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What a blitzkrieg fight. What battle is considered the collapse of the "blitzkrieg"? Operation "blitzkrieg" in the interpretation of the USSR

Blitzkrieg II Developer Nival Interactive Publisher 1C Release date September 23, 2005 Platforms PC (Windows) Genre ... Wikipedia

War Dictionary of Russian synonyms. blitzkrieg n., number of synonyms: 1 war (33) ASIS synonym dictionary. V.N. Trishin. 2013 ... Synonym dictionary

blitzkrieg- and blitzkrieg is acceptable ... Dictionary of pronunciation and stress difficulties in modern Russian

- (German Blitzkrieg from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), see Lightning war ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

From German: Blitzkrieg. Translation: Lightning war. The military strategy of combat operations, which was used by the Nazi generals during the war with France, Poland and tried to apply in the war with the USSR. This expression was already found in 1935 in ... ... Dictionary of winged words and expressions

- "BLITZKRIEG" (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), see Blitz war (see LIGHTNING WAR) ... encyclopedic Dictionary

Blitzkrieg- (Blitzkrieg German) lightning war. In the English version, the blitz (the blitz) was called German raids. aviation on the cities of Great Britain in 1940. As a concept of warfare, B. was used by the Germans during the 2nd World War, especially successfully against ... ... The World History

BLITZKRIEG- (German "Blitzkrieg" "Lightning War") developed by the Nazi command military strategy of warfare, which was used by the Nazi generals during the French, Polish and Russian campaigns. For the first time the theory of "B." suggested in... Legal Encyclopedia

This term has other meanings, see Blitzkrieg (meanings). Blitzkrieg II Developer Nival Interactive Publisher 1C Release date September 23, 2005 Genre RTS ... Wikipedia

Books

  • , Baryatinsky Mikhail Borisovich. This book is the most in-depth study of the strategy of "blitzkrieg", a story about the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, about the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg...
  • Blitzkrieg Hitler. "Lightning War", Baryatinsky M.B. This book is the most profound study of the "lightning war" strategy, a story about the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, about the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of the Nazi blitzkrieg. ...

academy

Under the Government of the Russian Federation

in the subject "History"

Theme: "The collapse of Blitzkrieg"

Done: student

Teacher:

Moscow, 2000.


Introduction………………………………………………………………………..3

1. Preparation and purpose of the plan “Barbarossa”……………………………………….4

1.1 Development of German strategic plans for the war against the USSR…………………4

1.2 Plan "Barbarossa"……………………………………………………………………….…8

1.3 Russia before the start of the war …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

2. The beginning of the war…………………………………………………………………..17

2.1 Assault…………………………………………………………………………….…..17

2.2 Battle for Moscow …………………………………………………………………..….….23

2.3 Counteroffensive…………………………………………………………………..……24

2.4 Opinions of various historians on the reasons for the failure of Blitz Krieg…………………..26

Conclusion……………………………………………………………..………28

List of sources used…………………………………………..29


INTRODUCTION

For the 55th time the world will celebrate the victory in the bloodiest war in the history of mankind - the Second World War.

Many books have been written about her, kilometers of film have been shot. Veterans all over the world who survived that horror still remember every moment of those distant days with pain in their hearts. But again and again, during all these 55 years, local conflicts flare up in different parts of the Earth, threatening to flare up with a new global fire, as if History does not teach anything.

Even the most carefully planned operation "Barbarossa", provided with the resources of the entire conquered Europe, with a highly professional army, launched suddenly and treacherously, did not bring success to its organizers.

In the West, there are still disputes about the reasons for the defeat of the "invincible". These are “Russian frosts”, and bad roads, and the stubbornness of the Fuhrer ... Only the human factor, the courage of a simple soldier defending his homeland, the professional training of the officer corps, who was trained during the battles, the struggle of the entire people, conquered, but not subjugated, are deregistered.

Considering this topic, I will try once again to carefully understand what really is the reason for the collapse of this “brilliant” operation, what lessons can be learned from studying this topic, what can be said to all mankind about who “wins” from unleashing wars.

1. Preparation and purpose of the Barbarossa plan

1.1 Development of German strategic war plans against the USSR

Planning for German aggression against the Soviet Union began long before the war. Back in the mid-1930s, as can be judged from the documents, the political and military leadership of Germany, in solving a number of issues, proceeded from option "A", which meant the war against the USSR. At that time, the Nazi command was already accumulating information about the Soviet Army, studying the main operational directions of the eastern campaign and outlining possible options for military operations.

The outbreak of the war against Poland, and then the campaigns in Northern and Western Europe, temporarily switched the German headquarters thought to other problems. But even at that time, the preparation of a war against the USSR did not go out of sight of the Nazis. War planning, concrete and comprehensive, the German General Staff resumed after the defeat of France when, according to the fascist leadership, the rear of a future war was provided and Germany had at its disposal enough resources to wage it.

As shown by the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the German high command, Lieutenant General A. Jodl at the Nuremberg Trials, Hitler "decided to take action against the Soviet Union as soon as our martial law made it possible."

Already on June 25, 1940, on the third day after the signing of the armistice in Compiègne, the option of "strike force in the East" was being discussed. On June 28, "new tasks" were considered. On June 30, Halder wrote in his official diary: "The main attention is to the East."

July 22, 1940 Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Field Marshal V.Brauchich received an order to start development detailed plan for the war in the east.

The Hitlerite leadership gradually developed strategic views on waging war against the USSR and refined it in every detail in the highest military instances: at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, at the general headquarters of the ground forces, the air force and at the headquarters of the navy.

On July 22, Brauchitsch instructed the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder comprehensively think over various options "concerning the operation against Russia."

