Commander of the central front on the Kursk Bulge. Kursk Bulge: the battle that decided the outcome of the Great Patriotic War

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material on the loss of equipment in our and German units. With us, they were significantly higher, especially in the battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army, was engaged, created by the decision of Stalin, a special commission chaired by Malenkov. In the report of the commission, in August 1943, fighting Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka are called a model of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact, by no means victorious. In this regard, I want to bring you several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov's report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although she sins in places against the truth, she nevertheless deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the battle of Prokhorov won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to full texts which are listed at the end of the article.

29th Panzer Corps :

“The attack began without artillery processing of the occupied line by the pr-com and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from a place . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable for its ruggedness, the presence of impassable for tanks hollows northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to cuddle up to the road and open their flanks, unable to cover them.

Separate units that pulled ahead, approaching even the svh. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. From 13.00, cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the release of tanks to the front line of defense, pr-ka from the forest with / z. GUARD and east. env. STOROGEVOE pr-k opened heavy fire from ambush tanks "Tiger", self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Parts of the pr-ka, with the support of a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front edge of the pr-ka, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks and even breaking ahead of the tanks, had losses from anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action).

18th Panzer Corps :

"Enemy artillery fired intensely at the battle formations of the corps.
The corps, not having proper support in fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense bombardment from the air (by 12.00 enemy aircraft had made up to 1500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the zone of action of the corps is crossed by three deep ravines, passing from the left bank of the river. PSEL to the railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the tank brigades advancing in the first echelon 181, 170 were forced to act on the left flank of the corps strip near a strong enemy stronghold of the temporary storage warehouse. OCTOBER. 170 brigade, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat materiel.

By the end of the day, from the KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE area, the enemy launched a frontal tank attack with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the KOZLOVKA, POLEGHAEV direction, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Fulfilling the assigned task, the 18th tank met a well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with tanks and assault guns dug in advance at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.

To avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.

"The car is on fire"

The battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a wrecked Soviet T-34

Shot down near Belgorod T-34 and the dead tanker

T-34 and T-70 shot down during the Battle of Kursk. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battles for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 "For Soviet Ukraine" near Belgorod. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70s and BA-64s from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL. SECRET
Ex. No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE USSR - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army met with exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all, there were T-V ("Panther") tanks on the battlefield, a significant number of T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Commanding tank units from the first days Patriotic War I am compelled to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in terms of armor and weapons.

Armament, armor and fire aiming of German tanks became much higher and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, greater saturation tank units artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully use the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good aiming devices in German tanks puts our tanks in a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure is increasing.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, using the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans, with their tank units, go over, at least temporarily, to the defensive, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the aiming range of their tank guns, being at the same time almost completely out of reach of our aimed tank fire. .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, no longer experience their former tank fear on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to engage in tank combat, as they are more than easily destroyed by German tank fire..

We have to state with bitterness that our tank equipment, with the exception of the introduction of self-propelled guns SU-122 and SU-152, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that took place on the tanks of the first production, somehow: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower, exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation are not completely eliminated today.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, is steadily advancing, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately this cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost their first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests conducted by the Germans of our KV and T-34 tanks.

As a result of these tests, the instruction was written, approximately, as follows: German tanks cannot conduct tank battles with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank battles. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another sector of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other branches of the armed forces, and if they did, then with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to give an even more advanced T-V tank, "Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in terms of its qualities it is significantly higher than the T-34 tank, and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I give the following table:

Brand of tank and SU	Nose armor in mm.	Forehead tower and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Gun caliber in mm.	Qty. shells.	Speed max.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1S	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
SU-152	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a much higher muzzle velocity.

As an ardent patriot of the tank forces, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and, with all acuteness, raise the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design formalization of existing types German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his wrecked tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot on this in terms of tank recovery. At the same time, in those cases when the field of tank battles remains with the enemy for a certain period, our repairmen instead of their wrecked tanks find shapeless piles of metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our wrecked tanks.

TROOP COMMANDER
5 GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK TROOPS -
(ROTMISTROV) Signature.

active army.
=========================
RTsHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 9027s, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the stunning losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that about a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm gun 20K model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks on the field near Prokhorovka had nothing to catch at all (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up at close range and working in the "woodpecker" mode ... if you persuade the German tankers to look the other way; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you are lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, for which, in fact, they were created.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received replenishment literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, the untrainedness of both directly ordinary tankers and junior / middle-level commanders. Even in this suicidal attack, better results could have been achieved by observing a competent construction - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a bunch. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrously inefficient work of repair and evacuation teams. It was generally very bad with this until 1944, but in this case, 5 TA simply failed on a large scale. I don’t know how many were at that moment in the state of the BREM (and whether they were even in those days in its battle formations - they could have forgotten in the rear), but they did not cope with the work. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front) in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka writes: “when retreating, the enemy, by specially created teams, evacuates his wrecked tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including our tanks and our material part, burns and undermines. As a result, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future "(RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control.

