Battle of Kursk commanders-in-chief. Kursk Bulge: the battle that decided the outcome of the Great Patriotic War

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We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material on the loss of equipment in our and German units. With us, they were significantly higher, especially in the battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the loss suffered by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army, was engaged, created by the decision of Stalin, a special commission chaired by Malenkov. In the report of the commission, in August 1943, fighting Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka are called a model of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact, by no means victorious. In this regard, I want to bring you several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov's report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although she sins in places against the truth, she nevertheless deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the battle of Prokhorov won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to full texts which are listed at the end of the article.

29th Panzer Corps :

“The attack began without artillery processing of the occupied line by the pr-com and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from a place . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable for its ruggedness, the presence of impassable for tanks hollows northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to cuddle up to the road and open their flanks, unable to cover them.

Separate units that pulled ahead, approaching even the svh. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. From 13.00, cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the release of tanks to the front line of defense, pr-ka from the forest with / z. GUARD and east. env. STOROGEVOE pr-k opened heavy fire from ambush tanks "Tiger", self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Parts pr-ka supported a large number aviation and tanks launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front edge of the pr-ka, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks and even breaking ahead of the tanks, had losses from anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action).

18th Panzer Corps :

"Enemy artillery fired intensely at the battle formations of the corps.
The corps, not having proper support in fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense bombardment from the air (by 12.00 enemy aircraft had made up to 1500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the zone of action of the corps is crossed by three deep ravines, passing from the left bank of the river. PSEL to the railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the tank brigades advancing in the first echelon 181, 170 were forced to act on the left flank of the corps strip near a strong enemy stronghold of the temporary storage warehouse. OCTOBER. 170 brigade, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat materiel.

By the end of the day, from the KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE area, the enemy launched a frontal tank attack with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the KOZLOVKA, POLEGHAEV direction, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Fulfilling the assigned task, the 18th tank met a well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with tanks and assault guns dug in advance at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.

To avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.

"The car is on fire"

The battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a wrecked Soviet T-34

Shot down near Belgorod T-34 and the dead tanker

T-34 and T-70 shot down during the Battle of Kursk. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battles for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 "For Soviet Ukraine" near Belgorod. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70s and BA-64s from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL. SECRET
Ex. No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE USSR - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army met with exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all, there were T-V ("Panther") tanks on the battlefield, a significant number of T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Commanding tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in terms of armor and weapons.

Armament, armor and fire aiming of German tanks became much higher and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, greater saturation tank units artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully use the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good aiming devices in German tanks puts our tanks in a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure is increasing.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, using the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans, with their tank units, go over, at least temporarily, to the defensive, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the aiming range of their tank guns, being at the same time almost completely out of reach of our aimed tank fire. .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, no longer experience their former tank fear on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to engage in tank combat, as they are more than easily destroyed by German tank fire..

We have to state with bitterness that our tank equipment, with the exception of the introduction of self-propelled guns SU-122 and SU-152, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that took place on the tanks of the first production, somehow: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower, exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation are not completely eliminated today.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, is steadily advancing, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately this cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost their first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests conducted by the Germans of our KV and T-34 tanks.

As a result of these tests, the instruction was written, approximately, as follows: German tanks cannot conduct tank battles with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank battles. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another sector of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other branches of the armed forces, and if they did, then with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more advanced tank T-V, "Panther"), which in fact is a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way qualities is significantly higher than the T-34 tank, and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I give the following table:

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a much higher muzzle velocity.

As an ardent patriot of the tank forces, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and, with all acuteness, raise the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design design of the existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his wrecked tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot on this in terms of tank recovery. At the same time, in those cases when the field of tank battles remains with the enemy for a certain period, our repairmen instead of their wrecked tanks find shapeless piles of metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our wrecked tanks.

