Finland

The first international act that laid the foundation for the formation of a bloc of aggressor countries was the military-political alliance of Germany and Italy, called the Berlin-Rome Axis. Later - during the war - they will say so: "Axis countries." The document was signed in Berlin on October 25, 1936, but in general the parties only stated the coincidence of positions in the field of foreign policy, delimited spheres of influence in the Balkans and the Danube, and also recognized General Francisco Franco Baamonde as the head of the Spanish government and agreed to help him .

The next, more serious step towards the formation of a powerful union was the conclusion in Berlin on November 25, 1936 of the so-called. Anti-Comintern Pact. It was first signed by the representatives of Germany and Japan. In Article 1, the parties pledged to inform each other about the activities of the Comintern and to fight against its intrigues. Article 2 invited other countries to join the pact. Article 3 established the duration of the pact - 5 years. The signing protocol obliged the parties to take action against those who "inside or outside the country directly or indirectly act in favor of the Communist International." This pact has already become a legal formalization of the bloc of countries supporting the "axis" Germany - Italy - Japan. November 6, 1937 Italy joined the pact, February 24, 1939 - Hungary and Manchukuo, March 27, 1939 - Spain. On November 25, 1941, the Anti-Comintern Pact was extended for another 5 years, at the same time Finland, Croatia, Denmark, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, as well as the Chinese government of Wang Jingwei, joined it.

Finally, on September 27, 1940, in Berlin, in a solemn atmosphere, von Ribbentrop (on behalf of Germany), Count Ciano (on behalf of Italy) and Kurusu (on behalf of Japan) signed the pact, which was called the "Berlin Pact". The parties pledged to provide each other with political, economic and military assistance. The term of the pact was set at 10 years. It was already a full-fledged aggressive block. Soon other countries joined the "founding fathers": Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940), Bulgaria (March 1, 1941). On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government of Cvetkovic announced its accession to the pact (two days later, a coup d'etat took place in Yugoslavia, and the new government of General Simović refused to approve the act of accession to the noisy approval of the people). In addition, Finland, Spain, Thailand, Croatia, Manchukuo and China (Wang Jingwei's government) joined the pact at various times.

All of Germany's allies can be very conditionally divided into several "categories". The first can be attributed to those who, within the framework of cooperation, had the opportunity to maneuver and, on the whole, were considered almost a full-fledged partner. First of all, this is Japan, which was able to wage the most difficult war against the USA and Great Britain without any direct help (except for the fact that Germany's actions pulled over a significant part of the resources of these countries). Then, of course, Italy, which claimed almost the role of "senior partner" in the Italo-German alliance. But, despite all the claims of Benito Mussolini, it turned out that the almost 3 millionth Italian army turned out to be of little use, and its economic potential was generally below any criticism. Nevertheless, Italy is the cradle of fascism. And finally, the third - Finland. Although, perhaps, its remoteness from the main concentration of power in Germany - Central Europe - affected here. But the fact remains: no matter how much Finland is called a German satellite, it has always pursued its own policy and, unlike others, it succeeded.

At the next stage are sovereign states that had a fairly long history, which, due to their economic and political position, were forced to agree with Germany and become its satellites. First of all, this includes the countries of the "Balkan bloc" - Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. They simply had nowhere to go: in fear of the great aggressive eastern neighbor, whose victory threatened their ruling circles only with complete annihilation, they were forced to constantly strengthen their ties with Germany and even allow its armed forces into their territory. (By the way, Finland also gave permission for the German 20th Mountain Army to be stationed in Lapland, but still it was only a small region, and the Wehrmacht units did not control the country at all.) There was also a similar country in Asia, which received great benefits from the war, but nevertheless managed to safely get out of it without much shock. This is Thailand.

On the third line of the "tournament table" can be placed formally sovereign states created under the direct tutelage of Germany and Japan. These countries had their own governments, foreign ministries, national armies, but did not have the right to take a single step without the knowledge of their "guardians". These are the "independent states" of Croatia and Slovakia. In addition, until 1942, Denmark was theoretically considered not an occupied state, but a "comma", and the pre-war government continued to function properly and cooperate with Germany. In Asia, such "allies" were the Manchukuo Empire and two republics - Burma and the Philippines, as well as the "government of free India" headed by Bos Chandra. Here it is necessary to say about one more "state formation", which is located somewhere at the junction - this is the government of France, headed by Marshal Petain in Vichy. To call it simply a collaborationist cabinet in the occupied territory is too rude. At the first stage, the Vichy government controlled not only the southern part of France, but also the administration of a number of French colonies, and, more importantly, the main forces of the French fleet. It was the latter fact that forced Germany to reckon with the Vichy government - after all, the French fleet before the war was the second most powerful in Europe. After British. And if he started active operations against Great Britain, it is not known what would have happened to "foggy Albion".

And finally, at the end of the list are the collaborationist governments set up by the Germans (or their “first category” allies) in the countries they occupied. In fact, in any country captured by the "axis" countries, local governments were created, incl. central. These are Greece, and Denmark (after 1942), and Norway, and Albania, and Belgium, and Holland, and China, and Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the "imperial protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" ...

The option of an alliance between Germany and the USSR against the whole world is a very real historical retrospective. And not only historians but science fiction writers from history write about this. There is also an invoice. Just today is the anniversary of one of such important events in the past.
Dr. Watson, Feb 17, 2014 .
Only in the chronicle dug up about this event for 1940.
November 13, 1940 . The head of the Soviet delegation, Vyacheslav MOLOTOV, meets with Adolf Hitler in Berlin.
November 14, 1940 . The Soviet-German negotiations on the accession of the USSR to the alliance of fascist states, which were conducted by V.M., end in failure. MOLOTOV.
November 25 1940 . (Sent to Berlin) Memorandum of the USSR on the conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact.
Can anyone elaborate on the topic - why the Tripartite Pact, on what conditions they wanted to enter, why the negotiations failed.
And finally - if the USSR had joined the Tripartite Pact, would it have been possible to avoid a war between the USSR and Germany?
i.e. there would be no next step:
December 18, 1940 . HITLER signs Basic Directive No. 21<План Барбаросса>, which provides for a fleeting military operation against the USSR. Its goal is to create a protective barrier against Asian Russia on the Astrakhan-Volga-Arkhangelsk line.

