Battle of Kursk time to attack. Kursk Bulge or Oryol-Kursk Bulge - how to
After the battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the very next year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.
Prehistory of the Battle of Kursk
During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the surrender of the 6th Wehrmacht Army near Stalingrad, and also liberate very vast territories. So, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached about 200 kilometers wide and 100-150 deep.
Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of everything Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a number of energetic actions in the Kharkov region. A strike force was created very quickly, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and made an attempt to cut off the ledge in the Kursk region. However, here the German advance was stopped.
As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically even throughout its entire length, and only in the Kursk region did it bend, forming a large ledge that jutted into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.
Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk
In the spring, heated debate broke out in the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Part of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from the offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most of the German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive as early as 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.
Thus, for the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht launched an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.
The meaning of the operation, called the "Citadel", was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their strike in the general direction of Kursk. The Soviet troops in the ledge were bound to be surrounded and destroyed. After that, it was planned to launch an offensive into the formed gap in the Soviet defense and go to Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have been a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk salient.
The Soviet leadership learned the important lessons of the spring of 1942 and 1943. So, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to the defeat near Kharkov. After that, it was decided not to start the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubts that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed to this as much as possible.
That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to wear down the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
For the attack on Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large grouping, the number of which was 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were armored and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets of the Luftwaffe. Thus, total strength German troops at the beginning of the battle near Kursk amounted to approximately 900 thousand people, about 2700 tanks and 2000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern groups of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge were part of different groups armies ("Center" and "South"), the leadership was carried out by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.
The Soviet grouping on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern front of the ledge was defended by the troops of the Central Front under the command of General of the Army Rokossovsky, the southern - by the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of General of the Army Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general command of the troops in the Kursk Salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.
The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 - 12 July 1943)
On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive against Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which made it possible in the first minutes and hours of the battle to inflict serious losses and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.
Nevertheless, the German offensive began, and in the early days he managed to achieve some success. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious successes. On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht attacked in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, failing to break through the Soviet defenses, turned towards the settlement of Ponyri. However, here, too, the Soviet defense managed to withstand the onslaught of the German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered monstrous losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of order. On July 10, units of the army went on the defensive.
The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here the German army managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses in the first days, but did not break through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by the Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.
After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the lava strike to Prokhorovka. The implementation of this decision would make it possible to cover large area than planned. However, units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.
On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, about 700 tanks participated in it, while from the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy's penetration into the Soviet defenses. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk salient, but it was possible to restore the position at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.
By July 15, having suffered as a result of continuous violent attacks huge losses, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive throughout the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Given the current situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.
Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, parts of the Wehrmacht, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.
To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: "Kutuzov" (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and "Rumyantsev" (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).
As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groupings of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops, who liberated the cities from the enemy.
The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by the Soviet troops. The battles for this city took on a very fierce character, however, thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.
Side losses
Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more ambiguous are the large differences between the estimates of the losses of the parties in different sources.
So, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. At the same time, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Losses of armored vehicles range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. The losses of Soviet aviation are estimated at 1600 aircraft.
However, regarding the estimate of the losses of the Wehrmacht, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at about 420 thousand. Losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.
The results and significance of the Battle of Kursk
Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations to liberate Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: "Suvorov" (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.
Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for the Soviet troops to operate. The German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this absolutely does not mean that the Wehrmacht at that time was not strong. On the contrary, fiercely snarling, the German troops sought to hold at least the line of the Dnieper.
For the command of the allies, who landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of "help", since the Wehrmacht was now unable to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was more priority. Even after the defeat near Kursk, the command of the Wehrmacht was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place to send units battered in battles with the Red Army.
For the German command, the Battle of Kursk was the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for a sufficiently long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.
The Battle of Kursk was the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic and World War II. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union, including such large cities as Kyiv and Smolensk, were liberated.
In international terms, the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the moment when the peoples of Europe, enslaved by the Nazis, perked up. The people's liberation movement in the countries of Europe began to grow even faster. It culminated in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.
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In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge ledge was formed on the line of the Soviet-German front between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was informally called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc, the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups "Center" and "South" were located.
Individual representatives of the highest German command circles suggested that the Wehrmacht go on the defensive, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring their own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk salient for striking. According to the plan, the German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.
It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending for many kilometers into the depths of the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to switch to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The troops of the Red Army were supposed to hold back the onslaught of the Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then go on the counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After that, it was supposed to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.
In the event that the Germans decided not to advance in the area of the Kursk Bulge, a plan was also created for offensive operations by forces concentrated on this sector of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and the Red Army began its implementation in April 1943.
