Stalingrad battle.

By the middle of the summer of 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga.

In the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea), the German command also includes Stalingrad. The goal of Germany was to take over an industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil needed for the front was extracted.

Hitler wanted to carry out this plan in just a week with the help of the 6th Paulus Field Army. It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people, 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks.

From the side of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov).

The difficulty also lay in the fact that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered on July 17, when near the rivers Chir and Tsimla, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German army. Throughout the second half of the summer, fierce battles were going on near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows.

Defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad

On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked day and night. By mid-September, the German army broke through to the city center, the fighting went right on the streets. The Nazis stepped up their attack more and more. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city.

The courage of the Stalingraders was unparalleled. Many European countries were conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they needed only 2-3 weeks to capture the whole country. In Stalingrad, the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

In the battles passed the beginning of autumn, mid-November. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was still too early to announce the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed even in the midst of the fighting, on September 12th. The development of the offensive operation "Uranus" was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov.

Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to collect right amount troops.

On November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite the resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and defeated. During the week from November 23, the efforts of the Soviet troops were directed to strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to remove this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), however, it was also defeated.

The destruction of the encircled grouping of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, the Soviet troops proceeded to destroy the enemy, which was the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. On February 2, 1943, the last enemy grouping was liquidated, which is considered the end date of the battle.

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad:

Losses in the Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people.

Significance of the Battle of Stalingrad

The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad can hardly be overestimated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had a great influence on the further course of World War II. She stepped up the fight against the Nazis in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis (Hitler's coalition). There was a crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries.

The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the largest battles of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, which marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war. The battle was the first large-scale defeat of the Wehrmacht, accompanied by the surrender of a large military group.

After the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42. front has stabilized. When developing a plan for a new campaign, A. Hitler decided to abandon a new offensive near Moscow, as insisted on by the General Staff, and concentrate his main efforts on the southern direction. The Wehrmacht was tasked with defeating the Soviet troops in the Donbass and on the Don, breaking through North Caucasus and seize the oil fields of the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Hitler insisted that, having lost a source of oil, the Red Army would not be able to conduct an active struggle due to lack of fuel, and for its part, the Wehrmacht needed additional fuel for a successful offensive in the center, which Hitler expected to receive from the Caucasus.

However, after an unsuccessful offensive for the Red Army near Kharkov and, as a result, an improvement in the strategic situation for the Wehrmacht, Hitler in July 1942 ordered the Army Group South to be divided into two parts, setting each of them an independent task. Army Group A of Field Marshal Wilhelm List (1st Panzer, 11th and 17th Armies) continued to develop the offensive in the North Caucasus, and Army Group B of Colonel General Baron Maximilian von Weichs (2nd, The 6th Army, later the 4th Panzer Army, as well as the 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies) received an order to break through to the Volga, take Stalingrad and cut the lines of communication between the southern flank of the Soviet front and the center, thereby isolating it from the main grouping (if successful, Army Group "B" was supposed to strike along the Volga to Astrakhan). As a result, from that moment on, Army Groups "A" and "B" advanced in divergent directions, and the gap between them constantly increased.

The task of directly capturing Stalingrad was entrusted to the 6th Army, which was considered the best in the Wehrmacht (commander - Lieutenant General F. Paulus), whose actions were supported from the air by the 4th Air Fleet. Initially, she was opposed by the troops of the 62nd (commanders: Major General V.Ya. Kolpakchi, from August 3 - Lieutenant General A.I. Lopatin, from September 9 - Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov) and 64th ( commanders: Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov, since July 23 - Major General M.S. Shumilov) armies, which, together with the 63rd, 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th and 8th th Air Armies on July 12, 1942 formed a new Stalingrad Front (commander: Marshal Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, from August 10 - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko).

July 17 is considered the first day of the Battle of Stalingrad, when those advanced to the line of the river. Chir, the forward detachments of the Soviet troops came into contact with the German units, which, however, did not show much activity, since these days the preparations for the offensive were just being completed. (The first combat contact took place on July 16 - at the positions of the 147th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army.) On July 18-19, units of the 62nd and 64th armies entered the front lines. For five days there were battles of local significance, in which the German troops went directly to the main line of defense of the Stalingrad Front.

At the same time, the Soviet command used the lull at the front to speed up the preparation of Stalingrad for defense: it was mobilized local population, sent to the construction of field fortifications (four defensive lines were equipped), the formation of militia detachments was deployed.

On July 23, the German offensive began: parts of the northern flank attacked first, two days later the southern flank joined them. The defense of the 62nd Army was broken through, several divisions were surrounded, the army and the entire Stalingrad Front found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Under these conditions, on July 28, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 was issued - "Not a step back!", Forbidding the withdrawal of troops without an order. In accordance with this order, the formation of penal companies and battalions, as well as barrage detachments, began at the front. At the same time, the Soviet command strengthened the Stalingrad grouping by all possible means: in a week of fighting, 11 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, 8 separate tank brigades were sent here, and on July 31, the 51st Army, Major General T.K. Kolomiets. On the same day, the German command also strengthened its grouping by deploying the 4th Panzer Army of Colonel General G. Goth, which was advancing to the south, on Stalingrad. From that moment on, the German command declared the task of capturing Stalingrad a priority and decisive for the success of the entire offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front.

Although success was generally on the side of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet troops, suffering heavy losses, were forced to retreat, nevertheless, thanks to the resistance, the plan to break through to the city on the move through Kalach-on-Don was thwarted, as well as the plan to encircle the Soviet group in the bend Don. The pace of the offensive - by August 10, the Germans advanced only 60-80 km - did not suit Hitler, who on August 17 stopped the offensive, ordering to begin preparations for a new operation. The most combat-ready German units, primarily tank and motorized formations, were concentrated on the main strike directions, the flanks were weakened by the transfer of their allied troops.

On August 19, the German troops again went on the offensive, they resumed the offensive. On the 22nd, they crossed the Don, gaining a foothold on the 45-km bridgehead. For the next XIV Panzer Corps, Gen. G. von Witersheim to the Volga at the Latoshynka-Rynok section, being only 3 km from the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, and cut off parts of the 62nd Army from the main ones of the Red Army. At the same time, at 16:18, a massive air strike was launched on the city itself, the bombing continued on August 24, 25, 26. The city was almost completely destroyed.