Here's some info from there:

November 12, 1940 . To Berlin at the invitation of Hitler's Foreign Minister Joachim von RIBBENTROP the Soviet Foreign Minister arrives for negotiations Vyacheslav Mikhailovich MOLOTOV(The visit will continue until November 14). Two-day negotiations, in which he will participate HITLER, will be ineffective. The USSR will insist on the inclusion in the Soviet zone of influence of Finland, Bulgaria, Romania and the old dream of all Russian rulers - the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles, and in response to this it is ready to join the Tripartite Pact - the fascist axis Rome - Berlin - Tokyo, but with the rights of a full-fledged partner. Hitler, who has already decided to attack the USSR, will be courtesy itself, and will begin to say that the defeat of Great Britain is a matter of the near future, and promise everything, including participation in the division of the inheritance of the British Empire, but over time, hinting that Moscow has already acquired enough, moreover, without fighting. Saying goodbye to Molotov, Hitler once again emphasize that Germany's interests are in the West, and say: " I consider Stalin an outstanding historical figure. Yes, and I myself expect to go down in history. Therefore, it is natural that two politicians like us should meet in the very near future.". Nevertheless, Molotov will feel a growing threat to the USSR, which he will report STALIN and members of the Politburo. Stalin will make the final decision to join the Tripartite Pact in the spring of 1941., and a corresponding dispatch will follow to Berlin. But there will be no answer to it. On the days when Molotov will be located in Berlin, especially massive bombing of the German capital by the Royal Air Force will follow. Later CHURCHILL say Stalin: "We knew about the stay of Mr. Molotov in Berlin and decided in this way to remind us that we are still alive".

The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War, turned out to be predatory. Some territories of defeated Germany went to France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia. The former German colonies were divided among the victorious powers.

In particular, Italy did not derive from the last war the benefits that it expected, although it was in the camp of winners. And its rulers started talking about a new redistribution of the world. In the chauvinist propaganda that was gaining strength, such slogans and concepts as “we were betrayed”, “we were abused”, “saving the nation”, “strengthening its dignity”, etc. appeared.

The Italian military was looking for a "strong hand", a political force that would be able to carry out a coup d'état and establish an open reactionary dictatorship. Such strength was found in the fascist movement that arose in March 1919, headed by Benito Mussolini.

ALBANIAN FACTOR

Among the circumstances that contributed to the revival of the militaristic aspirations of Rome was the Albanian factor. Until 1918, Albania was part of the Turkish Empire, and on January 31, 1920, it became an independent republic headed by Suleiman Delvina. The former colonel of the Austrian army, Ahmet bey Zogu, was appointed Minister of the Interior of the republic. On December 12, 1922, he became prime minister, and two years later he was defeated in the elections and was forced to resign. Soon he had to flee to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. There he recruited a gang of thugs and invaded Albania. He managed to occupy Tirana. And in January 1925 he was elected president for a seven-year term. On November 22, 1927, it was he who signed the Italo-Albanian treaty "On a defensive alliance", establishing Italy's control over the Albanian army for a period of 20 years. Weapons and instructors began to arrive from Italy to modernize the Albanian army. However, Zogu eventually began to get rid of the Italian guardianship. And then Mussolini sent him an ultimatum demanding that Italian troops be allowed into Albanian territory. A powerful Italian squadron approached the Albanian port of Durres. The landing has begun. The resistance of the Albanian troops was quickly crushed. Having captured Albania, Mussolini received a formal reason to present territorial claims to Yugoslavia and Greece.

BERLIN-ROME

From the middle of 1936, the militaristic aspirations of Rome and Berlin began to converge. Already on October 19 of that year, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, arrived on a friendly visit to Germany. In a conversation with him, Hitler announced the recognition of the sovereignty of the Italian kingdom over Ethiopia. Instructing Ciano before this, Hitler convinced: “From the point of view of tactics, anti-Bolshevism must be used as a field of action for maneuvering. Indeed, many countries, being concerned about the Italo-German friendship, out of fear of pan-Germanism or Italian imperialism, would unite against us if they see in the Italo-German alliance a barrier against the internal and external threat of Bolshevism, they will be inclined to join our system. .

The leader of the Nazi Reich argued that the interests of Germany and Italy did not clash: they say that Germany should have freedom of action in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and any changes in the balance of power in the Mediterranean basin should take place in the interests of Italy. And so, the signing of the German-Italian agreement took place, which laid the foundation for the existence of the so-called “Berlin-Rome Axis”. Measures were agreed between the two aggressors to help the rebellious Spanish General Franco.

ANTI-COMINTER PACT

The ruling circles of Japan, who hastened to sign the "Anti-Comintern Pact", were closely watching the planned bloc policy of Italy and Germany. The content of the Japanese-German agreement boiled down to three main points. In the first, both sides mutually undertook to inform each other about the activities of the Communist International and to fight against it in close cooperation. The second paragraph obliged the parties to take the necessary measures to fight and "against those who, inside or outside the country, directly or indirectly act in favor of the Communist International." The third paragraph established the duration of the agreement: five years. The second clause of the agreement was of particular importance. It gave the contracting parties the opportunity, under the pretext of fighting the Comintern, to interfere in the affairs of other states.

Japan agreed to the annexation of Abyssinia to please Italy. In turn, Rome and Berlin officially recognized the government of Manchukuo.

After the Second World War, when the archives of the diplomatic departments of Germany and Japan fell into the hands of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the secret became clear. A secret appendix to the "Anti-Comintern Pact" was discovered, which stated: in the event of a war between Germany or Japan against the USSR, the other side "is obliged not to take any measures that would essentially help to alleviate the situation of the USSR." It was also established that the parties would hold consultations "in order to protect their mutual interests." Germany and Japan assumed obligations not to conclude agreements with the USSR that "do not correspond to the spirit" of the pact of November 25, 1936.

Italy's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact laid the foundation for the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. In February 1939, Manchukuo, Hungary, and two months later, Spain joined the pact. Thus arose the so-called new world order, created and protected by the countries participating in the tripartite agreement.

THREE POWER PACT

The events of the summer of 1940 led to significant changes in the balance of power in the Middle East. The Axis powers were given a convenient territorial foothold in Syria and Lebanon. It was immediately used to expand subversive activities in the countries adjacent to it. Italy's entry into the World War brought the front of hostilities closer to Egypt and the Suez Canal. The Axis powers began to develop plans for the invasion of Iran, Afghanistan, India.

It should be noted that the "Three Powers Pact" (Triple Pact) was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in a completely different environment than the "anti-Comintern Pact". It took shape by September 27, 1940 in the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe and was a real military-political union of the three countries.

