| The participation of the USSR in the conflicts of the Cold War. Events in Czechoslovakia (1968)

Events in Czechoslovakia
(1968)

The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968), also known as Operation Danube or the Invasion of Czechoslovakia - in waters of the Warsaw Pact troops (except Romania) to Czechoslovakia, started August 21, 1968 and ending reforms of the Prague Spring.

The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the USSR. The united group (up to 500 thousand people and 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers) was commanded by General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky.

The Soviet leadership feared that if the Czechoslovak communists pursued an internal policy independent of Moscow, the USSR would lose control over Czechoslovakia. Such a turn of events threatened to split the Eastern European socialist bloc both politically and military-strategically. The policy of limited state sovereignty in the countries of the socialist bloc, which allowed, among other things, the use of military force, if necessary, was called the "Brezhnev doctrine" in the West.

At the end of March 1968 The Central Committee of the CPSU sent classified information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to party activists. This document stated: “... recently, events have been developing in a negative direction. In Czechoslovakia, actions by irresponsible elements are on the rise, demanding the creation of an "official opposition" and "tolerance" towards various anti-socialist views and theories. The past experience of socialist construction is incorrectly covered, proposals are made for a special Czechoslovak path to socialism, which is opposed to the experience of other socialist countries, attempts are made to cast a shadow on the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, and the need for an "independent" foreign policy is emphasized. There are calls for the creation of private enterprises, the abandonment of the planned system, and the expansion of ties with the West. Moreover, in a number of newspapers, on radio and television, calls are being propagated for “complete separation of the party from the state”, for the return of Czechoslovakia to the bourgeois republic of Masaryk and Benes, for the transformation of Czechoslovakia into an “open society” and others ... "

March 23 in Dresden, a meeting was held between the leaders of the parties and governments of six socialist countries - the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, at which the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Dubcek was sharply criticized.

After the meeting in Dresden, the Soviet leadership began to develop options for action against Czechoslovakia, including military measures. The leaders of the GDR (W. Ulbricht), Bulgaria (T. Zhivkov) and Poland (W. Gomulka) took a hard line and to a certain extent influenced the Soviet leader L. Brezhnev.

The Soviet side did not rule out the option of NATO troops entering the territory of Czechoslovakia, which carried out maneuvers code-named "Black Lion" near the borders of Czechoslovakia.

Given the current military and political situation, spring 1968 The joint command of the Warsaw Pact, together with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, developed an operation code-named "Danube".

April 8, 1968 the commander of the airborne troops, General V.F. Margelov, received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive stated: "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger looming over it." The document also emphasized: “... if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army treat the appearance of Soviet troops with understanding, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the ChNA troops are hostile to the paratroopers and support the conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them, and if this is not possible, to disarm them.

During April - May Soviet leaders tried to "reason" Alexander Dubcek, to draw his attention to the danger of the actions of anti-socialist forces. At the end of April, Marshal I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, arrived in Prague to prepare exercises for the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

May 4th Brezhnev met with Dubcek in Moscow, but it was not possible to reach mutual understanding.

May 8 in Moscow A closed meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria and Hungary took place, during which a frank exchange of views took place on measures to be taken in connection with the situation in Czechoslovakia. Even then there were proposals for a military solution. However, at the same time, the leader of Hungary, J. Kadar, referring to, stated that the Czechoslovak crisis cannot be resolved by military means and a political solution must be sought.

At the end of May the government of Czechoslovakia agreed to conduct exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries called "Shumava", which took place June 20 - 30 involving only the headquarters of units, formations and signal troops. With 20 to 30 June For the first time in the history of the military bloc of the socialist countries, 16,000 personnel were brought into the territory of Czechoslovakia. With July 23 to August 10, 1968 on the territory of the USSR, the GDR and Poland, the rear exercises "Neman" were held, during which troops were redeployed to invade Czechoslovakia. On August 11, 1968, a major exercise of the air defense forces "Heavenly Shield" was held. On the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the GDR, exercises of the signal troops were held.

July 29 - August 1 a meeting was held in Čierná nad Tisou, in which the entire Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, together with President L. Svoboda, took part. The Czechoslovak delegation at the talks basically acted as a united front, but V. Bilyak adhered to a special position. At the same time, a personal letter was received from a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Kapek with a request to provide his country with "fraternal assistance" from the socialist countries.

AT late July preparations for a military operation in Czechoslovakia were completed, but a final decision on its conduct had not yet been made. August 3, 1968 A meeting of leaders of six communist parties took place in Bratislava. The statement adopted in Bratislava contained a phrase about collective responsibility in the defense of socialism. In Bratislava, L. Brezhnev received a letter from five members of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia - Indra, Kolder, Kapek, Shvestka and Bilyak with a request for "effective assistance and support" in order to wrest Czechoslovakia "from the imminent danger of counter-revolution."

In the middle of August L. Brezhnev called A. Dubcek twice and asked why the personnel changes promised in Bratislava were not taking place, to which Dubcek replied that personnel matters were resolved collectively, by a plenum of the Central Committee of the party.

August 16 In Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia was held and proposals for the introduction of troops were approved. At the same time, a letter was received from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. August 17 Soviet Ambassador S. Chervonenko met with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda and informed Moscow that at the decisive moment the president would be together with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. On the same day, the materials prepared in Moscow for the text of the Appeal to the Czechoslovak people were sent to the group of "healthy forces" in the HRC. It was planned that they would create a Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. A draft appeal was also prepared by the governments of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary to the people of Czechoslovakia, as well as to the Czechoslovak army.

August 18 A meeting of the leaders of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary took place in Moscow. Appropriate measures were agreed, including the appearance of the "healthy forces" of the HRC with a request for military assistance. In a message to the President of Czechoslovakia Svoboda on behalf of the participants in the meeting in Moscow, one of the main arguments was the receipt of a request for assistance by the armed forces to the Czechoslovak people from the “majority” of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and many members of the government of Czechoslovakia.

Operation Danube

The political goal of the operation was to change the political leadership of the country and establish a regime loyal to the USSR in Czechoslovakia. The troops were to seize the most important objects in Prague, the KGB officers were to arrest the Czech reformers, and then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the session of the National Assembly were planned, where the top leadership was to be replaced. At the same time, a large role was assigned to President Svoboda.

The political leadership of the operation in Prague was carried out by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU K. Mazurov.

The military preparation of the operation was carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, but a few days before the start of the operation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed its head.

At the first stage, the main role was assigned to the airborne troops. The air defense troops, the navy and the strategic missile forces were put on high alert.

To August 20 a grouping of troops was prepared, the first echelon of which numbered up to 250,000 people, and the total number - up to 500,000 people, about 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers. For the implementation of the operation, 26 divisions were involved, of which 18 were Soviet, not counting aviation. The troops of the Soviet 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms, 16th Air Armies (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), 11th Guards Army (Baltic Military District), 28th Combined Arms Army (Belarusian Military District) took part in the invasion. district), the 13th and 38th combined arms armies (Carpathian military district) and the 14th air army (Odessa military district).

The Carpathian and Central Fronts were formed:
☑ Carpathian Front was created on the basis of the administration and troops of the Carpathian military district and several Polish divisions. It included four armies: the 13th, 38th combined arms, 8th Guards Tank and 57th Air. At the same time, the 8th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 13th Army began to move to the southern regions of Poland, where Polish divisions were additionally included in their composition. Commander Colonel General Bisyarin Vasily Zinovievich.
☑ central front was formed on the basis of the administration of the Baltic Military District with the inclusion of the troops of the Baltic Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the GDR and Poland. The Central Front included the 11th and 20th Guards Combined Arms and the 37th Air Armies.

Also, the Southern Front was deployed to cover the operating group in Hungary. In addition to this front, the operational group Balaton (two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units) was deployed on the territory of Hungary to enter Czechoslovakia.

