Many serious works and no less frivolous fiction have been written about the Russo-Japanese battles. However, even today, more than a century later, researchers are arguing: what was the main reason for the shameful and fatal defeat of Russia? The complete unpreparedness of a huge, unorganized empire for decisive military action, or the mediocrity of commanders? Or maybe the miscalculations of politicians?

Zheltorossiya: an unfulfilled project

In 1896, the real state councilor Alexander Bezobrazov submitted a report to the emperor, in which he proposed to colonize China, Korea and Mongolia. The Yellow Russia project provoked a lively debate in court circles... And a nervous outcry in Japan, which, in need of resources, claimed dominance in the Pacific region. The role of the catalyst in the conflict was played by Britain, who did not want Russia to turn into a gigantic colonial power. Diplomats recalled that all the Russian-Japanese negotiations that took place on the eve of the war were attended by the British - advisers and consultants of the Japanese side.

Nevertheless, Russia was gaining a foothold on the east coast: the governorship of the Far East was established, Russian troops occupied part of Manchuria, resettlement began in Harbin and the fortification of Port Arthur, which was called the gate to Beijing ... Moreover, preparations began officially for the inclusion of Korea into the Russian Empire. The latter became the notorious drop that overflowed the cup of the Japanese.

One minute before the attack

Actually, the war in Russia was expected. Both the “bezobrazovskaya clique” (as those who financially supported the projects of Mr. Bezobrazov) and Nicholas II soberly believed that a military competition for the region was, alas, inevitable. Could it have been bypassed? Yes, but at too high a price - the price of the Russian crown not only abandoning colonial ambitions, but the Far Eastern territories as a whole.
The Russian government foresaw the war and even prepared for it: roads were built, ports were strengthened. Diplomats did not sit idly by: relations with Austria, Germany and France improved, which should have provided Russia, if not support, then at least European non-intervention.

However, the Russian politicians still hoped that Japan would not take risks. And even when the cannons rumbled, the country was dominated by hatred: is it really some kind of Japan in comparison with huge, mighty Russia? Yes, we will defeat the adversary in a matter of days!

However, was Russia so powerful? The Japanese, for example, had three times as many destroyers. And the battleships built in England and France surpassed the Russian ships in a number of the most important indicators. The Japanese naval artillery also had an undoubted advantage. As for the ground forces, the number of Russian troops beyond Baikal, including border guards and the protection of various objects, was 150 thousand military personnel, while the Japanese army after the announced mobilization exceeded 440 thousand bayonets.

Intelligence informed the tsar about the superiority of the enemy. She asserts: Japan is fully prepared for a skirmish and is waiting opportunity. But it seems that the Russian emperor forgot Suvorov's testament that procrastination is similar to death. The Russian elite hesitated and hesitated...

The feat of the ships and the fall of Port Arthur

The war broke out without a declaration. On the night of January 27, 1904, an armada of Japanese warships attacked a Russian flotilla stationed in a roadstead near Port Arthur. The Mikado warriors struck a second blow near Seoul: there, in Chemulpo Bay, the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreyets, guarding the Russian mission in Korea, took an unequal battle. Since ships from Britain, the United States, Italy and France were nearby, the duel could be said to have taken place before the eyes of the world. Having sunk several enemy vessels,

"Varyag" with "Korean" preferred the seabed to Japanese captivity:

We did not let down before the enemy
Glorious Andreevsky flag,
No, we blew up the Korean
We sunk the Varyag...

By the way, a year later, the Japanese were not too lazy to raise the legendary cruiser from the bottom to make it a training watercraft. Remembering the defenders of the Varyag, they left the ship its honest name, adding on board: "Here we will teach you how to love your Fatherland."

Busi's heirs failed to take Port Arthur. The fortress withstood four assaults, but remained unshakable. During the siege, the Japanese lost 50 thousand soldiers, however, the losses of Russia were extremely noticeable: 20 thousand killed soldiers. Would Port Arthur survive? Perhaps, but in December, unexpectedly for many, General Stessel decided to surrender the citadel along with the garrison.

