There is no need to introduce Alexander Rutskoy to our readers. To this day, his name is widely known. And until now, it causes an ambiguous reaction - primarily in connection with the events of the autumn of 1993. Then, 10 years ago, his name was a kind of banner. Many sincerely believed in this banner, but many of them deftly hid in its shadow. That is why today, on the tenth anniversary of those tragic events, we cannot do without Rutskoi.

"- Alexander Vladimirovich, how did your disagreements with Boris Yeltsin begin?

Our relationship generally developed along a sinusoid, and shortly after the election, when I became vice president, this sinusoid somehow went down sharply.

What did it depend on?

From whisperers. Burbulis constantly sang to him that I was sawing a chair under the president. And the main whisperer was Korzhakov.

Did you have a strained relationship with him?

Outwardly - normal. But, apparently, such is the psychology of this person: be sure to throw mud at someone. You read his book about Yeltsin, everything will be clear.

Somewhat later, an interesting story happened to Korzhakov and me. Of course, I have no direct evidence, but there is no one else. Somehow they invited me to the ZIL, the workers rebelled there. Salary - somewhere around 340 rubles a month, then with this money you could buy a couple of kilos of meat and a kilo of butter. In short, you can't feed your family. Well, I went. Calm down. Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov was also present there. I got inflamed and told the workers: when Boris Nikolayevich returns from vacation, I will ask him to allow me to put my guards on Nechaev (then Minister of Economics), and let's see how this scoundrel will live on 340 rubles.

Yeltsin returned, calling me to the dacha - to celebrate his birthday. I went. He has Burbulis, Barannikov, Korzhakov, and someone else there. We didn’t have time to say hello, Yeltsin said to me: “Well, give me 340 rubles.” And includes a record. Everyone is listening. And there, so it is. My words were “edited”, Nechaev was removed, and it turned out: they say, Boris Nikolayevich will return, I will put my guards on him, give him 340 rubles and see how this scoundrel will live on them.

I see Korzhakov smiling so nastily.

And then Barannikov intervened. He asks: “Boris Nikolaevich, who gave you this record?” And he, Barannikov, had a habit: to write down what happened at such rallies. He took out his cassette, inserted it into the recorder and turned it on. Yeltsin listened, grabbed the recorder and slammed it against the wall. And then he says to me: “Okay, let's work. I entrust agriculture to you.”

This is after his decree on the disbandment of collective farms and the creation on their basis - in one year! - 200 thousand farms?

Well, yes. Pure scam. We had a lot of skirmishes about this. In the end, he appointed me chairman of the interdepartmental commission to combat corruption. After a while, I bring him a very sharp report. He leafed through the report and said with a grin: "Well, well." And that's all. And then I found out that Yeltsin retold everything to those about whom I wrote in the report. It was then that I decided to speak at the Supreme Council.

After this memorable meeting, were you removed?

Yeltsin and I then parted ways. The next day I come to work, and the guard says to me: “Sorry, but the president forbade you to enter the territory of the Kremlin.”

Were you like-minded with Khasbulatov?

Never. We are completely different people. But then, in August 1993, we united. We decided to hold a congress and sent telegrams to the deputies. Telegrams with all sorts of promises also rained down from the Kremlin - only that no one would come.

And how did the communists behave?

Yes, they are communists! They are shifters. They are like a flag in a bathhouse: in which direction the wind blows, the flag goes there. Remember 1993: where did their leader go after the meeting of the Supreme Council? He said that he was going to raise the masses. And on September 23 - disappeared. And no one saw him again. Later, however, we saw Mr. Zyuganov on TV. He urged the people "not to support the rebels", "not to participate in the confrontation."

And then, at the end of that year, the same “communists” came to the Duma, they were in the majority there. And all these laws on privatization - in other words, a signal for the total plunder of the country - were adopted with their active participation.

But was there still a quorum?

Even in excess. So everything was perfectly legal. We also invited Boris Nikolaevich. In response to our invitation, we were surrounded by barbed wire, dogs, communications, electricity, water, sewage were cut off ... What happened next, you know.

Much is known indeed, but some questions still remain. What was the impetus for the fact that the confrontation grew into an armed conflict?

Terekhov's provocation. Well, the one who leads some sort of “union of officers”. With several of his people, he tried to capture the headquarters of the CIS troops, although no one instructed him to do so. In addition - and this is very important - his people had weapons with cut down numbers. The guards of the Supreme Council had their own weapons park. There was a machine gun, machine guns, and sniper rifles. Then, when the investigation began, it established that all the weapons of the Supreme Council remained in grease, they were not fired from. The cartridges remained in galvanized boxes.

Where did Terekhov's people get weapons from, and even with cut off numbers?

As they say, good question. But I don't have an answer to it. But I know that before appearing in our White House, Terekhov met with the head of the FGC department for Moscow and the region, Yevgeny Savostyanov. Draw your own conclusions.

I have interesting questions myself. How did Terekhov and his men manage to get through the three or four chains of cordons that surrounded the White House? Yes, even with weapons? And how did the Barkashovites get to us, and also - with their weapons?

You want to say that the arrival of Terekhov with his people and the Barkashovites was a provocation of the special services?

I am 100% sure of this. Their slogans, which they hung out, are “Beat the Jews, save Russia!” - part of the same provocation. I repeatedly sent guards to rip off these slogans. And several times there were fights between the guards and the Barkashovites.

Why didn't you put them out of there?

And try to put them in this mess. By the way, they left the White House by underground passages, which no one except the secret services could know about.

Let us suppose. But there is an episode for which you are personally responsible. I mean your call to fellow pilots: to take the planes into the air and bomb the Kremlin. Would you subscribe to it today?

Now, ten years later, no. But try to imagine that situation. A two-week blockade, the complete absence of the opportunity to express one's position through the media, brutal beatings of people on the outskirts of the White House, the shooting of a demonstration near the mayor's office, the massacre in Ostankino, firing from tanks at the building. They hit the meeting room with direct fire, moreover, with shells that pierce the wall and explode inside the room. There were rivers of blood, guts on the walls, severed heads. I saw it all. Perhaps I was wrong in making such an appeal. But it was almost unconscious. I don't know what another person would do in this situation. Only later, in Lefortovo, I told the investigator the same thing: the fault is mine, I am responsible for everything.

And how did the other defendants behave?

I happened to read some protocols of interrogations. It was a shame for Khasbulatov. From the testimony of the “leader of the communists” Anpilov, there was such a feeling as if he was lying in shit. It was embarrassing to read the protocols of interrogations of Yanaev and Makashov... Come on, God bless them all...

Snipers in October. How many were there? Who are they? Where?

This is one of the most mysterious pages of the October events ten years ago. And to this day it remains a mystery. Of course, not the only one. For example, there are many answers to the question about the number of dead and wounded. And this means that most likely none of them is reliable. However, there are no answers to some questions at all, and it is almost impossible to approach them. First of all, I have in mind the snipers, whose role in those October days was discussed so much later in almost all the media. Who are these snipers? How many were there? Where did they come from? And where did they go after it was all over? And why weren't any of them caught?

In the book Notes of the President, Boris Yeltsin writes that on October 4, the Alpha and Vympel special forces refused to obey the order and storm the White House. Mikhail Barsukov, Lieutenant General, head of the Main Directorate of Presidential Security, had to persuade them:

“Barsukov hardly managed to convince them to even just go to the White House,” Yeltsin recalls. - The fact that they are somewhere nearby will psychologically put pressure on those who have settled in the building, they will surrender earlier ... Barsukov had a simple tactic: try to pull them as close as possible to the building, to the fighting. Feeling the gunpowder, burning, plunging into the whirlpool of shots, automatic bursts, they will go further forward.

However, even approaching the White House, the commandos were in no hurry to storm. Here it is - just in time! - Junior Lieutenant Sergeev was killed by a sniper's shot.

“After the Alpha fighters learned that their comrade had died,” Yeltsin continues, “many did not have to be persuaded. Almost the entire team went to the release of the "white house". Barsukov and the head of the presidential guard Alexander Korzhakov were at the head of Alpha.

What kind of sniper it was, Yeltsin did not specify. From the context it was necessary to understand that we are talking about a sniper who fired from the White House.

A year after these events, in 1994, I had a rare stroke of luck. A person agreed to answer my questions, whose last name and even first name I promised not to name under any circumstances. I was allowed to tell about him only that he is a high-ranking intelligence officer, and that part of the information (as far as I understood, very insignificant), which he shared with me, was received by him from his subordinates and colleagues - professionals like him myself. Under the terms of our agreement, even his voice on the tape was changed by me - an interview with him was broadcast in October 1994 on the waves of Radio Liberty, where I worked at that time.

Much of what you are about to read may seem incredible even after 10 years. I can neither confirm nor deny this information. And my interlocutor did not need to confirm anything. He just told me what he thought was possible. By the way, even today he continues to work in the same special service - professionals of his level are always needed.

* * *

According to official and unofficial estimates, 100-110 professional snipers operated in Moscow in those days. There is a version that these are militants who arrived from Abkhazia and Transnistria. Indeed, there are professionals there, but they are few. According to the data I have, there were 8-10 of them in Moscow.

Not more?

Not more. Them, professionals, and in general it is not enough. In addition, even on a train it is very difficult to carry a sniper rifle. This is not a shortened amphibious assault rifle, this is not an AKS.

Maybe they were snipers from the former "Afghans" who were brought to the White House by Kotenev? (Reserve Lieutenant Colonel A. Kotenev, Chairman of the Union of Afghan Veterans. His “Afghans” then took the side of Boris Yeltsin. - M.D.)

In my opinion, no. I myself am a good shooter and I know that in order to prepare and train a sniper, you need to practice at least once a week. Former “Afghans” did not have such an opportunity. Also, when they arrived at the White House, they were armed with pump-action shotguns and AKCs. They didn't have sniper rifles.

True, there was another group that theoretically could have been able to introduce snipers into the combat area ...

There were also snipers from the White House, weren't there?

I just want to talk about them. It was there that the snipers from Abkhazia and Transnistria were located. But in the White House, according to the documents known to me, there were no more than 10 SVD rifles. If we keep in mind the other, opposing side, then the Kremlin guards have a platoon of “attic highway workers”. These people cover the President's route or equip their sectors during his public speeches. They were involved in the October events: even in the media there were reports that, when detaining a sniper, he showed a certificate from the special services, in particular from the Ministry of Security. Employees of the Main Security Directorate have similar certificates - as cover documents. However, there are also very few such people with professional sniper skills. According to my information, some other forces were involved here.

What do you have in mind? According to a simple calculation, there were 20-25 “October snipers” in total, well 30. But not 100-110! Where did the rest come from?