Halder vigorously took up the execution of the received order. He was convinced that "an offensive launched from the area of ​​concentration in East Prussia and the northern part of Poland in the general direction of Moscow would have the greatest chance of success." Halder saw the advantage of this strategic plan in that, in addition to the direct threat posed to Moscow, an offensive from these directions puts Soviet troops in Ukraine at a disadvantage, forcing them to fight defensive battles with a front turned to the north.

For the specific development of a plan for the eastern campaign to the general headquarters of the ground forces, the chief of staff of the 18th army, General E. Marks, who was considered an expert on the Soviet Union and enjoyed the special confidence of Hitler. On July 29, Halder informed him in detail about the essence of the planned campaign against the USSR, and the general immediately began planning it.

This stage of the development of the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was completed July 31, 1940. On this day, a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces of fascist Germany was held in the Berghof, at which the goals and plan of the war were clarified, and its timing was outlined. Speaking at the meeting, Hitler justified the need to defeat the Soviet Union by striving to gain dominance in Europe. “According to this…” he declared, - Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941".

The fascist military leadership considered this period of attack on the USSR as the most favorable, counting that by the spring of 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces do not have time to finish the reorganization and will not be ready to repel an invasion. The duration of the war was determined in few weeks. It was planned to complete it by the autumn of 1941.

It was supposed to inflict on the Soviet Union two powerful blows: southern - to Kyiv and to the bend of the Dnieper with a deep detour of the Odessa region and northern - through the Baltic to Moscow. In addition, it was planned to conduct independent operations in the south to capture Baku, and in the north - a strike by German troops concentrated in Norway in the direction of Murmansk.

The Nazi command, preparing for the war with the Soviet Union, attached great importance to the political and operational-strategic masking aggression. It was supposed to carry out a series of major events that were supposed to create the impression that the Wehrmacht was preparing for operations in Gibraltar, North Africa and England. S.P. Solovyov writes that the air raids on England were part of the camouflage, distracting from preparations for war in the East . Herman Goth believes that the bombing of England was to pave the way for the invasion of England and that the Germans had to abandon this plan because of the heavy losses of the material part of German aircraft. A very limited circle of people knew about the idea and plan of the war against the USSR. At a meeting in the Berghof on July 31, it was decided to find out whether Finland and Turkey would be allies in the war against the USSR. In order to draw these countries into the war, it was planned to give them some territories of the Soviet Union after the successful completion of the campaign. At the same time, considerations were considered on the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian relations and the guarantees of Romania.

Herman Goth, the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, writes in his memoirs that on August 1, Halder again discussed with General Marx a plan for a war against the USSR and on August 5 he received the first version of this plan. According to the fascist leadership, by August 1940, the Soviet Army had 151 rifle and 32 cavalry divisions, 38 mechanized brigades, of which 119 divisions and 28 brigades were located in the west and were divided by Polesye approximately into equal parts; reserves were located in the area of ​​Moscow. By the spring of 1941, no increase in the Soviet Armed Forces was expected. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would conduct defensive operations along the entire western border, with the exception of the Soviet-Romanian sector, where the Soviet Army was expected to go on the offensive with the aim of capturing the Romanian oil fields. It was believed that the Soviet troops would not evade decisive battles in the border areas, would not be able to immediately withdraw into the depths of their territory and repeat the maneuver of the Russian army in 1812.

Based on this assessment, the Nazi command planned to deliver the main blow of the ground forces from Northern Poland and East Prussia in the direction of Moscow, since the concentration of German troops in Romania at that time was impossible, the southern direction was not taken into account. A maneuver north of the Moscow direction was also ruled out, which lengthened the communications of the troops and, ultimately, led them to a difficult-to-pass wooded area north-west of Moscow.

The main grouping was tasked with destroying the main forces of the Soviet Army in the western direction, capturing Moscow and the northern part of the Soviet Union; in the future - to turn the front to the south in order to occupy Ukraine in cooperation with the southern group. As a result, it was supposed to reach the Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk line.

To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create a group of armies "North" from three armies (68 divisions in total, 15 of them tank and two motorized). The northern flank of the shock grouping was to be covered by one of the armies, which at the first stage was to, going on the offensive, force the Western Dvina in its lower reaches and move in the direction of Pskov, Leningrad.

UDK 94(47)" 1941/1945"(045)

The collapse of Blitzkrieg through the eyes of a German soldier

Maslov Dmitry Vladimirovich, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Head. Department of Humanitarian Social Cycle, [email protected],

Branch of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Moscow State Industrial University",

Sergiev Posad

The article contains an assessment of the sources contained in the book of the British historian Robert Kershaw “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron ones. The book allows us to imagine the evolution of views on the course of hostilities in 1941, the most difficult period of the war for the USSR. The article provides an analysis of this evolution and the assessments formulated by the author of the book, R. Kershaw. The sources cited (letters, diaries of German soldiers and officers) convincingly testify that already in the first months of the war, the Wehrmacht had serious problems that became the prologue of the coming defeat. The article presents the possibilities of using the material of the book in the educational process and in the fight against falsifications of the history of the Second World War.

Key words: Wehrmacht, German soldier, war.

The article offers the author's estimation of the sources from the book by the British historian Robert Kershaw “War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942” (the Russian translation “1941 through Germans' eyes. Birch-tree crosses for iron ones” was published in Moscow in 2008). The book allows imagining the evolution of viewpoints of the combat operations in 1941 in the hardest war period for the USSR. The article gives an analysis of the evolution and assessments formulated by the book author R. Kershaw. The cited sources (letters, diaries of German soldiers and officers) prove convincingly that during the first months of the war die Wehrmacht faced serious problems that were the prologue of the coming defeat. The article offers opportunities of using the book materials in education process and in fighting falsifications of the history of World War II.