The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built solid. In total, 8 defensive lines were created with a total depth of about 300 kilometers. Great attention was paid to the mining of approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. Anti-tank artillery was not evenly distributed along the front, but gathered in the so-called "anti-tank areas" - localized accumulations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other's sectors of fire. Thus, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once was achieved.
Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, and 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.
From the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.
Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, one should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and, consequently, the German command was able to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the desired concentration of troops in the breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received a fairly large number of new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled units "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the troops (out of 90 built) and which, however, , in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were competently used in the right place.
At that time, new combat aircraft entered service with the German Air Force: Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use of the La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters by the Soviet Air Force took place.
On May 6-8, Soviet aviation, with the forces of six air armies, struck on a 1,200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast of the Sea of Azov. The target for this strike was the airfields of the German Air Force. On the one hand, this really made it possible to cause some damage to both vehicles and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aviation suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.
In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railway lines, bridges, places of concentration of Soviet forces. It is worth noting that German aviation often acted more successfully. Claims in this regard were expressed by parts of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops failed to achieve serious damage and disruption of the communication routes of the Red Army.
Both commands - the Voronezh and Central Fronts - predicted the date of the transition of the German troops to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attacks were to be expected in the period from 3 to 6 July. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture the "tongue", which reported that on July 5 the Germans would launch an assault.
The northern face of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the beginning of the German offensive, at 2:30 in the morning the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 04:30, the artillery strike was repeated. Efficiency this event was quite controversial. According to the reports of Soviet artillerymen, significant damage was inflicted on the German troops. However, it doesn't appear to have done much damage. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of the enemy's wire communication lines. In addition, now the Germans knew for sure that a sudden offensive would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.
Aviation was supposed to support the Soviet troops in the process of countering an artillery raid, but due to the dark time of the day, all sorties were canceled. At 02:30 on July 5, the aviation units received a readiness directive from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, the fighter units had to be ready at dawn to repel possible Luftwaffe raids, and attack aircraft and bombers were ordered to be on alert by 6:00 in the morning.
Early in the morning, Soviet fighters began to fight German bombers and attack aircraft. In the Maloarkhangelsk area, German Ju-88s, operating under the cover of Focke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. Pilots of the 157th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost the unit commander Hermann Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.
Until half past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front sector, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel the attacks of the Luftwaffe. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to take off in groups of 6-8 fighters: an organizational mistake made by the aviation command affected. This led to serious difficulties for the Red Army Air Force fighters. In general, on the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the mistakes mentioned above, the low experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.
On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps near Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st bomber division made sorties until the second half of the day, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyan and other settlements. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed the positions of the Soviet troops. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by ground forces.
Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also in parallel to try to change the tactics of using aviation. Before the bombers, they tried to send large groups of fighters to "clear" the airspace. The commanders of air divisions and regiments began to receive more initiative in planning operations. But during operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with the set goals, without being distracted from the plan.
In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army made about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy casualties but did its best to provide adequate support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of the fighting, the army command changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive strikes against accumulations of enemy equipment and manpower. These blows had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.
In the zone of operations of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), hostilities began on the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the outposts of the front and lasted until late at night.
On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern face of the Kursk salient, the fighting was much more intense and was accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front command.
The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 am on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the strike towards the settlement of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassky, the enemy practically managed to make a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, the Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the personnel of the units.
Air support for units of the Red Army on the southern face of the Kursk salient was carried out by the 2nd and 17th air armies. In the early morning of July 5, German aviation began bombing the combat formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. Departures of fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite significant damage on the enemy, but the losses of the Soviet troops were also high.
On July 6, German tanks stormed the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among other Soviet units, it should be noted the 291st assault and 2nd guards assault air divisions of the 16th air army, which for the first time used PTAB 2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy vehicles was described as "excellent".
The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of the Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th air armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th army. However, here, too, the command tried to adjust the tactics of using aircraft, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible, and strive with all its might to increase the effectiveness of the air forces. Apparently, these measures have achieved their goal. Increasingly, in the reports of the commanders of ground units, words began to appear that Soviet attack aircraft greatly facilitated the repulsion of German tank and infantry attacks. Fighters also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Thus, it was noted that only the 5th Fighter Air Corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 downed enemy aircraft.
On July 10, bad weather set in on the Kursk Bulge. This drastically reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5s from the 193rd Fighter Regiment, who managed to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with cover from six Bf.109s. Enemy aircraft randomly dropped bombs and began to retreat to their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. A heroic feat in this battle was performed by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went to the oncoming ram of the Messerschmitt and died.
