USSR in the post-war period 40-60 years. Introduction

The post-war USSR has always attracted the attention of specialists and readers interested in the past of our country. The victory of the Soviet people in the most terrible war in the history of mankind became the finest hour of Russia in the 20th century. But at the same time, it also became an important frontier, marking the onset of a new era - the era of post-war development.

It so happened that the first post-war years (May 1945 - March 1953) were "deprived" in Soviet historiography. In the first post-war years, a few works appeared, extolling the peaceful creative work of the Soviet people during the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, but not revealing, of course, the essence of even this side of the socio-economic and political history of Soviet society. After Stalin's death in March 1953 and the ensuing wave of criticism of the "cult of personality", even this story was exhausted and soon forgotten. As for the relationship between government and society, the development of a post-war socio-economic and political course, innovations and dogmas in foreign policy, these topics have not received their development in Soviet historiography. In subsequent years, the plots of the first post-war years were reflected only in the multi-volume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", and even then fragmentarily, from the point of view of the concept of "restoring the country's national economy destroyed by the war."

Only in the late 80s. publicists, and then historians, turned to this complex and short period of the country's history in order to look at it in a new way, to try to understand its specifics. However, the lack of archival sources, as well as the “revealing” attitude, led to the fact that the place of one half-truth was soon taken by another.

As for the study of the Cold War and its consequences for Soviet society, these problems were not raised at that time either.

A breakthrough in the study of the post-war USSR came in the 1990s, when archival funds of the highest bodies of state power, and, most importantly, many documents of the top party leadership, became available. The discovery of materials and documents on the history of the foreign policy of the USSR led to the appearance of a series of publications on the history of the Cold War.

In 1994, G. M. Adibekov published a monograph on the history of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties (Cominform) and its role in the political development of Eastern European countries in the first post-war years.

In a collection of articles prepared by scientists from the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Cold War: New Approaches. New Documents” have developed such new topics for researchers as the Soviet reaction to the “Marshall Plan”, the evolution of Soviet policy on the German issue in the 40s, the “Iranian crisis” of 1945-1946. and others. All of them were written on the basis of the latest documentary sources found in previously closed party archives.

In the same year, a collection of articles prepared by the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945-1985): A New Reading" was published. Along with the disclosure of private aspects of the history of the Cold War, articles were published in it that revealed the doctrinal foundations of Soviet foreign policy in those years, clarified the international consequences of the Korean War, and traced the features of the party leadership of the foreign policy of the USSR.

At the same time, a collection of articles “The USSR and the Cold War” appeared under the reaction of V. S. Lelchuk and E. I. Pivovar, in which for the first time the consequences of the Cold War were studied not only from the point of view of the foreign policy of the USSR and the West, but also in connection with with the impact that this confrontation had on the internal processes that took place in the Soviet country: the evolution of power structures, the development of industry and agriculture, Soviet society, etc.

Of interest is the work of the author's team, united in the book "Soviet Society: Origin, Development, Historical Finale" edited by Yu. N. Afanasyev and V. S. Lelchuk. It examines various aspects of the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR in the postwar period. It can be stated that the comprehension of many issues has been carried out here at a fairly high research level. The understanding of the development of the military-industrial complex, the specifics of the ideological functioning of power, has noticeably advanced.

In 1996, VF Zima published a monograph on the origin and consequences of the famine in the USSR in 1946–1947. It also reflected various aspects of the socio-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR in the first post-war years.

An important contribution to the study of the formation and functioning of the Soviet military-industrial complex, its place and role in the system of relations between government and society was made by N. S. Simonov, who prepared the most complete monograph on this issue to date. He shows in it the growing role of "commanders of military production" in the system of power in the USSR in the post-war period, highlights the priority areas for the growth of military production in this period.

During these years, V.P. Popov showed himself to be a leading specialist in the field of a comprehensive analysis of the economic development of the USSR in the postwar years and the development of state policy in this area, publishing a series of interesting articles, as well as a collection of documentary materials that were highly appreciated by the scientific community. The general result of his many years of work was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph on these issues.

In 1998, R. G. Pikhoi's monograph “The Soviet Union: the history of power. 1945-1991". In it, the author, using unique documents, shows the features of the evolution of power institutions in the first post-war years, argues that the system of power that developed in these years can be considered as classical Soviet (or Stalinist).

E. Yu. Zubkova has established herself as a well-known specialist in the history of the reformation of Soviet society in the first post-war decades. The fruit of her many years of work on the study of moods and everyday life of people was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph “Post-war Soviet society: politics and everyday life. 1945-1953".