In general, the number of troops introduced into Czechoslovakia was:
☑ the USSR- 18 motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, 22 aviation and helicopter regiments, about 170,000 people;
☑ Poland- 5 infantry divisions, up to 40,000 people;
☑ GDR- motorized rifle and tank divisions, up to 15,000 people in total (according to publications in the press, it was decided at the last moment to refuse to send parts of the GDR to Czechoslovakia, they played the role of a reserve on the border;
☑ of Czechoslovakia there was an operational group of the NNA of the GDR of several dozen military personnel);
☑ Hungary- 8th motorized rifle division, separate units, a total of 12,500 people;
☑ Bulgaria- 12th and 22nd Bulgarian motorized rifle regiments, with a total number of 2164 people. and one Bulgarian tank battalion, armed with 26 T-34 vehicles.

The date for the entry of troops was set for the evening of August 20 when the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held. On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read to the officers on the formation of the Danube High Command.

Commander-in-Chief was appointed General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky, whose headquarters was deployed in the southern part of Poland. Both fronts (Central and Carpathian) and the Balaton task force, as well as two guards airborne divisions, were subordinate to him. On the first day of the operation, to ensure the landing of airborne divisions, five divisions of military transport aviation were allocated at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief "Danube".

Chronology of events

At 10:15 p.m. August 20 the troops received a signal "Vltava-666" about the beginning of the operation. AT 23:00 August 20 in the troops intended for the invasion, a combat alert was announced. Through closed communication channels, all fronts, armies, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions were given a signal to advance. At this signal, all commanders were to open one of the five secret packages they kept (the operation was developed in five versions), and burn the four remaining in the presence of the chiefs of staff without opening. The opened packages contained an order to start Operation Danube and to continue hostilities in accordance with the Danube-Canal and Danube-Canal-Globus plans.

In advance, "Orders for interaction on the Danube operation" were developed. White stripes were applied to the military equipment participating in the invasion. All military equipment of Soviet and Union production without white stripes was subject to "neutralization", preferably without firing. In the event of resistance, stripless tanks and other military equipment were to be destroyed without warning and without commands from above. When meeting with NATO troops, it was ordered to stop immediately and not to shoot without a command.

Troops were sent in 18 places from the territory of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Hungary. Parts of the 20th Guards Army from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Lieutenant General Ivan Leontyevich Velichko) entered Prague, which established control over the main objects of the capital of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, two Soviet airborne divisions were landed in Prague and Brno.

AT 2 am August 21 At the airfield "Ruzyne" in Prague, advanced units of the 7th Airborne Division landed. They blocked the main objects of the airfield, where Soviet An-12s with troops and military equipment began to land. The capture of the airfield was carried out with the help of a deceptive maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane flying up to the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After permission and landing, paratroopers from the aircraft captured the airport control tower and ensured the landing of landing aircraft.

At the news of the invasion, the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia immediately gathered in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Dubcek's office. The majority - 7 to 4 - voted in favor of the Presidium's statement condemning the invasion. Only members of the Presidium Kolder, Bilyak, Svestka and Rigaud spoke according to the original plan. Barbirek and Piller supported Dubcek and O. Chernik. The calculation of the Soviet leadership was on the preponderance of "healthy forces" at the decisive moment - 6 against 5. The statement also contained a call for an urgent convocation of a party congress. Dubcek himself, in his radio appeal to the inhabitants of the country, urged citizens to remain calm and prevent bloodshed and the actual repetition of the Hungarian events of 1956.

To 4:30 am August 21 the building of the Central Committee was surrounded by Soviet troops and armored vehicles, Soviet paratroopers broke into the building and arrested those present. Dubcek and other members of the Central Committee spent several hours under the control of paratroopers.

AT 5:10 am August 21 a reconnaissance company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes, they captured the airfields of Turzhany and Namesht, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at the airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With a minimum interval, other planes with troops and military equipment began to arrive here. Then the paratroopers on their military equipment and captured civilian vehicles went deep into the country.

To 9:00 am August 21 in Brno, paratroopers blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, telegraph, main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, printing house, railway stations, as well as headquarters of military units and military industry enterprises. ChNA commanders were asked to remain calm and maintain order. Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a predetermined plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

At 10 a.m. Dubcek, Prime Minister Oldřich Czernik, Speaker of Parliament Josef Smrkowski (English) Russian, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Josef Spacek and Bohumil Szymon, and head of the National Front Frantisek Kriegel (English) Russian. KGB officers and employees of the StB who collaborated with them were taken out of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and then they were taken to the airfield in Soviet armored personnel carriers and taken to Moscow.

By the end of the day on August 21 24 divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries occupied the main objects on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The troops of the USSR and its allies occupied all points without the use of weapons, since the Czechoslovak army was ordered not to resist.

Actions of the HRC and the population of the country

In Prague, protesting citizens tried to block the movement of troops and equipment; all signs and street signs were knocked down, all the maps of Prague were hidden in the shops, while the Soviet military only had outdated wartime maps. In this regard, control over radio, television and newspapers was belatedly established. "Healthy forces" took refuge in the Soviet embassy. But they could not be persuaded to form a new government and hold a Central Committee Plenum. The media has already managed to declare them traitors.

At the call of the President of the country and the Czech Radio, the citizens of Czechoslovakia did not provide an armed rebuff to the invading troops. However, everywhere the troops met the passive resistance of the local population. Czechs and Slovaks refused to provide Soviet troops with drink, food and fuel, changed road signs to impede the advance of troops, took to the streets, tried to explain to the soldiers the essence of the events taking place in Czechoslovakia, appealed to the Russian-Czechoslovak brotherhood. Citizens demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of party and government leaders who had been taken to the USSR.

At the initiative of the Prague City Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, clandestine meetings of the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began ahead of schedule, on the territory of the plant in Vysochany (a district of Prague), however, without delegates from Slovakia who did not have time to arrive.

Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the HRC.

Side losses

There was practically no fighting. There were isolated cases of attacks on the military, but the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia did not resist.

According to modern data, during the invasion, 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed and more than 500 wounded, the vast majority of civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child.

The largest number of civilian casualties was in Prague near the building of the Czech Radio. Perhaps some of the victims were undocumented. Thus, witnesses report that Soviet soldiers fired on a crowd of Prague residents on Wenceslas Square, as a result of which several people were killed and injured, although data on this incident were not included in the reports of the Czechoslovak security service. There are numerous testimonies of the death of civilians, including among minors and the elderly, in Prague, Liberec, Brno, Kosice, Poprad and other cities of Czechoslovakia as a result of the unmotivated use of weapons by Soviet soldiers.

Total from August 21 to September 20, 1968 the combat losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 12 dead and 25 wounded and injured. Non-combat losses for the same period - 84 dead and dead, 62 wounded and injured. Also, as a result of a helicopter crash near the city of Teplice, 2 Soviet correspondents were killed. It should be noted that the surviving helicopter pilot, fearing that he would have to bear responsibility for the accident, fired several bullets at the helicopter from a pistol, and then claimed that the helicopter had been shot down by the Czechoslovaks; this version was official for some time, and correspondents K. Nepomniachtchi and A. Zworykin appeared, including in internal KGB materials, as victims of "counter-revolutionaries".

August 26, 1968 near the city of Zvolen (Czechoslovakia), an An-12 crashed from the Tula 374 VTAP (c / c captain N. Nabok). According to the pilots, the plane with a load (9 tons of butter) during landing approach was fired from the ground from a machine gun at an altitude of 300 meters and, as a result of damage to the 4th engine, fell, not reaching the runway for several kilometers. 5 people died (burned alive in the resulting fire), the gunner-radio operator survived. However, according to Czech archivist historians, the plane crashed into a mountain.

Near the settlement of Zhandov near the city of Ceska Lipa, a group of citizens, blocking the road to the bridge, impeded the movement of the Soviet T-55 tank foreman Yu. I. Andreev, who was catching up with the column that had gone ahead at high speed. The foreman decided to turn off the road so as not to crush people and the tank collapsed from the bridge along with the crew. Three soldiers were killed.

The losses of the USSR in technology are not exactly known. In parts of the 38th Army alone, in the first three days, 7 tanks and armored personnel carriers were burned on the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia.