On July 12, at the height of the Battle of Prokhorov, the aircraft of both sides could only provide very limited support to ground units: weather continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties that day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. At the same time, there is no mention of destroyed Soviet tanks in the reports of German pilots. Subsequently, the air superiority on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the German 8th Air Corps had fallen to almost zero.
In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazi dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.
Total mobilization - selected generals, best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles. A matter of prestige.
(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)
It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"
The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day military glory Russia - Victory Day of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.
Moiarussia collected the most Interesting Facts about this great confrontation:
Operation Citadel
In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation code-named Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation were involved in total 50 divisions, including 16 armored and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.
German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"
The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or the new tanks were not delivered, or the new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then
"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.
Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military experts of the Soviet army, will be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority will be absolutely vulnerable and useless.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.
However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.
(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images) Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.
That very night took place telephone conversation Rokossovsky with Stalin:
- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!
- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
Agent Werther
On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.
Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.
- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.
Biggest tank battle
"Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against the "Tigers" and "Panthers" key point The Battle of Kursk is considered the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.
Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and decrease the number of German ones.
None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).
Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:
According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:
“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.
The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.
The Russians drove, if they ever got that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.
The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.
As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.
The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.
“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."
It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.
One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.
It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"
Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95 When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.
On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev's feat
Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. The painting "The Tale of a Real Man." Photo: Kommersant The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.
Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of power at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.
In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.
August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreat routes on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.
As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, greatness and stamina were demonstrated to the whole world. Soviet soldier. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...
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We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material on the loss of equipment in our and German units. With us, they were significantly higher, especially in the battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army, was engaged, created by the decision of Stalin, a special commission chaired by Malenkov. In the report of the commission, in August 1943, the military operations of the Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called a model of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact, by no means victorious. In this regard, I want to bring you several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov's report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although she sins in places against the truth, she nevertheless deserves attention.
This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...
"Why was the battle of Prokhorov won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.
29th Panzer Corps :
“The attack began without artillery processing of the occupied line by the pr-com and without air cover.
This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from a place . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable for its ruggedness, the presence of impassable for tanks hollows northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to cuddle up to the road and open their flanks, unable to cover them.
Separate units that pulled ahead, approaching even the svh. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by fire forces.
There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. From 13.00, cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.
With the release of tanks to the front line of defense, pr-ka from the forest with / z. GUARD and east. env. STOROGEVOE pr-k opened heavy fire from ambush tanks "Tiger", self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.
Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.
Parts of the pr-ka, with the support of a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to withdraw.
During the attack on the front edge of the pr-ka, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks and even breaking ahead of the tanks, had losses from anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action).
18th Panzer Corps :
"Enemy artillery fired intensely at the battle formations of the corps.
The corps, not having proper support in fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense bombardment from the air (by 12.00 enemy aircraft had made up to 1500 sorties), slowly moved forward.
The terrain in the zone of action of the corps is crossed by three deep ravines, passing from the left bank of the river. PSEL to the railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the tank brigades advancing in the first echelon 181, 170 were forced to act on the left flank of the corps strip near a strong enemy stronghold of the temporary storage warehouse. OCTOBER. 170 brigade, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat materiel.
By the end of the day, from the KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE area, the enemy launched a frontal tank attack with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the KOZLOVKA, POLEGHAEV direction, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.
Fulfilling the assigned task, the 18th tank met a well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with tanks and assault guns dug in advance at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.
To avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.
"The car is on fire"
The battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a wrecked Soviet T-34
Shot down near Belgorod T-34 and the dead tanker
T-34 and T-70 shot down during the Battle of Kursk. 07.1943
Destroyed T-34s during the battles for the Oktyabrsky state farm
Burnt T-34 "For Soviet Ukraine" near Belgorod. Kursk Bulge. 1943
MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.
MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge
Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60
Destroyed T-70s and BA-64s from the 29th Tank Corps
OWL. SECRET
Ex. No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE USSR - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov
In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army met with exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all, there were T-V ("Panther") tanks on the battlefield, a significant number of T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.
Commanding tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I have to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in terms of armor and weapons.
The armament, armor and aiming of the fire of the German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, the greater saturation of the tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully use the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good aiming devices in German tanks puts our tanks in a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure is increasing.
The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, using the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.
When the Germans, with their tank units, go over, at least temporarily, to the defensive, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the aiming range of their tank guns, being at the same time almost completely out of reach of our aimed tank fire. .
Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.
The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, no longer experience their former tank fear on the battlefields.
T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to engage in tank combat, as they are more than easily destroyed by German tank fire..
We have to state with bitterness that our tank equipment, with the exception of the introduction of self-propelled guns SU-122 and SU-152, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that took place on the tanks of the first production, somehow: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower, exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation are not completely eliminated today.