Let me start by saying they were true professionals. The lieutenant of group “A”, which journalists dubbed “Alpha”, Sergeev, was killed by a bullet that hit between the upper border of the bulletproof vest and the lower border of the sphere. For civilians, I will explain: the sphere is a special protective helmet for special forces. According to information from the investigators, the shot was fired from the technical premises of the Kapranov factory, which is located next to the White House. This room was used for a long time by the KGB of the USSR to monitor the American embassy. The room in this room was equipped on 27 September.

What is equipped?

Everything you need for shift duty snipers.

What is the boundary between the top of the body armor and the sphere? Is it available to an ordinary shooter?

According to the data that I received, Sergeyev's gap was about two centimeters. Only a professional of the highest class can get into it.

Do you rule out an accidental shot?

I do not exclude. But its probability is so insignificant that it can be neglected.

Another fact. The 119th Naro-Fominsk Regiment, withdrawn from the Baltic before the October events (few people know about this - this regiment was also called “Achalovsky”, because before that it was commanded by Achalov, who was later appointed Rutsky Minister of Defense of the White House. The regiment went to the aid of Rutsky It was this that gave Achalov reason to report to the deputies in the White House and Rutskoi that "loyal" troops were rushing towards them), - and so, when this regiment approached the White House, Senior Lieutenant Krasnikov, Private Korovushkin and Corporal were killed by sniper shots ... (the name of the corporal on the tape turned out to be illegible; later I found out that it was corporal Khikhin. - M.D.) Who shot at them?

After that, as I understand it, the mood in the 119th regiment changed dramatically?

Correctly.

In that technical room of the Kapranov factory - what else was found there? Apart from what you have already mentioned?

You never said where all those snipers came from.

As an answer, I will offer you a few disparate facts.

In August, one of the people close to Korzhakov, General Prosvirin (Major General Boris Prosvirin, Deputy Head of the Security Guard of the President of the Russian Federation. - M.D.), through the Swiss residency, established informal contacts with the special services of several European states. On September 17, several groups of tourists flew from Cyprus to Sheremetyevo, among whom were only men. For some reason, documents about the arrival of these groups have not been preserved.

How do you know that - not preserved?

That's how my people informed me. As well as the fact that the documents for the arrival of a certain rugby team were not preserved, which, if I am not mistaken, Korzhakov himself met on September 27 at Sheremetyevo airport. There were no rugby competitions during that period either through the sports committee or through any sports clubs. Prior to the meeting of this group, first Korzhakov, and then Prosvirin, received SVD sniper rifles at the weapons depot of the special police in Reutov.

In what quantity?

According to the information I received - 50 and 52 rifles, respectively.

Here is another fact. In the Mir Hotel, from where - already after the murder of Sergeyev - there was shooting at the Alpha group, subsequently four corpses were found in one of the rooms. One of them is in the uniform of a police lieutenant colonel. According to my informants, this man was an employee of the Main Directorate of Security. Three others are in civilian clothes, without documents.

With weapon?

Not far from them, two SVD sniper rifles were found. It is impossible to say to whom they belonged, since, as far as I know, no investigations into the deaths of these people were carried out.

I remember the Romanian events well. There, snipers, also not caught and not seen by anyone, shot both opposing sides - in this way to untie the hands of the stronger side. Among ourselves, we conditionally call this technique “piccadilla”. During a bullfight, there are people who deliberately anger the bull with small darts so that he seems more furious against the bullfighter. It seems to the audience that because of this, the bull becomes scarier, but in fact it is safer.

Another curious fact. Immediately after the October events, groups of men left Moscow, among whom one could recognize those who flew in as rugby players or tourists from Cyprus. They left by train for Warsaw, Berlin and Bucharest. Moreover, they were traveling in those compartments, tickets for which, according to the practice established many years ago, were sold according to the KGB armor ...

Versions in this case are a thankless and even dangerous business. However, let's say - I emphasize: let's say - these people who flew to Moscow on the eve of the October events and left on the armor of the KGB were those snipers unknown to us. Such use of foreign professionals - how widespread is this practice in relations between special services?

I know of cases when the corporatism of the secret services turned out to be much stronger than the political ties of the heads of state. I also know cases when specialists from the Russian special services, with their physical participation, helped in the fight against organized crime in European countries, where our compatriots were involved against the so-called “Russian mafia”.

As for the story with the snipers, I'll tell you this. Unlike many military men, I am not a subscriber to the newspaper The Day (now it is called Tomorrow. - M.D.), which more than once built a delusional version about the arrival of Jewish militants in Moscow, from which combat detachments were formed here ... Let's leave this version to the "patriots". I just told you about some of the scattered facts that I received through my official channels.

More on this topic:

Alexander Rutskoi: "I don't hold a grudge against Yeltsin"

"Gazeta", 03.10.2003, Svetlana Smetanina

Ten years ago, Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi announced that he was taking over the powers of the president and barricaded himself in the White House. The two-week confrontation between the Kremlin and parliament ended with the execution of the latter. Since then, Russia has never had vice presidents again. Alexander Rutskoi recalls the events of October 1993.

How has your attitude towards those events changed over the years?

It is bad that the newest history of Russia began with a tragedy. As a result, all these sacrifices turned out to be unjustified: the basic industries have collapsed, the country's natural resources have been seized, and the population is impoverished.

If you had won then, would Russia have taken a different path?

We fought not for the division of portfolios, not for power. We were against this approach to reforms. From the very beginning it was clear to me what the amateurs' experiments would lead to. In 1993, the Congress of People's Deputies asked Yeltsin to clarify: what are the goals of the reforms, to give a program. But there were only amendments to the Constitution, giving the president unlimited powers.

What did you count on, starting the confrontation with the Kremlin - on the support of the people? Khasbulatov then called for the blocking of railways, oil pipelines, communications ...

The people supported us - remember those thousands of demonstrations. But bare hands cannot resist force. We were surrounded by barbed wire, troops in three rows. How could you get through it? We are accused of having criminals in the ranks of our defenders. And I say - name the names. And when they say that people from the RNE turned up in the White House, one asks, how could they get through these three cordons, who let them through? This was done on purpose, so that later they would point the finger - that's who defended them. In general, there were a lot of provocations. The same Terekhov, for example, who arranged all sorts of provocative combat sorties. Where is this "defender of the people" now? Not seen or heard. All this talk about snipers from the White House is also nonsense. The investigation found out that the bullets with which the victims of snipers were shot were of a caliber that neither the army nor the police had in service. Where would they come from with us? In addition, all the weapons belonging to the Supreme Council, including sniper rifles, were in their places in a special room, where the Prosecutor General later described them.

Have you tried to compromise? Did you call Yeltsin?

It was impossible to contact Yeltsin. We negotiated with his representatives. Our demands were to announce new elections for both the parliament and the president, and to convene a constitutional assembly for the period of anarchy.

Khasbulatov in one of his interviews says that disagreements soon began between you: he told you - "you are the president, well, go take your Kremlin."

If there had been another person in Khasbulatov's place, perhaps everything would have gone differently. He then sat huddled in a corner - neither seen nor heard. He's puffing out his cheeks now. And what did they say later during the investigation ... When I got out of prison, I published all my protocols of interrogation - I had copies. I suggested to Khasbulatov, Makashov, other "great revolutionaries" - Anpilov the same: publish your protocols, ten years have already passed. No, they are afraid.

So you don't talk to any of them now?

No, I don't talk. Zyuganov - he generally privatized these events. But I remember how in May 1993 Zyuganov fled through the Neskuchny Garden - he left a demonstration of workers. And on September 24, they, together with another figure, Tuleev, declared: we went to raise the proletariat, and no one saw them again. When Zyuganov starts blaming journalists that they are discrediting the Communist Party, I think, look at yourself. Privatize what does not belong to you. And people shed blood.

What do you think today - was the campaign against Ostankino justified?

I was standing at the window of the White House, and a demonstration was going on along the Arbat. And I saw how a machine gun began to hit from the city hall building, people began to fall. In a fit of anger, evil, despair, and because we had no outlet in the media, people were sent to Ostankino. Of course it was a mistake. I didn't want blood. But the nerves are in a ball. We are sitting without electricity, without water, there is no connection ...

And who specifically made those or other decisions?

I couldn't take one. Everything was decided collectively - Khasbulatov, Dunaev, Barannikov, Achalov, Rutskoi. We did not want confrontation, we made a compromise - remove the blockades, we will take away all the weapons, seal them in the gun park and start a dialogue.

When the shelling began, was it scary?

The first shell hit the meeting room, the second hit Khasbulatov's office, and the third hit mine. Moreover, they hit with high-explosive shells, and not with blanks, as they say today. From blanks the building will not burn. I was sitting in my office when a shell broke through the window and exploded in the right corner. Luckily, my desk was on the left. Jumped out of there crazy. What saved me, I don't know.

Do you still have a personal grudge against Yeltsin?

Some modern researchers of those events are trying to prove that all these were personal showdowns between Yeltsin, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. Yes, there were personal moments: a forgery was prepared against me - a trust agreement, accounts in Switzerland. And then, two years later, Prosecutor General Skuratov notified me in writing that the investigation had been completed, my signatures had been forged, and no perpetrators had been found. But I don't hold a grudge against Yeltsin. God will judge us, because the law cannot.

How will you celebrate those events?

What to celebrate? It's a memento. Besides, I can't drink. Well, maybe I'll drink lemonade ... "

The dispersal of the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 can be seen as the culmination of the struggle of various power groups for access to the proceeds of corruption. The elements of this struggle were "special operations", "wiring", propaganda, and the Muscovites who took to the streets turned out to be extras. This version of the dramatic events of October 3-4 would explain a lot.

SUPPRESSION OF THE "RED REBELLION"

The official version of events, with which President Boris Yeltsin spoke on television on October 5, 1993, was the postulate of the successful suppression of

Citizens and law enforcement agencies of the "fascist-communist rebellion." The very fact of the president's speech caused a sigh of relief from many: during the tragic historical events on the night of October 3-4, Yeltsin was not seen either on television or at a rally near the Kremlin, to which First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor, who had recently returned to the government, called on Muscovites to gather Gaidar. Yegor Gaidar also coordinated the security measures that night. This is recalled, in particular, by a military expert Viktor Baranets, who was then the press secretary of the Minister of Defense of Russia.

As for the meaning of Yeltsin's statement, the execution of the parliament was actively supported by a part of the intelligentsia, who put forward in open letters published in newspapers the same arguments as the president: "You can't go back to the USSR." The forceful dispersal of parliament was supported by the United States.

The deputies of the Supreme Council and the representative of the executive power deposed by Yeltsin, the Vice President, disagree with the definition of "red-brown". Alexander Rutskoy. Rutskoy about this makes fun of Gennady Zyuganov, who left on September 24 from the Supreme Council, which was under siege, with the intention of "raising the masses": " He left and did not return. And two weeks after the execution of the Supreme Council, the parties that did not participate in these tragic events signed an agreement on mutual understanding and cooperation with Yeltsin: the LDPR, the Communist Party. Well, what are we red?