Keywords: die Wehrmacht, German soldier, war.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War is rightfully the subject of our national pride. And therefore, attempts to question its regularity are especially painfully perceived in society. In recent years, a number of myths about this event have been widely circulated. They have already repeatedly been subjected to convincing criticism by domestic and foreign experts in military history. But this does not reduce the value of new sources on the history of the War.

A significant part of the slander falls on the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. Often, especially in journalism, it seems easy

walk of the Wehrmacht, allegedly barely managing to catch up with the fleeing Soviet troops without looking back. The more interesting are the testimonies of those who opposed the Soviet soldiers and had the opportunity (and most importantly, the vital necessity) to study their actions, as they say from the outside.

The memoirs of the German generals are quite well known to the reading public. In 2008, the book of the British historian Robert Kershaw “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron ones. Of course, the enemy is subjective in his assessments just like any other person. The same often affects the generalizations to which the author of the book resorts every now and then and which are generally typical of a Western researcher brought up within the framework of his political culture and historiographical tradition. And yet, with all the shortcomings, the book is important in terms of analyzing historical sources - it contains excerpts from letters and diaries of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, relating primarily to 1941, when their authors had not yet experienced the impact of the result of the War. The observations of the German servicemen allow once again to question a number of myths about the Great Victory and therefore can be widely used in the training of future historians, and will also be of interest to any reader. Especially to the young reader, for whom the war has managed to thickly acquire not only myths coming from the Soviet ideology, but also much more ignorant conjectures of recent years.

The key role in the first stage of the war, as you know, was played by the battle for Moscow. The enemy approached the capital itself, capturing part of the Moscow region. But it was here, in the Moscow region, that the enemy was dealt a blow that turned the outcome of the battle in favor of the USSR. The mentioned book clearly traces the evolution of the moods of German soldiers and officers from the moment the German aggression began to the successful counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. Therefore, one should start with an analysis of the mood with which the enemy entered Soviet territory on June 22, 1941. The more convincing will be the drop in the morale of the soldiers of the Third Reich in a situation where only a few kilometers remained to Moscow.

One of the most popular explanations for the failures of the initial stage of the war is the reference to the suddenness of the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. But, as it turns out when reading the book, even in the ranks of the attacking army there were many those for whom what happened was unexpected. Corporal Erich Kubi writes in his diary at noon on June 21: "I'm on duty, nothing interesting." Sonderführer Theo Scharf, noting that “something is being started against the Soviets,” admits

which, most likely, will bet a bottle of champagne to a Soviet lieutenant. The reason, it turns out, is that Scharf found the German attack on the USSR absurd, especially since trains with Baku oil were regularly going to the Reich. Scarf lost a bet, although it is unlikely that a bottle of champagne reached the Soviet officer. It is important, however, that the supply of raw materials to Germany confused not only the Soviet people.

Another reason to doubt the impending German aggression was the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. As soon as in Russia in recent years they have not evaluated the content and significance of this document! And some still see it as almost the cause of the Second World War. Convincing criticism of such ideas is given in the works of serious researchers. But it turns out that among the German soldiers there were also those who were disoriented by the treaty. And so much so that even contrary to obvious things, they refused to believe their eyes. Thus, an officer of the tank troops, Hauptmann Alexander Shtalberg, commenting on the June order on the development of the Russian alphabet, perplexedly refers to the said agreement, as well as to the meeting between Hitler and Molotov in Berlin in November 1940.

There were also those among the Germans who found an original explanation for such a contradiction. Lieutenant F.-V. Christians was firmly convinced that the coming events were connected with the intention of Germany to protect the oil-bearing regions of Baku from a possible British invasion. (I note in passing that the British themselves made similar proposals already during the Great Patriotic War, but received a polite - allies after all - but a firm refusal from the Soviet leadership). Turkey and even Africa appear in conversations as possible directions of the German offensive. Many Wehrmacht servicemen note that they learned about the war “with Russia” only a few hours before it began and were surprised a lot, some were even “amazed and not ready for this.”

The above evidence once again proves that the top German leadership did not at all advertise their plans for the USSR, even in their own troops. Therefore, to say that, say, almost the whole world knew about the impending attack on our country on June 22, and only Stalin did not believe anything, is hardly appropriate.

However, despite some unexpectedness of the forthcoming events, the overwhelming majority of the German military personnel at that moment did not doubt the imminent victorious end of the Russian campaign. True, there were doubts. Some even recalled the campaign of Napoleon in 1812. But such thoughts tried to drive away. In the end, all previous campaigns of the Wehrmacht ended

triumph, and even with the Fuhrer "everything is provided" - such is the general leitmotif of the reasoning on the eve of the morning of June 22. For the entire campaign, the soldiers of the Third Reich sometimes took even less time than was envisaged by the Barbarossa plan - 2-3 weeks. True, few of the Germans had an idea of ​​who and where they would have to fight this time. But the troops were glad the end of the period of uncertainty and the formulation of a specific combat mission.

One of the most far from the truth myths about the beginning of the war is that the USSR allegedly prepared an attack on Germany and Hitler, thus, delivered only a preemptive strike. In the 1990s the notorious Viktor Suvorov-Rezun made a name for himself on this fiction (suffice it to name his books “Icebreaker”, “Den-M” and others from “early creativity”; Suvorov does not rest on what he has achieved recently). This myth has been subjected to very sharp criticism.