The German attempts to take the city from the north on the following days were stopped due to the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, who, despite the superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment, managed to launch a number of counterattacks and on August 28 stop the offensive. After that, the next day the German command attacked the city from the southwest. Here the offensive developed successfully: the German troops broke through the defensive line and began to enter the rear of the Soviet grouping. To avoid the inevitable encirclement, on September 2, Eremenko withdrew troops to the internal line of defense. On September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was officially entrusted to the 62nd (operating in the northern and central parts of the city) and 64th (in the southern part of Stalingrad) armies. Now the battles were already directly behind Stalingrad.

On September 13, the German 6th Army struck again - now the troops were tasked with breaking through to the central part of the city. By the evening of the 14th, the Germans captured the ruins of the railway station and, at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies in the Kuporosny area, fell through to the Volga. By September 26, German troops entrenched in the occupied bridgeheads completely shot through the Volga, which remained the only way to deliver reinforcements and ammunition to the defending units of the 62nd and 64th armies in the city.

The fighting in the city entered a protracted phase. A fierce struggle went on for Mamaev Kurgan, the Krasny Oktyabr plant, the tractor plant, the Barrikady artillery plant, individual houses and buildings. The ruins changed hands several times, in such conditions the use small arms was limited, often the soldiers entered into hand-to-hand combat. The advance of the German troops, who had to overcome the heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers, developed extremely slowly: from September 27 to October 8, despite all the efforts of the German shock group, they managed to advance only 400-600 m. In order to turn the tide, General. Paulus pulled additional forces to this sector, bringing the number of his troops in the main direction to 90 thousand people, whose actions were supported by up to 2.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 300 tanks and about a thousand aircraft. The Germans outnumbered the troops of the 62nd Army in personnel and artillery 1:1.65, in tanks - 1:3.75, and aviation - 1:5.2.

German troops launched a decisive offensive on the morning of October 14. The German 6th Army launched a decisive offensive against the Soviet bridgeheads near the Volga. On October 15, the Germans captured the tractor factory and broke through to the Volga, cutting off the grouping of the 62nd Army, which was fighting north of the factory. However, the Soviet fighters did not lay down their arms, but continued to resist, creating another hotbed of fighting. The position of the defenders of the city was complicated by the lack of food and ammunition: with the onset of cold weather, transportation across the Volga under constant enemy fire became even more complicated

The last decisive attempt to take control of the right-bank part of Stalingrad was made by Paulus on 11 November. The Germans managed to capture the southern part of the Barrikady plant and take a 500-meter section of the Volga coast. After that, the German troops finally ran out of steam and the battles moved into the positional stage. By this time, Chuikov's 62nd Army held three bridgeheads: in the area of ​​​​the village of Rynok; eastern part plant "Red October" (700 by 400 m), which was held by the 138th Infantry Division of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikova; 8 km along the Volga bank from the Krasny Oktyabr plant to the 9th of January Square, incl. northern and eastern slopes of Mamaev Kurgan. (The southern part of the city continued to be controlled by units of the 64th Army.)

Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943)

The encirclement plan for the Stalingrad enemy grouping - Operation Uranus - was approved by I.V. Stalin on November 13, 1942. It provided for strikes from bridgeheads north (on the Don) and south (Sarpinsky Lakes region) of Stalingrad, where Germany's allies made up a significant part of the defending forces, to break through the defenses and envelop the enemy in converging directions on Kalach-on-Don - Soviet. The 2nd stage of the operation provided for the sequential compression of the ring and the destruction of the encircled group. The operation was to be carried out by the forces of three fronts: Southwestern (General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (General A.I. Eremenko) - 9 field, 1 tank and 4 air armies. Fresh reinforcements were poured into the front-line units, as well as divisions transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command, large stocks of weapons and ammunition were created (even to the detriment of supplying the group defending in Stalingrad), regrouping and the formation of strike groups in the directions of the main attack was carried out secretly from the enemy.

On November 19, as was envisaged by the plan, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the South-Western and Don Fronts went on the offensive, on November 20 - the troops of the Stalingrad Front. The battle developed rapidly: the Romanian troops, who occupied the areas that turned out to be in the direction of the main attacks, could not stand it and fled. The Soviet command, having introduced pre-prepared mobile groups into the gap, developed the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the troops of the Stalingrad Front took Kalach-on-Don, on the same day, units of the 4th Tank Corps of the South-Western Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the Soviet farm area. The encirclement was closed. Then, the inner front of the encirclement was formed from the rifle units, and the tank and motorized rifle units began to push the few German units on the flanks, forming the outer front. The German group turned out to be surrounded - parts of the 6th and 4th tank armies - under the command of General F. Paulus: 7 corps, 22 divisions, 284 thousand people.

On November 24, the Soviet Headquarters ordered the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts to destroy the Stalingrad group of Germans. On the same day, Paulus turned to Hitler with a proposal to start a breakthrough from Stalingrad in a southeasterly direction. However, Hitler categorically forbade the breakthrough, stating that by fighting in the encirclement, the 6th Army pulls back large enemy forces, and ordered the defense to continue, waiting for the encircled group to be released. Then all the German troops in the area (both inside and outside the ring) were united into a new army group "Don", headed by Field Marshal E. von Manstein.

The attempt of the Soviet troops to quickly eliminate the encircled grouping, squeezing it from all sides, failed, in connection with which hostilities were suspended and the General Staff began the systematic development of a new operation, code-named "Ring".

For its part, the German command forced the conduct of Operation Winter Thunder (Wintergewitter) to deblockade the 6th Army. To do this, Manstein formed a strong grouping under the command of General G. Goth in the area of ​​​​the village of Kotelnikovsky, the main striking force of which was the LVII Panzer Corps of General of Panzer Troops F. Kirchner. The breakthrough must be carried out in the sector occupied by the 51st Army, whose troops were exhausted by battles and had a large shortage. Going on the offensive on December 12, the Gotha grouping failed the Soviet defense and on the 13th crossed the river. Aksai, however, then got stuck in battles near the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. Only on December 19, the Germans, having brought up reinforcements, managed to push the Soviet troops back to the river. Myshkov. In connection with the emerging threatening situation, the Soviet command transferred part of the forces from the reserve, weakening other sectors of the front, and was forced to revise the plans for Operation Saturn from the side of their limitation. However, by this time the Gotha group, which had lost more than half of its armored vehicles, was exhausted. Hitler refused to give the order for a counter breakthrough of the Stalingrad grouping, which was 35-40 km away, continuing to demand that Stalingrad be held to the last soldier.