Mukden meat grinder and Tsushima rout

The battle near Mukden broke the record of military crowding: over half a million people on both sides. The battle lasted 19 days almost without interruption. As a result, the army of General Kuropatkin was completely defeated: 60 thousand Russian soldiers died the death of the brave. Historians are unanimous: the closeness and negligence of the commanders (the headquarters gave conflicting orders), their underestimation of the enemy’s forces and blatant sloppiness, which had a detrimental effect on providing the army with material and technical means, are to blame for the disaster.

The “control” blow was for Russia the battle of Tsushima. On May 14, 1905, 120 brand new battleships and cruisers under Japanese flags surrounded the Russian squadron, which arrived from the Baltic. Only three ships - including the Aurora, which played a special role years later - managed to escape from the deadly ring. 20 Russian battleships were sunk. Seven more were boarded. More than 11 thousand sailors became prisoners.

In the deep Tsushima Strait,
Far from native land
At the bottom, in the deep ocean
Forgotten there are ships
There Russian admirals sleep
And the sailors doze around
They grow coral
Between the fingers of outstretched hands ...

The Russian army was crushed, the Japanese army was so exhausted that the proud descendants of the samurai agreed to negotiate. Peace was concluded in August, in the American Portsmouth - according to the agreement, Russia ceded Port Arthur and part of Sakhalin to the Japanese, and also abandoned attempts to colonize Korea and China. However, the unsuccessful military campaign put an end not only to the expansion of Russia to the East, but, as it turned out later, to the monarchy in general. The “small victorious war”, which the Russian elite so hoped for, overturned the throne forever.

noble enemies

Newspapers of that time abound with photographs from Japanese captivity. On them, high-cheeked and narrow-eyed doctors, nurses, soldiers, and even members of the Japanese imperial family willingly pose with Russian officers and privates. It is hard to imagine something like this later, during the war with the Germans...

The attitude of the Japanese towards prisoners of war became the standard on the basis of which many international conventions were created years later. “All wars are based on political disagreements between states,” the Japanese military department said, “so one should not inflame hatred of the people.”

In 28 camps opened in Japan, 71,947 Russian sailors, soldiers, and officers were kept. Of course, they were treated differently, especially since becoming a prisoner of war for a Japanese meant tarnishing his honor, but on the whole, the humane policy of the War Ministry was respected. The Japanese spent 30 sen for the maintenance of a Russian prisoner-soldier (twice as much for an officer), while only 16 sen went for their own, Japanese warrior. The meals of the prisoners consisted of breakfast, lunch, dinner, as well as tea drinking, and, eyewitnesses noted, the menu was varied, and the officers had the opportunity to hire a personal chef.

Heroes and traitors

More than 100 thousand privates and officers were laid in the graves of the war. And the memory of many is still alive.
For example, the commander of the "Varyag" Vsevolod Rudnev. Having received an ultimatum from Admiral Uriu, the cruiser captain decided to go for a breakthrough, which he informed the team about. During the battle, the crippled, shot through Varyag managed to fire 1105 shells at the enemy. And only after that the captain, having transferred the rest of the team to foreign ships, gave the order to open the kingstones. The courage of the Varyag impressed the Japanese so much that later Vsevolod Rudnev received from them the prestigious Order of the Rising Sun. True, he never wore this award.

Vasily Zverev, the mechanic of the destroyer "Strong", did something completely unprecedented: he closed the hole with himself, enabling the ship, defeated by the enemy, to return to port and save the crew. This unthinkable act was reported by all foreign newspapers without exception.

Of course, among the numerous heroes were privates. The Japanese, who value duty above all else, admired the resilience of intelligence officer Vasily Ryabov. During the interrogation, the captured Russian spy did not answer a single question and was sentenced to death. However, even at gunpoint, Vasily Ryabov behaved, according to the Japanese, as befits a samurai - with honor.

As far as criminals are concerned, public opinion announced Adjutant General Baron Stessel. After the war, the investigation accused him of ignoring orders from above, did not take measures to provide Port Arthur with food, lied in reports about his personal, heroic participation in battles, misled the sovereign, handed out awards to senior officers who did not deserve them ... And , finally, he surrendered Port Arthur on conditions that were humiliating for the Motherland. In addition, the cowardly baron did not share the hardships of captivity with the garrison. However, Stessel did not suffer any special punishment: after serving a year and a half in home confinement, he was pardoned by a royal decree.