Known data on the losses of the armed forces of other countries participating in the operation. So, the Hungarian army lost 4 soldiers dead (all non-combat losses: accident, illness, suicide). The Bulgarian army lost 2 people - one sentry was killed at the post by unknown persons (while a machine gun was stolen), 1 soldier shot himself.

Further developments and international assessment of the invasion

AT early September troops were withdrawn from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Soviet tanks left Prague on September 11, 1968. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." October 17, 1968 a phased withdrawal of part of the troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

AT 1969 in Prague, students Jan Palach and Jan Zajic set themselves on fire a month apart in protest against the Soviet occupation.

As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the process of political and economic reforms was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak was elected first secretary. The reformers were removed from their posts, repressions began. Several tens of thousands of people left the country, including many representatives of the country's cultural elite.

On the territory of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet military presence remained until 1991.

August 21 representatives of a group of countries(USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke in the UN Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to the session of the UN General Assembly.

The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Then the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The military intervention of the five states was condemned by the governments of four socialist countries - Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania (which withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in September), the PRC, as well as a number of communist parties in Western countries.

Possible motivations for the deployment of troops and consequences

By the official version of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the countries of the Warsaw Pact(except Romania): The government of Czechoslovakia asked the allies in the military bloc to provide armed assistance in the fight against counter-revolutionary groups that, with the support of hostile imperialist countries, were preparing a coup d'état to overthrow socialism.

Geopolitical aspect: The USSR prevented the satellite countries from revising the unequal interstate relations that ensured its hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Military-strategic aspect: Czechoslovakia's voluntarism in foreign policy during the Cold War threatened the security of the border with NATO countries; before 1968 Czechoslovakia remained the only ATS country where there were no military bases of the USSR.

Ideological aspect: the ideas of socialism "with a human face" undermined the idea of ​​the truth of Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the communist party, which, in turn, affected the power interests of the party elite.

Political aspect: the harsh crackdown on democratic voluntarism in Czechoslovakia gave the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU the opportunity, on the one hand, to crack down on internal opposition, on the other hand, to increase their authority, and thirdly, to prevent the disloyalty of the allies and demonstrate military power to potential opponents.

As a result of Operation Danube, Czechoslovakia remained a member of the Eastern European socialist bloc. The Soviet grouping of troops (up to 130 thousand people) remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991. The agreement on the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia became one of the main military-political results of the introduction of troops from five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. However, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact as a result of the invasion.

The suppression of the Prague Spring increased the disillusionment of many on the Western Left with Marxist-Leninist theory and contributed to the growth of "Eurocommunism" ideas among the leadership and members of Western Communist parties - subsequently leading to a split in many of them. The communist parties of Western Europe lost mass support, as the impossibility of "socialism with a human face" was practically shown.

Milos Zeman was expelled from the Communist Party in 1970 for disagreeing with the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into the country.

The opinion is expressed that the operation "Danube" strengthened the position of the United States in Europe.

Paradoxically, the military action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 accelerated the arrival in relations between East and West of the period of the so-called. "detente" based on the recognition of the territorial status quo that existed in Europe and the holding by Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt of the so-called. "New Ostpolitik".

Operation Danube hindered possible reforms in the USSR: “For the Soviet Union, the strangulation of the Prague Spring turned out to be associated with many grave consequences. The imperial “victory” in 1968 cut off the oxygen to reforms, strengthening the positions of dogmatic forces, strengthening the great-power traits in Soviet foreign policy, and contributing to the intensification of stagnation in all areas.”

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

At two o'clock in the morning on August 21, 1968, the Soviet An-24 passenger plane requested an emergency landing at Prague's Ruzyne airport. The controllers gave the go-ahead, the plane landed, servicemen of the 7th Guards Airborne Division stationed in Kaunas disembarked from it. The paratroopers, under the threat of using weapons, seized all the facilities of the airfield and began receiving An-12 transport aircraft with paratrooper units and military equipment. Transport An-12s landed on the runway every 30 seconds. Thus began the operation carefully designed by the USSR to occupy Czechoslovakia and ended with the so-called. The Prague Spring is a process of democratic reforms carried out by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek.

The operation to capture Czechoslovakia, which was called the "Danube", was attended by the armies of four socialist countries: the USSR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The GDR army was also supposed to enter the territory of Czechoslovakia, but at the last moment the Soviet leadership was afraid of the analogy with 1939 and the Germans did not cross the border. The Soviet Army became the main striking force of the group of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries - these were 18 motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, 22 aviation and helicopter regiments, with a total number, according to various sources, from 170 to 240 thousand people. About 5000 tanks alone were involved. Two fronts were created - the Carpathian and Central, and the number of the combined group of troops reached half a million military personnel. The invasion was, according to the usual Soviet habit, presented as help to the fraternal Czechoslovak people in the fight against counter-revolution.

No counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia, of course, and did not smell. The country fully supported the Communist Party, which began political and economic reforms in January 1968. In terms of the number of communists per 1,000 people, Czechoslovakia ranked first in the world. With the beginning of the reforms, censorship was significantly weakened, free discussions took place everywhere, and the creation of a multi-party system began. A desire was declared to ensure complete freedom of speech, assembly and movement, to establish strict control over the activities of security agencies, to facilitate the possibility of organizing private enterprises and to reduce state control over production. In addition, it was planned to federalize the state and expand the powers of the authorities of the subjects of Czechoslovakia - the Czech Republic and Slovakia. All this, of course, worried the leadership of the USSR, which pursued a policy of limited sovereignty in relation to its vassals in Europe (the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine"). The Dubcek team was repeatedly persuaded to stay on a short leash from Moscow and not strive to build socialism according to Western standards. Persuasions did not help. In addition, Czechoslovakia remained a country where the USSR was never able to deploy either its military bases or tactical nuclear weapons. And this moment was, perhaps, the main reason for such a military operation so disproportionate to the scale of the country - the Kremlin Politburo had to force the Czechoslovaks to obey themselves at any cost. The leadership of Czechoslovakia, in order to avoid bloodshed and the destruction of the country, took the army to the barracks and provided the Soviet troops with the opportunity to freely dispose of the fate of the Czechs and Slovaks. The only kind of resistance the occupiers faced was civil protest. This was especially evident in Prague, where unarmed residents of the city staged a real obstruction to the invaders.

At three o'clock in the morning on August 21 (it was also a Wednesday), Prime Minister Chernik was arrested by Soviet soldiers. At 4:50 a.m., a column of tanks and armored personnel carriers headed for the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, where a twenty-year-old resident of Prague was shot dead. In Dubcek's office, the Soviet military arrested him and seven members of the Central Committee. At seven in the morning, the tanks headed for Winohradska 12, where Radio Prague was located. Residents managed to build barricades there, tanks began to break through, and shooting at people was opened. That morning, seventeen people were killed outside the Radio building, and another 52 were injured and taken to the hospital. After 14:00, the arrested leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was put on a plane and taken to Ukraine with the assistance of the country's President Ludwig Svoboda, who fought the puppet government of Bilyak and Indra as best he could (thanks to Svoboda, Dubcek was saved and then transported to Moscow). A curfew was introduced in the city; in the dark, soldiers opened fire on any moving object.

01. In the evening, European time, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting in New York, at which it adopted a resolution condemning the invasion. The USSR vetoed it.

02. Trucks with students holding national flags began to drive around the city. All key objects of the city were taken under the control of the Soviet troops.

03. At the National Museum. The military equipment was immediately surrounded by the inhabitants of the city and entered into conversations with the soldiers, often very sharp, tense. In some areas of the city, shooting was heard, and the wounded were constantly being taken to hospitals.

06. In the morning, the youth began to build barricades, attack tanks, threw stones at them, bottles of combustible mixture, tried to set fire to military equipment.

08. The inscription on the bus: Soviet cultural center.

10. One of the soldiers wounded as a result of shooting at the crowd.

11. Mass sabotage actions began throughout Prague. In order to make it difficult for the military to navigate the city, the citizens of Prague began to destroy street signs, knock down signs with street names, house numbers.

