European foreign policy in the 1930s stages of foreign policy

Double standards in foreign policy

Since its inception, the USSR has maintained double standards in foreign policy.

Remark 1

On the one hand, its leadership has always emphasized the peaceful nature of its policy, the desire to live in peace with all the peoples of the world, and on the other, it has always been emphasized that the USSR is surrounded by hostile imperialist, capitalist states, which must be fought until the new socialist build and reign communism.

The presence of double standards in foreign policy, as well as the refusal of the Soviet government to pay the debts of tsarist Russia to England, France, the USA, the nationalization of enterprises owned by citizens of these states on the territory of the USSR led to the fact that the Soviet Union was in international isolation for a long time. Only in 1922 did the USSR manage to establish a dialogue with Germany and conclude a profitable trade agreement in the city of Rapallo. In 1926, an agreement on friendship and neutrality was concluded between Germany and the USSR.

In 1924, the USSR was recognized by most European countries, China, and Japan. However, equal trade and economic agreements were concluded only with Afghanistan and Turkey. Only in 1933 was the USSR recognized by the United States, and in 1934 the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations (then analogue of the UN).

Peaceful politics and communist solidarity

In 1933 - 1938. The USSR pursued a predominantly peaceful foreign policy, trying to use the socialist and communist parties of other states for covert interference in their internal affairs. Seriously lagging behind the leading powers of the world in military equipment, the USSR called for the limitation of armaments in the world. The Union leadership was especially concerned about the growth of armies in Germany and Japan. In 1938, Germany captured Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Japan - most of China, Korea, Vietnam, and many islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Remark 2

In 1936, a civil war broke out in Spain. In it, the Soviet Union supported the supporters of the republic, and Germany and Italy supported the dictator Franco. At the request of the government of the Spanish Republic, the USSR sent planes, tanks, guns, mortars, etc. to Spain.

Military assistance to Franco's army was provided by Germany and Italy. On average, 10-12 thousand Germans and 40-45 thousand Italians were in combat every month. In total, more than 300 thousand foreign soldiers fought on the side of Franco, of which at least 50 thousand Germans, 150 thousand Italians, 90 thousand Moroccans, 20 thousand Portuguese, etc. Franco was supported by the Vatican. Since November 1936, the Luftwaffe Legion Condor unit, which had 250 Junkers-52 and Heinkel-51 aircraft, took part in the battles in Spain. On April 27, 1937, German pilots wiped out the Spanish town of Guernica.

The USSR sent about 3 thousand soldiers to Spain, about 200 of them died, 59 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 160 Soviet pilots fought in the skies of Spain. Volunteers of international brigades (42,000) fought on the side of the Republicans, having irrevocably lost at least 20,000 soldiers. On March 5, 1939, the Popular Front broke up, the government left the country. On March 30, the entire territory of the republic was occupied by the troops of the "caudillo" (leader) of General Franco. The war in Spain lasted 986 days.

The decisive factor in the defeat of the Republicans was the Italo-German intervention and the Anglo-French policy of "non-intervention". The delay in the creation of a regular army, as well as the geographical remoteness of the USSR from Spain, also played a role.

War with imperialist Japan in 1938-1939.

At the beginning of the summer of 1938, relations between the USSR and Japan deteriorated. In August 1938, battles took place between the Red Army and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, and the following year, near the river. Halkin Gol.

At the end of August 1939, the Japanese formed the 6th Army to invade Mongolia, led by General Ogisu Rippo. To repulse the invading Japanese, the 1st Army Group was formed, headed by commander commander G.K. Zhukov.

On Sunday, August 20, at 5:45 a.m., 153 Soviet bombers launched a preemptive strike against all positions of the Kwantung Army strike force. At 9 o'clock a general attack of the entire mass of Soviet and Mongolian troops began. On the night of August 21, having introduced reserves into battle, the Soviet troops closed the encirclement ring, cutting off the Japanese escape routes beyond the state border of Mongolia. The destruction of the enemy began. The attempts of the Japanese to release the encircled group were not successful. On August 31, the grouping of troops of the Kwantung Army ceased to exist.

Remark 3

The victory of the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol largely influenced Japan's decision not to cooperate with Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. This was reflected in 1941, when Japan did not support the aggression against the USSR.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the international situation changed significantly. The deep world economic crisis that began in 1929 caused serious internal political changes in all capitalist countries. In some (England, France, etc.), he brought to power forces that sought to carry out broad internal transformations of a democratic nature. In others (Germany, Italy), the crisis contributed to the formation of anti-democratic (fascist) regimes that used social demagoguery in domestic politics at the same time as unleashing political terror, forcing chauvinism and militarism. It was these regimes that became the instigators of new military conflicts (especially after A. Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933).

Hotbeds of international tension began to form at a rapid pace. One developed in Europe because of the aggressiveness of fascist Germany and Italy. The second in the Far East because of the hegemonic claims of the Japanese militarists.

Taking into account these factors, in 1933 the Soviet government defined new tasks for its foreign policy: refusal to participate in international conflicts, especially those of a military nature; recognition of the possibility of cooperation with democratic Western countries to contain the aggressive aspirations of Germany and Japan (policy of "appeasement"); struggle for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and the Far East.

In the first half of the 1930s, the USSR achieved further strengthening of its positions in the international arena. At the end of 1933, the United States recognized the Soviet Union and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. The normalization of political relations between the USA and the USSR had a favorable effect on their trade and economic ties. In September 1934 the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations and became a permanent member of its Council. In 1935, the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance were signed in case of any aggression against them in Europe.

However, in the mid-1930s, in the foreign policy activities of the Soviet leadership, there was a departure from the principle of non-intervention in international conflicts. In 1936, the USSR provided assistance to the government of the Popular Front of Spain with weapons and military specialists to fight General F. Franco. He, in turn, received broad political and military support from Germany and Italy. France and England remained neutral. The United States shared the same position, forbidding the Spanish government to purchase American weapons. The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939 with the victory of the Francoists.

The policy of "appeasement" pursued by the Western powers in relation to Germany, Italy and Japan did not produce positive results. International tensions intensified. In 1935, Germany moved its troops into the demilitarized Rhineland; Italy attacked Ethiopia. In 1936, Germany and Japan signed an agreement directed against the Soviet Union (the Anti-Comintern Pact). Relying on the support of Germany, Japan launched in 1937 a large-scale military operation against China.

Especially dangerous for the preservation of peace and security in Europe were the territorial claims of Nazi Germany. In March 1938, Germany carried out the Anschluss (attachment) of Austria. Hitler's aggression also threatened Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the USSR came out in defense of its territorial integrity. Based on the 1935 treaty, the Soviet government offered its assistance and moved 30 divisions, aviation and tanks to the western border. However, the government of E. Benes refused it and complied with the demand of A. Hitler to transfer to Germany the Sudetenland, populated mainly by Germans.

The Western powers pursued a policy of concessions to fascist Germany, hoping to create from it a reliable counterbalance against the USSR and direct its aggression to the east. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement (September 1938) between Germany, Italy, Britain and France. It legally formalized the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Feeling its strength, Germany in 1930 occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia.

In the Far East, Japan, having captured most of China, approached the Soviet borders. In the summer of 1938, an armed conflict took place on the territory of the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. The Japanese grouping was thrown back. In May 1939 Japanese troops invaded Mongolia. Parts of the Red Army under the command of G.K^TsKukov defeated them in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River.

At the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. However, Western states did not believe in the potential ability of the USSR to resist fascist aggression. Therefore, the negotiations were dragged out by them in every possible way. In addition, Poland categorically refused to guarantee the passage of Soviet troops through its territory to repel the alleged fascist aggression. At the same time, Great Britain established secret contacts with Germany in order to reach an agreement on a wide range of political problems (including the neutralization of the USSR in the international arena).

The Soviet government knew that the German army was already in full readiness to attack Poland. Realizing the inevitability of war and its unpreparedness for it, it sharply changed its foreign policy orientation and went towards rapprochement with Germany. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded in Moscow, which immediately entered into force and was designed for 10 years (Ribbentrop Molotov Pact). It was accompanied by a secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The interests of the Soviet Union were recognized by Germany in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Finland) and Bessarabia.

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Poland's allies Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured A. Hitler a quick victory. The second World War.

In the new international conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements of August 1939 on September 17, after the defeat of the Polish army by the Germans and the fall of the Polish government. The Red Army entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty "On Friendship and Border" was concluded, which secured these lands as part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the USSR insisted on concluding agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, gaining the right to deploy its troops on their territory. In these republics, in the presence of Soviet troops, legislative elections were held, in which the communist forces won. In 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the USSR.

In November 1939, the USSR began a war with Finland in the hope of quickly defeating it and creating a pro-communist government in it. There was also a military-strategic need to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the Soviet-Finnish border away from it in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Military operations were accompanied huge losses by the Red Army. They showed her poor preparedness. The stubborn resistance of the Finnish army was ensured by the deeply echeloned defensive "Mannerheim Line". Western states provided Finland with political support. The USSR, under the pretext of its aggression, was expelled from the League of Nations. At the cost of enormous efforts, the resistance of the Finnish armed forces was broken. In March 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR received the entire Karelian Isthmus.

In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union.

As a result, significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR. The border of the country moved in the west in different places to a distance of 300 to 600 km. The foreign policy agreements of 1939 helped to delay the German attack on the Soviet Union by almost two years.

The Soviet leadership made an agreement with fascist Germany, whose ideology and policy it had previously condemned. Such a turn could be carried out in the conditions of the state system, all the internal means of propaganda of which were aimed at justifying the actions of the government and forming a new attitude of Soviet society towards the Nazi regime.

If the Non-Aggression Pact, signed in August 1939, was to a certain extent a forced step for the USSR, then the secret protocol, the treaty "On Friendship and Border", other foreign policy actions of the Stalinist government, carried out on the eve of the war, did not take into account the interests of different states and peoples Of Eastern Europe.

Study of the foreign policy relations of the USSR in the 1930s, analysis and assessment of the "friends" and "enemies" of the state in those years. Consideration of the non-aggression pact and the Soviet-German treaty of 1939. The war with Finland, the definition of its role and significance for the country.

INTRODUCTION

In the history of Soviet diplomacy, there were and still are problems that, for a number of reasons, have not received proper coverage in Russian historiography. In particular, issues related to the design and implementation of the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet leadership in the 1930s remain insufficiently studied. The attention of most researchers is drawn to the problem of Soviet-German relations in the 20-30s, as well as to the tense international situation that developed on the eve of the Second World War. Quite strong in assessing the actions of Soviet diplomacy in the 30s. is the influence of period stamps " cold war”, as, for example,“ the intrigues of the Comintern ”,“ the intrigues of Stalin and Hitler ”,“ collusion with the aggressor ”, etc. The works of L.N. Nezhinsky, L.A. Bezymensky, S.Z. Sluch, Z.S. Belousova, G.A. Bodyugov allow a fresh look at the mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making by the Soviet leadership in relation to the "capitalist encirclement".

The conditions for the emergence of the Soviet state in the framework of the world and civil wars, the active participation in this process of a significant number of foreign states, and the peculiarities of the Bolshevik ideology with priority in setting goals for global aspirations, largely determined the goals and means of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s. On the one hand, being a product of the world revolutionary crisis, Soviet Russia focused on resolving world problems, which manifested itself in the idea of ​​a "world socialist revolution." This line is most clearly seen in the active support and leadership of the Soviet leaders of the international communist organization - the Comintern. On the other hand, the USSR was the heir Russian Empire with its obvious national and state interests, the protection of which was a natural function of any state. The implementation of this function was part of the task of the political system of the USSR. Naturally, the greatest place in determining the means and methods of its solution belonged to the foreign policy department - the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID). It is also natural that the interests of the state and the goals arising from the ideas of the "world revolution" lay on different planes, often contradicting each other. Therefore, the foreign policy of the USSR turns out to be internally contradictory: the "Comintern" and "Kidov" lines in it are in a state of almost constant struggle. This term paper is a consideration of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s. The objectives of this course work:

1. Consider the foreign policy relations of the USSR in the 1930s.

2. Consider the "friends" and "enemies" of the USSR in the 30s.

3. Consider the non-aggression pact and the Soviet-German treaty of 1939.

4. Consider the war with Finland and determine its significance for the country.

1. Orientationforeign policyconnections of the young Soviet state1930 - Xgg.

The study of the features of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. cannot be considered outside the context of the late 20s. XX century. In the first half of the 1920s, the economic blockade of Russia by the capitalist countries was broken. In 1920, after the fall of Soviet power in the Baltic republics, the government of the RSFSR concluded Peace Treaties with the new governments of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, recognizing their independence and independence. Since 1921, the establishment of trade relations between the RSFSR and England, Germany, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Czechoslovakia began. The negotiating political process with England and France reached a deadlock. Using the contradictions of the leading European powers with Germany, the Soviet representatives in the town of Rapallo (near Genoa) concluded an agreement with her. The treaty resumed diplomatic and consular relations between the countries and thereby brought Russia out of diplomatic isolation.

