The impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Japan. Russo-Japanese War

main reason the beginning of the war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers collided in the North East Asia. But, as in many other armed conflicts, the immediate causes of war are more confusing.

These are Russia's plans to build a railway on the Russian Far East, and the victory of Japan in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo's fears about the influence of St. Petersburg in Korea. Disorderly, inconsistent diplomacy also played a large role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out may take us beyond the scope of historical science.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept of diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once said that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON SINGING BRIDGE

Russia and Japan have been going to war since 1895, from the time the Japanese inflicted a spectacular defeat on the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. And Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki peace treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Chinese Japanese war. Among the requirements of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located near Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing dynasty agreed to cede the rights to the peninsula, but Petersburg enticed Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the cession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche was made after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was an ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient, washed warm waters harbor for the terminal station of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was under construction at that time. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary backing to make such a move, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo for a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential proponent was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who saw good relations with China as essential to the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that in time the Romanovs would dominate China. But the empire must go towards this peacefully and economic methods. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses and not troops should compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: "... for general position affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid anything that could cause external complications" 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of the role of defender of Beijing. The finance minister quickly drew dividends from the goodwill of the Chinese. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs. - Approx. Per.) to lay the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern segment of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires concluded a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, after only a year, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin Wilhelm, who captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks suddenly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even plotted a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconsistency reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. Sergei Witte, who was supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906, remained an unshakable supporter of friendly relations with China. A coalition of "hawks" opposed at different times, including naval commanders, Lamsdorf's predecessor Count Mikhail Muravyov, a retired guard captain and the dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the imperial viceroy in the Russian Far East, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, the differences did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURIA"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state, long time was a tribute to the Qing Dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, the progressive weakness of China led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and made it possible for stronger powers to operate here. The latter included Japan, which during the Meiji Restoration ended its medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and colonial aspirations of its own.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later, the empire started a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan "Man-Kan kokan" ("Korea for Manchuria") became one of the leading imperatives of the Japanese foreign policy 6 .

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty "incomplete and meaningless", the Japanese were also not in the best opinion about it 7 .

The next four years, when Russia was increasingly moving away from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its superiority on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn of policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals "were too interested in Korea" 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorf was wary of Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin, and Naval Minister Tyrtov that if Russia failed to appease the new serious rival, "the clear danger of an armed clash with Japan" would remain.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cold heads prevailed in Tokyo. From the time of the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the marquis tended towards a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901, his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, the Marquis of Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to carry out a policy of reconciliation. An experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and at meetings with Witte and Lamsdorf defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But while the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against it.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the tsar and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. The two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, changing the political landscape in the Pacific region at once.

PETERSBURG CONFUSION CONTINUES

The ministers of Nicholas II hastily assured the world that the Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorf and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the unwillingness to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reason that there are at least 14 problems at home. In addition, the "Kingdom of Witte" - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.

However, the idea of ​​retaining Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire, like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambitions, together with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The confused and unstable policy of the empire sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages within 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of the evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian Province, including in the ancient capital of the Qing Dynasty, Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, scheduled for April 1903, did not take place, the Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"VAIN NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura showed the initiative. By this point, the Russian line had hardened considerably as well, as the influence of Witte, a principled defender of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the "new course" 17 . Its goal was "to prevent the penetration of foreign influence into Manchuria in any form" 18 . Russia will emphasize its decisiveness, he wrote to Alekseev, as he embarks on a military and economic presence in East Asia.

Tired of the endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as viceroy in the Far East, which effectively made him the tsar's personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20 . And two weeks later, Nikolay removed Alekseev's main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21 .

Alekseev's rise provoked a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22 . The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment came two weeks after their government had proposed to start a new round of negotiations.

Throughout 1903 European foreign ministers were bewildered, alarmed, and often irritated by the constant reversals of tsarist policy that were exposing Russia to ever greater international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his governor still did not take Japan seriously.

Nikolai, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that "there will be no war, because I don't want it" 24 . As a result of fruitless negotiations until the very winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to his office to announce that the government had lost patience with all these "vain negotiations." Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 am local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, Japanese destroyer torpedoes hit three Russian ships in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires are at war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often viewed as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such a rivalry is not unique in an age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s and before the outbreak of the First World War, in Asia and Africa there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe. However, none of them escalated into open war. Differences were invariably resolved by "imperialist diplomacy," 27 an instrument for escaping colonial disputes that were gaining momentum in late XIX century.

An unwritten code determined the relationship between the great powers of Europe. Although strictly fixed rules did not exist here, they were quite clear. Based on hard calculation and a sense of fair play, imperialism's diplomacy was effective. Critical to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the inability of states to recognize new developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, only European governments received membership. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were called into question. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that on February 8, 1904, led to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how Petersburg trampled on his honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia s Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. P. 11-23, and also in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. S. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, 11/22/1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese railway // New time. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. C. 2.
15. For a good example of such opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russo-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. S. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined the term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe the growing influence of Bezobrazov.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. P. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer's classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme ruler of Japan.

Historical events about which we know insultingly little. The death of the Varyag, Tsushima, heroic defense Port Arthur - that, perhaps, is all that immediately pops up in our memory when we remember Russo-Japanese War which began on February 8, 1904. What did little Japan and huge Russia not share? What were the consequences of this? Are the echoes of past battles heard in today's relations between the two countries? Let's figure it out. The Deputy Director of the Institute of Russian History is with us Dmitry Pavlov and naval historian, member of the military historical society Nikolay Manvelov.

Dmitry Borisovich, briefly outline the political situation that preceded the conflict so that we understand its causes.

Relations between Japan and Russia were quite warm throughout the 19th century. They deteriorated after the Sino-Japanese War. Russia initiated pressure on Japan - in terms of revising the terms of peace following the results of this war. And it was very successful for Japan. These are the events of 1895. Since then, anti-Russian sentiment has been on the rise in Japan. But there have always been fears of the great northern neighbor in Japanese society. And in general, these events lay on fertile ground. The specific point of contention was the influence of Russia and Japan in Korea and Manchuria. The degree of influence of this or that empire was the ultimate cause of this war.