13. Soviet soldiers broke into the Church of St. Martin in Bratislava. First they fired at the windows and the tower of the medieval church, then they broke the locks and got inside. The altar, the donation box were opened, the organ, church supplies were broken, paintings were destroyed, benches and the pulpit were broken. The soldiers climbed into the crypt with burials and broke several tombstones there. This church was robbed throughout the day, by different groups of military personnel.

14. Units of the Soviet troops enter the city of Liberec

15. The dead and wounded after the military assault on the Prague Radio.

16. Unauthorized entry is strictly prohibited

19. The walls of houses, shop windows, fences have become a platform for merciless criticism of the invaders.

20. “Run home, Ivan, Natasha is waiting for you”, “Not a drop of water or a loaf of bread to the invaders”, “Bravo, guys! Hitler", "USSR, go home", "Twice occupied, twice taught", "1945 - liberators, 1968 - occupiers", "We were afraid of the West, we were attacked from the East", "Not hands up, but head up!" , “You have conquered space, but not us”, “The elephant cannot swallow a hedgehog”, “Do not call it hatred, call it knowledge”, “Long live democracy. Without Moscow” are just a few examples of such wall-mounted agitation.

21. “I had a soldier, I loved him. I had a watch - the Red Army took it."

22. On the Old Town Square.

25. I remember a contemporary interview with a Prague woman who, on the 21st, went out to the city with her university friends to see the Soviet military. “We thought there were some kind of terrible invaders, but in fact, very young guys with peasant faces were sitting on armored personnel carriers, a little scared, constantly grabbing weapons, not understanding what they were doing here and why the crowd reacted so aggressively to them. The commanders told them that they had to go and save the Czech people from the counter-revolution.”

39. A homemade leaflet from those that they tried to distribute to Soviet soldiers.

40. Today, at the building of the Prague Radio, where on August 21, 1968 people who defended the radio station died, a memorial ceremony was held, wreaths were laid, that morning broadcast from 68 was broadcast, when the radio announced the attack on the country. The announcer reads the text, and shooting in the street is heard in the background.

49. At the site of the National Museum, where a monument to self-immolated student Jan Palach is erected, candles are burning.

51. An exhibition has been arranged at the beginning of Wenceslas Square - a documentary film about the events of the Prague Spring and August 1968 is shown on a large screen, there is an infantry fighting vehicle with a characteristic white line, an ambulance of those years, there are stands with photographs and reproductions of Prague graffiti.

57. 1945: we kissed your fathers > 1968: you shed our blood and take away our freedom.

According to modern data, during the invasion, 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed and more than 500 wounded, the vast majority of civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child.

The result of the operation to remove the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the occupation of the country was the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Czechoslovakia: five motorized rifle divisions, with a total number of up to 130 thousand people, 1412 tanks, 2563 armored personnel carriers and Temp-S tactical missile systems with nuclear warheads. A leadership loyal to Moscow was brought to power, and a purge was carried out in the party. The Prague Spring reforms were completed only after 1991.

Photos: Josef Koudelka, Libor Hajsky, CTK, Reuters, drugoi

On the night of August 21, 1968, the temporary entry of troops of the USSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria (now the Republic of Bulgaria), the Hungarian People's Republic (now Hungary), the German Democratic Republic (GDR, now part of the Federal Republic of Germany) and the Polish People's Republic (now the Republic of Poland) to the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Czechoslovakia, now the independent states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in accordance with the then understanding of the leadership of the Soviet Union and other participating countries of the essence of international assistance. It was carried out with the aim of "defending the cause of socialism" in Czechoslovakia, to prevent the loss of power by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CHR), the country's possible exit from the socialist community and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. (ATS).

By the end of the 1960s, Czechoslovak society faced a set of problems that could not be solved within the framework of the Soviet-type socialist system. The economy suffered from the disproportionate development of industries, the loss of traditional markets; democratic freedoms were virtually non-existent; national sovereignty was limited. In Czechoslovak society, demands were growing for a radical democratization of all aspects of life.

In January 1968, the President of Czechoslovakia and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, was removed. Alexander Dubcek, a representative of the liberal wing of the Communist Party, was elected leader of the Communist Party, and Ludwik Svoboda became president of Czechoslovakia. In April, the program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was published, which proclaimed a course for the democratic renewal of socialism, provided for limited economic reforms.

Initially, the leadership of the USSR did not interfere in the inner-party problems of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but the main features of the proclaimed "new model" of socialist society (the synthesis of a planned and market economy; the relative independence of state power and public organizations from party control; the rehabilitation of victims of repression; the democratization of political life in the country, etc.) ) ran counter to the Soviet interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and caused alarm among the leadership of the USSR. The possibility of a "chain reaction" in the neighboring socialist countries led to hostility towards the Czechoslovak "experiment" not only of the Soviet, but also of the East German, Polish and Bulgarian leadership. A more restrained position was taken by the leadership of Hungary.

From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. The withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact would inevitably undermine the Eastern European military security system.

The use of force was considered by the Soviet leadership as the last alternative, but nevertheless, in the spring of 1968, it decided that it was necessary to take measures to prepare its armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The introduction of troops was preceded by numerous attempts at political dialogue during inter-party meetings of the leadership of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, mutual visits of government delegations, multilateral meetings of the leaders of Czechoslovakia and the socialist countries. But political pressure did not produce the expected results. The final decision on the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia was made at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 16, 1968 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the states parties to the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on August 18 on the basis of an appeal by a group of Czechoslovakian party and state leaders to the governments of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact with request for international assistance. The action was planned as short-term. The operation to bring in troops was codenamed "Danube", and its overall leadership was entrusted to General of the Army Ivan Pavlovsky.

Direct training of troops began on August 17-18. First of all, equipment was preparing for long marches, stocks of material resources were replenished, work cards were worked out, and other events were held. On the eve of the introduction of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrey Grechko informed Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzur about the upcoming action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The operation to bring troops into Czechoslovakia began on August 20 at 23.00, when an alarm was announced in the involved military units.

On the night of August 21, the troops of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions, ensuring surprise. The movement of troops was carried out in radio silence, which contributed to the secrecy of the military action. Simultaneously with the introduction of ground forces to the airfields of Czechoslovakia, contingents of airborne troops were transferred from the territory of the USSR. At two o'clock in the morning on August 21, units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at the airfield near Prague. They blocked the main objects of the airfield, where Soviet An-12 military transport aircraft with troops and military equipment began to land at short intervals. The paratroopers were supposed to take control of the most important state and party facilities, primarily in Prague and Brno.

The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. The introduced troops were deployed in all regions and major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The total number of troops directly involved in the operation was about 300 thousand people.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army (about ten divisions) offered practically no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of the events in the country. The population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, showed discontent. The protest was expressed in the construction of symbolic barricades on the way of the advance of tank columns, the work of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was actually arrested and taken to Moscow. However, the political goals of the action were initially not achieved. The plan of the Soviet leadership to form a "revolutionary government" of Czechoslovak leaders loyal to the USSR failed. All segments of Czechoslovak society strongly opposed the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the country.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark, and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The military intervention of the five states was condemned by the governments of the countries of socialist orientation - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China. Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of the situation.

On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations were held in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

At the end of August, the Czechoslovak leaders returned to their homeland. At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation appeared. The result was the withdrawal of the troops of the countries participating in the action from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated places of deployment. Aviation was concentrated on dedicated airfields. The withdrawal of troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia was hampered by the continued internal political instability, as well as the increased activity of NATO near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the FRG in close proximity to the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in conducting various exercises. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." In accordance with the document, the Central Group of Forces (TsGV) was created - an operational territorial association of the Armed Forces of the USSR, temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The headquarters of the CGV was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The combat strength included two tank and three motorized rifle divisions.

The signing of the treaty was one of the main military-political results of the introduction of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

The action of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, despite the absence of hostilities, was accompanied by losses on both sides. From August 21 to October 20, 1968, as a result of hostile actions of citizens of Czechoslovakia, 11 Soviet military personnel were killed, 87 people were wounded and injured. In addition, they died in accidents, with careless handling of weapons, died of diseases, etc. another 85 people. According to the Czechoslovak government commission, in the period from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 Czechoslovak citizens were killed, 345 people were injured of varying severity.