The testimonies of German soldiers and officers cited in Kershaw's book, however, provide additional evidence that the Soviet Union was not going to attack Nazi Germany. At the same time, before the attack on the USSR, in the German army, apparently, there was a widespread belief that the “Russians” themselves were preparing aggression. And the point here is not only in Goebbels' propaganda, but also in their own observations of the Wehrmacht military personnel, who noted the redeployment of Soviet troops near the border. This fact, by the way, refutes the still occurring assertions that on the eve of the war, the Soviet leadership did not make efforts to strengthen the western borders. True, there were those who, like infantry trooper Emmanuel Zelder, believed that "no one had such an idea that the Russians were going to strike some kind of blows there." The soldier notes that in some areas the "Russians" did not have artillery support forces at all.

Some Wehrmacht soldiers believed that their enemy was not ready to attack Germany by the summer of 1941, but could realize this plan later, after a few months or a year. But all these were - I emphasize - observations "from afar". And already the first battles on Soviet territory made a number of German soldiers doubt their initial ideas. So, for Berndt von Loringhoven, who served at the headquarters of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, it soon became clear that the "Russians" were preparing for defense, but did not have time to complete this preparation for the German invasion. The fact is that the Soviet infantry divisions were mainly concentrated near the borders, and the tanks were far in the rear. In preparation for the attack, the German staff officer argues, tank units should have been placed closer to the borders.

The above-mentioned Zelder drew attention to such a detail: the Soviet camps, unlike the German ones, were not disguised, portraits of Lenin and Stalin and red flags hung everywhere in them. Of course, this and other similar evidence is fragmentary, but even in this form they cast serious doubt on the concept of preventive war on the part of Germany.

Another myth about the first period of the war is that the Soviet troops allegedly retreated "without looking back", surrendered at the first opportunity, and the German offensive in the summer and autumn of 1941 was an easy walk. The significance of our losses in killed, wounded, captured seems to confirm this idea. At the same time, the well-known fact is underestimated - the battle for Moscow began at the moment when the entire Wehrmacht campaign on the Eastern Front, in accordance with the blitzkrieg plan, should have been completed long ago. Yes, the enemy ended up under the walls of Moscow, but when did this happen and at what cost to him! As the participants in the battles from the German side themselves note, the farther, the less everything that happens resembled a “walk”. And signs of this were already outlined on June 22.

The Wehrmacht report for that day reported that "after the initial confusion, the enemy begins to offer more and more stubborn resistance." At the same time, the same entry was made by the chief of staff of the Wehrmacht, General Halder. The diaries and letters of the Germans are literally littered with the facts of the fierce resistance of the "Russians". So, a group of Red Army soldiers torn off from their own, led by a political instructor, attacked a whole ... battalion! And although the losses of the defenders (as we see, the Germans already had to defend themselves then) were insignificant, such a desperate attack made a great impression on them.

A lot of space in Kershaw's book is devoted to the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress. A lot has been written about this in our literature, but the opinions of the Germans about this battle are of undoubted interest. Already by 11 o'clock on the first day of the war, pessimistic notes began to creep into the peppy tone of the reports of German officers: "the battle for the capture of the fortress is fierce - numerous losses." The fire of Soviet snipers primarily hit the commanders of enemy units, and the light tanks of the defenders of the fortress even attempted a counterattack. It is noteworthy that the Germans also died from their own air and shelling when they got too close to the positions of the Russians. As Major General von Waldau noted in his diary, the fierce and massive resistance of the Russians did not meet the initial expectations of the Nazi troops. However, in the early days of the invasion, this

It was presented as the agony of the communist regime. The Luftwaffe colonel, trying to understand what motivated the Soviet pilots to ram, could not find any other explanation than fanaticism and fear of the commissars. But what to ask of a fascist officer who wrote these lines in hot pursuit of events, when even today the author of the book, R. Kershaw, is perplexed why the Russian soldier (“a real mystery,” according to the author), “despite all the hardships caused by the totalitarian regime” heroically defends him. It doesn't even occur to Kershaw (and many of his colleagues) that the "true mystery" was not defending the notorious totalitarianism, but something else entirely. For the fascists themselves, the realization of the more significant causes of Soviet heroism and perseverance will come soon.

The advance of the aggressor at first was very fast. This fact is almost unambiguously considered, incl. and in modern Russia, as the most obvious confirmation of the German success and the alleged unpreparedness of the USSR for war. However, the Germans themselves, back in those summer months of 1941, discovered the other side of these victories.

First of all, the rapid pace of the German offensive (although not on all sectors of the front) led to the fact that the shock tank units broke away from the infantry supporting them. As a result, both of them often fell into ambushes. The advanced units of the Germans left the Red Army units in the rear and never felt calm. And the more obvious the successes of the advanced units of the Wehrmacht became, the more significant this gap turned out to be.

The speed of the German advance significantly affected the physical and psychological state of the attackers. On the march, the soldiers were raised at about three o'clock in the morning (often sleep did not exceed one and a half hours), they had to go up to 50 km a day. And this is often under the scorching sun, in the dust, under the load of uniforms and weapons. The standard layout on the march weighed about 14 kg. Those who preferred to send part of the warm clothes with the convoy, closer to the autumn, they already regretted this. It seemed to one of the Wehrmacht veterans that all roads in Russia were going uphill. From their stupor in anticipation of a halt, the soldiers were not brought out even by explosions of shells nearby. However, the German command did not slow down the pace of the offensive, not wanting to lose the advantages of the surprise factor and give the enemy a break.

Many in the Reich (the military is no exception) represented the war with the Soviet Union in the image and likeness of campaigns in Europe. Thus, the encirclement of French or Polish troops almost automatically meant their surrender. It seemed that it would be the same in Russia. AT

In 1941, the Wehrmacht managed to create more than one "cauldron", but it was with the encirclement of Soviet troops that the most unpleasant phase of the operation for the Germans began. The book also describes cases of the surrender of Red Army soldiers, but it is clear that for the most part, Soviet soldiers fought to the last, sometimes without any chance. In the latter case, their resistance was especially fierce.