If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, is steadily advancing, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately this cannot be said about our tanks.
Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost their first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.
Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests conducted by the Germans of our KV and T-34 tanks.
As a result of these tests, the instruction was written, approximately, as follows: German tanks cannot conduct tank battles with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank battles. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another sector of the front.
And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other branches of the armed forces, and if they did, then with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.
On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more advanced tank T-V, "Panther"), which in fact is a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way qualities is significantly higher than the T-34 tank, and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.
To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I give the following table:
| Brand of tank and SU | Nose armor in mm. | Forehead tower and stern | Board | Stern | Roof, bottom | Gun caliber in mm. | Qty. shells. | Speed max. |
| T-34 | 45 | 95-75 | 45 | 40 | 20-15 | 76 | 100 | 55,0 |
| T-V | 90-75 | 90-45 | 40 | 40 | 15 | 75x) | ||
| KV-1S | 75-69 | 82 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 76 | 102 | 43,0 |
| T-V1 | 100 | 82-100 | 82 | 82 | 28-28 | 88 | 86 | 44,0 |
| SU-152 | 70 | 70-60 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 152 | 20 | 43,0 |
| Ferdinand | 200 | 160 | 85 | 88 | 20,0 |
x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a much higher muzzle velocity.
As an ardent patriot of the tank forces, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and, with all acuteness, raise the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design design of the existing types of German tanks.
In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.
The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his wrecked tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot on this in terms of tank recovery. At the same time, in those cases when the field of tank battles remains with the enemy for a certain period, our repairmen instead of their wrecked tanks find shapeless piles of metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our wrecked tanks.
TROOP COMMANDER
5 GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK TROOPS -
(ROTMISTROV) Signature.
active army.
=========================
RTsHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 9027s, l. 1-5
Something I would definitely like to add:
"One of the reasons for the stunning losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that about a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm gun 20K model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks on the field near Prokhorovka had nothing to catch at all (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up at close range and working in the "woodpecker" mode ... if you persuade the German tankers to look the other way; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you are lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, for which, in fact, they were created.
One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received replenishment literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, the untrainedness of both directly ordinary tankers and junior / middle-level commanders. Even in this suicidal attack, better results could have been achieved by observing a competent construction - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a bunch. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.
Well, and most importantly - monstrously inefficient work of repair and evacuation teams. It was generally very bad with this until 1944, but in this case, 5 TA simply failed on a large scale. I don’t know how many were at that moment in the state of the BREM (and whether they were even in those days in its battle formations - they could have forgotten in the rear), but they did not cope with the work. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front) in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka writes: “when retreating, the enemy, by specially created teams, evacuates his wrecked tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including our tanks and our material part, burns and undermines. As a result, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future "(RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)
………………….
And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control.
The point is also that the German reconnaissance aircraft had previously opened the approach to Prokhorovka of the formations of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, the Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank defense on the left flank of the division " Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going after repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, to go on the counteroffensive themselves and surround the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS TC, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, 18 and 29, the most powerful German PTOPs had to be attacked head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tankers repulsed the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from a place.
In my opinion, the best thing Rotmistrov could do in such a situation is to try to insist on the cancellation of the July 12 counterattack near Prokhorovka, but no traces of him even trying to do this have been found. Here, the difference in approaches is especially clear when comparing the actions of the two commanders of the tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, I’ll clarify - Katukov’s 1 tank army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).
The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander orders a counterattack by the 1st Panzer Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that in the conditions of the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way to fight is a maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):
"Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing something completely wrong. As expected, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours are burning and smoking.
It was necessary, by all means, to achieve the abolition of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report my thoughts to him. But as soon as he crossed the threshold of the hut, the head of communications in some especially significant tone reported:
From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without emotion I picked up the phone.
Hello Katukov! said a well-known voice. - Report the situation!
I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.
In my opinion, - I said, - we hurried with the counterattack. The enemy has large unused reserves, including tank ones.
What are you offering?
For the time being, it is advisable to use tanks for firing from a place, burying them in the ground or setting them in ambushes. Then we could let the enemy's vehicles within a distance of three hundred or four hundred meters and destroy them with aimed fire.
Stalin was silent for some time.
Well, - he said - you will not counterattack. Vatutin will call you about this."
As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and the day of July 6 became the "blackest day" for the 4th German Panzer Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (for the most part in their own formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out and destroyed tank). Thus, Katukov's tactics fully justified themselves.