Member of the Supreme Council Ilya Konstantinov I am sure that in December 1993 the reactionary communists really opposed the liberals. Only the communists were not those whom Yeltsin pointed out: “Both Yeltsin, and Gennady Burbulis, and Sergei Shakhrai were communists. And who was Gaidar, who worked in the journal Kommunist? Marina Salie... And Yeltsin needed only a submissive parliament. Personally, the Moscow intelligentsia called me a red-brown monster. And I actually started in "Democratic Russia". What can I do, liberal moods prevailed among journalists then, and they understood it that way ". Ilya Konstantinov, according to him, is still a champion of democracy and parliamentarism, being one of the active members of the opposition's Coordinating Council.

"Red-brown rebellion", rightly suppressed, the actions of the defenders of parliament relatively recently again called Anatoly Chubais.

Economist Andrey Illarionovoffers to look at the facts :The "red-brown parliament" elected Boris Yeltsin chairman of the Supreme Council in 1990, supported Yeltsin as president of Russia in his confrontation with the State Emergency Committee during the August coup, supported Yeltsin's program of economic and state reform of Russia, the opening of the country, the inclusion her to the world community, a large number of laws and regulations to support former political prisoners, to rehabilitate innocently convicted prisoners of the Gulag, to return historical names to the map of Russia ... "

However, not all former political prisoners of the USSR were grateful to the parliament for the law on rehabilitation. So, Vladimir Bukovsky called the Supreme Council a "mastodon" that needs to be done away with (his interview with these words was published after the April 1993 referendum and before the October events).

The real reason for such assessments is hope. Hope for rapid democratic change under the leadership of President Yeltsin. " Russia needs a strong presidential power, at least for now." Bukovsky said. In 2013, you can shrug your shoulders: democracy without separation of powers turned out to be "sovereign". Some RS interlocutors admitted that years later they changed their assessment of the events of the early 1990s. Ilya Konstantinov today is proud that his well-known political colleague, Marina Salye, with whom he created democratic parties in Leningrad-Petersburg, who supported Yeltsin, said "I was wrong" five years after the execution of parliament.

At the same time, it is unlikely that the speaker of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov, seems to be playing the role of Cassandra ("I told you so") today, was so

From the very beginning, it was clear that an oligarchic variant of privatization was being prepared

A visionary from the very beginning. After all, the Supreme Soviet pinned high hopes on President Yeltsin, granting him emergency powers on economic reform on November 1, 1991. Andrey Illarionov believes that this ultimately led to the civil war: in 1992-1993, the parliament believed that Yeltsin was still obliged to consult with him, and Yeltsin, or rather his entourage, sought to do without parliament on important issues. Sociologist Alexander Tarasov, analyzing the October events of 1993 in hot pursuit, he noted then that " Parliament itself gave Yeltsin such a degree of power that the President, quite logically, wanted ALL power."

Ruslan Khasbulatov today denounces Boris Yeltsin, calling him a criminal who shot the parliament. However, the question of the responsibility of the parliament, which transferred power to Yeltsin already in 1991, puzzles him: " Well, yes, they themselves are to blame, they gave all power to Yeltsin. But we trusted him." Khasbulatov says.

Alexander Rutskoy laments: " up to a certain point, all the legislative initiatives that Yeltsin came up with - everything was introduced, including the position of the president of Russia, into the Constitution by the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies. And no one bothered him. And then - well, who could agree with this crazy privatization?"

Privatization really finally quarreled between parliament and Yeltsin, recalls Ilya Konstantinov. According to him, " from the very beginning it was clear that an oligarchic variant of privatization was being prepared; The Supreme Soviet insisted on nominal and gradual privatization, while Gaidar and Chubais wanted anonymous vouchers and privatized everything at once."

The arguments of Yeltsin's supporters are detailed, for example, in the voluminous work "So who still shot the parliament" by the journalist Oleg Moroz, who personally spoke with Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar and other participants in the events: Alexander Rutskoi insulted the Gaidar government, calling the reformers "boys in pink pants." This did not contribute to working relations between Gaidar and the parliament. The failures of the "oligarchic" privatization carried out as a result (already without interference from the Supreme Council), from the point of view of the author, could not be foreseen in advance. Moreover, Gaidar was simply not given time to finish what he started, and the threat of communist revenge loomed over the reforms, so they had to be carried out faster.

BARKASHOVTS ZIGGING AT THE SUPREME COUNCIL

Among the defenders of the Supreme Council on September 21 - October 4, 1993, about five thousand people were noticed: ordinary Muscovites, retired military men, Pridnestrovian volunteers, Anpilovites, "Makashovtsy", "Barkashovtsy" ("Russian National Unity - RNU") in an unclear number.

The founder of the RNU Alexander Barkashov in recent interview- in a monologue, answering the question of whether his actions were a provocation (for example, members of the RNE were in the forefront of the group that set off on October 2 to storm Ostankino), answers: " By intentions, no, by the result - yes, it turns out that it was a provocation". In an interview two years ago, Barkashov said that there were 130 of his fighters in the White House, and in 2013, in an interview with NTV, he already talks about 200. But outside, according to Alexander Barkashov, there were at least a thousand of his supporters. Formally, Vladislav Achalov, appointed Minister of Defense by the Supreme Council, allegedly called Barkashov to defend the Supreme Council. This version seems plausible to the former Minister of the Interior Andrey Dunaev ("Barkashov was friends with Achalov", - says Dunaev), but is laughed at by Alexander Rutskoi.

Ilya Konstantinov declares: " If General Makashov, being an assistant to Rutskoy and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, "called himself", then no one called the Barkashovites at all. But it was impossible to separate some defenders of the White House from others. Barkashchovtsy gathered and threw their provocative ridges. And there were only 15 armed Makashovites". Ilya Konstantinov also claims that the Barkashovites, who were in the building of the Supreme Council, left just on the eve of the assault on the night of October 3-4.

"Vodka and the swastika" - with such a special report shortly after the October
events in Russia was made, in particular, by the German magazine Der Spiegel. The photographs of zigzagging RNU-shniks are accompanied by captions that there are a total of one and a half thousand armed neo-Nazis in Moscow, and they do not hesitate to distribute their newspapers on Red Square. " And just a few weeks ago, an alliance of neo-Nazis and old school communists tried to take power from President Yeltsin., – reminds "Spiegel".

Researcher of right-wing radical organizations sociologist Alexander Tarasov I’m sure that the extremists’ posing for the press against the backdrop of the Supreme Council was their main task:

- The Supreme Council does not have exact figures on the number of RNU. But all witnesses agree that there were "150 people" from Barkashov. That is, there could be 130 of them, and

200, but not 1000-1200. I believe that the Barkashovites had the following task: to compromise the Supreme Soviet in world public opinion. The main reason why they were needed (and what they successfully did) was to be photographed in their Nazi-like uniform with their hands up in a Nazi salute against the backdrop of the White House. These shots went around the newspapers and TV channels around the world and created the necessary impression that supposedly the Supreme Council was defended exclusively by fascists. There are at least three facts that make us perceive RNU as provocateurs not only along this line: unhindered (unlike everyone else) passage through the checkpoints surrounding the White House, back and forth (even after a total blockade with barbed wire); the forcible removal from the White House of Sergei Kurginyan, who paranoidly looked for a provocation in Yeltsin's every move; the fact that it was the RNU militants who were at the forefront of the group that stormed the mayor's office.

- RNU was formed three months before the storming of the White House?

– RNU was formed back in 1990. In July 1993, the movement was officially registered. RNU's support for the Supreme Soviet in September-October 1993 aroused everyone's astonishment, since since the spring of 1993 the RNU had been consistently moving in the opposite direction, accusing the forces in opposition to Yeltsin of "falling under the commies and partyocrats." I am convinced that the RNU was created by the Ministry of Internal Affairs - and it was the Ministry of Internal Affairs that gave Barkashov the order to bring his own people to the Supreme Council. The discipline in the RNU was then very tough, military: the "leader" said, so we are doing it. Why - the "leader" knows.

The Barkashovites (those of them who did not die) turned out to be the only group that left the White House without hindrance (through secret underground communications) - and "disappeared". I am sure that they were taken out by curators from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (b There were those who left the White House in the same way, but individually. Ilya Konstantinov, according to him, was helped by an Alpha officer. – RS). RNE, despite its fascist reputation and participation in the conflict in 1993, received the right to create a network of private security companies and access to weapons, which was absolutely impossible without the permission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the middle and in the second half of the 1990s, the RNU did not get out of the scandals associated with the illegal sale of weapons and explosives, robberies and murders. Any other organization would have been banned long ago for this, but the RNE covered the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And when, at the turn of the decade, the FSB began to dominate the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the same time, through its agents (in particular, through Oleg Kassin), the FSB was able to split the RNE. But even after the split, the Ministry of Internal Affairs almost openly patronized one of the three main organizations of the ex-RNU - Volga structures led by the Lalochkin brothers. The fact that the RNU was then for Yeltsin and against the "commies" is not a secret, - argues Alexander Tarasov about the oddities of the RNU nationalist movement.

Alexander Barkashov himself denies his connection with the special services: he states that the support of the Supreme Council was natural, since it was this body of power that came out in defense of the Russian nation.

WHO SHOT?

In general, according to the sociologist Tarasov, the executive branch did everything to force the supporters of the Supreme Council to be the first to use force and thus legitimize the return fire. In a broader sense, May 1, 1993, when a rally of opposition to President Yeltsin (mostly “communist”) was brutally dispersed, can be considered the beginning of a violent, but not yet armed, confrontation and civil war. From September 28 to October 2, 1993, the rallies were also brutally dispersed, and then OMON broke several ribs to Viktor Alksnis.

Armed clashes near the CMEA building (Moscow Mayor's Office) and Ostankino became the prologue for the execution of the White House. Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky confirmed the fact that the fire was directed on October 3 from the CMEA building towards the assembled crowd. However, the massacre at Ostankino "untied Yeltsin's hands." The assault on Ostankino, as stated Alexander Rutskoy, was needed because he was not provided with ether. " Why trucks? - And then it went! Well, 14 days of lying - how do you think, how can you endure all this?

At the same time, Alexander Barkashov admits some "stupidity" of using trucks by his "fighters", who were at the forefront of events, to storm Ostankino ...

As it was reported at the beginning, two people died near Ostankino at the hands of the rebels - private Yuri Sitnikov and video engineer Sergei Krasilnikov. The editor-in-chief who was in the building at the time Elena Savina told the RS correspondent that, except for the defenders of the Supreme Council, "no one could do this": "I did not see a shot from a grenade launcher, but I felt a wave."