The records of some German servicemen look naive when they take offense at the enemy for fighting "not according to the rules." Those. fights to the last in encirclement and proceeds to guerrilla warfare. The fact that the Nazis themselves are fighting against the rules, violating international conventions on the humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, is recognized by only a few of them. But even these few are under the influence of Goebbels' ideas about Russian "subhumans", the destruction of which is justified and even necessary.

The book repeatedly shows how in 1941 the myth about the inferiority of the Soviet man, which had developed under the influence of fascist propaganda, collapsed. In the most difficult situations, this man showed his best qualities. Even the defenders of the Brest Fortress, who were captured after exhausting battles, according to the Germans, "did not at all look like people who were broken, hungry or had no idea about military discipline", they radiated "gloomy confidence".

An unpleasant revelation for the Germans was the meeting with the best examples of Soviet military equipment. A special place is given in the book to plots related to the T-34 tank. In one of the episodes, it is shown how the Soviet “thirty-four” beat off all attempts by the Germans to destroy it, incl. and with the help of artillery, she herself inflicted devastating blows. With great difficulty and after many efforts and sacrifices, the tank was still able to be disabled, but it was impossible to believe that such a miracle of technology could be designed by "subhumans".

In early August, the war exceeded the time frame set for the blitzkrieg. Already in Germany, few believed in the reality of this plan. In Russian literature, much attention is paid to the significant losses of Soviet troops in the first months of the war. At the same time, as if by default, the minimum of German losses is implied. Indeed, if we compare the losses of the Wehrmacht with the Soviet ones, then the ratio is not in favor of the Red Army (I emphasize that we are not talking about the entire war, but only about its initial stage). But the Germans compared their losses with the size of their own forces. And the picture here - the farther, the more - was frightening for them. So, in the Army Group "South" 63 thousand people were out of action.

people, the replenishment amounted to only 10 thousand. Tangible losses are typical not only for the rank and file of the Germans, but also for the officer corps. Units were increasingly led by those whose rank did not correspond to the position they held. Only in our country, for some reason, a similar phenomenon is mentioned only in relation to the Red Army [an example of an objective approach - 6. P. 57].

The German forces were dwindling, but the length of the front line - another downside to their temporary success - was increasing. From the planned "Barbarossa" 1200 km to 1600 km in a month and a half, and by the end of autumn, up to 2800 km! Such a length required, according to the norms, the presence of 280 fascist divisions. And there were no more than 139 of them, even according to the most complete estimates. And even those, in their actual number, were almost a third short of the regular one.

From the book it becomes obvious that not only did the Soviet Union not have time to prepare for the war with Germany in full, but also that the leaders of the Third Reich did not carry out the necessary preparations. The "German car" was not at all invulnerable. And the longer the war went on, the more obvious it became to the Germans themselves. Their problems were fully manifested precisely during the Battle of Moscow.

They had to experience a lot of difficulties in the country of vast expanses, unusual terrain and climate, with an unpredictable population for them. So, even orientation on the ground caused significant difficulties. As early as June 1941, cavalry non-commissioned officer Max Kunert stated that the Germans had to be very careful not to stray from the road - there are “no traces of them” in the European sense in Russia. A photojournalist who ended up in Ukraine wrote: “We have no more maps, and moving east, we have to rely only on a compass needle.”

At the beginning of the Battle of Moscow, the mood of the Germans can be characterized as a significant drop in enthusiasm, with a continuing desire to quickly end the war by taking Moscow. Already after the most difficult for the Germans forcing the Dnieper, artilleryman Gerhard Mayer was drawn to philosophical reflections about the beginning and end of life, about the despondency that reigned around him. As the author of the book R. Kershaw notes, referring to General Günther Blumentritt, at the moment when Moscow was already visible to the naked eye, the mood of the soldiers and commanders changed dramatically. At the end of October, few people in the Reich believed in the end of the war before the new year. The Germans (both in the rear and at the front) wondered why, after so many victorious reports of Nazi propaganda about the defeat of the next Russian divisions, their

resistance is still not broken and continues to grow. And by mid-November, bewilderment gave way to indifference and sarcasm towards the Berlin politicians, who lived on the illusions of previous victories. As noted in reports from the front-line units, "propaganda nonsense", which had nothing to do with reality, further undermined morale.

The advance deep into Soviet territory not only reflected the successes of the Wehrmacht, but also exacerbated supply difficulties. An obvious fact: the closer the Germans were to Moscow as the ultimate goal, the further they broke away from communications, and the more problems they had with supplies. In preparing for the war, the Nazi leaders did not sufficiently take into account the factor of the difference in the width of the railway track in the USSR and in Europe. The Germans also had to do a lot "on the go." This reverse side of the German successes is not always paid attention to in our country today. The fact that Germany was counting on the success of the blitzkrieg led to food problems already in early autumn. Thus, the head of the medical service of the SS regiment noted a decrease in immunity, an increase in the recovery period as a result of chronic malnutrition due to irregular food supplies.

In the midst of the Battle of Moscow, on November 17, the German 2nd Panzer Army complained about disruptions in the supply of fuel. There was a catastrophic lack of winter uniforms. The non-commissioned officer, in a letter home on this subject, allowed a comparison of the German army with the Napoleonic one in 1812 and came to the conclusion that the French were better provided for in this part. When the thermometer dropped below 30 degrees in early December, the German soldiers began to go berserk at the lack of warm clothing. What can I say if even ... newspapers were used as clothes. In Kershaw's book, in general, a lot of attention is paid to those little tricks that the Germans had to go to in order to somehow warm up. It was impossible to think in such conditions about the fight against the enemy. Cases were not uncommon when an unexpected attack by the "Russians" led the Germans into confusion and a stampede, as was the case in the village of Yazykovo on December 3. Nobody thought about resistance. Especially when the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops began on December 5-6, unexpected for the Germans in those conditions. For the retreat, which turned into a stampede, the Wehrmacht was not prepared, including psychologically. The Red Army completely surpassed the enemy in terms of support. Of course, the victory of the USSR in the Battle of Moscow cannot be reduced only to issues of rear work or temperature conditions.