The indecisiveness of military bureaucrats, their unwillingness to take risks, their inability to act in field conditions and unwillingness to see obvious things - that's what pushed Russia into the abyss of defeat and into the abyss of cataclysms that happened after the war.

Upon completion wars 1894-1895 Japan claimed to take away from China not only Taiwan, but also the Liaodong Peninsula located near Beijing. However, three powerful European powers - Russia, Germany and France - staged a joint diplomatic demarche in 1895 and forced the Japanese to withdraw their demand for Liaodong's concession. After the suppression in 1900 Boxer Rebellion Russia occupied Manchuria together with Liaodong, thus gaining access to the Yellow Sea and starting to build a strong military harbor here, Port Arthur. In Tokyo, they were extremely stung by the fact that Russia took what it had forced the Japanese to abandon shortly before. Japan began to demand compensation for itself in Korea, where its own and Russian influence at that time roughly balanced each other.

In the late autumn of 1901, a prominent Japanese figure, the recent prime minister, Marquis Ito, came to St. Petersburg. He proposed an agreement on the condition that Russia recognize exclusive Japanese rights in Korea, and Japan recognize Russians in Manchuria. The Petersburg government refused. Then Japan began to prepare for war with Russia and in January 1902 entered into an alliance with England (friendly support in a war with one power and military support in a war with two).

A dangerous situation for Russia was created: Great Siberian railway track from the European part of the empire to Vladivostok was not completely completed. Through traffic on it opened already in August 1903, but so far there was not enough Circum-Baikal Road - there was a traffic jam in the middle of the road. From Russian battleships the latest sample one "Tsesarevich" was ready. By 1905-1906 Russia was to be strengthened by Far East so as not to be afraid of Japan, but the next one and a half to two years became a time of great risk. Some members of the Petersburg government were in favor of an agreement with Japan, but Tsar Nicholas II leaned towards the opinion of the militant Admiral Alekseev and the "retired cavalry guard" Bezobrazov, who said that Russia's excessive compliance would only provoke new Japanese demands. Bezobrazov promised to take Manchuria and Korea for the empire with “one gesture”, promised fantastic profits to the state from a forest concession in Korea. Nicholas II made him his personal representative in the Far East. Bezobrazov ruled there, disregarding either the Russian ministries, or the obligations of diplomats, or the Chinese government (and often quarreling with Alekseev). On July 30, 1903, the tsar singled out the Far East into a special governorship headed by Alekseev, excluding the region from the jurisdiction of all ministries, giving the admiral both command of the troops, and administration, and diplomacy with Japan and China. On August 16, one of the main opponents of active operations in the Far East, Witte, was dismissed (honorary: removed from the post of Minister of Finance, but appointed chairman of the Committee of Ministers - which in Russia at that time was only an interdepartmental meeting, its chairman was not at all the head of government).

Russo-Japanese War [History of Russia. XX century]

Japan, meanwhile, began defiantly acting as a "defender of China", shouting that Russia had violated its rights, demanding the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria, frightening the Western world with Russian aggressiveness. This propaganda met with sympathetic attention in the Anglo-Saxon countries. At the end of 1903, the Russian government sent several new ships to the Far East. According to many, for Russia, in a clash with Japan, the issue of access to non-freezing seas in the east was decided. If Russia had not received it, the whole great movement into Siberia threatened to turn out to be only a gigantic dead end.

The balance of power at the start of the struggle was not particularly favorable for the Russians. The construction of Port Arthur progressed extremely slowly, funds were scarcely allocated for it (although Witte, who was in charge of finances, spent up to 20 million rubles on equipping a huge commercial port in the city of Dalniy). There were very few Russian troops in the Far East. The Japanese, from 1895 to 1903, using indemnities received from China in 1895 and 1900, increased their peacetime army two and a half times (from 64 to 150.5 thousand soldiers) and tripled the number of guns. The former Japanese fleet was quantitatively weaker even than the Chinese and Dutch, but Japan rebuilt it, mainly in English shipyards - and received at its disposal a naval force of a great power scale.