Despite the publication of these works over the past decade, it should be recognized that the development of the history of the first post-war years of Soviet society is just beginning. Moreover, there is still no single conceptually homogeneous historical work that would undertake a comprehensive analysis of the accumulated historical sources across the entire spectrum of the socio-economic, socio-political, foreign policy history of Soviet society in the early post-war years.

What sources have become available to historians in recent years?

Some researchers (including the authors of this monograph) got the opportunity to work in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (the former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU). The richest material is concentrated here on all aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state and its top leadership, personal funds of the leaders of the CPSU. Notes by members of the Politburo on specific issues of economic development, foreign policy, etc., make it possible to trace around what problems of post-war development disputes flared up in the leadership, what ways of solving these or those problems were proposed by them.

The end of the Great Patriotic War was a huge relief for the inhabitants of the USSR, but at the same time it set a number of urgent tasks for the government of the country. Issues that had been delayed for the duration of the war now needed to be resolved urgently. In addition, the authorities needed to equip the demobilized Red Army soldiers, provide social protection for war victims and restore destroyed economic facilities in the west of the USSR.

In the first post-war five-year plan (1946-1950), the goal was to restore the pre-war level of agricultural and industrial production. A distinctive feature of the restoration of industry was that not all evacuated enterprises returned to the west of the USSR, a significant part of them were rebuilt from scratch. This made it possible to strengthen industry in those regions that did not have a powerful industrial base before the war. At the same time, measures were taken to return industrial enterprises to civilian life schedules: the length of the working day was reduced, and the number of days off increased. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the pre-war level of production had been reached in all the most important branches of industry.

Demobilization

Although a small part of the Red Army soldiers returned to their homeland in the summer of 1945, the main wave of demobilization began in February 1946, and the final completion of demobilization took place in March 1948. It was envisaged that the demobilized soldiers would be provided with work within a month. The families of the dead and disabled of the war received special support from the state: their homes were primarily supplied with fuel. However, in general, the demobilized fighters did not have any benefits in comparison with citizens who were in the rear during the war years.

Strengthening the repressive apparatus

The apparatus of repression, which flourished in the pre-war years, changed during the war. Intelligence and SMERSH (counterintelligence) played a key role in it. After the war, these structures filtered prisoners of war, Ostarbeiters and collaborators returning to the Soviet Union. The organs of the NKVD on the territory of the USSR fought organized crime, the level of which increased sharply immediately after the war. However, already in 1947, the power structures of the USSR returned to the repression of the civilian population, and at the end of the 50s the country was shocked by high-profile lawsuits (the case of doctors, the Leningrad case, the Mingrelian case). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, “anti-Soviet elements” were deported from the newly annexed territories of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states: intelligentsia, large property owners, supporters of the UPA and “forest brothers”, representatives of religious minorities.

Foreign policy guidelines

Even during the war years, the future victorious powers laid the foundations of an international structure that would regulate the post-war world order. In 1946, the United Nations began its work, in which the five most influential states in the world had a blocking vote. The entry of the Soviet Union into the UN Security Council strengthened its geopolitical position.

At the end of the 1940s, the foreign policy of the USSR was aimed at creating, strengthening and expanding the bloc of socialist states, which later became known as the socialist camp. The coalition governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia that appeared immediately after the war were replaced by one-party ones, monarchical institutions were liquidated in Bulgaria and Romania, and pro-Soviet governments proclaimed their republics in East Germany and North Korea. Shortly before this, the Communists had taken control of most of China. Attempts by the USSR to create Soviet republics in Greece and Iran were unsuccessful.

Intra-party struggle

It is believed that in the early 50s, Stalin planned another purge of the top party apparatus. Shortly before his death, he also carried out a reorganization of the party's management system. In 1952, the VKP(b) became known as the CPSU, and the Politburo was replaced by the Presidium of the Central Committee, which did not have the post of General Secretary. Even during Stalin's lifetime, there was a confrontation between Beria and Malenkov on the one hand and Voroshilov, Khrushchev and Molotov on the other. Among historians, the following opinion is widespread: members of both groups realized that the new series of trials was directed primarily against them, and therefore, having learned about Stalin's illness, they made sure that he was not provided with the necessary medical care.

The results of the post-war years

In the post-war years, which coincided with the last seven years of Stalin's life, the Soviet Union turned from a victorious power into a world power. The government of the USSR managed to relatively quickly rebuild the national economy, restore state institutions and create around itself a bloc of allied states. At the same time, the repressive apparatus was strengthened, aimed at eradicating dissent and at "cleansing" party structures. With the death of Stalin, the process of development of the state has undergone drastic changes. The USSR entered a new era.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution

Higher professional education

All-Russian Correspondence Financial and Economic Institute

Department of History of Economics

Test No. 1

in the discipline "National History"

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Salnikova A.A.