TROOP COMMANDER
5 GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK TROOPS -
(ROTMISTROV) Signature.

active army.
=========================
RTsHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 9027s, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the stunning losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that about a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm gun 20K model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks on the field near Prokhorovka had nothing to catch at all (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up at close range and working in the "woodpecker" mode ... if you persuade the German tankers to look the other way; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you are lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, for which, in fact, they were created.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received replenishment literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, the untrainedness of both directly ordinary tankers and junior / middle-level commanders. Even in this suicidal attack, better results could have been achieved by observing a competent formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a bunch. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrously inefficient work of repair and evacuation teams. It was generally very bad with this until 1944, but in this case, 5 TA simply failed on a large scale. I don’t know how many were at that moment in the state of the BREM (and whether they were even in those days in its battle formations - they could have forgotten in the rear), but they did not cope with the work. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front) in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka writes: “when retreating, the enemy, by specially created teams, evacuates his wrecked tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including our tanks and our material part, burns and undermines. As a result, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future "(RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control.

The point is also that the German reconnaissance aircraft had previously opened the approach to Prokhorovka of the formations of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, the Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank defense on the left flank of the division " Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going after repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, to go on the counteroffensive themselves and surround the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS TC, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, 18 and 29, the most powerful German PTOPs had to be attacked head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tankers repulsed the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from a place.

In my opinion, the best thing Rotmistrov could do in such a situation is to try to insist on the cancellation of the July 12 counterattack near Prokhorovka, but no traces of him even trying to do this have been found. Here, the difference in approaches is especially clear when comparing the actions of the two commanders of the tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, I’ll clarify - Katukov’s 1 tank army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander orders a counterattack by the 1st Panzer Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that in the conditions of the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. the best way combat is a maneuverable defense with the help of tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

"Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing something completely wrong. As expected, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours are burning and smoking.

It was necessary, by all means, to achieve the abolition of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report my thoughts to him. But as soon as he crossed the threshold of the hut, the head of communications in some especially significant tone reported:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without emotion I picked up the phone.

Hello Katukov! said a well-known voice. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

In my opinion, - I said, - we hurried with the counterattack. The enemy has large unused reserves, including tank ones.

What are you offering?

For the time being, it is advisable to use tanks for firing from a place, burying them in the ground or setting them in ambushes. Then we could let the enemy's vehicles within a distance of three hundred or four hundred meters and destroy them with aimed fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

Well, - he said - you will not counterattack. Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and the day of July 6 became the "blackest day" for the 4th German Panzer Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (for the most part in their own formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out and destroyed tank). Thus, Katukov's tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw conclusions and on July 8 issues a new order to conduct a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 TC, 2 Guards TC, 5 TC and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which irrevocably - 17. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 is becoming the "blackest day" for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but at least it was worth a try!

At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlawful to limit the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, south-west of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the formed bag in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to abandon technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve a very significant tactical success, weakening 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and depriving 69 A of combat capability for some time. After July 12, the German side actually attempted to encircle and inflict maximum damage on Soviet troops withdraw their forces to the former front line). After that, the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines occupied by them until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but rather gradually withdraw their forces (in particular, the Dead Head division actually began to withdraw as early as July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly sit on the Germans' tail and peck at the back of their heads.

One gets the impression that the command of the Voronezh Front had a poor idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from 5 to 18 July, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties, they lack data on the opposing enemy, his composition and intentions, there is not even approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given "over the head" of lower-ranking commanders, and the latter were not made aware of this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were performing some incomprehensible actions.

So there is nothing surprising that sometimes indescribable mess reigned in the parts:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps attacked the Soviet 285th rifle regiment of the 183rd rifle division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the fighters and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the designated regiment (total: 25 people were killed and 37 were wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) did not have accurate information about the location of their own and the Germans and did not send reconnaissance forward (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment on the move opened fire on the combat formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending themselves from the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having passed with a fight through their own, the regiment stumbled upon the advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery following the front line behind the same regiment (53rd Guards Tank Regiment) and just arrived at the scene, mistaking the 96th brigade tanks for German ones, pursuing the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to happy accident.

Well, and so on ... In the order of the commander of the 69th army, all this was described as "these outrages." Well, to put it mildly.