Although the Russian armed forces numbered about 1 million fighters, less than 100 thousand of them were stationed in the Far East (50 thousand in the Ussuri Territory, 20 thousand in Manchuria, 20 thousand in the Port Arthur garrison). So far, the Siberian way passed only 4 pairs of trains a day, there was no Circum-Baikal road. The Russian population of the Far East, from which an appeal could be made, did not even reach a million in number. Japan was able to mobilize a million men with a transport fleet large enough to transport two divisions with all their equipment to the mainland at the same time. The Japanese fleet consisted of 14 battleships and armored cruisers, and the Russian Far East - 11 (although by 1905 their number was supposed to be increased to 15). In light ships, the Japanese predominance was even more impressive. In addition, the Russian Far Eastern fleet was divided into two parts: 3 armored cruisers in Vladivostok, covered with ice for several months a year, the rest in Port Arthur.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 (briefly)

The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26 (or, according to the new style, February 8) 1904. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, before the official declaration of war, attacked ships located on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this attack, the most powerful ships of the Russian squadron were disabled. The declaration of war took place only on 10 February.

The most important reason Russo-Japanese War was the expansion of Russia to the east. However, the immediate reason was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, previously captured by Japan. This provoked military reform and the militarization of Japan.

About the reaction of Russian society to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, one can briefly say this: Japan's actions outraged Russian society. The world community reacted differently. England and the USA took a pro-Japanese position. And the tone of the press reports was distinctly anti-Russian. France, which at that time was an ally of Russia, declared neutrality - an alliance with Russia was necessary for it in order to prevent the strengthening of Germany. But, already on April 12, France concluded an agreement with England, which caused a cooling of Russian-French relations. Germany, on the other hand, declared friendly neutrality towards Russia.

The Japanese failed to capture Port Arthur, despite active actions at the beginning of the war. But, already on August 6, they made another attempt. A 45-strong army under the command of Oyama was thrown to storm the fortress. Having met the strongest resistance and having lost more than half of the soldiers, the Japanese were forced to retreat on August 11. The fortress was surrendered only after the death of General Kondratenko on December 2, 1904. Despite the fact that Port Arthur could have held out for at least another 2 months, Stessel and Reis signed an act on the surrender of the fortress, as a result of which the Russian fleet was destroyed, and 32 thousand soldiers were destroyed. man was taken prisoner.

The most significant events of 1905 were:

The Battle of Mukden (February 5 - 24), which remained the largest land battle in the history of mankind until the start of the First World War. It ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, which lost 59 thousand killed. Japanese losses amounted to 80 thousand people.

The Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28), in which the Japanese fleet, 6 times larger than the Russian, almost completely destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron.

The course of the war was clearly in favor of Japan. However, its economy was depleted by the war. This forced Japan to enter into peace negotiations. In Portsmouth, on August 9, participants in the Russo-Japanese War began a peace conference. It should be noted that these negotiations were a major success for the Russian diplomatic delegation headed by Witte. The signed peace treaty sparked protests in Tokyo. But, nevertheless, the consequences of the Russo-Japanese war turned out to be very tangible for the country. During the conflict, the Russian Pacific Fleet was practically destroyed. The war claimed more than 100 thousand lives of soldiers heroically defending their country. The expansion of Russia to the East was stopped. Also, the defeat showed the weakness of the tsarist policy, which to a certain extent contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiment and eventually led to the revolution of 1904-1905. Among the reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. the most important are the following:

diplomatic isolation of the Russian Empire;

unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations in difficult conditions;

frank betrayal of the interests of the fatherland or mediocrity of many tsarist generals;

serious superiority of Japan in the military and economic spheres.

Portsmouth Peace

The Treaty of Portsmouth (Portsmouth Peace) is a peace treaty between Japan and the Russian Empire that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The peace treaty was concluded in the city of Portsmouth (USA), thanks to which it got its name, on August 23, 1905. S.Yu. Witte and R.R. participated in the signing of the agreement on the Russian side. Rosen, and from the Japanese side - K. Jutaro and T. Kogoro. The initiator of the negotiations was the American President T. Roosevelt, so the signing of the treaty took place on the territory of the United States.

The treaty canceled the effect of previous agreements between Russia and China regarding Japan and concluded new ones, already with Japan itself.