However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw conclusions and on July 8 issues a new order to conduct a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 TC, 2 Guards TC, 5 TC and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which irrevocably - 17. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 is becoming the "blackest day" for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.
Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but at least it was worth a try!
At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlawful to limit the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, south-west of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the formed bag in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to abandon technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve a very significant tactical success, weakening 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and depriving 69 A of combat capability for some time. After July 12, the German side actually attempted to encircle and inflict maximum damage on Soviet troops withdraw their forces to the former front line). After that, the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines occupied by them until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.
At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but rather gradually withdraw their forces (in particular, the Dead Head division actually began to withdraw as early as July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly sit on the Germans' tail and peck at the back of their heads.
One gets the impression that the command of the Voronezh Front had a poor idea of what was happening at the front in the period from 5 to 18 July, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties, they lack data on the opposing enemy, his composition and intentions, there is not even approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during Battle of Kursk was given "over the head" of lower-ranking commanders, and the latter were not made aware of this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were performing some incomprehensible actions.
So there is nothing surprising that sometimes indescribable mess reigned in the parts:
So on July 8, the Soviet 99th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps attacked the Soviet 285th rifle regiment of the 183rd rifle division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the fighters and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the designated regiment (total: 25 people were killed and 37 were wounded).
On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) did not have accurate information about the location of their own and the Germans and did not send reconnaissance forward (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment on the move opened fire on the combat formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending themselves from the Germans in the area of the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having passed with a fight through their own, the regiment stumbled upon the advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging separate groups of its own infantry along with it, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery following the front line behind the same regiment (53rd Guards Tank Regiment) and just arrived at the scene, mistaking the 96th brigade tanks for German ones, pursuing the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to happy accident.
Well, and so on ... In the order of the commander of the 69th army, all this was described as "these outrages." Well, to put it mildly.
So it can be summarized that the Germans won the battle of Prokhorov, but this victory was a special case against a general negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (as Manstein insisted), but not for defense. And it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began on the part of the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (taken by the German command of the OKH ground forces as an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts really went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became much more difficult for the Germans, where on July 10 the Americans and the British landed. Tanks were also needed there.
On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered to stop Operation Citadel due to the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the dispatch of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution, despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not explicitly ordered to withdraw troops, but was prohibited from using his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 shopping mall already reflected the offensive of the Soviet South- Western Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS TC was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd TC in order to eliminate the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th army.
The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and the combination of circumstances that were developing everywhere in July 1943, not in favor of Germany, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but talking about purely the military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "
Batov Pavel Ivanovich
Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 65th Army.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in 1927, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.
Member of the First World War since 1916. Awarded for distinction in battles
2 George crosses and 2 medals.
In 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936 he consistently commanded a company, a battalion, and a rifle regiment. In 1936-1937 he fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain. Upon his return, the commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the commander of a special rifle corps in the Crimea, deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (since August 1941), commander of the 3rd Army (January-February 1942), assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February -October 1942). From October 1942 until the end of the war, he was commander of the 65th Army, participating in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. The troops under the command of P. I. Batov distinguished themselves in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted about 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
For personal courage and courage, for organizing a clear interaction of subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P.I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for crossing the river. Oder and the capture of the city of Stettin (the German name for the Polish city of Szczecin) was awarded the second "Gold Star".
After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.
In 1962-1965 he was Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the states - participants of the Warsaw Pact. Since 1965, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.
Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, "Badge of Honor", Honorary weapons, foreign orders, medals.
Vatutin Nikolai Fyodorovich
Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). In the Battle of Kursk he took part as commander of the Voronezh Front.
In the Red Army since 1920
He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kiev Higher United Military School in 1924, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929, the operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937
Member of the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941. He was chief of staff of the division, chief of the 1st department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District, deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District, chief of the Operational Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff.
From June 30, 1941 Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943 he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (since October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, while leaving for the troops, he was seriously wounded and died on April 15. Buried in Kyiv.
He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st Class, the Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, and the Order of Czechoslovakia.
ZhADOV Alexey Semenovich
Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 5th Guards Army.
In the Red Army since 1919
He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950
Member of the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against Denikin. From October 1920 as a platoon commander of the cavalry regiment of the 11th cavalry division of the 1st cavalry army participated in battles with the troops of Wrangel, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi Central Asia, was badly wounded. Since 1925 he was the commander of a training platoon, then the commander and political instructor of the squadron, chief of staff of the regiment, chief of the operational part of the division headquarters, chief of staff of the corps, assistant inspector of cavalry in the Red Army. Since 1940, the commander of the mountain cavalry division.
To the Great Patriotic war commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (since June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central, then the Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the Battle of Moscow, in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th Cavalry Corps on the Bryansk Front.