So it can be summarized that the Germans won the battle of Prokhorov, but this victory was a special case against a general negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (as Manstein insisted), but not for defense. And it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began on the part of the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (taken by the German command of the OKH ground forces as an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts really went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became much more difficult for the Germans, where on July 10 the Americans and the British landed. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered to stop Operation Citadel due to the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the dispatch of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution, despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not explicitly ordered to withdraw troops, but was prohibited from using his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon, 24 TC was already repelling the offensive of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS TC was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd TC in order to eliminate the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and the combination of circumstances that were developing everywhere in July 1943, not in favor of Germany, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but talking about purely military victory Soviet army in the Battle of Kursk wishful thinking. "

The Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad. where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.

The main idea of ​​the "Citadel" was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled guns. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the general staff of the Soviet army developed a plan aimed at the liberation of the Russian troops and the defense of the battle.

Own interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk Bulge, the battle received due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.

To change the course of the Great Patriotic War and decide the fate of Russian cities such as Orel and Belgorod was entrusted to the armies "Center", "South" and the task force "Kempf". Detachments of the Central Front were put on the defense of Orel, and the Voronezh Front - on the defense of Belgorod.

Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the defeat of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel region, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Fronts, switching to Operation Kutuzov. In three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Nazi group was liquidated by the Central Front. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and thus were driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.

The results of the Battle of Kursk (briefly).

• a sharp turn in the course of events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the Nazis failed to pull off their operation "Citadel", at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
• the fascists were morally suppressed, all confidence in their superiority was gone.

Significance of the Battle of Kursk.

After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative in its own hands and continued to advance to the West, while freeing Russian cities.

A nation that forgets its past has no future. So once said the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In the middle of the last century, "fifteen sister republics", united by "Great Russia", inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of mankind - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be smashed at all frontiers. A purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. Since that time, the Nazis have forgotten what it means "forward to the East."

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander by the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the weapons of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.

Battle disposition

The advance of the Red Army after Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from the North Caucasus, the Don, the Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of the spring of 1943, the front had stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, in the direction of the Nazi army, a ledge stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought a lull to the front: no one attacked, both sides forcedly accumulated forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation of Nazi Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. "Under arms" were 9.5 million people (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on Soviet-German front.

The Führer was eager to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, was to occur precisely on that sector of the front, where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation "Citadel". The plan envisaged the application of attacks converging to Kursk (from the north - from the region of the city of Orel; from the south - from the region of the city of Belgorod). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts fell into the "cauldron".

Under this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this sector of the front, incl. 16 armored and motorized, in total numbering 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this grouping, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the military talent of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. Together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, he reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future battlefield, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy grouping.

On the front line, the Nazis were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and the Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) total strength 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As you can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, behind the listed fronts, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

The control and coordination of the actions of this group was carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

tactical battle plan

The idea of ​​Marshal Zhukov assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A bridgehead in depth (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the distance "Moscow - Vladivostok". It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of the initiative, making the task of the attackers as easy as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: the operation "Kutuzov" with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of "Eagle". Second: "Commander Rumyantsev" for the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place from the Soviet side "on defense". For offensive operations, as tactics teach, two or three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It so happened that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve of the German sappers began to make passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence started a fight with them and took prisoners. From the "tongues" it became known the time of the offensive: 03-00 07/05/1943

The reaction was prompt and adequate: On July 5, 1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (Commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. It was an innovation in combat tactics. Hundreds of Katyushas, ​​600 guns, 460 mortars were fired at the invaders. For the Nazis, this was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only at 4-30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5-30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

The beginning of the battle

Of course, our generals could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and the Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, the commander was General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoye (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for a day.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between the two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the attack front: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. They were followed by from fifty to a hundred Panther medium tanks, accompanied by infantry. Driven back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were like the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

Let's follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about the German tactics of tank combat. The Kursk Bulge (this must be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel-General Herman Goth, he "jewellery", so to speak about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of business. The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly on the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, came the blow of the Army Group "South", commanded by the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was dismissed).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rotmistrov P.A.) and the 5th Guards Army (Commander Zhadov A.S.)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions "Dead Head" and "Leibstandarte" the direction of the strike was changed to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle from the German side, 850 from ours. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was such that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, from which the towers turned off. Coming to the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks flared with torches. The tankers were, as it were, in prostration - while he was alive, he had to fight. It was impossible to retreat, to hide.