In the autumn of 1941, it is already difficult to find traces of the underestimation by the Germans of the enemy, which took place before the war and at its very beginning. Although the English historian, who tried to explain the phenomenon of the inflexibility of the Soviet soldier, was satisfied that "the Russian soldier is a real mystery." And he immediately gave a statement familiar since the days of Sovietology: despite all the hardships generated by the totalitarian regime, the “Russians” were ready to defend this regime. Obviously, a certain part of even generally objective Western researchers still identify the Soviet system with the political regime.

Even achieving individual successes on the way to Moscow, the Germans noted the growing resistance of the enemy and could not but pay tribute to him. An infantry officer of the Wehrmacht told how even the Soviet soldiers who were burned alive in the huts continued to shoot. Naturally, the losses of the Germans also increased.

The loss of Wehrmacht personnel near Moscow led to the fact that the use of rear troops, tankers left without tanks, etc., began to be actively practiced in combat units. By mid-November, the Germans on the Soviet-German front had lost about half of the vehicle fleet. Artillery soldier Franz Frisch recalled that the attack on Moscow was started on completely faulty equipment, 30% of truck springs broke. But the worst thing for any army is the loss of manpower. The book contains figures that testify to the catastrophic consequences of German victories for the aggressor. In fact, losses amounted to up to half of the personnel of combat units. And we are talking not only about the rank and file, but also officers. The loss of officers exceeded that of the campaigns in Poland and France. Despite the fact that the training of an officer took 14-18 months, non-commissioned officers had to be promoted to command positions. As Operation Typhoon proceeded, this situation steadily worsened. No less impressive losses were characteristic of tank units. Tanker Helmut von Harnack wrote home in late October that many had died in their tanks. The units were equipped with tanks only a third. The tankers left without cars made up special units. But the tankers, untrained as infantrymen, suffered heavy losses. At the very beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, the German Corporal Siegel, in a letter home, is already crying out to God, trying to understand "what these Russians are planning to do with us." He expressed the hope that “above” (in the leadership of the Reich) they would hear him, “otherwise we will all have to die here.”

The book convincingly traces how the importance of the climatic factor gradually increased for the German army. The weather conditions in mid-November at the decisive stage of the Moscow battle were characterized by terrible frosts. On the memorable day of November 7, the temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero (not the lowest temperature of that winter), and this caused the Junkers engines to fail. The commander of the air squadron, Major Hozel, noted in his diary that, despite all efforts, it was possible to organize no more than one (!) Flight in a few days. At the end of November, a situation developed when the decline in the activity of the Luftwaffe coincided with the activation of Soviet aviation. Lieutenant Richter recorded in a military diary: "The Russians dominate the air." In early December, he cursed the Soviet artillery, which smashed the positions of the Germans to pieces even in a thirty-degree frost. German guns "could not withstand" temperature overloads. And after all, all this was written long before the events that are considered to be a radical turning point in the course of the war!

In the battles near Moscow, the myth of the technical superiority of the Wehrmacht collapsed. The Soviet T-34 tank delivered significant trouble to the Germans. Neither the German tanks T-TTT and T-GU, nor the artillery could cope with the combat power of the T-34. Often the German infantry was left without fire support in the fight against miracle tanks. And then the Wehrmacht soldiers had a question similar to that captured in Kershaw's book: “With a rifle, or what, should we go at them?” . Such facts should not be forgotten today, because. often there is a statement that only Soviet soldiers in 1941 went with rifles to German tanks.

Thus, the book by R. Kershaw, with all its costs, contains valuable material in the genre of "oral history", which allows a more objective and respectful approach to the feat of Soviet soldiers in 1941, including the Battle of Moscow.

Literature

1. Halder F. Military diary. In 2 vols. M.: Military Publishing House, 1969.

2. Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999.

3. Gorodetsky G. The myth of the icebreaker. M., 1995.

4. Zhukhrai V.M. Hitler's fatal miscalculation: The collapse of the Blitzkrieg (1939-1941). M., 2000.

5. Kershaw R. 1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron ones / per. from English. A. Utkina. Moscow: Yauza-press, 2008.

6. Kulkov E., Myagkov M., Rzheshevsky O. War 1941-1945. / edited by O.A. Rzheshevsky. M., 2005.

7. Kumanev G.A. Difficult path to victory, 1941-1945. M., 1995.

8. Myagkov M.Yu. Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow, 1941-1942. M., 1999.

9. Polyakov Yu.A. Our unpredictable past. M., 1995; his own. Historical science: people and problems. M., 1999.

10. Samsonov A.M. Moscow 1941: From the tragedy of defeat - to the Great Victory. M., 1991.

11. Sipols V.Ya. Diplomatic secrets: Eve of the Great Patriotic War 1939-1941. M., 1997.

12. Chubaryan A.O. Eve of tragedy. Stalin and the International Crisis: September 1939 - June 1941. M., 2008.

13. Yakushevsky A.S. Western historiography of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: Stages and main concepts (1941-1991). M., 1997.

94(57) History of Siberia

HISTORY OF THE AUSTRIAN SINOLOGIST: ON THE QUESTION OF SCIENTIFIC TOURISM Marina V. Mongush, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Leading Researcher, [email protected],

Russian Institute of Cultural Studies, Moscow

The article is devoted to the trip of the Austrian sinologist Otto Moenchen-Helfen to the Tuva People's Republic in 1929 in order to collect scientific information about this country unknown to the Western reader. The article is based on the book by Menchen-Helfen "Journey to Asian Tuva", which was published in 1931 in Berlin.