Russo-Japanese War. Background and reasons

Japan did not pose any threat to the Russian Empire until the middle of the 19th century. However, in the 60s, the country opened its borders to foreign citizens, and began to develop rapidly. Thanks to the frequent trips of Japanese diplomats to Europe, the country adopted foreign experience and was able to create a powerful and modern army and navy in half a century.

It is no coincidence that Japan began to build up its military power. The country experienced an acute shortage of territories, so at the end of the 19th century, the first Japanese military campaigns began in neighboring territories. The first victim was China, which gave Japan a number of islands. Korea and Manchuria were supposed to be next on the list, but Japan clashed with Russia, which also had its own interests in these territories. Negotiations were held throughout the year between diplomats in order to divide the spheres of influence, but they did not achieve success.

In 1904, Japan, which did not want more negotiations, attacked Russia. The Russo-Japanese War began, which lasted two years.

Reasons for signing the Peace of Portsmouth

Despite the fact that Russia was losing the war, Japan was the first to think about the need to make peace. The Japanese government, which had already achieved most of its goals in the war, understood that the continuation of hostilities could hit the economy of Japan, which was already not in the best condition.

The first attempt to make peace took place in 1904, when the Japanese envoy to Great Britain turned to Russia with his version of the treaty. However, the peace provided for the condition that Russia agrees to appear in the documents as the initiator of the negotiations. Russia refused, and the war continued.

The next attempt was made by France, which assisted Japan in the war and was also severely exhausted economically. In 1905, France, which was on the verge of a crisis, offered its mediation to Japan. A new version of the contract was drawn up, which provided for indemnity (payback). Russia refused to pay money to Japan and the treaty was not signed again.

The last attempt to make peace took place with the participation of US President T. Roosevelt. Japan turned to the states that provided it with financial assistance and asked to mediate in the negotiations. This time, Russia agreed, as discontent was growing inside the country.

Terms of the Peace of Portsmouth

Japan, having enlisted the support of the United States and having agreed in advance with the states on the division of influence in the Far East, was determined to sign a speedy and beneficial peace for itself. In particular, Japan planned to take the island of Sakhalin, as well as a number of territories in Korea, and impose a ban on navigation in the waters belonging to the country. However, the peace was not signed, since Russia refused such conditions. At the insistence of S. Yu Witte, the negotiations continued.

Russia managed to defend the right not to pay indemnity. Despite the fact that Japan was in dire need of money and hoped to get a payoff from Russia, Witte's stubbornness forced the Japanese government to refuse money, otherwise the war could continue, and this would hit Japan's finances even more.

Also, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia managed to defend the right to own the greater territory of Sakhalin, and Japan was given only the southern part on the condition that the Japanese would not build military fortifications there.

In general, despite the fact that Russia lost the war, it managed to significantly soften the terms of the peace treaty and exit the war with fewer losses. Spheres of influence on the territory of Korea and Manchuria were divided, agreements were signed on movement in the waters of Japan and trade on its territories. The peace treaty was signed by both parties.

The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers collided in the North East Asia. But, as in many other armed conflicts, the immediate causes of war are more confusing.

These are Russia's plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan's victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo's fears about St. Petersburg's influence in Korea. Disorderly, inconsistent diplomacy also played a large role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out may take us beyond the scope of historical science.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept of diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once said that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON SINGING BRIDGE

Russia and Japan have been going to war since 1895, from the time the Japanese inflicted a spectacular defeat on the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. And Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki peace treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese war. Among the requirements of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located near Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing dynasty agreed to cede the rights to the peninsula, but Petersburg enticed Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the cession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche was made after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was an ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient, washed warm waters harbor for the terminal station of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was under construction at that time. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary backing to make such a move, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo for a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential proponent was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who saw good relations with China as essential to the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that in time the Romanovs would dominate China. But the empire must move towards this peacefully and by economic means. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses and not troops should compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: "... for general position affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid anything that could cause external complications" 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of the role of defender of Beijing. The finance minister quickly drew dividends from the goodwill of the Chinese. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs. - Approx. Per.) to lay the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern segment of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires concluded a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, after only a year, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin Wilhelm, who captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks suddenly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even plotted a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconsistency reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. Sergei Witte remained an unwavering supporter of friendly relations with China, supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906. A coalition of "hawks" opposed different time naval commanders, Lamsdorf's predecessor, Count Mikhail Muravyov, retired guards captain and dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov, and the imperial governor in the Russian Far East, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, the differences did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURIA"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state, long time was a tribute to the Qing Dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, the progressive weakness of China led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and made it possible for stronger powers to operate here. The latter included Japan, which during the Meiji Restoration ended its medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and colonial aspirations of its own.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later, the empire started a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan "Man-Kan kokan" ("Korea for Manchuria") became one of the leading imperatives of the Japanese foreign policy 6 .