Later in a Top Secret interview given by a senior investigator Leonid Proshkin, it was reported that Sitnikov died from a shrapnel wound received inside the building, and Krasilnikov was killed in the corridor, which was also not visible from the street.

It was after the death of Sitnikov that the spetraz opened heavy fire on the crowd in front of Ostankino. According to Elena Savina, she saw at least 10 corpses near her alone.

A lot has been written about the subsequent assault on the Supreme Council, the attempts of negotiations by Alexy II that had lasted several days before, or the attempts of Alpha to resolve the confrontation peacefully ("Alpha did not want blood"), much has been written in previous years.

The official death toll is still unknown, but the figure was 154 people - service personnel and defenders of the White House. 4 people from among the military. The version that the Supreme Council was defended by snipers was not confirmed, at least not documented. Statements about the snipers of the Supreme Council were made at a high level - by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and the head of the KGB department (MBR) for Moscow and the Moscow region Yevgeny Savostyanov.

Former Radio Liberty correspondent Mark Deutsch recorded an interview with an FSB general who claimed that the special services sent the snipers. However, the interview came out on condition of anonymity and with voice modulation.

But whether Alexander Rutskoi could (and wanted) to overcome political corruption, being in 1993 himself "under a criminal case", is an interesting question.

President of the Information and Research Center "Panorama" Vladimir Pribylovsky provided RS with a certificate on the biography of Alexander Rutskoy: "Being a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, in 1990 he took part in the organization of the charitable Foundation for the Social Development of Russia" Renaissance "and became the chairman of its board. The founder of the fund was the Presidium of the Armed Forces, and the post of president of the Renaissance fund was first taken by the Chairman of the Supreme Council Boris Yeltsin, but , after his election as President of Russia, Rutskoi himself was the president of the fund for some time. Later, he formally resigned from his duties as president of the fund, but in fact left the leadership of it to himself (since the charter of the Vozrozhdeniye fund remained a clause according to which the heads of the fund are appointed vice -President of Russia).

A journalist became interested in Rutskoy's business back in 1992 Vladimir Ivanidze:

- By the time the putsch of 1993 began and Yeltsin threw the general out of the post of vice president, Rutskoi was quite active, let's call it that, within the framework of the infamous Renaissance fund. The Renaissance Foundation is at first glance a jingoistic, state-run organization, but in fact they had a commercial center of the Renaissance Foundation with a branch in Brighton Beach, in which the money of the deceived investors of the Chara financial pyramid settled. This fund is a kind of shelter for former representatives of the special services and for bandits too. The fund developed wild activity in 1991-1992.

There are protocols of Rutskoi's interrogation in a criminal case, which peaked in 1993. $20 million was stolen using false vouchers. Even Vladimir Zhirinovsky was interrogated, because, according to the investigation, he received money from front companies that were associated with the "Pushkin" group. Akop Yuzbashev (head of the group) was Rutskoi's man. Rutskoi steamed in his bath. In 1993, the RUBOP tried to take Yuzbashev (he was found to have a whole arsenal of weapons), but he fled to Israel. When everything calmed down, he returned from Israel and became an adviser to Rutskoi, by that time the governor of the Kursk region, on foreign economic relations.

- What did they explain during interrogations about false advice notes in 1993?

“They give us money, we take it, I don’t care where it comes from,” Zhirinovsky said. Rutskoi spoke about the gifts he received from Akop Yuzbashev. Rutskoi was the honorary president of the Renaissance Foundation. He lobbied for all kinds of resolutions related to this fund: concessions, additional appropriations (Yuri Boldyrev specifically against Rutskoi has no claims in connection with corruption; but in general, according to him, the corrupt decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council - to allocate this and that or to exempt such and such structures from tax benefits - were not uncommon. - RS).

A scandal erupted in Moscow over Rutskoi's connections with the Vozrozhdeniye Foundation and with Boris Birshtein. There was an oligarch who headed the Siabeco Group structure. There were several criminal cases, but everything rested on Vladimir Belkin, who was Rutskoy's assistant. Belkin fled Russia without waiting for the denouement. He has been put on the international wanted list. But in the mid-90s, a miracle happened, as we often did. Criminal cases in the Prosecutor General's Office were frozen. And Belkin returns as an Israeli. However, he later goes missing.

Birshtein's partner was the wife of current senator Alexander Korovnikov ( now, in 2013, a criminal case on the transfer of a bribe to the Accounts Chamber is also being investigated against him. – RS). According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Belkin was engaged in jewelry smuggling. They also allegedly found lists of weapons that he traded for criminal gangs. All this is done through the Vozrozhdeniye Foundation. I will add that two of Rutskoi's assistants died under strange circumstances.

Korovnikov once said that all this was a lie and falsification. However, all telephones of the fund and the commercial center of the Vozrozhdeniye fund were registered to the Siabeco-Group company. That is, they were paid by Boris Birshtein.

Boris Birshtein, from my point of view, provoked a mess with "suitcases of compromising evidence". Rutskoi himself would not have started shouting about the suitcases, since he did not really know their contents. He didn't even know exactly how many there were: sometimes ten, sometimes

Rutskoi, from my point of view, became the leader who was needed to lead the herd to the slaughter, to get rid of the parliament

Eleven, then thirteen. Apparently, these were inspectors' assessments, checks, financial documents. Rutskoi would not have been able to digest all this, but they explained to him that this was compromising evidence. In all FBI reports, Birshtein appeared as an active member of the Solntsevo criminal organization. What is this data based on? In any case, in Belgium, Birshtein opened companies for Sergei Mikhailov (Mikhas), one of the leaders of the Solntsevo organization.

Another of the people close to Rutskoi was the singer Iosif Kobzon. Together they traveled to Israel in order to lobby for the release from prison of a man associated with both the mafia and the KGB - Shabtai Kolmanovich. He was also killed, and also in Moscow. In the army, Rutskoy maintained serious connections. Transport aviation was very important. These were fantastic opportunities to send goods anywhere by military cargo planes.

– Through Tiraspol?

- For example. Or through Abkhazia. There are reports from the German, Belgian police, French counterintelligence, in which people from Rutskoi's immediate circle appear. And this is not after he was amnestied and became governor; but they started much earlier. They are called quite unambiguously the mafia and organized crime group. Rutskoi's connection with these people did not stop. They sat down.

Thus, the struggle for corruption flows began in 1991-1992. By 1993, when they began to smash the White House, Rutskoi, from my point of view, was the kind of leader that was needed to lead the herd to the slaughter, to get rid of the parliament. It is not clear at the same time how consciously he played this role (here is conspiracy theory), but in fact it was a dirty role. The leader is trained - he is fed, never killed. Otherwise, panic begins, the sheep feel the blood, and so the leader goes ahead, and they are not afraid , - told Vladimir Ivanidze about the results of his previously unpublished journalistic investigation.

The Vozrozhdenie Foundation became the subject of the Moment of Truth broadcast on ORT on July 15, 1993. The host Andrey Karaulov told his guest Alexander Rutskoi that President Yeltsin had set up a special commission to check the fund that worked with the forms of the Supreme Soviet. True, the commission cannot really work: the speaker of the Supreme Court, Ruslan Khasbulatov, refuses to provide the necessary documents. Rutskoi said : "Rutskoi has exactly the same relation to this fund as Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He was the president of this fund. The fund worked according to a program approved by Chairman of the Supreme Council Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister Ivan Stepanovich Silaev ..."

Little is known about Rutskoy's current business (he himself defines the type of his activity as follows: "I do what I like").

“Rutskoi’s role in 1993 can be assessed in different ways. I don’t assess his role very positively, but not because I consider him a provocateur. Rutskoi was not a provocateur. He is a person who plays a game that could result in death or the presidency "Exchanging this game for some kind of governorship is naive, ridiculous and stupid. But the fact that he did not have enough political and intellectual potential to ensure the most important tasks that the acting president faced is a fact", - He speaks Ilya Konstantinov.

Former allies Ruslan Khasbulatov and Alexander Rutskoi can't stand each other today. For some reason, Rutskoi despises Khasbulatov - in his words, for cowardice. And Khasbulatov did not agree with the line of defense of the Supreme Council, chosen by Rutskoi. So, in the NTV film by Vladimir Chernyshev Khasbulatov said that he “understood that it was all over” when Rutskoi called for taking Ostankino.

In a conversation with RS Khasbulatov, however, advised to pay attention to Yeltsin's blatant lawlessness, and not to some kind of provocation on the part of the White House: " Well, I said that, yes, but that's not the point." Khasbulatov also does not want to talk about his tactical alliance with General Rutskoi. "We both need to be rehabilitated. Not amnestied, but rehabilitated!"

REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT

What is the real reason for the defeat of the "red-brown" parliament, which the vice president joined, and its consequences? On the version that Yeltsin and his team needed to eliminate any control over the executive branch during the reforms, insists Yuri Boldyrev using the phrase " group of reformers.

"The current Russian authoritarian political regime was born on the ruins of the parliament in October 1993", – He speaks Andrei Illarionov. He argues that in Russia there was no proper political culture, no understanding of the need for separation of powers, a system of checks and balances, and as a result, the defeat of the parliament was perceived calmly by some Russians, and applause by others.

And if someone had doubts, then many who hesitated were convinced by the "Makashovites and Barkashovites", versions about the snipers of the Supreme Council, the events in Ostankino and the CMEA.

Opponents of the version of the legacy of the "Putin" regime from the "Yeltsin" insist on the absence of predestination: the political regime of Yeltsin had a long evolution, Chechen wars before it became Putin's, and 1993 was not a decisive year. (Ilya Konstantinov objects: an independent parliament would not approve of a war in Chechnya.)

It is curious that an indirect consequence of the dispersal of the Supreme Council in Moscow was an attempt to destroy the materials of the parliamentary investigation against a politician who personifies the current political regime - then Vice-Mayor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Putin. Len-Petrosoviet (1990-1993), whose commission, headed by deputy Marina Salie, conducted parliamentary inquiry into Putin and even recommended that Putin be removed from office in 1992 for misconduct, was dissolved by Yeltsin's decree on December 21, 1993- and this is without any presence of Barkashovites, Pridnestrovians, etc., simply "in the model and likeness." " Everything happened suddenly. The deputies, including Salye, were simply not allowed into the building, I had to take away the report on Putin, I managed to get through under some pretext," recalls a relative of Marina Salier Natalia Mikhailova.

The fiasco of that parliamentary investigation (after all, the general public did not listen to the deputies - the press sometimes laughed at them, and the mayor of the city Anatoly Sobchak spoke about the "intrigues of the communists" inspiring parliamentary investigations against the executive branch) former representative of the president in St. Petersburg Sergey Tsyplyaev explains like this: "The Russians did not understand the essence of collegial governing bodies at all."

A reassessment of events took place many years later.

