (six T-34-76, 5 T-70, one KV, one SU-76) and 15 vehicles. The losses of this formation on the march were insignificant: 1 was killed (hit by a tank) and 3 people were wounded (which once again confirms that the columns were not bombed during the march. - Note. ed.). At 17.00 on July 11, there were 33 tanks on the way in the 18th shopping mall, 13 combat vehicles in the 29th shopping mall, and 51 in the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (a quarter of the entire fleet). In total, 198 tanks and self-propelled guns, or 27.5% of the army’s materiel, lagged behind on the march out of 721 armored units of 5 TAs (without formations and reinforcement parts). It is clear that it was impossible to go into battle with such equipment without maintenance, repair and restoration. It took several days, but they just didn’t exist. The men were also exhausted from the three-day "maneuvers" and the enemy was inexorably approaching.

There was also some funny stuff. The 1062nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment of the 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, equipped with ZiS-42 half-tracked vehicles instead of standard vehicles as traction means, managed to be 8-10 hours late everywhere on the march. The tanks were already in place, and the anti-aircraft gunners covering them were moving somewhere behind. In the same way, the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps was delayed (for 3 hours) by the advanced army detachment, which was slowly “dragging” at the head of the columns. So the implementation of the march left an ambiguous impression.

Nevertheless, the lessons of the summer tank battle of 1942 went to our generals for the future - the defense lines were occupied mainly by motorized rifle formations of the corps. Tank brigades were retained as a shock fist - for delivering counterattacks from the depths.

For example, on July 10, 1943, the 29th Tank Corps, which played a crucial role in the Battle of Prokhorovka, had 130 T-34-76, 85 T-70, one KV, 12 SU-122, 9 SU-76. Two refuelings of fuel and lubricants were brought to the concentration area, ammunition - 1.5 b / c, food - 8 daily dachas. The supply station was already 300–350 km from the location of the compound.

The total length of the defense front of 5 TA on July 10 was 60-70 km, and in depth the positions were echeloned by 35-40 km. In anxious tension, our fighters waited for the approach of the enemy.

Counterattack planning

The 5th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Armies, which arrived from the Stavka reserve, could be used in accordance with various operational and tactical schemes. But the Soviet command, remembering the year-long fiasco of the tank corps and the 5th tank army in the battle in the Voronezh region, wanted to finally use a powerful armored grouping as a single "ram fist". The optimal form of using a tank army is an offensive, as long as the terrain and conditions allow. The last parameter made its own adjustments - in this particular case, it could only be a counterattack. Its successful implementation could contribute to the destruction of one or more enemy formations, at worst, undermine their offensive power.

It was this option that was chosen and defended by the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. The commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army M.F. Vatutin, did not object to such a development of events.

Detailed planning of the counterattack (taking into account the terrain and the current situation) most likely began on July 9, since Vasilevsky himself later wrote that “since the evening of August 9, 1943, I have been continuously in the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov on Prokhorovskoye and southern directions". Consequently, the overall management of the planning of the counterattack fell primarily on his shoulders, especially since Vasilevsky was directly involved in organizing the strike of the 5th Panzer Army by Major General A.I. Lizyukov a year ago. According to the original plan, the 5th Guards Tank Army was to go on the offensive from the Vasilievka - Komsomolets state farm - Belenikhino line. In this area it was possible to deploy and at the same time bring into battle large forces of tanks. They had to go only 15-17 km to the Oboyanskoye Highway, which was by no means an excessive task. The 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies were supposed to deliver an auxiliary blow towards Rotmistrov's tanks from the west. With a favorable set of circumstances, there was every chance, if not to surround the enemy strike force, then at least inflict heavy losses on it.

One should not think that the form and place of the counterattack were "by definition" erroneous, and in general such an idea could only come into the heads of our generals. In the course of repelling the Soviet offensive on the Mius at the end of July 1943, the German command in the same way planned a deep strike by the SS corps into the center of the bridgehead captured by the Southern Front. The actions of the Germans on the Mius were, in essence, a reduced-scale counterattack of the Voronezh Front. In a word, no one developed new operational-tactical forms of combat, and the decision to counterattack was justified, and its form was acceptable and logical in its own way.

The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the commander of the Voronezh Fronts, assessing the situation that developed during the unfolding battle in the defense sector entrusted to them, concluded that by concentrating efforts in the Prokhorovka direction, the enemy was introducing more and more available forces into battle and that a crisis of the enemy offensive was brewing. A decisive disruption of the enemy offensive and the defeat of his wedged grouping under the prevailing conditions could be achieved in several ways, the most optimal of which, in the opinion of our generals, was a powerful counterattack by the troops of the Voronezh Front, reinforced by the strategic reserves of the Stavka.

Vasilevsky and Vatutin decided to launch a counterattack on the morning of July 12. It was envisaged to deliver two strikes in a converging direction to Yakovlevo: from the northeast - by the forces of the 5th Guards Army; from the northwest - the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies. The 7th Guards Army, by striking forces in the direction of Razumnoe south of Belgorod, was supposed to contribute to the fulfillment of the main task of the front. The rest of the armies of the Voronezh Front were ordered to defend on the occupied lines. The 2nd and 17th air armies received the task of supporting the counterattack of the ground forces with their main forces.

However, the planned preparation of the offensive operation was disrupted. On the morning of July 11, the enemy resumed the offensive and achieved some success. He managed to push the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the direction of Oboyan, and the formations of the 5th Guards Army and part of the 2nd Tank Corps - in the direction of Prokhorovka. In the zone of the 69th Army, the enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 305th Infantry Division. As a result of the withdrawal of our troops, a two-day preparation of artillery to support the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army was disrupted. Part of our artillery was destroyed, having fallen under the blow of enemy tanks during the exit to firing positions, and the other part was forced to retreat to new areas. Therefore, artillery preparation had to be organized anew and in a hurry, which in turn subsequently affected the course of the entire operation.

Thus, the conduct of the counterattack was called into question by the events that took place during its preparation, that is, on July 10-11. The complication of the situation in the Korochan direction forced the division of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the advancement of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to the Korocha region. Thus, the number of formations simultaneously introduced into battle has decreased by a third. A much more unpleasant event was the German breakthrough in the Prokhorovka area and the capture of positions from which Rotmistrov's tanks were supposed to advance. However, it was too late to give up the counterattack.

The situation is very original. The Soviet command did not yet know what the enemy would do, and, like a doctor who cannot make a final diagnosis to the patient, he constantly "was at the bedside of the latter, assessed the external symptoms and measured the temperature of the object of treatment." That is why Marshal Vasilevsky did not get out of the front line.

“07/11/43 from 03.00 the corps commander with a group of headquarters commanders, brigade commanders, following the order of the commander of the 5th guards. TA, made a reconnaissance of the area: Leski, railway. Booth 2 km west of Leska, Barracks, Shakhovo with the task:

a) Choice of starting positions for the body.

b) Determine the patency of tanks and artillery through the Sakhnovsky Donets stream, through the railway bed. Log Dry Raft.

c) Ways of approach to the area of ​​starting positions.

d) Determine the possibility of accumulating infantry for an attack on Log Dry Raft.

e) Places of command post and NP, as well as OP artillery.

In Shakhovo, at 0600 on 07/11/43, the results of the reconnaissance were reported to the commander of the 5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who, after reports from the corps commanders, gave the order.

Extract from the combat order to the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

"one. The enemy, with the forces of 4 tank and one mechanized divisions, continues to push our units in the north-eastern directions, trying to connect with the northern grouping of the Oryol-Kursk direction.

By 11.00 on 11.07.43, the advanced units of the enemy reached the line: Kochetovka, Krasny Oktyabr, Vasilyevka, the Komsomolets state farm, Ivanovsky settlement, Yasnaya Polyana, Belenikhino and further south along the railway line. to Gostishchevo.

2. 29 shopping mall with the 366 MZA regiment, 76 RS regiment, 1529 SAP - the task at 3.00 12.07.43 was to attack the enemy in the band:

right: high 252, 2, forest sowing. state farm "Komsomolets" 1 km, sowing. outskirts of Bolshiye Mayachki, vys. 251, 2;

left: Grushki, Watchtower, vys. 223, 4, north-west. outskirts of Pogorelovka - destroy the enemy in the area: high. 255, 9, forest 1 km southeast. H. Teterevino, vys. 256, 2, in the future to act on Big Lighthouses, Pokrovka.

On July 11, 1943, at 15:30, the corps began to move to its starting positions for the attack: the Oktyabrsky state farm, vys. 245, 8, Guard.

By the end of the day on July 11, 1943, the enemy pushed back the rifle units of the army, occupied the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Stalinskoe department state farm, Storozhevoye, and there was an immediate threat of the capture of Prokhorovka.

In connection with the occupation of the indicated line by the enemy, the corps, not having reached the intended starting positions, on 11.07.43 by 22.00 took up new starting positions: 0.5 km west and south-west of Prokhorovka in readiness to repel enemy attacks in the offensive in the southwestern direction.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky, who arrived in the corps, ordered to attack the enemy on July 11 at 21:00, but since the enemy did not show much activity in the corps and army sector, the attack was postponed and scheduled for 07/12/43 at 03:00.

Units and subunits of the corps with access to their original positions began to prepare personnel and materiel for the attack.