In 1926, the Berlin Treaty of Friendship and Military Neutrality was signed. Germany, thus, became the main trade and military partner of the USSR, which made significant adjustments to the nature international relations for subsequent years. By 1924 Russia was recognized in Europe by Great Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden; in Asia by Japan, China, Latin America- Mexico and Uruguay. The US delayed recognition until 1933. In total for 1921-1925. Russia has concluded 40 agreements and treaties. At the same time, Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations were unstable. In 1927 there was a break in diplomatic relations with England. In 1924, diplomatic and consular relations were established with China, and in 1925 with Japan.

Russia managed to conclude a series of equal treaties with the countries of the East. In 1921, a Soviet-Iranian treaty, a Soviet-Afghan treaty and an agreement with Turkey were concluded. In the late 1920s Since the predominant development of Soviet-German relations, the efforts of Soviet diplomacy have been directed towards expanding contacts with other countries. In 1929 diplomatic relations with England were restored. 1933 became the year of recognition of the USSR by the United States of America, in 1933-1935 - by Czechoslovakia, the Spanish Republic, Romania, etc. Relations with China also aggravated, where an armed conflict broke out on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in 1929. Thus, at this stage, priority in foreign policy was given to the "Comintern" direction.

2. The main "friends" and "enemies" of the USSR in 30- egg.twentieth century

Let us dwell on the reasons that influenced foreign policy in the 1930s. Firstly, it was influenced by the fact that the USSR began to turn into a totalitarian state, in which the foundations of a command-administrative system were laid. In order to justify the inevitability of emergency measures within the country, the Stalinist leadership begins to whip up "military alarm" among the Soviet people, constantly talking about a military danger to the USSR. In the 1930s in the foreign policy activities of the Stalinist leadership, political priorities finally triumphed over economic ones. Secondly, the world economic crisis that broke out in 1929 not only aroused hopes for a world revolution, but also led to the strengthening of fascism, as well as to its coming to power in a number of countries. This circumstance seriously changed the alignment of forces in the international arena, led to the emergence of hotbeds of tension in Europe and Asia, and made the struggle for the creation of a collective security system particularly relevant. Soviet diplomacy had to do everything possible to avoid the involvement of the USSR in a military conflict and secure its borders. She continued to strive to prevent the rapprochement of the imperialist states on an anti-Soviet basis and, in case of favorable conditions, to increase the territories, primarily at the expense of the border states. Thirdly, from the second half of the 1930s. one can speak of a change in the policy of the Comintern. If in the first half of this decade the leaders of the Third International tried with all their might to kindle the fire of the world revolution, then after the 7th Congress of the Comintern (July-August 1935), they, realizing the real threat of fascism, concentrated on creating anti-fascist fronts within each of the countries.

Until the beginning of the 30s. Germany remained the main political and economic partner of the USSR in Europe. It was there that the main flow of Soviet exports went, and equipment for Soviet industry was supplied from it. German exports from the USSR stimulated the restoration of German heavy industry. In 1931, Berlin provided the USSR with a long-term loan of 300 million marks to finance imports from Germany. The share of Germany in the imports of the Soviet Union increased from 23.7% in 1930 to 46.5% in 1932. In 1931-1932. The USSR occupied the first place in the German export of cars (in 1932, 43% of all exported German cars were sold to the USSR).

With the appearance in Germany of the new Chancellor A. Hitler, who proclaimed a course of uncompromising anti-communism in domestic and foreign policy, the policy of cooperation between the USSR and Germany was completed. The Soviet side in a short time had to work out a different strategy than before for Soviet-German relations. It was necessary to determine the line of conduct of the Comintern and the entire Soviet people in relation to the Nazi government. The ratio of pragmatic (diplomatic) and ideological (communist) dominants did not allow, on the one hand, to openly recognize at the official level new mode authorities hostile to the USSR, on the other hand, to immediately abandon the formula of social fascism, thereby recognizing the erroneous strategy of the Comintern in the struggle "for the voices and souls of the German workers." Time was needed to prepare for a change in the strategy and tactics of Soviet diplomacy. Preparations in securing a new course by creating a favorable information space for this were entrusted by the Soviet leadership to the communist press. The NKID did not stand aside. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov personally demanded from the Politburo that all notes of protest by the Soviet side against the German government be published in Pravda and Izvestia. This largely explains the daily interest of the central Soviet press in the events that took place in Germany during the period under review.

In 1930-1931. sharply aggravated Soviet-French relations. The French government accused the USSR of interfering in the internal affairs of the country and financing subversive communist activities. It has been alleged that Moscow uses official representations to transfer funds and instructions to the communists. In 1930, the Parisian authorities seized the property of the Soviet trade mission, and the government imposed restrictions on the import of Soviet goods. At the end of 1931, relations began to improve. This was primarily due to the fact that the USSR sharply reduced financial assistance FKP, as well as the deterioration of the international situation in Europe. A manifestation of the improvement in Soviet-French relations was the conclusion in November 1932 of a non-aggression pact.

Since Germany began to be seen as a potential enemy of the USSR, it was especially important that in 1933 diplomatic relations were established with the United States. The USSR tried to create a system of collective security in Europe. He was admitted to the League of Nations, concluded military-political agreements with France and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude more serious agreements with Britain and France to curb the aggressor. The USSR understood the threat of war approaching the world and its unpreparedness for it. Therefore, the sincerity of his efforts should not be doubted. At the same time, Western countries condoned Germany in the remilitarization of the Rhineland, its participation in the civil war in Spain, which ended in the victory of fascism, in the Anschluss of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. At the end of the 30s. The USSR was forced to pay serious attention to the situation that was developing near its borders. For him, there was a real threat of war on two fronts. A bloc of aggressive states was taking shape in the world, which concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact among themselves. Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement with the leading states of this pact, Germany and Italy. The USSR continued to negotiate with the Western democracies for a military agreement, but in August 1939 it became clear that it would not be reached.

This was especially noticeable in the difference in positions on the issue of attitudes towards the civil war that broke out in 1936 in Spain. In the second half of the 1930s. dramatic events unfolded in Spain. After the victory in the elections of the Popular Front in February 1936, the right-wing forces, led by General Franco, revolted. Fascist states (Germany, Italy) actively helped the rebels. At first, the Soviet Union agreed with this policy and tried to stop the intervention of Italy and Germany in this conflict, but, convinced of the inefficiency of this activity, it began to provide significant economic, political military assistance to the Republicans, including sending regular troops under the guise of volunteers. In addition to Soviet volunteers, international brigades formed by the Comintern from anti-fascists from 54 countries fought on the side of the republican government. At the same time, the forces were still unequal. After the withdrawal of international units from Spain, the republican government fell.

In fact, despite the seemingly internal nature of the Spanish conflict, the first clash between the USSR and Nazi Germany took place here (the first assisted the Republicans, the second, together with Italy, to the rebellious General Franco). The remaining members of the League of Nations refused to intervene in the "internal conflict", which could not but raise doubts about their readiness to participate in any measures to deter aggression from the Soviet Union. If we add to this the defeat of the Republicans in the Spanish conflict, then the reasons for the beginning of the revision of the position of the USSR on the issue of choosing a side in the escalating world conflict become clear.

There was a real threat of breaking the balance of power in Europe and a world war. European diplomacy did not oppose this. She pursued a policy of appeasing the aggressor, i.e. tried, through concessions to Germany, to turn it into a reliable partner in international affairs, also sought to use Germany as a counterbalance to the foreign policy of the USSR, hoping that Germany's predatory aspirations would be directed to the East. The policy of appeasement culminated in the agreement in Munich (September 1938), which was attended by the heads of the governments of Germany, Italy, England and France. The most significant result of this meeting was the decision to annex the Sudetenland - an industrialized region of Czechoslovakia - to Germany. This was the maximum possible concession from England and France to Germany, but it only whetted Hitler's appetites. After Munich, the cooling of relations between England and France with Germany begins, and attempts are made to establish cooperation with the USSR.

Important events took place in the Far East. In July 1937, Japan launched a large-scale aggression against China. As a result of hostilities for two years, the Japanese army captured the main industrial and agricultural regions of China. In August 1937, the USSR and China signed a non-aggression pact, after which the Soviet Union undertook massive military supplies to China. Soviet instructors and volunteer pilots took part in the battles on the side of the Chinese army. Until 1939, the USSR provided active support to China, but after the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, assistance was sharply reduced, and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of April 13, 1941, it ceased almost completely.

There were armed clashes between units of the Red Army and the Japanese Kwantung Army. The reasons for these clashes were the growing tension between the two countries and the desire of each side to strengthen and improve its border line. At the same time, neither side managed to achieve a significant advantage, although the Red Army in both cases somewhat improved its position on the border.

The growth of Germany's aggression in Europe in the spring of 1939 nevertheless forced Britain and France to negotiate with the USSR. In April 1939, experts from the three countries for the first time began to consider draft treaties of mutual assistance in connection with the planned German aggression.

The positions of the negotiators were very far from each other, as each side sought to gain unilateral advantages (Western countries - to force the USSR to put up significantly more armed forces in the event of hostilities, and the Soviet Union - to increase its political influence in Poland, Romania and the Baltic states) . In addition, none of the partners wanted to take on an unequivocal obligation to enter the war in the event of hostilities against one of the possible allies. It was felt that the interlocutors were "negotiating for the sake of negotiations." Part of the explanation for this position was found after the end of the Second World War, when it became known that, simultaneously with these negotiations, the governments of England and France were trying to establish contacts with Germany and conclude an agreement with it. As for the Soviet side, here, too, priorities have changed since May 1939: on May 3, a supporter of the coalition with democratic countries M.M. Litvinov. His place was taken by V.M. Molotov, who considered it necessary to ally with Germany.

3. Non-Aggression Pact and the Soviet-German Dogothief "On friendship andborder" 1939G.

Considering the foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. XX century, the greatest attention should be paid to the development of diplomatic relations with Germany, which is justified primarily with the appearance in historical science of opinions about the preventive nature of the war of 1941-1945. from the German side.

Almost simultaneously with the start of negotiations with Britain and France, in the spring of 1939, Soviet diplomats began to cautiously probe German positions regarding a possible rapprochement. This met with a favorable attitude from Berlin, which realized that it had exhausted all the possibilities of concessions from the West and decided to continue loosening international system security already with the help of the East. Germany was especially active in order to further improve relations with the USSR. On August 19, 1939, the Soviet Union was granted a long-term loan of 200 million marks at a symbolic interest. The German government expressed its readiness to delimit the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR in Eastern Europe, and also guaranteed the cessation of hostilities against the Soviet Union by Japan. At the same time, Germany and the USSR continued to maintain close economic ties. From August 1939 to June 1941, the Soviet Union placed large orders in Germany for the manufacture and supply of military equipment, machine tools and industrial equipment. In turn, Germany ordered agricultural products, timber, oil products, industrial raw materials and non-ferrous metals from the USSR.

In the course of secret preliminary negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union, agreements were reached that led to the signing in Moscow on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and People's Commissar Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov non-aggression pact, a non-aggression pact for a period of 10 years. The treaty contained secret articles that demarcated the "spheres of interest" of Germany and the USSR in Eastern Europe. According to these articles, most of Poland was recognized as a German sphere of influence, and the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Lithuania fell into this sphere after Ribbentrop's next visit to Moscow on September 28, 1939, Eastern Poland, Finland, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovinca (part of Romania ) - the sphere of interests of the USSR. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which were part of Poland under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1920, were to pass to the USSR after the German military invasion of Poland.

The contracting parties agreed on non-intervention in the event of a conflict between one of them and a "third power". The conclusion of the Soviet-German pact led to the termination of all diplomatic contacts between Britain, France and the USSR, the withdrawal of the British and French military delegations from Moscow.