From October 1942 he was commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. From April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army.
Under the leadership of A. S. Zhadov, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations.
The troops of the army for successful military operations were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For the skillful management of troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and courage shown at the same time, A.S. Zhadov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
AT post-war period- Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). From September 1964 - First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
He was awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, medals, as well as foreign orders.
Died in 1977
KATUKOV Mikhail Efimovich
Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 1st Tank Army.
In the Red Army since 1919
He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922, the Higher officer courses "Shot" in 1927, the academic advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army in 1935, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951.
Member of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.
During the Civil War, he fought as a private on the Southern Front.
From 1922 to 1940 he successively commanded a platoon, a company, was head of a regimental school, commander of a training battalion, chief of staff of a brigade, and commander of a tank brigade. From November 1940 commander of the 20th Panzer Division.
At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he participated in defensive operations in the area of the cities. Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten.
On November 11, 1941, for courageous and skillful fighting, the brigade of M.E. Katukov was the first in the tank troops to receive the title of guards.
In 1942, M. E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which repelled the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, and then the 3rd Mechanized Corps.
In January 1943, he was appointed to the post of commander of the 1st Tank Army, which, as part of the Voronezh, and later the 1st Ukrainian Front, distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk and during the liberation of Ukraine.
In June 1944, the army was transformed into a guards. She participated in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.
In the postwar years, M. E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1963 - military inspector-advisor of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, Kutuzov 2nd Class, Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR » 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.
Konev Ivan Stepanovich
Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the Steppe Front.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from advanced training courses for senior officers at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1926, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934
To the first world war was drafted into the army and sent to the South-Western Front. Demobilized from the army in 1918, he took part in the establishment of Soviet power in the city of Nikolsk (Vologda region), where he was elected a member of the Nikolsky district executive committee and appointed district military commissar.
During the Civil War, he was the commissar of an armored train, then a rifle brigade, division, headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. Fought on the Eastern Front.
After the Civil War - military commissar of the 17th Primorsky Rifle Corps, 17th Rifle Division. After completing advanced training courses for senior officers, he was appointed commander of the regiment. Later he was assistant division commander in 1931-1932. and 1935-1937, commanded a rifle division, a corps and the 2nd Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army.
In 1940-1941. - commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal and North Caucasian military districts.
At the beginning of World War II, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front. Then he successively commanded the Western, Kalinin, Northwestern, Steppe and 1st Ukrainian fronts.
In the Battle of Kursk, troops under the command of I. S. Konev successfully operated during the counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.
After the war, he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the participating States Warsaw Pact, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1970), Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (1971).
Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.
He was awarded the highest military order "Victory", the Honorary weapon.
MALINOVSKY Rodion Yakovlevich
Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Southwestern Front.
In the Red Army since 1919
Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.
Since 1914, he participated as a private in the First World War. He was awarded the St. George Cross of the 4th degree.
In February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon his return to Russia, he voluntarily joined the Red Army in 1919.
During the Civil War, he participated in battles as part of the 27th Infantry Division of the Eastern Front.
In December 1920, commander of a machine gun platoon, then head of a machine gun team, assistant commander, battalion commander.
Since 1930, the chief of staff of the cavalry regiment of the 10th cavalry division, then served in the headquarters of the North Caucasian and Belarusian military districts, was the chief of staff of the 3rd cavalry corps.
In 1937-1938. participated as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner for military distinctions.
Since 1939, a teacher at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. From March 1941, commander of the 48th Rifle Corps.
During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 6th, 66th, 2nd Guards, 5th shock and 51st armies, the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd Ukrainian, 2nd Ukrainian fronts. He took part in the Battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, Zaporozhye, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovat-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Budapest, Vienna operations.
Since July 1945, the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front, which dealt the main blow in the Manchurian strategic operation. For high military leadership, courage and courage he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the war, he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District, was the commander-in-chief of the troops Far East Commander of the Far Eastern Military District.
Since March 1956, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
Since October 1957 Minister of Defense of the USSR. He remained in this post until the end of his life.
Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, and foreign orders.
He was awarded the highest military order "Victory".
POPOV Markian Mikhailovich
Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Bryansk Front.
Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya (now Serafimovich, Volgograd Region).
In the Red Army since 1920
He graduated from the infantry command courses in 1922, the Higher officer courses "Shot" in 1925, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.
He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as a private.
Since 1922, platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and head of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. From May 1936 he was chief of staff of a mechanized brigade, then of the 5th mechanized corps. From June 1938 he was deputy commander, from September chief of staff, from July 1939 commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and from January 1941 commander of the Leningrad Military District.