The point is also in the fact that the German reconnaissance aviation had previously opened the approach to Prokhorovka of the formations of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A, and it was possible to establish that on July 12 near Prokhorovka Soviet troops go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank guns on the left flank of the Adolf Hitler division of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going after repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, to go on the counteroffensive themselves and surround the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS TC, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, 18 and 29, the most powerful German PTOPs had to be attacked head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tankers repulsed the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from a place.

In my opinion, the best thing Rotmistrov could do in such a situation is to try to insist on the cancellation of the July 12 counterattack near Prokhorovka, but no traces of him even trying to do this have been found. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly manifested when comparing the actions of the two commanders of the tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, I’ll clarify - 1 tank army Katukova occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander orders a counterattack by the 1st Panzer Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that in the conditions of the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. the best way combat is a maneuverable defense with the help of tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

"Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing something completely wrong. As expected, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours are burning and smoking.

It was necessary, by all means, to achieve the abolition of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report my thoughts to him. But as soon as he crossed the threshold of the hut, the head of communications in some especially significant tone reported:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without emotion I picked up the phone.

Hello Katukov! said a well-known voice. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

In my opinion, - I said, - we hurried with the counterattack. The enemy has large unused reserves, including tank ones.

What are you offering?

For the time being, it is advisable to use tanks for firing from a place, burying them in the ground or setting them in ambushes. Then we could let the enemy's vehicles within a distance of three hundred or four hundred meters and destroy them with aimed fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

Well, - he said - you will not counterattack. Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and the day of July 6 became the "blackest day" for the 4th German Panzer Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (for the most part in their own formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out and destroyed tank). Thus, Katukov's tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw conclusions and on July 8 gives new order to conduct a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 TC, 2 Guards TC, 5 TC and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which irrevocably - 17. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 is becoming the "blackest day" for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but at least it was worth a try!

At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlawful to limit the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, south-west of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the formed bag in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to abandon technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve a very significant tactical success, weakening 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and depriving 69 A of combat capability for some time. After July 12, the German side actually attempted to encircle and inflict maximum damage on Soviet troops withdraw their forces to the former front line). After that, the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines occupied by them until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but rather gradually withdraw their forces (in particular, the Dead Head division actually began to withdraw as early as July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly sit on the Germans' tail and peck at the back of their heads.

One gets the impression that the command of the Voronezh Front had a poor idea of what was happening at the front in the period from 5 to 18 July, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties, they lack data on the opposing enemy, his composition and intentions, there is not even approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during Battle of Kursk was given "over the head" of lower-ranking commanders, and the latter were not made aware of this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were performing some incomprehensible actions.

So there is nothing surprising that sometimes indescribable mess reigned in the parts:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps attacked the Soviet 285th rifle regiment of the 183rd rifle division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the fighters and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the designated regiment (total: 25 people were killed and 37 were wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) did not have accurate information about the location of their own and the Germans and did not send reconnaissance forward (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment on the move opened fire on the combat formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending themselves from the Germans in the area of the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having passed with a fight through their own, the regiment stumbled upon the advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging separate groups of its own infantry along with it, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery following the front line behind the same regiment (53rd Guards Tank Regiment) and just arrived at the scene, mistaking the 96th brigade tanks for German ones, pursuing the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to happy accident.

Well, and so on ... In the order of the commander of the 69th army, all this was described as "these outrages." Well, to put it mildly.

So it can be summarized that the Germans won the battle of Prokhorov, but this victory was a special case against a general negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (as Manstein insisted), but not for defense. And it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began on the part of the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (taken by the German command of the OKH ground forces as an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts really went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became much more difficult for the Germans, where on July 10 the Americans and the British landed. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered to stop the operation "Citadel" in connection with the activation of Soviet troops on different areas Eastern Front and sending part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution, despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not explicitly ordered to withdraw troops, but was prohibited from using his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon, 24 TC was already repelling the offensive of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). 2 SS TC was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with 3 TC in order to eliminate the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and the combination of circumstances that were developing everywhere in July 1943, not in favor of Germany, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but talking about purely the military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "

Battle of Kursk- one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to the plans of the Wehrmacht, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped on the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans had organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it had to withstand any attack.

Side forces

Germany
At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to the huge number human strength, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant, including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank troops there were three elite tank divisions that had not previously suffered a single defeat - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the land army, an air fleet was sent total number more than 1000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

the USSR
To slow down and complicate the advance of the enemy, Soviet army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines for each kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and not rivals to the same "Tigers" of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact numbers.

The course of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike in order to weaken the initial attack of the enemy.
Before the beginning offensive operation The Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern face of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon met with very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the strike, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, while losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern face of the Kursk salient. First, a powerful artillery preparation followed. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle fell on July 12. On the small area 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided at the front. The tanks of both sides mixed up and during the day many tank crews left the fighting vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of 12 July, the tank battle was on the wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken through a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
The losses of the Germans in the battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were already almost completely drained of blood and lost their offensive potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large number of equipment and guns. The Soviet army lost, according to various estimates, up to about 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure are irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations from the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this sector of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation began on the part of the Soviet army. The Soviet command set a goal to encircle the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank, and most importantly, pin down the German reserves on this sector of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from the Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the Bulge itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Oryol and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first salute was organized in the capital for the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
On the southern phage, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of important strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). The Germans during this offensive attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the Kutuzov offensive operation was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the Center group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 - September 22), the Donets Basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost the entire Left-Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
Losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were undertaken, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that the defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. The Barbarossa plan - a plan for a lightning war with the USSR - was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it has been put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - advanced in three groups ("North", "Center", "South"), aimed at quickly capturing the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and Kyiv in the south.