The treaty had far-reaching consequences for the destinies of all of Europe and the world. Undoubtedly, he hastened the outbreak of the Second World War, as he provided Hitler with freedom of action in Poland and even the moral support of the USSR. With the help of Germany, the Soviet Union hoped to return the territories taken from it by the Treaty of Riga (March 1921). Thus, by signing this treaty, the Soviet side sought not only to protect itself in case of war, but also to expand the territory.

So, when the German troops captured Warsaw and crossed the line specified in the secret protocol (along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers), on September 17 the Red Army entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. She was ordered to "cross the border and take under her protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." It was instructed to be loyal to the Polish military and government officials if they did not offer armed resistance. Aviation was forbidden to bombard settlements. The Red Army did not meet serious resistance here, since the main military forces of Poland were defeated by Hitler in the first days of September. The Polish command gave the order "not to engage in battles with the Soviets, to continue fighting with the Germans", so many units and formations surrendered. The further fate of most of them was tragic. A significant part of the military personnel was interned by the Soviet authorities, and the civilian population was deported to the eastern regions of the USSR (Siberia, Kazakhstan). By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted on March 5, 1940, 21,857 officers and other arrested Poles were shot in Katyn without trial or investigation.

The campaign lasted 12 days. During this time, units of the Red Army advanced 250-350 km to the west, annexing territories with a population of about 12 million people. We can talk about the restoration of historical justice, since these were primordially Russian lands, for which the Polish gentry had to fight for centuries. The local population as a whole warmly welcomed the Soviet troops, seeing them as liberators from the Polish genocide. But Ukrainian nationalists led by S. Bandera began to offer fierce resistance. In October 1939, elections to the people's assemblies were held here. These authorities immediately proclaimed Soviet power and turned to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to accept Western Ukraine and Western Belarus into the Soviet Union.

On September 28, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR and Germany signed an agreement on friendship and borders. Secret protocols and maps were attached to the agreement, according to which 48.6% of the territory of former Poland passed to Germany, and 51.4% to the USSR. According to the treaty, the western border of the Soviet Union now ran along the so-called Curzon Line, which was once recognized by England, France, the USA and Poland. But if the non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) can be justified by specific circumstances, then the signing of this treaty was in fact a conspiracy with the aggressor and did not reflect the will of the Soviet people. Having gained freedom of action in the Baltics, the Stalinist leadership attempts to sovietize it, both through diplomatic and military measures. The governments of these countries were offered to conclude mutual assistance pacts, which were signed on September 28 with Estonia, on October 5 with Latvia and on October 10 with Lithuania. As a result, the Soviet Union received the right to station its troops in the Baltic republics and to establish naval and air bases on their territories. The parties pledged to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of an attack or its threat. The clauses of the treaties were beneficial not only for the USSR. Lithuania, for example, received the territory of Vilna and the Vilna region with a population of about half a million people, among which Lithuanians made up no more than 20%. At the same time, trade agreements were signed on the supply of raw materials from the USSR, which compensated for the loss of ties with the West during the world war.

4. "Hfamous" war with Finland

Having secured his rear in the East, on October 9, 1939, Hitler signed a directive on preparations for an attack on France, and ten days later approved a plan for the strategic deployment of the German army to conduct offensive operations in the West (Plan Gelb). The spread of the fire of the world war forced, in turn, I.V. Stalin to think about the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR (the border with Finland passed in close proximity to Leningrad). In addition, he was not averse to implementing the agreements set out in the secret protocol to the treaty of August 23, 1939, on possible territorial and political changes in Finland. In October, the Soviet government offered Finland to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for the establishment of a Soviet military base on it and to exchange territories on the coast of the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for lands in Eastern Karelia. The Finnish side refused.

The concentration of Soviet troops began near the border with Finland. On November 26, 1939, in the area of ​​​​the village of Mainila, several Soviet soldiers were killed and wounded in firing practice. The Soviet side, using this incident, accused Finland of aggression and demanded to withdraw troops 20-25 kilometers from Leningrad. The refusal of the Finnish government served as a pretext for the USSR to unilaterally denounce the 1932 non-aggression pact with Finland on November 28, 1939. On the morning of November 30, the troops of the Leningrad Military District invaded Finland. The next day, in the village of Terioki, the "people's government" of the Finnish Democratic Republic (FDR) was formed, headed by O.V. Kuusinen. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops managed to reach the heavily fortified "Mannerheim Line" in early December 1939, they could not break through it. Only after almost two months of thorough training of the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko, they broke the stubborn resistance of the Finnish army and reached the approaches to Vyborg. On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. Several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the Finnish part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas in the Barents Sea went to the USSR, and the Khanko peninsula was transferred for a lease for a period of 30 years.

This war was not popular among the Soviet people, as it had a pronounced predatory character. The famous poet A.T. Tvardovsky called it "an unfamous war." The losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to almost 126.9 thousand killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, as well as 248 thousand wounded, shell-shocked and frostbite. Finland lost 48.2 thousand people killed and 43 thousand wounded. In political terms, this war caused serious damage to the international prestige of the Soviet Union. By decision of the League of Nations for aggression against Finland in December 1939, the USSR was expelled from this organization and found itself in international isolation.

Conclusion

Researchers who study the history of Soviet-German relations have to take into account, first, the emergence of new documents that shed light on this problem. In particular, in the collection of documents “The Fascist Sword Was Forged in the USSR”, it is convincingly proved that in the 20s. the Soviet leadership helped Germany create its own armed forces, bypassing the Treaty of Versailles. Secondly, one has to take into account the influence of Western historiography, which places the main blame for the outbreak of the Second World War either on the USSR, or on A. Hitler and I.V. Stalin at the same time.

Similar views are expressed, in particular, in the recently published works of N. Werth, in which the entire foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. served at the angle of destabilizing the situation in Europe and condoning the aggressor, and especially the work of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", which has a characteristic subtitle "Who started the Second World War?" and its content leads to an unambiguous answer to this question. These two circumstances influenced the work of M.I. Semiryaga. G.L. Rozanova, L.A. Nameless. O.A. Rzhemevsky, A.M. Samsonova, A.O. Chubaryan and other researchers devoted to the analysis of the foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Noteworthy are the studies of V. Petrov, A. Dongarov on the circumstances of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, V. Abarinov on the tragedy in Katyn, V.A. Parsadonova, about the relationship between the USSR and the territories that went to it under the Soviet-German pact of 1939. It is this pact and the policy of the USSR after its conclusion that require a balanced analysis of researchers not on the basis of ideology, but on the basis of an objective study of the facts and steps taken by all subjects of international relations. At the turn of the 20-30s. the same radical changes took place in the foreign policy of the USSR as inside the country. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Comintern has completely changed, before which the main task was set - to ensure favorable conditions for building socialism in the USSR. It was necessary to prevent the threat of drawing the USSR into international conflicts, as well as to maximize the benefits of economic cooperation with the developed countries of the West. In connection with the change in priorities in foreign policy, the activities of the Comintern were considered secondary compared to the activities of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by M.M. Litvinov, known for his sympathy for Western democracies. But later, the activity of the USSR in the diplomatic arena in the mid-30s was called the "policy of collective security." Its effectiveness in averting the threat of a world war was highly regarded by official Soviet historiography and questioned in contemporary literature.

However, it should be taken into account that the policy of collective security depends on the position of all the parties involved in its development. It is important to determine the extent to which these parties are interested in establishing such a system in Europe. The USSR understood the threat of war approaching the world and its unpreparedness for it at that time. Therefore, the sincerity of his efforts should not be doubted. At the same time, without the connivance of Germany on the part of the West, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the war in Spain and the victory of fascism in it, the Anschluss of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia would have been impossible. The calls of the USSR to curb the aggressor in the League of Nations can be regarded as demagogy, but one cannot but notice the formation of a bloc of aggressive states on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the signing of the Munich Agreement.

Considering the collapse of its diplomatic activity, the USSR was forced to pay attention to the situation that developed near its borders. The situation on the Far Eastern frontiers had to be corrected militarily in the battles with Japan on Lake Khasan and in the Khalkin-Gola region, the threat that was approaching from the West had to be resolved diplomatically, first in negotiations with Western democracies, and then with the country that posed a direct threat THE USSR. The circumstances that led to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, as well as its impact on international relations, are well known today, and one can hardly expect any new documents on these issues. Their interpretation depends on the position taken by the researcher, characterizing the Soviet foreign policy. Opinions on this issue differ fundamentally among various researchers, and they are based on political likes and dislikes, rather than an objective analysis of the facts.

The European foreign policy of the USSR went through three stages in the 1930s: before the arrival of the Nazis in Germany, there was a predominantly pro-German orientation; from 1933 to 1939 the “pro-democratic” line prevailed: orientation towards an alliance with Britain and France, attempts to create a system of collective security; from 1939 to 1941 the pro-German line prevailed again, which attracted Stalin with the opportunity to significantly expand the territory of the USSR by dividing Europe into “spheres of influence”.

1. Belousova Z.S. The Soviet Union and European problems: a textbook for universities. M.: 1999. - 234 p.

2. Bodyugov G.A. Hitler comes to power // Patriotic history. - 1999. - No. 2. - S. 27-45.

3. Voloshina V.Yu. Soviet period of Russian history: textbook. allowance / A.G. Bykova. - St. Petersburg: Neva, 2002. - 137 p.

4. Diplomacy and the press: the experience of interaction on the example of Soviet-German relations //RusGermHist: .

5. Kamynin V. Russia in the late 20s and early 30s. / V. Kamynin, B. Lichman // History of Russia. - M.: Enlightenment, 1995. - 309 p.

6. Nezhinsky L.N. Was there a military threat to the USSR in the late 20s and early 30s? // History of the USSR. - 1990. - No. 6. - S. 29-35.

7. Sluch S.Z. German-Soviet relations in 1918-1941. Motives and Consequences of Foreign Policy Decisions // Slavic Studies. - 1996. - No. 3. - S. 106-145.

8. A.S. Orlov History of Russia: a textbook for universities. M: Prospect, 2004. - 520 p.

	To download work free to join our group In contact with. Just click on the button below. By the way, in our group we help with writing academic papers for free. A few seconds after the subscription is verified, a link will appear to continue downloading the work.
	Boost originality this work. Anti-plagiarism bypass.
	REF-Master- a unique program for self-writing essays, term papers, tests and theses. With the help of the REF-Master, you can easily and quickly make an original abstract, control or coursework based on finished work- Foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s. The main tools used by professional abstract agencies are now at the disposal of refer.rf users absolutely free of charge!
	How to write correctly introduction? The secrets of the ideal introduction of term papers (as well as abstracts and diplomas) from professional authors of the largest abstract agencies in Russia. Learn how to correctly formulate the relevance of the topic of work, determine the goals and objectives, indicate the subject, object and methods of research, as well as the theoretical, legal and practical basis of your work.
	The secrets of the ideal conclusion of the thesis and term paper from professional authors of the largest abstract agencies in Russia. Learn how to correctly formulate conclusions about the work done and make recommendations for improving the issue under study.

At the turn of the 20-30s. 20th century the world system of capitalism has entered a period of one of the most terrible crises. The economies of many countries, recently bled dry by the First World War, are again in danger of destruction. The result of the crisis was the establishment in many states totalitarian regimes. The Nazis came to power in Germany. In the United States, the "new course" of President T. Roosevelt began to be implemented, the essence of which was the selective application of Soviet experience in state regulation economy.

Conservative circles in the West saw a way out of the crisis in unleashing new large-scale military conflicts. In 1931 militarist Japan began an aggressive war against China. A hotbed of military tension developed on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR. Another hotbed of military tension arose on the western borders after Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. He declared his goal to be the expansion of "living space" in the East.

The new situation also required the USSR to change its foreign policy guidelines. In 1933, the new head of the foreign policy department of the USSR, Μ. M. Litvinov put forward a plan to create a system of collective security. In the same year, diplomatic relations with the United States were established. Favorable ground was created for rapprochement with the liberal states of the West. In order to ease the tension in its relations with them, the Soviet Union agreed to revise the policy of the Comintern. G. Dimitrov, a prominent Bulgarian communist, became the head of this organization.

On the VII Congress of the Comintern the doctrine of the creation of popular anti-fascist fronts on a broad democratic basis is proclaimed, which meant a break with the narrow-class methods of activity of this organization in previous years. The most odious figures known for their left views are being eliminated from the leadership of the Comintern. Repressions begin against its former leaders. The first leaders of the Comintern G. E. Zinoviev and N. I. Bukharin, the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Republic B. Kun, and many other Soviet and foreign communists were destroyed.

