Battle of Kursk message. Battle of Kursk
In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - Battle of Kursk. The Nazi dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.
Total mobilization - selected generals, best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles. A matter of prestige.
(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)
It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"
The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day military glory Russia - Victory Day of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.
Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:
Operation Citadel
In April 1943, Hitler approved military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation were involved in total 50 divisions, including 16 armored and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.
German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"
The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then
"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.
Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.
However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.
(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images) Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.
That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:
- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!
- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
Agent Werther
On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.
Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.
- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.
Biggest tank battle
"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers" The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.
Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.
None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).
Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:
According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:
“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.
The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.
The Russians drove, if they ever got that far, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.
The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.
As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.
The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.
“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."
It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.
One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.
It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"
Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95 When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, ending with brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.
On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943 in Moscow it was held to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev's feat
Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. August 24, 1943 Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.
Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.
Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of power at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.
In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.
August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreat routes on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.
As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and stamina of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...
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In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive against Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to crush the advancing German tanks at some point with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.
CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12
July 5 - 04:30 the Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.
July 6 - over 2,000 tanks from both sides participated in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops.
July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern face of the arc and went on the defensive.
July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the blow of German tanks in a grandiose battle near Prokhorovka.
Background. Decisive bet
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In the summer of 1943, Hitler sent the entire military might of Germany to the Eastern Front in order to achieve a decisive victory on the Kursk salient.
After the surrender of German troops in Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht should collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold on. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the beginning of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the west of Rostov on the Black Sea.
In the spring, both sides summed up the results. Soviet leadership wanted to resume the attack. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrendous losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The shortage of the German army as a whole was 700,000 people.
Hitler entrusted the revival of the tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of the armored forces. Guderian, one of the creators of the lightning victories at the beginning of the war in 1939-1941, did his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped to adopt new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V "Panther".
Supply issues
The German command was in a difficult position. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the transition of the German army to the defense of the reserves, there were clearly not enough. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to conduct a maneuverable war, the problem would be solved by "elastic defense" with "delivering powerful local strikes of a limited nature to the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level."
Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first, he sought to achieve success in the East in order to encourage Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis. Secondly, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This will further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - the so-called ledge in the front line, which had 100 km across at its base. In the operation, which received the code designation "Citadel", the German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would have thwarted the Red Army's plans for a summer offensive and shortened the front line.
The plans of the German command revealed
German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident "Lucy" in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly objected that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by the Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhausted the enemy on our defenses, knocked out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive, we would finally finish off the main enemy grouping ". Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.
The Germans were going to strike in late spring or early summer, but they failed to concentrate strike groups. It was not until 1 July that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on 5 July. A day later, Stalin learned from "Lutsi" that the blow would be delivered in the period from 3 to 6 July.
The Germans planned to cut the salient under its base with powerful simultaneous blows from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel-General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven armored and motorized divisions. In the south, the 4th Panzer Army of General Herman Goth from Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance on Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.
The northern face of the arc was defended by the Central Front of General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was supposed to reflect the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. In the depths of the ledge, powerful reserves were concentrated as part of the Steppe Front, Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. Up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were laid on the most tank-prone areas for every kilometer of the front.
Opposing sides. Great Confrontation
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In the Battle of Kursk, the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - an experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was the tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In fact, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS Panzer divisions (as well as the "Grossdeutschland" division) had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks each. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.
Basically, tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types participated in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the strike power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular, those associated with an unreliable transmission and running gear, as Heinz Guderian had warned.
The battle involved 1800 Luftwaffe aircraft, which were especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Squadrons of Ju 87 bombers carried out the classic massive dive bombing strikes for the last time in this war.
The Germans during the Battle of Kursk faced reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They could not break through or bypass them. Therefore, the German troops had to create a new tactical grouping for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - "Panzerkeil" - was supposed to become a "can opener" for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy tanks "Tiger I" and tank destroyers "Ferdinand" with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand the hit of Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front at intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure interaction in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.
Red Army
In 1943, the combat power of the Wehrmacht was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. The uniform with epaulettes and unit badges was re-introduced. Many famous units have earned the title of "Guards", as in the tsarist army. The main tank of the Red Army was the T-34. But already in 1942, the modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank according to their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the armor and armament of the T-34 needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered the troops in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery mount was armed with a 152-mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.
The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its success. Fighter anti-tank artillery batteries included 152-mm and 203-mm howitzers. Also actively used rocket artillery combat vehicles - "Katyusha".
The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters nullified the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also proved to be effective.
Victory Tactics
Although the German army had the upper hand in the skill of using tanks at the beginning of the war, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The courage of the Soviet tankers and the courage of the infantry in defense also nullified the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its splendor. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in the labyrinths of trenches in vain attempts to break through. With the help of the local population, Soviet troops dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected barbed wire, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.
Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mostly women and children, were involved in the construction of defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.
Red Army |
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| Groupings of the Red Army: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573195 soldiers, 8510 guns and mortars, 1639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625591 soldiers, 8718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft. | ||||||||||
| Commander-in-Chief: Stalin Representatives of the Headquarters of the Knrkhovny High Command during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky |
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| central front Army General Rokossovsky 48th Army 13th Army 70th Army 65th Army 60th Army 2nd Panzer Army 16th Air Army |
Steppe (Reserve) Front Colonel General Konev 5th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Army 27th Army 47th Army 53rd Army 5th Air Army |
Voronezh Front Army General Vatutin 38th Army 40th Army 1st Panzer Army 6th Guards Army 7th Guards Army 2nd Air Army |
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german army |
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| Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft. | ||||||||||
| Army Group Center: Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model | ||||||||||
| 20th Army Corps General von Roman 45th Infantry Division 72nd Infantry Division 137th Infantry Division 251st Infantry Division 6th Air Fleet Colonel General Greim 1st Air Division |
46th Tank Corps General Zorn 7th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 258th Infantry Division 41st Tank Corps General Harpe 18th Panzer Division 86th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division |
47th Tank Corps General Lemelsen 2nd Panzer Division 6th Infantry Division 9th Panzer Division 20th Panzer Division 23rd Army Corps |
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| Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein 4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Goth Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf |
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| 11th Army Corps General Routh 106th Infantry Division 320th Infantry Division 42nd Army Corps |
3rd Tank Corps
General Bright 6th Panzer Division 7th Panzer Division 19th Panzer Division 168th Infantry Division 48th Tank Corps General Knobelsdorff 3rd Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 167th Infantry Division Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany" |
2nd SS Panzer Corps General Hausser 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" 52nd Army Corps 4th Air Fleet |
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Airborne Brigade |
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First step. Strike from the North
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The tanks and infantry of Model's 9th Army launched an offensive against Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky's troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.
Taking into account these data, Rokossovsky ordered counter-barrage preparations to begin at 02:20 in the areas of concentration of German troops. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intensive shelling of the forward units of the Red Army began.
The German infantry with great difficulty advanced through densely fired terrain, suffering serious losses from high-density anti-personnel mines. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions, which were the main striking force of the grouping on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through along the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.
The advancing German tanks achieved more significant success. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, wedged in some places 6-8 km deep into the defense zone, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, having assessed the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day, and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The town of Maloarkhangelsk became the main center of defense.
On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command at the end of June appreciated the significance of this position. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified defense sector.
On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the forefront, but they had to not only break through the defensive lines of the Red Army, but also beat off counterattacks by Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails on the engine blinds. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively fired upon by machine guns and artillery. Although the Soviet tanks suffered damage from the fire of the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, the German losses were very heavy.
The German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements arrived in time in Maloarkhangelsk strengthened the defense.
The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to a shallow depth, but every time Model thought he had succeeded in breaking through, the Soviet troops withdrew, and the enemy ran into a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave a secret order to the northern grouping of troops to prepare for a counteroffensive.
Especially strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on such a scale, desperate battles flared up for the most important positions - the school, the water tower and the machine and tractor station. During fierce battles, they repeatedly passed from hand to hand. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but the resistance of the Soviet troops could not be broken.
Although the Germans still captured most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to penetrate 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.
The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by that time the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which was the beginning of Zhukov's counteroffensive against Orel in the rear of the 9th Army. The model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. Already by noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was reliably withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.
Map-scheme of the battle for the village of Ponyri
July 5-12, 1943. View from the southeast
Developments
1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked the Soviet positions in the village itself and near it.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th Panzer Divisions attack Ponyri, but run into Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft attack advancing tanks from the air.
4. Fierce hand-to-hand fights boil in the village itself. Especially hot battles took place at the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key points of defense. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called "Kursk Stalingrad".
5. On July 9, the 508th German Grenadier Regiment, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupies Hill 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, the German troops advanced, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this area, Model on the night of July 10-11 throws his last reserve, the 10th Panzer Division, to assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they did not manage to completely break through the Soviet defenses.
Second phase. Strike from the south
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Army Group "South" was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Her offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was relatively easy to stop the advance of Model's 9th Army from the north for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would strike a decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful grouping was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their the best troops on the southern face of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops here. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.
Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as well as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-barrage preparations for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were used in this artillery preparation than in general during the entire period of the war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.
The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.
2nd SS Panzer Corps
In the center of the German grouping, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser was advancing (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type in the Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the Kempf army task force was hopelessly stuck not far from the crossings across the Donets River.
These first offensive actions of the German army disturbed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.
Despite this, the next day the German SS Panzer divisions developed success. The powerful 100-mm frontal armor and 88-mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to the fire of Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.
Resilience of the Red Army
However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own established units, hindering the offensive. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Nevertheless, on July 8 it seemed that the 48th Panzer Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite the stubborn counterattacks of the Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met with dense fire from the Tiger tanks of the elite Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.
During July 10, the 48th Panzer Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack the Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. By winning this battle, the Germans would be able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.
Map-scheme of the defense of Cherkassky
Impact of the 48th tank corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south
Events:
1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Panzer Army.
3. The new Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade launch an offensive supported by the Fusilier Regiment of the Grossdeutschland Division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under the concentrated heavy fire of Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the offensive of the 48th Panzer Corps stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main body of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the division "Grossdeutschland" began at 05:00. At the head of the strike force, a company of Tiger tanks of this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoye. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the grenadier regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the "Grossdeutschland" division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet line of defense.
6. Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with wrecked German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It did not help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and the resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psyol River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.
Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka
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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in the battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge reached its climax. Three significant events took place that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further advance to the west. In this direction, defensive lines remained through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly went over to counterattacks, restricting the freedom of action of the Germans. Since the German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Panzer Corps was suspended.
Also on 11 July, Army Task Force Kempf, on the extreme right flank of the German advance, finally began to move north. She broke through the defenses of the Red Army between Melehovo and the Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance towards Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were drawn to this area to prepare for a decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.
July 12 - decisive day
Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tankers prepared their vehicles for the battle that was to take place the next day. Long before dawn, the rumble of tank engines warming up was heard in the night. Soon their deep rumble filled the whole neighborhood.
The SS Panzer Corps was opposed by Lieutenant General Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of the Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombarded by German aircraft. Three SS panzer divisions then went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the forefront. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on the German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 Red Army tanks, only 500 were T-34s. They attacked the German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" at maximum speeds in order to prevent the enemy from using the superiority of the guns and armor of his tanks at a long distance. As they got closer, the Soviet tanks were able to hit the German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.
The Soviet tanker recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It well illuminated the contours of German tanks and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops at full speed. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Management in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The German fascist Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantage of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. In essence, it was a tank melee. Russian tankers went to ram. Tanks flared up like candles, falling under direct shots, shattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, towers flew off.
Thick black oily smoke swirled over the entire battlefield. The Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were not able to achieve success in the offensive either. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of sensitive losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported having destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of their tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its combat vehicles, but the Germans had also suffered losses in the amount of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that went on the attack in the morning.
Defeat of the German army
This colossal tank battle could have been won by the Germans if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but it did not succeed. The units of the Red Army that opposed him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov's positions until the evening.
From July 13 to July 15, the German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.
Map-scheme of the tank battle near Prokhorovka
The impact of the Hausser tanks on the morning of July 12, 1943, view from the southeast.
Events:
1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe aircraft begin an intensive bombardment of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks come out of camouflaged shelters and rush to the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada on high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range cannons.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, which broke up into many local actions and individual tank battles at a very close distance (the fire was fired almost point-blank). Soviet tanks tend to cover the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the "Tigers" fire from a place. All day long, and even into the advancing twilight, the fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, two Soviet corps strike at the Totenkopf division. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffers heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command presumably estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles.
Results of the Battle of Kursk
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The result of the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the transfer of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies carried out a landing in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were deplorable. The courage and steadfastness of the Soviet troops, as well as selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions.
As soon as the German offensive bogged down, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, the Soviet troops immediately went over to the offensive on the Oryol ledge, which went deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for the refusal of the Model on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle near Prokhorovka. The model itself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol ledge (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but the German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to the prepared line of defense (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, the Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which have not yet been replenished.
On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units that had penetrated the Kursk salient. On July 23, the Germans had to withdraw to the positions they occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had withdrawn to the western bank of the Dnieper.
Losses in the Battle of Kursk are estimated differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, the defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still attempting to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often considered separate from the Battle of Kursk. The German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten retroactively, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count their losses after the battle. The enormous significance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda on both sides also had an effect.
According to some studies, for example, by Colonel David Glantz, from July 5 to 20, the 9th Army of the Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, the units of the Army Group South - 29,102 people. In total - 49 822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people lost the Central Front and 73,892 people - the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were the losses of the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.
Losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often wrecked tanks were repaired or restored on the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law, which states that up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are usually completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk, German tank formations lost 1612 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1600 vehicles. This is due to the fact that the Germans have more powerful tank guns.
During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more aircraft were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.
The Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. The defeat of Germany was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically minded German military leaders realized that the war was lost.
The front line at the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 ran from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga, further along the Svir River to Leningrad and further south; at Velikie Luki, it turned to the southeast and in the Kursk region formed a huge ledge, deeply protruding into the disposition of enemy troops; further from the Belgrade region, it ran east of Kharkov and along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers stretched to the eastern coast of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov; on the Taman Peninsula, it passed east of Timryuk and Novorossiysk.
The largest forces were concentrated in the southwestern direction, in the area from Novorossiysk to Taganrog. In the maritime theaters, the balance of power also began to take shape in favor of the Soviet Union, primarily due to the quantitative and qualitative growth of naval aviation.
The fascist German command came to the conclusion that the most convenient site for delivering a decisive blow was the ledge in the Kursk region, which received the name of the Kursk salient. From the north, the troops of the Army Group "Center" hung over it, creating a heavily fortified Oryol bridgehead here. From the south, the ledge was covered by the troops of the Army Group "South". The enemy hoped to cut off the ledge under the base and defeat the formations of the Central and Voronezh fronts operating there. The fascist German command also took into account the exceptionally great strategic importance of the salient for the Red Army. Occupying it, Soviet troops could strike at the rear of the flags of both the Oryol and Belgrade-Kharkov enemy groups.
The development of the offensive operation plan was completed by the Nazi command already in the first half of April. He received code name"Citadel". The general plan of the operation boiled down to the following: with two simultaneous counter strikes in the general direction to Kursk - from the Orel region to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north - to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts on the Kursk salient. The subsequent offensive operations of the Wehrmacht were made dependent on the results of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. The success of these operations was to serve as a signal for an attack on Leningrad.
The enemy prepared carefully for the operation. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the fascist German command transferred 5 infantry divisions from France and Germany to the area south of Orel and north of Kharkov. It paid particular attention to the concentration of tank formations. Large aviation forces were also drawn up. As a result, the enemy managed to create strong strike groups. One of them, consisting of the 9th German Army of the Center group, was located in the area south of Orel. The other, which included the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Task Force of the Army Group South, was located in the area north of Kharkov. The German 2nd Army, which was part of Army Group Center, was deployed against the western front of the Kursk salient.
The former chief of staff of the 48th tank corps, which participated in the operation, General F. Mellenthin, testifies that "not a single offensive was as carefully prepared as this."
Soviet troops were also actively preparing for offensive operations. The headquarters planned in the summer-autumn company to defeat the Army Groups "Center" and "South", liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, eastern regions of Belarus and reach the Smolensk line, the Sozh river, the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper. The troops of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Steppe fronts, the left wing of the Western Front and part of the forces of the Southwestern Front were to participate in this large offensive. At the same time, it was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the southwestern direction in order to defeat the enemy armies in the areas of Orel and Kharkov, on the Kursk Bulge. The operation was prepared by the Headquarters of the General Staff, the military councils of the dandies and their headquarters with the utmost care.
On April 8, G.K. Zhukov, who was at that time on the instructions of the Headquarters in the area of the Kursk ledge, outlined his thoughts on the plan for the upcoming actions of the Soviet troops to the Supreme Commander. “It will be better,” he reported, “if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping by going on a general offensive.” A. M. Vasilevsky shared this point of view.
On April 12, a meeting was held at Headquarters, at which a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense. The final decision on deliberate defense was made by Stalin in early June. The Soviet High Command, realizing the importance of the Kursk ledge, took appropriate measures.
The repulse of an enemy strike from the area south of Orel was assigned to the Central Front, which defended the northern and northwestern parts of the Kursk ledge, and the enemy’s offensive from the Belgorod region was supposed to disrupt the Voronezh Front, which defended the southern and southwestern parts of the arc.
The coordination of the actions of the fronts on the spot was entrusted to the representatives of the Stavka marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
Never before during the war did Soviet troops create such a powerful and grandiose defense.
By the beginning of July, the Soviet troops were fully prepared to repel the enemy offensive.
The fascist German command kept postponing the start of the operation. The reason for this was the preparation of the enemy to attack the Soviet troops with a powerful tank avalanche. On July 1, Hitler summoned the main leaders of the operation and announced the final decision to start it on July 5.
The fascist command was especially concerned about achieving surprise and devastating impact. However, the enemy's plan failed: the Soviet command promptly revealed the intentions of the Nazis and the arrival of his new technical means to the front, and established the exact date start of Operation Citadel. Based on the data received, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to carry out a pre-planned artillery counter-training, to bring down a fire strike on the areas of concentration of the main enemy groupings in order to stop his initial onslaught, to inflict heavy damage on him even before he rushes to the attack.
Before the offensive, Hitler issued two orders to keep the spirit of his soldiers: one, on July 1, for the officers, the other, on July 4, for the entire personnel of the troops participating in the operation.
On July 5, at dawn, the troops of the 13th Army, the 6th and 7th Guards Armies of the Voronezh and Central Fronts launched a powerful artillery strike on its battle formations, artillery firing positions, command and observation posts. One of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War began. During the artillery counter-preparation, serious losses were inflicted on the enemy, especially in artillery. The battle formations of the Nazi units and subunits were largely disorganized. There was confusion in the camp of the enemy. The German fascist command, in order to restore the disturbed command and control of troops, was forced to postpone the start of the offensive for 2.5-3 hours.
At 0530 hours, after artillery preparation, the enemy went over to the offensive in the zone of the central front and at 0600 in the zone of Voronezh. Under cover of the fire of thousands of guns, with the support of many aircraft, a mass of fascist tanks and assault guns rushed into the attack. The infantry followed them. Fierce battles began. By troops Central Front in the 40 km strip, the Nazis delivered three blows.
The enemy was sure that he would be able to quickly join the battle formations of the Soviet troops. But his main blow fell on the strongest sector of the defense of the Soviet troops, and therefore, from the very first minutes of the battle, it began to unfold not as the Nazis had planned. The enemy was met with a flurry of fire from all types of weapons. From the air, enemy manpower and equipment were destroyed by pilots. Four times during the day, the Nazi troops tried to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and each time they were forced to roll back.
The number of wrecked and burned enemy vehicles grew rapidly, the fields were covered with thousands of corpses of the Nazis. The Soviet troops also suffered losses. The fascist command threw more and more tank and infantry units into battle. Up to 4 infantry divisions and 250 tanks were advancing against two Soviet divisions operating in the main direction (the left flank of the 13th Army) (81st Generals Barinova A.B. and 15th Colonel V.N. Dzhandzhgov). They were supported by about 100 aircraft. Only by the end of the day did the Nazis manage to penetrate into the defense of the Soviet troops for 6-8 km in a very narrow area and reach the second defensive zone. This was achieved at the cost of huge losses.
At night, the troops of the 13th Army consolidated their positions and prepared for the next battle.
In the early morning of July 6, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army, and the 19th Separate Tank Corps, supported by aviation, counterattacked the main enemy grouping. Both sides fought with extraordinary tenacity. Enemy aviation, despite heavy losses, continuously bombed the battle formations of Soviet units. As a result of a two-hour battle, the enemy was pushed back to the north by 1.5 -2 km.
Unable to break through to the second line of defense through Olkhovatka, the enemy decided to concentrate his main efforts on another sector. At dawn on July 7, 200 tanks and 2 infantry divisions, supported by artillery and aircraft, attacked in the direction of Ponyri. The Soviet command urgently transferred here large forces of anti-tank artillery and rocket launchers.
Five times during the day the Nazis made violent attacks, and they all ended unsuccessfully. Only at the end of the day the enemy, having brought up fresh forces, broke into the northern part of Ponyri. But the next day he was knocked out of there.
On July 8, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy resumed the attack on Olkhovatka. On the small area 10 km away, he brought two more tank divisions into battle. Now almost all the forces of the shock German fascist group advancing on Kursk from the north took part in the battle.
The fierceness of the fighting grew with every passing hour. The onslaught of the enemy was especially strong at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlement of Samodurovka. But the Soviet soldiers survived. The enemy, although he advanced another 3-4 km at the cost of exceptional losses, could not break through the Soviet defenses. This was his last push.
During four days of bloody fighting in the area of Ponyri and Olkhovatka, the fascist German group managed to engage in the defense of the troops of the Central Front in just a zone up to 10 km wide and up to 12 km deep. On the fifth day of the battle, she could no longer advance. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive at the line reached.
Towards this grouping, which was trying to pass to Kursk from the north, enemy troops sought to break through from the south.
The enemy delivered the main blow from the area west of Belgorod in the general direction to Kursk. In this grouping, the enemy included the bulk of tanks and aircraft.
The battles in the Oboyan direction resulted in the largest tank battle, which had a significant impact on the entire course and outcome of events on the southern face of the Kursk salient. The Nazis intended to ram the first and second lanes of defense operating in this direction of the 6th Guards Army of General I. M. Chistyakov on the move. Ensuring the main attack from the east, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps advanced from the Belgorod region to Korocha. Here the defense was occupied by the troops of the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov.
From the morning of July 5, when the enemy went on the offensive, the Soviet troops had to withstand an exceptional onslaught of the enemy. Hundreds of planes and bombs were thrown at Soviet positions. But the soldiers fought back the enemy.
Pilots and sappers inflicted great damage on the enemy. But the Nazis, despite huge losses, continued to attack. The most fierce battles broke out in the area of the settlement of Cherkesskoye. By evening, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the division's main defense line and encircling the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment. Having chained significant enemy forces to themselves, they slowed down his advance. On the night of July 6, the regiment received an order to break out of encirclement and retreat to a new line. But the regiment survived, providing an organized retreat to a new defensive line.
On the second day, the battle continued with unrelenting tension. The enemy threw more and more forces into the attack. In an effort to break through the defense, he did not reckon with huge losses. Soviet soldiers fought to the death.
The pilots provided great assistance to the ground forces.
By the end of the second day of the battle, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, advancing on the right flank of the shock group, wedged itself into the second line of defense on a very narrow section of the front. On July 7 and 8, the Nazis made desperate attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen in the direction of Prokhorovka.
No less fierce battles flared up in the Korochan direction. Up to 300 enemy tanks advanced from the Belgorod region to the northeast. In four days of fighting, the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps managed to advance only 8-10 km in a very narrow area.
On July 9-10-11, in the direction of the main attack, the Nazis continued to make desperate efforts to break through to Kursk through Oboyan. They brought into battle all six tank divisions of both corps operating here. Intense fighting went on in the strip between the railway and the highway leading from Belgorod to Kursk. The Nazi command expected to make a march to Kursk in two days. The seventh day was already running out, and the enemy advanced only 35 km. Having met such stubborn opposition, he was forced to turn to Prokhorovka, bypassing Oboyan.
By July 11, the enemy, having advanced only 30-35 km, reached the Gostishchevo-Rzhavets line, but he was still far from the goal.
Having assessed the situation, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, the representative of the Headquarters, and the command of the Voronezh Front decided to launch a powerful counterattack. The 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov, who arrived at the disposal of the front, was involved in its application, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th Guards Armies and part of the forces 40.69 and 7th Guards Army. On July 12, these troops launched a counteroffensive. The struggle flared up on all fronts. On both sides, a huge mass of tanks participated in it. Particularly heavy fighting was fought in the Prokhorovka area. The troops stumbled upon exceptional, stubborn resistance from units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which continuously launched counterattacks. A large oncoming tank battle took place here. A fierce fight lasted until late in the evening. Both sides suffered heavy losses. July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. On this day, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive. On the very first day, with strong blows, they broke the defenses of the 2nd Panzer Army in a number of sectors of the Oryol grouping of the enemy and began to develop the offensive in depth. July 15 launched an offensive and the central front. As a result, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon its plan to destroy the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge and began to take urgent measures to organize defense. On July 16, the fascist German command began to withdraw its troops on the southern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front, brought into battle on July 18, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the end of July 23, they had basically restored the position they had occupied before the start of the battle.
Thus, the third summer offensive of the enemy on the eastern front completely failed. It bogged down within a week. But the Nazis claimed that the summer is their time, that in the summer they can really use their huge opportunities and achieve victory. This turned out to be far from the case.
Hitler's generals considered the Red Army incapable of broad offensive operations in the summer. Incorrectly assessing the experience of previous companies, they believed that Soviet troops could only advance in “alliance” with a fierce winter. Fascist propaganda persistently created myths about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy. However, reality has refuted these claims.
The Soviet command, having the strategic initiative, dictated its will to the enemy in the Battle of Kursk. The defeat of the advancing enemy groupings created a favorable situation for launching a decisive counteroffensive here, which was prepared in advance by the Headquarters. Its plan was developed and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May. After that, it was discussed more than once in the Headquarters and corrected. Two groups of fronts were involved in the operation. The defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy was entrusted to the troops of Bryansk, the left wing of the Western and the right wing of the central fronts. The troops of the Voronezh and Stepnovsky fronts were to strike at the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping. The partisan formations of the Bryansk region, the Oryol and Smolensk regions, Belarus, as well as the regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine were given the task of disabling railway communications in order to disrupt the supply and regroup the enemy forces.
The tasks of the Soviet troops in the counteroffensive were very complex and difficult. Both on the Oryol and on the Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead the enemy created a strong defense. The Nazis fortified the first of them for almost two years and considered it as a starting area for striking Moscow, and they considered the second “a bastion of German defense in the east, a gate that blocked the paths for Russian armies to Ukraine”.
The enemy defense had a developed system of field fortifications. Its main strip, 5-7 km deep, and in some places up to 9 km, consisted of heavily fortified strongholds, which were connected by trenches and communications. In the depths of the defense there were intermediate and rear lines. Its main nodes were the cities of Orel, Bolkhov, Muensk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Merefa - large nodes of railways and highways, which allowed the enemy to maneuver with forces and means.
It was decided to start the counteroffensive with the defeat of the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies defending the Oryol bridgehead. Significant forces and means were involved in the Oryol operation. Its general plan, which received the code name "Kutuzov", consisted in the simultaneous delivery by the troops of three fronts of attacks from the north, east and south to the eagle in order to capture the enemy grouping here, cut it and destroy it piece by piece. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front, operating from the north, were to first, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, defeat the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, and then, advancing on Khotynets, intercept the enemy's retreat from the Orel region to the west and destroy it together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central fronts.
To the southeast of the Western Front, the troops of the Bryansk Front prepared for the offensive. They were supposed to break through the enemy defenses from the east. The troops of the right wing of the central front were preparing for an offensive in the general direction of Kromy. They were ordered to break through to Orel from the south and, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts, defeat the enemy grouping on the Oryol bridgehead.
On the morning of July 12, powerful artillery and air preparations began in the offensive zone of the shock groups of the Western and Bryansk fronts.
The Nazis, after powerful artillery and air strikes, at first could not offer any serious resistance. As a result of two days of fierce fighting, the defense of the 2nd Panzer Army was broken through to a depth of 25 km. The fascist German command, in order to strengthen the army, hastily began to transfer units and formations here from other sectors of the front. This favored the transition to the offensive of the troops of the Central Front. On July 15, they attacked the Oryol grouping of the enemy from the south. Having broken the resistance of the Nazis, these troops in three days completely restored the position that they occupied before the start of the defensive battle. Meanwhile, the 11th Army of the Western Front advanced south to 70 km. Its main forces were now 15-20 km from the village of Khotynets. Over the most important communication of the enemy - railway. Orel-Bryansk highway is under serious threat. The Nazi command hastily began to pull additional forces to the breakthrough site. This somewhat slowed down the advance of the Soviet troops. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, new forces were thrown into the battle. As a result, the pace of advance increased again.
The troops of the Bryansk Front were successfully advancing towards Orel. The troops of the Central Front, advancing on Kromy, interacted with them. Aviation actively interacted with the ground forces.
The position of the Nazis on the Oryol bridgehead became more and more critical every day. Divisions transferred here from other sectors of the front also suffered heavy losses. The stability of the soldiers in the defense has declined sharply. Increasingly frequent were the facts when the commanders of regiments and divisions lost command of the troops.
In the midst of the Battle of Kursk, the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel regions, according to a single plan “Rail War”, began a massive decommissioning of the railway. enemy communications. They also attacked enemy garrisons, convoys, intercepted railways and highways.
The Nazi command, irritated by the failures at the front, demanded that the troops hold their positions to the last man.
The Nazi command failed to stabilize the front. The Nazis retreated. The Soviet troops increased the strength of their blows and did not give a break day or night. On July 29, the city of Bolkhov was liberated. On the night of August 4, Soviet troops broke into Orel. At dawn on August 5, the Eagle was completely cleared of the enemy.
Following Orel, the cities of Krom, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky, Karachaev, as well as hundreds of villages and villages were liberated. By August 18, the Oryol bridgehead of the Nazis ceased to exist. For 37 days of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops advanced westward up to 150 km.
Another offensive operation was being prepared on the southern front - Belgorod-Kharkovskaya, which received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev".
In accordance with the concept of the operation, the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow on its left wing. The task was to break through the enemy defenses, and then develop the offensive with mobile formations in the general direction of Bogodukhov, Valki. Before the counteroffensive, intense preparations were going on in the troops day and night.
Early in the morning of August 3, artillery preparation for the attack began on both fronts. At 8 o'clock, on a general signal, the artillery moved its fire into the depths of the enemy's battle formations. Clinging to its fire shaft, the tanks and infantry of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the attack.
On the Voronezh Front, the troops of the 5th Guards Army advanced up to 4 km by noon. They cut off the enemy's retreat to the west of his Belgorod grouping.
The troops of the Steppe Front, breaking the resistance of the enemy, went to Belgorod and on the morning of August 5 started fighting for the city. On the same day, August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated.
The offensive breakthrough of the Soviet troops increased day by day. On August 7-8, the armies of the Voronezh Front captured the cities of Bogodukhov, Zolochev and the village of Cossack Lopan.
The Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping was cut into two parts. The gap between them was 55 km. The enemy was moving fresh forces here.
Fierce battles took place from 11 to 17 August. By August 20, the enemy grouping was drained of blood. The troops of the steppe front successfully advanced on Kharkov. From August 18 to 22, the troops of the Steppe Front had to fight heavy battles. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, after stubborn fighting, Kharkov was liberated.
During the successful offensives of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the tasks of the counteroffensive were fully completed. The general counter-offensive after the Battle of Kursk led to the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass, and southeastern regions of Belarus. Soon Italy withdrew from the war.
Fifty days lasted the Battle of Kursk - one of the greatest battles of the Second World War. It is divided into two periods. The first - a defensive battle of the Soviet troops on the southern and northern faces of the Kursk ledge - began on July 5. The second - the counteroffensive of five fronts (Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe) - began on July 12 in the Oryol direction and on August 3 - in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended.
After the Battle of Kursk, the power and glory of Russian weapons increased. Its result was the insolvency and fragmentation of the Wehrmacht in the satellite countries of Germany.
After the battle for the Dnieper, the war entered its final stage.
Front commanders
central front
Commanding:
Army General K. K. Rokossovsky
Members of the military council:
Major General K. F. Telegin
Major General M. M. Stakhursky
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General M. S. Malinin
Voronezh Front
Commanding:
Army General N. F. Vatutin
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev
Lieutenant General L. R. Korniets
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General S. P. Ivanov
steppe front
Commanding:
Colonel General I. S. Konev
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops I. Z. Susaykov
Major General I. S. Grushetsky
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General M. V. Zakharov
Bryansk Front
Commanding:
Colonel General M. M. Popov
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General L. Z. Mekhlis
Major General S. I. Shabalin
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov
Western Front
Commanding:
Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General N. A. Bulganin
Lieutenant General I. S. Khokhlov
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky
From the book Kursk Bulge. July 5 - August 23, 1943 author Kolomiets Maxim ViktorovichCommanders of the Fronts Central FrontCommander: Army General K. K. Rokossovsky Members of the Military Council: Major General K. F. Telegin Major General M. M. Stakhursky Chief of Staff: Lieutenant General M. S. Malinin Voronezh Front Commander: Army General
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The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is a turning point in the Great Patriotic War and a giant historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.
Hitler had high hopes for this major offensive battle called the Citadel, he needed a victory to raise the spirit of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 was fatal for Hitler, as the countdown to the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched to victory.
Intelligence service
Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, the intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the "Citadel". Anastas Mikoyan (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) claims that on April 12, Stalin received information about the Citadel project.
Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted the messages of the 3rd Reich. As a result, the summer offensive project was intercepted, and information about general plan"Citadel", location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.
Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the deployment of German troops on the Eastern Front became known to the Soviet command, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other areas of the fronts.
Confrontation
The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparation was carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.
The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - the Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - the Central direction, I. Konev - the Steppe direction of the front, adequately responded to the German offensive.
The Kursk Bulge was supervised by the enemy by talented generals - these are General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having been rebuffed at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyri, using the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they failed to break through the defensive might of the Red Army.
Since July 11, a fierce battle has been going on near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that the turning point in the war took place, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the south and western fronts.
One of the global tank battles took place. The Nazi army advanced 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1200 tanks from 2 sides. The defeat of the Germans overtook by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned into a defensive one.
During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 men and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Only 6 days lasted the operation "Citadel", in which the Germans tried to attack.
Used technique
Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery mounts, nicknamed "St. SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tigr, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by Elefant self-propelled guns (we have Ferdinand).
Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Ferdinands in 200 mm, they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.
Also, the German assault guns were tank destroyers StuG III and JagdPz IV. Hitler strongly relied on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.
During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German "Panthers" and "Tigers", abandoned by the crew or broken. After the elimination of breakdowns, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet troops.
List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
- 3444 tanks;
- 2172 aircraft;
- 1.3 million people;
- 19100 mortars and guns.
As a reserve force was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.
List of enemy forces:
- 2733 tanks;
- 2500 aircraft;
- 900 thousand people;
- 10,000 mortars and guns.
The Red Army had a numerical superiority by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of the technical level of military equipment.
Offensive
On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack in order to defeat the Kharkov-Belgorod group of Germans. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions that they occupied before the offensive.
By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18 o'clock Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was fought for the city of Orel, on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, the soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railway line during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, slowing down the pace of fighting on both fronts.
Heavy fighting lasted until 14 August. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. The German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intensive assault on Kharkov began.
This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until 30 August.
Losses
According to various historical reports, the losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. claims that the losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and captured, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.
Losses in the heavy battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army amounted to:
- Killed, disappeared, were captured - 254,470 people,
- Wounded - 608833 people.
Those. in total, human losses amounted to 863303 people, with average daily losses - 32843 people.
Losses of military equipment:
- Tanks - 6064 units;
- Aircraft - 1626 pieces,
- Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.
The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were killed - 130429 people. The losses of military equipment amounted to: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft - 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were destroyed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.
Outcome
Irritated Hitler put the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, in the future, the major offensives "Watch on the Rhine" in 1944 and the operation at Balaton in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.
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