On July 12, 1943, at 0300, there was no signal to attack. At 4.00 an order was received from the commander of the 5th Guards. TA about changing the start time of the attack:

“To the commander of the 29th TC, Major General Comrade Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same, that is, actions from 76 GMP, 1529 SAP, to break the enemy’s resistance at the turn: a grove 1 km north of the Komsomolets state farm, to destroy his grouping in the area of ​​Luchki, Bolshie Mayachki, Pokrovka, by the end of 07/12/43. go to the Pokrovka area, preparing for further actions to the south:

2. The beginning of the attack. 07/12/43 at 8.30. Beginning of artillery preparation from 8.00.

3. I allow you to use the radio. 07/12/43 from 7.00.

(Commander of the 5th Guards TA) (Lieutenant General Rotmistrov.) (Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA) (Major General Baskakov ".)

These documents show that our command had a very vague idea of ​​the intentions and actions of the enemy.

It may seem strange, but the German command did not have clear information about the upcoming counterattack by large forces of tanks and infantry. Of course, German reconnaissance aircraft observed the concentration of tank units. However, they could not give definite data on what forces were assembled on the outskirts of Prokhorovka. Also, there could be no question of revealing the numbering of parts and connections. In the conditions of a dense positional front, there could be no question of any raids deep into the Soviet rear in order to capture "tongues". The brigades of Rotmistrov's corps observed the strictest radio silence regime, which did not allow the enemy's radio intelligence to calculate the arrival of tanks. Probably, on most used vehicles, tactical markings were also deliberately absent. In a word, the secrecy measures taken significantly disoriented the enemy and ensured the surprise of the counterattack.

Even on the evening of July 11, the command of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had no idea what kind of "surprise" was waiting for him the next day. The report, signed by the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the corps, contains only general words about the intentions of the enemy:

“General impression: it is possible to strengthen the enemy in the Prokhorovka area. Presumably located in the bend of the river. The psel of the 10th tank corps is represented only by the 11th motorized rifle brigade, since the remaining three tank brigades are located in the area west of the Belgorod-Kursk road.

Intensive traffic in the Oboyan area indicates the enemy's intention to stop the advance of the left neighbor (the 47th tank corps of the Wehrmacht. - Note. ed.) in the area south of the Oboyan settlement. The blow on the left flank of the corps has not yet been identified.

As we can see, no assumptions were made about the impending large-scale Soviet counteroffensive by the headquarters of the 2nd SS TC. Based on the currently available data, the author cannot assert about a trap prepared in advance by the Germans for the 5th Guards Tank Army. The plan of the German command provided for an exit to Prokhorovka and a transition to the defensive in anticipation of possible counterattacks by our forces or until the approach of German reserves. However, on July 12, such a blow was not yet expected (or was not expected any more, based on the events of the previous days). The main operating factor was that the command of the 4th Panzer Army was in some confusion regarding plans for further actions. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of SS-Obergruppenführer Hausser did not receive offensive tasks pursuing decisive goals on July 12. If such tasks were received, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler division could regroup and take a more advantageous position to repel a counterattack. This could be the allocation and promotion to another direction of the armored group. Instead, the division only took up positions from Psel to the railway on a front of about 7 km. The artillery regiment of the 1st SS infantry regiment was supposed to support the attack of the 3rd SS infantry regiment "Totenkopf" from the bridgehead on the Psel River, therefore an observer-coordinator was sent to the SS Brigadeführer Priss compound. At 18.35 on July 11, the Leibstandarte tank regiment consisted of 4 Pz.Kpfw.II, 5 Pz. Kpfw.III, 47 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 4 Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" and 7 command tanks. The assault gun battalion of the division had 10 combat-ready vehicles. Of course, theoretically, a certain number of previously damaged tanks could be restored by repair services by the morning of July 12th. One way or another, the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division of Brigadeführer Theodor Wisch could field about 60 tanks and 10 StuG IIIs on the battlefield. Regarding the location of the Leibstandarte tanks on the morning of July 12, there are discrepancies. According to some testimonies, they were pulled into the depths of defense, according to others, they occupied positions at the Oktyabrsky state farm, that is, they were at the forefront of defense.

On the eve of the battle, the 2nd SS PGD "Reich" had 95 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, including 8 captured T-34-76, and the 3rd SS PGD - 121 units. But no one planned to use all armored vehicles as a "shock fist".

It should be noted that both Vasilevsky and Vatutin were primarily talented staff officers, the “lucky star” of their careers rose precisely during their service in the General Staff of the Red Army. Therefore, the operations developed by these military leaders were less improvised, but thoroughly detailed.

According to the order received from the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, in close cooperation with formations and units of the 5th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, from the morning of 07/12/43 should go on the offensive with the task of destroying the enemy that had broken through in the area Pokrovka, Greznoye, Kochetovka, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south, and by the end of the day reach the Krasnoye Dubrovo-Yakovlevo line.

The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the military corps Rotmistrov, decided: with the forces of the 18th, 29th, and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, “to strike the main blow in the direction of the railroad. on Pokrovka, Yakovlevo in order to cut the Belgorod highway at the turn of height 242.1, Yakovlevo. With the forces of the 2nd Panzer Corps, cover the concentration of troops in the initial position for the offensive and prevent the enemy from breaking through to the east, with the start of the attack on 18.29 and 2 Guards. maybe support their attack with all firepower, in readiness for an attack in the direction of Dry Solotino.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps should concentrate in the area of ​​Sokolovka, Dranny, Krasnoye, Vysypnoy, Sagaidachnoye in readiness to build on the success of the 2nd Guards. shopping mall in the general direction to Prokhorovka, Luchni, Smorodino.

The course of the battle

At 08.30, after a short shelling of enemy positions, the army troops went on the offensive.

The tank attack was preceded by a 15-minute artillery preparation (started at 08.00. - Note. ed.), which ended with a 5-minute fire attack along the enemy's front line. The fire was fired at areas with a density somewhat lower than that envisaged by the combat order. As a result, the enemy artillery was not suppressed and our tanks immediately met with strong artillery fire and fierce counterattacks.

Why did it happen? The answer is simple - the first order to attack by brigades and separate regiments was received by the end of the day on July 11, and then the army formations were kept at their original positions, constantly postponing the start of the counteroffensive. It is clear that proper reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy forces by formations and units of the army was not carried out. Even worse, due to the events of July 10–11, artillery reconnaissance was practically absent, and artillery observation posts were not created in the combat formations of tank and motorized rifle formations, both at the beginning and in the first hours of the battle.

But the grouping (artillery) was rather big and, with proper use, had great potential. As already mentioned, by the beginning of the offensive, the artillery of the army was reinforced by the front with the “following composition”:

a) the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment, which had 11 self-propelled guns SU-152;

b) a group of long-range artillery, structurally consisting of the 522nd howitzer regiment of high power (12 203-mm guns), the 148th howitzer artillery regiment (18 152-mm howitzers), the 148th cannon artillery regiment (18 122-mm guns ) and the 93rd cannon artillery regiment (also 18 122-mm guns);

c) a front-line group of guards mortar units, consisting of the 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments (24 M-13 installations each) and additionally reinforced by the 76th guards mortar regiment from the 5th guards tank army, 409th a separate guards mortar battalion from the 5th mechanized corps and the 307th separate guards mortar battalion from the 2nd tank corps.

There were also quite a lot of artillery units in the combat formations of the offensive grouping of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Before the start of the attack, the distribution of forces and means was decided to be made as follows:

a) 18 tk - 271 mp, 108 iptap, 1446 sap;

b) 29 tk -1502 iptap, 269 mp, 307 ogmd (after general artillery preparation advanced to the battle formations of the corps), 1698 glanders;

c) 2 tk - 273 mp, 1500 iptap, 755 iptad, 1695 sap;

d) 2nd Guards. tk - 285 mp, 104 iptap, 447 omp, 409 ogmd (after general artillery preparation, it advanced into the battle formations of the corps);

e) 5th Guards. mk - 689 iptap RGK, 522 gap RGK, 76 guards. MP, 1529 SAP, 148 GAP RGK, 27th Cannon Brigade, 80 Guards. MP, 16 Guards. mp, 6th and 26th anti-aircraft artillery divisions (522, 148, 76, 80, 16th regiments, as well as the 27th cannon brigade, were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 5th MK after general artillery preparation);

f) The 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough, equipped with Churchills with 57-mm guns, received an additional 292 mp and 1000 iptap.

The density of artillery in our offensive groupings before the start of the battle (data for July 12, 1943) is given in the following table.

The structure of the advancing battle group	Anti-tank artillery on the front	Guns and mortars on the front km	Total guns and mortars
18 tk, 1000 iptap, 292 mp, 36 guards. tp	25,7	57	171
29 tk, 108 iptap, 271 mp, 1446 sap, 578 gap, 1529 sap	14,4	43,1	194
2 tk, 1502 iptap, 269 mp	10,6	28,4	142
2 Guards shopping mall, 1500 iptap, 273 mp	-	-	142
forward detachment of Major General Trufanov	7,1	4,6	48

It is interesting to note that the planned assignment of artillery units to corps and combat groupings, moreover, on the same day - July 12, according to various documents, coincides only fragmentarily, although the data given is based on reports from the 5th Guards Tank Army and the corps that make it up. The answer was not found immediately, but it is!