Retaliatory steps are being taken by Western leaders as well. An expression of increased confidence in the USSR is the signing of several bilateral treaties that created the foundation for collective security in Europe. Thus, on May 2, 1935, the Soviet Union concluded an agreement on mutual assistance with France. A similar agreement was signed on May 16, 1935 with Czechoslovakia. The most important success of domestic diplomacy is the entry on September 18, 1934 of the Soviet Union into League of Nations.

At the same time, many of the efforts of the USSR aimed at maintaining peace did not meet with understanding. The course towards collective resistance to aggressors was seriously tested during the war in Spain. In February 1936, the anti-fascist Popular Front won the elections in Spain. But democratic reforms in this country were thwarted already in July 1936 by a military coup led by General Franco. The international community declared its non-interference in Spanish affairs. France, England and the United States refused to provide the Spanish Republic with military and economic assistance.

Out of fear of being again accused of exporting the revolution, the Soviet Union initially took a wait-and-see attitude. Fascist states behaved quite differently. Italy and Germany began to carry out regular deliveries of weapons and military equipment to General Franco. About 50 thousand Italians and 10 thousand Germans fought on his side. The situation required the prompt intervention of the Soviet Union and other progressive forces, otherwise the Spanish Republic was doomed.

Beginning in October 1936, the USSR openly took the side of the legal government of the country. In the documents of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the actions to provide assistance to the Republicans were designated as Operation "X". During its implementation in 1936-1938. 648 aircraft, 347 tanks, 120 armored vehicles, 1186 guns, 20.5 thousand machine guns, 500 thousand rifles, and ammunition were sent to Spain.

About 2,000 Soviet advisers arrived to help the Spanish government. The Comintern launched a broad campaign to help Spain. He organized international brigades, in which up to 50 thousand volunteers from 54 countries fought. However, the position of the Western states in the end turned out to be in the hands of the rebels, and the republic in Spain was destroyed. The defeat of the Republicans in Spain showed the complete inability of the pre-war system of international relations to stop the actions of the aggressors.

Taking advantage of the inaction of the Western states, Germany no longer concealed its aggressive plans. In 1934, Hitler concludes a non-aggression pact with Poland, the anti-Soviet orientation of which was not hidden by anyone, and even emphasized by the Polish side. In 1935 in Germany, in violation of international agreements, universal military service was introduced. In 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland. In March 1938, the "Anschluss" (attachment) of Austria was made. This treacherous act was recognized by the governments of England and France. Czechoslovakia was next. In May 1938, Germany began to concentrate its troops near its borders. The pretext for Hitler's treacherous plans was the supposedly "disastrous" situation of the Germans in the Czech Sudetes. Europe is facing the threat of military conflict.

The USSR was connected with Czechoslovakia by an agreement on mutual assistance, under the terms of which, in the event of France's refusal to provide military assistance to the Czechs, the Soviet side could also refrain from entering the conflict. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union firmly stated that it would act without the French side if the Czechoslovak government turned to it with an official appeal for help. Together, the army of Czechoslovakia and the armed forces of the USSR significantly exceeded the army of Germany. But the government of Czechoslovakia continued to focus on Western countries, hoping for their assistance. This was the main mistake of the Czechoslovak side - the ruling circles of England and France had other plans in relation to the states of Eastern Europe.

In September 1938, the first persons of France and Great Britain arrived at a meeting with Hitler in Munich. Neither the USSR nor even Czechoslovakia were admitted to the negotiations. During the negotiations, it was decided to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany. The government of Czechoslovakia was forced to agree to the conditions presented to it. But this did not save Czechoslovak statehood. In March 1939, Hitler completely occupied the Czech lands, creating a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on them, and in the east of the country - a puppet fascist state of the Slovaks. In the division of Czechoslovakia, with the consent of the German side, Hungary and Poland also took part. Many Russian and foreign historians, such as V. Sipols, G. Gorodetsky, see the Munich agreement between Western leaders and Hitler as a prologue to World War II.

In October 1936, an agreement was signed between Italy and Germany, called the Berlin-Rome Axis. Soon, the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact was signed between Germany and Japan. In 1937, the Italian side joined him. In 1940, the fascist states will finally consolidate their tripartite alliance. The participants in the "Anti-Comintern Pact" will proclaim the goal of creating a new order throughout the world. Directly or indirectly they will be supported by such states as Spain, Finland, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia.

The aggressive plans of the fascist states will not meet with serious opposition from Western liberal regimes either. At that time, the leadership of France and England had supporters of the policy of appeasing the aggressor. His goal was to untie Germany's hands in the West and push her to search for "living space" in the East. As part of the policy pursued by Britain and France to "appease the aggressor", in September 1938 the Anglo-German and in December of the same year the Franco-German declarations were signed, which were in fact non-aggression pacts. Their conclusion created a real danger for the USSR and aroused the concern of the Soviet leadership.

Despite the unfriendly policy of England and France, the USSR did not abandon plans to create a system of collective security. In July-August 1939, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations took place in Moscow. Neither the French, nor especially the English side, showed a desire for sincere cooperation in the negotiations. The stumbling block was the position of Poland. The Polish government stubbornly refused to allow Soviet troops to pass through Polish territory to the border with Germany in the event of an attack. Without this, any agreements on the provision of military assistance to Poland turned out to be a sham.

The British government did not consider it necessary to influence its Polish partners, although it was aware of Hitler's plans to attack Poland in the very near future. In turn, the Soviet leadership became aware of the behind-the-scenes negotiations between Britain and Germany. It was feared that Britain did not want to conclude an effective military agreement with the Soviet Union, as it was preparing to conclude a treaty with Hitler.

It was also restless on the eastern borders of the USSR. Back in 1938, 20 thousand Japanese soldiers invaded the territory of the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, 130 km south of Vladivostok. The culmination of the Soviet-Japanese conflict during this period was military operations in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River on the territory of an ally of the USSR - Mongolia. In May 1939, about 70 thousand people, supported by 500 guns, 182 tanks and 300 aircraft from Japan, crossed the Mongolian border. The moment of surprise played an important role, and the Japanese advanced far into Mongolian territory. Only by concentrating large forces of tanks and aircraft did the Soviet and Mongolian troops liquidate the Japanese invasion by September. Thus, the USSR faced the threat of war on two fronts - in Europe and in the Far East.

In a situation of military danger, the Soviet leadership was faced with persistent proposals from Germany to conclude a non-aggression pact. Seeing the futility of continuing negotiations with France and England, and also in dire need of peace in the West, Stalin decided on another sharp turn in foreign policy. In August 1939, German Foreign Minister A. Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow. On August 23, he and V. M. Molotov, who replaced Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sign a non-aggression pact between the two countries. Today, this treaty is interpreted by historians far ambiguously. Of particular criticism is the signing of secret protocols on the division of spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and Germany.

For many people, including those in the USSR itself, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, as it was dubbed in the Western press already in those years, was a complete surprise. Continuing the chosen course, on September 28, the Stalinist leadership signed an agreement on "friendship and borders" with Germany, which reflected the new military-strategic and geopolitical alignment of forces in Europe. At the same time, despite some rapprochement with Germany, the USSR was still ready to continue the policy of collective security together with Britain and France. But neither in London nor in Paris showed any interest in holding negotiations with the USSR, although there was still time between August 23 and September 1, 1939 to prevent an attack on Poland.

As a result, no real mechanisms were created in Europe to prevent a major war. The Soviet Union was well aware that without this peace with Germany would be short-lived. And yet, the respite received made it possible to delay Hitler's attack on the USSR for almost two years, which were used by our country to prepare to repel aggression.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

Mogilev State University named after Kuleshov A.A.

Department of East Slavic and Russian History

COURSE WORK

Topic: Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s

Completed by a 4th year student

gr. A OZO of the Faculty of History

Azarenka D.M.

scientific adviser

Associate Professor, Candidate of Historical Sciences

Vorobyov A.A.

MOGILEV - 2010

Introduction

I. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1930S

1.1 The USSR on the international stage in the early 1930s

1.2 Strengthening the international position of the USSR in the mid-1930s. Creation of a collective security system

II. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

2.1 Soviet-German relations

2.2 Foreign policy of the USSR in the Far East

2.3 Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of fascist aggression

Conclusion

List of used literature

1.1 The USSR on the international stage in the early 1930s

Since the end of the 1920s, the world situation and the foreign policy of the USSR were largely affected by the impact of the world economic crisis, which acquired the most pronounced character in 1929-1933. This led to a significant reduction in industrial production in the developed capitalist countries: in the USA it decreased by 46%, in Germany - 40%, in France - 31%, in England - 16%. The crisis was a consequence of the intensification of the processes of concentration and cyclical production in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution that unfolded from the end of the 19th century.

Monopoly associations, which rapidly developed during the First World War and after it, largely determined the domestic and foreign policy of states. The struggle of the monopolies for profit led to an even greater intensification of contradictions in the relations between the states participating in this war. Relations between them were already aggravated by the unequal Versailles system of treaties adopted as a result of the defeat of Germany in it.

The study of the features of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. cannot be considered outside the context of the events that took place in the world in the late 1920s. twentieth century. Here, first of all, it should be said that in the first half of the 1920s the economic blockade of Russia by the capitalist countries was broken. In 1920, after the fall of Soviet power in the Baltic republics, the government of the RSFSR concluded Peace Treaties with the new governments of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, recognizing their independence and independence.

Since 1921 the establishment of trade relations between the RSFSR and England, Germany, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Czechoslovakia began. The negotiating political process with England and France reached a deadlock. Using the contradictions of the leading European powers with Germany, the Soviet representatives in the town of Rapallo (near Genoa) concluded an agreement with her. The treaty resumed diplomatic and consular relations between the countries and thereby brought Russia out of diplomatic isolation.

In 1926, the Berlin Treaty of Friendship and Military Neutrality was signed. Germany, thus, became the main trade and military partner of the USSR, which made significant adjustments to the nature of international relations in subsequent years. By 1924, Russia was de jure recognized in Europe by Great Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, in Asia by Japan, China, and in Latin America by Mexico and Uruguay. The US delayed recognition until 1933. In total for 1921-1925. Russia has concluded 40 agreements and treaties. At the same time, Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations were unstable. In 1927 there was a break in diplomatic relations with England. In 1924, diplomatic and consular relations were established with China, and in 1925 with Japan.

Russia managed to conclude a series of equal treaties with the countries of the East. In 1921, a Soviet-Iranian treaty, a Soviet-Afghan treaty and an agreement with Turkey were concluded. In the late 1920s With the predominant development of Soviet-German relations, the efforts of Soviet diplomacy were directed towards expanding contacts with other countries.

The Soviet foreign policy concept in the late 1920s and early 1930s was built in accordance with two conflicting goals: the preparation of a world proletarian revolution and the establishment of peaceful relations with the capitalist states. The task was set to turn the gained peaceful respite into a lasting peace, to bring the country out of the state of foreign policy and economic isolation, including by attracting foreign capital. The USSR sought to overcome the state of diplomatic isolation. However, the solution of this problem was hampered by a number of factors, such as the rejection of the Soviet system and the Bolshevik slogan of world revolution by the Entente countries; claims against Russia for tsarist debts and the dissatisfaction of the capitalist powers with the monopoly of foreign trade; as well as Russia's course to support revolutionary organizations in Europe and America and the national liberation movement in the colonial countries.

From the late 20's - 30's. Soviet foreign policy was carried out in a complex and rapidly changing environment. It was determined by the main foreign policy principle of the hostility of the imperialist powers to the USSR and the need to use their mutual contradictions. This balance of power policy pushed the USSR first to forge an alliance with Germany against the British threat, and then forced Soviet diplomacy to seek cooperation with England and France against the much more dangerous Third Reich.

In 1929 the capitalist world was shaken by the outbreak of the economic crisis. In the West, a catastrophic decline in production, wages and employment, and the general standard of living began. The number of officially registered unemployed worldwide has exceeded 30 million people. In the Soviet Union, many assumed that the "Great Depression" would open a new round of proletarian revolutions and lead to the rise of the national liberation movement. At the same time, the activities of Soviet diplomacy during the years of the economic crisis were very restrained and cautious. At the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, who replaced G. V. Chicherin in 1930, became increasingly famous.