Checked Chernykh R.M.

Moscow - 2008

USSR in the post-war period (40s - early 50s).

1. Introduction - the relevance of the chosen topic.

Consequences of the Great Patriotic War.

Restoration of the country's economy;

Industry recovery;

Rearmament of the army;

Agriculture;

Financial system;

Organization of labor in the postwar period;

The standard of living of the people, social benefits.

3 . Conclusion.

Introduction

Consequences of the Great Patriotic War

The victory over fascism went to the USSR at a high price. A military hurricane raged over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union for several years. Most of the industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main granaries - Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a significant part of the Volga region - were also in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, or even decades.
Nearly 32,000 industrial enterprises lay in ruins. On the eve of the war, they gave the country 70% of all steel production, 60% of coal. 65,000 kilometers of railway lines were put out of action. During the war, 1,700 cities and about 70,000 villages were destroyed. More than 25 million people lost their homes. But even more serious losses were human lives. Almost every Soviet family lost someone close during the war years. According to the latest estimates, the losses during the hostilities amounted to 7.5 million people, the losses among the civilian population - 6-8 million people. To military losses should be added the death rate in the camps, which during the war continued to function in full, carrying out emergency construction, logging and mining on a colossal scale generated by the requirements of wartime.

The nutrition of the prisoners then, perhaps, corresponded even less to the physical needs of a person than in peacetime. Total between 1941 and 1945. premature death overtook about 20-25 million citizens of the USSR. Of course, the greatest losses were among the male population. Reducing the number of men 1910-1925 birth was horrendous and caused permanent disproportions in the demographic structure of the country. Too many women of the same age group were left without husbands. At the same time, they were often single mothers, who at the same time continued to work in the enterprises of the economy transferred to the war footing, which was in dire need of workers.

Thus, according to the 1959 census, there were only 633 men per 1,000 women between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four. The result was a sharp drop in the birth rate in the 1940s, and the war was not the only reason.

Plans for the recovery of the country's economy.

The Soviet state began to restore the destroyed economy even during the war years, as the territories occupied by the enemy were liberated. But as a priority, restoration arose only after the victory. The country faced the choice of the path of economic development. In February - March 1946, Stalin again returned to the slogan put forward shortly before the war: the completion of the construction of socialism and the beginning of the transition to communism. Stalin assumed that in order to build the material and technical base of communism, it was enough to increase the production of pig iron to 50 million tons per year, steel to 60 million tons, oil to 60 million tons, coal to 500 million tons.

More realistic was the fourth five-year plan. The development of this plan is closely connected with the name of N. A. Voznesensky, who in those years was at the head of the State Planning Commission. During the war years, he actually led the industry complex that produced the most important types of weapons: the people's commissariats of the aviation and tank industries, weapons and ammunition, and ferrous metallurgy. A son of his time, Voznesensky tried to introduce elements of cost accounting and material incentives into the economic system that had developed after the war, albeit while maintaining the decisive role of central planning.

Such foreign policy factors as the beginning of the Cold War, the looming nuclear threat, and the arms race had an effect. Thus, the first post-war five-year plan was not so much a five-year period for the restoration of the national economy, as the construction of new enterprises of the military-industrial complex - factories for the construction of ships of the Navy, new types of weapons.

Recovery of industry, rearmament of the army.

Immediately after the end of the war, the technical re-equipment of the army takes place, saturating it with the latest models of aviation, small arms, artillery, and tanks. Large forces required the creation of jet aircraft and missile systems for all branches of the armed forces. In a short time, tactical, then strategic, and air defense missiles were developed.

A broad program of building both large-capacity ships of the Navy and a significant submarine fleet was launched.

Huge funds were concentrated on the implementation of the atomic project, which was supervised by the all-powerful L.P. Beria. Thanks to the efforts of Soviet designers, and partly intelligence, which managed to steal important atomic secrets from the Americans, atomic weapons in the USSR were created in an unpredictably short time - in 1949. And in 1953, the Soviet Union created the world's first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.

Thus, in the post-war years, the Soviet Union managed to achieve considerable success in developing the economy and rearming the army. However, these achievements seemed insufficient to Stalin. He believed that it was necessary to "spur" the pace of economic and military development. In 1949, the head of the State Planning Commission, N.A. Voznesensky was accused of having drawn up in 1946 a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. contained low scores. Voznesensky was convicted and executed.

In 1949, at the direction of Stalin, without taking into account the real possibilities for the development of the country, new indicators were determined for the main branches of industry. These voluntaristic decisions created extreme tension in the economy and slowed down the improvement of the already very low standard of living of the people. (Several years later this crisis was overcome, and in 1952 the increase in industrial output exceeded 10%).

We must not forget about the forced labor of millions of people in the Gulag system (the main administration of the camps). The volume of camps completed by the system, where prisoners worked, increased several times after the war. The army of prisoners expanded with the prisoners of war of the losing countries. It was their labor that built (but was never completed) the Baikal-Amur Railway from Baikal to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Northern Road along the shores of the Arctic Ocean from Salekhard to Norilsk, nuclear industry facilities, metallurgical enterprises, energy facilities were created, coal was mined and ore, timber, huge state farm camps produced products.

While acknowledging the undoubted economic successes, it should be noted that under the most difficult conditions of restoring the war-torn economy, a unilateral shift in favor of the military industries, which essentially subjugated the rest of the industry, created an imbalance in the development of the economy. Military production fell heavily

burden on the country's economy, sharply limited the possibility of improving the material well-being of the people.

Agriculture.

The development of agriculture, which was in a severe crisis, proceeded at a much slower pace. It could not fully provide the population with food and raw materials for light industry. The terrible drought of 1946 hit Ukraine, Moldova, and southern Russia. People died. Dystrophy was the main cause of high mortality. But the tragedy of the post-war famine, as often happened, was carefully hushed up. After a severe drought, a high grain harvest was obtained in the next two years. This to some extent contributed to the strengthening of agricultural production in general and some of its growth.

In agriculture, the establishment of the old order, the unwillingness to undertake any reforms that would weaken the tight control of the state, had a particularly painful effect. In general, it rested not so much on the personal interest of the peasant in the results of his labor, but on non-economic coercion. Each peasant was obliged to perform a certain amount of work on the collective farm. For non-compliance with this norm, prosecution was threatened, as a result of which the collective farmer could be deprived of his liberty or, as a measure of punishment, his personal plot was taken away from him. It should be taken into account that it was this site that was the main source of livelihood for the collective farmer, from this site he received food for himself and his family, the sale of their surplus on the market was the only way to receive money. A collective farm member did not have the right to move freely around the country; he could not leave his place of residence without the consent of the head of the collective farm.

At the end of the 40s, a campaign was launched to enlarge the collective farms, which at first seemed a reasonable and reasonable measure, but in fact turned out to be only a stage on the path of turning the collective farms into state-owned agricultural enterprises. The situation in agriculture made it much more difficult to supply the population with food and raw materials for light industry. With an extremely limited diet of the population of the Soviet Union, the government exported grain and other agricultural products abroad, especially to the countries of central and southeastern Europe, which began to "build socialism."

As for the study of the Cold War and its consequences for Soviet society, these problems were not raised at that time either.

What sources have become available to historians in recent years?

Of particular value are the documents of the personal fund of I. V. Stalin, which absorbed not only his correspondence, but also all the main decisions of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers of the USSR - the key institutions of state power. The authors studied the medical history of the leader, which reveals the pages of the history of power, the political struggle in the highest spheres of the party and state leadership in the first post-war years, inaccessible to the researcher.

In the State Archive of the Russian Federation (SARF), the authors studied the documents of the highest bodies of state power - the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR, a number of ministries. Great help in the work on the monograph was provided by the documents of the "special folders" of I. V. Stalin, L. P. Beria, V. M. Molotov, N. S. Khrushchev, which contain especially important materials on domestic and foreign policy.

In the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the authors studied numerous cases with the protocols of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, and a number of departments (f. 17). A special place was occupied by documents from the funds of I. V. Stalin (f. 558), A. A. Zhdanov (f. 77), V. M. Molotov (f. 82), G. M. Malenkov (f. 83), containing unique documents and materials on key issues of domestic and foreign policy.

A special place was occupied by the documents of Stalin's correspondence with the top party leadership during his vacations of 1945–1951. It is these documents and working materials to them that make it possible to trace what has so far been inaccessible to researchers - the mechanisms for making key political decisions in matters of domestic and foreign policy.

The memoirs of participants in the events of those years - V. M. Molotov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. S. Khrushchev, S. I. Alliluyeva, I. S. Konev, A. G. Malenkov, S. L. Beria, P. K. Ponomarenko, N. S. Patolicheva and others.

The authors believe that methodologically unjustified is the conclusion, traditional for the literature of previous years, that the main content of the first post-war period was "the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR during the Fourth Five-Year Plan". The main thing was something else - the stabilization of the political regime, which managed during the war years not only to survive, but also to noticeably grow stronger. At the same time, the lack of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of supreme power inevitably led to an intensification of the struggle for power between various groups and specific individuals. This is especially clearly seen in the period under study, when the aging leader increasingly sent former favorites into disgrace and put forward new ones. Therefore, when studying the mechanisms of power in 1945-1953. we proceeded from the fact that, along with constitutional and statutory bodies, it is necessary to carefully study those that were not officially stipulated anywhere, but played a key role in making the most important decisions. These were the "fives", "sevens", "nines" within the Politburo in 1945-1952. and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952–1953. Using concrete examples and documents, the monograph shows how and why there were changes in the leadership of the country in 1946-1949, which can explain the rapid rise and no less rapid fall of the "Leningrad group", what are the reasons for the unsinkability of the Malenkov-Beria tandem. On the basis of the documents studied, the authors argue that only Stalin's death stopped a new wave of change in the top leadership in the spring of 1953. The circumstances of Stalin's last illness and death raise all the more questions, about which the book also gives a fundamentally new assessment based on previously completely closed documents.

The monograph gives a detailed description of the position of the USSR in the world that has changed after the war. The authors deviate from the assessment traditional for previous publications, according to which the West was the culprit of unleashing the Cold War. At the same time, they do not share the positions of those historians who blame the years of confrontation solely on the Stalinist leadership of the country. The documents show that the origins of the Cold War lie in the fundamentally different national interests of the USSR and Western countries, which took shape as early as the final stage of the Second World War. The divergence of positions of the allies was inevitable. It could only take other forms.

The monograph notes that 1947 became the turning point in East-West relations, after which the emphasis on military force in relations between the former allies became the main policy instrument. Stalin did not rule out a new war with the West (this time with the USA), who launched in the late 40s. large-scale military preparations for the coming clash.

The development of the country's economy was also subordinated to this main vector. The overmilitarization of almost all sectors of the economy could not but lead to an increase in disproportions in its development, and in the long term - to the collapse of the Soviet economic system based on non-economic coercion.

However, the entire second half of the 40s. passed under the sign of economic discussions and disputes in scientific circles and in the country's leadership on the question of the ways and direction of economic development. The limited use of material incentives to work was not ruled out. True, it should be noted that the use of market levers throughout Soviet history has never been of a strategic nature. They began to be applied in conditions when the traditional Soviet economic model did not give the proper return, and as the commodity market became saturated, they were also rapidly curtailed. The first post-war period was no exception. The emphasis planned by N. A. Voznesensky on light and food, and not heavy industry, did not take place (although, as follows from the documents, Voznesensky’s opponents Malenkov and others agreed with this approach, who later adopted this strategically correct slogan ).

The monograph shows that the stabilization of power during the war raised the question of the role and purpose of the official ideology in a different way, in which there has been a certain shift in emphasis. The public sentiment associated with the expectation of changes for the better has also changed significantly.

This work, of course, does not pretend to reflect the diversity of materials and points of view on the post-war USSR that are available today. Each of the subjects and directions raised in it can become the topic of a specific special historical study.

We would like to express our gratitude to the archivists S. V. Mironenko, T. G. Tomilina, K. M. Anderson, G. V. Gorskaya, V. A. Lebedev, A. P. Sidorenko, N. A. Sidorov and etc. We are very grateful for the useful and qualified advice that influenced our work on the book, well-known scientists - A. O. Chubaryan, V. S. Lelchuk, N. B. Bikkenin.

Exactly 100 years ago, on November 7, 1917, the Great October Socialist Revolution took place.

For the first time in world history, a working man threw off the shackles of oppression and exploitation that had weighed on him for millennia, his interests and needs were placed at the center of state policy. The Soviet Union has achieved truly world-historic successes. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet people built socialism, defeated fascism in the Great Patriotic War, and turned our Motherland into a powerful state.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was economically backward and dependent on advanced capitalist states. The national wealth of the country (per inhabitant) was 6.2 times less than the USA, 4.5 times less than England, 4.3 times less than France, and 3.5 times less than Germany. The gap in the economic development of Russia and the advanced states increased. Its industrial production in relation to the USA in 1870 was approximately 1/6, and in 1913 - only 1/8.

Being the greatest power in terms of territory and natural resources, the country ranked only fifth in the world and fourth in Europe in terms of industrial production.

In the agrarian sector, Russia was an ocean of small peasant farms (20 million) with primitive technology and manual labor.

“Russia was ruled after the revolution of 1905 by 130,000 landowners, they ruled through endless violence against 150 million people, through boundless mockery of them, forcing the vast majority to hard labor and a half-starved existence” (V.I. Lenin).

In pre-revolutionary Russia, there were a total of 91 higher educational institutions, 177 theaters, 213 museums, and 77,767 churches.

“Such a wild country in which the masses of the people would be so robbed in terms of education, light and knowledge - there is not one such country in Europe, except for Russia” (V.I. Lenin).

The First World War put the country on the brink of disaster. Industry fell by 1/3, the grain harvest was reduced by 2 times. Only the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and landowners and its transfer into the hands of the working people could save the country from destruction.

The victory of October opened up grandiose creative prospects for the young Soviet state. The people took over the main means of production. The land was nationalized (peasants received more than 150 million hectares of land free of charge), plants, factories, all the bowels of the country, banks, sea and river transport, and foreign trade.

The Russian economy, undermined by the imperialist war, was severely ruined by the civil war and foreign intervention unleashed by the overthrown classes of landlords and capitalists.

By the end of the civil war, large-scale industry produced almost 7 times less products than in 1913. In terms of coal, oil and iron production, the country was thrown back by the end of the 19th century. Compared with 1917, the size of the working class has more than halved.

The Soviet country, which fought for 7 years, suffered enormous destruction, in a short time by 1926 managed to restore the pre-war level of the national economy.

Entering a period of peaceful development, the Land of Soviets began to implement the tasks of building socialism.

IN AND. Lenin said on the eve of October:

"Either death, or catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries."

I.V. Stalin said that Russia was constantly beaten for its backwardness - industrial, agricultural, cultural, military and state. Such is the wolfish law of the exploiters - to beat the backward and weak, to rob and enslave them.

The construction of socialism began under extremely difficult conditions for the young Soviet Republic.

“We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we will do it, or they will crush us ”(I.V. Stalin).

It was necessary to overcome this backlog in the shortest possible time, relying only on our own strengths and resources.

Industrialization became a vital task of the country. A course was set for the accelerated pace of development of heavy industry.

During the years of the Stalin five-year plans, the following number of large industrial enterprises were built and reconstructed on a new technical basis: in the first five-year plan (1929 - 1932) - 1,500, in the second five-year plan (1933 - 1937) - 4,500, in three and a half years of the third five-year plans (1938 - the first half of 1941) - 3,000.

These were five-year plans for the construction of factories, representing a new technical basis for the reconstruction of the entire national economy. These were the five-year plans for the creation of new enterprises in agriculture - collective farms and state farms, which became the lever for the organization of all agriculture.

In the period after the victory of October and before the start of the Great Patriotic War, 11,200 large industrial enterprises were built and restored. Mechanical engineering and metalworking, the chemical and petrochemical industry, and the electric power industry, which play a key role in the industrialization of the country and strengthening its defense potential, developed especially rapidly.

History has never seen such a pace of development. Socialism has liberated dormant productive forces and given them a powerful forward vector of development.

The development of the national economy of the USSR in 1940 compared with 1913 is characterized by the following data: the national income increased by 5.3 times, the volume of industrial output - by 7.7 times, including in machine building - 30 times, in the electric power industry - 24 times, in the chemical industry - 169 times, in agricultural production - 14 times.

The growth rates of the industry of the USSR significantly outstripped those of the leading capitalist states. If industrial production in the USSR for the period from 1921 to 1939. increased by 24.6 times, then in the USA - 1.9 times, Great Britain - 1.7 times, France - 2.0 times, Germany - 2.2 times.

The growth rate of heavy industry during the years of Stalin's five-year plans ranged from 20 to 30 percent per year. In the 12 years from 1929 to 1940, the output of heavy industry increased 10 times. No country in the world has known such a breakthrough in its development.

Domestic industry was the basis for the transfer of small-scale peasant farming to the path of large-scale collective production. In a short time, more than 210 thousand collective farms and 43 thousand state farms were organized, about 25 thousand state machine and tractor stations were created. By the end of 1932, state farms and collective farms owned 78 percent of the country's sown area. They gave 84 percent of marketable grain. In the years of the first five-year plan alone, sown areas were increased by 21 million hectares.

Technical equipment of agriculture in 1928 - 1940 characterized by the following data: the fleet of tractors increased 20 times (from 27 to 531 thousand), the fleet of grain harvesters - up to 182 thousand, the fleet of trucks - up to 228 thousand units. During the Great Patriotic War, collective farms and state farms uninterruptedly supplied the army and cities with food, and industry with raw materials.

The Soviet Union has become an industrial power and a country of large-scale advanced agriculture.

As a result of the reforms, unemployment, which is the scourge of the working people in the capitalist countries, was forever eliminated.

cultural revolution put an end to the almost universal illiteracy of the working people of Russia and created the starting conditions for the transformation of the USSR into the most cultured, educated and reading country in the world.

In 1897, the proportion of illiterates among the adult population was 71.6%, in 1926 - 43.4%, in 1939 - 12.6%. Illiteracy in the USSR was completely eliminated in the first years after the Great Patriotic War.

In 1913, only about 290 thousand people had higher and secondary specialized education. These were representatives of the privileged elite. Among the workers and peasants, there were practically no persons with a secondary education, and even more so with a higher education. And by 1987, out of 1,000 workers, 861 people had higher and secondary education, out of 1,000 collective farmers - 763. If in 1926 2.7 million people were employed in mental labor, then in 1987 - more than million

During the period of Soviet society, including from 1937 to 1939, there was a steady increase in the population in all regions of the USSR. Thus, from 1926 to 1937 the country's population increased by 11.2 million people, i.e. increased by more than 1.1 million per year. It grew at a faster rate from 1937 to 1939 - an average annual increase of 1.5 million people.

Such a rapid growth of the population of the USSR more convincingly than any other statistics refutes the speculation about the millions of people repressed in the so-called years of repression.

Clouds of imminent war began to thicken over the country. Thanks to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union received time, redirected resources to military needs, created and put into production the latest weapons.

The peaceful creative development of the USSR was interrupted by the perfidious attack of fascist Germany.

Poland was defeated in 35 days, France - in 44 days, Denmark - in a day. The Soviet Union staunchly defended and advanced for 1,418 days and broke the back of fascism.

The German economy was boosted by US and British investment. The economic potential of all Western Europe worked for Germany. And the Soviet Union fought with its own forces and resources. During the war years, all external deliveries to the USSR amounted to only 4% of domestic production, for artillery - 1.5%, for tanks and self-propelled guns - 6.3%, for aviation - about 10% and for grain - 1.6%.

The Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses - about 25 million people, primarily because 18 million people ended up in the death camps, of which 11 million people were killed by the Nazi executioners. More than one million Soviet soldiers gave their lives in the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia. Losses of the USA - about 300 thousand people, Great Britain - 370 thousand, France - 600 thousand.

The advantages of the socialist economic system were most clearly manifested during the war years. Suffice it to cite the fact that in the shortest possible time at the beginning of the war, more than 1.5 thousand enterprises, 145 universities, dozens of research institutes were evacuated from the occupied regions to the East and put into operation.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union quickly heals the wounds inflicted by the war and occupies one of the leading places in the world economy.

In the post-war period, the Soviet state carried out a number of unprecedented reforms. The ruble is untied from the dollar and transferred to a gold basis, there is a seven-fold decrease in retail prices for consumer products with a simultaneous increase in wages, which leads to a significant real increase in the well-being of the people.

In 1954, state retail prices for foodstuffs were 2.6 times lower than the prices of 1947, and for non-food products - 1.9 times.

The powerful economic potential created during the Stalin period charged the Soviet Union with sustainable development for the next decades.

The rates of development of the USSR economy for 1966-1985 were as follows: the growth of national income - 3.8 times, the volume of industrial production - 4.3 times, agricultural - 1.8 times, investment - 4.1 times, real incomes - 2.6 times, foreign trade - 4.7 times, the production of consumer goods increased almost 3 times.

As a result of Kosygin's market reforms, the growth rates of the USSR economy are significantly reduced compared to the growth rates of the Stalinist model of the economy and are approaching the level of capitalist countries. Thus, the average annual growth rate of industrial output in the USSR in the prewar years (1928 - 1940) was 16.8%, in the years of the postwar fifth five-year plan (1951 - 1955) - 13.1%, and in the years of the Kosygin reforms they sharply decrease by 2 - 4%. times, in the period 1971 - 1975. - up to 7.4%, in the period 1976 - 1980. - up to 4.4% (for comparison: in the USA - 5.1%), in 1981 - 1985. - up to 3.7% (in the USA - 2.7%).

Kosygin's reforms led to a significant slowdown in scientific and technological progress and a decrease in the growth rate of labor productivity. During the years of the Stalinist five-year plans, labor productivity in industry grew by an average of 10.8% per year, and during the years of the Kosygin reforms, the rates fall to 5.8 - 6.0% (1966 - 1975) and 3.1 - 3.2 % (1976 - 1985).

Despite this, in the years called "stagnant" by liberals and foreign Sovietologists, the growth rates of the USSR economy outstripped or were at the level of the growth rates of the leading countries of the world. Average annual growth rates of national income for 1961 - 1986 in the USSR amounted to 5.5% and per capita - 4.9%, in the USA - 3.1 and 2.1%, in the UK - 2.3 and 2.7%, in Germany - 3.1 and 3, 4%, in Italy - 3.6 and 3.1%, in Japan - 6.6 and 5.5%, in China - 5.5 and 4.1%.

Thus, the Soviet Union had a powerful economy, provided with all kinds of resources sufficient to meet all the challenges of the time.

If the share of the USSR in world industrial production in 1913 was a little more than 4%, then in 1986 it was 20% (from the US level - more than 80%). In 1913, industrial production per capita in Russia was 2 times less than the world average, and in 1986 it was 3.5-4 times more.

By 1985, the USSR occupied all the first places in Europe in terms of the level of production of the main types of products of industry, agriculture, transport and communications. In many positions, the USSR occupies the first places in the world, yielding in some positions to the USA and a number of other countries.

In world culture, the USSR takes a leading position. In terms of the number of school and university students, including engineering specialties, the number of cinemas, and the circulation of newspapers and books, the USSR ranks first in the world.

As a result of the defeat of the bloc of fascist states by the forces of the Soviet Union, socialism is being transformed into a world system. The potential of the economy of the socialist countries by the beginning of the 80s. approaching the level of the potential of the capitalist countries. The socialist countries covered more than 40% of world industrial production. The output of the socialist countries was more than three-fourths of that of the developed capitalist countries.

The national wealth of the USSR during the years of Soviet power increased by more than 50 times in comparison with 1913. About 20% of all fuel and energy resources of the world were concentrated on the territory of the USSR. In the USSR, almost all the elements contained in the periodic system of Mendeleev were mined. The USSR occupied the first place in terms of forest areas and hydropower resources.

It is no coincidence that I.V. Stalin warned in 1937 that “Having these successes, we have turned the USSR into the richest country and at the same time into a tasty morsel for all predators who will not calm down until they try all measures to grab something from this piece.”

In the USSR, the entire national income was used to improve the well-being of the working people and develop the national economy. Four-fifths of the national income was directed to the people's welfare, including housing and socio-cultural construction. The following were provided in the USSR: free education, free medical care, free housing, decent pensions, scholarships for students, payment for annual holidays, free and reduced-price vouchers to sanatoriums and rest homes, free maintenance of children in preschool institutions, etc. The rent was only 3% of the population's budget. Retail prices remained at a stable level with wage growth. In the USSR, the right to work was really guaranteed, everyone had to work.

There is nothing like it in the capitalist countries.

In the United States, the wealthiest 1% of families own wealth that is almost one and a half times the combined income of the 80% of families at the bottom of the social pyramid. In the UK, 5% of the owners own 50% of the country's wealth. In "prosperous" Sweden, the income of 5% of families is equal to the income of 40% of families at the bottom of the social ladder.

After the collapse of the USSR, the country's economy faced a catastrophe. The country was plundered by the mafia bourgeoisie that came to power.

In modern Russia, 62% of its wealth falls on the share of dollar millionaires, 29% - on the share of billionaires.

In the last year alone, the wealth of Russia's 200 richest people has increased by $100 billion. The top Russian billionaires own $460 billion, twice the annual budget of a country of 150 million people.

During the period of capitalist reforms, more than two-thirds of the country's enterprises and entire advanced science-intensive sectors of the national economy were destroyed.

The volume of industrial production in Russia decreased by 62%, in mechanical engineering - by 77.5%. In light industry in 1998, the output amounted to only 8.8% of the 1990 level. The decline in the fuel and energy complex - by 37%, oil production - by 47%, gas industry - by 9.1%. Ferrous metallurgy decreased by 55%, non-ferrous metallurgy - by 30%, chemistry and petrochemistry - by 62.2%, timber, woodworking and pulp and paper - by 69.1%, building materials - by 74.4%, food - by 64.1%.

The share of companies with foreign capital now stands at 56% in mining, 49% in manufacturing, and 75% in communications.

Russia is once again losing its economic independence and falling under the pressure of the leading imperialist states. Only the country's oil and gas resources, as well as the advanced military and nuclear technologies of the Soviet Union period, are pulling the country back from the brink.

The destruction of the country's economy took place in accordance with the law of the correspondence of productive forces and production relations. The forcibly introduced private capitalist ownership of tools and means of production destroyed the country's common national economic ties and led to the collapse of a great power unprecedented in history.

Just like 100 years ago, in order to save the country, our people are faced with the task of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie and transferring power to the working class.

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