But the fact is that the front-line group of long-range artillery for the duration of the operation was not subordinate to the artillery commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army and acted autonomously. There was not even a direct connection between them - the artillery commander of 5 TA (who did not have his own radio station) contacted the ADD group using the radio station of the front group of guards mortar units. Thus, after the initial artillery preparation, part of the ADD group, contrary to the plan, did not reinforce the offensive groupings of the 5th Panzer Army. The distribution of artillery had to be urgently reshuffled, based on the available forces and means. Without communication, the ADD group could not even support the advance of our troops with artillery fire, which, under the bombardment of enemy aircraft, engaging in oncoming battles with enemy tanks, began to move forward. The next day, the error was corrected (the ADD group was subordinated to the artillery commander of 5 TA. - Note. ed.), but the offensive has already fizzled out.

It turns out that the 5th Guards Tank Army did not have effective support for artillery and aviation. In addition, our aviation did not operate on the morning of July 12 due to bad weather conditions (German aviation, according to our own reports, actually began to operate in the morning. - Note. ed.). It remained to hope for the surprise of the strike and the massive introduction of a large tank group into battle. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, wrote about the beginning of the battle, which later became a heroized legend:

“Finally, volleys of the army artillery group burst out. Artillery batteries of direct support for tanks hit. Artillery fired mainly on the areas - the alleged areas of concentrations of enemy tanks and the firing positions of his artillery. We did not have time to determine exactly where the enemy batteries were located and where the tanks were concentrated, so it was not possible to determine the effectiveness of artillery fire.

The barrage of fire from our artillery had not yet ceased, when volleys of regiments of guards mortars were heard. This is the beginning of the attack that my radio station duplicated. “Steel”, “Steel”, “Steel”, - the head of the radio station, a junior technician, Lieutenant V. Konstantinov, broadcast on the air. Immediately followed by signals from the commanders of tank corps, brigades, battalions, companies and platoons.

The radio silence, which helped the formations of the army of lieutenant general t / v P. A. Rotmistrov to hide their appearance from the enemy, was finally broken. The suddenness of the strike was formally achieved, it only remained to put it into practice. Tank corps entered the battle.

But even in this case, tactical surprise could not be fully preserved. German reconnaissance aircraft, despite the non-flying weather, still took to the air and detected the movement of large masses of tanks, indicating their presence with a prearranged signal - purple smoke from special missiles. Rockets warning of the appearance of Soviet tanks soon rose over the positions of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler". This SS formation could no longer radically reorganize its battle formations, but some changes in the alignment of troops could be made. Yes, and the moral and psychological state of the l / s in the case of an expectation of an attack (in comparison with a sudden blow) is already different.

We proceed to the description and analysis of hostilities.

In the first echelon of our two attacking tank corps (18th and 29th tank corps) in a strip 6 km wide there were four brigades, one breakthrough tank regiment and one self-propelled artillery regiment. In total, 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns moved into battle in the first line.

The plan of action for the 18th and 29th Panzer Corps was as follows. The Oktyabrsky state farm area was supposed to fall into the “pincers”, on the one hand, formed by the 181st Tank Brigade and the 36th Guards Breakthrough Regiment, and on the other, by the 32nd Tank Brigade with three batteries of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and 170th tank brigade. They were followed by the infantry of the 33rd Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army. It was assumed that the 181st tank brigade, advancing through the villages along the river, which the tankers of the 2nd tank corps had only recently left (meaning the settlements of Vasilievka and Andreevka), should not meet stubborn resistance, so it would move faster. The 32nd Tank Brigade was to pave the way for the main forces of the 29th Tank Corps along the railroad. The 9th Guards Airborne Division and two regiments of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division were to consolidate the expected success of the 32nd, 181st and 170th Tank Brigades (“clear” Hill 252.2 and the village near the river from the enemy).

The second echelon of the 18th and 29th tank corps of generals V.S. Bakharov and I.F. Kirichenko had the task of increasing the force of impact and restoring the number of tanks of the first echelon after they suffered losses during the breakthrough of the defense near the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252, 2.

The 18th tank corps of Major General V.S. Bakharov acted on the right flank of the army, and the battle order was built in three echelons. In the first echelon were 170 (39 tanks) and 181 (44 tanks) tank brigade, in the second echelon - the 32nd motorized rifle brigade with an artillery group, the third echelon was the 110th (38 tanks) tank brigade. The 36th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, equipped with heavy Churchill tanks (19 units), operated behind the 170th Tank Brigade in the second echelon.

The 170th and 181st tank brigades had the task of attacking the enemy in the corps zone, capturing Malaye Mayachki, and then advancing and reaching the Krasnaya Polyana-Krasnaya Dubrava line. By 14.30 on July 12, as a result of fierce fighting, the brigades captured the Oktyabrsky state farm (either this information is incorrect, or the state farm was soon recaptured by the Germans. - Note. ed.) and came close to Andreevka and Vasilievka. An hour earlier, at 13.30, the brigades were attacked from the flank by 13 Tigers (approximately from the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 226.6), which were moving towards the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka from a ravine south of Andreevka.

In Andreevka, the 180th tank brigade ran into a large column of enemy tanks. In addition to the Tigers, these were assault guns that fired heavily from a height of 241.6. As a result of the oncoming battle, the German tanks were thrown back to Kozlovka with heavy losses. Between 17.00 and 18.00 the corps commander brought into battle the 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough (19 MK IV Churchill IV tanks), which was almost completely destroyed as a result of the hardest battle. Despite huge losses, the 170th Tank Brigade and the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade advanced. By 18.00, the corps brigades had finally captured Vasilievka and reached the approaches to Kozlovka. But at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6, the 18th Panzer Corps, making its way forward, met strong enemy fire resistance. I had to take up defense: the 32nd motorized rifle brigade and the 170th tank brigade with the remnants of the 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough were located in the Vasilyevka, Mikhailovka, Charming area; The 181st tank brigade - in Petrovka, the 110th tank brigade - on the outskirts of Petrovka and Beregovoy.

The defense was organized "round" in order to prevent the advance of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of Vesely, Polezhaev, Vasilievka, and the Komsomolets state farm.

During the day of fighting, the 18th Tank Corps lost: medium tanks T-34-76-20 units, light tanks T-70 - 11 units, heavy tanks MK IV "Churchill IV" - 15 units. Total - 46 units. 21 people were killed and 107 people were injured.

The 29th Tank Corps of Major General of the Tank Forces I.F. Kirichenko became the "main face" of the tank battle unfolding near Prokhorovka. The order of battle of this formation was built in two echelons.

At 08.30, immediately after the salvo of the 76th mortar regiment of the RS, which (volley) was the signal for the start of the offensive, formations and parts of the corps went on the attack in the direction of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Stalinist department state farm, Storozhevoye.

The formation of the 29th Tank Corps, as mentioned earlier, was in two echelons: in front of the 32nd Tank Brigade, followed by the 31st and 25th Tank Brigades, the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, along with the 271st Mortar Regiment.

The 29th Panzer Corps operated in the main direction for the army, attacking along the railway and inflicting its main blow with the right flank in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm, Tetervino farm, Pokrovka.

The attack began without artillery preparation of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover.

This made it possible for enemy troops to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps, as well as to bomb our tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which in turn led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack. Our slowly advancing armored vehicles began to be effectively “shoot off” by anti-tank guns and Leibstandarte tanks, especially since the latter fired from a place. The situation was further complicated by the heavily rugged terrain, unsuitable for the advance of tanks. The presence of hollows impassable for armored vehicles northwest and southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belenikhino road forced our tanks to cling to it (the road) and open their flanks, unable to cover them.

Despite the strong fire resistance of the enemy, the 32nd tank brigade, without losing organization in combat formations and in cooperation with the 25th tank brigade, was moving forward, conducting massive fire from tank guns. When approaching the line - the state farm "Oktyabrsky", the state farm "Stalin's department", Storozhevoe - our tanks were stopped by strong frontal and flank artillery and mortar fire, which forced them to gain a foothold on the reached line, gather forces for further advance and prepare to repel possible attacks enemy.

Separate subunits that rushed forward came close to the Komsomolets state farm, but, having suffered heavy losses from anti-tank artillery and tanks that fired from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the main forces.

From 11.00 am 29th shopping mall, it fixed itself at the reached line: 0.5 km northeast of the Oktyabrsky state farm, 0.5 km northeast of the Stalinskoye branch state farm, 0.5 km southeast of Storozhevoy. At this line, the corps repelled repeated attacks by enemy infantry and tanks, inflicting heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

Now we will analyze the actions of the brigades of the corps and the units attached to them.

a) The 32nd tank brigade at 08.30 on July 12, without artillery and aviation treatment of the front line of the enemy’s defense, without having accurate data on his firepower, attacked the enemy’s positions in the direction of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Komsomolets state farm, Pokrovka along the railway line in two echelons / d in a strip of 900 m. In this main direction, the enemy concentrated a large number of Tiger tanks, assault guns, and other anti-tank weapons.

32 brigade was followed by 31 brigade. The attack of the 32nd Tank Brigade proceeded at an exceptionally fast pace. The report says so: "All the tanks went on the attack and there was not a single case of indecision or lagging behind the battle." By 1200, the tank battalions broke through into the area of ​​the enemy's artillery positions. The German infantry began to retreat in panic. Realizing the success of the brigade, the enemy took to the air and attacked the front line with more than 150 aircraft. Air strikes forced the infantry of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade to lie down, following behind the tanks, and disabled several combat vehicles. The 31st Tank Brigade, instead of building on the success of the 32nd Tank Brigade, "continued to stagnate behind." The command of the "Leibstandarte" noticed that the pace of the attack had fallen, and pulled up fresh tank reserves and infantry. By this time, the 32 brigade had lost up to 40 tanks and about 350 personnel and was forced to stop.