During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the Northern and Leningrad fronts (June - September 1941), 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. He successfully commanded the 5th Shock Army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and the troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June-October 1943), Baltic and 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war he was chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, then again Leningrad fronts.
Participated in the planning of operations and successfully led the troops in the battles near Leningrad and Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.
In the post-war period, the commander of the Lvov (1945-1946), Tauride (1946-1954) military districts. From January 1955 he was deputy chief and then chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, from August 1956 chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of the Red Star, medals, and foreign orders.
ROKOSSOVSKY Konstantin Konstantinovich
Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the Central Front.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from the cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929
In the army since 1914. Member of the First World War. He fought as part of the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment, as an ordinary and junior non-commissioned officer.
After the October Revolution of 1917 he fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal bravery and courage he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner.
After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for military distinctions at the CER.
From 1930 he commanded the 7th, then the 15th cavalry divisions, from 1936 - the 5th cavalry, from November 1940 - the 9th mechanized corps.
From July 1941 he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the Bryansk, from September the Don, from February 1943 the Central, from October 1943 the Belorussian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian fronts.
Troops under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky participated in the Battle of Smolensk (1941), the Battle of Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the Belorussian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations.
After the war, commander-in-chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet government, he left for the PPR, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR. He was awarded the title of Marshal of Poland.
Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962. Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1962 he was the chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
He was awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.
He was awarded the highest military order "Victory". Awarded with Honorary Arms.
ROMANENKO Prokofy Logvinovich
Colonel General. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 2nd Tank Army.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1933, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948
On the military service since 1914. Member of the First World War, ensign. Awarded 4 St. George's crosses.
After the October Revolution of 1917, he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then during the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, fought on the Southern and Western fronts as a squadron commander, regiment and assistant commander of a cavalry brigade.
After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, since 1937 a mechanized brigade. Participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin.
Since 1938, commander of the 7th mechanized corps, participant in the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940). Since May 1940, the commander of the 34th rifle, then the 1st mechanized corps.
During the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front. From May 1942 commander of the 3rd tank army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944 commander of the 5th, 2nd tank armies, 48th army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the Belorussian operation.
In 1945-1947. Commander of the East Siberian Military District.
He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, a foreign order.
ROTMISTROV Pavel Alekseevich
Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
In the Red Army since 1919
He graduated from the Military Joint School. All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff.
During the Civil War, he commanded a platoon, company, battery, and was deputy battalion commander.
From 1931 to 1937 he worked at the headquarters of the division and the army, commanded a rifle regiment.
Since 1938, he has been a lecturer in the Tactics Department of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.
During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of a tank battalion and chief of staff of the 35th tank brigade.
From December 1940 he was deputy commander of the 5th Panzer Division, and from May 1941 he was chief of staff of the mechanized corps.
During the Great Patriotic War he fought on the Western, Northwestern, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian fronts.
Participated in the Battle of Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, as well as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Uman-Botoshansk, Korsun-Shevchenko, Belorussian operations.
After the war, commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, then the Far East. Deputy Chief, then Head of the Department of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, Assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st class, Suvorov 2nd class, Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd class, medals, as well as foreign orders.
RYBALKO Pavel Semyonovich
Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.
Born on November 4, 1894 in the village of Maly Istorop (Lebedinsky district of the Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine).
In the Red Army since 1919
He graduated from advanced training courses for senior officers in 1926 and 1930, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934
Member of the First World War, private.
During the Civil War, the commissar of the regiment and brigade, squadron commander, commander of the cavalry regiment and brigade.
After graduating from the academy, he was sent as an assistant commander of a mountain cavalry division, then as a military attache to Poland, China.
During the Great Patriotic War, Deputy Commander of the 5th Tank Army, later commanded the 5th, 3rd, 3rd Guards Tank Armies in the Bryansk, South-Western, Central, Voronezh, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.
He participated in the Battle of Kursk, in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, Kharkov, Kiev, Zhytomyr-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Lvov-Sandomierz, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.
For successful military operations, the troops commanded by P. S. Rybalko
22 times noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.
After the war, first deputy commander, and then commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet army.
Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, medals, and foreign orders.
SOKOLOVSKY Vasily Danilovich
Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Western Front.
Born on July 21, 1897 in the village of Kozliki, Belostok district (Grodno region, Republic of Belarus).
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1921, the Higher Academic Courses in 1928.
During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern, Southern and Caucasian fronts. He held the positions of company commander, regiment adjutant, assistant regiment commander, regiment commander, senior assistant chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Division, brigade commander, chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.