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty "incomplete and meaningless", the Japanese were also not better opinion about him 7 .

The next four years, when Russia was increasingly moving away from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its superiority on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn of policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals "were too interested in Korea" 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorf was wary of Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin, and Naval Minister Tyrtov that if Russia failed to appease the new serious rival, "the clear danger of an armed clash with Japan" would remain.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cold heads prevailed in Tokyo. From the time of the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the marquis tended towards a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901, his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, the Marquis of Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to carry out a policy of reconciliation. An experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and at meetings with Witte and Lamsdorf defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But while the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against it.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the tsar and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. The two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, changing the political landscape in the Pacific region at once.

PETERSBURG CONFUSION CONTINUES

The ministers of Nicholas II hastily assured the world that the Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorf and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the unwillingness to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reason that there are at least 14 problems at home. In addition, the "Kingdom of Witte" - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.

However, the idea of ​​retaining Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire, like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambitions, together with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The confused and unstable policy of the empire sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages within 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of the evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian Province, including in the ancient capital of the Qing Dynasty, Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, scheduled for April 1903, did not take place, the Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"VAIN NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura showed the initiative. By this point, the Russian line had hardened considerably as well, as the influence of Witte, a principled defender of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the "new course" 17 . Its goal was "to prevent the penetration of foreign influence into Manchuria in any form" 18 . Russia will emphasize its decisiveness, he wrote to Alekseev, as he embarks on a military and economic presence in East Asia.

Tired of the endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as viceroy in the Far East, which effectively made him the tsar's personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20 . And two weeks later, Nikolay removed Alekseev's main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21 .

Alekseev's rise provoked a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22 . The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment came two weeks after their government had proposed to start a new round of negotiations.

Throughout 1903 European foreign ministers were bewildered, alarmed, and often irritated by the constant reversals of tsarist policy that were exposing Russia to ever greater international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his governor still did not take Japan seriously.

Nikolai, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that "there will be no war, because I don't want it" 24 . As a result of fruitless negotiations until the very winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to his office to announce that the government had lost patience with all these "vain negotiations." Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 am local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, Japanese destroyer torpedoes hit three Russian ships in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires are at war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often viewed as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such a rivalry is not unique in an age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s and before the outbreak of the First World War, in Asia and Africa there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe. However, none of them escalated into open war. Differences were invariably resolved by "diplomacy of imperialism," 27 an instrument for escaping colonial disputes that were gaining momentum at the end of the 19th century.

An unwritten code determined the relationship between the great powers of Europe. Although strictly fixed rules did not exist here, they were quite clear. Based on hard calculation and a sense of fair play, imperialism's diplomacy was effective. Critical to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the inability of states to recognize new developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, only European governments received membership. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were called into question. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that on February 8, 1904, led to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how Petersburg trampled on his honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And after a hundred extra years this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia s Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. P. 11-23, and also in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. S. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, 11/22/1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese railway // New time. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. C. 2.
15. For a good example of such opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russo-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. S. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined the term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe the growing influence of Bezobrazov.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. P. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer's classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme ruler of Japan.

One of the largest military conflicts of the early 20th century is the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Its result was the first recent history, the victory of an Asian state over a European one, in a full-scale armed conflict. The Russian Empire entered the war, counting on an easy victory, but the enemy was underestimated.

In the middle of the 19th century, Emperor Mutsuhio carried out a series of reforms, after which Japan turned into a powerful state with a modern army and navy. The country has come out of self-isolation; its claim to dominance in East Asia was intensifying. But another colonial power, the Russian Empire, also sought to gain a foothold in this region.