At 16:00, the brigade commander gathered the remaining combat vehicles and threw his reserve (15 tanks in total) into an attack on the Oktyabrsky state farm. This operation was not successful, as the enemy brought up a large number of anti-tank weapons and tanks from the 3rd SS Totenkopf paramilitary group.

The brigade, shielded by its infantry and infantry of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in the area of ​​​​a hollow 1.5 km from the Oktyabrsky state farm, went on the defensive.

b) The 31st tank brigade was ready for an attack as early as 01.30, when the tanks and the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion of the formation took up their starting position for the offensive 1 km southwest of the village of Barchevka.

At 08.30, after the signal (RS salvo), the attack began, without artillery preparation and air cover. Enemy planes soon began to bomb the battle formations of the advancing tanks and infantry (for some reason, our planes did not fly at the same time due to bad weather. - Note. ed.). The raids were carried out in groups of 8 to 37 units, the Luftwaffe used Me-110 and Yu-87 aircraft. Our armored vehicles suffered heavy losses from enemy aircraft and artillery fire. But the brigade stubbornly continued to attack in the direction - the Oktyabrsky state farm, through the northwestern outskirts of Prokhorovka (Aleksandrovsky). At 10.30 the tanks of the brigade reached the frontier - the Oktyabrsky state farm. Further advance was halted by continuous enemy air strikes.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. Since that time, our fighters have appeared in the air, operating in groups of two to ten aircraft.

At 15.40, the enemy launched a counterattack, which was repulsed (probably, the forces of the 3rd SS Totenkopf paramilitary group counterattacked. - Note. ed.). As a result, during the day of fighting, the brigade had losses: 24 T-34-76 tanks, 20 T-70 tanks, one 45-mm gun, an easel machine gun - 1, PPSh - 2, a rifle - 1; killed - 44 people, wounded - 39 people, missing - 18 people.

Destroyed and knocked out enemy manpower and equipment: small and medium tanks - 21, heavy tanks "Tiger" - 6, machine-gun emplacements - 17, up to 600 enemy soldiers and officers.

c) The 25th tank brigade, by order of the corps command at 08.3012 July, accompanied by batteries of self-propelled guns SU-122, went on the offensive in the direction: Storozhevoe, Ivanovsky settlement, Tetervino, high. 228, 4, western outskirts of the settlement Luchki, vys. 246, 3, 218.3 with the task of destroying the enemy in these areas and by the end of the day to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Krapivinskiye Dvory with a readiness to act in the direction of the city of Belgorod.

The 362nd tank battalion, supported by a company of submachine gunners of the MSPB and a battery of 122-mm self-propelled guns, advanced on the right. A ledge on the left behind 362 TB was advancing by 25 TB with small tanks without one company, with a battery of 45-mm anti-tank guns and a battery of self-propelled guns SU-76.

As the tanks approached the front line of the enemy defenses from the forest northwest of Storozhevoye and east of the outskirts of Storozhevoye, the enemy opened heavy fire from ambush tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV and Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger", StuG III self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and lay down. Having broken through into the depths of the enemy's defenses, our armored vehicles suffered huge losses.

The remnants of the material part of the brigade by 10.00 on July 12 retreated "from the depths of the enemy's defense" and concentrated in a hollow 1.5 km southeast of Storozhevoy. By 10.30, the 25th brigade, in which only 6 T-34-76 and 15 T-70 remained, took up defensive positions along the slopes of nameless heights 600 meters southeast of Storozhevoy. The enemy, who went over to the attack twice, rolled back from the positions defended by the brigade, with heavy losses for him.

By the end of the day on July 12, the 25th brigade had the following losses: the brigade lost 26 T-34-76 and 24 T-70 tanks, a mortar - 1.45-mm anti-tank gun - 1; personnel: killed - 40 people, wounded - 91 people, missing - 27 people. In total - 158 people.

During the day of the battle on July 12, parts of the brigade were destroyed: soldiers and officers - up to 350 people, small and medium tanks - 2, heavy tanks - 1, self-propelled guns - 2, anti-tank guns - 3, mortars - 2, heavy machine guns - 1, hand machine guns - 6, fuel and lubricants warehouse - 1, trucks with cargo - 4.

d) The 53rd motorized rifle brigade on July 12 at 09.00, in cooperation with the 31st and 25th tank brigades, went on the offensive and by 11.00 reached the line: the state farm "Stalin's department", the state farm "Oktyabrsky", Storozhevoe.

Parts of the enemy, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack, and the brigade units were forced to withdraw to the line: a hollow 0.5 km east of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the southeastern outskirts of the Yamki settlement.

e) The 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment - at 03.00 on July 12, settled in battle formation on the western outskirts of the village of Berchevka and supported the 25th tank brigade with two batteries (1st and 6th), having the task of following on the flanks of the formation and suppressing firing points during an attack on the front line of the enemy. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th batteries supported the 32nd Tank Brigade in the following disposition - two batteries on the flanks and one in the center.

The regiment began the attack together with the 32nd and 25th tank brigades in the area of ​​the state farm "Stalin's Department" and the village of Storozhevoe. During the attack on the front line of the enemy, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks, suffered losses from anti-tank fire from heavy enemy tanks (11 self-propelled guns were put out of action).

During the attack, the regiment destroyed: heavy tanks "Tiger" - 1 (knocked out), tanks of other brands - 4, 75-mm guns - 3, anti-tank guns - 23, anti-tank rifles - 5, machine guns - 10, self-propelled guns - 1, vehicles - 7, dugouts - 3, bunkers - 2 and up to 300 infantry.

f) The 271st mortar regiment, with the introduction of units of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, provided it with fire support. Three divisions supported the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, operating in the direction northeast of the edge of the forest, which was located north of Storozhevoy. It should be noted that the entry into the battle was done in a very organized manner, the command of the regiment perfectly organized interaction with the combined arms commanders, following the infantry, the divisions advanced their battle formations forward. Due to a number of the above reasons, the attack was not a complete success, so the mortar units had to gain a foothold in positions located near the 53rd motorized rifle brigade.

g) The 108th anti-tank artillery regiment supported the attack of tank units. Destroyed 2 anti-tank guns and up to an enemy infantry platoon. Casualties: 2 wounded.

The remaining parts of the corps provided the actions of brigades and regiments.

According to the report of the 29th shopping mall, excerpts from which were given above, the unit completed its task: it stopped the enemy’s offensive and marked the beginning of the rout of his military grouping. Of course, the compilers of the document cannot refuse logic, the “glass”, from their point of view, is “half full”. But, if we consider the results achieved in relation to the tasks set by the front and army commands, then the counterattack was not successful - here "the glass is half empty."

It was noted that the battles on both sides were particularly tenacious, often ending in hand-to-hand combat. Our tanks, as a rule, did not retreat from the achieved lines, and if the enemy managed to recapture this or that point, then the tankers either died or fought on foot in groups to the last.

According to the data given in the report of the 29th shopping mall, the losses of this formation for July 12 amounted to: killed - 72 people. commanding staff (officers), 144 people. junior commanding staff (foremen and sergeants) and 88 people. privates; wounded - 75 people. commanding staff, 197 people. junior commanding staff and 241 privates; missing - 19 people. commanding staff, 100 people. junior commanding staff, 164 privates. Total were lost: 166 officers, 441 foremen and sergeants, 493 privates.

The losses of the material part (armored vehicles) were as follows. Total participated in the battle: 122 T-34-76, 70 T-70, 11 SU-122, 9 SU-76. Total losses: 95 T-34–76s, 36 T-70s, 10 SU-122s, 9 SU-76s. Irretrievable losses: 75 T-34–76, 28 T-70, 8 SU-122, 6 SU-76.

Other losses: rifles - 200, anti-tank rifles - 25, heavy machine guns - 25, light machine guns - 62, 82-mm mortars - 2, 120-mm mortars - 2, anti-tank gun - 1.

During the day of hostilities, l / s 29 tk were destroyed up to 3620 enemy soldiers and officers, 138 machine guns, 54 guns, 17 mortars, 68 tanks, 127 vehicles, 16 motorcycles, 2 aircraft, 2 ammunition depots, 4 mortar batteries and 9 artillery batteries.

Just as described above, the day of July 12 is described in the report of the 29th Panzer Corps. It is not clear from this document whether the Komsomolets state farm was taken by the troops of the corps or not. And how did things go with the liberation of the Oktyabrsky state farm? In the seemingly detailed "to the limit" document, there is not a word about this.

In the report “The July operation of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Belgorod direction”, prepared by Colonels G. Ya. Sapozhkov and G. G. Klein, the description of the battles of 29th shopping mall on July 12 has a slightly different time and geographical framework.

According to this document, the 29th TC, acting in the main direction of the army, attacked along the railway, delivering the main blow with its right flank in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm and the Tetervino farm. The 32nd and 31st tank brigades combined had 67 tanks, and the 25th tank brigade had 69 tanks. In 1446 there were 19 self-propelled guns. In total - 155 armored vehicles.

The morning part of the battle is omitted in this document for inexplicable reasons, but the actions of the corps after 1300 are indicated. At 13.30, the 32nd and 31st tank brigades, after a fierce oncoming battle with enemy armored vehicles at the turn of the roads south of the Oktyabrsky state farm, were stopped by "hurricane fire from anti-tank guns and tanks buried in the ground." Reflecting counterattacks and air strikes, our armored formations went over to the defensive.