On December 16, Soviet troops launched Operation Little Saturn with the forces of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts. The enemy defense was broken through and mobile units were introduced into the breakthrough. Manstein was forced into urgently start the transfer of troops to the Middle Don, weakening incl. and the G. Goth group, which was finally stopped on December 22. Following this, the troops of the Southwestern Front expanded the breakthrough zone and pushed the enemy back 150-200 km and reached the Novaya Kalitva - Millerovo - Morozovsk line. As a result of the operation, the danger of deblockade of the encircled Stalingrad enemy grouping was completely eliminated.

The implementation of the plan of operation "Ring" was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front. On January 8, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, General Paulus, was presented with an ultimatum: if the German troops did not lay down their arms by 10 o'clock on January 9, then all those surrounded would be destroyed. Paulus ignored the ultimatum. On January 10, after a powerful artillery preparation of the Don Front, he went on the offensive, the main blow was delivered by the 65th Army of Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. However, the Soviet command underestimated the possibility of resistance of the encircled group: the Germans, relying on defense in depth, put up desperate resistance. Due to new circumstances, on January 17, the Soviet offensive was suspended and a regrouping of troops and preparations for a new strike began, which followed on January 22. On this day, the last last airfield was taken, through which the 6th Army communicated with the outside world. After that, the situation with the supply of the Stalingrad group, which, on the orders of Hitler, was carried out by air by the forces of the Luftwaffe, became even more complicated: if earlier it was also completely insufficient, now the situation has become critical. On January 26, in the area of ​​​​Mamaev Kurgan, the troops of the 62nd and 65th armies advancing towards each other united. The Stalingrad group of Germans was divided into two parts, which, in accordance with the plan of the operation, were to be destroyed in parts. On January 31, the southern group capitulated, along with which Paulus, who was promoted to field marshal on January 30, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group, commanded by General K. Strecker, laid down its arms. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad. 24 generals, 2500 officers, more than 91 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars, 744 aircraft, 166 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, more than 80 thousand cars, etc. were captured.

Results

As a result of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, it managed to seize the strategic initiative from the enemy, which created the prerequisites for preparing a new large-scale offensive and, in the long term, the complete defeat of the aggressor. The battle became the beginning of a radical turning point in the war, and also contributed to the strengthening of the international prestige of the USSR. In addition, such a serious defeat undermined the authority of Germany and its armed forces and contributed to increased resistance from the enslaved peoples of Europe.

Dates: 17.07.1942 - 2.02.1943

Place: USSR, Stalingrad region

Results: USSR victory

Enemies: USSR, Germany and its allies

Commanders: A.M. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, A.I. Eremenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, V.I. Chuikov, E. von Manstein, M. von Weichs, F. Paulus, G. Goth.

Red Army: 187 thousand people, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, 230 tanks, 454 aircraft

Germany and allies: 270 thousand people, approx. 3,000 guns and mortars, 250 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,200 aircraft

Side forces(to the beginning of the counteroffensive):

Red Army: 1,103,000 men, 15,501 guns and mortars, 1,463 tanks, 1,350 aircraft

Germany and her allies: c. 1,012,000 people (including approx. 400 thousand Germans, 143 thousand Romanians, 220 Italians, 200 Hungarians, 52 thousand Khivs), 10,290 guns and mortars, 675 tanks, 1216 aircraft

Losses:

USSR: 1,129,619 people (including 478,741 irrevocable people, 650,878 - sanitary)), 15,728 guns and mortars, 4,341 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,769 aircraft

Germany and its allies: 1,078,775 (including 841 thousand people - irrevocable and sanitary, 237,775 people - prisoners)

Taking into account the tasks to be solved, the peculiarities of the conduct of hostilities by the parties, the spatial and temporal scale, as well as the results, the Battle of Stalingrad includes two periods: defensive - from July 17 to November 18, 1942; offensive - from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943

The strategic defensive operation in the Stalingrad direction lasted 125 days and nights and included two stages. The first stage is the conduct of defensive combat operations by the troops of the fronts on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12). The second stage is the conduct of defensive operations to hold Stalingrad (September 13 - November 18, 1942).

The German command delivered the main blow with the forces of the 6th Army in the direction of Stalingrad along the shortest path through the large bend of the Don from the west and southwest, just in the defense zones of the 62nd (commander - major general, from August 3 - lieutenant general , from September 6 - major general, from September 10 - lieutenant general) and the 64th (commander - lieutenant general V.I. Chuikov, from August 4 - lieutenant general) armies. The operational initiative was in the hands of the German command with almost double superiority in forces and means.

Defensive combat operations by the troops of the fronts on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12)

The first stage of the operation began on July 17, 1942, in a large bend of the Don, with combat contact between units of the 62nd Army and the forward detachments of German troops. Fierce battles ensued. The enemy had to deploy five divisions out of fourteen and spend six days to approach the main line of defense of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. However, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were forced to withdraw to new, poorly equipped or even unequipped lines. But even under these conditions, they inflicted significant losses on the enemy.

By the end of July, the situation in the Stalingrad direction continued to be very tense. German troops deeply covered both flanks of the 62nd Army, reached the Don in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area, where the 64th Army held the defense, and created the threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.

Due to the increased width of the defense zone (about 700 km), by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Stalingrad Front, commanded by Lieutenant General from July 23, was divided on August 5 into the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts. In order to achieve closer interaction between the troops of both fronts, from August 9, the leadership of the defense of Stalingrad was united in one hand, in connection with which the Stalingrad Front was subordinated to the commander of the troops of the South-Eastern Front, Colonel General.

By mid-November, the advance of the German troops was stopped on the entire front. The enemy was forced to finally go on the defensive. This was the end of the strategic defensive operation of the Battle of Stalingrad. The troops of the Stalingrad, South-Eastern and Don fronts fulfilled their tasks, holding back the powerful offensive of the enemy in the Stalingrad direction, creating the prerequisites for a counteroffensive.

During the defensive battles, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses. In the struggle for Stalingrad, the enemy lost about 700,000 killed and wounded, over 2,000 guns and mortars, over 1,000 tanks and assault guns, and over 1,400 combat and transport aircraft. Instead of a non-stop advance to the Volga, the enemy troops were drawn into protracted, exhausting battles in the Stalingrad region. The plan of the German command for the summer of 1942 was frustrated. At the same time, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses in personnel - 644 thousand people, of which 324 thousand people were irretrievable, and 320 thousand were sanitary people. The losses of weapons amounted to: about 1400 tanks, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2 thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops continued to advance

During the height of the Great Patriotic War Soviet people heard in the word "Stalingrad" the crunch of the fascist spine. There were also later, after Stalingrad, major victories, but the people perceived the Battle of Stalingrad as a turning point in the course of the war, as the beginning of our victory, as the fact that there was no way for the Nazis to go east further than the Volga mother.