In the context of the global economic crisis (1929-1933), in order to maintain foreign exchange earnings, the government of the USSR increased the export of its goods, reducing their price to a minimum. The foreign trade policy of the USSR caused in 1930-1932. years, there was a sharp protest in many countries that accused the Soviet Union of dumping, that is, exporting goods to the world market at a price below their cost. In their opinion, this policy was ensured by the massive use of forced labor in the USSR and it was this policy that led to the economic crisis in the West.

In July 1930, the United States, hit by the crisis more than other countries, became the initiator of the economic blockade of the USSR. They banned the import of Soviet goods, began to detain Soviet goods. France, Belgium, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and also England joined the blockade, despite the Labor government's unwillingness to aggravate relations with Moscow. Of the major countries, only Germany did not join the boycott. She, on the contrary, sharply increased the exchange of goods with the USSR, becoming its main trading partner.

At the same time, France came up with the initiative to "unify Europe" against the USSR (the "pan-Europe" plan), that is, the creation of an anti-Soviet bloc of European states. Since the League of Nations did not support this initiative, the French government decided to push Poland, Romania and the Baltic states to put pressure on the USSR. The supply of French weapons to these countries increased. Another reason for the increased hostility towards the USSR was the continuous collectivization, accompanied by the closing of churches and the exile of peasants, mostly Christians. In February 1930, Pope Pius XI announced a "crusade" against the USSR. In Western Europe and the USA in February-March 1930 prayers, rallies and demonstrations took place against the persecution of religion and Christians in the USSR.

At this time, disturbing news came from the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.

In 1929, for the first time since the end of the Civil War, the Soviet country was subjected to a serious military provocation. On July 10, detachments of the Manchu troops and the White Guards defeated the Soviet consulate in Harbin; seized the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which had been in joint Soviet-Chinese management since 1924; arrested the Soviet administration of the road (more than 200 people). At the same time, the Manchurian troops began to shell the Soviet border outposts and settlements. Attempts by the Soviet government to resolve the conflict by peaceful means were frustrated. On August 16, the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution to break off diplomatic relations with China. The Soviet government created the Special Far Eastern Army under the command of V.K. Blucher (18.5 thousand soldiers and commanders), which in October-November 1929 expelled the invaders from the Soviet regions of Primorye and Transbaikalia. On December 22, 1929, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed, according to which the former situation was restored on the CER. However, a full-scale restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries took place only in 1932.

In addition, at this time, taking advantage of the fact that the countries of Western Europe and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union were largely preoccupied with their economic problems, on September 18, 1931, Japan sent its troops into the territory of Manchuria. Japanese propaganda explained the aggression by the need to confront the "Bolshevik danger" in China. Before this threat, the USSR was alone, and therefore its policy consisted of a series of diplomatic protests, military countermeasures (troop movements to the border) and, at the same time, conciliatory actions, the purpose of which was to deprive Japan of a pretext for an attack.

The Soviet Union, which began to modernize its economy in a hostile environment, was actually forced to fight for survival. In the most distinct form, such a strategy was expressed by I. V. Stalin in February 1931 at the First All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” Foreign policy for the period of accelerated modernization of the country was aimed at ensuring security for the reconstruction of the national economy of the country and the creation of reliable Armed Forces capable of protecting the country from external threats.

According to the Constitution of the country, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had the highest powers in the field of foreign relations. The general management of relations was entrusted to the government. In fact, the foreign policy of the Politburo and its head were directly in charge. Daily foreign policy activities were carried out by the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Foreign Affairs, headed by G. V. Chicherin (1923-1930), M. M. Litvinov (1930-1939), V. M. Molotov (1939-1949). Foreign economic in 1926-1930. headed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Domestic Trade (People's Commissar A. I. Mikoyan), later - the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (A. P. Rozengolts in 1930-1937; E. D. Chvyalev in 1938; A. I. Mikoyan 1938-1949).

At the beginning of the first five-year plan, the foreign policy of the USSR had to be carried out in the conditions of the strengthening of interventionist sentiments in the imperialist countries. Striving for the peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems, the Soviet Union joined the "Briand-Kellogg Pact" signed in Paris in August 1928 by nine powers (initiators - the French Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State) on the rejection of war as a means of foreign policy and was the first to put it into effect.

Thus, the foreign policy of the USSR with the countries of Western Europe, the USA, Japan and China in the early 1930s was significantly influenced by the global economic crisis, the cause of which many countries were inclined to consider the dumping policy of the USSR in foreign trade. As a result, numerous breaks in economic relations between Western European countries and the United States with the Soviet Union followed.

In turn, the beginning of the world economic crisis was initially regarded in the USSR, and especially in the Comintern, as a harbinger of a new stage in the long-awaited world proletarian revolution. However, capitalism once again demonstrated its vitality: the crisis was overcome. In many ways - due to increased state intervention in economic and social life and the transfer of resources from colonial and dependent countries.

The general consequence of such a controversial policy of the USSR and Western countries was the aggravation of foreign policy relations between them. In other words, the main destabilizing factor in the world was the intransigence of capitalism and socialism, which escalated during the global economic crisis. The task of the leading capitalist states was to maintain their dominant positions in the world, to satisfy the claims of "infringed" rivals, mainly at the expense of the Soviet Union. The USSR, in turn, set itself the goal, using capitalist contradictions, to delay the war as long as possible, to prepare for it as best as possible.

1.2 Strengthening the international position of the USSR in the mid-1930s.Creation of a collective security system

At the turn of the 20-30s. reconsideration of relations between the USSR and the USA begins. Both representative delegations of American senators and individual engineers come to the Soviet Union. With the help of the latter, large-scale construction is being carried out in the country. So, X. Cooper, who took part in the construction of the Dneproges, was awarded the Order of Lenin. In the United States, the successes of the country of the Soviets are gradually being recognized.

By 1933, when F. Roosevelt moved into the White House instead of President Hoover, the issue of diplomatic recognition of the USSR was a foregone conclusion. In the fall, the Senate voted by a majority vote in favor of the need to take appropriate steps in this direction. On October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt published his message addressed to M. I. Kalinin with a proposal to resume diplomatic contacts. It was decided to put an end to "abnormal relations between the 125 million population of the United States and the 160 million population of Russia." In a reply letter dated October 19, Kalinin informed the American president that the proposal had been accepted by the Soviet side. Diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA were established on November 16, 1933, during Litvinov's visit to Washington, which was regarded by the world press as the most important event in many years. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA, Litvinov made a statement in which he noted that "the absence of relations for 16 years contributed to the accumulation in the United States of incorrect and false ideas about the situation in the USSR. Many people amused themselves by spreading the wildest fables about the Soviet Union." The resumption of diplomatic contacts, according to the majority, meant that "one of the most important political and economic anomalies has been eliminated."

In 1932, the international positions of the USSR were significantly strengthened. After lengthy negotiations, non-aggression pacts were signed with Latvia, Estonia, Finland, France and Poland. In the same year, the Soviet delegation made a proposal at the International Conference in Geneva on general and complete disarmament.

The USSR delegation, headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, put forward three proposals: a project for general and complete disarmament or partial disarmament, which provided for the complete destruction of the most aggressive types of weapons; draft declaration on the definition of the attacking side (aggressor); the transformation of the disarmament conference into a permanent "peace conference". None of these proposals was supported by the Geneva Conference. She completed her work in June 1934, having two main decisions to her credit - the recognition of Germany's right to "equality" in armaments and the plan for "qualitative disarmament" ("MacDonald's plan"), which provided for the maximum numbers of ground and air forces of only European countries. During the conference, two future initiators of a new world war - Japan and Germany - withdrew from the League of Nations.

In 1933, in the context of a growing military threat in Europe (after the Nazis came to power in Germany) and Asia (due to Japan's aggression against China), the USSR became a party to the Convention on the definition of an aggressor and took the initiative to create a collective security system in Europe and Asia. He signed acts on the definition of the aggressor with Poland, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, as well as with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In September, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Italy.

By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with most countries of the world. On September 18, 1934, he was admitted to the League of Nations, which testified to the growing authority of the USSR in the international arena. The rhetoric about the world revolution is also sharply curtailed within the country. The 7th Congress of the Comintern, which worked in Moscow in July-August 1935, proclaimed a course towards the creation of a united anti-fascist popular front. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union changed the direction of its foreign policy. Believing that the system of non-aggression pacts was not enough, he focused his efforts on creating a system of collective security against aggression, primarily from Germany.

One of the initiatives was the proposal of Soviet diplomacy to conclude an "Eastern Pact", which, in addition to the USSR, would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany. It provided for the provision of military assistance to any country participating in the pact that was subjected to aggression, no matter who the aggressor was, and was aimed at creating an obstacle to the outbreak of war, primarily from Germany.

In September 1934, Germany rejected its participation in the pact. She was supported by Poland. However, the Soviet Union managed to conclude in May 1935 pacts on mutual assistance in case of aggression with France and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, both these countries concluded an agreement on mutual assistance between themselves. At the same time, the agreement with Czechoslovakia contained a significant clause, according to which the Soviet Union could provide assistance to an ally only with simultaneous assistance from France. With this reservation, Czechoslovakia limited the possibility of receiving Soviet assistance in the event of an attack by an aggressor.

At the same time, it was proposed to conclude a Pacific Pact with the participation of the USSR, the USA, England, Holland and Japan. The conclusion of the pact was intended to contain Japanese aggression in the Pacific Ocean. The draft pact put forward by the USSR provided for the USSR, the USA, China and Japan to become its participants, i.e. powers with interests in the Pacific region. By the middle of 1937, negotiations finally reached an impasse due to the refusal of the United States to support not only the plan, but also the idea of ​​its creation. In June 1937, F. Roosevelt declared that "there is no faith pact." He believed that the only guarantee of security in the Pacific was a strong US Navy.

In response to the proposals of the USSR on the creation of collective security, the Western powers are pursuing a policy of bilateral agreements, which, in the opinion of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov, "do not always serve the goals of peace."

In 1934, Germany concludes a non-aggression pact with Poland. In 1935, an Anglo-German naval agreement was signed ... Revealing the aggressive plans of Poland, Germany, Japan, Finland, one of the heralds of Polish imperialism V. Studnitsky at the beginning of 1935 in the book “ Political system Europe and Poland" wrote that "together with Germany, Poland could go to the Ukrainian experiment." In addition to Ukraine, these powers could "tear Crimea, Karelia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan from Russia." It was also envisaged that "the Far East up to Lake Baikal should go to Japan".

Thus, the creation of collective security in Europe was significantly narrowed. The conclusion of the German-Polish non-aggression pact effectively ruled out the signing of the Eastern Pact. In addition, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries did not want to spoil relations with Germany and Poland for the sake of the USSR. The Soviet Union was forced to change the methods of searching for allies in the fight against the aggressor.

A powerful blow to the collapse of Soviet initiatives was the agreement of the heads of the four powers - Germany, Britain, France and Italy, concluded in September 1938 in Munich, which led to the liquidation of independent Czechoslovakia and opened the way for fascist aggression to the East. On March 20, 1939, the Soviet Union declared its non-recognition of the inclusion of the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the German Empire. The essence of the Munich agreement, the anti-Soviet orientation of the policy of the Western powers were disclosed in the Report on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the XVIII Party Congress on March 6, 1939. The tasks in the field of foreign policy of the USSR were formulated in the report of the Central Committee:

1. Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries;

2. To be careful and not let the country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands;

3. To strengthen in every possible way the combat power of our Red Army and the Red Navy;

4. Strengthen international ties of friendship with the working people of all countries who are interested in peace and friendship among peoples.

On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Government presented England and France with a draft treaty of mutual assistance against aggression for a period of 5-10 years. However , an equal and effective mutual assistance pact could not be reached .

The British and French could not solve another cardinal issue - the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland. On August 21, 1939, the Soviet side declared: “The Soviet mission believes that the USSR, which does not have a common border with Germany, can provide assistance to France, England, Poland and Romania only if its troops pass through the Polish and Romanian territories, because there are no other ways to get in touch with the aggressor's troops ... This is a military axiom.

The perniciousness of the actions of British politicians was expressed by the leader of the Liberal Party, Lloyd George; "Mr Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir Simon do not want an alliance with Russia".

Thus, the obvious unwillingness of England and France to agree with the USSR on collective security placed it in conditions of complete isolation before the aggressor.