The 25th tank brigade attacked the enemy in the direction of the state farm "Stalinskoye branch" and after stubborn fighting, having suffered significant losses from aviation and artillery fire, by the end of the day took up defense along a hollow 1 km southeast of the state farm "Stalinskoye branch".

The 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, after fierce battles for the Komsomolets state farm, occupied it by 14.30 (!), but under "pressure from superior enemy forces and strong air pressure" was forced to leave this settlement. The 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade withdrew to the line of the "Stalin Branch" state farm, where, together with the 25th Tank Brigade, it went on the defensive, repelling "fierce counterattacks by enemy tanks and motorized infantry."

Of course, the 29th CC that day had the biggest tests, since it was on its offensive sector that the main forces of the 2nd SS TC were located. But this is not so much an accident as the miscalculations of the Soviet command, which forced the 29th shopping mall to attack blindly.

It is clear from this report that the Komsomolets state farm was liberated, but soon abandoned again, and our troops apparently failed to take the Oktyabrsky state farm, although the battles were going on literally a few meters from it (and victorious reports were already sent up - Note. ed.).

As a result of the fighting on the day of July 12, the 29th Panzer Corps had little tactical success in the "territorial advance", but suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment.

During the day of fighting on July 12, the 29th Tank Corps lost: medium tanks T-34-76-95 units, light tanks T-70 - 38 units, self-propelled guns - 8 units. Total - 141 tanks and self-propelled guns. 240 people were killed and 210 injured.

According to Soviet estimates, the corps destroyed 41 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 14 were Tigers), 43 guns of all calibers, about 100 soldiers and officers were killed.

Referring to the report of the 5th Guards Tank Army regarding the battles of the 29th Tank Corps on July 12, 1943, the author wants to draw the following conclusions, which reflect the opinion of the army command on what happened:

“It must be said that the 29th Tank Corps, which operated in the main direction of the army, found itself in a difficult situation, since the direction of the main attack of the Germans coincided with the area of ​​\u200b\u200boperations of the corps.

The corps had little tactical territorial success and suffered heavy losses. However, parts of the corps, by their heroic actions, inflicted such a blow on the enemy, after which he was no longer able to launch a large offensive in this direction.

Here it is - the fundamental principle of glorification of ongoing events, successfully hiding the mistakes of the commander of the 5th Panzer Army in organizing the operation.

Although it must be honestly admitted that Rotmistrov himself and his headquarters were under pressure from the headquarters of the Voronezh Front and its commander, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Such is the peculiarity of the Russian mentality: the plan is excellent, but we all know its implementation - they didn’t finish it, they forgot it, they didn’t organize something, they didn’t think it through, but people are dying! In this particular case (with the success of the battle on the Kursk Bulge for us as a whole), the large losses of personnel and equipment were attributed to the uniqueness of the tank battle. Although there are many questions about this definition.

The main question that worries the reader when describing the Prokhorov battle is the number of tanks of the opposing sides that filled the battlefield. For example, Rotmistrov himself wrote: "Two huge tank avalanches were moving towards." As it became clear, there was no avalanche of tanks from the Germans, and the organization of such a group of 60 tanks was not necessary for tactical reasons. The well-known Russian military historian A. Isaev is inclined to the version that much larger masses of tanks acted from our side, and cites the following arguments to substantiate his assumption: “Any anti-tank defense could be saturated with the attack of a large number of tanks on a narrow front. Tanks moving in a dense mass are able to cover each other and effectively duel with anti-tank artillery. At least due to the fact that more eyes are looking for flashes of anti-tank guns and more barrels hit them. The Germans themselves, as we see from the general course of the battle, often used this technique - the concentration of a large mass of tanks on a narrow front. If the Soviet side had succeeded in concentrating the main forces of the 18th and 29th Panzer Corps in a single shock fist, the defense of the Leibstandarte would have been crushed. The capture of starting positions for a counterattack led to the fragmentation of the attacking forces into several echelons. A deep beam with a developed system of spurs in front of Oktyabrsky prevented the normal entry into battle of the 170th tank brigade of the 18th tank corps. A forced decision was made to send it behind the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps. So the forces of the first echelon of the 18th Panzer Corps were reduced to one brigade. As a result, only two brigades entered the Prokhorovskoe field (from Psel to the railway) at 08.30: the 32nd and 181st. Accordingly, the total strength of the first echelon of Rotmistrov's army was 115 tanks and self-propelled guns. There are also quite a few combat vehicles, but by no means an “avalanche”.

Most likely, the distortion of the real situation is associated with a different idea or even an approach to assessing what is happening between the military leaders leading the operation and ordinary participants in the events. On July 14, from the battle area, Marshal Vasilevsky sent a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which also describes the events on the Prokhorovka field: “Yesterday, I myself personally observed a tank battle of the 18th and 29th corps southwest of Prokhorovka with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack . At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.

Is there a lie here? Of course not. For Vasilevsky, as for a commander who viewed the operation through the prism of "space - time", the situation was seen as a single battle of armored formations maneuvering and fighting each other on a front of 32-35 km. He understood the meaning of everything that was happening, but he saw one of the battles of two (among several locally participating in the battle) tank groups. The number of one group in its maximum value fluctuated between 80-100 tanks and self-propelled guns, which, in general, is confirmed by ordinary participants in the events from the German side:

“A wall of purple smoke rose into the air, it was smoke projectiles. This meant: attention, tanks!

The same signals could be seen all along the crest of the slope. Purple signals of impending danger also appeared further to the right at the railway embankment.

A small valley stretched out to our left, and as we went down the front slope, we noticed the first T-34 tanks, which, obviously, were trying to envelop us from the left flank.

We stopped on a slope and opened fire. Several Russian tanks caught fire. For a good gunner, 800 meters was the ideal range.

As we waited for more enemy tanks to appear, I looked around out of habit. What I saw left me speechless. Due to a small elevation at a distance of 150-200 meters, 15, then 30, then 40 tanks appeared in front of me. Finally I lost count. T-34s rolled at us at high speed, carrying infantry on them.

Along the entire front of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the same picture was repeated again and again. The memoirs of a Leibstandarte officer quoted above are supplemented by another soldier (2nd SS Panzer Corps):

“... Three ... five ... ten appeared above the hill to the left of the embankment ... But what was the point of counting? Rushing at full speed and firing from all barrels, the T-34s one by one rolled over the hill, right in the middle of our infantry positions. We opened fire with our five guns as soon as we saw the first tank, and it was seconds before the first T-34 stood up, shrouded in black smoke. Sometimes we had to fight the Russian infantry, riding on tanks, in hand-to-hand combat.

Then suddenly 40 or 50 T-34 tanks appeared, advancing on us from the right. We had to turn around and open fire on them ...

One T-34 appeared right in front of me when my gunnery partner shouted so loudly that I could hear him without a helmet: “Last round in the barrel!” Only that was not enough! I turned around, facing the T-34 tank, which was rushing at us at a distance of about 150 meters, when another disaster struck.

The rear support pin of the gun broke, and the barrel shot up into the sky. I did my best to turn the turret and lower my 75mm cannon down, managed to get the T-34 turret in sight and fired. Hit! The hatch opened and two men jumped out. One stayed where it was while the other hopped across the road. About 30 meters in front of me, I knocked out the T-34 again.

Burning tanks were visible everywhere, they filled an area 1500 meters wide; 10 to 12 artillery pieces also smoked. Presumably, one hundred and twenty tanks were involved in the attack, but there could be more. Who counted!

As they say, fear has big eyes. In reality, there were somewhat fewer tanks. Let's briefly evaluate their actions.

In conditions when the "defense" of the enemy was not "torn" by artillery and aircraft, the attack of hundreds of tanks and self-propelled guns on the dense defenses of the SS division had dubious prospects. Even without tanks, the Leibstandarte had Marder self-propelled anti-tank guns and towed anti-tank artillery in the grenadier regiments. Therefore, approaching the enemy's line of defense, the tanks of the 32nd and 181st tank brigades began to flare up one after another. Only one battalion of the 32nd brigade (under the command of Major S.P. Ivanov) managed to slip under the cover of a forest belt along the railway deep into the enemy defenses, to the Komsomolets state farm.

In the situation that developed in the first minutes of the offensive, the situation could be corrected by the introduction of the second echelon into battle, but it was late. The 31st tank brigade entered the battle only at 09.30-10.00, when a significant part of the tanks of the first echelon had already been knocked out. In addition, having met a flurry of fire from enemy anti-tank weapons, the commander of the 32nd brigade changed the direction of the offensive, but not along the forest belt, but entering the lane of the neighbor on the right - the 18th tank corps. Accordingly, the success of Major S.P. Ivanov was not used. Moreover, the route along the railroad was the only possible one. Soviet tanks that broke through into the depths of the defense of the 1st SS infantry regiment stumbled upon an anti-tank ditch blocking the path to the Komsomolets state farm. It was a Soviet ditch from the system of the third line of defense, and it is very strange that the tankers inflicting a counterattack were not warned of its presence.

Another brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, the 25th Tank Brigade of Colonel N.K. Volodin, collided with a battalion of Leibstandarte assault guns. The brigade was advancing on Storozhevoye, south of the railway. StuG III with long-barreled 75-mm guns were a tough nut to crack. Already by 10.30, six T-34s and fifteen T-70s remained from the brigade of N.K. Volodin. The brigade commander was shell-shocked and sent to the hospital.