As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted.

Since the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the "Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union" of December 4, 1989, and in the "Statement of the Soviet government" of December 5, 1989, the decision on the entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous and condemned as unreasonable interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign states.

On February 26, 1990, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. By this time, the CGU was located in 67 settlements in the Czech Republic and in 16 in Slovakia. The combat strength included over 1.1 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand infantry fighting vehicles, more than 1.2 thousand artillery pieces, 100 aircraft and 170 helicopters; the total number of military personnel was over 92 thousand people, civilian personnel - 44.7 thousand people. In July 1991, the TsGV was abolished in connection with the completion of the withdrawal of troops to the territory of the Russian Federation.

In 1968, the Soviet Army carried out the most grandiose military action in the post-war years. More than 20 divisions of the ground forces occupied the whole country in the center of Europe in one day and with virtually no losses. Even the Afghan war involved a much smaller number of troops (see the corresponding section of the book).

That year, the "counter-revolution" in Eastern Europe again had to be fought - this time in Czechoslovakia. The development of events in Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring has long worried the Soviet leadership. L. I. Brezhnev and his associates could not allow the fall of the communist regime in this country and were ready to use force at any moment. The "Brezhnev Doctrine", formulated by that time and carefully hidden from everyone, assumed the use of military power to maintain Soviet influence in the socialist countries of Europe without regard to their sovereignty and international norms.

In January 1968, A. Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), gave up his post to A. Dubcek, who immediately assured Moscow that he would make every effort to stabilize the situation in the party and society. Being a convinced Marxist, he still considered it necessary to carry out some reforms in the economy and politics. Public opinion generally supported Dubcek's reformist aspirations - the existing model for building a socialist society did not allow him to catch up with the industrialized countries of Western Europe in terms of living standards.

N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev on the podium of the Mausoleum

Dubcek took the initiative to establish a "new model of socialism". At the next (April) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the so-called Program of Action of the Czechoslovak Communists was adopted. If we consider this document from modern positions, then in general it was sustained in the communist spirit, with the exception of two points - the party leadership abandoned the command-administrative management system and declared freedom of speech and the press.

In the country, including in the official press, heated discussions on various socio-political problems unfolded. The most frequently heard theses were about the removal of state officials who had compromised themselves from the authorities and the intensification of economic relations with the West. Most of the official circles of the countries of the socialist community perceived the events taking place in Czechoslovakia only as a "counter-revolution".

Soviet political leaders were especially concerned, fearing a change in the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, which could lead to a reorientation to the West, an alliance with Yugoslavia, and then to a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, as it almost happened with the Hungarian People's Republic.

During this period, the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" was finally formed, which in foreign policy became the cornerstone and connecting link of the entire socialist camp. The doctrine proceeded from the premise that the withdrawal of any of the socialist countries from the Warsaw Pact or the CMEA, a departure from the agreed line in foreign policy, would disrupt the balance of power existing in Europe and inevitably lead to an aggravation of international tension.

One of the main sources of information about the internal situation in Czechoslovakia for the leadership of the USSR was the reports of informants and Soviet diplomats. Thus, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia F. Havlicek directly warned of the "inevitable rapprochement of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia and Romania", which would lead to a weakening of the positions of the socialist bloc.

The course of thought of the Soviet leaders is clearly illustrated by the story of the Soviet “curator” in Czechoslovakia, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU K. T. Mazurov: “Despite the nuances, the general position was the same: we must intervene. It was hard to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic (!) would appear at our borders, overrun by the Germans of the FRG, and after them by the Americans. This did not meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact in any way. During the last week before the introduction of troops, the members of the Politburo hardly slept, did not go home: according to reports, a counter-revolutionary coup was expected in Czechoslovakia. The Baltic and Belorussian military districts were brought to state of readiness number one. On the night of August 20-21, they again gathered for a meeting. Brezhnev said: "We will bring in troops ...".

Judging by the recollections of eyewitnesses, in December 1968, Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko, discussing the issue, pointed out that Brezhnev did not want to send troops for a long time, but Ulbricht, Gomulka, and Zhivkov put pressure on him. Yes, and our "hawks" in the Politburo (P. G. Shelest, N. V. Podgorny, K. T. Mazurov, A. N. Shelepin and others) demanded a solution to the problem by force.

The leaders of the countries of the socialist community also considered the Czechoslovak events as a "dangerous virus" that could spread to other countries. First of all, this concerned East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent - Hungary.

From the point of view of the military (according to the memoirs of the former Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, General of the Army A. Gribkov), the main danger of Czechoslovakia's independence in foreign policy was that it would inevitably lead to the vulnerability of borders with NATO countries, the loss control over the Czech armed forces. The refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to voluntarily deploy a group of Soviet troops on their territory seemed at least illogical and required adequate immediate measures.

Preparations for the operation "Danube" - the entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia - began in the spring of 1968 and at first was carried out under the guise of the Shumava maneuvers. On April 8, the commander of the Airborne Forces, Margelov, in preparation for the exercises, received a directive from the Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, which read: “The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, had to send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from danger looming over her.

At the signal for the start of the Shumava exercises, two airborne divisions should be ready for landing in Czechoslovakia by parachute and landing methods. At the same time, our paratroopers, who recently put on “maroon” (red) berets at the parade in November 1967, like most units and subunits of special forces around the world, put on blue hats in the summer of 1968.

This "move" by the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Margelov, judging by the stories of eyewitnesses, later, already during the operation "Danube" itself, saved more than a dozen lives of our paratroopers - local residents who tried to resist the Soviet troops, at first mistook them for representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces, the so-called "blue helmets".

The commanders of regiments and divisions, which were supposed to be involved in the invasion operation, got acquainted with the roads and cities of Czechoslovakia, studying possible ways of moving troops. Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises were held, after which the Soviet units lingered on Czechoslovak soil for a long time and left it only after numerous reminders from the Czech leadership.

“Early in the morning of June 18, 1968, the operational group of the field command of the army crossed the state border of Czechoslovakia,” S. M. Zolotev, head of the political department of the 38th army of the Carpathian military district, described the events of those days. - Three days later, the main forces of the army, allocated to participate in the exercise, crossed the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.

Already from the first meetings on Czechoslovak soil, it became clear that changes had taken place in the consciousness and behavior of a significant part of Slovaks and Czechs. We did not feel that fraternal warmth and friendliness that had distinguished our Czechoslovak friends before, wariness appeared. On July 22, a group of senior officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army arrived at the headquarters of our army ... On behalf of the Minister of National Defense of Czechoslovakia, they posed questions to us: why, despite the promise given by Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky to withdraw Soviet troops by July 21, they are still in the area teachings; for what reasons we are delayed and what are our future plans ... We are in a difficult situation.

Only in early August, after repeated demands from the Czech government, did units of the 38th Army return to their garrisons. Let us again give the floor to S. M. Zolotov: “Soon I received an order to return to the command post of the army. There was a lot of work to be done here to get acquainted with new units and formations ... In addition to the regular formations of the army, divisions from other regions were already deployed here. Together with the commander, I visited these formations and talked to people. Although they did not directly talk about a possible throw across the Czechoslovak border, the officers understood why such a powerful grouping of troops was being created in Transcarpathia. “On August 12, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko arrived in our troops.”

But even earlier, in mid-July, the leaders of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary met in Warsaw to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. At the meeting, a message was drafted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, demanding the adoption of energetic measures to restore "order". It also said that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private affair of this country only, but the direct duty of all countries of the socialist community.

In Cerne nad Tisou, consultations and an exchange of views began between the Soviet leaders and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. As a result, by August 3, when a joint communiqué was signed at the Bratislava Conference of Communist Parties, a split had already been made in the ranks of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Czechs. In Bratislava, it was decided that “the defense of the gains of socialism. is an. international duty of all fraternal parties."

The Czechs themselves also did not rule out the possibility of using their own armed forces inside the country. Thus, Minister of Defense Dzur considered the possibility of dispersing demonstrations in front of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the help of army armored personnel carriers, and Dubcek bluntly stated at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on August 12: “If I come to the conclusion that we are on the verge of a counter-revolution, then I myself will call the Soviet troops.”