Key words: scientific tourism, Tuva, travelers, Central Asia, foreign Tuvan studies.

The article is devoted to the trip of the Austrian Sinologist Otto Menchen-Helfen to the Tuvinian Peoples Republic in 1929 in order to research and gather information of that unknown to foreign readers country. The article is based upon the book by O. Menchen-Helfen “A Travel to Asian Tuva” published in Berlin in 1931.

Keywords: research tourism, Tuva, travelers, Central Asia, foreign tuvinology.

Scientific tourism as a way of understanding the world originated in ancient times, when chroniclers or scientists (Aristotle, Herodotus, Strabo) took part in overland trade caravans, crews of river or sea merchant ships or conquering armies. And what benefit did Afanasy Nikitin pursue by walking under

The German military leader Alfred von Schlieffen became the ancestor of the blitzkrieg, known as the "blitzkrieg". The main points of his theory are:

  • The speed of offensive action.
  • surprise factor.
  • The concentration of a large number of shock forces.
  • The inability of the enemy to mobilize and deploy the main forces to repel attacks in short lines.

The Nazis were able to successfully put their theory into practice during the capture of France and Poland in 1939-1940. The French company took 44 days, and the Polish 36.

The collapse of the "blitzkrieg" historians unanimously recognize the Battle of Moscow, which served as a turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. Marshal Zhukov attached great importance to this event, which changed the course of history.

At the cost of incredible stamina and heroic courage of Soviet soldiers attack on Moscow bogged down, a thanks to the counteroffensive, the enemy was driven back a significant distance from the borders of the capital.

In 2003, Nival Interactive released the computer game Blitzkrieg and five add-ons based on the battles that took place during World War II. Battles in the game take place on the territory of the USSR and nine other states.

Check out other interesting answers.

The collapse of the blitzkrieg

The decisive military-political event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the defeat of the Nazi hordes near Moscow - their first major defeat in the course of the Second World War as a whole. By the end of April 1942, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front were almost 5 times higher than all the losses suffered in Poland, Western Europe and the Balkans.

The significance of this event cannot be overestimated. It meant that the Soviet Armed Forces thwarted the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, with the help of which German fascism intended to clear the way for world domination. The strategy of blitzkrieg, or "blitzkrieg", aimed at the complete destruction of the Soviet state, failed. For the first time, a strategic initiative was wrested from fascist Germany, and she faced the prospect of a protracted war. The myth of the invincibility of the German military machine was also dispelled.

Why did the plan of a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR fail, which seemed to the Hitlerite military-political leadership to be a universal and unfailing means of achieving victory: the defeat of eleven European states in less than two years, reasoned in Berlin, is not convincing proof of this?

The question is far from idle. It still retains its relevance today. After all, to this day the strategy of blitzkrieg is quoted very highly in the offensive, aggressive doctrines and plans of the Western powers. The principle of blitzkrieg was at the heart of Israel's "six-day" war of conquest against the Arab countries in 1967. The same principle is now the basis of the newest American concept of "air-ground" combat operations, fixed in military manuals and manuals.

It seemed to the Hitlerite leadership that a powerful, lightning strike would suffice, and success in the fight against the USSR would be assured. At the same time, Nazi Germany relied on the use of its developed military-industrial base, as well as such temporary but significant advantages as the militarization of the country, the exploitation of the military-economic resources of almost all of Western Europe, the long-term preparation of aggression, the complete mobilization of troops, the core of which had experience conduct of modern warfare, secrecy of strategic deployment and surprise attack. A simultaneous offensive by sin groups against Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets Basin was envisaged. Together with the troops of Germany's satellites, the invading army consisted of 190 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks, and 5,000 aircraft. On the directions of the main attacks, a five-sixfold superiority in forces was ensured. 6–8 weeks were allotted for the “victorious blitzkrieg” ...

However, in the USSR, the strategy of "blitzkrieg" was waiting for a complete collapse. During the grandiose battle near Moscow, which was fought on a front of over 1000 kilometers, Soviet troops pushed the enemy back 140-400 kilometers to the west, destroyed about 500 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 1300 tanks, 2500 guns. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front. In the days of the battle near Moscow, US President F. Roosevelt reported to I. V. Stalin about the general enthusiasm in the United States about the successes of the Red Army.

Bourgeois literature is full of all sorts of conjectures and concoctions about the reasons for the collapse of the "blitzkrieg" plan. Among the main versions, it includes the so-called "geographical factor" in the form of spatial, climatic and other "unfavorable" conditions of the Soviet Union, as well as Hitler's military incompetence. Today, a number of bourgeois historians recognize the adventurism of the German fascist military strategy as a whole, but only as the result, again, of "fatal mistakes."

The viciousness of the version about the "geographical factor" as the reason for the failure of the blitzkrieg is beyond doubt. Heat, dust, dirt, frost, long distances - all these are conditions that equally affect both warring countries. They do not determine the course and outcome of gigantic battles. This truth is also recognized by some bourgeois historians. The outcome of the battle near Moscow, they note, determined the actions of "capable Soviet military leaders" and "uncompromising as death itself" Soviet soldiers.

As a "more convincing" version, many falsifiers of history put forward the concept of Hitler's sole responsibility for the collapse of the "blitzkrieg" plan due to his military incompetence.

The Fuhrer is accused of abandoning the leading strategic principle of concentrating the main forces on the decisive direction and underestimating the significance of the capture of Moscow. This underestimation allegedly took place both before and after the start of the aggression. This, according to the beaten Nazi generals and their followers, led to the "loss of pace" of the offensive of the German troops, their "inaction" in August - September 1941, and ultimately to the fact that the victory was "lost".