The results of the first hours of the counterattack were discouraging. For 2–2.5 hours of battle, three brigades and a self-propelled artillery regiment of the 29th tank corps lost more than half of their combat vehicles. According to a similar scenario, events developed in the 18th tank corps. Entered into battle after the 181st tank brigade, the 170th tank brigade by 12.00 lost about 60% of its tanks.

The commander of a tank platoon of the 170th tank brigade, V.P. Bryukhov, recalled: “The tanks were burning. From the explosions, five-ton towers broke off and flew off to the side by 15–20 m. Sometimes the upper armor plates of the tower were torn off, soaring high into the air. Slamming hatches, they tumbled in the air and fell, instilling fear and horror in the surviving tankers. Often, the entire tank fell apart from strong explosions, at the moment turning into a pile of metal. Most of the tanks stood motionless, mournfully lowering their guns, or burned. Greedy flames licked at the red-hot armor, raising clouds of black smoke. Together with them, tankers were on fire, unable to get out of the tank. Their inhuman cries and pleas for help shocked and clouded the mind. The lucky ones who got out of the burning tanks rolled on the ground, trying to knock the flames off their overalls. Many of them were overtaken by an enemy bullet or shell fragment, taking away their hope for life.

Nevertheless, with great difficulty, the 181st tank brigade of the corps of V.S. Bakharov managed to break into the Oktyabrsky state farm. The infantry of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division followed the tankers, and although the Soviet troops fought on its outskirts, they failed to consolidate their success. Unlike his neighbor, V. S. Bakharov had not yet managed to bring all three of his brigades into battle. The 110th tank brigade remained at the disposal of the corps commander. This allowed at 14.00 to resume the offensive, changing the direction of the blow. Now the direction of the main attack of the 18th Panzer Corps lay close to the floodplain of the Psel River. Although here the tankers had to face the defense of one of the Totenkopf regiments and the heavy tanks of the Leibstandarte, the battalions of the 181st and 170th tank brigades managed to break through to the enemy artillery positions. Parts of the two brigades managed to advance to a depth of 6 km. The command of the "Leibstandarte" managed to rectify the situation only due to the counterattacks of their tank regiment, which became the "fire brigade". In addition, the successful offensive of the "Dead Head" from the bridgehead on the Psel River put the 18th Panzer Corps at risk of encirclement in the event of a reverse forcing of the river. All this forced the brigades to be pulled back.

Nevertheless, the courage and bravery of the crews of tanks and self-propelled guns of the 18th and 29th tank corps are not even discussed here - in their vehicles, which were significantly inferior in quality and combat capabilities to the latest German armored vehicles, they stubbornly and purposefully tried to complete a permanent task. Eternal glory to the heroes!

German troops could have suffered less losses if they had not been drawn into dueling at close range, beneficial to the Soviet side.

"Tigers", deprived in close combat of the advantages that their powerful guns and thick armor possessed, were successfully shot by "thirty-fours" at close range. A huge number of tanks mixed up on the entire battlefield, where several local battles were going on at the same time. Shells fired at close range pierced both the side and frontal armor of the tanks. When this happened, ammunition often exploded, and tank turrets were thrown tens of meters away from the mangled vehicles by the force of the explosion.

Subsequently, the commander Rotmistrov assessed the events as follows:

“Our tanks were destroying the Tigers at close range… We knew their vulnerable spots, so our tank crews fired on their sides. Shells fired at very close range punched huge holes in the armor of the Tigers.

Studying archival documents, the author came to the conclusion that during July 12, 1943, on the Prokhorovka field, formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army had two relatively large local collisions with enemy units equipped with heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger". And what's more - get ready for them!

One of them was in the Andreevka area, where the 180th tank brigade of the 18th tank corps was advancing. As soon as the "Tigers" were discovered, the absolutely fresh 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough was immediately introduced into the battle, equipped with "Churchills", equal in armor protection to the "Tigers". Crews on British-made tanks tried to impose close combat on the Germans and, having lost 15 vehicles, forced the German tank group to retreat to Kozlovka. The Germans had losses, but their exact number is unknown to the author.

The second battle took place in the area of ​​the state farm "Stalin's branch", the positions of which the 25th tank brigade of the 29th tank corps tried to attack. And again, as soon as the "Tigers" were discovered, a characteristic maneuver followed: trying to impose close combat on the Germans, batteries of the 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment, equipped with self-propelled guns SU-122, were introduced into the battle. During the battle, our self-propelled gunners lost 10 self-propelled guns, 6 of them burned down. The Germans for the whole day in the sector of responsibility 29 mk lost 14 "Tigers". It was not possible to recapture the state farm "Stalin's branch" that day.

Interestingly enough, our anti-tank artillery acted at the same time. On the Willys and Dodge vehicles, anti-tank guns quickly moved between the centers of local battles and rolled out to fire direct fire at enemy armored vehicles. Another part of the anti-tank artillery systems, especially the 76.2-mm guns, was in the reserve of the artillery commanders of the corps and operated from closed positions.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, Major General A.S. Burdeiny, being in the Vinogradovka, Belenikhino area, with the forces of two tank brigades (94 tanks) went on the offensive at 11.15 in the direction of Yakovlevo. Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, by 14.30 on July 12, the corps reached the following lines.

The 25th Guards Tank Brigade - to the western edge of the forest, 1 km northeast of Kalinin, where it launched an offensive to a height of 243.0. The enemy met our formation with strong artillery fire and the fire of tanks dug into the ground. In addition, enemy aircraft periodically attacked the advancing tank brigade.

The 4th Guards Tank Brigade “crossed” the railway and by 14.30 was fighting on the outskirts of Kalinin, but had no success.

The 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, advancing on the left flank of the corps, entered the road south of Kalinin, where it met strong enemy resistance from the eastern edge of the grove southwest of Kalinin.

At this moment (at about 14.30), the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly collided with the 2nd SS Reich Panzergrenadier Division moving towards it, which in turn was supposed to secure the flank of the Leibstandarte. In connection with the unsuccessful results of the offensive of the 29th shopping mall, the flank of the 2nd Guards. mk "bare". The enemy immediately struck at the "weak" place and forced the "Tatsins" to retreat to their original position.

By the end of the day on July 12, 2 Guards. TC, in connection with the withdrawal of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade (29th TC) from the Komsomolets state farm and the threat created to its right flank from this direction, retreated to the line of Vinogradovka, Belenikhino, where it entrenched itself. It became impossible to maneuver, the pouring rain turned the land into a swamp.

Corps losses during the day of fighting were as follows: 10 medium tanks T-34-76 were lost, light tanks T-70 - 8 units, 85-mm guns 52-K model 1939 - 4 pieces.

By noon on July 12, it became completely clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it was decided to force the Psel River, part of the forces to go north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which 11 TD and the remaining units of the 3rd PgD SS "Totenkopf" were allocated (96 tanks, a regiment of motorized infantry, up to 200 motorcycles with the support of two divisions of assault guns). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. sd and by 13.00 mastered a height of 226.6. But on the northern slopes of the height, the 95th Guards continued to defend. sd, reinforced by an anti-tank artillery regiment and two divisions of captured guns. Until 18.00 she successfully held the defense.

At 20.00, after a powerful enemy air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of l / s 95 guards. under the blows of the approaching German motorized infantry, it retreated behind the Polezhaev settlement.

Around 20.30, enemy troops managed to break through on the right flank of the 5th Guards. TA and reach the line: the northern outskirts of Polezhaev, vys. 236, 7. By order of the commander, the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade was advanced to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Ostrenky with the task of preventing the spread of the enemy in the east and northeast directions. At the same time, the 24th Guards Tank Brigade advanced to the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov with the task of attacking the enemy in the direction of 1 km west of the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov, Nizhnyaya Olshanka, Prokhorovka and preventing its advance in the east and northeast directions .

The commander of the 18th TC was ordered to put forward a cover on the northern outskirts of Petrovka and elev. 181.9 to ensure the release of 24 Guards. TBR to the area of ​​the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov. With the onset of night, the fighting began to subside.

During the day of July 12, the enemy, "having received a strong counterattack in the direction of Prokhorovka", continued to look for a weaker point in the system of battle formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the direction of Vypolzovka, Avdeevka. Having some success, he began to throw his units there, trying to develop an offensive along the Seversky Donets River and go to the rear of the army. As soon as this became known at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. The 11th and 12th mechanized brigades of the 5th guards mechanized corps were advanced to this area to eliminate the advancing group. In addition, the commander ordered the head of the mobile (reserve) detachment, Major General Trufanov, to unite under his command the 11th, 12th mechanized brigades and the 26th tank brigade, transferred from the 2nd guards. maybe, and immediately advance to the area of ​​​​Ryndinka, Avdeevka, Bolshie Podyarugi with the task of destroying the enemy grouping that had broken through in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bRyndinka, Rzhavets.

And in this direction the enemy was stopped. So by 18.00 the 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, reinforced by a division of the 85th mortar regiment, together with the 26th Guards. brigade captured Ryndinka from the north. And the 12th Guards Mechanized Brigade captured Vypolzovka and entered the road two kilometers southeast of Vypolzovka. The mobile detachment itself, in the same composition, went to Oboyan and concentrated in the settlement of Bolshiye Podyarugi. Throughout the day, intense battles were going on in the Rzhavets, Ryndinka area. The enemy, throwing up reserves, sought to move forward. But everything was unsuccessful.