An analysis of the statements of Western politicians suggested that the US and NATO would not interfere in the conflict. The main reason for such optimism was the statement by US Secretary of State D. Rask that the events in Czechoslovakia are a personal matter, first of all, of the Czechs themselves, as well as other Warsaw Pact countries (a similar statement was made during the Hungarian crisis, then the Americans did not officially intervene) . Thus, intervention in the conflict between the armed forces of NATO and the United States was not foreseen, at least at the first stage, until there was serious resistance.

At an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 16, a decision was made to send troops. This decision was approved at a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on 18 August. The reason was a letter of appeal from a group of Czech party and statesmen to the governments of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact for the provision of "international assistance". As a result, it was decided to change the political leadership of the country during a short-term military intervention. After completing this mission, the main group of troops was supposed to be immediately withdrawn, leaving only a few units to stabilize the situation.

On the same day, August 18, in the office of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Grechko, the entire leadership of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the armies who were destined to go to Czechoslovakia, gathered. Further conversation is known from the words of the commander of the 38th Army, General A. M. Mayorov:

“The assembled marshals and generals have been waiting for the late minister for a long time, already guessing what will be discussed. Czechoslovakia has long been the number one topic worldwide. The minister appeared without preamble and announced to the audience:

I have just returned from a meeting of the Politburo. A decision was made to send troops of the Warsaw Pact countries to Czechoslovakia. This decision will be carried out even if it leads to a third world war.

These words hit the audience like a hammer. No one expected the stakes to be so high. Grechko continued:

With the exception of Romania - it does not count - everyone agreed to this action. True, Janos Kadar will present the final decision tomorrow morning, on Monday. He has some complications with members of the Politburo. Walter Ulbricht and the Minister of Defense of the GDR prepared five divisions for entry into Czechoslovakia. Politically, it is now inexpedient. Now is not the 39th year. If necessary, we will connect them.

After a short pause, while those present thought over what they had heard, the minister demanded a report on the readiness of the troops for the operation and gave final instructions:

Commander of the first tank!

Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Kozhanov!

Report.

The army, Comrade Minister, is ready to carry out the task.

Good. The main attention, comrade Kozhanov, is the rapid advance of the army from north to south. Bristle to the west with four divisions... Keep two divisions in reserve. KP - Pilsen. Of course, in the forests. The army's area of ​​responsibility is three northwestern and western regions of Czechoslovakia.

Commander of the twentieth!

Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Velichko.

Report.

The army is prepared for the task you have set.

Good. Commander, 10-12 hours after "Ch" with one, or better with two divisions, you should connect with the airborne division in the area of ​​​​the Ruzyne airfield southwest of Prague.

The commander of the airborne troops, Colonel General Margelov, excited by the upcoming operation, spoke most temperamentally:

Comrade Minister, the airborne division is on time… We will smash everything to smithereens to hell.”

The direct preparation of the grouping of Soviet troops for the invasion, already under the leadership of the Minister of Defense Grechko personally, began on August 17–18. Draft appeals to the people and the army of Czechoslovakia, a government statement from the five participating countries, and a special letter to the leaders of the Communist Parties of the Western countries were prepared. All prepared documents emphasized that the introduction of troops was only a forced measure taken in connection with the "real danger of a counter-revolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia."

Il-14-30D (according to NATO classification - Crate) was intended to transport 30 paratroopers or 3 tons of cargo

In the course of direct training of troops, a white stripe was applied to armored vehicles - a hallmark of Soviet and other "friendly" troops being introduced. All other armored vehicles during the operation were subject to "neutralization", and preferably without fire damage. In the event of resistance, "bandless" tanks and other military equipment were subject, according to the instructions brought to the troops, to defeat immediately upon opening fire on our troops. At a meeting, if this suddenly happens, NATO troops were ordered to immediately stop and "do not shoot without a command." Naturally, no "sanctions from above" were required to destroy the Czech equipment that opened fire.

The last time the date and time of the start of the operation was clarified and finally approved - August 20, approximately late in the evening. According to the general plan, during the first three days, 20 divisions of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact enter Czechoslovakia and 10 more divisions are introduced in the following days. In the event of a complication of the situation, 6 of the 22 military districts of the USSR (and this is 85-100 combat-ready divisions) are put on high combat readiness. All forces armed with nuclear weapons were to be brought to a state of full combat readiness. In Poland, the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria, an additional 70-80 divisions were deployed to the wartime states in addition to being brought in if necessary.

By August 20, all preparatory activities were completed. Formations of the 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms and 16th Air Armies of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 11th Guards Combined Arms Army of the Baltic Military District, 5th Guards Tank and 28th Combined Arms Armies of the Belarusian Military District, 13 th, 38th combined arms armies and the 28th army corps of the Carpathian military district, the 14th air army of the Odessa military district - up to 500 thousand people in total. (of which 250 thousand were in the first echelon) and 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers were ready for action. Army General I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the grouping of Soviet troops.

However, even on the eve of the introduction of troops, Marshal Grechko informed the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia about the upcoming action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The political and state leadership of the country was “temporarily neutralized”, which was not in the plan approved in advance. But it was necessary to stop possible incidents like the speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Prague radio. A reconnaissance company led by Lieutenant Colonel M. Seregin seized the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at seven o'clock in the morning, disarming the guards and cutting all telephone wires. A few minutes later, the paratroopers had already burst into the room where the Czechoslovak leaders were sitting. To the question of one of those present: “Gentlemen, what kind of army has come?” - followed by an exhaustive answer:

It was the Soviet army that came to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia. I ask you to remain calm and remain in place until the arrival of our representatives, the security of the building will be provided.

Fighting on the streets of Prague - the outcome is clearly a foregone conclusion ...

Soviet BTR-152 on a city street

At seven o'clock in the afternoon on August 21, the entire Czechoslovak leadership, on two armored personnel carriers, under the escort of paratroopers, was taken to the airport and taken by plane to Legnica (Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. From there they were transported to Transcarpathia, and then to Moscow for negotiations with Soviet leaders.

Column T-54A with identification stripes "friend or foe"

Part of the paratroopers took up positions along the highway from the airfield to Prague in order to stop possible attempts by the Czechoslovak army to prevent the invasion. But at four o'clock in the morning, instead of Czech cars, blinding the soldiers with headlights, the first column of Soviet tanks from the 20th Guards Army rumbled.

A few hours later, the first Soviet tanks with white stripes on their armor appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities so that they could distinguish their vehicles from the same type of Czech tanks. The roar of tank diesel engines, the rumble of caterpillars woke up peacefully sleeping townspeople that morning. On the streets of morning Prague, even the air was infused with tank cinders. Some people, both soldiers and civilians, had an unsettling feeling of war, but in general it can be seen that for the most part the Czechs turned out to be passive - the introduction of troops aroused more curiosity than fear in them.

The main role in the operation to establish control over the situation in the country was assigned to tank formations and units - the 9th and 11th Guards Tank Divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces K. G. Kozhanov from the GSVG, 13th Guards tank division from the Southern Group of Forces, the 15th Guards Tank Division of Major General A. A. Zaitsev from the Belarusian Military District, the 31st Tank Division of Major General A. P. Yurkov from the 38th Combined Arms Army of the Carpathian Military District and tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Taking into account the difference in the speed of movement, the Soviet command gave the order to the ground grouping to cross the border, when the paratroopers were still preparing for the landing. At one in the morning on August 21, 1968, units and formations of the 38th Army of Lieutenant General A. M. Mayorov crossed the state border of Czechoslovakia. There was no resistance from the Czechoslovak side. The advanced motorized rifle division of Major General G.P. Yashkin covered 120 km in 4 hours.

At 4 o'clock in the morning the loss account was opened. 200 km from the border, near the small town of Poprad, in front of a reconnaissance patrol of three T-55 tanks, the Volga stopped, in which the commander of the 38th Army, General Mayorov, was sitting. Lieutenant Colonel Shevtsov and the head of the Special Department of the Army Spirin, who were accompanied by KGB special forces, approached the car (they were assigned to the general on the eve of the invasion, and they controlled his every step). Majorov ordered Shevtsov:

Lieutenant colonel, find out the reason for stopping the tanks.