The main thing is that not only we, but the whole world believed in our victory. The storming of Berlin was only a matter of time.

1. The situation on the eve of the 1942 summer campaign of the year.

In the summer campaign of 1942, Hitler decided to seize the southern regions of the USSR (Don, Volga, Caucasus) rich in bread, coal, and oil in order to paralyze the Soviet economy. In addition, the southern direction was the most favorable for the offensive of the Nazi troops due to the flat terrain, where it was planned to use a significant number of German tanks.

Hitler planned to inflict the main blows on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. If Stalingrad had been taken, the Germans would have established control over the Volga. With a favorable development of the offensive, they planned to move further north along the Volga. Thus, the German generals set out to cut off the center of Russia from the Ural rear, and then surround and take Moscow.

The plan of the German command for the summer of 1942, as is clear from Directive No. 41 of April 5, was to "take the initiative again" lost as a result of the defeat near Moscow, "finally destroy the manpower that is still at the disposal of the Soviets, deprive the Russians of as many military and economic centers as possible."

However, in 1942, Hitler was no longer able to attack on a broad front. Therefore, the Germans decided to implement the planned plan by carrying out successive offensive operations in accordance with the available forces and the prevailing situation.

The plan was originally "concentrate all available forces to carry out the main operation on the southern sector of the front with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don and subsequently capturing the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasian ridge."

With a breakthrough to the Caucasus, Hitler intended to involve Turkey in the war against the USSR on the side of Germany, and also planned an invasion of the Middle East in the future. Initially, the fascist command entrusted the task of capturing Stalingrad to the 6th and 4th tank armies. German strategists believed that the Soviet troops, weakened in previous battles, would not put up serious resistance on the way to Stalingrad. They were so convinced of this that even in mid-July they turned the 4th Panzer Army to the south for action in the Caucasus, including two corps of the 6th Army in its composition. However, they miscalculated cruelly, and their hopes for an easy victory were dispelled in July-August in the big bend of the Don.

2. Operations of the Battle of Stalingrad

The Battle of Stalingrad includes defensive(July 17-November 18, 1942) and offensive(November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) operations carried out by Soviet troops with the aim of defending Stalingrad and defeating a large strategic group of Nazi troops operating in the Stalingrad direction.

In the defense of Stalingrad different time the troops of the Stalingrad, South-Eastern, South-Western, Don, left wing of the Voronezh Front, the Volga military flotilla and the Stalingrad air defense corps region participated.

The Nazi offensive on Stalingrad began on July 17, 1942 with the forces of Army Group B under the command of General Weichs (250 thousand people). They were opposed by the troops of the Stalingrad Front under the command of General Gordov (187 thousand people).

The fighting in the bend of the Don and the Volga continued for a month. Units and formations of the Red Army fought to the death.

On July 31, to strengthen the blow, Hitler returned the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth from the Caucasian direction. After that, the Germans stepped up the onslaught and at the end of August broke through to the city.

3. Far Eastern divisions and brigades.

On July 11, 1942, a directive of the General Staff of the following content was sent to Khabarovsk, to the commander of the Far Eastern Front, General of the Army I.R. Apanasenko:

“Send the following rifle formations from the troops of the Far Eastern Front to the reserve of the High Command:

- 205 rifle division - from Khabarovsk;

- 96 rifle division - from Kuibyshevka, Curly;

- 204 rifle division - from Cheremkhovo (Blagoveshchensk);

- 422 rifle division - from Rozengartovka;

- 87 rifle division - from Spassk;

- 208 rifle division - from Slavyanka;

- 126 rifle division - from Razdolny, Putsilovka;

- 98 rifle division - from Khorol;

- 250 rifle brigade - from Birobidzhan;

- 248 rifle brigade - from Zanadvorovka (Primorye);

- 253 rifle brigade - from Shkotovo.

At the end of July - beginning of August 1942 in the area of ​​Stalingrad with Far East eight infantry divisions arrived. In addition, from the first days of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 9th Guards (former 78th) Rifle Division, transferred here after the Moscow battle, the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, the 112th Tank Division and naval rifle brigades of the Pacific Fleet and KAF participated in the battles.

Without a doubt, the Far East made a worthy contribution to the defensive and offensive operations of the Battle of Stalingrad.

This order entered the history of the Great Patriotic War under the name "Neither step back!" It was published in connection with the extremely difficult situation that developed on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1942. The order gave a description of the state of affairs in the south of the country. The enemy broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops in a wide strip, deeply wedged into it in the Caucasian and Stalingrad directions, rapidly advancing towards Stalingrad and Rostov. Soviet troops retreated with heavy fighting, leaving rich areas to the enemy. The order of the NPO demanded to decisively strengthen the resistance of the enemy and stop his advance: "Not a step back!" Stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last possible.

The order was perceived by the personnel of the Red Army as an alarm, as a demand of the people to protect the Motherland. He played a big role in stabilizing the front.

5. Opposing forces.

On the night of July 12, German troops broke into the Stalingrad region in the big bend of the Don. They developed an offensive from the area of ​​​​the village of Kletskaya in the north to the village of Romanovskaya in the south, trying to encircle and destroy Soviet troops on the distant approaches to Stalingrad and capture the city.

Considering that the attack on Stalingrad was developing even more successfully than planned, the Nazi command decided to leave only the 6th Army of General Paulus in this direction, and launch an offensive into the Caucasus with the main forces of Army Group A. Including sending the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth there.

To a certain extent, these calculations were justified. In the first ten days of July 1942, 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, and about 500 tanks remained in the 6th Army. From the air, the army was supported by up to 1200 combat aircraft, having complete air supremacy.

The Soviet troops opposing the 6th Army had about 160 thousand people, 2200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks. The Air Force had only 454 aircraft in the 8th Air Army. In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 fighters of the 102nd air defense division operated here.

The enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in men by 1.7 times, in artillery and tanks by 1.3 times, in aircraft by more than 2 times.

The main efforts of the front troops were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where the 62nd and 64th armies were on the defensive in order to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and breaking through the German troops by the shortest route to Stalingrad. The 126th, 204th, 208th Far Eastern divisions fought as part of the 64th Army.

In July 1942, the 4th Panzer Army was formed. It included one tank division and two rifle divisions, including the 205th rifle division, which arrived from Khabarovsk on the 20th of July 1942, which took up positions in the bend of the Don.