“My first reaction was such that the two parties rushing to the trough grappled in a fight in this division. Nevertheless, the historical view paints a different picture. Firstly, the majority of deputies behaved, by and large, with dignity. Secondly, they are to blame in that they could not limit the arbitrariness of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, which tried to distribute benefits and benefits, just like the executive branch," says Yuri Boldyrev.

At the end of August 1991, a group of state and officials of the Soviet government announced the creation of the GKChP (State Committee for the State of Emergency) and tried to seize power in the USSR. Tanks were brought into Moscow, but not a single shot was fired. Lenta.ru publishes excerpts from an interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, about the events of that time.

There were many rumors about the preparation of the rebellion, and the press wrote about it, and Gorbachev's "advisor", a certain Migranyan, even substantiated the need for an "enlightened dictatorship." scribbled. I gave interviews to television people on this topic, where I denied the possibility of such a scenario, I believed that the situation in the USSR did not give prerequisites for conspiracies and coups. He proceeded from the fact that the democratic process in the country had gone far, and society would not tolerate putschists.

Before the putsch

The introduction of the State Emergency Committee was a big surprise for me. A few days before that, I was in Sochi, helping the local authorities cope with the consequences of a natural event - a storm, and even called Defense Minister Yazov, asking for heavy equipment to restore some kind of pipeline near the Caucasian ridge. He said “Of course, we will help immediately” and provided assistance. Returning to Moscow, the day before the State Emergency Committee, I met, already at night, Yeltsin - he flew to Moscow from Kazakhstan, where he had some kind of negotiations with Nazarbayev. I, as usual, met him at the airport, took him home - we lived next door.

The signing of a new union treaty was scheduled for August 20, and Yeltsin and I discussed some issues. In particular, we, the Russian delegation, will not sign certain articles in the Gorbachev treaty, since Gorbachev's lawyers in this treaty equated the republics of the Russian Federation with the union republics. I categorically disagreed with this and explained this to Yeltsin. By the way, when this issue began to be discussed in Novoogarevo, I even stopped attending these meetings - as a sign of protest.

Following the union republics, Tatar, Bashkir, Ossetian, Chechen, Dagestan and so on would be declared. All of them would become equal with Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine. We discussed this with Yeltsin and parted ways.

"Swan Lake"

At 7 am I got up, as always, cheerful. The wife calls from the Moscow apartment and reports that there is a coup in the country, she asks to turn on the TV. I turned on the TV, and there really was “Swan Lake”, then they showed Yanaev and others.

Later I learned that the actual organizer of the putsch was Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB. I immediately ran to the Yeltsins. There, at the threshold, stands a gloomy Korzhakov. I saw Naina Iosifovna, ran to the second floor. Yeltsin sat on the bed, untidy and depressed. He saw me and said: “Kryuchkov beat us. Everything, in an hour they will take us with you. ”

I answer him: “How will they take it like that? Gather yourselves, put yourself in order, are we playing spillikins with you? Let's call Nazarbayev in Alma-Ata, Kravchuk in Kyiv, we will get support.” I ask him: “Which of the military do you know? Be all right in 15 minutes, I'll call all of our leaders. We must fight, not give up!

Neither the light nor the connection was turned off. I believe that they knew the psychology of Yeltsin well in the KGB and believed that he would surrender. And he actually gave up when I saw him. So they "calculated" it. They had a plan to take us to one of the dachas near Moscow, so that he (Yeltsin) resigned all his powers there and returned to Sverdlovsk. It was an extremely peaceful scenario. Kryuchkov later told me several times: “I didn’t take your factor into account, we lost because of you, and Yeltsin got all the laurels.”

I wrote an appeal to the people, after which the defenders of the White House began to gather. Silaev, Rutskoi, Shakhrai, Poltoranin, Burbulis gathered at Yeltsin's. I gave the pen to Poltoranin, he was our chief journalist, and his hands were trembling. I got angry, angrily took the pen from him and began to write myself. With this, the opposition to the putschists began. Muscovites supported us.

Failed escape

Yeltsin was afraid of arrest (well, who is not afraid?) I remember: at night, it is drizzling, wet Gavriil Popov, Yuri Luzhkov and his young wife came to the House of Soviets - they were also afraid that they would be arrested. I sent them to warm up, and then Korzhakov ran into the office and shouted in a bad voice: “Ruslan Imranovich, urgently to the president!” We go down the elevator, downstairs, in the garage, there is Yeltsin, his assistants, security and a large Zil 114 car. Yeltsin immediately came to me: "In half an hour there will be an assault, we need to save ourselves, we are going to the US Embassy, ​​two days after the big noise in the world we will return."

I didn’t even think about it, I said: “You are right, the right decision, you are the president, you are the only one with us, you need to be saved, and I have 500 deputies here.” With that, he turned and walked towards the elevator. I go to my room and think: “What will happen now ... The President has escaped ...” And when I was walking along the corridor, the military turned up to me. General Kobets ran up and said: “Here is General Lebed, he wants to tell us something, to help ...”

I was furious, I didn't know who to rip it off on, but here is the right opportunity. I say: “If you want to help, then why did you bring tanks here?” Lebed says to me: "If necessary, I'll take your White House in five minutes." To which I answer him: “You won’t take it in five minutes! General Kobets, arrest this putschist and throw him in the basement! In two days we will defeat the rebels, and he will go to the tribunal.

Kobets opened his mouth, and Lebed fell silent and stood at attention. Here I finally calmed down and went to my office. He spat out evil, ordered not to let anyone in, did not know what to do, there was some kind of emptiness, even some lazy thoughts. I thought that as soon as Yeltsin escaped, the Americans would immediately inform everyone about our defeat. I sat, thought, 20-30 minutes passed, I think. And then a phone call is heard from Yeltsin: “Ruslan Imranovich, you so resolutely refused to evacuate that I decided to fight with you. We'll be together until the end." He went to the basement, and I remained in command, of course.

Photo: Vladimir Fedorenko / RIA Novosti

As I later learned from Vladislav Achalov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Yeltsin's plan to escape to the US embassy was Kryuchkov's game. Through his agents at the embassy, ​​he launched information that the time for the assault was set, at which Yeltsin was to be killed. It was disinformation, but the Americans “swallowed” it and recommended that Yeltsin “evacuate” to the US embassy.

Kryuchkov was on the phone all the time, Achalov said, waiting for Yeltsin to flee, and then, when he was informed that Khasbulatov refused to run, and Yeltsin changed his mind after him, Kryuchkov hung up the phone, grabbed his head and exclaimed: "Khasbulatov won against me."

Gorbachev was semi-arrested in Foros - in a mild form. He did not give them a decree or permission for a coup. The delegation that came to him with the order to introduce the State Emergency Committee, Gorbachev swore and refused to sign. In the heat of the moment, he said - they say, do what you want, but I will not sign. They used this phrase. He didn't have a deal with them. Of course, he had to get on their plane and return to Moscow, to the Kremlin, and demand an explanation: what are you doing here? He knew them all well. So to say unequivocally that Gorbachev knew everything, approved everything, is wrong. Another thing is that he did not try to severely stop any "initiatives" in this direction.

Why did the putsch fail?

The GKChP fell down not because of cowardice. General Achalov and Marshal Yazov knew the value of life, both were in Afghanistan, Transcaucasia. Yazov was still a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. Both Yazov and Achalov did not particularly rely on General Grachev, so Achalov himself bypassed the positions at the House of Soviets. Grachev and Lebed, by the way, were ready to shoot the demonstrators if they gave the order, it was then they dressed up as saviors.

Achalov, after the detour, informed Yazov that a lot of people had gathered and there could be bloodshed: “Is it worth storming the House of Soviets?” Yazov immediately said: “No, it’s not worth it. Because of this gang, you and I will not risk the honor of Soviet officers. I must say that General Vladislav Achalov showed the highest decency, honor, and service to the people these days. He was a very authoritative general of the Airborne Forces, he was reckoned with in the army, he was trusted.

I think the KGB could have arrested me, but they did not believe that I would act so decisively. They knew Yeltsin and those around him well, his adventures, falls into the river, Sverdlovsk episodes, when he later apologized, repented, and wept. They did not expect that so many people would come out to defend the House of Soviets. And they miscalculated with me - as in 1993. For me, the concept of honor is very important, but I could not leave the line of struggle, so that they would laugh at me later. How to live with this?

And the deputies, both "left" and "right", they all cast aside their contradictions and showed heroism, we must give them their due. And the KGB was afraid of the military: as Achalov told me, when Kryuchkov began to raise his voice, Yazov took Achalov aside and ordered him to be ready to arrest Kryuchkov and his generals. The Kryuchkovites overheard everything and realized that if they act against the people, the army will not support them and will crush them.

The press writes that there were cowardly, cowardly figures in the GKChP, and Yeltsin showed himself to be "decisive." But it's not. There were worthy people in the GKChP, they made a mistake, but did not shed blood. This must be acknowledged. And Yeltsin was always a coward - both in August 1991 and later, and in 1993 he showed himself to be a bandit. The putschists in August 1991 risked their careers and lives, but did not allow bloodshed.

After the coup

The real revolution took place in Belovezhye. Only in history successful coups are not called coups. I sometimes reflect on the past and consider it my big mistake that I didn’t go then (after Belovezhye) to Gorbachev and didn’t offer to sign a decree appointing me Prime Minister of the USSR - perhaps then it would have been possible to save the Union. But what can you do, history is ahead of us!

I did not take this step, probably because my upbringing is like that. I did not offer this saving idea. This idea was in the air in our parliamentary circles.

After the GKChP, a terrible thing happened. The Union was extremely weakened, it was teetering on the border of existence. Gorbachev actually became Yeltsin's hostage. He ordered the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; arrested Lukyanov. And in our Russian-Soviet conditions, if there is no head, then consider there is no power, no union government, or anything else. There was also no government in the Russian Federation at that time! Yeltsin dispersed Silaev's government even before the putsch. A huge country was not ruled by anyone!

Then I convened the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on an impromptu basis, and we worked around the clock, in fact, managed the country and even the affairs of the USSR, regions and republics. Everyone then knew that "Khasbulatov is in place" - he solves problems. This did not allow Russia to disintegrate, although these processes of disintegration began to develop rapidly. During this period, I repeatedly posed the question to Yeltsin: let's create a government as soon as possible!

By the way, he himself had good ideas to invite a well-known ophthalmologist, Academician Svyatoslav Fedorov, then Academician Yuri Ryzhov, then Yuri Skokov to the government. But it all turned out to be a pathetic game. He proposed to the government unknown people, some Gaidar, Burbulis and someone else, whose names I do not want to name because of their insignificance.

On September 21, 1993, at exactly 20:00 on the central television channel, the news broadcast opened with an emergency speech by B. N. Yeltsin.

In his address to the people, he announced that he had signed Decree No. 1400 "On a phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation."

Based on this decree,

"The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation have been dissolved, and elections to a new legislative institution, the State Duma, have been scheduled at the same time"

Did Boris N. Yeltsin have the right to such things?

The answer to this question is given by the Constitution in force at that time. She directly:

Moreover, as specifically stated in the Constitution, in such a case, the powers of the President « stop immediately».

This means that on the evening of September 21, 1993, the 1993 coup d'état began in Russia.

…………………………………..

Two years ago, in 1991, few people imagined that the allies, who together killed socialism and the USSR, would quarrel with each other in the end.

This is R. I. Khasbulatov, according to some, initially "served Boris Nikolayevich" so that he was ready to "get out of his shirt" And Yeltsin directly called him his successor.

The White House was the center, the soul of the resistance of the all-pro-Western anti-socialist forces, all those who wanted to end the USSR

In just a couple of years, Yeltsin will shoot the White House

Yes, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi did a lot for Yeltsin and for the murder of the USSR. Here are just a few of their accomplishments:

1. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported the separation of the RSFSR and other regions from the USSR, ignored the Politburo and the CPSU.
2. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the spring of 1991 thwarted an attempt by people's deputies to remove B. N. Yeltsin from the post of speaker
3. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the summer of 1991 supported Yeltsin in the presidential elections
4. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in August 1991 supported Yeltsin in his confrontation with the State Emergency Committee
5. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported the ban on the CPSU
6. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported Yeltsin's liberal "shock therapy"
7. Khasbulatov and the Supreme Council approved the ratification of the Belovezhskaya Accords, which liquidated the USSR

Already half of the acts committed by them "Khasbulatov and Rutskoi" are drawn to high treason and even directly to treason to their homeland. In any other country, this is punishable by a court, a life sentence or even the death penalty.

In the United States, the revision of borders and the separation of branches of power is already the gravest crime; it would never occur to anyone to destroy their statehood there. But Russia in 1991 and 1993 is a special case.

Yeltsin, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi killed the USSR together, but soon their paths will part

The stumbling block will be power and property. It will be too small, there are three of them, the third will be superfluous

Here is an approximate table that indicates the actions of future opponents

In fact, the main cause of the conflict was the question of power. Who will govern the RSFSR - the president or the parliament?

But there was another reason - property, its privatization. The Supreme Council had its own plans for its privatization.

Summing up, there are 2 reasons that served as a catalyst for the conflict:

• The question of power
• The issue of privatization of property

It would seem that there is no reason to doubt the reality of the conflict, that it was not a performance, as it is now commonly believed, about the August putsch of 1991. However, a reasonable doubt arises again.

These are the lists of the dead during the bloody conflict of 1993.

There are different people on the lists, but when you read them, doubts arise

None of the lists contains a single politician, an enemy of B. N. Yeltsin, there is not a single deputy of the Supreme Council or someone from their inner circle on the lists

As in August 1991, ordinary citizens died, with the only difference being that there were more of them, more victims

Yeltsin seemed to be fighting the Supreme Soviet, but not a single deputy of the Supreme Soviet was injured, killed or even wounded.

So why was such a bloody massacre necessary?

Take a look at the following table

August coup 1991	The conflict between the RSFSR Armed Forces and the Kremlin in 1993
The plans and the "putschists" were known in advance, 1-2 weeks in advance	Yeltsin's plans were known in advance, 2-3 weeks in advance
"Putschists" did nothing to neutralize Yeltsin in advance	Yeltsin did nothing to neutralize the Supreme Soviet in advance
For a long time, the “putschists” were inactive	For a long time, both sides were inactive
During the "putsch" killed only ordinary people	Only ordinary people died during the conflict
"Putschists" abandoned the use of force	Yeltsin agreed to the use of force by shooting the White House

The scenarios of the events of 1991 and 1993 are very similar, with the only difference that in the first case the White House won, and in the second the Kremlin.

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Many people were surprised that, having dissolved the parliament, B. N. Yeltsin did not take the House of Soviets under protection and thereby allowed him to raise the banner of struggle against the Kremlin. Boris Nikolayevich explains his actions by the fact that people's deputies knew in advance about the upcoming dispersal of parliament and could prepare for the defense of the White House

Indeed, rumors about the upcoming coup began to circulate in the capital on the afternoon of September 21st.

According to V.I. Anpilov, he was warned about this even earlier - on the 20th.

According to Yu. M. Voronin, on the same day, Deputy Minister of Defense General K. I. Kobets came to him.

He reported that

"An hour ago" the meeting of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense ended, at which the question of the role of the army in the upcoming dispersal of parliament was discussed.

Having received such information, Yu. M. Voronin immediately brought it to R. I. Khasbulatov.

Meanwhile, there is reliable information that A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov learned about the existence of the draft decree No. 1400 “ a week before its release”, that is, around September 14th.

It would seem that they should have immediately taken appropriate measures. So far, no information on this score has been found, except for I. Ivanov's statement that shortly before September 21, Ruslan Imranovich had a secret meeting with B. N. Yeltsin.

As for Monday the 20th, according to R. I. Khasbulatov, after Yu. M. Voronin contacted him, he tried to contact P. S. Grachev, without finding him at his workplace, called the Kremlin.

It turned out that Grachev was there. Neither the president nor the minister of defense wanted to talk to the speaker.

Then Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov invited the Chief of the General Staff M. N. Kolesnikov to his place. He confirmed the information received from K. I. Kobets, but declined to put it in writing.

The next morning, R. I. Khasbulatov ordered to inform the heads of the subjects of the Federation about the “alarming situation” in the capital, then met with generals V. A. Achalov, Yu. N. Kalinin and B. V. Tarasov and posed the question to them: what wait from the rebels? At 10.00 Khasbulatov invited Yu. M. Voronin to contact V. S. Chernomyrdin, and he himself tried to phone the president and prime minister.

He was not connected to any of them.

Sounding the alarm, R. I. Khasbulatov called a special meeting for 17.30 with the invitation of the Chief of the General Staff.

It was attended by A. V. Rutskoy, V. D. Zorkin (head of the constitutional court) and V. G. Stepankov. An invitation was sent to the government. Nobody came from there.

But why was it impossible late at night from the 21st to the 22nd to blockade the White House, change its security, turn off communications, record the president's address to the people, and only after that, on the morning of the 22nd, promulgate Decree No. 1400?

Why couldn't all this have been done on the 21st, just before Boris Yeltsin's speech on television?

Moreover, the president and his entourage developed plans to capture the Armed Forces.

So, here is the chronology of events that took place before the climax of the conflict:

a) 14.10. 93 The Supreme Council (SC) becomes aware of the draft decree No. 1400

b) 21.10.93 Yeltsin and Khasbulatov have a meeting, the content of which is unknown

c) The government ignores the sun

d) 21.10.93 Yeltsin announces constitutional reform on TV

So, Yeltsin had every opportunity to unleash a bloodless conflict. He only needed to prevent the organized resistance of the Armed Forces.

But he did not, allowing the opposition to organize itself.

It turns out that Boris Nikolayevich allowed the opposition to organize itself. But why?

First, by doing so, he provoked her to retaliatory actions, which could then be qualified as unleashing a civil war.

Secondly, he put the heads of local councils, most of them dissatisfied with the presidential policy, with a choice that allowed them to strike at the local Soviet authorities.

Thirdly, in this way it was possible to influence foreign financial and credit institutions, which at that very time continued to decide the fate of Russia's external debt.

At 19.55 R. I. Khasbulatov was brought a “sealed envelope” from the “President of the Russian Federation”.

The speaker himself recalled:

« In it, I was informed that from September 21 "the activity of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies is terminated, that the President signed a Decree on a phased constitutional reform." There was no decree ».

While Ruslan Imranovich was thinking about what to do, Boris Nikolayevich appeared on the screens and announced the decree.

What did Khasbulatov do? He saw that he was being ousted from power. He further recalled:

« After listening to this, Yu. Voronin, V. Agafonov, V. Syrovatko, A. Milyukov, members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, deputies, our employees, as well as the heads of regions, enterprises, leaders of socio-political movements, parties, who were here trade unions...

I proposed to immediately convene the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. His meeting began at 20.15.

The meeting of the Presidium ended with the adoption of a resolution "On the immediate termination of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin". It noted the anti-constitutional nature of Decree No. 1400 and went on to say:

"one. On the basis of Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, consider the powers of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin terminated from the moment of signing the said Decree.

2. The said Decree, in accordance with the second part of Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is not subject to execution.

3. In accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to recognize that the Vice-President of the Russian Federation A. V. Rutskoi began to exercise the powers of the President of the Russian Federation from the moment the Decree was signed.

4. To convene on September 22, 1993, an extraordinary meeting of the VII emergency session of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation with the agenda "On the political situation that has developed in the Russian Federation as a result of the coup."

At the same time, it was decided to create the Headquarters of the Resistance of the Supreme Council. Khasbulatov recalls:

“It included members of the Presidium, deputies, leaders of parties and social movements, senior officials of the Supreme Council, chairmen of a number of regional Councils, located in the building of the Supreme Council. Y. Voronin headed the Headquarters.

The meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council lasted “only 30-40 minutes”, that is, until about 20.50

At 21.00 R. I. Khasbulatov spoke at a meeting of people's deputies in the hall of the Council of Nationalities. He stated that the parliament would defend the Constitution, called the organization of the defense of the House of Soviets as the first task, suggested that the councils of all levels immediately convene sessions and assess what had happened, called on political organizations and trade unions to stand up for the parliament.

Subsequently, during that period, having met with the leader of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) Igor Evgenievich Klochkov, the speaker agreed with him on the support of the parliament by trade unions,

and then, having discussed with the head of the Department of Security of the House of Soviets Alexander Bovt some issues of protecting the "White House", he retired and between 22.40 and 23.00 tried to determine the parliament's response to the step taken by B. N. Yeltsin.

Thus, a document called "Organization of the work of the Leadership of the Resistance (general plan)".

It provided for an emergency convocation of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, an assessment of the actions of B. N. Yeltsin by the Constitutional Court, the formation of the Provisional Government, the involvement of law enforcement agencies and local authorities on the side of the parliament, reaching an agreement with public organizations and using them to put pressure on the rebels.

It is very strange that the speaker drew up such a document only on the evening of the 21st, although he had long known about the existence of draft decree No. 1400.

Even more amazing is that in twenty minutes he wrote a document that took up almost six pages of typographical text.

The speaker of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, long before the adoption of decree No. 1400, knew about it, about Yeltsin's intentions to disperse the Supreme Council

But he did nothing to prevent this, to somehow prevent it, although the constitutional powers of Parliament allowed him to do this.

It so happened that that evening an hour and a half, from 22.30 to 24.00, the journalist A. Lugovskaya spent in the reception room of A. V. Rutskoy.

During this time, V. S. Lipitsky, A. G. Tuleev, V. G. Urazhtsev, Yu. M. Voronin, V. G. Stepankov and S. N. Baburin visited his office, the longest, almost 40 minutes, was V. G. Stepankov. What they discussed, we do not know.

In the meantime, the speaker and vice president were making the first decisions and issuing related orders, the Kremlin began to move from words to deeds.

Shortly after BN Yeltsin's speech at the House of Soviets, long-distance communications ceased to operate, not only the telephone, but also the telegraph.

During R. I. Khasbulatov's speech in the hall of the Council of Nationalities, it was reported that the White House was disconnected from government communications. According to other sources, government communications were turned off a little later - at 23.00.

The next day, "about 10 o'clock" V. S. Chernomyrdin ordered to turn off the city telephone in the House of Soviets. This order was carried out in several stages. So, on the afternoon of the 22nd, the telephone on the White House watch continued to work.

The speaker's phone worked until the next morning, and " three telephones in the offices of "3" employees" and after that…

If on the 22nd it was impossible to call from the disconnected phones from the White House, then until the 23rd they received calls from the city.

In addition, as R. I. Khasbulatov writes

« objects of the Parliament were seized - the Parliamentary Center on Tsvetnoy Boulevard, a garage, a building on Novy Arbat, where a number of ... organizations worked - the Supreme Economic Council, the Control and Budget Committee, the State Property Fund, the Central Election Commission, part of the apparatus of the Supreme Council.

Almost immediately, the accounts of the Supreme Council were blocked.

Parliament was left without means of communication, without transport, without money.

On the very first evening, police outfits appeared at the White House, the Constitutional Court, the Moscow City Council, the mayor's office. True, they were only observing the order.

When the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was coming to an end, writes R. I. Khasbulatov, “A noise was heard. Everyone turned their heads, someone approached the windows. I got up and walked over too. People were gathering at the White House.”

The arrivals were people from the National Salvation Front (leader A. Kryuchkov), a military group (leader A. Markov) and from the Union of Officers (leader S. Terekhov).

According to some reports, on the evening of the 21st there were “several thousand people” at the White House, according to others, one and a half, two or even three thousand.

The White House defense headquarters was immediately created, some defenders received pistols and machine guns (few, about 10-20 pieces). This resistance had broad prospects. However, most of the people at the barricades were unarmed.

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What were the first stepsopposing sides?

While the people were gathering under the windows of the White House and the first preparations were being made for its defense, the session of the Constitutional Court began at 21:40.

« When the meeting of the Supreme Council was already coming to an end, the floor was given to Valery Zorkin.

He read out the decision of the Constitutional Court, which qualified Presidential Decree No. 1400 as unconstitutional.

After that, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on the termination of the powers of B. N. Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation from 20.00 and on the transfer of his powers to A. V. Rutskoi.

A. V. Rutskoi describes these events in a similar way. This is how it really should have happened.

In fact, events developed quite differently.

When the Supreme Council heard the speaker's brief information about the coup, a resolution was immediately adopted to remove B. N. Yeltsin from power. This happened already at 00.19. 142 voted in favor, 3 against, 3 abstained.

Khasbulatov adds:

« After the vote to remove Yeltsin from the presidency, a whole group of influential members of the Presidium - chairmen of committees and commissions, who did a lot to aggravate and complicate the situation in the Supreme Soviet, resigned their powers of chairmen.

These are: S. Stepashin, Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee; E. Ambartsumov, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs; A. Pochinok, Chairman of the Budget Commission; S. Kovalev, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee. Finally, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council N. Ryabov resigned.

Then, by 137 votes, the Supreme Council decided to assign presidential duties to A. V. Rutskoi. Already at 00.25 he was sworn in, after which he announced two decrees: on his assumption of the presidency and on the abolition of decree No. 1400.

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court recognized that Decree No. 1400 was unconstitutional only at 00.45. And Valery Dmitrievich Zorkin went up to the podium of the Supreme Council at 2:12.

This was important. If we take the point of view of the law, we must admit that the Supreme Soviet showed unnecessary haste. Although, on the basis of the Constitution, from the moment of promulgation of Decree No. 1400, B. N. Yeltsin automatically lost his presidential powers, a decision of the Constitutional Court was required for the legal registration of this fact.

Why did the Supreme Council issue its decision without waiting for its verdict? What did those two hours give him?

Nothing. On the other hand, the “hurriedness” shown allowed the Kremlin to talk about the illegality of the decision adopted by the Supreme Council to remove B. N. Yeltsin from power.

The situation was exactly the same with A. V. Rutskoi. Since, by signing Decree No. 1400, B. N. Yeltsin automatically lost presidential power, from that moment his powers automatically passed to the vice president.

But for the legal registration of this fact and the swearing in of the acting president, the decision of the Constitutional Court was also required.

The premature swearing in of A.V. Rutskoy did not give him anything. But it allowed the Kremlin to characterize him as an impostor.

Let's note these facts:

• The Supreme Court stripped Yeltsin of his presidential status, bypassing the Constitutional Court (CC), which made this decision dubious from the point of view of legality
• The Supreme Court, bypassing the Constitutional Court, expressed doubts about the legitimacy of President A. Rutskoi

Both of these actions played into the hands of Yeltsin. Was it intentional or not?

The Constitutional Court (CC) was initially on the side of the Supreme Council and condemned Yeltsin's decree No. 1400

But the Supreme Council, depriving Yeltsin of the status of president, for some reason bypassed the Constitutional Court, which gave Yeltsin's supporters grounds to declare that the decision taken by the Supreme Court was not legitimacy

If the Supreme Council would have accepted the deprivation of Yeltsin's presidential status after the decision of the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin would have stopped being president of the RSFSR

Another issue is closely related to the question of A. V. Rutskoy's presidential powers. The fact is that according to the Constitution, the President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

This means that simultaneously with the issuance of a decree on his assumption of the post of President, A. V. Rutskoi had to issue a decree on his assumption of the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Maybe A. V. Rutskoi forgot about this and no one reminded him of the need for such a step?

No. This question arose on the evening of the 21st, when a whole group of generals came to the White House.

According to the testimony of Colonel General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, he not only initiated this proposal, but also prepared a draft of the corresponding decree.

However, if A. V. Rutskoi signed Decree No. 1 on assuming the office of President at 0.25, then the decree on assuming the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which has No. 8 and dated September 22, apparently, was signed only in the evening of that day, when the number " Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which came out on the morning of the 23rd, has already been made up.

As a result, on the afternoon of the 22nd, a contradictory situation arose. On the one hand, B. N. Yeltsin lost his presidential powers, but was not legally deprived of the powers of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

On the other hand, A. V. Rutskoi became president, but did not assume the powers of the Supreme Commander.

In order to deprive Yeltsin of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, it was necessary to announce this on the Rossiyskaya Gazeta page.

The editorial office of the publication was controlled by the Supreme Council, but the decree depriving Yealtsin of the powers of the commander-in-chief was not published.

The Supreme Council deprived Yeltsin of the status of president, retained for him the right of supreme commander

This could not but affect the relationship between the White House and the army, which faced the question: who to obey?

As we remember, when planning his first actions, R. I. Khasbulatov outlined the formation of the Provisional Government. A draft decree No. 3 on the resignation of V. S. Chernomyrdin was even prepared.

But this idea of ​​the speaker did not receive support. Before the meeting of the Supreme Council, R. I. Khasbulatov and A. V. Rutskoi agreed to create a Military Council, and not to touch the government for the time being.

The meetings of the factions that took place came to a similar conclusion, suggesting that they limit themselves only to the resignation of VF Yerin, who was responsible for dispersing the May Day demonstration. Deputy N.A. Pavlov informed A.V. Rutskoy about this. Pavlov himself recalled it this way:

"BUT. V. Rutskoi, replied that he absolutely agreed with this ... And what was our amazement when, after about 2-3 hours, in the morning, Rutskoi went up to the podium of the congress and read out decrees on the release of Grachev and Golushko and on their appointment to their positions Achalov and Barannikov.

Later, instead of V. F. Erin, A. F. Dunaev became the Minister of Internal Affairs.

According to some reports, when the Supreme Soviet took a break, A. V. Rutskoi called N. M. Golushko and P. S. Grachev and invited them to the House of Soviets. Both refused to do so, demonstrating that they did not recognize him as president.

Explaining the position of P. S. Grachev, A. V. Rutskoy said a few days later:

“… Grachev has an incentive to defend Yeltsin. As soon as Yeltsin is removed from power, the question immediately arises of how and by whom the property of the army was sold. But corruption is even a trifle.

Grachev will need to answer for the secret supply of weapons to Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and Georgia, to Moldova and Transnistria and answer why he armed ... the warring parties.

If on the night of the 21st to the 22nd A. V. Rutskoy had a telephone conversation with the Minister of War and the Minister of Security and they really refused to come to the White House, the decree on their resignation was quite logical.

Apparently, after that, A. V. Rutskoi chose V. A. Achalov and, fearing that he might refuse the ministerial portfolio, signed a decree on his appointment without even talking to him.

This is how V. Achalov recalled it:

“I learned about my appointment to the post of Minister of Defense when I was on the thirteenth floor of the House of Soviets. No one consulted me about this."

How the appointment of V.P. Barannikov and A.F. Dunaev took place remains unknown. In a conversation with me, Andrei Fedorovich for some reason evaded answering this question, noting only that he had been invited to the White House by Yu. M. Voronin.

Having received a new appointment, V. A. Achalov remained in his office on the 13th floor. He appointed General A. M. Makashov as his deputy. The duties of the chief of staff were assigned to Colonel V. V. Kulyasov.

V.P. Barannikov settled on the sixth floor. His “team” included 6-8 people: 2-3 people were outside the walls of the White House and only occasionally appeared here; 3-4 people were active officers of the Ministry of Security, therefore, although they were under V.P. Barannikov, they did not advertise it.

As a result, some, even quite knowledgeable people, believed that Viktor Pavlovich had only one assistant, Nikolai Vladimirovich Andrianov.

A. F. Dunaev is located on the 4th floor, in the left wing of the building. According to A. M. Sabor, A. F. Dunaev had only one assistant - Grigory Stepanovich Nikulin, several technical personnel and about 20 security people.

A. F. Dunaev fully confirmed this information, specifying only that Oleg Georgievich Gorbatyuk performed the duties of leading his guards

In addition, the team of A. F. Dunaev included the former lieutenant colonel of the investigative committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Alexander Alekseevich Rodionov.

After the meeting of the Supreme Council ended, A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov met with the appointed ministers and invited them to go to their workplaces.

S. Baburin recalled:

“We, the deputies, were ready to go with them to the ministries so that they could actually perform their official functions. I told them about it many times."