Kursk Bulge

In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Two large fronts could be surrounded here at once, as a result of which a large gap would have formed, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the south and northeast directions.

The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began to develop a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command had completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.

July 5, 1943 German troops began the offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to withdraw. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was eventually forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The struggle on the southern face of the Kursk ledge, in the zone of the Voronezh Front, was also exceptionally tense.

On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history near Prokhorovka took place. The battle unfolded on both sides railway Belgorod - Kursk, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, the former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the struggle was extremely fierce, “tanks jumped on each other, grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire. The battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - go to the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy's way to Kursk was closed and the day of July 12, 1943 became the day of the collapse of the German offensive near Kursk.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15, the troops of the Central.

August 5, 1943 (the day of celebration of the Pochaev icon Mother of God, as well as the icon "Joy of All Who Sorrow"), the Eagle was released. On the same day Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.

The events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, the general withdrawal of the Nazi troops began on the southern face of the Kursk salient.

On August 23, 1943, the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War ended with the liberation of Kharkov - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main grouping of German troops.

Liberation of Smolensk (1943)

Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. In the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from 7 to 20 August. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demenskaya operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelnensko-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov operation.

On September 25, 1943, the troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk - the most important strategic center of defense of the Nazi troops on westbound.

As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke into the enemy's heavily fortified multi-lane and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200-225 km to the West.

Date of the battle July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943 This battle was included in modern history as one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. It is also known as the largest tank battle in the history of mankind.
Conditionally the Battle of Kursk can be divided into two stages:

Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23)
Oryol and Kharkov-Belgorod (July 12 - August 23) offensive operations.

The battle lasted 50 days and nights and influenced the entire subsequent course of hostilities.

Forces and means of the opposing sides

Before the start of the battle, the Red Army concentrated an unprecedented number of troops: the Central and Voronezh Fronts numbered more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers, over 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2800 aircraft different types. In reserve was the Steppe Front numbering: 580 thousand soldiers, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. Its air cover was carried out by over 700 aircraft.
The German command managed to pull up reserves and by the beginning of the battle it had fifty divisions total strength over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 thousand guns and mortars, as well as approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft. For the first time in the history of World War II, the German command used a large number of its latest equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as heavy self-propelled guns - the Ferdinand.
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army had an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht, being on the defensive, it could quickly respond to all offensive actions of the enemy.

defensive operation

This phase of the battle began with a pre-emptive massive artillery preparation by the Red Army at 2.30 am, at 4.30 it was repeated. The German artillery preparation began at 5 am and the first divisions went on the offensive after it ...
During the bloody battles, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers along the entire front line. The main attack fell on the Ponyri station, a key railway junction of the Orel-Kursk line, and the village of Cherkasskoye, on the section of the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. In these areas, the German troops managed to advance to the Prokhorovka station. It was here that the largest tank battle of this war took place. From the side Soviet Union 800 tanks under the command of General Zhadov participated in the battle, against 450 German tanks under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. In the battle near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost about 270 tanks - German losses amounted to over 80 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Offensive

On July 12, 1943, the Soviet command launched Operation Kutuzov. In the course of which, after bloody battles of local significance, the troops of the Red Army on July 17-18 squeezed the Germans to the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. The fierce resistance of the German troops continued until August 4, when the Belgorod group of fascists was liquidated and Belgorod was liberated.
On August 10, the Red Army launched an offensive in the Kharkov direction, and on August 23, the city was stormed. City battles continued until August 30, but August 23, 1943 is considered the day of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk.

The Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad. where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.

The main idea of the "Citadel" was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled guns. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the general staff of the Soviet army developed a plan aimed at the liberation of the Russian troops and the defense of the battle.

Own interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk Bulge, the battle received due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.

To change the course of the Great Patriotic War and decide the fate of Russian cities such as Orel and Belgorod was entrusted to the armies "Center", "South" and the task force "Kempf". Detachments of the Central Front were put on the defense of Orel, and the Voronezh Front - on the defense of Belgorod.

Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the defeat of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel region, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Front, switching to the operation "Kutuzov". In three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Nazi group was liquidated by the Central Front. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and thus were driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.

The results of the Battle of Kursk (briefly).

a sharp turn in the course of events of the Great Patriotic War;
after the Nazis failed to pull off their operation "Citadel", at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
the fascists were morally suppressed, all confidence in their superiority was gone.

Significance of the Battle of Kursk.

After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative in its own hands and continued to advance to the West, while freeing Russian cities.