6. Bloody defensive battles for Stalingrad.

From July 22, 1942 to August 30 there were bloody battles between the Soviet troops and the German invaders. The enemy struck blow after blow with the forces of the 14th tank and 8th army corps. With air support, the fascist German troops attacked the right flank of the 62nd Army south of the village of Kletskaya, broke through our defenses and with their advanced units reached the right bank of the Don near Kamensky.

The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky prepared for the counteroffensive those formed in the Stalingrad region

1st and 4th tank armies. Counterattacks were planned for July 25 by the 1st Panzer Army from the Kalach region and the 4th Panzer Army from the Trekhostrovskaya region.

As a result of the counterattacks of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy offensive was stopped. The enemy attacked the troops of the right flank of the 64th Army, part of whose forces retreated to the eastern bank of the Don.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front, covering the approaches to Stalingrad in the great bend of the Don, fought unequal battles with the enemy, some parts of which broke through the battle formations of the 62nd Army and reached the Don. The 64th Army fought against superior enemy forces, as a result of which its defense was divided into two parts. Formations and units of the army began to retreat to the Don.

A counterattack by part of the forces of the 21st Army began from the north to Kletskaya. The troops that launched the counterattack were not successful. However, as a result of counterattacks by the Soviet troops, the 8th Army and 14th Tank Corps of the enemy were forced to temporarily go on the defensive at the front in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Kletskaya, Kamensky, Manoilin.

The Commander-in-Chief issued Order No. 227 of the NPO of the USSR, in which he summed up the results of the struggle of the Soviet troops, showed the current situation and categorically demanded to stop further withdrawal and stop the enemy at any cost.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front continued to conduct defensive battles in the large bend of the Don, where the 62nd and 64th armies repelled enemy attempts to break through to Stalingrad from the west.

On August 1, the troops of the enemy's 4th Army went on the offensive, trying to break through to Stalingrad from the southwest on the move.

But the troops of the 62nd, 64th and 51st armies of the Stalingrad Front fought defensive battles with the 6th and 4th German tank armies on the line of the eastern bend of the Don, continuing to repel enemy attacks from the west and southwest of Stalingrad.

Soviet troops fought fierce battles on the right bank of the Don, where the German 6th Army, having brought fresh forces into battle, went on the offensive. The main forces of the 4th German Panzer Army were advancing from the Abganerovo area in the direction of the southwestern part of Stalingrad. Soviet troops retreated to the last line of defense in the Krasnoarmeysk region.

The troops of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front fought fierce battles in the bend of the Don and, under pressure from superior enemy forces, crossed to its left bank. Four divisions - the 33rd Guards, 181st, 147th and 239th (rifle, and the last, Far Eastern), were surrounded by the enemy and were forced to fight their way to their units. The troops of the 64th and 51st armies held back the attacks of the enemy's 4th tank army, which continued to make its way to Stalingrad from the southwest.

The Soviet troops organized a defense in the strip between the Don and the Volga and suspended the offensive of the enemy rushing towards Stalingrad, successfully completed counterattacks on the Middle Don. As a result of the offensive operations of the Soviet troops, a bridgehead was captured on the right bank of the Don, the bridgehead was expanded in the bend of the Don northwest of Sirotinskaya, and a bridgehead north of Trekhostrovskaya was also captured.

By the end of September 1942, more than 80 divisions were operating as part of Army Group B, advancing on Stalingrad. From September 12, when the enemy came close to the city from the west and southwest, the defense of Stalingrad was assigned to the 62nd (Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov) and 64th Army (Major General M.S. Shumilov) . Fierce fighting broke out in the city.

FROM north side incessant counterattacks on enemy troops were carried out by the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th armies.

A private offensive operation on the southern approaches to Stalingrad was undertaken by the troops of the 57th and 51st armies.

The Germans made their last attempts to capture Stalingrad, to break through to the Volga. But these were their last encroachments, because the Soviet troops exhausted and bled the main enemy grouping. The defensive period is over. All conditions were created for a counteroffensive.

7. 205th Rifle Division.

Formed in Khabarovsk in March-April 1942. Participated in the Battle of Stalingrad from July 28 to August 30, 1942 as part of the 4th Panzer Army. For a month of fighting with the enemy, she suffered heavy losses and was disbanded.

In the history of the Great Patriotic War, it is hardly mentioned, including in the history of the Far Eastern Military District. This is unfair and shameful because 205th the rifle division died following order No. 227 "Not a step back!"

S.M. Leskov, who now lives in Khabarovsk, told something about her story:

“Before being sent to the front, soldiers from the Volochaevsky garrison marched in full gear along the main street of Khabarovsk. Residents stood along Karl Marx Street, children gave the soldiers pouches containing a pencil, letter paper, addresses, shag, soap. Everyone wished them a victory to return home.

In Stalingrad, the defensive line for the 205th Infantry Division was selected based on the prevailing situation in the area of ​​the village of Kletskaya. The choice of the defensive zone was made without taking into account the requirements of the regulations and instructions that the defender must first of all evaluate the enemy and the terrain on which he will have to fight, and place his units and subunits in the most advantageous position. For the defenders, the terrain should always be an ally. It must give him tactical advantages for counterattacks, for the use of all firepower, for camouflage.

At the same time, the terrain should, if possible, slow down the movement and maneuver of the enemy. And with engineering support, make it inaccessible to tanks so that the attacker does not have secret approaches and stays under fire from the defenders for as long as possible ego.

The positions of the 205th Rifle Division were placed in the bare steppe, open for observation and viewing both from the ground and from the air. The division did not have time to use natural barriers - rivers, streams and ravines, which could be easily reinforced with engineering structures and made them difficult for the Germans.

“In those troubled days, behind our backs, on the western bank of the Don, many retreating troops accumulated. Bridges were destroyed, many tried to cross on improvised means. But the Don is a deep river, about 40 meters wide, with a fast current. What was happening on it at the end of May is difficult to convey. Fascist planes flew in and bombed. Although we were about three kilometers from the coast, we saw how "reconnaissance frames", bombers, and fighters were circling over the Don. In the direction of Stalingrad, huge armadas of bombers flew under the cover of fighters.

Our planes were not in the air. Tears flowed from helplessness. It is better to meet in hand-to-hand combat than to lie helplessly in an open field under the whistle of bombs.