Before the general had time to finish, one tank rushed to the Volga. Spirin, grabbing Mayorov by the shoulder, pulled him out of the car. In the next moment, the Volga crunched under the tracks of the tank. The driver and radio operator sitting in the front seats managed to jump out, and the sergeant sitting next to the general was crushed.

What are you bastards doing?! - the commander yelled at the tank commander and the driver, who jumped to the ground.

We need to go to Trenchin ... Mayorov ordered, - the tankers justified themselves.

So I am Mayorov!

We didn't recognize you, Comrade General...

The cause of the accident was the fatigue of the driver.

He, having stopped the car to transfer control to the shift, left the tank on the brake without turning off the first speed, and forgot to tell about it. The driver, having started the car, took it off the brakes. The tank jumped onto the Volga in front of it. Only a lucky chance saved General Mayorov from death, otherwise the whole army could find itself without a commander in the very first hours of being in a foreign land.

By the end of August 21, the troops of the 38th Army entered the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia. Ordinary citizens began the fight against uninvited guests. In Prague, young people hastily tried to build fragile barricades, sometimes throwing cobblestones and sticks at soldiers, and removing street signs. Equipment left unattended even for a second suffered the most. During the first three days of their stay in Czechoslovakia, 7 combat vehicles were set on fire in the 38th Army alone. Although there were no hostilities, there were still losses. The most impressive and tragic feat was performed on a mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately sent their tank into the abyss in order to avoid running into children set there by picketers.

The Soviet BTR-40, despite obsolescence, again proved to be very good on paved roads

At five o'clock in the morning, the first Soviet T-55 tank appeared on the right bank of the Vltava. He stopped at the main entrance and turned the cannon towards the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was followed by dozens of other combat vehicles. The commander of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division was appointed commandant of the city. Several thousand tanks appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities, marking the end of the Prague Spring.

T-55 and next to it a German anti-tank gun from World War II Pak-37

All power in the country was in the hands of the mysterious "General Trofimov", who for some reason appeared in public in the uniform of a colonel. Only a few knew who this man was, who longed to remain anonymous. The role of a simple army general was played by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR K. T. Mazurov. Sending his comrade-in-arms on a "combat mission", Brezhnev admonished him:

One of us must be sent to Prague. The military can do such things there ... Let Mazurov fly.

General I. G. Pavlovsky, who led the Danube operation, described the events of those days as follows: “I received the appointment on August 16 or 17, three to four days before the start of the operation. Initially, it was planned to put Marshal Yakubovsky at the head of the allied forces. He organized all the practical training. Suddenly, the Minister of Defense Grechko calls me: "You are appointed commander of the formations that will enter Czechoslovakia."

I flew to Legnica (on the territory of Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. I found Yakubovsky there. He showed on the map which divisions were coming out and from which direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for August 21 at zero one o'clock. Grechko warned: "The team will be from Moscow, your job is to make sure that it is carried out." At the appointed hour, the troops went.

And then Grechko called again: “I just spoke with Dzur (Minister of National Defense of Czechoslovakia) and warned that if the Czechs, God forbid, open fire on our troops, it could end badly. I asked to give a command to the Czechoslovak units not to move anywhere, no opening of fire, so that they would not show resistance to us. After the troops left, about an hour later, Grechko calls again: “How are you?” I report: such and such divisions are there. In some places, people take to the roads, make blockages. Our troops avoid obstacles... He warned me not to leave the command post without his permission. And suddenly a new call: “Why are you still there? Fly to Prague immediately!”

We flew up to Prague, made two or three circles over the airfield - not a single person. Not a single voice is heard, not a single aircraft is visible. Sat down. With Lieutenant General Yamshchikov, who met me, we went from the airfield to the General Staff to Dzur. They immediately agreed with him: that there would be no fights between our soldiers and that no one would think that we had arrived with some tasks to occupy Czechoslovakia. We brought in troops, that's all. And then let the political leadership figure it out.

The Soviet embassy recommended to meet with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda. I took with me a Hungarian general, our German one. I said: “Comrade President, you know that the troops of the Warsaw Pact states have entered Czechoslovakia. I came to report on this matter. And since you are an army general and I am an army general, we are both military men. You understand, the situation forced us to do this.” He replied: "I understand ...".

Two decades later, in 1988, I. G. Pavlovsky recognized the fact that “the attitude of the population towards us was not friendly. Why did we come there? We scattered leaflets from the plane, explaining that we entered with peaceful intentions. But you yourself understand that if I, an uninvited guest, come to your house and start disposing, it will not be very pleasant.

The Czechoslovak army did not offer resistance, showing its discipline and loyalty to the orders of the higher leadership. For this reason, large casualties were avoided.

T-55 took up position on the streets of Prague

However, there were still losses: during the introduction of troops from August 21 to October 20, 1968, 11 military personnel, including 1 officer, died as a result of hostile actions by individual citizens of Czechoslovakia. During the same period, 87 people were wounded and injured, including 19 officers. On the Czechoslovak side, from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 civilians were killed and 345 were seriously injured.

From a military point of view, this was a brilliantly prepared and conducted operation, which came as a complete surprise to the NATO countries.

In total, in the first three days, according to the plan, 20 foreign divisions (Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian) entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, in the next two days - another 10 divisions.

However, despite the military success, it was not possible to immediately achieve political goals. Already on August 21, a statement of the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia appeared, in which the introduction of troops was condemned. On the same day, representatives of a number of countries spoke in the Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, but consideration of this issue was blocked by the "right of veto" by Hungary and the USSR. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from the agenda of the General Assembly.

Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and China condemned the "military intervention of five states". However, most of these "protests" were purely declarative and could not have a noticeable impact on the situation.

"Striped" T-54

The heads of the major states of Western Europe, and indeed the United States, considered the Prague Spring and the related divisions within the Eastern Bloc to be "communist domestic quarrels" and avoided such interference in the affairs of Eastern Europe, which could be regarded as a violation of the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Another aspect was the beginning of negotiations on the limitation of armaments, which began to acquire real features (in 1972, an ABM treaty would be signed), and interference in the internal affairs of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact could nullify the entire course of these negotiations.

But, despite the "non-intervention" of the West, a quick normalization of the situation did not happen. The expectation of receiving broad support from the opposition groups also did not materialize. A successful military action, as noted in one of the documents, "was not accompanied by the mobilization of healthy forces in the CPC." Moreover, in the words of one of the Czechoslovak reformers M. Miller, the "healthy forces" were suppressed and frightened, faced with the unanimous condemnation of the "interventions" and their assistants from the Czechoslovak society.

Having found itself in a political impasse on this issue, the Soviet side was forced to return to its former policy. Since it was not possible to form a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government", it was necessary to return to attempts to put pressure on A. Dubcek and his colleagues in order to direct his domestic policy in the right direction. But now the positions of the Soviet side were already much stronger - the Czechoslovak leaders brought to Moscow signed a corresponding agreement, and the presence of allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia gave a certain carte blanche.

A new line of "normalization" began to be carried out immediately, during the visit of Czechoslovak Prime Minister O. Chernik to Moscow on 10 September. The Czech comrades were promised not only substantial economic assistance, but also a certain amount of political pressure. Demanding that Chernik immediately comply with the Moscow Agreement, the Politburo insisted that the precondition for the withdrawal or reduction of the Allied troops was "a complete cessation of the subversive activities of anti-socialist forces and the provision of a more active role for conservative leaders in political life."

After three weeks, the situation in Prague and other large cities of Czechoslovakia almost completely stabilized: a new government was appointed by Czechoslovakia President L. Svoboda, which immediately declared the importance of friendship and close cooperation with the countries of socialism.

Sometimes the "striped" burned

On September 10-12, the main formations and units of the Soviet troops and the troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact were withdrawn and headed for the places of permanent deployment. By November 4, 1968, 25 divisions were withdrawn from the country.