Causes of the war and the balance of power

The cause of the war was the clash in the Far East of the geopolitical interests of two empires - modernized Japan and Tsarist Russia.

Japan, having established itself in Korea and Manchuria, was forced to make concessions under pressure from the European powers. Russia was given the Liaodong Peninsula, captured by the island empire during the war with China. But both sides understood that a military conflict could not be avoided and were preparing for hostilities.

By the time the hostilities began, the opponents had concentrated significant forces in the conflict zone. Japan could put up 375-420 thousand people. and 16 heavy warships. Russia had 150 thousand people stationed in Eastern Siberia and 18 heavy ships (battleships, armored cruisers, etc.).

The course of hostilities

The beginning of the war. The defeat of Russian naval forces in the Pacific

The Japanese attacked before the declaration of war, on January 27, 1904. The blows were delivered in various directions, which allowed the fleet to neutralize the threat of opposition from Russian ships on sea lanes, and units of the Japanese imperial army to land in Korea. Already by February 21, they occupied the capital Pyongyang, and by the beginning of May they blocked the Port Arthur squadron. This allowed the Japanese 2nd Army to land in Manchuria. Thus, the first stage of hostilities was, ended with the victory of Japan. The defeat of the Russian fleet allowed the Asian empire to invade the mainland by land units and ensure their supply.

Campaign of 1904. Defense of Port Arthur

The Russian command expected to take revenge on land. However, the very first battles showed the superiority of the Japanese in the land theater of operations. The 2nd Army defeated the Russians opposing it and was divided into two parts. One of them began to advance on the Kwantung Peninsula, the other on Manchuria. Near Liaoyang (Manchuria), the first major battle took place between the ground units of the warring parties. The Japanese were constantly attacking, and the Russian command, which had previously been confident in victory over the Asians, lost control of the battle. The battle was lost.

Having put his army in order, General Kuropatkin went on the offensive and tried to release the Kwantung fortified area cut off from his own. A major battle unfolded in the Shahe River Valley: there were more Russians, but the Japanese Marshal Oyama managed to hold back the onslaught. Port Arthur was doomed.

Campaign of 1905

This naval fortress had a strong garrison and was fortified from the land. Under the conditions of a complete blockade, the garrison of the fortress repelled four assaults, inflicting significant losses on the enemy; during the defense, various technical innovations were tested. The Japanese kept under the walls of the fortified area from 150 to 200 thousand bayonets. However, after almost a year of siege, the fortress fell. Almost a third of the captured Russian soldiers and officers were wounded.

For Russia, the fall of Port Arthur was a severe blow to the prestige of the empire.

The last chance to turn the tide of the war for the Russian army was the battle of Mukden in February 1905. However, the Japanese were no longer confronted by the formidable force of a great power, but by units that were suppressed by continuous defeats and were far from their native land. After 18 days, the left flank of the Russian army faltered, and the command gave the order to retreat. The forces of both sides were exhausted: a positional war began, the outcome of which could only be changed by the victory of the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. After many months on the road, she approached the island of Tsushima.

Tsushima. Ultimate Japanese victory

By the time of the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet had an advantage in ships, the experience of defeating Russian admirals and high morale. Having lost only 3 ships, the Japanese utterly defeated the enemy fleet, scattering its remnants. Russia's maritime borders were unprotected; a few weeks later the first amphibious assaults landed on Sakhalin and Kamchatka.

Peace treaty. The results of the war

In the summer of 1905, both sides were extremely exhausted. Japan had an undeniable military superiority, but she was running out of supplies. Russia, on the contrary, could use its advantage in resources, but for this, it was necessary to restructure the economy and political life for military needs. The outbreak of the 1905 revolution ruled out this possibility. Under these conditions, both sides agreed to sign a peace treaty.

According to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia lost the southern part of Sakhalin, the Liaodong Peninsula, railway to Port Arthur. The empire was forced to leave Manchuria and Korea, which became the de facto protectorates of Japan. The defeat hastened the collapse of the autocracy and the subsequent disintegration of the Russian Empire. Its opponent Japan, on the contrary, significantly strengthened its position, becoming one of the leading world powers.