Then, after July 31, German tanks appeared, followed by infantry. With tank wedges, the enemy pierced our defenses, surrounded and destroyed the defending units and formations. Due to the hopeless situation, many surrendered. Therefore, perhaps, they did not become over post-war years and did not begin to mention the 205th rifle division anywhere. For the Red Army, the 205th Far Eastern Rifle Division ceased to exist on August 30, 1942. The 4th Tank Army, which included the 205th Rifle Division, was disbanded in October 1942,” Leskov said.

Of the more than 10 thousand people of the 205th Infantry Division, about 300 people crossed the Don, including Sergei Mikhailovich Leskov, who still had to go through the hell of the Battle of Kursk.

According to the stories of local residents, after the battles, the entire field in the vicinity of the Venets farm, where the soldiers of the 205th Infantry Division fought, was white from the bones of the dead Red Army soldiers and their commanders. Residents collected the remains, took them to a mass grave and installed an obelisk with the inscription "To the Heroes of the forty-second year" at their own expense. This is all they could do, since officially the 205th Rifle Division ceased to exist in those years, although its soldiers stood to death, following the Order “Not a step back!”

This often happens in our history, although the slogan “No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten” is often repeated from various stands and in the media from year to year. And the children, whose fathers died in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, and their grandchildren are still looking for and finding remains with medallions and erecting monuments at their own expense.

So, for example, Mikhail Gusev, who now lives in Minsk, repeatedly visited the battlefields of the 205th Infantry Division and nevertheless found the grave of his father, Senior Lieutenant Sergei Vasilievich Gusev, who served in the Volochaevsky town in the pre-war and early war years. His name is immortalized in the regional Book of Memory and on the pylons of the memorial in the city of Khabarovsk. And in 1942, the family received the news that he was “missing.” And this meant that they did not receive a pension for the deceased husband and father.

Such is the history of the 205th Far Eastern Rifle Division, which carried out the Order without stepping back “not a single step back”, giving 10,000 lives of our fellow countrymen for the freedom of the Motherland. Eternal glory to them!

8. Offensive operation.

The counteroffensive plan (codenamed "Uranus") was developed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff by the beginning of November 1942. counteroffensive Soviet troops began November 19, 1942 strikes by the troops of the Southwestern and 65th Army of the Don Front.

On this day, formations of the 5th Panzer and 21st Army joined in the counteroffensive. To complete the breakthrough, the 1st, 26th and 4th tank corps were introduced into the battle, then the 3rd guards and 8th cavalry corps. By the end of the day, the troops of the Southwestern Front advanced 25-30 kilometers.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front (57th and 51st Armies) and the left-flank formations of the 64th Army launched an offensive on November 20. On the very first day, they broke through the enemy defenses and ensured the introduction of the 13th tank corps, the 4th mechanized corps and the 4th cavalry corps into the breakthrough.

On November 23, the mobile formations of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts completed the encirclement of the 6th German Army and part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (in total, 22 German divisions and 160 separate units were in the ring).

By November 30, Soviet troops had squeezed the encirclement. On December 12, the German command made an attempt to release their encircled troops with a strike from the tank divisions of the Manstein army, but they were stopped by the troops of General Malinovsky, then defeated.

By the beginning of January 1943, the number of enemy groupings had been significantly reduced. The liquidation of the German grouping in the "Ring" area near Stalingrad was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky). In accordance with the plan of the operation "Ring", the main blow from the west was delivered by the 65th Army of General P.I. Batov. On January 31, the southern group of troops of the 6th Army, led by Field Marshal F. Paulus, stopped resistance, on February 2, the northern group capitulated.

9. The contribution of the Far East to the liberation of Stalingrad

In early August, the Far Eastern 87th, 96th, and 98th Rifle Divisions joined the 21st Army.

The 87th Infantry Division (commander Colonel A.I. Kazartsev) became famous in the August defensive battles. Having survived, she also took part in the counteroffensive. The division consisted mainly of Primorye.

Since November 19, the 87th Rifle Division participated in the 2nd guards army General R.Ya.Malinovsky. In those days, the 87th S.D. received a telegram from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin: “ I'm proud of your hard work. No step back…"

The 96th Infantry Division (commander D.S. Zherebin), in stubborn battles from August 12 to 26, 1942, captured a bridgehead on the right bank of the Don and liberated the city of Serafimovich. Then the bridgehead was expanded and became one of the important points of concentration of troops during the subsequent breakthrough and encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy grouping.

On November 19, 1942, the division broke through the enemy defenses and, together with other formations, participated in the encirclement and defeat of the 3rd Romanian army. For steadfastness and heroism in the Battle of Stalingrad, 1167 soldiers of the division were awarded orders and medals. On February 7, the division was awarded the title of "68th Guards » .

The 98th Infantry Division (commander Colonel I.F. Seregin), as part of the shock group of the 21st Army, participated in the counteroffensive against the village of Kletskaya, stubbornly defended the Verkhnyaya Rotten, Peskovatka line. Then parts of the division broke through the enemy defenses and, developing the offensive, in mid-December 1942, they reached the area of ​​​​the city of Nizhne-Kumsky. At the cost of incredible efforts and sacrifices, the division survived until the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army approached the line of the Aksay and Myshkov rivers. April 16, 1943 the division was transformed into the 86th Guards.

The 126th, 204th, 208th Far Eastern Rifle Divisions fought as part of the 64th Army.

The 204th Rifle Division (commanded by Colonel A.V. Skvortsov) firmly entrenched itself abroad Guzov-Dubovsky-Staromaksimovsky. On August 19, 1942, the enemy launched a general offensive and continuously increased his strength. However, the 204th division firmly held its lines. She also distinguished herself in breaking through the enemy defenses in Stalingrad. By order of the NPO of the USSR No. 104 dated March 1, 1943, the division was awarded the title of "78th Guards".

The 422nd Rifle Division, formed on March 1, 1942, fought courageously near the walls of the Volga stronghold. Khabarovsk Territory. It was commanded by Colonel I.K. Morozov, a participant in the Khasan events.

August 13, 1942 near the village of Tundutovo 422-s.d. received a baptism of fire. The commander of the 57th army, General F.I. Tolbukhin, set the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from the south to Stalingrad. And the division completed this difficult task. In his first battle, sniper A. Samar destroyed 16 Nazis within an hour.

Constantly repelling attacks by superior enemy forces, the 422nd Infantry Division held the line Ivanovka - Tundutovo - Prigorodnoye Khozyaistvo.

On August 25, 1942, only the gun of A. Alekantsev destroyed 10 German tanks in one battle. In one of the halls of the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg, there is an anti-tank gun No. 2203 by senior sergeant Alexander Alekantsev, symbolizing the steadfastness and courage of Far Eastern soldiers.

For exceptional stamina, excellent combat skills and the ability to beat the enemy, the 422nd Rifle Division received the title of "81st Guards".

All Far Eastern divisions took part in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943, including the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 112th Tank Division, which distinguished themselves near Moscow.

The Battle of Stalingrad put an end to the advance of German troops deep into Soviet territory.

Merezhko Anatoly Grigorievich

The battle for Stalingrad in terms of the duration and fierceness of the fighting, in terms of the number of people and military equipment participating, surpassed at that time all the battles of world history.

At certain stages, more than 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, up to 26 thousand guns took part in it on both sides. The Nazi troops lost more than 800,000 soldiers and officers, killed, wounded, captured, as well as a large number of military equipment, weapons and equipment.

Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)

In accordance with the plan for the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, having concentrated large forces in the south westbound, expected to defeat the Soviet troops, go to the big bend of the Don, take possession of Stalingrad on the move and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.

For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. By July 17, it included 13 divisions, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation of the 4th air fleet - up to 1200 combat aircraft.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field administration of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinated to the front commander.

The newly created front began to fulfill the task, having only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks, the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.

In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive actions near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops by 1.7 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in artillery and tanks, and by more than 2 times in the number of aircraft.

On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. Four defensive bypasses were built on the outskirts of the city: outer, middle, inner and city. The entire population, including children, was mobilized for the construction of defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units, self-defense work units were created at factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material assets were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.

Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where they occupied the defenses of the 62nd and 64th armies in order to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and breaking through it by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense at the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and perseverance shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front failed to defeat the enemy groupings that had penetrated, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.

On July 23-29, the 6th German Army made an attempt to encircle them with sweeping attacks on the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, go to the Kalach region and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and the counterattack of the formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.

Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating a threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.

To facilitate the command and control of troops stretched out in a strip of 500 km, on August 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed to the fight against the German 6th Army, which was advancing on Stalingrad from the west and northwest, and the South-Eastern Front was directed to the defense of the southwestern direction. On August 9-10, the troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Panzer Army and forced it to stop.

On August 21, the infantry of the 6th German Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Gotha's tanks launched an offensive from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1000 tons of bombs on the city.

Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, encountering almost no resistance, however, in the Gumrak area, they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been put forward to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Panzer Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshynka. The enemy wanted to break into the city on the move through its northern outskirts, however, along with the army units, self-defense units, the Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.

The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the reserves of the Headquarters transferred to its structure launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army was cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.

Since September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, commanded by General V. I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, after another bombardment, German troops launched an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamaev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing over the Volga was clearly visible, in the center the German infantry made its way to the railway station, in the south, Goth's tanks, with the support of the infantry, gradually moved towards the elevator.

On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards threw back the German troops from the area of ​​the central crossing over the Volga, cleared many streets and quarters of them. On September 16, the troops of the 62nd Army, with the support of aviation, stormed the Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.

On September 21, on the front from Mamaev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyno part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with the forces of five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off the Soviet units from the river.

By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even separate buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.

The fighting in the city took on a protracted character. The troops of Paulus lacked the strength to finally throw the defenders of the city into the Volga, and the Soviet ones - to dislodge the Germans from their positions.

The struggle was for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were active. The use of aviation and artillery, due to the proximity of enemy formations, became almost impossible.

From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were fought on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Krasny Oktyabr and Barrikady factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.

At the same time, the Germans were attacking in the center on Mamaev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamaev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of ​​the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where the Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and losing control, began to cross over to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks of the newly arriving reserves.

They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army took on catastrophic proportions.

It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except for the 62nd. Commander was appointed General K. K. Rokossovsky. From the composition of the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command General A. I. Eremenko. Each front was directly subordinated to the Stavka.

Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Photo reproduction. Photo: RIA Novosti

By the end of the first decade of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, the German troops, after a powerful air and artillery preparation, went on the attack again.

Several divisions advanced on a sector of about 5 km. This offensive of the enemy, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.

On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After that, they launched an offensive along the banks of the Volga to the south. On October 17, the 138th division arrived in the army to support Chuikov's weakened formations. Fresh forces repelled enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus' ram began to noticeably lose its strength.

To alleviate the situation of the 62nd Army, on October 19 from the area north of the city went on the offensive troops of the Don Front. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.

By the end of October, the offensive operations of the 6th Army slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, no more than 400 m remained to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting weakened, and the Germans basically consolidated the captured positions.

November 11 was made the last attempt to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by the forces of five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh engineer battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast with a length of 500-600 m in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.

In other sectors, Chuikov's troops held their positions.

The offensive of the German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant, and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.

During the period of defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost in July - November up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1000 tanks, over 2000 guns and mortars, more than 1400 aircraft. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.

Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy grouping operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.

Stalingrad offensive operation

By the autumn of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army had been basically completed. At the factories located in the deep rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was launched, which not only was not inferior, but often surpassed the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment had come when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin mass expulsion of him from the borders of the Soviet Union.

With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.

The Soviet troops were to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad region. This task was assigned to the troops of three fronts - the South-Western ( Commander General N. F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K. K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although in tanks, artillery and aviation, the Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy. Under such conditions, in order to successfully complete the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. The success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the assigned positions only at night, while the radio stations of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy had the impression that the units remained in their previous positions. All correspondence was forbidden, and orders were given only orally, and only to direct executors.

The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the direction of the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks that had just rolled off the assembly line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.

One of the centers of fighting in Stalingrad is an elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group "B", because. was waiting for the offensive of the Soviet troops against the Army Group "Center".

Group B Commander General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was worried about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. According to his insistent demands, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don in order to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.

Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November when aerial reconnaissance photographs showed the presence of several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the transfer of the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks for their preparation and transfer to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so he calculated that reinforcements should have arrived in time.

By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army, which, possibly, would also be directed against the German 4th tank army. Since all of his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new grouping as part of the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the 3rd Romanian Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian armored division to this corps and was about to transfer the 29th motorized division of the 4th tank army there, but changed his mind, because he also expected an offensive in the area where the Gota formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in building up the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs's formations.

On November 19, at 0850, after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite the fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Panzer, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian.

Only one 5th tank army in its composition consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to the sharp deterioration weather conditions aviation was inactive.

It also turned out that during the artillery preparation, the enemy’s firepower was not completely suppressed, which is why the offensive of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. After assessing the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, decided to bring tank corps into battle, which made it possible to finally crack the Romanian defense and develop the offensive.