However, both old and new "critics" of Hitler are prevaricating. Moscow figured as the No. 1 goal in all variants of the Barbarossa plan, which was not the result of the creativity of the Fuhrer alone. Having rejected one version of the plan of attack on the USSR, which provided for a non-stop "march on Moscow" (the Brauchitsch plan), Hitler approved another version developed in the Wehrmacht General Staff (Lossberg version) and providing for an even greater concentration of forces against the main goal - Moscow.

Completely contradicts the facts and the version according to which the blitzkrieg collapsed Hitler's strong-willed decision of August 21, 1941 to turn part of the forces of Army Group Center towards the flanks of the Soviet-German front. And the point here is by no means in the “will of the Fuhrer”.

As recently as July 4, under the influence of the June successes of the Wehrmacht, Hitler declared: the USSR "practically ... has already lost the war." On August 4, that is, just a month later, his tone changed dramatically. If, before the war, I had known about the strength of the Red Army, he declared, it would have been difficult for me "to decide on the need to attack the USSR." The fact is that by July 18, the Wehrmacht ground forces had lost 110 thousand people, 50 percent of the original composition of the tanks, 1284 aircraft. With a stubborn defense on the Luga River, the Soviet troops stopped, and then for three weeks they fettered Army Group North. On the approaches only to Kyiv, 17 divisions of Army Group South were pinned down, which was hopelessly behind Army Group Center, which was operating to its left.

But the Soviet troops imposed military operations on the Army Group Center, which went down in history as the Battle of Smolensk and lasted two months. With their active defense, despite significant losses, they thwarted the plan of the Nazi command in the very first weeks of the war to destroy the main forces of the Red Army. As a result, having met a solid defense in the main Moscow strategic direction, the enemy rushed to rectify the situation on his flanks, especially on the south.

The rate of the Nazis on the "rapid collapse" of the Soviet state, its Armed Forces turned out to be nothing more than a gamble. And it is precisely this aspect that bourgeois historiography, which unsubstantiatedly insisted on the “accidental nature” of the collapse of the blitzkrieg, prefers to hush up. Ignoring the unprecedented stamina and stubbornness of the Soviet troops during active strategic defense, reactionary historians prefer to focus on the significant losses they suffered in the first weeks of the war, not stopping at fabrications about their "stampede". At the same time, they widely promote the version of the “last battalion”, which was not enough for the German troops to enter Moscow, forgetting that hundreds of “last battalions” were exterminated near Moscow in October-November, when the Typhoon operation had already failed .

“The Moscow battle was lost by the Nazis even before the arrival of great frosts,” concluded a Western researcher, former Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces O. Guillaume. The total losses of the Wehrmacht on the entire Eastern Front before the start of the Soviet counteroffensive on December 5, 1945 amounted to 750 thousand people, 2851 tanks and assault guns, 5180 aircraft.

But Hitler and his field marshals drove their soldiers forward. Why? The Nazis had their own reasons for acting adventurously. The crisis state of the Wehrmacht reflected the crisis of the military economy of fascist Germany, which was adjusted to the adventurous blitzkrieg strategy, designed for 6-8 weeks of struggle. Hitler and his entourage had to pay the bills that were issued to them by those to whom they promised a quick victory over the Soviet state.

However, the "miracle" did not happen. Much more realistic than the Nazi field marshals, for example, assessed the chances of the German troops rushing to Moscow, Corporal Otto Salfinger. The letter found with the dead man said: “Very little is left to Moscow. And yet it seems to me that we are infinitely far from it ... Today we are walking on the corpses of those who fell ahead: tomorrow we will become corpses ... "

The version about the "enormous numerical superiority" of the Soviet troops, which, along with the help of the Western allies, allegedly brought them victory near Moscow, is also falsified. It ignores facts and figures: on the eve of the counter-offensive, the Nazi troops outnumbered the Soviet troops, excluding aviation, by 1.5 times in manpower, 1.4 times in artillery, and 1.6 times in tanks. Thus, an attempt is being made to belittle the outstanding success of the Soviet command, which managed to correctly choose the time and direction of the main attacks, to ensure their surprise by covert regrouping and concentration of strategic reserves, as well as the heroism of Soviet soldiers.

As for the volume of economic assistance from the United States and Great Britain, it was far from corresponding to the huge contribution of the Soviet people to the disruption of Hitler's plan for a "blitzkrieg". In October - November 1941, the Soviet Union received less than 0.1 percent of all American aid that the United States provided to other countries on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act. By December 24, 1941, the United States had fulfilled only one-fourth of its obligations. A similar picture was observed with military supplies from England.

This situation took place against the background of continuous transfers by the Nazi command of divisions from the west to replace those defeated on the Soviet-German front. Until December 21, 1941, 21 divisions and 15 brigades were transferred to the east. In other words, the blitzkrieg was thwarted by the forces and means of the Soviet people.

The collapse of the blitzkrieg testified not only to the fact that German imperialism had set itself goals for the war that clearly did not correspond to its capabilities. First of all, the matter was that on June 22, 1941, he faced the socialist state. From the very beginning, aggression against the USSR was doomed to failure. The point of view of the Soviet Union as a "colossus with feet of clay" that would fall apart at the first blow testified to the misunderstanding by the monopoly circles and the military-political leadership of Germany of the nature of the socialist system, the economic and military capabilities of socialism, which, combined with the Soviet people's loyalty to its ideals, rallied around the Communist Party, and were the decisive advantage that ensured the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow and the victory of the Soviet people in the war against Nazi Germany as a whole.

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