In 1921, assistant chief of the operational department of the Turkestan Front, then division chief of staff, division commander. He commanded the Group of Forces of the Fergana and Samarkand regions.
In 1922 - 1930. chief of staff of a rifle division, rifle corps.
In 1930 - 1935. commander of a rifle division, then chief of staff of the Volga Military District.
From May 1935 he was chief of staff of the Ural, from April 1938 of the Moscow military districts. Since February 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
During the Great Patriotic War, he served as Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Chief of Staff western direction, Commander of the Western Front, Chief of Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.
For the skillful leadership of the military operations of the troops in the Berlin operation, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the war, he served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, then Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Minister of War.
Awarded 8 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 3 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals, Honorary Weapons.
CHERNYAKHOVSKY Ivan Danilovich
Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he took part in the post of commander of the 60th Army.
In the Red Army since 1924
He graduated from the Kiev Artillery School in 1928, the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936.
From 1928 to 1931, he served as a platoon commander, head of the topographic detachment of the regiment, assistant battery commander for political affairs, commander of a reconnaissance training battery.
Upon graduation from the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of a battalion, then commander of a tank battalion, tank regiment, deputy division commander, commander of a tank division.
During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded a tank corps, the 60th Army on the Voronezh, Central and 1st Ukrainian fronts.
The troops under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky distinguished themselves in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the Battle of Kursk, while crossing the river. Desna and Dnieper. Later they participated in the Kiev, Zhytomyr-Berdichev, Rivne-Lutsk, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Vilnius, Kaunas, Memel, East Prussian operations.
For successful military operations during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by I. D. Chernyakhovsky were noted 34 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
In the area of the town of Melzak, he was mortally wounded and died on February 18, 1945. Buried in Vilnius.
Awarded with the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class and medals.
CHIBISOV Nikandr Evlampievich
Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the 38th Army.
In the Red Army since 1918
Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1935
During the First World War he fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. Commanded a company.
During the Civil War, he took part in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus, near Narva, Pskov, in Belarus.
He was the commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, assistant chief of staff and chief of staff of a rifle brigade. From 1922 to 1937 in staff and command positions. Since 1937, the commander of a rifle division, since 1938 - a rifle corps, in 1938-1940. Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District.
During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Chief of Staff of the 7th Army.
From July 1940 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, and from January 1941 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Odessa military district.
Troops under the command of N. E. Chibisov took part in the Voronezh-Kastornoye, Kharkov, Belgorod-Kharkov, Kiev, Leningrad-Novgorod operations.
For the skillful leadership of the army troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, courage and heroism was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
From June 1944, he served as head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, from March 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF, and from October 1949 - Assistant Commander of the Belarusian Military District.
He was awarded 3 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st degree and medals.
SHLEMIN Ivan Timofeevich
Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 6th Guards Army.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1925, the operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932
Member of the First World War. During the Civil War, as a platoon commander, he took part in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. Since 1925 he was the chief of staff of a rifle regiment, then the chief of the operational unit and the chief of staff of the division, since 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (since 1935 the General Staff).
Since 1936, the commander of a rifle regiment, since 1937, the head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940, the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position entered the Great Patriotic War.
From May 1942 Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, then 1st guards army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th tank, 12th, 6th, 46th armies on the Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.
Troops under the command of I. T. Shlemin took part in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen and Budapest operations. For successful actions, 15 times were noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.
For the skillful command and control of the troops and the heroism and courage shown at the same time, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the Great Patriotic War, Chief of Staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and since April 1948, Deputy Chief of the General Staff ground forces- Chief of Operations, from June 1949 Chief of Staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962. senior lecturer and deputy head of the department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Reserved since 1962.
Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, medals.
SHUMILOV Mikhail Stepanovich
Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 7th Guards Army.
In the Red Army since 1918
He graduated from the courses of the command and political staff in 1924, the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in 1929, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, the Chuguev Military School in 1916.
Member of the First World War, ensign. During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts, commanded a platoon, company, regiment. After the war, the commander of the regiment, then the division and corps, participated in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle corps, deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 64th Army (reorganized in March 1943 into the 7th Guards), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian fronts.
The troops under the command of M. S. Shumilov participated in the defense of Leningrad, in the battles in the Kharkov region, fought heroically near Stalingrad and, together with the 62nd Army in the city itself, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles near Kursk and for the Dnieper, in Kirovogradskaya , Uman-Botoshansky, Iasi-Chisinau, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnovskaya operations.
For excellent military operations, the troops of the army were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
After the war, he commanded the troops of the White Sea (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) military districts.
In 1956-1958. retired. Since 1958, military consultant of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Orders of the Red Star, Orders of "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .
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