On the Don Front, especially fierce battles unfolded in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, passing along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, decisive battles unfolded behind the third line, which took place along the chalk heights. They were a powerful defense unit. The location of the heights made it possible to fire at all the approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with barbed wire, and the approaches to them crossed deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from the dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.

The enemy carried out violent counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. At that moment it was not possible to get around the heights, and after a powerful artillery raid, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division stormed the enemy fortifications. Despite the hurricane of machine-gun and automatic fire, by 4 p.m. the enemy's stubborn resistance had been broken.

As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest success. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide was formed in the enemy defenses.

On November 20, south of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in adverse weather conditions.

It was decided to begin artillery training in each army as soon as the necessary conditions. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous conduct on the scale of the front, however, as well as from aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were launched for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in the street. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

After the artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, the formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.

Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop success in the western direction. By the middle of the day, conditions were created for the introduction of army mobile groups into the breakthrough.

Rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, securing achieved success.

To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian army had to bring into battle its last reserve - two regiments of the 8th cavalry division. But even this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.

The incoming reports painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, the counterattack of the 48th Panzer Corps was thwarted.

The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army, which was defending there, was defeated.

The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encirclement of the 6th Wehrmacht Army clearly loomed. The red arrows of the blows of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in the area between the Volga and the Don. In the course of almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the situation. It was necessary to urgently make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad region and confine themselves to a regrouping of forces. The leadership of the OKH and the command of Army Group "B" found the only way to avoid disaster in withdrawing the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.

The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops with counterattacks by tank formations. The 6th Army was ordered to stay where it was. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the encirclement of the army, and if it did happen, he would take all measures to unblock it.

While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, the Soviet troops developed the success achieved. A subdivision of the 26th Panzer Corps, during a daring night operation, managed to capture the only surviving crossing over the Don near the town of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of great operational importance. The rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by the Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle the enemy troops near Stalingrad.

By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Yeryomenko, to join tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.

Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th field army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th tank corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.

The commander of the 6th Army already at 18 o'clock on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group "B" that the army was surrounded, the situation with ammunition was critical, fuel supplies were running out, and food was enough for only 12 days. Since the command of the Wehrmacht on the Don did not have any forces that could release the encircled army, Paulus turned to the Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request went unanswered.

Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Instead, he was ordered to immediately go to the boiler, where to organize an all-round defense and wait for help from outside.

On November 23, the troops of all three fronts continued the offensive. On this day, the operation reached its climax.

Two brigades of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the Don and launched an offensive against Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy fiercely resisted, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m., he was driven out of Kalach, which housed the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.

At about 4 p.m. on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days, the success was achieved.

An oppressive atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army was received. Despite the obviously disastrous situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because. in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes for conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that the battle with the superior forces of Soviet troops in the open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited means of transportation, fuel and ammunition supplies, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in the positions occupied and strive to unblock the grouping. This point of view was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Führer that his aircraft would supply the encircled group by air. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up an all-round defense and wait for a deblocking offensive from the outside.

Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus's radiogram, in which he requested "freedom of action". But Paulus hesitated to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, the corps commanders gathered for a meeting at the army headquarters in order to work out a plan for further actions.

Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seidlitz-Kurzbach called for an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps General G. Hube.

But most of the corps commanders, led by the chief of staff of the army General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that in the course of a heated dispute, the infuriated commander of the 8th Army Corps General W. Gates threatened to personally shoot Seydlitz if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that Hitler should be approached for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called "troops of the fortress of Stalingrad", and the breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and brought them the order of the Fuhrer.

Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.

An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a grouping of six divisions. In order to pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans on the Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of ​​the Krasny Oktyabr plant, but met with fierce resistance. The depth of their advancement during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.

By November 24, the encirclement was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga front. But Paulus was a too cautious and indecisive person, a general who was used to obeying and accurately weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. Subsequently, he confessed to the officers of his headquarters: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: "Now you can judge me." But, you know, unfortunately, I'm not Reichenau."

On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare the deblockade of the 6th field army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks - "Tigers", hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these machines had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the conditions of the Russian winter, he believed that even one battalion of "Tigers" could radically change the situation near Stalingrad.

While Manstein received reinforcements from the Caucasus and prepared the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and fortified it. When on December 12 Panzer Group Gotha made a breakthrough, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to make his way towards the “tigers” of Goth, which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.

By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad "cauldron" by 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory occupied by them was shot through by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering's promise, in practice, the average daily aviation capacity in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other "boilers" caused huge losses in German aviation.

The ruins of the fountain "Barmaley" - which has become one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to tie down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army launched an operation to destroy the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of ​​​​the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units that continued to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent one of the last radiograms to Hitler, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and offered to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to take out of the "cauldron" anyone except the wounded.

On the night of January 31, the 38th motorized rifle brigade and the 329th sapper battalion blocked the area of ​​the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radiogram received by the commander of the 6th Army was an order for his promotion to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet parliamentarians made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and handed over an ultimatum to the field marshal. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht came into force.

The Hitlerite government declared mourning in the country.

For three days, the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.

Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has claimed that a 330,000-strong enemy grouping was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.

The point of view of the German side on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the scatter of opinions, the figure of 250-280 thousand people is most often called. This figure is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25,000), captured (91,000), and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160,000). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6,000 people returned to their homeland.

Kotelnikovskaya operation Having completed the encirclement of a large group of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they entrenched themselves and went on the defensive.

The German command made every effort to break through the corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December, in the area of ​​the village. Kotelnikovsky, an attack group was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel-General G. Goth - the Goth army group. The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was inflicted along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in terms of the number of tanks - more than 6 times.

They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day they reached the area of ​​​​the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the strike force, on December 14, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in an effort to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and the mechanized corps from its reserve to reinforce the Stalingrad Front, setting them the task of defeating the enemy strike force.

On December 19, having suffered significant losses, the Goth group reached the Myshkova River. 35-40 km remained to the encircled grouping, however, Paulus's troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not strike back, and Goth could no longer move further.

On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The 2nd Guards Army delivered the main blow towards the Kotelnikov group with fresh forces. The 51st Army was advancing on Kotelnikovsky from the east, while enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured the crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough, which began to rapidly move towards Kotelnikovsky.

On December 27, the 7th Panzer Corps came out to Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy grouping's escape route to the southwest. Continuous strikes against the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.

As a result of the Soviet counter-offensive, the enemy's attempt to release the 6th Army encircled near Stalingrad was thwarted, and the German troops were thrown back from the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km.