Of course, it was unreasonable to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses one to five, what would they be like during the offensive?!). At the same time, real heroism was shown by Soviet soldiers on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In our time, the day of its end - August 23 - is annually met by residents of the country as Russia.

Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the way to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, a fierce clash of huge masses of troops took place with the involvement of the most modern military equipment at that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. On the part of the Wehrmacht, more than 100 divisions participated in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions that were on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in World War II. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk put it in front of a catastrophe.».

The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943

Especially heavy defeats were inflicted on the tank formations of the Nazis. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:

« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, due to the large losses in people and equipment on long time were disabled. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive operations on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question ... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy ...».

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments on the article)

The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the command of the Wehrmacht to find new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian V. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed operation "Citadel" was the beginning of the end of the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has not stabilized any more.».

The crushing defeat of the German fascist armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory near Kursk was the result of the great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. It was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)

Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" and " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", planes" Focke-Wulf-190A". They believed that the new weapons received by the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, aircraft, anti-tank artillery, which, in terms of their tactical and technical data, were not inferior, and often surpassed similar enemy systems.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metalworker, designer, engineer, and grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, tanker, artilleryman, pilot, sapper. feat of arms the soldier merged with the selfless work of the home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the combat successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. A great merit in the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.

was of great international importance. It had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, profitable terms for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Kursk directly influenced the plans of the Nazi command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. As early as June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden is well aware that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it.».

Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the grave consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected interior setting in Germany, on the morale of the German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust of the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler went on to further intensify repression to strengthen the "internal front". But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo, nor the colossal efforts of the propaganda machine of Goebbels could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the soldiers of the Wehrmacht.

near Kursk. Direct fire on the advancing enemy

Huge losses of military equipment and weapons made new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Involvement in the industry Agriculture and the transport of foreign workers whom Hitler's " new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.

After the defeat in Battle of Kursk German influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich intensified. The outcome of the Battle of Kursk, catastrophic for the fascist elite, predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced the supply of raw materials and materials " third reich».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the prestige of the Soviet Union even higher as the decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance from the Nazi plague to mankind.

victorious end of the Battle of Kursk intensified the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at the Kursk Bulge, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to come out even more resolutely with the demand for the speediest opening of a second front in Europe.

The successes of the Soviet Army were reflected in the position ruling circles USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt wrote in a special message to the head of the Soviet government: During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their perseverance, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences ... "

The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk the superiority of the Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.

The defense of the Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved their goals. The Soviet Army has enriched itself with experience in organizing a defense in depth, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as experience in decisive maneuvers of forces and means. Pre-established strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and in the counteroffensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War total depth the operational formation of fronts in defense reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy strikes, as well as the overall operational density of troops in the defense, have increased. The stability of the defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of the troops with military equipment and weapons.

Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrier detachments were more widely used.

Captured Germans after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

Captured Germans after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver by the second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, in the course of the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units, and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades were regrouped.

In the Battle of Kursk The Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive for the third time during the Great Patriotic War. If the preparation of the counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad proceeded in an atmosphere of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then conditions near Kursk were different. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet war economy and purposeful organizational arrangements in the preparation of reserves, the balance of forces already by the beginning of the defensive battle had developed in favor of the Soviet Army.

During the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops showed great skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. Right choice the moment of the transition from defense to counteroffensive, the close operational-strategic interaction of the five fronts, the successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this was of great importance to defeat the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.

In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up first-echelon strikes and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks by the Nazi troops.

The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of service. In defense, artillery was more resolutely massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which, in comparison with previous defensive operations, ensured the creation of higher operational densities. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 barrels, and the maximum was up to 250 barrels per kilometer of the front.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet tank troops successfully solved the most complex and diverse tasks both in defense and in the offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily for delivering counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved a greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.