The 2nd tank corps of General A.F. Popov, according to the order of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, put himself in order with the expectation of launching an offensive in the direction of Storozhevoye, Greznoye, the Solotino state farm. By that time, there were about fifty combat vehicles in the corps, and his evening attack, which began between 19.00 and 20.00, was not successful.

By the end of the day, the 26th and 99th tank brigades were respectively in the southern and northern parts of Ivanovka, the 58th motorized rifle brigade was located in a grove east of Ivanovka, and the 169th tank brigade was "hiding" in a large ravine east of the Storozhevoye settlement.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, having concentrated in the area of ​​Krasnoe, Vysypnoy, Sokolovka, Dranny, Sagaidachnoye, Kamyshovka, as already mentioned, received an order at 10.00 on July 12 "to throw the 11th and 12th th guards motorized rifle brigades to eliminate the impending danger from Rzhavets, Ryndinka, the 10th tank brigade to enter the area with the task of preventing the enemy from spreading to the northeast.

The 24th Guards Tank Brigade was ordered to advance to the area of ​​the Voroshilov state farm with the task of preventing the enemy from advancing to the northwest and southwest.

Its special task (and this was also mentioned, but the data are given from other sources. - Note. ed.) continued to carry out the so-called mobile (reserve) detachment of Major General Trufanov - in essence, a consolidated combat group operating in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bRyndinka, Rzhavets.

By six in the morning on July 12, the enemy, with up to 70 tanks, captured these settlements and made his way in the direction of Avdeevka, Plots.

The army commander ordered Major General Trufanov to unite units of the 376th Rifle Division, 92nd Rifle Division, 11th and 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 26th Tank Brigade, 1 Ogmtsp (Motorcycle Regiment), 689 Iptap and one battery of 687 Gap - with the task of destroying the enemy that had broken through in the area of ​​Rzhavets, Ryndinka.

Partially, this was done, and fierce battles unfolded in the indicated area. Rzhavets and Ryndinka changed hands several times, until by 1600 our command had brought up 10 tanks from the Shakhovo area and 16 tanks from the Kurakovo area. Only by the end of the day, Trufanov's battle group managed to liberate the settlements of Rzhavets and Ryndinka.

Vasilevsky and Vatutin believed that they should continue to hold the strategic initiative and put pressure on the enemy along the entire front. Therefore, Vatutin ordered that all the forces of the front "... prevent the enemy from further advancing to Prokhorovka from the west and from the south, liquidate enemy groups that penetrated the northern bank of the Psel River through joint operations of part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army - two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps ; liquidate units of the 3rd tank corps of the Wehrmacht that broke into the area of ​​the settlement Rzhavets; and continue the offensive with the forces of the 1st Panzer and 6th Army on the right flank of the 5th Guards Army.

Meanwhile, Trufanov was preparing to attack the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht. This was to be a determined attempt to stop the advance of the 3rd Tk in a northerly direction, and stop it once and for all. Trufanov's group was supposed to be supported as much as possible by the aircraft of the 2nd Air Army.

Thus, on the night of July 13, the corps were given the task of gaining a foothold on the achieved lines, regrouping units in order to be ready to continue the offensive by morning. But this never happened. Why?

On July 13, the enemy himself began to attack in the morning, and the order to advance the 5th Guards. TA had to be cancelled. All day most of the formations of the 5th Guards. TA fought off the enemy. This is the first. There was another reason as well.

The battle on the Prokhorovsky field caused real devastation in the ranks of two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. According to the data given, the 29th Tank Corps lost 131 tanks and 19 SU-122s and SU-76s destroyed and burnt out, which accounted for 71% of the combat vehicles participating in the attacks. In the 18th Panzer Corps, 46 tanks were knocked out and burned, that is, 33% of the number participating in the battle. The mechanized formations operating in neighboring areas also did not avoid sensitive losses of armored vehicles. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 18 tanks on July 12, or 19% of those participating in the counterattack. The 2nd Panzer Corps suffered the least - it lost only 22 tanks. However, data on losses in different documents vary.

In general, the total losses (236 tanks and self-propelled guns) are significant (especially in 29 tanks), but this cannot be considered a rout. With the exception of 29 shopping malls and partially 18 shopping malls, all other connections are 5 guards. TAs were fully operational and the next day they were supposed to be used in the offensive, and then in defensive battles.

German losses were much less. According to the reports of the 1st SS PgD, on the day of July 12, German tankers destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 13 anti-tank guns, losing 30 of their vehicles. Own losses may be true, and the Soviet ones are most likely an exaggeration characteristic of the Germans.

According to the above-mentioned report of Colonels G. Ya. Sapozhkov and G. G. Klein, the oncoming tank battle that unfolded on July 12 continued on July 13 and 14, and only on July 15 the 5th Guards Tank Army officially went on the defensive.

As already mentioned, on May 13, Rotmistrov's tankers received an order to continue the offensive, but were forced to fight off German attacks.

So, the 18th TC repelled a strong attack of enemy tanks and infantry on Polezhaev, Petrovka (carried out from the ravine south of Andreevka).

29th shopping mall at 11.30 and 15.30 successfully repelled the attacks of the division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" in the direction of the state farm "Stalin's branch", Yamki.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps in its sector throughout the day also successfully repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks and motorized infantry.

The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps improved its positions on the left flank of the army with its active actions. The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade and the 24th Guards Tank Brigade attacked and drove the enemy out of the Polezhaev area, height 226.6, and after regrouping, they again advanced in the direction of Klyuchi, Krasny Oktyabr.

By the end of the day, the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade was withdrawn to the Zhilomostnoye area in the reserve of the army commander.

The detachment of Major General Trufanov defended the Podyaruga, Novo-Khmelevskaya area and, with part of the forces, launched a counterattack in the direction of Aleksandrovka, for which the 53rd Guards Regiment was used, which supported the batteries of the 689th anti-tank artillery regiment. At 22.00, our tankers broke through to the northwestern outskirts of Aleksandrovka, where they were suddenly attacked from a hollow (1.5 km southwest of Aleksandrovka) by 28 enemy tanks (including 2 Tigers) supported by 13 guns. Our losses were nine T-34-76s and three T-70s.

Thus, according to the report, "despite the numerous and fierce attacks of large enemy forces and their desire to move forward, the troops of the army in the battles and the next day, that is, 13.07, completely eliminated the plans of the Nazi command."

On July 14, the enemy showed no activity. The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army held the occupied lines, regrouping forces on the left flank.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, "in order not to scatter forces", was forced to leave Belenikhino and retreat behind the railway. Corps formations defended the following lines: 4th Guards. tbr - Ivanovka; 25 Guards tbr - southern outskirts of Ivanovka, slopes of height (1 km east of Leska); 4th Guards MSBR - slopes of an unnamed height (1 km east of Leska), northwest of height 225.0; 26 Guards tbr - Shakhovo.

The detachment of Major General Trufanov that day assisted the left neighbor - the 69th Army - repelled the attack of enemy tanks and took the following position: 1 Guards. kmtsp - height 223.5, western outskirts of Novo-Khmelevskaya; 689 iptap - at the base station Novo-Khmelevskaya, height 223.1.

The defensive stage of the actions of the tank army of General Rotmistrov in the above document begins on July 15th.

In the report "Fighting of the 5th Guards Tank Army from 7 to 24.07.43", compiled by Major of the General Staff of the KA Chernik on August 1, 1943, the defensive stage of the actions of the 5th Guards. TA starts July 13th.

In any case, the clashes on July 13-14 no longer had such a global goal as a day earlier (for the Soviet troops, for sure. - Note. ed.), and our armored formation should be replenished with reserves and put itself in order. The offensive potential of the army, albeit for a while, was exhausted.

On July 13, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov arrived at the Voronezh Front. Apparently, Stalin, fearing a deterioration in the situation (which followed from Vasilevsky's reports), sent our most competent military leader to this theater of operations.

And the not very beautiful “undercarpet fight” began. Georgy Konstantinovich, with his characteristic frankness, began to criticize Rotmistrov and Zhadov for heavy losses and inept leadership of the formations entrusted to them.

But after all, these were only “performing generals”, true arrows flew at the main creators of the counterattack: the commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin and the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The latter was worried, if not frightened, by the situation that was taking shape by the morning of 14 July. Here is an assessment of the situation by Vasilevsky, sent by the Chief of the General Staff to I.V. Stalin: “Tomorrow the threat of enemy tanks breaking through from the south to the Shakhovo, Andreevka, Aleksandrovka area continues to be real. Throughout the night, I take all measures to bring here the entire 5th mechanized corps, the 32nd motorized brigade and four IPTAP regiments. Given the large tank forces of the enemy in the Prokhorovka direction, here on 14.VII, the main forces of Rotmistrov, together with the rifle corps of Zhadov, set a limited task - to defeat the enemy in the Storozhevoye area, the Komsomolets state farm, to reach the Gryaznoye-Yasnaya Polyana line and, all the more, to secure the Prokhorovka direction .

The possibility of an oncoming tank battle is not ruled out here and tomorrow. In total, at least eleven tank divisions continue to operate against the Voronezh Front, systematically replenished with tanks. The prisoners interviewed today showed that the 19th Panzer Division currently has about 70 tanks in service, although the latter has already been replenished twice since 5.VII.43. The report was delayed due to the late arrival from the front: 2 hours 47 hours 14.VII.43. From the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Turning to medical terminology, we can say that by the actions of the enemy "the final diagnosis has not been made." And if the Germans start a new counterattack, it will be difficult to defend: the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies are bled white, there are no significant reserves nearby. Zhukov, like an "academician of medical sciences", was sent to prevent the emerging panic moods and make his own "diagnosis". After reviewing the situation, it was he who expressed the idea that the enemy was exhausted.

In reality, the Germans were more hampered by geostrategic concerns. The beginning of Operation Kutuzov, the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy emasculated the value of Operation Citadel.

In order to raise morale, the commander of the 4th Wehrmacht Army, General Goth, sent a message to the troops from the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Manstein, who stated that he would like to “... express my gratitude and admiration for the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps for their outstanding achievements and exemplary conduct in this battle."

But it was a sweet pill. Despite the heavy losses of our troops, the counterattack partially achieved its goal - the German plans were thwarted, the Soviet grouping could not be surrounded. Meanwhile, the geostrategic situation was rapidly changing not in favor of the German side.

The actions of Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Rotmistrov are the author (despite the fact that the tasks set by the command of the 5th Guards TA were not completed. - Note. ed.) generally considers successful, and Zhukov's criticism - excessive. Georgy Konstantinovich himself had such "failures" throughout the war "at least a dime a dozen." Nevertheless, on July 14, Vasilevsky was transferred to the Southwestern Front to coordinate the upcoming offensive there. Marshal G.K. Zhukov remained on the "economy" on the Voronezh Front.

Actions of the 5th Guards Army

In order to understand the full depth of the operational-tactical plans of our command, let's go back a few hours again, when the troops of the front were just getting ready to launch a counterattack. The capture by the Germans of the starting positions for the offensive planned by our command seriously complicated the operation. Therefore, in the early morning hours of July 12, an attempt was made to recapture the Oktyabrsky state farm. The task of recapturing the state farm was given to two regiments from the 9th Guards Airborne Division and the 95th Guards Rifle Division. The attack began early in the morning, and the first battle of the eventful day on July 12 lasted about three hours. Artillery preparation was not carried out - shells were saved for artillery preparation at 8.00. It was believed that it would be possible to recapture the Oktyabrsky by supporting the attack with their own infantry firepower. These expectations were not met. The SS stopped the guardsmen with concentrated artillery fire in front of their front line. Apparently, counting on the success of the paratroopers' attack, the artillery assigned to support Rotmistrov's army was aimed at strikes along the Vasilievka - Komsomolets state farm - Ivanovsky Vyselok - Belenikhino line. After that, the gunners had to move the fire into the depths. Such a plan of artillery preparation actually excluded the leading edge of the defense of the Leibstandarte from the targets of artillery. A similar picture is observed when considering the air preparation plan for a counterstrike. Assault and bomber aircraft were aimed at the depth of the enemy formation.

This development of events indirectly contributed to the failure of the counterattack of our tank corps.

But in addition to a counterattack in the Prokhorovka area, the Soviet command set the 5th Guards Army the task of eliminating the bridgehead on the north bank of Psel, captured by units of the 2nd SS Totenkopf Panzergrenadier Division. It was supposed to tie up the SS units on the bridgehead, and the successful offensive of Rotmistrov's army would lead to the capture of crossings and the encirclement of the enemy.

The main difference between the position of the Soviet units near Prokhorovka and on the perimeter of the bridgehead captured by the 3rd Totenkopf infantry fighting group was a different degree of readiness for a counterattack. If under Prokhorovka Rotmistrov's corps were ready to advance already with the first rays of the sun, on the bridgehead on the morning of July 12, the concentration of forces was in full swing. Actually, on the perimeter of the bridgehead by the beginning of the day there were only parts of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of Colonel G. G. Pantyukhov, reassigned to the army of A. S. Zhadov. The formation participated in the battles from the first day of the battle and by the end of July 11, there were only 3380 people. The 95th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army was to turn around on the morning of July 12 for an offensive under the cover of Colonel Pantyukhov's units. This division was much more numerous - 8781 people on July 10th. Also on the way to the battlefield was the 6th Guards Airborne Division (8894 people).

The Soviet command believed that the Germans would not be able to concentrate tanks on the bridgehead along the crossings, which were under constant artillery fire and air strikes. However, the tanks of the "Dead Head" were nevertheless transported through Psel. This allowed them to forestall a counterattack by A. S. Zhadov’s troops and at 05:25–05:40 on July 12 begin “opening up” the bridgehead. The positions of the small 52nd Guards Rifle Division were crushed, and German tanks and infantry attacked units of the 95th Guards Rifle Division, which were preparing to attack the bridgehead. The artillery regiment of the division had not yet managed to reach positions, but artillery became the main means of deterring the enemy offensive. Already in the middle of the day, units of the 6th Guards Airborne Division had to engage in battle with the SS "Totenkopf". They hurriedly dug in on positions in the depths of the defense north of the bridgehead. Also, a means of blocking the breakthrough of the 3rd SS Pgd from the bridgehead was the concentration of artillery against it from neighboring divisions of the 5th Guards Army, including the 42nd Guards Rifle Division from the southern coast of Psel.

Until July 11, inclusive, the 5th Guards Army did not have any armored vehicles in its composition. Only in the evening of that day, the 1440th self-propelled artillery regiment, transferred from the 6th Guards Army, arrived in the army formation, in which there were 8 medium self-propelled guns SU-122 and 5 light self-propelled guns SU-76. On July 12, the regiment was placed at the disposal of the commander of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, and by 18:00, two SU-76 batteries attached to the 13th Guards Rifle Division took up firing positions in the area of ​​height 239.6 with the task of repelling enemy tank counterattacks.

Due to the lack of 122-mm ammunition in the regiment and in the warehouse, the SU-122 battery was not brought into battle until July 13, being in the reserve of the commander of the 32nd Guards. sk .

Operation results

The counterattack near Prokhorovka did not give the result expected by the Soviet command. The Germans managed to repel it without losses, leading to a loss of combat capability. However, on July 12, the offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts began on the northern face of the Kursk salient. Model took command of the 2nd Panzer and 9th Armies, and the continuation of the offensive on the northern front (Kursk Bulge) had to be forgotten. The cessation of the offensive of the 9th Army made the further advance of the 4th Panzer Army in a northerly direction pointless. The command of Army Group South continued the operation. An attempt was made to encircle and destroy the 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army with a strike in converging directions by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Army Group. The Germans intended to close the ring around those Soviet forces on the ledge, which were sandwiched between 2nd SS TC and 3rd Wehrmacht TC. Both the Leibstandarte and the Reich had to hold their positions, although the 3rd SS Totenkopf / Totenkopf was ordered to attack the next day: “... continue their attack with the right flank in the Psel river valley to the northeast and throw as much force as possible to the ridge of heights north of the Psel River to the road connecting Beregovoe with Korievka. They were supposed to force Psel in the southeast and destroy enemy forces southeast and southwest of Petrovka in cooperation with the Leibstandarte. This environment was partially implemented, but large losses were avoided. Soon, Manstein had to abandon even local offensives on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge - the offensive of the Southern Front on the Mius and the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation of the Southwestern Front began. The 24th Panzer Corps and the withdrawn 2nd SS Panzer Corps were used to repulse these new two Soviet attacks. On July 16, the withdrawal of the main forces of the shock group of Army Group South began to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. Operation Citadel ended in failure for both enemy army groups.

1. Notes on the use and operation of BT and MV of the Voronezh Front from July 5 to July 25, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80040ss, d. 98, m. 15–22).

2. Report of the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA on the military operations of the army from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d, 31, pp. 2–89).

3. Description of the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80040ss, d. 1, pp. 95–181).

4. Report of an officer of the General Staff of the Red Army at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA on the military operations of the army from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 51, pp. 1–28).

5. Description of the July operation of the 5th Guards. TA in the Belgorod direction (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 85, pp. 2–39).

6. Report of the headquarters of the Commander of the BT and MV of the 5th Guards. And about the combat operations of the armored and mechanized troops of the army from July 1 to August 7, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 323, op. 4869, d. 3, ll. 113-118).

7. Report of the headquarters of the 29th TC on the combat operations of the corps from July 7 to 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 46, pp. 1–16).

8. Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945 M., military publishing house. 800 s.

9. Designer of combat vehicles. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1988. 382 p.

10. Vasilevsky A. M. The work of a lifetime. Minsk, "Belarus", 1988. 542 p.

11. Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche. 622 p.

12. Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M., Military Publishing House, 1984. 420 p.

13. Cornish N. Battle of Kursk The greatest tank battle in history. July 1943. M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2009.224 p.

14. Ustyantsev S., Kolmakov D. Fighting vehicles of Uralvagonzavod. Tank T-34. Nizhny Tagil, Media-Print Publishing House, 2005. 232 p.

15. Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen 1943-1945. Schiffer Military History, 1996. 287 p.

The plan of the counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front and the grouping of Soviet troops on the morning of July 12, 1943

Notes:

Koch T., Zalewski W. El Alamein. Warszawa, 1993, s. 28.

The Brereton Diaries. New York, 1946, p. 148. Designer of combat vehicles. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1988, p. 283.

Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche, 2010, p. 377.

Cornish N. Battle of Kursk The greatest tank battle in history. July 1943. M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, p. 180.

Ibid, p. 180–181.

Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche, 2010, p. 378.

Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M., Military Publishing, 1984, p. 187.

TsAMO RF, f. 332, he. 4948, d. 51, l. 7.

There, l. eight.

TsAMO RF, f. 323 he. 4869, d. 3, l. 113.