Could war have been avoided by fraternally dividing China and Korea? Korea - entirely Japan, Manchuria - Russian. And that was one of Japan's proposals.

- This is not entirely true. There were quite lengthy negotiations throughout half of 1903. In July they began, and at the beginning of 1904 they ended. Their meaning is trading about the degree of influence of countries: Japan in Korea and Russia in Korea and China. And in Manchuria. There is a point of view - and it is common among Japanese historians - that the parties overestimated each other's aggressiveness. It would be possible to agree peacefully. But around this there is a lot of speculation and a lot of mysteries that have not yet been solved.

Nikolai Vladimirovich, how did the forces of Japan and Russia compare in 1904 militarily and economically in the Far East? If you want, you can limit yourself to fleets.

If we consider the Far Eastern naval theater, then in terms of the number of battleships, Russia and Japan had equal forces. If we take cruising destroyer forces, then the Japanese were ahead. In addition, the Japanese had a big plus - there were construction facilities right in the theater of action. The Russians, after the Japanese surprise attack on Port Arthur, had to use the only dock that was in Port Arthur. The situation no longer allowed to drive ships to Vladivostok. To do this, it was necessary to pass the coast of Japan. That is why the Russians had to use the so-called caissons - something like wooden lining on the hulls, in order to be able not to enter the damaged ship into the dock.

Russia already had the Trans-Siberian Railway, a powerful army and 9,000 miles to the theater of operations, while Japan had a strong fleet and Manchuria was within easy reach. Who was in a better position?

- If we are talking about the Trans-Siberian Railway, then everything was not so simple with it. The fact is that this highway was single-track and allowed only a few pairs of trains to run per day. As for the Japanese, yes, they were nearby, but the very first raiding operations of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers showed that Japan was extremely unprotected from cruising operations. There were cases when the captains and owners of passages, who delivered everything necessary to Japan, refused to go to sea because of the danger of stealth cruisers.

This is the historian Nikolai Manvelov. We are talking today about the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Dmitry Pavlov, please, you obviously wanted to add something

Yes, I did. It was about the fleet, but nothing was said about the ground forces. The Trans-Siberian Railway came into operation in the midst of Russo-Japanese negotiations in the summer of 1903. Then average speed traffic on the Trans-Siberian was 27-28 km / h. One way, lots of detours. Plus, by that time, by the beginning of the war, there was no Circum-Baikal Railway. Therefore, during the first wartime winter, trains were dragged right across the ice of Lake Baikal. And in the summer there was a ferry.

What was the international situation like? Preparing for the program, I once again became convinced that England was trying with all her might to set Japan against Russia. The US was on the same side. Germany at that moment was our ally, France occupied some intermediate position. What was the schedule?

France is Russia's closest ally, England has been in allied relations with Japan since January 1902. The Japanese-British treaty of 1902 provided for entry into the war only if a third party intervened in the war. I meant France. And France "mired" in Indochina - then she had colonies there. The likelihood of France entering the war was extremely small. Britain's position is roughly as follows: on the one hand, turn Japan into a shield against Russian expansion towards China, and on the other hand, do everything not to be drawn into hostilities. Germany was inciting Russia against Japan. That is the meaning of her policy. In general, this well-known legend about the "yellow threat" is a propaganda stamp of German origin.

Dmitry Borisovich, how did the Russian public react to the war? Is it true that the Russian liberal intelligentsia sent congratulatory telegrams to the Japanese Emperor after every Japanese victory?

I know nothing about congratulations from the liberal public. It is a fact that the students of several gymnasiums, inspired by the spirit of the liberal movement, sent such telegrams several times. The trouble was that the Japanese were successfully trying to finance the Russian revolutionary movement. This was done through Colonel Motojiro Akashi. Before the war, he was Japan's military attache in St. Petersburg, but from the beginning of hostilities, together with the Japanese diplomatic mission, he moved to Scandinavia, to Stockholm. From there, constantly moving around Europe, he managed to establish contacts with Russians and revolutionaries and liberals. The well-known Paris Peace Inter-Party Conference in September 1904 was held with Japanese money. But the main achievement of this man, this worst enemy of the Russian empire - that's how he can be called, if we talk about covert operations - was that he received a million yen from the Japanese General Staff. Then the yen was very heavy - 98 kopecks. And the then ruble is about one and a half thousand modern rubles. It is easy to calculate what kind of money we are talking about. This money went to the purchase of several ships, weapons and explosives. In the summer of 1905, when hostilities on the Manchurian front actually ceased, this steamer was sent to the St. Petersburg region to supply workers with these rifles to raise an armed uprising in Russia.

Nikolai Vladimirovich, a question for you: you are an expert on fleets, on weapons of that era. What happened in Tsushima with our squadron? The main question of that war and, probably, the most difficult. They name a variety of reasons: from crappy explosives and weak armor of our ships to the mediocrity of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. It was a complete rout.

Few people now remember that the long standing of our squadron in the Madagascar region - in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bNosy Be Bay - was connected with Rozhdestvensky's hope that after the fall of Port Arthur, the squadron would be turned back. Rozhdestvensky understood that he could not win the battle. I'm afraid he just had a desire to follow orders. And the order was to break through to Vladivostok. This is where he broke through.

Why did the Japanese win?

In my opinion, the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War were always a little more lucky than the Russians. If we take the battles in the Yellow Sea - in July 1904, when the Russian squadron of Rear Admiral Witgeft fights with the Japanese squadron of Togo. Then the Russian squadron practically managed to break through, only the flagship was beaten to the point of impossibility - it hardly kept afloat. And at that moment, when the squadron practically broke through, its command was hit by a stray projectile. He got into a group of people standing on the upper bridge. Vitgeft died, several more people died - the squadron was left without leadership. What is it? That little bit of luck. It is quite possible that the same Rozhdestvensky could have been more lucky in this situation.

- Could be lucky and Makarov.

With Makarov, the story is very strange. He was on one of the patrol ships, he was informed that the Japanese were showing strange activity in the fairway. It looked like they were mining the passage in the very place where the squadron was supposed to go in the morning. Makarov was offered to delay the exit of the squadron, but Port Arthur has a very unpleasant feature: there is a fairly short tide, and the depth did not allow the entire squadron to quickly leave. That is, if they had lost time for trawling, they would have lost water, as they say. And Makarov ordered not to trawl the passage. How did it end? We know.

Yes, I ran into a bunch of mines. The Russo-Japanese War is called the dress rehearsal for the First World War. For the first time, hitherto unknown weapons were used, for the first time military-technical innovations of that era were massively applied. Can you elaborate on this?

This is the first use of submarines. Real submarines - not oared, as in the days ...

- Abraham Lincoln?

Yes. Plus a sixth mine. It was necessary to approach, lay a mine, have time to connect the electrical wires in the fuse and have time to run away. There was only one case known when the Som submarine launched an attack on Japanese destroyers. Considering that her speed was 6 knots, and the Japanese went about 30, the Japanese simply left. But it became clear that there is something to be afraid of. By the way, all the wunderwaffes of Port Arthur were somehow connected with the creative rethinking of naval weapons. For example, the Japanese could not even think that sea mines would be dropped on their heads from the mountains. They removed the galvanic shock fuses, attached a fuse cord, and then threw it down. In the Russian fleet there was a very peculiar type of weapon, which was called a throwing mine. This is something like a non-self-propelled torpedo, which was fired from the apparatus and flew about 40 meters through the air, then went through the water. By inertia. All this structure was dismantled from the ship, dragged to land. Then this cigar, in which up to 40 kg of dynamite was invested, was simply fired from a hill. And she flew down an inclined trajectory.

- What is the "Japanese shimosa" that burned through Russian armor?

In Russia, it was believed that the main weapon in the fight against an armadillo was artillery, which would fire armor-piercing shells. Russian shells had a delayed fuse that breaks through an unarmored side and explodes on impact with armor. But the problem is that the battleships of that time did not have the entire side armored. There are cases when, already during peace negotiations, Russian officers saw Japanese ships with clear patched holes. It turns out that the shell pierced the ship through and through and did not explode. The Japanese main idea was that high-explosive explosives should work - the explosion comes from a blow. But the problem came to them later. Shimosa proved to be extremely unstable during storage. There were a lot of unexpected explosions both during and after the war. This substance required very delicate storage. By the way, this is how the Mikas flagship exploded, it happened already in 1906 or 1907.

Do I understand correctly that the submarines were not safe diesel, but were gasoline? Did they burn like matches?

They were not gasoline, they were kerosene. Moreover, several cases are known - people either lit a cigarette, or there was a spark, and the boat exploded. The first submarine "Dolphin" 2 or 3 times perished due to the explosion of kerosene vapor.

- Overalls for submariners, which the Empress allegedly invented?

Indeed, there were overalls sewn from squirrel fur. It was believed that it was cold and very cold on board. high humidity. They stood in Vladivostok, and by order of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, squirrel fur overalls were sewn. It was the only submarine with this kind of uniform. Where these overalls later went and whether other submarines had such overalls is unknown.

Dmitry Pavlov, how do you assess the military gift of our land commander-in-chief Kuropatkin? The fact is that a lot has been said about this: about his mediocrity, his indecision and even about outright cowardice.

Defeat has few friends, but victory has plenty of them. Three villains are known - three mediocrities that pop up in memory when it comes to the Russo-Japanese war. These are Anatoly Mikhailovich Stessel, Alexei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin and Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky. All this is an absolute myth. None of them is a villain, mediocrity or a coward. Kuropatkin is a serious big staff officer, military administrator. But not a general. He wrote magnificent analytical notes, was immersed in military reform, seriously engaged in personnel. But he was not a general.

Was there mutual hatred, Dmitry Borisovich? The Japanese treated our prisoners unusually well. You can remember and compare how cruel they were to the Americans during World War II. They admired the samurai feat of the "Varyag", looked after our graves. Where does this sentimentality, which is completely uncharacteristic of the Japanese, come from?

It is rather characteristic of them, if we talk about the Japanese of the XIX century. In general, the Russo-Japanese war in spirit, in this chivalry, with which most of the episodes of this war are saturated, is certainly not a war of the 20th century, but precisely of the 19th. By the way, the attitude towards prisoners of war was no less humane in Russia. In addition to the Japanese prisoners of war, there were incomparably fewer of them - only 2,500 people. They were kept in the Novgorod province, they were kept there together with pro-Japanese Koreans. The only serious concern of the camp administration was to prevent the Japanese and Koreans from meeting. They immediately started to fight. The regime was as free as that of Russian prisoners of war in Matsuyama and other cities where prisoner of war camps were located. They were dying of boredom, they taught Japanese language, taught English language, corresponded, walked around the city, had affairs with Japanese young ladies and sometimes complained about harassment. And the harassment was absolutely domestic kind.

At the beginning of our conversation, you said that the war is shrouded in secrets, myths and conjectures. Please name the most common. Confirm or debunk them.

Who fired the first shot in this war?

- The Japanese.

You see, it is also one of the stamps that we constantly replicate. Most of the English-speaking world, and the Japanese themselves, believe that the first shot was fired by the Russians. This was done by the gunboat "Koreets" on the afternoon of February 8, 1904, about 20 minutes sailing from the then Chemulpo, now Korean Incheon. This is the sea gate of Seoul. The second myth is that, in general, the parties could come to an agreement. If the last very benevolent government telegram had arrived in Tokyo on time, then there would have been no hostilities. The telegram was delayed by the Japanese telegraph, probably with intent. It went on for two days, although the usual transmission time is by no means more than a day. I have already mentioned the third myth - the myth of obvious villains or mediocrity on the Russian side in the person of the command. I can repeat: Rozhdestvensky, Stessel and Kuropatkin. Why did Russia not put the squeeze on Japan after all? Indeed, by the summer of 1905, in the Far East, through the increased exploitation of the Trans-Siberian Railway, it was possible to concentrate a group of about one million people. The commander was replaced, Linevich became instead of Kuropatkin. Around this, too, there is a lot of speculation. Few people here know that Japan was so dissatisfied with the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty that in Tokyo - a rare case in Japanese history - a riot took place for two or three days. The well-known Tokyo Riot of early September 1905.

- They wanted money?

Not only money, they wanted all of Sakhalin. They wanted a serious indemnity, they wanted Russia's consent to Japan's exclusive influence on the Korean Peninsula. Russia could not guarantee this.

- Results and consequences of the Russian-Japanese war? Nikolay Vladimirovich.

If we take the fleet, then Russia completely loses the naval base in Port Arthur. Russia is experiencing a kind of shame associated with the heroic death of the Varyag. "Varyag" was really flooded in shallow water, it was set on fire. The Japanese will raise it a year later, after which it will join the Japanese fleet. In 1916, the ship will be sold to the Russian Empire. But the most interesting thing is different: when the Varyag enters service in 1907, the commander of the Varyag, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, will receive the Order of the Rising Sun from the Japanese Emperor. This will coincide with the fact that Rudnev will be removed from the fleet. And it is still unknown: did Nicholas II give him permission to wear this order?

- Did you receive the order after retirement or before?

- Dmitry Borisovich, what are your results of that war?

Russia is losing not only the Pacific Fleet, it is withdrawing from the Far East. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is changing, who is reorienting Russian policy towards the western and southern directions. The priority is not approval on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, but a breakthrough to the Black Sea. Fight for the Black Sea Straits. A completely different combination is emerging - the Entente - in which Russia enters the First World War. I would like to remind respected listeners that World War I was a time of unprecedentedly warm and trusting Russian-Japanese relations.

With us were: Deputy Director of the Institute of Russian History Dmitry Pavlov and fleet historian, member of the military historical society Nikolai Manvelov. We talked about the 1904 war between Russia and Japan. We complete the program to the sounds of the famous waltz "On the Hills of Manchuria". It was written by the composer Ilya Shatrov during the years of the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the Music Company of the 214th Infantry Regiment. He dedicated this melody to his comrades who died near Mukden.

RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR(1904–1905), war between Russia and Japan for dominance in Northern China (Manchuria) and Korea.

The cause of the war was Russian expansion in Manchuria. In May 1896, Russia obtained from China a concession for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) from Harbin to Port Arthur, and in March 1898, the lease of the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula (Kwantung) and Port Arthur, which soon turned into its main naval base in the Far East. In 1900, taking advantage of the Yihetuan uprising in China, Russian troops occupied Manchuria. However, Russia's attempt to maintain its military presence there ran into opposition from Japan, Great Britain and the United States, who did not want the strengthening of Russian influence in Northern China. In January 1902, Japan and Great Britain signed an alliance treaty directed against Russia. In this situation, in March 1902, Russia was forced to conclude an agreement with China, undertaking to withdraw its troops from Manchuria within eighteen months, but in every possible way delayed its implementation, which led to a sharp aggravation of its relations with Japan. In March 1903, Russia demanded that China provide guarantees that it would not lease any part of Manchurian territory to another power without its consent; the Chinese government, backed by Japan and Britain, refused. In July 1903, Japan proposed to Russia a plan for the division of spheres of influence in northern China, but subsequent negotiations were unsuccessful. January 23 (February 5), 1904 Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia.

In the upcoming war, the Japanese command considered its main task to be the destruction of the Russian Pacific Fleet, the capture of Port Arthur and the defeat of the Russian army in Manchuria (the Manchurian army of General A.N. Kuropatkin). On the night of January 26-27 (February 8-9), 1904, without waiting for the declaration of war, Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Pacific Fleet in the Port Arthur roadstead and disabled the best Russian battleships Retvizan and Tsesarevich, as well as the cruiser "Pallada". On January 27 (February 9), Rear Admiral Uriu's squadron attacked the Varyag cruiser and the Korean gunboat in the Korean port of Chemulpo; after a short but fierce battle, the Russian ships were scuttled by their crews. On the same day, Russia declared war on Japan.

Admiral Togo blocked the Pacific Fleet in Port Arthur, whose commander, Vice Admiral O.V. Stark, adhered to passive tactics. Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov, who replaced him on February 24 (March 8), proceeded to active operations, organizing a number of successful sorties against the enemy fleet, but on March 31 (April 13), his flagship battleship Petropavlovsk was blown up by a mine; S.O. Makarov died. The new commander, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft, abandoned offensive tactics. Taking advantage of the inactivity of the Russians, Togo tried on the night of April 19-20 (May 2-3) to destroy the Pacific Fleet with the help of firewalls, but failed. At the same time, the Vladivostok cruiser squadron of Rear Admiral Jessen conducted several raids off the northern coast of Japan and disrupted its trade communications.

The Japanese launched active hostilities on land as well. General Kuroka's 1st Japanese Army landed in Korea, captured its capital, Seoul, and moved to the Sino-Korean border. On the night of April 17-18 (April 30-May 1), 1904, she crossed the Yalu River and entered Manchuria, on April 18 (May 1) she defeated the consolidated reserve corps of General M.I. Zasulich and on April 23 (May 6) occupied the city of Fynhuangchen. M.I. Zasulich led the corps to Liaoyang, where the main Russian forces were concentrated.

On April 21–22 (May 4–5), in the east of the Liaodong Peninsula, near the town of Biziwo, without encountering any resistance, the 2nd Japanese army of General Oku landed. On May 13 (26), in the course of fierce six-day battles, she captured the fortifications of Jinzhou and blocked Port Arthur from land. Capturing the trading port of Dalniy and Talien Bay, it ensured the landing of the 3rd Japanese army of General Nogi, and on June 1–2 (14–15) at Vafangou repelled an attempt by the corps of Lieutenant General A.F. Shtakelberg to break through to Port Arthur.

By decision of the Japanese commander-in-chief, Marshal I. Oyama, the Nogi army began the siege of Port Arthur, while the 1st, 2nd and 4th armies, which had landed at Dagushan, moved to Liaoyang from the southeast, south and southwest. On June 12–14 (25–27) Kuroki's army occupied the passes southeast of the city, and on July 4 (17) repelled an attempted Russian counteroffensive. The Oku army after the battle at Dashichao on July 11 (24) captured the port of Yingkou, cutting off the connection of the Manchurian army with Port Arthur by sea. In the second half of July, three Japanese armies joined at Liaoyang; them total strength was more than 120 thousand against 152 thousand Russians. In the battle of Liaoyang on August 11-21 (August 24-September 3), both sides suffered huge losses: the Russians lost more than 16 thousand killed, and the Japanese - 24 thousand; the Japanese were unable to encircle the army of A.N. Kuropatkin, which retreated to Mukden in perfect order, but they captured Liaoyang and the Yantai coal mines.

The retreat of the Russians to Mukden meant for the defenders of Port Arthur the collapse of hopes for any effective help from ground forces. On July 17 (30), the Japanese 3rd Army captured the Wolf Mountains and began intensive shelling of the city and the internal raid. Nevertheless, several assaults undertaken by her on August 1-12 (14-25) were repulsed by the garrison under the command of Major General R.I. Kondratenko; the besiegers lost 16,000 dead. At the same time, the Japanese succeeded at sea. An attempt to break through the Pacific Fleet to Vladivostok on July 28 (August 9) failed; Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft died. On August 1 (14), the squadron of Vice Admiral Kamimura managed to overtake and defeat the cruising detachment of Rear Admiral Jessen.

By the beginning of October, thanks to reinforcements, the number of the Manchurian army reached 210 thousand, and the Japanese troops near Liaoyang - 170 thousand. Fearing that in the event of the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese forces would increase significantly due to the released 3rd Army, A.N. Kuropatkin on September 22 (October 5) launched an offensive to the south, but was defeated in the battle on the Shahe River on September 26 - October 6 (October 9-19), losing 46 thousand killed (the enemy - only 16 thousand), and went on the defensive . The four-month "Shahei Sitting" began. At this time, the Manchurian army was reorganized into three armies: 1st (N.P. Linevich), 2nd (O.-F.K. Grippenberg) and 3rd (A.V. Kaulbars) under the general command of A .M.Kuropatkina.

In September-November, the defenders of Port Arthur repulsed three Japanese assaults. But on November 13–22 (November 26–December 5), the 3rd Japanese Army captured Mount Vysokaya, which dominated Port Arthur. On December 2 (15), R.I. Kondratenko, the soul of the city's defense, died. On December 15 (28), the Japanese took Fort Erlungshan and became the masters of the entire northeastern front of the fortress. On December 20 (January 2, 1905), the head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, Lieutenant-General A.M. Stessel, without exhausting all possibilities for resistance, surrendered Port Arthur (in the spring of 1908, a military court sentenced him to death, commuted to ten years in prison).

The fall of Port Arthur sharply worsened the strategic position of the Russians; the command tried to turn the tide and take the initiative into their own hands. However, the attack of the 2nd Manchurian Army on the village of Sandepa, successfully launched on January 12 (25), 1905, was not supported by other armies, and on January 16 (29) it was stopped. After joining the main forces of the Japanese 3rd Noga Army, their number was equal to the number of Russian troops. On February 5 (18), they launched an offensive on the Russian left flank. On February 11 (24) Kuroki's army attacked the 1st Manchurian army southeast of Mukden, and on February 13 (26) Nogi's army began bypassing the Russian right flank. Counterattacks by A.V. Kaulbars on February 20–21 (March 5–6) were unsuccessful. February 24 (March 9) Kuroki broke through the front of the army of N.P. Linevich. Having lost more than 90 thousand killed and captured, the Russian troops retreated north to Telin in disarray. The largest defeat near Mukden meant the loss of the campaign in Manchuria by the Russian command, although he managed to save a significant part of the army. On March 2 (15), A.N. Kuropatkin was replaced by N.P. Linevich, who fortified at Sypingai.

The last chance Russian government to achieve a turning point in the war by sending to the Far East the 2nd Pacific squadron of Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, created from part of the Baltic Fleet (on April 30 (May 13), 1905, the 3rd Pacific squadron of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov joined), was lost after her crushing defeat on May 14–15 (27–28) near Tsushima Island in the Korea Strait; only one cruiser and two destroyers reached Vladivostok. At the beginning of the summer, the Japanese completely ousted the Russian detachments from North Korea, and by June 25 (July 8) captured Sakhalin.

Despite the victories, Japan's forces were exhausted, and at the end of May, through the mediation of US President T. Roosevelt, she invited Russia to enter into peace negotiations. Russia, which found itself in a difficult domestic political situation, agreed. On July 25 (August 7) ​​a diplomatic conference opened in Portsmouth (New Hampshire, USA), which ended on August 23 (September 5) with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. According to its terms, Russia ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, the rights to lease Port Arthur and the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Chanchun station to Port Arthur, allowed its fishing fleet to fish off the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. , recognized Korea as a zone of Japanese influence and renounced its political, military and commercial advantages in Manchuria; at the same time, she was exempt from paying any indemnity; the belligerents pledged to withdraw their troops from Manchuria.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan became the leading power in the Far East. Russia's foreign policy positions were seriously undermined. The defeat also exposed the vices of its military organization (the technical backwardness of the fleet, the weakness of the senior command staff, the shortcomings of the control and supply system) and contributed to the deepening of the crisis of the monarchical system.

Ivan Krivushin

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905 Russo-Japanese War 1904‒1905, arose in the context of the intensified struggle of the imperialist powers for the division of semi-feudal China and Korea; was predatory, unjust, imperialistic in nature on both sides. In the unfolding rivalry of powers in the Far East, capitalist Japan played a particularly active role, striving to capture Korea and Northeast China (Manchuria). Defeated China in Japanese-Chinese war 1894‒1895, Japan by Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895 received the islands of Taiwan (Formosa), Penghuledao (Pescadores) and the Liaodong Peninsula, but under pressure from Russia, supported by France and Germany, she was forced to abandon the latter, after which the aggravation of Russian-Japanese relations began. In 1896, Russia received a concession from the Chinese government to build a railway through Manchuria, and in 1898 leased the Kwantung Peninsula from China with Port Arthur ( Luishunem) with the right to create a naval base on it. During suppression Yihetuan uprising in China, tsarist troops occupied Manchuria in 1900. Japan began energetic preparations for war with Russia, signing in 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. The tsarist government, whose aggressive policy in the Far East was directed by adventurist "bezobrazovskaya clique", counted on an easy victory in the war with Japan, which would make it possible to overcome the worsening revolutionary crisis.

In economic and military terms, Japan was much weaker than Russia, but the remoteness of the Far Eastern theater of operations from the center of Russia reduced the military capabilities of the latter. After mobilization, the Japanese army consisted of 13 infantry divisions and 13 reserve brigades (over 375 thousand people and 1140 field guns); in total, the Japanese government mobilized about 1.2 million people during the war. The Japanese Navy had 6 new and 1 old battleship, 8 armored cruisers (2 of them, built abroad, arrived after the start of the war), 17 light cruisers (including 3 old ones), 19 destroyers, 28 destroyers (only in part of the so-called United Fleet), 11 gunboats, etc.

Russia was not ready for a war in the Far East. With a personnel army of 1.1 million people. and a reserve of 3.5 million people, by January 1904 it had here only about 98 thousand people, 148 guns and 8 machine guns; the border guard numbered 24 thousand people. and 26 guns. These forces were scattered over a vast territory from Chita to Vladivostok and from Blagoveshchensk to Port Arthur. Bandwidth Siberian Railway the highway was very low (at first, only 3 pairs of military echelons per day). During the war, about 1.2 million people were sent to Manchuria. (most in 1905). The Russian Navy in the Far East had 7 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 10 light cruisers (including 3 old ones), 2 mine cruisers, 3 destroyers (1 of them entered service after the start of the war), 7 gunboats: most of the ships were based on Port Arthur, 4 cruisers (including 3 armored ones) and 10 destroyers - to Vladivostok. Defensive structures Port Arthur (especially land) were not completed. Pursuing an adventurist policy unsecured by forces and means, the tsarist government considered Japan a weak adversary and allowed itself to be taken by surprise.

The Russian command assumed that the Japanese army would not be able to launch an offensive on land soon. Therefore, the troops in the Far East were tasked with holding back the enemy until the arrival of large forces from the center of Russia (in the 7th month of the war), then going on the offensive, throwing Japanese troops into the sea and landing troops in Japan. The fleet was supposed to fight for supremacy at sea and prevent the landing of Japanese troops.

From the beginning of the war until August 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers conducted active operations on the enemy’s sea lanes, destroying 15 steamships, including 4 military transports, and heroically fighting the superior forces of the Japanese on August 1 (14) in a battle in Korea Strait. R.'s last stage - I. in. appeared Battle of Tsushima 1905. Russian 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, they made an 18,000-mile transition (32.5 thousand km) from the Baltic Sea around Africa and on May 14 (27) approached the Tsushima Strait, where they entered into battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet. In a two-day naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated, which meant "... not only a military defeat, but a complete military collapse of the autocracy" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 10, p. 252 ).

Despite the victory, Japan was exhausted by the war, anti-war sentiment was growing in it, Russia was engulfed in revolution, and the tsarist government sought to make peace as soon as possible. On May 18 (31), 1905, the military government turned to US President T. Roosevelt with a request for mediation in peace negotiations, which began on July 27 (August 9) in the American city of Portsmouth. August 23 (September 5) was signed Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, according to which Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese influence, transferred to Japan the lease rights of Russia to the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin.

The root causes of Russia's defeat in R.-I. in. were the reactionary and rotten tsarism, the inability of the high military command, the unpopularity of the war among the people, the low combat quality of the replacements manned by the storekeepers, including the older ages, who did not have sufficient combat training, the poor preparedness of a significant part of the officer corps, insufficient material and technical support, poor knowledge of the theater of operations, etc. Japan won the war with widespread support from Britain and the United States. From April 1904 to May 1905, she received 4 loans from them in the amount of 410 million dollars, which covered 40% of military expenses. The most important result of R.-I. in. was the establishment of Japanese imperialism in Korea and South Manchuria. Already on November 17, 1905, Japan imposed a protectorate agreement on Korea, and in 1910 included it in the Japanese Empire. The strengthening of Japanese imperialism in the Far East changed the attitude of the United States towards Japan, which became a more dangerous competitor for them than Russia.

The war had a great influence on the development of military art (see. operational art). It was the first time that rapid-fire weapons (rifles, machine guns) were used on a mass scale. In defense, trenches have replaced the complex fortifications of the past. The need for closer interaction between the branches of the armed forces and the widespread use of technical means of communication has become obvious. Artillery firing from closed positions became widespread. Destroyers were used for the first time at sea. Based on the experience of the war in the Russian army, military reforms 1905‒12.

R.-i. in. brought the peoples of Russia and Japan a deterioration in their financial situation, an increase in taxes and prices. Japan's public debt increased 4 times, its losses amounted to 135 thousand killed and died from wounds and diseases and about 554 thousand wounded and sick. Russia spent 2347 million rubles on the war, about 500 million rubles were lost in the form of property that went to Japan and sunk ships and vessels. Russia's losses amounted to 400 thousand killed, wounded, sick and captured. The Far Eastern adventure of tsarism, which led to heavy defeats accompanied by heavy casualties, aroused the indignation of the peoples of Russia and hastened the beginning of the first bourgeois-democratic Revolution of 1905–07.

Lit .: Lenin V.I., To the Russian proletariat, Complete collection soch., 5th ed., vol. 8; his same, First of May. Draft leaflet, ibid.; his, The Fall of Port Arthur, ibid., vol. 9; his, First of May, ibid., vol. 10; his own, Rout, ibid., vol. 10; Yaroslavsky E., Russo-Japanese War and the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards it, M., 1939; Russo-Japanese War 1904‒1905 The work of the military-historical commission on the description of the Russian-Japanese war, vol. 1–9, St. Petersburg. 1910; Russo-Japanese War 1904‒1905. The work of the historical commission on the description of the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904‒1905. at the Naval General Staff, Prince. 1–7, St. Petersburg, 1912–18; Kuropatkin A.N., [Report...], vol. 1‒4, St. Petersburg - Warsaw, 1906; Svechin A., Russo-Japanese War 1904‒1905, Oranienbaum, 1910; Levitsky N. A., Russo-Japanese War of 1904‒1905, 3rd ed., M., 1938; Romanov B. A., Essays on the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese war. 1895‒1907, 2nd ed., M. ‒ L., 1955; Sorokin A.I., The Russo-Japanese War of 1904‒1905, M., 1956: Luchinin V., The Russo-Japanese War of 1904‒1905 Bibliographic index, M., 1939.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

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Japan and Russia were incomparable neither in terms of human potential - the difference was almost threefold, nor in terms of the capabilities of the armed forces - the Japanese themselves feared that an angry "bear" could put up a three millionth army in the event of mobilization.

The thesis, familiar since Soviet times, that the conflict with the samurai was lost due to the rottenness of tsarism, “the general backwardness of Russia” completely coincides with the conclusions that are contained in many in Western publications. Their essence boils down to a simple one - they say, "corrupt tsarism could not effectively wage war." The views of our and Western historians do not often coincide, what is the reason for such a unity of opinion?

Almost all researchers agree that hard work, self-sacrifice, patriotism, high combat skills of soldiers, the skill of military leaders, and exceptional discipline helped the Japanese to win - praise can be continued indefinitely. Let's try to figure it all out.

To what extent were the officers and soldiers of the Land of the Rising Sun ready to sacrifice themselves, as they like to say now? To what extent did their fighting spirit surpass the patriotism of our soldiers and sailors? After all, the Russians are credited with a tendency to rebellion not only in the rear - this is about the Potemkin battleship, but even at the front - let's recall the description of a small rebellion on the Eagle battleship before the Tsushima battle. How sharply this contrasts with the description of the life of Japanese sailors, which became public thanks to the pen of French journalists: the crew members of a Japanese armored cruiser in their free time wove woolen socks for their army colleagues!

In order to dot the "i", let's turn to Japanese sources. It's about about feature films created in the Land of the Rising Sun itself. And far from in order to instill pacifist feelings among the subjects of the emperor, but, as they say, to the descendants as an example.

Talking about the life of ordinary sailors on the flagship of the Japanese squadron "Mikasa", filmmakers show all its ins and outs - mass fights, theft, disobedience to orders, hazing.

There is also an element unfamiliar to us: the foremen lend money to the sailors at a high percentage. The Russian army and navy, thank God, never knew such a "bouquet" of violations. So it is understandable why, despite external discipline, the Mikasa crew rebelled immediately after arriving from England in 1902.

Now - about readiness for self-sacrifice. We, as, indeed, the majority of the world, have a completely false idea of ​​​​all Japanese as kamikaze pilots. It is also necessary to take into account the following: the courage of the Japanese was blown away as soon as they began to fail in battles. As historians recall, in 1904, after several unsuccessful attempts to storm Port Arthur, right on the front line, the 8th Infantry Regiment refused to obey orders, and many Japanese officers were going to desert, flee to Shanghai for fear of dying.

Another argument in favor of the exclusivity of the Japanese is as follows: they acted exceptionally competently in battle, due to which they won. Let us even recall the well-known rhyme of those times: “In Manchuria, Kuroki in practice gives Kuropatkin lessons in tactics.” This quality allegedly allowed the Japanese to prevail. In fact, this is just a zealously inflated myth. What kind of literacy can we talk about when the Russian fortifications in Port Arthur were stormed head-on through a well-targeted area several times. And the same Admiral Heihatiro Togo, proclaimed almost the military genius of that war, could not explain to his admirers why in August 1904 he did not attack the Russian squadron, which had huddled together after the failure of the flagship Tsesarevich. Another question: why did he suddenly expose his flagship to the concentrated fire of the most powerful Russian ships at the initial stage of the Tsushima battle, almost dying himself?

The actions of our enemies did not differ in the special coherence of the various units.

According to an Englishman, captain of the first rank William Pakinham, who was seconded to the squadron of Admiral Togo, after the end of the first day of Tsushima, when the Japanese gave the order to attack the remnants of the Second Pacific Squadron to their destroyers, one of them, avoiding a collision with a ship of another formation that suddenly emerged from the darkness , made a sharp turn and rolled over. Probably, those who say that the root of all the fantastic victories of the Japanese in the exceptional luck of the admiral are right.

We were somewhat inferior to the Japanese in the design of artillery systems, however, the Japanese were also far from good in everything: their Arisaka rifle noticeably lost to the Russian rifle of Sergei Mosin in a number of important characteristics. Samurai are simply unable to compete with the best Russian cavalry in the world, and, most importantly, our opponents could not compete in physical strength with our warriors.

Well, what helped the Japanese win? I think it made itself felt a whole range of factors - both subjective and objective. One of the main ones is the extremely careful handling of military secrets by the Japanese, our rivals were able to classify even the death of two of the six battleships they had. What can we say about smaller destroyers - they went to the bottom in “packs”, but the Japanese stubbornly denied everything, and after a while they commissioned the same type, that is, the same ship under the same name. The world and Russian public believed, and the myth of the invincibility of enemies was born. Naturally, all this affected the mood among our military. The Japanese, on the other hand, drew all the information about our losses, troop movements and the appointment of new commanders from Russian newspapers.

Our gendarmerie, which was then entrusted with the function of counterintelligence, simply could not cope with the new conditions for it - many of its employees were simply unable to distinguish a Japanese from a Chinese.

Things got to the point that in the summer of 1904, as is clear from the front-line reports of the Niva magazine, the strictest order was issued to shoot all Asians who appeared on the combat positions of our troops.

Let's not discount the underestimation of the enemy: at first, the tsar did not want to transfer a single formation from the European part of Russia, and the second Pacific squadron began to be equipped on the road only after the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov.

Another reason is the peculiarity of the Russian spirit. After all, we are accustomed to wage war with the expectation of a gradual gathering of forces for a subsequent crushing blow against the enemy. An example is the Patriotic War of 1812, when we retreated to Moscow, and the Great Patriotic War. As the saying goes, Russians harness slowly but drive fast. So in those years, statements were heard like "The Japanese will inevitably be defeated, if not near Luoyang, then near Mukden, not near Mukden, then near Harbin, not near Harbin, then near Chita." History has not given us this chance.

But there was also the lack of will of Russian diplomacy. The office on Pevchesky was unable to use the fact of the attack on Port Arthur without declaring war to isolate Tokyo internationally.

The diplomats were also unable to resolve the issue of passing the most powerful battleships of the Black Sea Fleet through the straits controlled by Turkey. Instead, the Foreign Ministry preferred to write horror stories about a possible war with England, Afghanistan and Turkey in the event of the passage of our ships.

Evil tongues then accused Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf of weakness of character, seeing the reason in his unconventional sexual orientation ...

The main reason was the initially wrong decision to place the main naval base in Port Arthur. It is more than nine hundred kilometers from the Korea Strait, which was and still is the hub of ship routes between Russia, China, Korea, Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia. No wonder the sailors did not like this city, calling it a "hole". Therefore, the naval command, in order to sweeten the pill, formally considered the entire Pacific Fleet ... the Pacific squadron of the Baltic Fleet. The situation of the main base was aggravated by the fact that it was connected with the metropolis by a thin “thread” of the railway, the final part of which ran through Manchuria, a territory that then had an incomprehensible status - it seemed that it was not Chinese, but not completely Russian either. But naval strategists persisted—we needed an ice-free harbor in the Pacific, period.

The most realistic position on this issue was taken, oddly enough, by the then Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin. At the very end of 1903, he sent a note to the authorities, in which, in particular, he wrote that Port Arthur, “being away from our natural defensive line running along the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan, and being at a distance from it from 600 to 1000 miles, it cannot serve as a support for our naval operations along this coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack; in particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea with the Japanese outpost of Fusan existing here remains open to unpunished seizure, and, being at a distance of 600 to 1200 miles from the northern ports of our main enemy - Japan, our fleet in Port Arthur would be completely deprived of the opportunity to prevent and even threaten the advance of the Japanese fleet to the Korean or our coast. This base does not even cover the western coast of Korea and the approaches to Seoul, because it is located at a distance of 350 km in front of the entrance to the Yellow Sea, that is, in front of the front of the enemy offensive, which, moreover, will firmly rely on all the ports of the southern and southwestern coast of Korea. . Finally, being at a distance of 1080 miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains completely cut off from it, because the line of communication, on the one hand, does not have intermediate strongholds, on the other, it is subject to attack by the Japanese fleet along its entire length.

The outbreak of war then fully confirmed his fears.

Moreover, in his note A. Kuropatkin went much further - he proposed to leave not only Port Arthur, but the whole of South Manchuria, referring to the arguments - we simply may not have enough strength to simultaneously defend Port Arthur and conduct large-scale hostilities with the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea. Anticipating possible objections, the general argued that industrial enterprises there are not too many in these parts, and therefore the costs of a possible departure will not be too great. Altogether, he cites more than a dozen arguments in favor of our leaving South Manchuria.

Well versed in all the intricacies of the functioning of the state machine, A. Kuropatkin was well aware that his innovative plan had little chance of being implemented. Therefore, he sent it out "fan", in the hope of enlisting support at least somewhere. But everyone was silent.

And so the war begins. Kuropatkin is appointed to the post of commander of the Manchurian army. And then strange things begin to happen - the Russian army suffers one humiliating defeat after another, and, as it seems to an outside observer, completely empty place. For example, near Luoyang, we, having retreated before the panicked Japanese, who were preparing to retreat, simply gave up the victory. Almost the same thing happened near Mukden at the beginning of 1905: Kuropatkin refused to send Russian reserves into battle at a critical moment for the Japanese, for which he was publicly insulted by another Russian commander. Doesn't this speak of Kuropatkin's stubborn, fatal desire to still realize his plan of leaving South Manchuria? After all, that is what eventually happened. It turns out that the commander expected that in the event of a defeat, he would remain in the highest echelons of power - which happened.

Finally, one more question that often arises: could Russia continue the war after the Battle of Tsushima? The same Vladimir Linevich, appointed to the post of commander of the Russian army after the removal of Kuropatkin, later stated that he could defeat the Japanese. He is echoed in his memoirs by the future leader of the White movement in southern Russia, Anton Denikin, saying that we could put the squeeze on the Japanese. But these are the opinions of generals who do not represent the role of the fleet very well.

It should be understood: after the defeat of the Russian squadron, the Japanese owned the sea. And this meant that they could freely and quickly land troops wherever they pleased - for example, they were already testing the ground for an invasion of Kamchatka.

We were unable to do anything in response - we were able to concentrate troops only at the final points of our railways.

Of course, the Russo-Japanese War, despite allegations that all the facts about it are known, is still not fully understood. To more or less clarify the situation, work is needed both in Russian and in Japanese, Chinese and Korean archives. And this is not a task for one generation of researchers.

One thing is clear - assurances about the invincibility of the Japanese army and the genius of its military leaders are simply a myth.