The signatory states of the treaty declared that their goal was to "preserve lasting peace" by "giving every state the opportunity to take its place in the world" and "creating and maintaining a new order" in Europe and Greater East Asia. Articles 1 and 2 specified the geographic scope of the pact: in Europe, the "leading position" in the creation of the "new order" was recognized for Germany and Italy, in Greater East Asia - for Japan. In fact, these slogans turned out to be verbiage, and the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo bloc remained in the memory of mankind as a reminder of its fascist essence.

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Why didn't they shoot Zhukov? [In defense of the Marshal of Victory] Kozinkin Oleg Yurievich

The Tripartite (Berlin) Pact of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, or Why Stalin Couldn't Attack Hitler "Preemptively" and Why Hitler Declared War on the United States in December 41st

In examining the question of whether Stalin could or could not have attacked Hitler in the first summer of 1941, researchers and historians did not often analyze such a question in the problem - could the USSR be drawn into a war on two fronts in this case? What would we have to do with the same Japan if the USSR attacked Germany first?

Supporters and fans of Rezun declare in unison - yes, nothing would have happened. Japan would not have attacked the Soviet Far East in this case. Because Japan itself was going to fight in Southeast Asia and the USSR was not interested in it.

As they say, the clever ones got it ... And in order not to be unfounded, we will simply analyze the documents, treaties and agreements of the Axis countries and the USSR for June 1941, to which they obliged the countries that signed them, or did not oblige.

Let's start with the Mutual Assistance Treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan:

TRIPARTITE (Berlin) PACT

between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The parties agreed on the following: “The Government of the Great Japanese Empire, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy, recognizing as a preliminary and necessary condition for long-term peace the opportunity for each state to take its place in the world, consider as a basic principle the creation and maintenance of a new order necessary for the peoples in regions of Great East Asia and Europe could reap the fruits of coexistence and mutual prosperity of all interested nations, express their determination to cooperate mutually and take concerted action in these areas with respect to efforts based on these intentions.

The governments of the three powers, full of desire to cooperate with all states that make similar efforts throughout the world, are full of desire to demonstrate their unwavering will for world peace, for which the government of the Great Japanese Empire, the government of Germany and the government of Italy have concluded the following agreement.

Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leading position of Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe.

Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leading position in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate mutually on the basis of this course, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by any power which is not presently participating in the European war and in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance with all political, economic and military means at their disposal.

Article 4. For the purpose of implementing the present pact, a mixed commission appointed by the Government of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy shall be established without delay.

Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles in no way affect the current political course between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union.

Article 6. The present pact shall enter into force from the moment of its signing. The term of the pact is ten years from the date of entry into force. The contracting parties, at the request of one of the powers that have concluded the pact, will discuss the issue of revising the present treaty at any time before the expiration of this period.

The Berlin Pact of 1940, also known as the Three Powers Pact of 1940, or the Tripartite Pact, is an international treaty concluded on September 27, 1940 between the main countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact: Germany (represented by Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop), Italy ( represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano) and the Empire of Japan (represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Saburo Kurusu) for a period of 10 years.

This Pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the Axis countries when establishing a "new world order" and mutual military assistance in the event of an attack on one of the countries by a third party that was not participating at that time in the war. Germany and Italy were assigned a leading role in Europe, and the Empire of Japan - in Asia. The Berlin Pact was also joined by such "European countries" dependent on Germany - Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940) and Bulgaria (March 1, 1941). Also, this Pact was joined by such countries as Spain, Finland, Croatia in Europe and Asia - Manchukuo, Siam, Thailand, the government of Wang Qingwei in China.

And here is how V.M. Pact assessed this. Molotov:

“NOTE V.M. MOLOTOVA

"BERLIN PACT OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE"

September 27 in Berlin signed a pact on a military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. There is no need to expand on the content of this pact, since its text has been published in the press. The pact is not something particularly unexpected for the Soviet Union, but because it is, in fact, the formalization of the already established relations between Germany, Italy and Japan - on the one hand, England and the United States of America - on the other hand, and because the Soviet government was informed by the German government of the forthcoming conclusion of the tripartite pact even before its publication.

Turning to the question of the meaning of the pact, it should be noted first of all that it marks the entry into a new phase of the war, wider than before the conclusion of the pact. If until recently the war was limited to the sphere of Europe and North Africa - in the West and the sphere of China - in the East, and these two spheres were cut off from each other, now this isolation is being put to an end, because from now on Japan abandons the policy of non-interference in European affairs, and Germany and Italy, in turn, abandon the policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Far East. This undoubtedly means a further aggravation of the war and an expansion of its scope. Tov. Molotov was right when he said in his speech at the last session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that there was "a danger of further expansion and further kindling of the war, with its transformation into a worldwide imperialist war."

What caused the appearance of the pact, what stimulated it?

There is no doubt that it was stimulated above all by the latest facts in the area of ​​strengthening and expanding military cooperation between Britain and the United States of America. These include: ever-increasing US military aid to England; the transfer of British naval bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States of America; the unification of the military efforts of England, Canada and Australia with the United States of America and the inclusion of the South American countries in the US sphere of influence; Britain's consent to the transfer of its Far Eastern and Australian bases to the United States of America. Of course, the US has not yet formally entered the war on the side of England against Germany, Italy and Japan. But this is not so important, since the United States is in fact in the same general military camp with the military opponents of Germany, Italy and Japan in both hemispheres.

One of the important features of the pact is that it openly recognizes the spheres of influence of its participants and the division of these spheres between them with the obligation to mutually protect these spheres of influence from encroachments by other states and, of course, primarily by England and in cooperation with her United States of America. According to the pact, Japan is granted the "great East Asian space", and Germany and Italy - "Europe". Another question is whether the parties to the pact will be able to actually implement such a division of spheres of influence. Undoubtedly, the implementation of such a plan will depend on the actual correlation of forces between the belligerent countries, on the course and outcome of a real, increasingly escalating war.

Another important feature of the pact is the reservation it contains about the Soviet Union.

The pact states: "Germany, Italy and Japan declare that this agreement in no way affects the political status currently existing between each of the three parties to the agreement and the Soviet Union."

This reservation must be understood, first of all, as respect on the part of the participants in the pact for the position of neutrality that the Soviet Union has been pursuing since the first days of the war.

Faithful to its policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union can, for its part, confirm that this policy of its, inasmuch as it will depend on it, remains and will remain unchanged.”

That is, the Axis countries respect the position of the USSR, but as long as the USSR remains neutral and does not attack anyone. Well, the USSR in this article in Pravda confirmed that it wants to remain neutral in the world showdown between Germany and England with the United States.

For those who have not yet understood the essence of this pact and the situation around the USSR, it can be explained that the USSR did not participate in any war in September 1940 or June 1940. Not in Europe, not in Asia, and not with any of the signatories of the Berlin Pact. And thus, if the USSR attacks either Germany or Japan, then all participants in the Berlin Pact are obliged to attack the USSR! At least they have no reason not to attack to "help" an ally, and even more so at the request of a victim of Soviet aggression. And the same Japan can attack the USSR at any convenient moment.

In the same "WIKIPEDIA" it says this about the essence of the points of the pact, and Rezun's fans really like it:

“The Berlin Pact, according to Article 3, was originally anti-American; at the same time, Article 5 provided for a benevolent attitude towards the USSR. The pact also took into account the right of the contracting parties to have their own relations with the Soviet Union…”

Like, Japan would never have attacked the USSR, even if the USSR hit Hitler first. Well, let's look at these points again:

"Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles in no way affect the political course that currently exists between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union."

I don’t know what the one who entered his “opinion” in VIKI saw there, but this paragraph only says that at that time Stalin was powdering the brains of this company - putting forward unrealistic demands for supposedly joining their “Union”. What they really wanted, in principle, was to draw the USSR into an "Union" against England and the USA. Or at least that the USSR remains neutral. Stalin was playing for time with accession negotiations, and this item is just about that specific situation around the USSR.

But if the USSR attacked one of the participants in the "Union", then they wanted to give a damn about this point from the big bell tower ... This point does not oblige anyone to anything, if someone from the countries not participating in the war with the Axis countries does not attack one of the countries. And the question of who will attack whom first does not matter to the Axis participants! This equally applied to both the US and the USSR.

"The above articles in no way affect the current political course between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union."

Yes, the Axis countries flirted with the USSR-Stalin, wanting to see him, if not an ally against England and the USA, then at least neutral, but paragraph No. 3 refers to the above articles, which says: “if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power that is not currently participating in a European war, and. in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance with all the political, economic and by military means».

That is, if the USSR turns out to be an aggressor, then the Axis countries will have to forget their “benevolent” attitude towards the USSR ...

But the USSR in the spring of 41 again took everyone away - it concluded a treaty of neutrality with Japan, which made it possible to be sure that if the USSR became a victim of aggression from Germany (participants of the Berlin Pact), Japan would have its hands tied and it would not can attack the USSR. The Japanese prime minister was finally intoxicated at the station, he sang “The Noise of the Reeds” with Molotov, Stalin arrived at the station, kissed him again, and the drunk and happy Japanese was thrown into the car ... (Hitler was wildly offended by such a trick of Japan - the signing of a treaty THE USSR.)

See this agreement:

"TERM OF NEUTRALITY

BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND JAPAN

Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union

The Great Japanese Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between both countries, decided to conclude a neutrality pact and agreed as follows:

Article 1. Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between themselves and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

Article 2. In the event that one of the contracting parties becomes the object of hostilities on the part of one or more third powers, the other contracting party will remain neutral throughout the entire conflict.

Article 3. The present pact shall enter into force on the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and shall remain in force for five years. If neither of the contracting parties denounces the pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically renewed for another five years.

Article 4. The present pact shall be subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification should also take place in Tokyo as soon as possible.

Vyacheslav Molotov

Yusuke Matsuota

Yushitssugu Tatekawa"

The point that did not give Japan the opportunity to help Hitler in the event of his attack on the USSR, if the USSR was not an aggressor - paragraph 2. I hope there is no need to “translate” it into human language - and so everything is clear and intelligible. It is clear why Hitler was offended by Japan for this treaty? On this point, Japan could not attack the USSR if it was not the aggressor. And the USSR did not help the United States in the war with Japan. More precisely, the USSR did not consider itself obligated to help the United States while it was at war with Hitler. But since Japan formally became the aggressor in December of the 41st, having bombed Pearl Harbor, the USSR could violate neutrality with respect to Japan at any moment.

Also, this neutrality treaty with Japan did not allow the USSR to become an ally of the United States in the Pacific. And when Stalin began to buy planes from the United States (under Lend-Lease) and they decided to fly them under their own power through Alaska-Kamchatka-Siberia, then Stalin refused the proposal-request of the United States to drive planes by American pilots almost to the Urals. The Americans would not see any "military secrets" over the tundra and taiga, but Japan would have a chance to protest about this. After all, Japan is at war with the United States, but the USSR had to remain neutral and not help America. As a result, American planes were driven from Kamchatka by our pilots, and American planes, who made emergency landings in Primorye after the bombing of Japan, were interned in the USSR and kept on the territory of the USSR until the end of the war.

Do you think the Americans offered their pilots to fly over our taiga out of "altruism"?! Right now! Already in the winter of 1941/42, the United States was making requests - would Stalin be able to strike Japan in order to help the United States? The answer was something like this: if we finish with Hitler, we will help. But if Stalin agreed that the Americans themselves would drive those planes, then there would be a chance to drag the USSR into a war with Japan ...

Having concluded a neutrality treaty with Japan, Stalin covered his back in case Hitler attacked first. But this neutrality pact with Japan would not play a role if the USSR attacked Germany first - Japan, bound by an earlier pact with Berlin and "allied duty", still has the right to attack the USSR to help its ally Hitler. But if the USSR is not an aggressor, but a victim, then Japan decides for itself whether to help Hitler or not. Japan did not help Hitler.

To this, on one of the forums, the doubter objected:

“As for your example with the signing of a neutrality treaty with Japan, I did not understand. This fact is in my favor. Why would Stalin need this treaty if he wanted to be a "victim of aggression"? If Stalin is a "victim", then Japan will not attack anyway. But Stalin concludes such an agreement, and even defiantly escorts the Japanese ambassador. And it turns out in the end that if Stalin attacks Hitler, then Japan will watch from afar. Is not it?" (Did you understand what the “rezun” asked? I didn’t.)

I will have to explain once again the tricks of international relations (although I hope the experts will not criticize me too much for this).

Japan has a mutual assistance pact with Hitler if he is attacked. And it will be higher for Japan than the agreement with the USSR on neutrality, if the USSR turns out to be an aggressor! The USSR does not attack first, Japan has the moral right not to attack the USSR, and this is backed up by a neutrality treaty with the USSR.

But if you can’t, but really want to, then you can. If Japan had wanted to, then, of course, it would have attacked the USSR, violating international treaties. In case of need, Japan would have figured out how to attack Russia, not even the aggressor. Like, these Russians are completely “fucked up”! Not only did they want to attack poor Hitler treacherously, but he, thank the gods, managed to strike first, they also bully us, arrange provocations at the border and fire at our Japanese border guards in China and Korea ... Or, like, they want to take away our concessions on Sakhalin . But Japan didn't go for it. She preferred to comply with the treaties regarding the USSR. Well, Stalin did everything possible for Japan to start a campaign south in the summer and autumn of the 41st, to the British colonies. After that, Japan was no longer up to the USSR. Although before Stalingrad, or rather, after the pogrom of the Red Army near Kharkov, Japan tried to appear a certain itch and a desire to attack ...

(Note: By the way, these joint companies (concessions) for the extraction of oil and coal pumped oil with Sakhalin coal almost until the summer of 1945. At the same time, no one has ever dared to reproach the USSR-Stalin for these concessions in all these years. Indeed, in this case, the USSR and Japan are neutral in this World War, and the supply of oil and coal to Japan is nothing more than a business. In the same way, no one reproaches Sweden for the fact that she, "neutral", sold ore to Hitler. And who would dare to reproach Stalin and the USSR, if the same United States, through the front companies of the "Honduras", drove oil to Hitler almost until the spring of 1945. And by the way, these "concessions" Stalin also used to maintain peace with Japan. When Hitler tried to draw the USSR into the "Triple Alliance", then one of the conditions for joining Stalin put forward the demand - to "nationalize" these concessions in favor of the USSR.

Like the rest of Stalin's "proposals" to "join" this union, they were obviously unacceptable to the participants in the "Berlin Pact". Stalin understood this and put forward these demands precisely so that the USSR would not be accepted into the union. Here is what Halder wrote in his official diary on December 3, 1940:

Well. Our proposals to Molotov: We offer one open contract and two secret agreements for a period of ten years. Russians agree to join Tripartite Pact if five secret protocols are signed:

1. Regarding Finland, with which they want to come to an agreement without the use of force.

2. Regarding Bulgaria, which should conclude a mutual assistance pact with Russia (in this case, Bulgaria can join the Tripartite Pact).

3. On the lease of strongholds on the Bosphorus.

4. Concerning Turkey, which should be required to join the Tripartite Pact; in case of consent - a guarantee of its borders. If a refusal follows, then "diplomatic and military pressure from Germany, Italy and Russia." Japan must give up its concessions on Sakhalin.

5. Regarding the Russian sphere of influence south of the Batumi-Baku line. We have not yet responded to these proposals.”

Stalin's "proposals" were not accepted, the concessions were preserved, Japan did not attack the USSR ...)

An additional neutrality treaty with Japan gave the USSR a strengthened and fixed guarantee that Japan would not risk attacking even if Hitler began to beg her. That is, this treaty of neutrality tied the hands of Japan more tightly and gave an extra decent guarantee against a war in the Far East. After all, the USSR, having signed neutrality, must observe it. And this made it possible for Japan to aim south, being sure that the USSR would not attack them until they began to drive the British and other French-Dutch people there, taking away their colonies. And by the way, the USSR did everything possible to push Japan into Southeast Asia. This is politics...

But if, having a neutrality treaty with Japan, the USSR nevertheless attacks itself first, then Japan's hands will be untied. And the neutrality between the USSR and Japan is canceled due to the fact that the USSR is the aggressor, and Japan has an agreement on assistance with Hitler.

In short, it will be bad for the USSR in any way if it is an aggressor. In the event of an attack by the USSR on Germany, Japan at any convenient moment will “forget” about neutrality at its own discretion, as the USSR quite legally rejected it in 1945, by the way, when the faithful allied debt, etc. “blah blah” The USSR officially struck at the Japanese army, warning Japan about the denunciation of neutrality for several months, and then beautifully declaring war. But in the 41st it would be the opposite.

Stalin, in principle, himself "tied" the USSR with this treaty with Japan, because now the USSR could not attack Germany first. But Stalin was a smart politician...

Japanese diplomats signed a neutrality treaty with the USSR on April 13, 1941. However, they did it on their way back from Berlin, where they arrived in March… via Moscow. The thing is that it was the second part of the negotiations between Japan and the USSR. In mid-March, Japan's minister of foreign affairs arrived in Moscow for talks at which he began to demand that northern Sakhalin be sold to Japan. After that, all the island's oil would go to Japan. It was a sounding, a test of Stalin's strength. Stalin showed firmness, the Japanese left for Berlin, and upon their return they signed a neutrality treaty with the USSR.

Stalin was, of course, pleased with such an agreement, which gave additional legal protection against a possible attack by Japan in the event of Hitler's aggression. After all, by signing the neutrality pact, Stalin greatly reduced the likelihood of a war on two fronts simultaneously against Germany and Japan. Immediately after this, the formation of the reserve of the High Command began, and at the end of April the General Staff gave the command to advance the first divisions from the ZabOVO and the Far East to the western borders.

And immediately after the departure of the Japanese, Stalin ordered L. Beria to prepare Operation Snow to draw the United States into the war with Japan, after which Japan would not care about the USSR, no matter how Hitler begged the Japanese to strike at our Far East.

That is why it is worth remembering how Hitler declared war on the United States on December 7-8, 1941, seemingly out of the blue. Immediately after the Japanese air raid on the morning of December 7, 1941 on the US naval base Pearl Harbor occupied by the central base of the Pacific Fleet of the US Navy).

In this regard, at one of the historical forums, I asked the following question to lovers and “experts” in history: “Why did Hitler declare war on the United States these days? You can catch the connection - why did he do it? Why would Hitler declare war on the United States, which, apart from problems for him personally and Germany, which is at war in Russia at that time, will not give anything for sure?

The answer "experts" gave something like this: "Because the United States acted as a non-belligerent ally of England and the USSR," and also "to sink American ships going to help England."

On the one hand, it seems to be true - the United States at that time seemed to be an "ally" of the USSR. But rather “moral”, because the US signed an agreement on paper with the USSR only in the spring of 1942! The United States is indeed an ally of England, but this is not the most important reason.

The decision to declare war on the United States, Hitler announced, in fact, not because of this. These days, he has already begun to get in the teeth in the Battle of Moscow. It became clear to him that without the help of Japan he would not defeat the USSR-Russia and definitely would not take Moscow, but Japan did everything in its power to fight off Hitler's invitation to take part in the war with the USSR and strike at the Far East. After all, she had already got involved in a war with England on the islands of Southeast Asia. And the same "p. 2" of the treaty on the neutrality of the hands tied.

Hitler, who in June and before that himself pushed the Japanese in every possible way towards the British colonies to the south (the same English Singapore), so that in the event of a victory over the USSR not to share “trophies”, by the winter of 41, any help from Japan was needed. Even if Japan does not strike with all its might, but if protracted border battles with the Red Army begin on the border, then Stalin will not be able to transfer divisions from the East. After all, at that time the USSR had a “common border” with Japan in the same China, well, it was very large, and Stalin kept up to 40 divisions there to cover this border.

So what did Hitler achieve by this declaration of war on the United States in this case? And the calculation was simple, and it was connected precisely with the Berlin Pact of September 1940. After all, according to it, the Axis countries were supposed to help with military assistance, including to those who were attacked by a third country that was not participating in the war at that moment. The United States did not formally attack Japan. But Hitler thus made a "goodwill gesture" to Japan.

On the one hand, Japan launched its strike against Hawaii in response to US provocations in the form of refusal to fulfill agreements on oil supplies to Japan. And called the "aggressor" is the United States. And Hitler, with his declaration of war on the United States, seemed to admit that Japan was "a victim of aggression." After all, "formally" what the United States did to supply oil (scrap metal?) to Japan, violating long-term trade contracts for large sums, can also be regarded as aggression on the part of the United States. And on the other hand, Hitler thus showed Japan - they say, I went to some violation of the Berlin Pact, so why don't you go to the same "violations" and declare war on the USSR !? Moreover, in this case it is really not at all necessary to start large-scale hostilities on the border with the USSR and try to chop off Primorye or the whole of Sakhalin or Siberia. The mere fact of declaring war on the USSR will force Stalin to keep large forces on these borders and not to transfer them to Moscow! Hitler did not have enough of those 20 divisions of the Wehrmacht that the partisans of Yugoslavia pulled over to take Moscow, and Stalin did not have enough of those divisions that he eventually sent from the Far East and Siberia to defeat and push the Germans away from Moscow.

And here it turned out that Japan had already gotten involved in the war in Southeast Asia by this time and the USSR was no longer interested in it - it itself did not need a war on two fronts.

Japan launched a one-time attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Japan, and Hitler, as befits an ally, declared war on the United States, making it clear to Japan that he considered her "a victim of American aggression." Hoping that now Japan will also screw up its neutrality treaty with the USSR and start fighting in the Far East. But Japan was smart enough not to fuck around.

However, opponents are trying to refute this: “The Japanese considered the option of attacking the USSR. And it was not the presence of an agreement with the USSR on neutrality that stopped them, but the lack of raw materials for industry.”

But in fact, she had enough troops in northern China to pull back significant forces of the USSR to help Hitler take the same Moscow or Stalingrad, which is even worse, but she was smart enough not to climb. Who said that, having started hostilities in the Far East, Japan had to shove to the Urals? It would only be necessary for her to divert sufficient forces of the Red Army on the border by “local battles”, which in the end would not have gone to the West, and Hitler would have finished off the USSR by the summer of 42 for sure. Japan would have had enough strength for this. Count how many forces were transferred from the Far Eastern Military District “near Moscow”, and estimate what would have happened if they were not there ... Would Churchill be asked to send soldiers? But Japan in this situation simply did not want to fight on two fronts - in the winter of the 41st, she already received one ...

But there is another aspect: why Stalin also needed the “image of a victim of aggression” for the USSR in the war with Hitler. And we'll talk about it in the next chapter.

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MYTH FIRST. “Stalin and Hitler sympathized with each other. By signing a pact between the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939, Stalin thereby gave Hitler a free hand to start the Second World War. Therefore, Stalin is to blame for everything just like Hitler, or even more "First - about" sympathies "

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MYTH FOUR. “Hitler’s attack on the USSR turned out to be “sudden”, because Stalin did not believe the intelligence reports. For example, Richard Sorge and many other intelligence officers reported the exact date of the start of the war long before the German attack, but Stalin ignored all the messages.

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Axis Berlin-Rome

Axis Berlin-Rome

"Axis Berlin ≈ Rome”, a military-political alliance of fascist Germany and Italy, formalized by the Berlin Agreement of October 25, 1936. The creation of the “axis” testified to the open preparation of the fascist states for unleashing World War II (1939-45). Continuation of the agreement "O. B.≈R.” was signed November 25, 1936 by Germany and Japan "Anti-Comintern Pact", which was joined on November 6, 1937 Italy.

Munich agreement

From the spring of 1938, the Nazis launched a campaign of unprecedented blackmail and provocation against Czechoslovakia, demanding the transfer of the original Czech lands to Germany. In the governmental spheres of the Western countries were deeply indifferent to the fate of the Slavic country. The ambassador of Czechoslovakia in London said at the time: “Once during a conversation with several prominent figures, when I showed them a map of Czechoslovakia, I got the impression that they were seeing it for the first time. Indeed, looking thoughtfully at the map, they said: “Oh! It's curious! What a fun shape! You might think that you have a big sausage in front of you! In Berlin, Goering inspired the French ambassador: “Do you see the contours of Czechoslovakia on this map? Isn't this a challenge to common sense? This is the appendix, the vestigial organ of Europe. It will need to be removed." The ruling circles of the West “went open with the Nazis, they decided to betray Czechoslovakia in the interests of unleashing a war between Germany and the USSR. Under these conditions, only aid from the East could save Czechoslovakia. But the Czech bourgeoisie committed an unheard-of national betrayal: on December 16, 1937, President Benes assured the German envoy in Prague that the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR was “a product of a bygone era, but it cannot be so easily thrown into the trash.”

Meanwhile, the Soviet government during this critical period for Czechoslovakia firmly declared its readiness to come to its aid. From March 1938, this was repeatedly brought to the attention of Prague, as well as Paris. And the British and French governments strongly recommended that Czechoslovakia capitulate. All international reaction did not want a war in defense of Czechoslovakia, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably take part. According to N. Chamberlain's trusted adviser, G. Wilson, “only Bolshevism would profit from this. This should be prevented. It is necessary to recognize the right of the Germans to expand to the South-East. The American ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, intimidated that in the event of a "general fire" Russia would be reborn "like a phoenix from our ashes" in order to carry out a "world revolution." Daladier explained to the German chargé d'affaires: "At the end of the war, regardless of who is the winner and who is the vanquished, a revolution will inevitably begin in France, as well as in Germany and Italy." In other words, the rulers of the capitalist world understood that a war in defense of Czechoslovakia would lead to the collapse of fascism and the inevitable growth of democratic forces. The Francoists in Spain followed the events connected with Czechoslovakia with the deepest anxiety: they understood that if an anti-Hitler front appeared, the defeat of Franco was inevitable.

The High Command of the German Armed Forces presented Hitler with an assessment of Germany's military capabilities: the war against Czechoslovakia would last at least three months. It cannot be expected that the conflict will remain localized. Only by 1943 will Germany be able to wage war against the Western powers with a reasonable chance of success. Some generals were even ready to take drastic measures: arrest Nazi leaders and create a military government. At the Nuremberg trials, Keitel was asked the question: "Would Germany have attacked Czechoslovakia in 1938 if the Western powers had supported Prague?"

The answer was: “Of course not. We were not strong enough from a military point of view. The goal of Munich (i.e. reaching an agreement in Munich) was to push Russia out of Europe, buy time and complete the armament of Germany.

September 29 - 30, 1938 in Munich, a meeting of the heads of government of England, France, Germany and Italy, convened with the active support of the United States, was held. Representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR were excluded from participation in the meeting. It decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. Within ten days, the Sudetenland was transferred to Germany, and in the near future some areas were captured by Pan Poland and Horthy Hungary. Regions of 41 thousand square meters were torn away from Czechoslovakia. km with a population of 4.9 million people, the rest of Czechoslovakia was a country with a territory of 99 thousand square meters. km and a population of about 10 million people. On the lands seized from Czechoslovakia, there was a large part of the heavy and mining industry of Czechoslovakia. There were also extensive, expensive fortifications created to protect against Germany. The Nazis celebrated a new victory. At the same time, an Anglo-German declaration was signed in Munich on September 30: the parties declared that from now on they would never fight each other. On December 6, 1938, an agreement similar in spirit was signed with Hitler by France. These documents were essentially non-aggression pacts between England and France, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. Summing up, the ardent Munichian, the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, wrote to British Foreign Secretary Halifax: "By preserving the peace, we have saved Hitler and his regime."

In the spring of 1939, the alignment of forces on the European continent in the event of a war took on a clear outline. Two Western European countries, Great Britain and France, and their allies represented by the small states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe opposed the two totalitarian dictatorships that constituted the Rome-Berlin axis. Of the great powers, only the Soviet Union had no clear political and military obligations. The opposing coalitions, of course, tried to enlist the help of the USSR. In addition, Eastern Europe turned out to be a zone of conflict of interests: Poland had become the object of Germany's aggressive claims by this time; Romania also felt threatened. Hitler, who during the summer of 1939 sought to place Poland in a position of international isolation, needed to secure at least the neutrality of the Soviet Union in order to carry out the planned Weiss plan - aggression against Poland. The help of the Soviet state was also important for Western countries to strengthen the anti-German front. In this regard, the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in August 1939 seems to be an indisputable diplomatic success for Germany. Leaving aside the reasons for the Soviet "appeasement" of Nazi Germany "in the Stalinist way", consider the position of Great Britain during the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a tripartite defensive alliance. An analysis of the foreign policy of the British government in this dramatic period of pre-war history is important for understanding the reasons for the failure of the attempt to create a united anti-Hitler front in 1939.

British policy during this period was determined almost entirely by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, consisting of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary Lord Edward Halifax, Minister for Security Coordination Lord Chatfield, Home Secretary Samuel Hoare and Minister Finance John Simon. The published papers of the British Cabinet, together with a whole series of private letters from N. Chamberlain, show that he was not at all eager to win over Soviet Russia to the side of the Western powers, thereby contributing to the split of Europe into two opposing blocs. It is quite clear that he did not trust the Russians, did not believe in their combat value, wanted to drag out negotiations and not conclude agreements with a country that would have to be helped. In a letter to his sister dated March 26, 1939, N. Chamberlain wrote, explaining his attitude to a possible union with the USSR: “I must admit that I have a deep distrust of Russia. I do not in any way believe in her ability to carry out an effective offensive, even if she wants to take such a step. And I do not trust her motives, which, it seems to me, have little to do with our ideas of freedom ... Moreover, Russia is hated and suspected by most of the small states, especially Poland, Romania and Finland. In July, he again wrote that the cabinet was very nervous about the failure of the negotiations, which had to be carried out very carefully. The Prime Minister remained highly skeptical about the value of Soviet aid to Western countries. So, on July 15, when it seemed that the negotiations were about to be crowned with success, N. Chamberlain noted that he would not "consider this as a triumph" in view of the small military power of Russia. Instead of an agreement with her, he would like to have "a lot more time left" while the negotiations last.

E. Halifax, S. Hoare and other members of the British government had a different point of view, and, despite the negative attitude of the Prime Minister, the government committee on foreign policy as a whole took the negotiations seriously. These conservative politicians, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom N. Chamberlain always recognized as the "brain of the Cabinet" and who enjoyed enormous influence in determining the foreign policy line, were ready to go right up to the conclusion of the treaty, not forgetting for a minute that Great Britain is in quite a predicament, providing guarantees for the independence of Poland. Under the influence of their argumentation, as well as experiencing increasing pressure from the press and the parliamentary opposition, demanding retaliatory measures against Hitler's aggressive actions in Europe, N. Chamberlain was forced to officially acknowledge the collapse of the "appeasement" policy and proclaimed a radical change in the British foreign policy. "We are not going to sit back and watch the independence of one country after another be destroyed with impunity," the British Prime Minister declared on May 11, 1939, in his Albert Hall speech.

According to W. Strang, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office in 1937-1939, who played a prominent role during the Moscow negotiations in 1939, “N. Chamberlain, having survived one Munich, could not put the English public in the face of another. Having left Czechoslovakia, he could not leave Poland ... ". The Prime Minister himself described in his parliamentary speech the agreement to guarantee Poland as "a new moment ... a new era in the conduct of our foreign policy", saying quite figuratively that "this decision will be a whole chapter in the history books, if one day the time comes write them." The British conservatives, for whom, since the time of Munich, “the urgent need for a massive armaments program has been the strongest impression”, found themselves in time trouble, were forced to overcome their distrust and hostility towards the Soviet state and try to negotiate with it on the creation of a front of peace-loving states that oppose aggression.

Joint Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations began in April 1939, following a Soviet proposal to convene a six-power conference and a British counterproposal to sign a four-power declaration that involved consultations between Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Poland in the event of aggression against them. These proposals were not implemented due to Poland's refusal to take part in them. The goals of British foreign policy at that time were formulated in the following memorandum by the Foreign Office: “Our goal since the guarantee of Polish independence has been to form a front of peace with the participation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Romania, Poland, Greece and Turkey. In this combination, Poland occupies a key position and her position will become perilous in the event of a hostile or even neutral position of the Soviet Union. In case of war, the only way of communication with Poland will remain - through Russian territory. Thus, we need to enlist at least the friendly neutrality of the Soviet Union, and better, the possible help of Poland and Romania in the event of an attack against them.

April 17 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov came up with a proposal to conclude a tripartite mutual assistance pact between Great Britain, France and the USSR, which was to be backed up by a military convention. Assistance was also provided to the states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. This proposal was sent to both governments and went much further than their original plans. British Ambassador to Moscow W. Seeds, according to instructions received on April 14, was to make a much more modest offer: the Soviet government was expected to publish a declaration promising assistance to the USSR's European neighbors if they agreed. In other words, Britain pressed the Soviet Union to provide guarantees to Poland and Rumania, along the lines of the obligations undertaken by her and France. The French, for their part, went further, proposing to revive the Soviet-French treaty of 1935, adding to it guarantees of mutual assistance.

Considering the Soviet initiatives, the government committee on foreign policy and the British cabinet as a whole decided to adhere to their demand for the adoption of the Soviet declaration and rejected the proposals of M.M. Litvinov and a compromise plan presented by the French government, which agreed to limit Soviet obligations under the pact. The French did not consider it possible to insist on its adoption, knowing that both N. Chamberlain and E. Halifax seriously feared the difficulties that might arise on the question of Poland. N. Chamberlain even declared among conservative figures especially close to him that "he would rather resign than sign an agreement with the Soviets."

Before the British government confirmed its decision, an inquiry was sent to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (TSNTTT) about the state of the Soviet armed forces. The TSNTTT memorandum, although noting the negative effects of the purges, the inefficiency of the Soviet war economy, and the deplorable state of communications, nevertheless concluded that the participation of the Soviet Union in the war on the side of the Western countries would bring them some benefit. In general, Soviet military power was estimated at an average level. In addition, it was emphasized that the Soviet Union would not be able to provide significant military assistance to Poland and Romania. In the event of the defeat of these countries, the Soviet armed forces will be able to tie up a certain number of German troops.

At the beginning of May 1939, M.M. Litvinov, known for his desire to achieve a significant result in negotiations with Western democracies, was replaced as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs by V.M. Molotov, whose uncompromising and firm manner of negotiating reminded E. Halifax of "smiling granite". He was handed the answer of the British. The answer contained a certain concession to the Soviet side, which did not want to bind itself with obligations in relation to Poland and Romania without the reciprocal obligations of England and France in relation to the Soviet borders with the Baltic countries and Finland: now Russia should not take active actions until its western the allies will not go to war in accordance with their common obligations. In determining the foreign policy steps of their government, conservative leaders did not attach much importance to rumors about a possible Soviet-German rapprochement. E. Halifax and Forinoffis generally relied on the assurances of V.M. Molotov about the immutability of the Soviet foreign policy line, taking as an encouraging sign his promise to consider the proposal for a Soviet declaration, as well as the energetic statement of Marshal K.E. Voroshilov to the British military attache on the need for close cooperation against German aggression.

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

About the source

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is the name of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, rooted in socio-political and historical literature, especially its secret appendix, signed by V. M. Molotov and I. Ribbentrop on behalf of their governments and states. The existence of a secret protocol was denied by the Soviet side for a long time, and only in the late 1980s. this fact was recognized and became the property of the world community.

By the time the pact was signed, Germany had annexed the Sudetenland, incorporated Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The Moscow negotiations between the USSR, England and France, which ended with the adoption of a draft agreement on mutual assistance on August 2, 1939, were supposed to ensure international security and combat German aggression, but the project never became a real agreement, since neither side showed interest often putting forward obviously unacceptable conditions. Thus, at the negotiations of the military missions of these powers on the organization of joint defense against aggression in Europe, the Soviet side set as the main condition the passage of the Red Army through the territory of Poland or Romania in case they were attacked by the aggressor, knowing in advance that neither Poland nor Romania would ever would not agree at that time to “deal with the Soviets” (Yu. Beck), especially since this issue was not discussed at all with either the Polish or the Romanian governments.

The decision to stop negotiations with England and France and conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany was made by Stalin and Molotov. Both parties had different goals in concluding this treaty. Hitler was feverishly preparing an attack on Poland and believed that this treaty would exclude Germany from the threat of a war on two fronts in Europe, since Stalin, according to his calculations, was interested in seizing the territories of the former Russian Empire and would seek to obtain such an opportunity through a treaty with Germany. Stalin viewed the treaty as a chance to carry out his aggressive intentions, avoiding an armed conflict, and an opportunity to prepare for military operations that would inevitably have to come.

On August 20, 1939, Hitler, who had already scheduled the attack on Poland on September 1, sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he insisted on the speedy conclusion of the treaty and asked that the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs be received no later than August 23 to sign both the non-aggression pact and the additional protocol. According to the agreement signed on August 23, 1939, the parties undertook to resolve all disputes and conflicts among themselves "only by peaceful means through a friendly exchange of views." The second article of the treaty stated that "in the event that one of the contracting parties becomes the object of hostilities on the part of a third power, the other contracting party will not support this power in any form." In other words, the USSR will not help the possible victims of the Nazi Reich's aggression.

The treaty had a "secret additional protocol" on the delimitation of "spheres of influence" in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. It was envisaged that in the event of a war between Germany and Poland, German troops could advance to the so-called "Curzon Line", the rest of Poland, as well as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia were recognized as the "sphere of influence" of the USSR. The fate of Poland will be decided "by way of friendly mutual agreement." The agreement was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a week after its signing, and the existence of a "secret additional protocol" was hidden from the deputies. The day after the treaty was ratified on September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. The USSR, in accordance with the agreements, was also supposed to send its troops to Poland, but Molotov asked for a slight delay, telling the German ambassador to the USSR V. Schulenburg that due to the fact that Poland was falling apart, the Soviet Union should come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians, who "threatens" Germany, which allowed the Soviet Union not to look like an aggressor.

On September 17, 1939, units of the Red Army crossed the Polish border, and thus the USSR essentially entered World War II in 1939, and not in 1941, as Stalin always emphasized. Poland ceased to exist as a state. Contrary to the norms of international law, the results of its defeat were enshrined in a new treaty "on friendship and borders" signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop on September 28, 1939. The treaty isolated the USSR from the forces fighting against fascism. Any anti-fascist propaganda was banned on the territory of the USSR. Germany and the USSR had a common border, and the question of an attack by one of the partners in the treaty on the other became a matter of time. Since the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR on June 22, 1941, the treaty has lost all force.

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