VI Anpilov was even more resolute. He proposed to build a column of supporters of the parliament, put people's deputies at the head of the column, as well as A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov, and accompany the appointed ministers "to the buildings in which they should work."

According to S. A. Filatov, on the night of the 21st to the 22nd, all the commanders of the armed forces, fleets and military districts called from the White House, and all of them answered the question posed by him that they would be faithful to the Constitution.

But when it was required to move from words to deeds, it turned out that the army and parliament understand this loyalty differently.

Why this happened is the subject of a special study.

According to V. A. Achalov, having received a new appointment, he immediately contacted the headquarters of the Airborne Forces (VDV). Since the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Yevgeny Nikolaevich Podkolzin, was ill, the conversation took place with his first deputy, Oswald Mikulovich Pikauskas.

He declared that he supported the Supreme Council and was ready to place the headquarters of the Airborne Forces at the disposal of V. A. Achalov.

This means that already on the morning of September 22, the parliament could receive the support of the paratroopers. There is evidence that at the same time, the leaders of two special groups "Alpha" and "Vympel" declared their readiness to go over to the side of the parliament.

The support of the paratroopers and the two above-mentioned special forces groups made it possible to restore legitimate power in the capital as early as the afternoon of the 22nd. However, the White House shied away from using this opportunity.

According to V. A. Achalov, when he announced that he was going to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, the leadership of the White House and all the military who were in it opposed this.

Alexander Rutskoi refused the assistance offered to the Supreme Council by the command of the Airborne Forces

He also forbade the new Minister of Defense Achalov to go to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces and coordinate actions to protect the Supreme Council

Having refused the support of the paratroopers, A. V. Rutskoi on the afternoon of the 22nd addressed in writing to the commanders of the military branches with an appeal to support the parliament. It would be understandable if Alexander Vladimirovich dressed his appeal in the form of an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile, it was a letter on behalf of the acting president and began with the words: “ I am addressing you as an officer."

The call is strange to say the least. And it is not surprising that he remained unanswered.

On the same day, R.I. Khasbulatov ordered several military units to be sent to the White House.

On the 23rd, R. I. Khasbulatov turned to

“to the military - members of the collegium, deputy ministers of defense, individual commanders, heads of military schools” “with a request to fulfill the requirements of the Constitution and the Law on Defense: to defend their own oath - on loyalty to the Constitution ».

There was no answer, but the Ministry of Defense turned off the city phones just in case.

To attract military units to the side of the parliament, some generals and officers who were in the House of Soviets were sent to them: for example, B. V. Tarasov and M. G. Titov.

Was it worth it to issue such orders and appeals to commanders whose position was not known, if it was possible to rely on the support of the paratroopers?

This indicates that the leadership of the White House from the very first day of the coup began to play some kind of strange game

We can judge how a new day began in the White House from the “working diary” of R. I. Khasbulatov: “ 8.00.- Deputies, chairmen of regional and regional councils, entrepreneurs, scientists, cultural figures, a huge number of telegrams in support of the Supreme Council ».

The first actions of R. I. Khasbulatov look quite logical.

He ordered to start “work with public organizations” and entrepreneurs, offered to help “the military organize resistance in the regions”, held a conference call with local councils at the Ministry of Communications, at 16.30 opened a meeting of chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics, regional and regional councils, at which an agreement on joint actions and A. Tuleev was entrusted with the duty of coordinator.

Ruslan Imranovich spent the whole evening until 24.00 in other similar conferences and meetings, trying to unite the most diverse social forces around the parliament.

I. Ivanov claims that on the same day, “ on the first day, the Chairman of the Supreme Council spoke four times by satellite phone with Washington and representatives of the State Department.

The speaker's actions could be understood as an attempt to find a way out of the current crisis at the highest political level. But, if such negotiations really took place, why did Ruslan Imranovich prefer to keep them secret from everyone?

On the night of September 23-24, the Speaker of the Supreme Court R. Khasbulatov had 4 conversations with US government authorities,

What Khasbulatov talked about with the Americans is a mystery to this day

In the morning, people began to flock to the White House. The Moscow police department informed that by 10 o'clock about 900 people had gathered here, in the evening no more than 5 thousand.

According to other sources, on the evening of the 22nd, there were about 20 thousand people near the walls of the White House.

R. I. Khasbulatov claims that when around 19.00 he spoke at the rally from the balcony at the 14th entrance, there were about 40 thousand people on the square.

Since, with the receipt of official positions in the Ministry of Defense, A. M. Makashov and S. N. Terekhov resigned from their duties as heads of the centers of the Federal Tax Service created the day before, both centers were merged into one “headquarters”, and the leader of the PKK, a member of the Political Council of the Federal Tax Service Anatoly Viktorovich, was appointed its head Kryuchkov.

In the first half of that day (between 11.00 and 14.00), a group of supporters of the parliament, consisting of 10-15 people, among whom were deputy I. A. Shashviashvili and S. N. Terekhov, went to Ostankino on the Ikarus to demand air for the parliament, but received a refusal.

When S. N. Terekhov was still in Ostankino, a "lieutenant colonel" was brought to A. M. Makashov, who "named himself a civil defense officer." He stated that

“at one of the reserve command posts of the Civil] about [defense] in Kuntsevo”, where I.V. Stalin’s dacha was once located, you can get a “working connection” with military units .»

Having discussed this proposal and received the consent of V. A. Achalov, A. M. Makashov began to prepare for the trip.

A group of 8 people was assembled, which included the leaders of the Union of Officers Gennady Fedorovich Kiryushin, Vladimir Mikhailovich Usov, Vladimir Viktorovich Fedoseenkov.

On two "Volga" they got to Kuntsevo. The Colonel-General and those accompanying him were allowed into the territory without delay. However, the Communications Center located here was inactive. The press notes that the connection "was turned off for a scheduled inspection",

V.V. Fedoseenkov believes that it was turned off when they appeared on the territory of the unit.

The trip there and back took about three hours, so A. M. Makashov returned back no earlier than 18.00

By this time, the Analytical Center of the Supreme Council summed up the first results. They were disappointing. Parliamentary analysts stated that the collegiums of power ministries are on the side of the Kremlin. And consequently, state security, the army and the police are on the side of the Kremlin.

From this, it was concluded that the parliament can turn the tide in its favor only with the support of the population. Meanwhile, the main instrument of ideological influence - television - was also in the hands of the conspirators.

The think-tank proposed to deprive the Kremlin of this tool, not stopping at the most extreme means, up to the disruption of the power supply to Ostankino.

On the same evening, on the 22nd, according to S. N. Terekhov, A. V. Rutskoi held a meeting. It was about the need to occupy the buildings of the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, in other words, about taking power into their own hands.

Apparently, it is this meeting that is mentioned in the memoirs of A. M. Makashov. He writes that “in the first days of the siege” A.V. Rutskoi gathered “those who wear epaulettes” and burst into an emotional speech. Moreover, the retired general admits,

“I never heard such a swear word as from Rutskoy then, except in an army smoking room.” “Rutskoi didn’t even swear, but poured these words mixed with orders: “take”, “block”, “disperse”.

What was offered to the military? Unfortunately, Albert Mikhailovich does not give a complete answer to this question. But from his memoirs we learn that he was personally ordered to "take the post office, telegraph, railway stations." In addition, an order was issued to “occupy” the “MVD”, “General Staff”, “Ostankino”.

How this meeting ended, we do not know. It can only be noted that not a single order of the acting president was carried out.

In order not to return to this issue, it should be noted: since A. V. Rutskoi was acting president, his orders were completely legal. It was about the subordination of state bodies that went beyond the law. It was not the orders of the acting president that were criminal in nature, but the unwillingness of these institutions to obey him.

But unlike the legitimate authorities, the conspirators had real power. Under such conditions, the orders of A.V. Rutskoi were, if not provocative, then adventurous.

Before returning power to legitimate hands, it was necessary to provide it with appropriate force.

The think tank was absolutely right: the fate of the parliament depended entirely on whether the people would support it or not.

But to support the people, powerful agitation was needed. Was she? No, it was not.

The central newspapers Pravda and Sovetskaya Rossiya took a consistent anti-Kremlin stance, but you will not find any specific proposals on their pages.

You will not find even in the order of information the appeals under consideration by A.V. Rutskoi.

This gives reason to think that the CEC of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did not take any specific decisions related to the organization of a general Moscow rally and a general strike.

The same was the position of the leadership of the White House in relation to the army.

As witnesses who were directly at the scene recalled, they spoke of it this way:

“After September 22, the officers who were on duty at Rutskoi received calls from military units, they offered help, military equipment that they wanted to put around the White House,” but “to this Rutskoi answered:

"Not necessary".

“They also talked about how envoys from military units came to the leaders of the parliament and A. V. Rutskoi with decisions of officer meetings in support of the constitution”

According to the St. Petersburg journalist Yu. A. Nersesov, in the early days, officers and generals went to the White House with offers of their services in "jambs", but their services were refused.

N. S. Afanasiev witnessed one of these scenes. In his presence, a major general unknown to him proposed to allocate a company in armored vehicles to guard the White House, but A. V. Rutskoi declared :

"Not yet."

The military repeatedly appealed and offered the Supreme Council protection from the army

But A. Rutskoy repeatedly refused offers of help

Thus, the Supreme Council remained without army protection.

General Achalov recalled it this way:

“People supported us. Calls from military units followed. There were hotheads who were ready to act immediately, to arrive in Moscow with weapons.

I advised them not to take any action. There should not have been unrest in the country. At the moment when dual power begins, any excess can lead to tragic consequences.

V. Domnina, who was in the council house, said:

“General Achalov, who on the fifth day of the blockade managed to contact the troops by radio, persuaded them not to go to the aid of the parliament”

“Rutskoi ordered me to take all measures so as not to provoke a split in the army ... Our people dispersed to military units, the commanders of which were ready to take the troops out into the street and warned them not to do this.

I am a military man and I understand that dividing the army into “ours” and “not ours” will inevitably plunge the country into a civil war.”

A. Dunaev said:

« To me, - many heads of the regional police departments personally called and asked if troops were needed. I asked them not to send troops, but to restore order on the ground.

The tranquility of the province is, I think, the main thing that the executed Supreme Soviet and I personally have achieved.

Then it turns out that those appeals to the army that V. A. Achalov, A. V. Rutskoi and R. I. Khasbulatov made on September 22 and 23 were purely declarative.

But the matter was not limited to this. One of the bibliographers of those days writes:

“Neither the leadership of the Supreme Council, nor about. of the President, nor the newly appointed heads of the Ministries, made no effort to organize a targeted resistance to the regime”, moreover, they did not even try to somehow organize their supporters who came to the White House ».

……………………………….

So the conflict flared up, which was too reminiscent of the “confrontation” played out in advance. To be continued.