The international situation sharply worsened in 1935. Fascist Germany unilaterally tore up the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, introduced universal military service in March and announced the creation of military aviation. In June 1935, Great Britain and Germany concluded a maritime agreement allowing Germany, contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, to have a navy of up to one third of the surface ships and almost half of the submarines of the level of the British fleet. On October 3, 1935, Italy attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and occupied it in early May of the following year. On May 9, 1936, the establishment of the Italian Empire was proclaimed in Rome. Of the major powers, only the USSR, which did not have diplomatic relations with Abyssinia, resolutely came out in its defense. However, the Western powers blocked Soviet proposals to boycott the aggressor.

The year 1936 brought a new aggravation of the international situation. On March 7, Nazi Germany renounced the Locarno agreements of 1925, according to which it pledged to comply with the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland, sent troops into its territory and went to the borders of France. The latter did not use the right under the Treaty of Versailles to force Germany to withdraw its troops. In September 1936, a Nazi party congress was held in Nuremberg, at which a four-year plan was announced to prepare Germany for a major war for "living space" for the Germans. On January 30, 1937, Hitler announced in the Reichstag that "Germany is withdrawing its signature from the Treaty of Versailles." After this declaration, a new war in Europe became inevitable.

On October 25, 1936, inspired by impunity, the aggressors formalized the union of Germany and Italy under the name Berlin-Rome Axis with the Berlin Agreement. It recognized the capture of Ethiopia by Italy, established a common line of conduct in relation to events in Spain, fixed an agreement on delimiting the spheres of "economic penetration" in the Balkans and in the Danube river basin. The formation of the "axis" marked the beginning of the formation of a bloc of fascist aggressors who were preparing the Second World War.

The continuation of this policy was the signing on November 25, 1936 by Germany and Japan of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The participants in this agreement were obliged to inform each other about the activities of the revolutionary proletarian organization and to fight against it. Other states were encouraged to "take defensive measures" in the spirit of the agreement or join the pact. The pact was aimed at the USSR, where the headquarters of the Comintern was located. In 1937 fascist Italy joined him. The hatred that many laymen around the world had for the Comintern explains why the fascist states of the 1930s were often seen as "bastions against Bolshevism."

In an effort to conform to such ideas, fascist Germany, together with Italy since 1936, participated in 8 interventions against Republican Spain. In February 1936, the government of the Popular Front, created on the initiative of the Communist Party, came to power in this country as a result of the elections. In July of the same year, a military-fascist rebellion broke out in the country, led by General Francisco Franco, who relied on the Spanish Falange (the right-wing political party of Spain, founded in 1933) and most of the army (up to 100 thousand people). The rebels were openly supported by the fascist powers. The League of Nations rejected the Republican government's demand for collective action against the aggressors. Military equipment, weapons, as well as officers and military instructors were sent from Germany and Italy to help the rebels. When this was not enough, regular troops began to arrive: from Germany - more than 50 thousand (Legion "Condor"), from Italy - about 200 thousand. Legal basis the appearance of these, only formally volunteer, interventionist troops was the recognition on November 18, 1937 by Germany and Italy of the Franco regime. During the war in Spain, the term “fifth column” was born, denoting enemy secret agents and their accomplices used to weaken the rear of the armed forces of the republic.

In the unfolding civil war, the Spanish Republicans were assisted by the communists and socialists of many countries. The Soviet Union, responding to the request of the legitimate Spanish government, supplied the republicans with weapons and military equipment (aircraft, tanks, armored cars, torpedo boats, artillery pieces, machine guns, rifles, cartridges, shells, bombs). About 3 thousand Soviet volunteers (military advisers, pilots, tankers, sailors and other specialists) fought against the Falangists in the ranks of international brigades, which included more than 50 thousand people from 64 countries of the world. The main military advisers in the Spanish Republic were Ya. K. Berzin, G. M. Stern, K. M. Kachanov.

England, France and other Western powers pursued a policy of "non-intervention" in the national revolutionary war. From September 1936, the International Committee for Non-Intervention in the Affairs of Spain, consisting of representatives of 27 European countries, worked in London. However, as it soon became clear, in fact, he began to serve as a cover for the German-Italian intervention in Spain. The Soviet representative on the committee, I. M. Maisky, fought for the termination of aid to the rebels from Germany, Italy, Portugal, which was provided with the complicity of England, France and the actual connivance of the United States. In October 1936, the Soviet government declared that, since the non-intervention agreement "has actually ceased to exist", it considers it necessary "to return to the Spanish government the rights and the opportunity to purchase weapons outside of Spain." Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, in September 1937 it was possible to conclude an agreement on measures to combat piracy by submarines of the fascist powers. However, the policy of aiding aggression paralyzed the work of the Non-Intervention Committee, which largely predetermined the fall of Republican Spain.

Strengthening its positions in the Far East, the USSR in March 1936 concluded an agreement on mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. He was a warning to the Japanese militarists. However, continuing its further expansion in the Far East, on July 7, 1937, Japan attacked China, occupied its northern regions, captured Shanghai, Beijing and other important centers. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, having signed a non-aggression pact with China on August 21, 1937, provided it with a large loan on favorable terms, supplied aircraft, weapons, and fuel.

Thus, by the end of 1937, the efforts of the USSR to organize a system of collective security did not achieve their goals. They also failed to use the possibilities of creating a broad popular front for the joint struggle against fascism and the war.

The foreign policy activity of the USSR in the first half of the 1930s was built not only on the basis of internal tasks, but also depending on the state and development of international relations.

Events in the world have shown that the Soviet Union actually has no strong and reliable allies either in the West or in the East. In the current situation, the greatest danger for Stalin was the possibility of collusion between Western states and Hitler. Soviet diplomacy sought, on the one hand, to implement a plan for collective security in Europe, to prevent the creation of a broad united anti-Soviet front, to exercise maximum caution and not succumb to enemy provocations, and on the other hand, to take all necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense.

With all the difference in approaches to tactics in foreign policy, the general trend of international development in the early 30s. The Soviet leadership has correctly defined: the aggravation of the international situation, the growth of the forces of revanchism and war, the movement of the world to a new war. In the foreign policy of the USSR of this period, there is active activity aimed at combating fascist aggression, creating a system of collective security in Europe, and developing international relations based on a policy of peaceful coexistence. The implementation of this line of foreign policy was the establishment in 1933-1935. diplomatic relations of the USSR with Spain, Uruguay, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, Belgium, Luxembourg and Colombia, which did not recognize our country for more than 25 years. Special place in the international events of these years is the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA in November 1933. All this testified to the strengthening of the international authority of the USSR and created more favorable conditions to intensify his foreign policy activities, which at that time were primarily aimed at creating a collective security system in order to prevent a world war, for which the USSR was not yet ready and sought to delay its start for the maximum period.

II. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

2.1 Soviet-German relations

By the end of the 30s. German expansion in Europe unfolded with particular force. On March 12, 1938, German troops invaded Austria and carried out its annexation to the Reich ("Anschluss"). Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschning was arrested and until his release in May 1945 was in concentration camps. Having captured Austria, Hitler began to prepare the ground for the liquidation and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

In 1933, with the advent of Hitler to power in Germany, on the initiative of the Soviet side, military relations between the Red Army and the Reichswehr were severed. The Nazi authorities, for their part, declared the Soviet-German trade agreement of May 2, 1932, invalid. As a result, exports to Germany fell by 44% in the first half of 1933 alone. During 1933, the Soviet embassy in Berlin sent 217 notes to the German Foreign Ministry, protesting against various anti-Soviet acts of the Nazis - illegal arrests, searches, etc. Preparations for an aggressive war were elevated to the rank of German state policy. “Nothing will scare me. No so-called rules international law, no treaties will prevent me from using the advantage presented to me. The coming war will be unheard of bloody and cruel,” said Hitler.

Despite the changes taking place in Germany, the USSR sought to maintain civilized relations with this state. Stalin stated this from the rostrum of the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) in January 1934. However, in 1935-1936. Soviet-German ties are gradually weakening. Not the last role was played by Hitler's statements that “Germany will be complete only when Europe becomes Germany. No European state now has complete borders.

In the autumn of 1937, a real “consular war” broke out between Germany and the USSR, as a result of which 5 German consulates out of 7 were closed in the USSR, and 2 Soviet consulates out of 4 in Germany. The year before, in November 1936, after After 15 months of negotiations between Germany and Japan, the "Anti-Comintern Pact" was concluded.

The parties that signed it pledged to fight the Comintern. In the event of a war between one of the contracting powers and the USSR, the other country pledged not to render any assistance to the Soviet Union. In November 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. This is how the “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle” arose, aimed at combating the communist movement within each of the countries and on the international arena. For Hitler, however, this was only the beginning. The main task that he formulated was the desire to “turn the continent into a single space where we and only we will command. And we will take the burden of this struggle on our shoulders. It will open doors for us to a long dominion over the world.

On September 30, 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Daladier signed the Munich Agreement, which allowed the German army to enter Czechoslovakia on October 1 and complete the occupation of its Sudetenland by October 10, populated mainly by Germans. The Czechoslovak government capitulated, submitting to the joint dictates of Berlin, London, Rome and Paris. This shameful deal was the pinnacle of the short-sighted policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor. The word "Munich" has since become a symbol of betrayal, capitulation of Western states before fascism. The Soviet Union did not provide assistance to Czechoslovakia, since when the treaty between the countries was signed in 1935, a clause was included in the text, according to which the obligations of mutual support could operate only if "assistance to the side - the victim of the attack - will be provided by France." The Soviet ambassador to Great Britain I. M. Maisky noted that England and France "washed their hands", and the leaders of Czechoslovakia did not dare to rely on the USSR in these conditions. They preferred capitulation, losing their border fortifications, factories and plants, buildings and warehouses, institutions and organizations located in the Sudetenland. The Czech population of these areas fled in panic, leaving behind all their property.

At the beginning of 1939, Soviet-German relations were virtually frozen. In an effort to overcome the foreign policy isolation of the USSR, Stalin was forced in the spring of 1939. start a diplomatic game to determine Hitler's immediate plans. The fascist dictator in the circle of close people said that he would not shy away from an alliance with Russia. Moreover, he stated that “this alliance is the main trump card that I will save until the end of the game. This will probably be the most decisive game of my life."

In April 1939, the Soviet leadership turned to Great Britain and France with a proposal to conclude a Tripartite Mutual Assistance Pact with them, an appropriate military convention and provide guarantees of independence to all powers bordering the USSR from the Baltic to the Black Seas. London and Paris in every possible way delayed the start of negotiations on a military alliance, which Moscow insisted on. Molotov was called upon to pursue the Soviet line in the intricacies of world politics. On May 3, 1939, while remaining Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he replaced M. M. Litvinov, a Jew by nationality and clearly an unsuitable figure for a possible Soviet-German dialogue, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

At the end of May, the British and French governments made their choice in favor of negotiations on political issues from the USSR. However, they true purpose it was not so much the achievement of specific agreements as opposition to the possible normalization of relations between Germany and the USSR. The British Prime Minister declared that he would "rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets", which would provide for the immediate assistance of England and France to the Soviet Union if the latter were at war with Germany. Molotov's talks with the British and French diplomatic representatives in Moscow in June-July 1939 were unsuccessful. The Western partners did not want to commit themselves to guaranteeing the independence of the powers bordering the USSR from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Considering it expedient to calm public opinion "for some time to continue to support negotiations", the French and British governments agreed to continue negotiations on concluding a political and military agreement with the USSR at the same time. However, their military missions, which arrived in Moscow on August 12, consisted of minor persons who did not have the authority to imprison him. The Soviet side at the talks proposed a plan providing for the joint actions of the armed forces of the three countries in all possible cases of aggression in Europe. The Polish government, requested in this regard, refused to accept the proposal to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory in the event of a German attack. The negotiations stalled. Their failure contributed to Germany's outbreak of World War II.

Moscow's termination of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations is also largely due to the fact that by that time it had received a specific proposal from Germany on "the resumption of the political line that was beneficial to both states over the past centuries." It was confirmed by Hitler in a personal telegram to Stalin dated August 21, 1939. Germany was clearly afraid of the successful conclusion of the Moscow Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. For the first time, the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop spoke about the possibility of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union on May 25, 1939. And on July 26, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires of Germany G. A. Astakhov was informed of the readiness of the German side "to prove in practice the possibility of agreeing on any issues, give any guarantees. Published Soviet diplomatic documents made it possible to establish that the Soviet leadership gave consent to negotiations with Germany on August 3-4, the final decision in favor of concluding a pact was made on August 19-21.

Discussing the emerging situation with members of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, Stalin solved a difficult dilemma: “If we conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with France and England, then Germany will abandon Poland and begin to seek a “modus vivendi” with the Western powers. War will be prevented, but in the future events may take on a dangerous character for the USSR. If we accept Germany's offer to conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will, of course, attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will become inevitable. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay out of the conflict, and we can hope for our profitable entry into the war.

He was clearly impressed by the second variant of the development of events, which, among other things, opened up "a wide field of activity for the development of the world revolution." Therefore, Stalin concluded, “it is in the interests of the USSR, the motherland of the working people, that a war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides. It is for this reason that we must agree to the conclusion of the pact proposed by Germany and work to ensure that this war, declared once, lasts for the maximum amount of time. Stalin's conclusion was in full agreement with the secret French-Polish protocol signed on May 19, 1939, according to which France undertook to provide immediate military assistance to Poland in the event of aggression, as well as with the agreement on mutual assistance between England and Poland concluded on August 25 of the same year.

Since the end of July, Soviet-German contacts have resumed at various levels. Having learned about the departure of the Anglo-French military mission to the USSR and about the negotiations that had begun in Moscow, the German leadership made it clear to Stalin and Molotov (the latter replaced M. M. Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in May 1939) that he wanted to conclude a favorable Union agreement. Convinced of the futility of negotiations with the Anglo-French military mission, the Soviet leadership on the evening of August 19 agreed to the arrival in Moscow of German Foreign Minister J. Ribbentrop. On the same day, a trade and credit agreement was signed in Berlin, which provided for the provision of a 200 million loan to the USSR for five years at 4.5% per annum. The August 19 agreement marked a turning point in the development of Soviet-German economic and political ties. The economic agreements between the two countries dated February 11, 1940 and January 10, 1941 provided for further development relations .

On August 23, 1939 I. Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow. On the night of August 24, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty for a period of 10 years was signed, and the next day published. Both contracting parties assumed obligations to refrain from any violence and aggressive actions against each other. In the event of disputes or conflicts between the USSR and Germany, both powers had to resolve them "exclusively peacefully in the manner of a friendly exchange of views." In final editing of the Soviet draft treaty, Stalin rejected Ribbentrop's formulation of "German-Soviet friendship". The peculiarity of the signed treaty was that it entered into force immediately, and not after its ratification.

The content of the non-aggression pact was not at odds with the norms of international law and the treaty practice of states adopted for such settlements. However, both at the conclusion of the treaty and in the process of its ratification (August 31, 1939), the fact was concealed that simultaneously with the treaty a secret additional protocol was signed, which contained the delimitation of the "spheres of interest" of the Soviet Union and Germany and was, from a legal point of view, in contradictions with the sovereignty and independence of a number of third countries. Thus, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Bessarabia found themselves in the Soviet sphere of influence; in German - Lithuania.

The secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact has long been the subject of heated debate. In the USSR, until 1989, its existence was denied - the Soviet side either declared the text a fake, or referred to the absence of the original protocol in both German and Soviet archives. Changes in this regard became possible only during the work of the commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on the political and legal assessment of the treaty dated August 23, 1939. In December 1989, the II Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution in which it condemned the fact of concluding a secret additional protocol and other secret agreements with Germany. This recognized that the secret protocols were legally untenable and invalid from the moment they were signed.

The decision of the Soviet government to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany was under those circumstances forced, but quite natural and justified, since it was not possible to achieve the creation of an effective Anglo-French-Soviet coalition. Much also suggests that if Moscow had not agreed to Ribbentrop's visit to the USSR, then, in all likelihood, Goering's trip to England would have taken place, on which an agreement had already been reached between London and Berlin. British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain in August 1939 at a government meeting said: "If Great Britain leaves Herr Hitler alone in his sphere (Eastern Europe), then he will leave us alone." Thus, the goal of England and France in the current situation was the desire to stay away from the imminent World War II.

The policy of "appeasement of the aggressor", which was carried out by the leaders of Western states, untied Hitler's hands in Europe. In turn, Stalin, by signing the non-aggression pact and the secret additional protocol to it, quite deliberately gave Germany the opportunity to attack Poland. On September 1, 1939, without a declaration of war, on the orders of the Fuhrer, the Wehrmacht began to implement the Weiss plan (White Plan). The Second World War began.

On September 28, 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed another document in Moscow. It was a treaty of friendship and borders, which, like the non-aggression pact, was accompanied by a secret additional protocol. In accordance with it, the territory of the Lithuanian state was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR, and Germany received Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship in return. Thus, already in the autumn of 1939, the spheres of state interests of the Soviet Union and Germany were clearly defined.

The question arises: was the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany the best option for solving the problems that confronted the Soviet government during this period?

The USSR was faced with a dilemma: either reach an agreement with Britain and France and create a system of collective security in Europe, or conclude a pact with Germany, or remain alone. There are different points of view of historians on this score.

Some experts consider the conclusion of an agreement with Germany as the worst option, compare it with Munich, and argue that the pact with Germany provoked the Second World War. Another point of view boils down to an attempt to compare the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact with the signing of the Brest peace, to consider it as an example of the use of a compromise, the ability to use inter-imperialist contradictions.

What prompted Germany to make an alliance with the USSR? For Hitler, this was a tactical step: he needed to guarantee the unhindered capture of Poland and deploy further military operations. The Soviet side, signing the treaty, sought, on the one hand, to ensure the security of the USSR on the eve of the German war against Poland by limiting the advance of German troops and Germany's refusal to use the Baltic states for anti-Soviet purposes, on the other hand, to secure the Far Eastern borders of the USSR from Japanese attacks. Having concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, when hostilities were going on in the Far East, the USSR avoided a war on two fronts.

In addition, the signing of this treaty gave the Soviet Union a number of other positive aspects:

The Soviet Union demonstrated to the Western powers the independence of its foreign policy;

The threat of a Soviet-German armed conflict was pushed back, which made it possible to strengthen the country's defense capability;

Japan, counting on joint actions with Germany against the USSR, was forced to reorient its aggressive plans;

Under a trade and credit agreement of August 19, 1939, the USSR received the necessary industrial equipment and military materials worth 400 million marks.

Historians also note the negative aspects of the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty:

The anti-fascist front of the communist, social democratic and liberal-bourgeois parties has been weakened. Authority Soviet country among the democratic public was significantly undermined;

Deliveries of Soviet raw materials and foodstuffs strengthened the strategic power of Germany;

By signing secret protocols hidden from the people and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet leadership entered into a criminal conspiracy with the Nazis on territorial robbery.

On the whole, this pact made it impossible to create a united anti-Soviet front in Europe. Thus, by concluding a pact, the USSR delayed the start of hostilities for a while and pushed its borders away from the vital centers of the country. But there is no doubt that the USSR used the delay received less effectively than its partner in the pact.

In addition, as the further development of events showed, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact largely predetermined the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War. The opinion of the well-known translator V.N. Pavlov seems justified, who believed that if the USSR had not had two additional years of preparation to repel aggression, the German armies, having launched an offensive from the Baltic bridgehead, could occupy Moscow in a week. “And it is not known how this first strike would have ended, maybe we had to carry out the Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk defensive operations.” At the same time, the post-war publication of the secret protocol, in which the statesmen who signed it actually decided the fate of third countries without their participation, caused a fair condemnation of these figures in the USSR and other countries of the world.

2.2 Foreign policy of the USSR in the Far East

Simultaneously with the aggravation of the situation in Europe, the situation in the Far East continued to worsen. Japan tried to create an extensive springboard for the conquest of China and the territories of a number of other states. The position of Japan towards the USSR became more and more aggressive and militant.

At the beginning of 1936, in the face of the increased threat of an attack on the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), the question arose of concluding an agreement between the governments of Mongolia and the USSR. As a result, already on March 12, a Soviet-Mongolian protocol on mutual assistance for a period of 10 years was signed in Ulaanbaatar, which replaced the agreement of 1934. In accordance with the agreement, Soviet troops were deployed on the territory of the MPR.

Wishing to test the "strength" of the Soviet borders, on July 29, 1938, Japan attacked the border post of the USSR on the Bezymyannaya Hill with the forces of several hundred soldiers. The divisions of the regular troops of the Red Army arrived in time to help our border guards and knocked out the Japanese who had broken through the border. A few days later, Japan repeated its maneuver, capturing a number of important points in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan (Far East). In early August 1938, the troops of the Far Eastern Front (commanded by Marshal V.K. Blucher) fought with the enemy, during which the Japanese government offered to start negotiations. On August 11, hostilities between the Soviet and Japanese troops were stopped. The casualties of the Japanese troops during the fighting at Lake Khasan amounted to 500 people killed and 900 wounded. More significant were the losses in this two-week conflict on the part of the Red Army: 792 people were killed, died of wounds and went missing and over 3 thousand people were wounded and sick.

At the beginning of 1939, the Japanese government was headed by K. Hiranuma, who represented fascist groups in ruling circles Japan. military figures of the country" rising sun"publicly threatened the USSR, inspiring public opinion the idea of ​​the weakness of the Soviet troops. At the beginning of May 1939, the Japanese General Staff received an order from the emperor to begin military operations against the MPR in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River. V. M. Molotov warned the Japanese ambassador to the USSR that "by virtue of the mutual assistance agreement concluded between them, we will defend the border of the Mongolian People's Republic as resolutely as our own border."

In the early days of June 1939, after the armed violations of the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic by Japanese troops, it became clear that Japan's goal was to seize part of the territory of Mongolia. GK Zhukov, Deputy Commander of the Belorussian Military District, was summoned to Moscow. He was instructed by People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov to take command of the Soviet units on the territory of the MPR. After assessing the situation on the ground, Zhukov came to the conclusion that the 57th Special Corps, which numbered only 5.5 thousand people by the end of May, could not solve the problem of defeating the Japanese. Soviet troops were reinforced with aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Their number by the time the hostilities ended was 57 thousand people. In early July, Soviet troops defeated the Japanese on Mount Bain-Tsagan. On August 20, a decisive offensive of the Red Army units began, which ended in September with the complete defeat of the 6th Japanese Army, which invaded the Mongolian People's Republic.

The news of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had a demoralizing effect on Japan. This was a violation of the "Anti-Comintern Pact" and caused an acute crisis in the ruling circles. The government of Hiranuma, which built its policy on cooperation with Germany, resigned.

The losses of the Red Army during the fierce battles amounted to about 8 thousand people. There were 16 thousand people wounded and sick. Losses of Japanese troops exceeded 60 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, 660 aircraft, as well as a significant amount of other military equipment.

In Japan, which found itself in international isolation, more and more voices began to be heard in favor of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. In December 1939, negotiations were underway between the two countries to expand trade ties. An agreement was signed to extend for one year the fishing treaty, which had been in force since 1928. On December 31, a Soviet-Japanese agreement was concluded regarding Japan's last payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway.

However, the establishment of economic ties did not mean that Japan would abandon its aggressive plans. In March 1940, the general staff prepared and approved by the emperor a plan for an attack on the USSR with the aim of capturing Soviet Primorye.

Under these conditions, Moscow turned out to be interested in normalizing relations with its Far Eastern neighbor. After difficult negotiations, on April 12, 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister I. Matsuoka was received in the Kremlin by Stalin. On April 13, a neutrality pact was signed between the USSR and Japan. The key provision of this agreement was that "in the event that one of the contracting parties becomes the object of hostilities on the part of one or more third powers, the other contracting party will remain neutral throughout the entire conflict." The contract was concluded for 5 years. He did not relieve the Soviet leadership of fears about a possible struggle on two fronts, but still significantly improved the position of the USSR both on the eastern and western borders.

2.3 Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of fascist aggression

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. On September 3, Britain and France declared war on Germany. The Second World War began. The Polish army was unable to provide sufficient resistance to the German troops and retreated to the east. On September 17, units of the Red Army entered the territory of Poland, occupied Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands. Poland ceased to exist as an independent state. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty "On Friendship and Borders" was signed, according to which the western border of the USSR passed along the Western Bug and Narew rivers. The treaty was accompanied by a secret additional protocol, which stated that the document signed on August 23, 1939 was changed "in such a way that the territory of the State of Lithuania is included in the sphere of interests of the USSR, since, on the other hand, the Lublin Voivodeship and parts of the Warsaw Voivodeship are included in the sphere of interests of Germany" .

In the campaign in the name of the liberation of "consanguineous Ukrainians and Belarusians", Soviet troops captured 450 thousand Polish soldiers, including 18.8 thousand officers. The fate of many of them was tragic. By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of March 5, 1940, 21,857 officers and other arrested Poles were shot. (The dislike of the “White Poles”, who fiercely and mercilessly destroyed the captured Red Army soldiers during and after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, affected. As noted in the note of the People's Commissar G.V. 60 thousand died.) The Katyn affair became a kind of “retaliatory crime” of the Stalinist regime, which deepened the contradictions with the neighboring people.

After the "liberation campaign" to the west of Ukraine and Belarus, the eyes of the Soviet government were fixed in a northwesterly direction from Moscow. In October 1939, the government of Finland was asked to push back the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus by several tens of kilometers and lease the territory at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union to ensure the protection of Leningrad. After these proposals were rejected, the Soviet leadership started the war. The “Mainil incident” was used as a pretext - the shelling on November 26, 1939 of the Soviet border territory near the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, announced by the Finns as a provocation by Moscow. The hostilities that began on November 30 were considered by the Soviet side as the end of the fight against the "Finnish White Guard". Many Western countries did not find the position of the USSR convincing. In December, the Soviet Union as an "aggressor" was expelled from the League of Nations.

Suffering heavy losses, units of the Red Army in February 1940 broke through the Finnish system of fortifications (the Mannerheim line) and launched an attack on Helsinki. On March 12, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was concluded. According to the agreement, a significant territory on the Karelian Isthmus departed to the USSR, and the Khanko Peninsula was leased. On March 31, 1940, after all these events, a new, twelfth in a row Karelian-Finnish Union Republic was formed as part of the USSR. Its government was headed by the well - known leader of the Comintern O. V. Kuusinen .

In June 1940, the Soviet government accused Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia of violating the mutual assistance pacts concluded in September-October 1939, and sent its troops to their territories. Pro-Soviet governments were formed in all three countries, and soon, with the support of the local population, the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian SSRs were proclaimed, which were included in the USSR in August 1940.

At the end of June 1940, the USSR demanded that the Romanian government withdraw troops from Bessarabia occupied in 1918, as well as from Northern Bukovina, populated mainly by Ukrainians. Bessarabia was annexed to the Moldavian ASSR, which was transformed into the sixteenth federal Soviet republic. Northern Bukovina became part of Ukraine.

Germany, which had been at war with Great Britain and France since September 1939, under the influence of rapid success in Poland, focused on expanding its "living space" through Western countries. On April 9, 1940, Hitler's troops invaded Denmark and Norway, on May 10 - in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, then, as a result of a blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg), they defeated France, which capitulated on June 24. From June 10, Italy participated in the war on the side of Germany. At the same time, German losses turned out to be insignificant: 27 thousand killed in the campaign against France, according to German analysts, were quite tolerable, “given the grandiosity success". The economy of the occupied countries was placed at the service of the Reich.

Events 1939-1940 were far from Stalin's predictions. His biggest miscalculation was that the neighboring countries of Germany offered unexpectedly weak resistance to aggression. The exhausting "fight" between the capitalist countries essentially did not happen. The potential of Germany as a result of the blitzkriegs was not only not weakened, but also significantly increased. However, despite this, Germany's resources were insufficient to successfully end the war with England. Hitler succumbed to the temptation to first increase them by conquering the USSR, and then to achieve colonial domination over all of Europe.

In July 1940, the development of a specific plan for the war against the USSR began at the German General Staff, and already on December 18, Hitler approved a directive according to which the armed forces were instructed to “defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the war against England was over (option “Barbarossa ')'. According to "optimistic" forecasts, the campaign could be successfully completed in 1.5-2 months, according to "more cautious" forecasts, in 4-5. In any case, the war was planned under the absolute condition of its mandatory end before the onset of the winter of 1941.

Hitler's instructions left no doubt that the stake was placed on the destruction of the USSR and a radical reduction in its population due to death from starvation and forced eviction beyond the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. First of all, the destruction of the Russians as a people was envisaged.

The inevitability of war with Germany was clearly realized by the top leadership of the USSR and the vast majority of the Soviet people. Among them there were definitely people who saw in the impending war the possibility of victories for the next “Bolshevik revolutions”. Some of the upcoming events seemed even easier. L. 3. Mekhlis, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, said at the 18th Party Congress that the task set by Stalin in case of war should be understood as follows: “Transfer military operations to enemy territory, fulfill their international duties and multiply the number of Soviet republics” . Stalin, who took the post of Chairman of the Government on May 5, 1941, was aware of the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces to participate in a modern war. Hoping that until Germany had finished with England, she would not dare to attack the USSR, he chose the tactic of postponing the outbreak of war in every possible way in order to complete technical re-equipment and increase the size of the army.

Unfortunately, the high military command of the Red Army at that time had not yet realized and did not fully appreciate the fundamental changes that had taken place thanks to the Wehrmacht in military operational art. Proof of this is the statement of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. Timoshenko at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army, held from December 23 to 31, 1940: "In terms of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not give anything new." Molotov later made a no less curious confession: “We knew that the war was on the threshold, not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war.

Stalin was really afraid of the impending war with Germany. He tried by all means to delay its beginning. This goal was pursued to a certain extent by the supply of oil, wheat and raw materials to Germany from the USSR in 1940-1941. But by doing this, Stalin only strengthened the potential enemy and helped him in preparing for a campaign in the East.

Ten days after Molotov returned from Berlin, the Soviet government outlined its position on the issue of concluding a four-state pact (Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR) on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance. On November 25, 1940, in the Kremlin, Molotov announced to Schulenberg that the USSR was ready to accept a draft four-power pact on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance, subject to the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and the recognition of its territorial aspirations south of Batumi and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf, the provision of naval and land bases of the USSR in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Japan's refusal of coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin. All these proposals were subject to registration in the form of five secret additional protocols to the pact of four. Moscow was eagerly awaiting an answer. Time passed, and the Nazi government was silent. Berlin's reply never arrived.

Thus, despite all the efforts made by I.V. Stalin took measures to delay the start of the war with Nazi Germany - the war began suddenly. And here lies one of the major miscalculations in the foreign policy of the USSR of that time - no one could have imagined that Germany, before launching an attack on Great Britain, would choose another vector of its aggression - the east, and bring down its armed forces on the Soviet Union.

However, despite all the miscalculations in foreign policy, it is worth noting that it was thanks to her that the Soviet Union managed to push back the threat of the outbreak of war for itself for almost two years, during which the USSR managed to resolve a number of territorial issues both in the western direction and in the Far East, what to think positive influence to the final outcome of World War II.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we will try to briefly formulate an answer to the question: Did the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s ensure country security? The answers to this question are ambiguous. If earlier the entire foreign policy of the USSR of this period was assessed as infallible, then today we encounter completely opposite judgments. The facts of that period indicate that the foreign policy activity of the USSR in the 30s. was controversial, the methods of its implementation in the first and second half of the 30s. differed from each other, which was explained by the specific situation, its change, the desire to delay the war at any cost, which inevitably led to mistakes and miscalculations. As a result, many tasks related to ensuring the country's security have not been fully resolved.

The second, but very important issue that needs to be explained is Soviet-German relations, connected not only with the signing of the 1939 treaty itself, but also with subsequent events, up to the treacherous attack of Germany on the USSR.

In this regard, the trip of the head of the Soviet government V.M. Molotov to Germany in November 1940 was of fundamental importance. This trip became a sensation that immediately spread all over the world. Molotov's mission still attracts public attention and arouses the increased interest of researchers who interpret and evaluate it in different ways. This interest is not accidental, because the Soviet materials of Molotov's talks with Reich Chancellor Hitler, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, conversations with the German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenberg, Reich Marshal Goering, Hitler's deputy Hess are important for understanding the relationship between the two states on the eve of the war between them.

Molotov's visit to the capital of the "Third Reich" took place against the backdrop of the tragic events of World War II, the flames of which were fanned by Hitler. The "Third Reich" established its dominance over a large part of Europe. By November 1940, the Wehrmacht had occupied Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway. Germany threatened to land an expeditionary force on the British Isles. German troops were also in Finland and Romania.

The negotiations revealed the hidden political and diplomatic rivalry between the two states. Hitler's rejection of proposals for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland testified to the firmness of Berlin in carrying out his plans. In essence, none of the issues discussed has been resolved or settled.

Negotiations exposed harsh reality and the true intentions of Germany. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was not ready for the great trials and the big war that was approaching its borders.

What were the reasons that determined the behavior of Hitler and his diplomacy, the nature of the negotiations and such a rapid loss of interest in the Molotov mission?

There were many. But still, the main circumstance was the decision taken by the Chancellor to start a war against the Soviet Union. On July 31, 1940, Hitler officially informed the top generals about the upcoming military campaign. In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff ground forces Colonel General F. Halder on this day there was a record: "The beginning (of the military campaign) - May 1941. The duration of the entire operation is five months." The General Staff hastily set about developing a strategic plan for waging war against the USSR. The planning was based on the requirement of the most rapid, lightning-fast defeat of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) on the attack on the USSR and gave it the code name "Barbarossa".

The result of these preparations was the events that took place on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war. And here, as it seems, lies the main miscalculation of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s. All diplomacy could not completely prevent the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, although it was able to postpone this event for almost two years, which ultimately predetermined the outcome of the war in favor of the Soviet Union.

List of used literature

1. Bodyugov G.A. Hitler Comes to Power: New Dominants of Foreign Policy Decisions of the Stalinist Leadership in 1933-1934 // Domestic History. 1999. No. 2.

2. Valiullin K.B., Zaripova R.K. Russian history. XX century. Part 2: Tutorial. - Ufa: RIO BashGU, 2002.

3. World History: Textbook for universities / Ed. G.B. Polyak, A.N. Markova. - M .: Culture and sport, UNITI, 1997.

4. History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 20th century in 3 books. / Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M., Dmitrenko V.P., Book III. Russian history. XX century. – M.: AST, 2001.

5. History of Russia. Theories of study. Book two. The twentieth century. Tutorial. /Under. ed. B. V. Lichman. Yekaterinburg: Publishing house “SV-96”, 2001.

6. History of Russia. 1917-2004: Proc. allowance for university students / A. S. Barsenkov, A. I. Vdovin. - M.: Aspect Press, 2005.

7. History of Russia (Russia in world civilization): Course of lectures / Comp. and resp. editor A. A. Radugin. - M.: Center, 2001.

8. History of Russia in the XX - early XXI century / A.S. Barsenkov, A.I. Vdovin, S.V. Voronkova, ed. L.V. Milova - M .: Eksmo, 2006.

9. History of Russia: XX century. A course of lectures on the history of Russia. Second half of the nineteenth century - XX century / Ed. prof. B.V. Lichman: ed. Ural. state tech. un-ta - UPI, Yekaterinburg, 1993.

10. History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day. Series two. Volume VIII. The struggle of the Soviet people to build the foundation of socialism in the USSR. 1921 - 1932 - M.: Nauka, 1967.

11. Levandovsky A.A., Shchetinov Yu.A. Russia in the XX century. Textbook for grades 10-11 educational institutions. - M.: Jurist, 2002.

12. Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M. Russian history. - M.: INFRA M-NORMA Publishing Group, 2005.

13. Ratkovsky I. S., Khodyakov M. V. History of Soviet Russia - St. Petersburg: Lan Publishing House, 2001.

14. Orlov A.S., Polunov A.Yu., Shestova T.L., Shchetinov Yu.A. Handbook on the history of the Fatherland for those entering universities. 2nd ed., add. - M., Moscow State University. M.I. Lomonosov, 2005.

15. Orlov A. S., Georgiev V. A., Georgieva N. G., Sivokhina T. A. Russian history. Textbook.- M.: PROSPECT, 1997.

16. Domestic history: Lecture notes / Potaturov V.A. - M.; MIEMP, 2004.

17. Kisses V.A. History of Russia of the XX century: (Main problems): Proc. allowance for university students. - M.: Humanit. ed. center VLADOS, 1997.

18. Case C.3. German-Soviet relations in 1918-1941. Motives and Consequences of Foreign Policy Decisions // Slavic Studies. 1996. No. 3.

19. Sokolov A.K. The course of Soviet history, 1917-1940: Proc. allowance for university students. - M.: Higher. school, 1999.

Tutoring

Need help learning a topic?

Our experts will advise or provide tutoring services on topics of interest to you.
Submit an application indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.