During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used massively, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing the breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since in carrying out these tasks they suffered heavy losses. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was completed by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.

Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. AT Battle of Kursk more resolute massing of forces of front-line aviation and long-range aviation in the main directions was carried out, their interaction with the ground forces improved.

A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which ground attack and bomber aircraft continuously affected enemy groupings and objects, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally won strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

In the Battle of Kursk successfully passed the test organizational forms of military branches and special troops. Panzer armies new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations played an important role in winning the victory.

In the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the military school of the Nazis.

Bodies of the strategic, frontline, army and military rear have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support for the troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured the uninterrupted supply of troops with materiel and the timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.

The enormous scale and intensity of hostilities required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the period of the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, South-Western and left wing of the Western Fronts by rail 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other materiel were delivered from central bases and warehouses. By air 1828 tons of various supply cargoes were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.

The medical service of the fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuvering of the forces and means of medical and sanitary institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses that the troops suffered, many of the wounded already during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.

Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and conducting Operation Citadel used the old methods and methods that had become a template, which did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. Thus, the English historian A. Clark in work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction of the mass of tanks and infantry ... without due regard for the changed conditions, with the exception of a simple arithmetic increase in the corresponding components. The West German historian W. Görlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».

The reactionary bourgeois investigators of the Second World War made no small effort to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the command of the Wehrmacht, obscure its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel to lay on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. So, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel-General Halder, back in 1949, was at work "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ In order to overcome the great operational threat posed in the East, the commanders of the army groups and armies and military advisers to Hitler from the High Command of the Ground Forces unsuccessfully tried to direct him on the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of swordsmanship, consists in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of forces with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops ...».

The documents testify that miscalculations in the planning of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The intelligence service of the Wehrmacht also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.

The thesis that the offensive of the Nazi troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be regarded as a phenomenon of strategic importance.

AT last years works appeared in which a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events of the Battle of Kursk is given. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " the greatest land battle ever fought in history", and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary" goals. " History deeply doubts, the author writes, in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided near Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events.". The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, which notes that the Battle of Kursk " broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the course of World War II... Few outside of Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today, the Soviets are bitter as they see Western historians belittling the Russian triumph at Kursk.».

Why did the last attempt by the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative failed? The main reasons for the failure Operation Citadel the ever-growing economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy provided more military equipment and weapons than the industry of fascist Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.

But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by the Nazi political and military leaders. The underestimation of the possibilities of the Soviet Union and the overestimation of one's own forces were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.

From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise strike. Thanks to the precise work of all types of reconnaissance, including air, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations, could not be resisted by any defense. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded, the tanks cost huge losses only slightly wedged into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.

An important reason the collapse of Operation Citadel was the secrecy of the preparation of Soviet troops both for a defensive battle and for a counteroffensive. The Nazi leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In prepared July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for studying the armies of the East "Assessing the actions of the enemy during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of the Soviet troops going on a counteroffensive against the shock groups of the Wehrmacht.

The major miscalculations of Nazi intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the ground forces of the German army, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very fragmentary data about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.

In early July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and the possible decisions of the Soviet command were assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, in essence, from their previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.

In the battles near Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, steadfastness and mass heroism. communist party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Combat orders flashed on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the title of guards, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, Komsomol organizer of the battalion Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon commander senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad leader sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander junior sergeant A.I. Petrov, senior sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.

The victory of the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists carried away the fighters. The political organs took measures to preserve and replenish the party organizations in the subdivisions. This ensured continuous party influence on all personnel.

An important means of mobilizing soldiers for combat exploits was the promotion of advanced experience, the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battles. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with the announcement of gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed with the help of leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.

The increase in the morale of the Soviet soldiers, confidence in victory was facilitated by the timely information of the personnel about the events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, while actively working to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with the commanders, they held high the banner of the party, were the bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.

« giant battle on Oryol-Kursk Bulge summer 1943, - noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its shock armored troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily occupied by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces were increasingly deploying a general offensive.