"We're here for a while..."

And on the territory of Czechoslovakia until 1991, the Central Group of Forces of the Soviet Army, which included the 15th Guards and 31st Tank Divisions, the 18th, 30th Guards, and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions, lingered. When signing an agreement on the temporary stay in Czechoslovakia of a group of Soviet troops (this happened on October 16), it was determined that its number could not exceed 130 thousand people. This force was quite enough to stabilize the situation, taking into account the fact that the army of Czechoslovakia at that time numbered 200 thousand people. When confirming the post of commander, Colonel-General A. Mayorov, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, told him as parting words: “The troops of the Group under the agreement will be deployed temporarily. But it is not for nothing that they say: there is nothing more permanent than temporary. We are talking, Alexander Mikhailovich, not about months - about years.

The Central Group of Forces proved its effectiveness already at the end of 1968, when our troops managed to disrupt a major anti-government political strike. The forces of the Democrats have scheduled mass political demonstrations for December 31st. However, on the eve, in accordance with the commander’s previously developed plan called “Gray Hawk”, 20 Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalions were introduced into all major cities “to control order” during the demonstration - anti-government demonstrations did not take place. The usual demonstration of equipment was enough, there was no need to use weapons.

The situation in the country began to gradually normalize only from the middle of 1969, when the reorganization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of Czechoslovakia was completed (that is, when the main "troublemakers" were politically isolated).

Well, the events in Czechoslovakia were then considered for a long time in military academies as an example of a clear organization and conduct of a large-scale operation in the European theater of operations to provide "fraternal assistance to friends and allies."

However, in 1989, the last Soviet leader, M. S. Gorbachev, officially admitted that the introduction of troops was an unlawful act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, which interrupted the democratic renewal of Czechoslovakia and had long-term negative consequences. In 1991, in the shortest possible time, the TsGV was liquidated, and the troops were withdrawn to their homeland.

A few years later, the “democratic” traditions, so touted by the first and last president of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev, finally took over, and the country, which had collapsed into two sovereign states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), entered the American program of “NATO expansion to the East.”

Notes:

15 developing countries are armed with ballistic missiles, another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 states.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 234–235.

Cit. Quoted from: Drogovoz I. G. Tank sword of the country of the Soviets. - M., 2002. S. 216.

USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay.

Cit. Quoted from: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts in the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. S. 154.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 314.

In 1968, Soviet tanks entered Prague. The suppression of the Prague Spring became one of the most senseless foreign policy actions of the USSR and one of the most harmful to the image of Russians abroad.

In the 1960s, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia experienced a division into two camps - a conservative one led by a Stalinist, the head of the KChS and the country's president Antonin Novotny, and a "reformist" one, which was represented by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Alexander Dubcek.

In January 1968, the party congress of the CPSU elected Dubcek as the first secretary. Dubcek launched reforms: decentralization of power, admission of workers to power, liberalization of the media, and the like. He wanted to combine Soviet "socialist construction" with European social democracy. He called it "socialism with a human face."

In March 1968, the heroes of World War II, the legendary commander of the Czechoslovak brigade, Ludwig Svoboda, became president of the country. He supported Dubcek's reforms. Thus began the Prague Spring.

Liberalization in Czechoslovakia angered communist leaders in other countries. The Kremlin was afraid that this would lead to a weakening of the military power of the Warsaw Pact (a defensive pact between the countries of the socialist camp), because the borders of Czechoslovakia bordered on West Germany, which was a member of NATO.

On the night of August 21, 1968, the troops of the Warsaw Pact began an invasion of the fraternal republic. 300,000 soldiers and 7,000 tanks came to fight the "counter-revolution". Thus began Operation Danube, the only non-training military action of the Warsaw Pact.

A column of tanks on the way to Prague.

Crushed bus, which blocked the path of movement of tanks.

Morning August 21st.Soviet troops on the streets of Prague. Riding on armored vehicles. At this time, the landing force had already captured the government buildings. At 10 am, KGB workers loaded the party, government and parliamentary leadership of Czechoslovakia into landing armored personnel carriers, took them to the airfield, put them on a landing plane and sent them to Moscow.

The army of Czechoslovakia was ordered not to resist the invasion. But from the very morning, the population began to destroy and sketch street signs. The disoriented Soviet troops were not immediately able to capture the radio, the station and the newspapers. A large crowd had gathered at the radio station in the morning, barricading the street. Molotov cocktail flew, in response - bullets.

The scene at the radio building. Smoke and fire, a tank covered with fire extinguisher foam, the crew quickly leaves the car, one tanker covers those who get out. A demonstrator rushes at him: "Come on, shoot!"

During the entire invasion, 108 civilians were killed. Of them on the first day - 58 Most of them are here by the radio building

The act of self-immolation committed by Ryszard Sivec at the "Stadium of the Decade" in protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Following R. Sivets, several more people expressed their protest by self-immolation.

Soviet tanks and artillery settle down on the Vltava embankment

Spontaneous rally. Poster "Never with the USSR!" - A remake of the official communist slogan "Forever with the USSR!"

Demonstration in Prague.

After lunch, the clashes finally stopped, communication began. Residents of the cities convinced the soldiers that they did not need "international assistance", they had their own socialist party and government.

A familiar scene for Prague and Bratislava at the end of August 1968. "Here, read here the appeal of our government ..." - "We have an order!"

One of the many homemade posters. There was another option: "The technology is great, but there is no culture"

lingerie shop window poster

Karlovy Vary, 21 August. A group of students on a truck.

Prague, 22 August. Soviet armored vehicles surrounded by city residents.

When news of the invasion became known, the government of Czechoslovakia ordered the army not to resist. Not a single soldier violated this order and did not shoot. But they went to rallies. On the poster: "No one called you, invaders"

Prague, 29 August. Students burn Soviet newspapers on Wenceslas Square.

None of the Czech politicians dared to create a "revolutionary government". The congress of the CPSU supported Dubcek. The shocked Kremlin agreed to keep his team in power, promising to withdraw the army. In September 1968, Soviet tanks left Prague. But not Czechoslovakia. The so-called "Central Group of Forces" of the USSR remained in the country - 150,000 soldiers. Within a year, Dubcek and Sloboda were fired. "Hawks" came to power in the CPChS and began to tighten the screws. The "Prague Revolution" was defeated.

And this victory was the beginning of the end, primarily in the sphere of the image of the USSR. From the beautiful country of bright people who defeated Nazism and launched a man into space, the Union again became a prison of nations. The European "left" has finally turned its back on the East, concentrating on its own problems. The further progress of the "proletarian revolution" in the world, which had been going on since 1917, stopped.

Video of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia

Operation Danube was the largest military campaign for the USSR since World War II. And it was the end for the Soviet Union. The Kremlin no longer talked about any reforms. A long period of "stagnation" began - the bureaucratic apparatus ossified, corruption flourished, instead of real actions, the practice of ritual speeches and replies appeared. The last leader of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev, made attempts to change something, but it was too late.

On August 20, 1969, the anniversary of the events in Czechoslovakia, a group of Soviet dissidents made the following statement:

"On August 21 last year, a tragic event occurred: the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries invaded friendly Czechoslovakia.

This action was intended to stop the democratic path of development, which the whole country has embarked on. The whole world followed with hope the post-January development of Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the idea of ​​socialism, defamed in the Stalin era, would now be rehabilitated. The tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries destroyed this hope. On this sad anniversary, we declare that we continue to disagree with this decision, which threatens the future of socialism.

We stand in solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia, who wanted to prove that socialism with a human face is possible.

These lines are dictated by pain for our homeland, which we want to see truly great, free and happy.

And we are firmly convinced that a people who oppress other peoples cannot be free and happy.

— T. Baeva, Yu. Vishnevskaya, I. Gabai, N. Gorbanevskaya, Z. M. Grigorenko, M. Dzhemilev, N. Emelkina, S. Kovalev, V. Krasin, A. Levitin (Krasnov), L. Petrovsky, L. Plyushch, G. Podyapolsky, L. Ternovsky, I. Yakir, P. Yakir, A. Yakobson"