The Land of the Rising Sun consistently increased its expansion, becoming one of the largest geopolitical players, and remained so until 1945.

Table: chronology of events

date of	Event	Result
January 1904	Beginning of the Russo-Japanese War	Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian squadron, stationed on the outer roadstead of Arthur.
January - April 1904	Collisions between the Japanese fleet and the Russian squadron in the Yellow Sea	The Russian fleet is defeated. Land units of Japan land in Korea (January) and Manchuria (May), moving deep into China and towards Port Arthur.
August 1904	Liaoyang battle	The Japanese army established itself in Manchuria
October 1904	Battle on the Shahe River	The Russian army failed to unblock Port Arthur. Positional warfare was established.
May - December 1904	Defense of Port Arthur	Despite repelling four assaults, the fortress capitulated. The Russian fleet lost the ability to operate on sea lanes. The fall of the fortress had a demoralizing effect on the army and society.
February 1905	Battle of Mukden	The retreat of the Russian army from Mukden.
August 1905	Signing of the Peace of Portsmouth	According to the Peace of Portsmouth concluded between Russia and Japan in 1905, Russia ceded a small island territory to Japan, but did not pay indemnities. South Sakhalin, Port Arthur and the port of Dalniy came under the perpetual possession of Japan. Korea and South Manchuria entered the Japanese sphere of influence. Count S.Yu. Witte was nicknamed "Polu-Sakhalin", because during the peace negotiations with Japan in Portsmouth he signed the text of the treaty, according to which South Sakhalin was withdrawn to Japan.

Strengths and weaknesses of opponents

Japan

Russia

Japan's strengths were its territorial proximity to the conflict zone, modernized military forces, and patriotic sentiment among the population. In addition to new weapons, the Japanese army and navy have mastered the European tactics of warfare. However, the officer corps did not have a well-developed skill in managing large military formations armed with progressive military theory and the latest weapons.

Russia had extensive experience of colonial expansion. The personnel of the army, and especially the navy, had high moral and strong-willed qualities if they were provided with the appropriate command. The weapons and equipment of the Russian army were at an average level and, with proper use, could be successfully used against any enemy.

Military-political reasons for the defeat of Russia

The negative factors that determined the military defeat of the Russian army and navy were: remoteness from the theater of operations, serious shortcomings in the supply of troops and ineffective military leadership.

The political leadership of the Russian Empire, with a general understanding of the inevitability of a collision, purposefully, did not prepare for a war in the Far East.

The defeat hastened the collapse of the autocracy and the subsequent disintegration of the Russian Empire. Its opponent Japan, on the contrary, significantly strengthened its position, becoming one of the leading world powers. The Land of the Rising Sun consistently increased its expansion, becoming the largest geopolitical player and remained so until 1945.

Other factors

• Economic and military-technical backwardness of Russia
• Imperfect management structures
• Weak development of the Far East region
• Embezzlement and bribery in the army
• Underestimation of the Japanese Armed Forces

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

In conclusion, it is worth noting the importance of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War for the continued existence of the autocratic system in Russia. The inept and ill-considered actions of the government, which caused the death of thousands of soldiers who faithfully defended it, actually led to the beginning of the first revolution in the history of our country. The captured and wounded returning from Manchuria could not hide their indignation. Their testimonies, combined with the visible economic, military and political backwardness, led to a sharp surge of indignation, primarily in the lower and middle strata of Russian society. In fact, the Russo-Japanese War exposed the long-hidden contradictions between the people and the authorities, and this exposure happened so quickly and imperceptibly that it baffled not only the government, but also the participants in the revolution themselves. In many historical publications there is an indication that Japan managed to win the war due to betrayal by the socialists and the nascent Bolshevik Party, but in fact such statements are far from the truth, since it is precisely the failures Japanese war provoked a surge of revolutionary ideas. Thus, the Russo-Japanese War became a turning point in history, a period that forever changed its further course.

“It was not the Russian people,” Lenin wrote, “but the Russian autocracy that started this colonial war, which turned into a war between the new and the old bourgeois world. Not the Russian people, but the autocracy came to a shameful defeat. The Russian people benefited from the defeat of the autocracy. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism.