Brest peace definition. Brest peace and its consequences

100 years ago, on March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk, documenting the loss of Russia's territory, where a third of its population lived. Since the time of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, Russia has not experienced catastrophes comparable in scale. Our country managed to surpass the territorial losses dictated by the enemy in Brest only at the end of the 20th century. During negotiations in Brest-LitovskThe peace of Brest-Litovsk was not a surprise: Russia was doomed to catastrophe by the events that exactly a year preceded Brest - the betrayal of the highest military leaders who forced the holy Emperor Nicholas II to abdicate, which at that ill-fated time became an occasion for all-class rejoicing. With the fall of the autocracy, the process of decomposition of the army inevitably began, and the country lost the ability to defend itself.

And so, when the anemic Provisional Government fell and the Bolsheviks seized power, on October 26 (November 8) the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets issued a "Decree on Peace" with a proposal addressed to all the belligerent states to conclude a truce and start peace negotiations without annexations and indemnities. On November 8 (21), the Council of People's Commissars sent a telegram to I. about. the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army, General N. N. Dukhonin, with the order to enter into negotiations with the command of the enemy troops on a truce. The next day, the Commander-in-Chief had a telephone conversation with V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and a member of the Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs N.V. Krylenko on the same topic. Dukhonin refused the demand to immediately start negotiations, citing the fact that the headquarters could not conduct such negotiations that were within the competence of the central government, after which it was announced to him that he was resigning from his post and. about. Commander-in-Chief and that Ensign Krylenko is appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief, but he, Dukhonin, must continue to fulfill his former duties until the new Commander-in-Chief arrives at headquarters.

N. V. Krylenko arrived in Mogilev, at headquarters, with a retinue and an armed detachment on November 20 (December 3). The day before, General Dukhonin ordered the release of generals L. G. Kornilov, A. I. Denikin, A. S. Lukomsky and their accomplices, arrested by order of A. F. Kerensky, from the Bykhov prison located near the headquarters of the Bykhov prison. Krylenko announced to Dukhonin that he would be delivered to Petrograd, at the disposal of the government, after which the general was taken to the carriage of the new commander-in-chief. But after the release of the Bykhov prisoners, a rumor spread among the soldiers guarding the headquarters that L. G. Kornilov was already leading a regiment loyal to him to Mogilev in order to seize the headquarters and continue the war. Spurred on by provocative rumors, the brutalized soldiers burst into Krylenko’s car, took out his predecessor, while Krylenko himself either tried or did not try to interfere with them, and committed brutal reprisals against his yesterday’s commander-in-chief: first they shot him, and then finished him off with his bayonets - the mere suspicion that attempts were being made to keep the army from collapsing and continue the war infuriated the soldiers. Krylenko reported the massacre of Dukhonin to Trotsky, who found it inexpedient to initiate an investigation into this incident so as not to irritate the revolutionary soldiers and sailors.

11 days before the assassination of General Dukhonin, on November 9 (22), V. I. Lenin, catering to the "pacifist" moods of the front masses, sent a telegram to the troops: truce with the enemy. It was an unprecedented case in the history of diplomacy - it was proposed to negotiate a peace treaty as an amateur soldier. A parallel with this action was only the order of another leader of the revolution - L. D. Trotsky - to publish secret treaties and secret diplomatic correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to compromise both the Russian and other governments in the eyes of the public - Russian and foreign.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by Trotsky, sent a note to the embassies of neutral countries proposing mediation in peace negotiations. In response, the embassies of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland only informed about the receipt of the note, and the Spanish ambassador informed the Soviet People's Commissariat of the transfer of the note to Madrid. The proposal to start negotiations on the conclusion of peace was all the more ignored by the governments of the Entente countries allied with Russia, who firmly counted on victory and had already previously divided the skin of the beast they were going to finish off, it seems, anticipating the sharing of the skin of the bear that was allied to them yesterday. Naturally, a positive response to the proposal to start peace talks came only from Berlin and Germany's allies or satellites. The corresponding telegram arrived in Petrograd on 14 (27) November. On the same day, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars telegraphed the governments of the Entente countries - France, Great Britain, Italy, the USA, Japan, China, Belgium, Serbia and Romania - about the start of negotiations, offering to join them. Otherwise, the corresponding note said, "we will negotiate with the Germans alone." There was no reply to this note.

The first phase of negotiations in Brest

Separate negotiations began on the day of the assassination of General N. N. Dukhonin. A Soviet delegation headed by A. A. Ioffe arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where the headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located. It included L. B. Kamenev, the most influential political figure among the participants in the negotiations, as well as G. Ya. Sokolnikov, the Left Social Revolutionaries A. A. Bitsenko and S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky and, as consultants, representatives of the army: Quartermaster General under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General V. E. Skalon, Generals Yu. M. Karakhan, who was responsible for translators and technical staff. The original feature in the formation of this delegation was that it included representatives of the lower ranks - soldiers and sailors, as well as the peasant R. I. Stashkov and the worker P. A. Obukhov. Delegations of Germany's allies were already in Brest-Litovsk: Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. The German delegation was headed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R. von Kuhlmann; Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs Count O. Chernin; Bulgaria - Minister of Justice Popov; Turkey - Grand Vizier Talaat Bey.

At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet side proposed to conclude a truce for 6 months, so that hostilities would be suspended on all fronts, German troops would be withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands, and so that the German command, taking advantage of the truce, would not transfer troops to the Western Front. These proposals were rejected. As a result of the negotiations, they agreed to conclude a truce for a short period, from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17), with the possibility of its extension; during this period, the troops of the opposing sides had to remain in their positions, so there was no longer any talk of leaving Riga by the Germans, and as for the ban on the transfer of troops to the Western Front, Germany agreed to stop only those transfers that had not yet been started . In view of the collapse of the Russian army, this transfer was already underway, and the Soviet side did not have the means to control the movement of enemy units and formations.

A truce was declared and put into effect. During ongoing negotiations, the parties agreed to extend it for 28 days, starting from 4 (17) December. Negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty were tentatively decided to be held in the capital of a neutral country - in Stockholm. But on December 5 (18), Trotsky reported to Commander-in-Chief Krylenko: “Lenin defends the following plan: during the first two or three days of negotiations, fix the annexationist claims of the German imperialists on paper as clearly and sharply as possible and break off the negotiations on this for a week and resume them either on Russian soil in Pskov, or in a hut in no man's land between the trenches. I join this opinion. There is no need to travel to a neutral country.” Through Commander-in-Chief Krylenko, Trotsky gave instructions to the head of the delegation, A. A. Ioffe: “The most convenient thing would be not to transfer the negotiations to Stockholm at all. This would alienate the delegation very much from the local base and would make relations extremely difficult, especially in view of the policy of the Finnish bourgeoisie. Germany did not object to the continuation of negotiations on the territory of its headquarters in Brest.

The arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk The resumption of negotiations was, however, postponed due to the fact that upon the return of the delegation to Brest on November 29 (December 12), during a private meeting of the Russian delegation, the chief military consultant, Major General V. E. Skalon, a descendant of the great mathematician Euler, committed suicide. According to the characterization of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, the brother of a Bolshevik, who then held the position of the manager of the Council of People's Commissars, “Skalon, an officer of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky Regiment, was known at headquarters as an ardent monarchist. But he worked in the intelligence department, was a serious and well-versed officer, and from this point of view he had an impeccable reputation. In addition ... his irreconcilable attitude towards everything that was even a little bit to the left of the absolute monarchy should have made him treat the negotiations with particular acuteness ... - to inform the headquarters in detail and carefully about the progress of the negotiations.

General Scalon, being an extreme monarchist in his views, continued to serve in the General Staff when it submitted to the Council of People's Commissars. A characteristic and typical detail of that era: liberal generals, supporters of a constitutional monarchy or a direct republic, like the Bykhov prisoners, then considered it their duty to remain loyal to the allies who contributed to the overthrow of the tsarist government, therefore the white struggle, which they led, was guided by the help of the Entente, in while successive monarchists from military circles, unwilling to attach importance to the differences in political concepts of the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, subsequently either avoided participation in the Civil War or continued to serve in the army that became Red, in the hope that Lenin and Trotsky , for all their commitment to utopian projects, the hand will be stronger than that of worthless temporary ministers, and that they will create a regime in which it will be possible to restore controllability of the armed forces, or the monarchist-minded generals fought with the Reds, relying on the support not of the Entente, but of the occupying German authorities like P.N Krasnov.

Arrival of the Russian Delegation General VE Skalon, having agreed to the role of a consultant to the Soviet delegation, could not stand this role to the end and shot himself. Various opinions were expressed about the reasons for his suicide, the most convincing are the words spoken by a member of the German delegation, General Hoffmann, with which he addressed General Samoilo, who replaced Skalon: “Ah! So, you have been appointed to replace poor Skalon, whom your Bolsheviks left! Could not bear, poor fellow, the shame of his country! Brace yourself too!” This arrogant tirade is not contradicted by the version from the memoirs of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who believed that Skalon committed suicide, struck by the arrogant demands and arrogance of the German generals. General Skalon was buried at St. Nicholas Garrison Cathedral in Brest. The German command ordered to put up a guard of honor at the burial and fire a volley befitting a military leader. The funeral speech was delivered by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who arrived at the opening of the second phase of the negotiations.

In the course of the renewed negotiations, the Soviet delegation insisted on the conclusion of peace "without annexations and indemnities." The representatives of Germany and its allies agreed with this formula, but on a condition that made its implementation impossible - if the Entente countries were ready to accept such a peace, and they just waged war for the sake of annexations and indemnities and at the end of 1917 firmly hoped to win. The Soviet delegation proposed: “In full agreement with ... the statement of both contracting parties that they have no plans of conquest and desire to make peace without annexations, Russia withdraws its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. The German side insisted that Russia recognize the independence of not only Poland, Lithuania and Courland occupied by German troops, where puppet governments were created, but also Livonia, part of which had not yet been occupied by the German army, as well as participation in peace negotiations delegation of the separatist Kiev Central Rada.

At first, these demands, in essence, for the surrender of Russia by the Soviet delegation were rejected. December 15 (28) agreed to extend the truce. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, a 10-day break was announced, under the pretext of an attempt to seat the Entente states at the negotiating table, although both sides thereby only demonstrated their peacefulness, fully understanding the futility of such hopes.

The Soviet delegation left Brest for Petrograd, and the question of the course of the peace talks was discussed there at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). It was decided to drag out the negotiations in the hope of a revolution in Germany. The delegation was supposed to continue the negotiations in a new composition, headed by the people's commissar for foreign affairs, L. D. Trotsky himself. Showing off, Trotsky subsequently called his participation in the negotiations "visits to the torture chamber." He was not interested in diplomacy at all. He commented on his very activities as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs as follows: “What kind of diplomatic work will we have? Here I will issue a few leaflets and close the shop. The impression he made on the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, is quite consistent with this remark of his: “Not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he… would have been better off ending the unsympathetic negotiations with a couple of grenades, throwing them across the green table, if it was somehow in line with the overall political line… sometimes I wondered if he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.

K. Radek, a native of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, was included in the Soviet delegation; at the negotiations he represented the Polish workers, with whom he really had nothing to do. According to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, Radek, with his assertive temperament and aggressiveness, had to maintain the revolutionary tone of the delegation, balancing the other participants in the negotiations, Kamenev and Ioffe, who were too calm and restrained, as it seemed to Lenin and Trotsky.

L. Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk Under Trotsky, the resumed negotiations often took on the character of verbal battles between the head of the Soviet delegation and General Hoffmann, who also did not hesitate in expressions, demonstrating to the negotiating partners the impotence of the country they represent. According to Trotsky, "General Hoffmann … brought a fresh note to the conference. He showed that he did not like the behind-the-scenes tricks of diplomacy, and several times put his soldier's boot on the negotiating table. We immediately realized that the only reality that should really be taken seriously in these useless conversations is Hoffmann's boot."

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), at the invitation of the German side, a delegation of the Central Rada headed by V. A. Golubovich arrived from Kyiv in Brest, who immediately declared that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia did not extend to Ukraine. Trotsky agreed to the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations, stating that Ukraine was actually at war with Russia, although formally the independence of the UNR was proclaimed later, by the “universal” of January 9 (22), 1918.

The German side was interested in the speedy completion of the negotiations, because, not without reason, they feared the threat of the decomposition of their own army, and even more so - the troops of the allied Austria-Hungary - the "patchwork empire" of the Habsburgs. In addition, in these two countries, the food supply of the population has deteriorated sharply - both empires were on the verge of starvation. The mobilization potential of these powers was exhausted, while the Entente countries at war with them had unlimited possibilities in this regard, due to the large population in their colonies. In both empires, anti-war sentiment grew, strikes were organized, councils were formed in some cities, modeled on Russian councils; and these councils demanded an early conclusion of peace with Russia, so that the Soviet delegation at the talks in Brest had a well-known resource for putting pressure on partners.

But after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 6 (19), 1918, the German delegation began to act more assertively. The fact is that until then there was still, at least virtually, the possibility that the government formed by the Constituent Assembly would stop peace negotiations and resume allied relations with the Entente countries, broken by the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars. Therefore, the failure of the Constituent Assembly gave the German side confidence that in the end the Soviet delegation would agree to conclude peace at any cost.

Presentation of the German ultimatum and reaction to it

Russia's lack of a combat-ready army was, as they say today, a medical fact. It became absolutely impossible to convince the soldiers, who had turned into potential deserters, if they had not yet fled from the front, to remain in the trenches. Once, when overthrowing the tsar, the conspirators hoped that the soldiers would fight for a democratic and liberal Russia, their calculations turned out to be beaten. The socialist government of A.F. Kerensky called on the soldiers to defend the revolution - the soldiers were not tempted by this propaganda. From the very beginning of the war, the Bolsheviks campaigned for an end to the war of peoples, and their leaders understood that soldiers could not be kept at the front by calls to defend the power of the Soviets. On January 18, 1918, the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, sent a note to the Council of People's Commissars with the following content: “Desertion is progressively growing ... Entire regiments and artillery go to the rear, exposing the front for significant stretches, the Germans walk in crowds along an abandoned position ... Constant visits enemy soldiers of our positions, especially artillery, and their destruction of our fortifications in abandoned positions are undoubtedly of an organized nature.

After the formal ultimatum presented to the Soviet delegation in Brest by General Hoffmann, demanding consent to the German occupation of Ukraine, Poland, half of Belarus and the Baltic states, an intra-party struggle flared up at the top of the Bolshevik Party. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), held on January 11 (24), 1918, a bloc of "left communists" was formed, headed by N. I. Bukharin, who opposed Lenin's capitulatory position. “Our only salvation,” he declared, “is that the masses will learn by experience, in the course of the struggle itself, what a German invasion is, when cows and boots will be taken away from the peasants, when workers will be forced to work 14 hours, when they will take them to Germany, when the iron ring is inserted into the nostrils, then, believe me, comrades, then we will get a real holy war. Bukharin's side was taken by other influential members of the Central Committee - F. E. Dzerzhinsky, who attacked Lenin for betraying them - not the interests of Russia, but the German and Austro-Hungarian proletariat, whom, as he feared, the peace treaty would keep from the revolution. Objecting to his opponents, Lenin formulated his position as follows: “For a revolutionary war, an army is needed, but we have no army. Undoubtedly, the peace that we are forced to conclude now is an obscene peace, but if a war breaks out, our government will be swept away and peace will be made by another government. In the Central Committee, he was supported by Stalin, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov and Sergeev (Artem). A compromise proposal was put forward by Trotsky. It sounded like this: "no peace, no war." Its essence was that in response to the German ultimatum, the Soviet delegation in Brest would declare that Russia was ending the war, demobilizing the army, but would not sign a shameful, humiliating peace treaty. This proposal received the support of the majority of the members of the Central Committee during the voting: 9 votes against 7.

Before the delegation returned to Brest to resume negotiations, its head, Trotsky, was instructed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars to drag out the negotiations, but if an ultimatum was presented, sign a peace treaty at any cost. On January 27 (February 9), 1918, representatives of the Central Rada in Brest-Litovsk signed a peace treaty with Germany - its consequence was the occupation of Ukraine by the troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who, having occupied Kyiv, eliminated the Rada.

On February 27 (February 9), the head of the German delegation, R. von Kuhlmann, presented the Soviet side at the talks in Brest with an ultimatum demanding an immediate renunciation of any influence on the political life of the territories torn away from the Russian state, including Ukraine, part of Belarus and the Baltic states. The signal to toughen the tone during the talks came from the capital of Germany. Emperor Wilhelm II said then in Berlin: “Today the Bolshevik government directly addressed my troops with an open radio message calling for rebellion and disobedience to their top commanders. Neither I nor Field Marshal von Hindenburg can tolerate this state of affairs any longer. Trotsky must by tomorrow evening ... sign a peace with the return of the Baltic states up to the Narva - Pleskau - Dunaburg line inclusive ... The Supreme High Command of the armies of the Eastern Front must withdraw troops to the indicated line.

Trotsky at the talks in Brest rejected the ultimatum: “The peoples are looking forward to the results of the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. The peoples are asking when will this unparalleled self-destruction of mankind, caused by the selfishness and lust for power of the ruling classes of all countries, end? If ever a war was waged in self-defense, then it has long ceased to be such for both camps. If Great Britain takes possession of the African colonies, Baghdad and Jerusalem, then this is not yet a defensive war; if Germany occupies Serbia, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania and Rumania and seizes the Moonsund Islands, then this is also not a defensive war. This is a struggle for the division of the world. Now it's clearer than ever... We're getting out of the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. This statement of his was made public, which was regarded by all parties involved in the hostilities as a propaganda action. On the part of the German delegation at the talks in Brest, an explanation followed that the refusal to sign a peace treaty meant a breakdown in the truce and would entail the resumption of hostilities. The Soviet delegation left Brest.

Breakdown of the truce and resumption of hostilities

On February 18, German troops resumed fighting along the entire line of their Eastern Front and began to rapidly move deep into Russia. Within a few days, the enemy advanced about 300 kilometers, capturing Revel (Tallinn), Narva, Minsk, Polotsk, Mogilev, Gomel, Chernigov. Only near Pskov on February 23 was there real resistance to the enemy. Together with the officers and soldiers of the not completely decomposed Russian army, the Red Guards who arrived from Petrograd fought. In the battles near the city, the Germans lost several hundred soldiers killed and wounded. February 23 was subsequently celebrated as the birthday of the Red Army, and now as the day of the Defender of the Fatherland. And yet Pskov was taken by the Germans.

There was a real threat of capturing the capital. On February 21, the Petrograd Revolutionary Defense Committee was formed. A state of siege was declared in the city. But it was not possible to organize an effective defense of the capital. Only regiments of Latvian riflemen reached the line of defense. A mobilization was carried out among the St. Petersburg workers, but its results were scanty. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who voted in the majority for the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Soviets and to the Constituent Assembly, a little more than one percent were ready to shed blood: a little more than 10 thousand people signed up as volunteers. The fact is that the Bolsheviks were voted for because they promised immediate peace. To spread propaganda in the direction of revolutionary defencism, as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had done in their time, was a hopeless affair. The head of the metropolitan party organization of the Bolsheviks, G. E. Zinoviev, was already preparing to go underground: he demanded that funds be allocated from the party treasury to support the underground activities of the Bolshevik party committee in Petrograd. In view of the failure of the negotiations in Brest, on February 22, Trotsky resigned from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. A few days later, G. V. Chicherin was appointed to this position.

The Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) held continuous meetings these days. Lenin insisted on resuming peace talks and accepting the demands of the German ultimatum. Most members of the Central Committee took a different position, offering as an alternative a guerrilla war with the occupation regime in the hope of a revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. At a meeting of the Central Committee on February 23, 1918, Lenin demanded consent to the conclusion of peace on the terms dictated by the German ultimatum, otherwise threatening to resign. In response to Lenin's ultimatum, Trotsky declared: “We cannot wage a revolutionary war with a split in the party ... Under the conditions that have arisen, our party is not able to lead the war ... maximum unanimity would be needed; since it is not there, I will not take the responsibility of voting for the war.” This time, Lenin's proposal was supported by 7 members of the Central Committee, four headed by Bukharin voted against, Trotsky and three more abstained from voting. Bukharin then announced his withdrawal from the Central Committee. Then the party decision to accept the German ultimatum was carried through the state body - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. At a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 24, the decision to conclude peace on German terms was adopted by 126 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions. The majority of the Left SRs voted against, although their leader M. A. Spiridonova voted for peace; the Mensheviks headed by Yu. O. Martov and from the Bolsheviks N. I. Bukharin and D. B. Ryazanov voted against peace. A number of "left communists", including F.E. Dzerzhinsky, did not appear at the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in protest against agreeing to the German ultimatum.

Conclusion of a peace treaty and its contents

Signing of documents on the armistice in Brest-Litovsk On March 1, 1918, the Soviet delegation, this time headed by G. Ya. Sokolnikov, returned to Brest for negotiations. The negotiating partners representing the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria categorically refused to discuss the draft developed by the German side, insisting on its adoption in the form in which it was presented. On March 3, the German ultimatum was accepted by the Soviet side, and a peace treaty was signed.

In accordance with this agreement, Russia took upon itself the obligation to stop the war with the UNR and recognize the independence of Ukraine, in fact transferring it to the protectorate of Germany and Austria-Hungary - the signing of the agreement was followed by the occupation of Kyiv, the overthrow of the government of the UNR and the establishment of a puppet regime headed by Hetman Skoropadsky . Russia recognized the independence of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Courland and Livonia. Some of these territories were directly included in Germany, others passed under the German or joint protectorate with Austria-Hungary. Russia also transferred Kars, Ardagan and Batum with their regions to the Ottoman Empire. The territory torn away from Russia under the Brest Treaty amounted to about a million square kilometers, and up to 60 million people lived on it - a third of the population of the former Russian Empire. The Russian army and navy were subject to radical reductions. The Baltic Fleet was leaving its bases located in Finland and the Ostsee region. An indemnity in the amount of 6.5 billion gold rubles was assigned to Russia. And the annex to the agreement included a provision stating that the property of citizens of Germany and its allies was not subject to Soviet nationalization laws, those of the citizens of these states who lost at least part of their property had to be returned or compensated. The refusal of the Soviet government to pay foreign debts could no longer apply to Germany and its allies, and Russia undertook to immediately resume payments on these debts. Citizens of these states were allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Soviet government undertook to ban all subversive anti-war propaganda against the states of the Quadruple Alliance.

The peace treaty concluded in Brest was ratified on March 15 by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets, despite the fact that a third of the deputies, mainly from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, voted against its ratification. On March 26, the treaty was ratified by Emperor Wilhelm II, and then similar acts were adopted in the states allied with Germany.

The consequences of the peace treaty and the reaction to it

Photocopy of the first two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918 however, it soon choked. For the occupation of the western territories torn from Russia, mainly Ukraine, it took 43 divisions, against which a guerrilla war unfolded under various political slogans, which cost Germany and Austria-Hungary more than 20 thousand lives of soldiers and officers; Hetman Skoropadsky's troops, who supported the regime of German occupation, lost more than 30 thousand people in this war.

In response to Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Entente states undertook interventionist actions: on March 6, British troops landed in Murmansk. This was followed by the landing of the British in Arkhangelsk. The Japanese units occupied Vladivostok. The dismemberment of Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided anti-Bolshevik forces with a non-separatist orientation with a wonderful slogan for organizing military operations aimed at overthrowing Soviet power - the slogan of the struggle for "a united and indivisible Russia." So after the signing of the Brest Peace in Russia, a full-scale Civil War began. The call put forward by Lenin at the beginning of the World War "to turn the war of the peoples into a civil war" was carried out, however, at the moment when the Bolsheviks least of all wanted it, because by that time they had already seized power in the country.

His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon could not remain an indifferent spectator of the tragic events taking place. On March 5 (18), 1918, he addressed the All-Russian flock with a message in which he assessed the peace treaty concluded in Brest: “Blessed is the peace between peoples, for all brothers, the Lord calls everyone to work peacefully on earth, He has prepared His incalculable blessings for everyone . And the Holy Church unceasingly lifts up prayers for the peace of the whole world... The unfortunate Russian people, involved in a fratricidal bloody war, unbearably thirsted for peace, just as the people of God once thirsted for water in the scorching heat of the desert. But we did not have Moses, who would give his people to drink miraculous water, and it was not to the Lord, his Benefactor, that the people called for help - people who renounced the faith, persecutors of the Church of God, appeared, and they gave the people peace. But is this the peace for which the Church prays, for which the people yearn? The peace now concluded, according to which entire regions inhabited by the Orthodox people are torn away from us and surrendered to the will of an enemy alien in faith, and tens of millions of Orthodox people fall into conditions of great spiritual temptation for their faith, a world according to which even Orthodox Ukraine from time immemorial is separated from brotherly Russia and the capital city of Kyiv, the mother of Russian cities, the cradle of our baptism, the repository of shrines, ceases to be a city of the Russian state, a world that gives our people and Russian land into heavy bondage - such a world will not give the people the desired rest and tranquility. The Orthodox Church will bring great damage and grief, and incalculable losses to the Fatherland. And meanwhile, the same strife that is destroying our Fatherland continues in our country... Will the declared peace eliminate these discords crying to heaven? Will it bring even greater sorrows and misfortunes? Alas, the words of the prophet are justified: They say: peace, peace, but there is no peace(Jer. 8, 11). The Holy Orthodox Church, which from time immemorial has helped the Russian people to gather and glorify the Russian state, cannot remain indifferent at the sight of its death and decay... As the duty of the successor of the ancient collectors and builders of the Russian land, Peter, Alexy, Jonah, Philip and Hermogenes, We call... Raise your voice in these terrible days and loudly declare before the whole world that the Church cannot bless the shameful peace now concluded on behalf of Russia. This peace, forcibly signed on behalf of the Russian people, will not lead to fraternal cohabitation of peoples. There are no pledges of calm and reconciliation in it, the seeds of malice and misanthropy are sown in it. It contains the germs of new wars and evils for all mankind. Can the Russian people come to terms with their humiliation? Can he forget his brothers separated from him by blood and faith?.. The Orthodox Church... can now only look with the deepest sorrow at this appearance of peace, which is no better than war... Do not rejoice and triumph over peace We call you, Orthodox people, but it is bitter to repent and pray before the Lord... Brothers! The time has come for repentance, the holy days of Great Lent have come. Cleanse yourself from your sins, come to your senses, stop looking at each other as enemies, and stop dividing your native land into warring camps. We are all brothers, and we all have one mother, our native Russian land, and we are all children of one Heavenly Father... In the face of the Terrible Judgment of God that is taking place over us, let us all gather around Christ and His Holy Church. Let us pray to the Lord that He soften our hearts with brotherly love and strengthen them with courage, so that He Himself will grant us men of understanding and counsel, faithful to the commandments of God, who would correct the evil deed done, return the rejected and gather the squandered. ... Convince everyone to pray fervently to the Lord, that He turn away His righteous wrath, our sin for our sake, driven by us, and strengthen our relaxed spirit and raise us from heavy despondency and extreme fall. And the merciful Lord will take pity on the sinful Russian land ... ".

This was the first epistle of Patriarch Tikhon devoted to a political topic, while it did not touch upon issues of domestic politics, it does not mention political parties and political figures, but, faithful to the tradition of patriotic service of the Russian Primates, the holy Patriarch expressed in this epistle his grief over the experience Russia of the catastrophe, called on the flock to repentance and an end to pernicious fratricidal strife, and, in essence, predicted the course of further events in Russia and in the world. Anyone who carefully reads this epistle can be convinced that, composed on the occasion of an event a hundred years ago, it has not lost its relevance in our day.

Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamyanets-Podilsky after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Meanwhile, Germany, which forced Russia to capitulate in March 1918, could not avoid the fate of the perished Russian Empire. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were resumed between Russia and Germany. The Soviet ambassador A. A. Ioffe arrived in Berlin, and the German ambassador Count Wilhelm von Mirbach arrived in Moscow, where the seat of government was moved. Count Mirbach was killed in Moscow, and the peace treaty did not prevent A. A. Ioffe and the staff of the Soviet embassy from conducting anti-war propaganda in the heart of Germany itself. Pacifist and revolutionary sentiments spread from Russia to the armies and peoples of her former opponents. And when the imperial thrones of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns shook, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk turned into a piece of paper that did not bind anyone to anything. On November 13, 1918, it was officially denounced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR. But at that time, Russia was already thrown into the abyss of fratricidal slaughter - the Civil War, the signal for the beginning of which was the conclusion of the Brest Treaty.

In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, G. Nikolnikov, N. Yakupov, A. Bovin), the “Decree on Peace” was traditionally considered as the first and important stage in the formation and development of the “Leninist peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state”, based on the cornerstone principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In reality, Lenin's "Decree on Peace" could in no way lay the foundations for a new foreign policy doctrine of Soviet Russia, because:

He pursued a purely pragmatic goal - the withdrawal of dilapidated and exhausted Russia from the state of war;

The Bolsheviks considered the revolution in Russia not as an end in itself, but as the first and inevitable stage in the beginning of the world proletarian (socialist) revolution.

November 8 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky sent the text of the "Decree on Peace" to the ambassadors of all the allied powers, inviting the leaders of these states to immediately stop hostilities at the front and sit down at the negotiating table, but this call was completely ignored by the Entente countries. November 9, 1917 to the commander-in-chief N.N. Dukhonin was instructed to immediately turn to the command of the Fourth Bloc countries with a proposal to end hostilities and start peace negotiations with them. General N.N. Dukhonin refused to comply with this order, for which he was immediately declared an "enemy of the people" and removed from his post, which was taken by ensign N.V. Krylenko. A little later, upon the arrival of N.V. Krylenko to Mogilev, General N.N. Dukhonin was first arrested and then killed at the staff car by drunken sailors, and the new Commander-in-Chief immediately followed the instructions of the Central Committee on this issue.

On November 14, 1917, representatives of the German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership informed the Soviet side of their agreement to stop hostilities on the Eastern Front and begin the process of peace negotiations. On November 20, 1917, the first round of negotiations between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc began in Brest-Litovsk, at which the leadership of the Soviet delegation represented by A.A. Ioffe (chairman of the mission), L.B. Kameneva, G.Ya. Sokolnikov and L.M. Karakhan immediately announced a declaration of principles, in which they again proposed to conclude a democratic peace treaty without annexations and indemnities. Having received no response to their proposal, the Soviet side refused to conclude a formal truce and took a week-long time-out.

On November 27, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR approved the "Outline of the peace talks program", compiled by V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and L.B. Kamenev, in which the idea of ​​concluding a general democratic peace was reaffirmed, and three days later the negotiation process resumed in Brest-Litovsk. The result of new negotiations was the signing on December 2, 1917 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month, until January 1, 1918.

On December 9, 1917, a new round of negotiations began, in which the head of the Soviet delegation, A.A. Ioffe announced the declaration "On the principles of universal democratic peace", consisting of six main points. In this declaration, based on the main provisions of the Peace Decree and the Outline of the Peace Negotiation Program, the main components of a democratic peace were once again concretized: "refusal of annexations and indemnities" and "complete self-determination of peoples".

On December 12, 1917, the Austrian Foreign Minister O. Chernin announced a response note to the Soviet side, which stated that the countries of the Quadruple Bloc agreed to immediately conclude a peace treaty with all Entente countries without annexations and indemnities. But for the Soviet delegation, this turn of events was so unexpected that its head, A.A. Ioffe suggested a ten-day break. The opposing side rejected this proposal, and three days later the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, who, by the way, while holding the post of State Secretary (Minister) of Foreign Affairs, was personally involved in the financial support of the Bolshevik Pravda, directly laid claim to the possession of all of Poland, Lithuania , Courland, part of Estonia and Livonia, whose peoples "they themselves expressed a desire to come under the protection of Germany." Naturally, the Soviet delegation categorically refused to discuss this proposal, and a break was announced in the work of the peace conference.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky once again tried to give the peace talks a general character and addressed with a repeated note to the governments of the Entente countries to sit down at the negotiating table, but he did not receive an answer to his message. In this situation, fearing that the negotiations in Brest would take on an openly separate character, at the suggestion of V.I. Lenin, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to move the peace talks to the capital of neutral Sweden, the city of Stockholm. The Austro-German side rejected this trick of the Soviet government, and Brest-Litovsk remained the place to continue negotiations. At the same time, representatives of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, referring to the fact that the Entente countries remained deaf to the proposal to conclude a "general democratic peace", abandoned their own declaration on December 12, which seriously aggravated the negotiation process itself.

On December 27, 1917, the second round of the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began, at which the Soviet delegation was already headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. A new round of negotiations, at the suggestion of the oracle of the revolution, began with an empty theoretical dispute about the state and the right of nations to self-determination. This political chatter, which had become rather annoying for the opposing side, was soon stopped, and on January 5, 1918, the delegation of the countries of the Quadruple Union in an ultimatum presented the Soviet side with new conditions for a separate peace - the rejection from Russia not only of the entire Baltic and Poland, but also of a significant part of Belarus.

On the same day, at the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, a break was announced in the negotiations. L.D. Trotsky, having received a letter from V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, was forced to urgently leave for Petrograd, where he had to give his explanations about his new position regarding the further conduct of negotiations, which he outlined in a letter addressed to V.I. Lenin on January 2, 1918. The essence of the new position of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was extremely simple: “We stop the war, we demobilize the army, but we don’t sign peace.” In Soviet historical science, the position of L.D. Trotsky has always been interpreted in derogatory tones and expressions as the position of a "political prostitute" and a traitor to the interests of the working class and the working peasantry. In reality, this position, which was initially supported by V.I. Lenin, was absolutely logical and extremely pragmatic:

1) Since the Russian army cannot, and most importantly, does not want to fight, it is necessary to completely disband the old imperial army, and stop fighting at the front.

2) Since the opposing side is categorically in favor of a separate peace treaty, which threatens the Bolsheviks with a loss of reputation in the eyes of the world proletariat, a separate treaty with the enemy should by no means be concluded.

3) It is necessary to drag out the negotiation process as long as possible, in the hope that in Germany and other European powers the fire of the world proletarian revolution will flare up in the near future, which will put everything in its place.

4) Refusal to sign a separate treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance will not formally give the Entente countries a reason to start military intervention against Soviet Russia, which has violated its allied duty.

5) Finally, the refusal to sign a peace treaty will significantly smooth out the contradictions that have already arisen both within the ruling Bolshevik Party and in relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs.

By mid-January 1918, the latter circumstance began to acquire paramount importance. At this time, the “left communists” headed by N.I. Bukharin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.S. Uritsky, K.B. Radek and A.M. Kollontai. This rather noisy and influential faction of the Bolsheviks, which was supported by a number of leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (B.D. Kamkov, P.P. Proshyan), categorically opposed any agreements with the enemy and declared that only a “revolutionary war” with the German imperialism will save the Bolsheviks from the universal disgrace of the accomplices of world capital and create the necessary conditions for kindling the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Moreover, at this time B.D. Kamkov and P.P. Proshyan turned to K.B. Radek, N.I. Bukharin and G.L. Pyatakov with a proposal to arrest the entire Council of People's Commissars headed by V.I. Lenin and form a new government consisting of Left Social Revolutionaries and Left Communists, which could be headed by Georgy Leonidovich Pyatakov, but this proposal was rejected by them.

In the meantime, another principled approach to solving this problem was outlined in the party leadership, which was expressed by V.I. Lenin. The essence of his new position, which he reached at the end of December 1917, was also extremely simple: to conclude a separate peace with Germany and its allies at any cost.

In historical science, the question of the motives that prompted the leader of the revolution to such a political conclusion, which ran counter to all the postulates of orthodox Marxism, has long been discussed.

Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, A. Bovin) claimed that V.I. Lenin came to this conviction under the pressure of harsh objective circumstances, namely the complete disintegration of the old Russian army and the uncertainty about the timing of the proletarian revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany itself.

Their opponents, mainly from the liberal camp (D. Volkogonov, Yu. Felshtinsky, O. Budnitsky), are sure that, while advocating extremely harshly for the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany, V.I. Lenin only fulfilled his obligations to his German sponsors, who generously forked out for the October Revolution.

On January 8, 1918, after discussing the new Leninist theses at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee, an open vote was held, which clearly showed the alignment of forces in the top party leadership: the position of N.I. Bukharin was supported by 32 participants in this meeting, for L.D. Trotsky was voted by 16 participants, and the position of V.I. Lenin was supported by only 15 members of the Central Committee. On January 11, 1918, the discussion of this issue was submitted to the Plenum of the Central Committee, where the position of L.D. was supported by a small majority. Trotsky. This situation forced V.I. Lenin to make partial adjustments to his previous position: no longer insisting on the immediate conclusion of peace, he proposed to delay the process of negotiations with the Germans in every possible way. The next day, the Trotskyist slogan "no war, no peace" was approved by a majority vote at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the PLSR, which was immediately formalized as a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Thus, all supporters of peace in both ruling parties, in particular members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev, I.V. Stalin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga, A.F. Sergeev, M.K. Muranov and E.D. Stasov, and members of the Central Committee of the PLSR M.A. Spiridonova, A.L. Kolegaev, V.E. Trutovsky, B.F. Malkin and A.A. Bidenko again remained in the minority. On January 14, 1918, the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved a resolution reflecting the position of L.D. Trotsky, and on the same day the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs left for Brest-Litovsk, where on January 17 the third round of peace negotiations began.

Meanwhile, in Brest itself, negotiations were in full swing between Austro-German representatives and the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Rada (N.A. Lyublinsky), whose government the Bolsheviks recognized back in December 1917. On January 27, 1918, immediately after the signing of a separate treaty with the government of the Ukrainian People's We are glad that the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance in an ultimatum demanded that the Soviet side immediately respond to its terms of the peace treaty.

The next day, L.D. Trotsky, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, announced a declaration in which:

1) it was announced the termination of the state of war between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as the complete demobilization of the old Russian army;

In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev), this ultimatum of the head of the Soviet delegation was always regarded as another act of vile betrayal on the part of the “Jewish Trotsky”, who violated the oral agreement with V.I. Lenin that after the new "German ultimatum we sign a peace treaty."

Modern Russian historians, including outspoken apologists L.D. Trotsky (A. Pantsov), they say that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs acted in strict accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of both ruling parties and the resolution of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and their oral agreement with V.I. Lenin clearly contradicted them.

February 14, 1918 declaration by L.D. Trotsky received official support at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, and a day later the German command, represented by Leopold of Bavaria and Max Hoffmann, announced the end of the truce and the resumption of hostilities along the entire front from noon on February 18. In this situation, on the evening of February 17, 1918, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee was convened, at which six of the eleven members of the highest party Areopagus, namely L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Bukharin, M.S. Uritsky, G.I. Lomov, N.N. Krestinsky, A.A. Ioffe, spoke out against the resumption of the negotiation process in Brest.

The Germans launched an offensive at the front and by the end of February 19 occupied Polotsk and Dvinsk. In this critical situation, at a new meeting of the Central Committee, with seven votes in favor, it was decided to immediately resume the peace process. In this situation, L.D. Trotsky announced his resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the leader of the left communists N.I. Bukharin - about his withdrawal from the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda.

On February 23, 1918, the Soviet government was presented with new conditions for a separate peace treaty and a very strict framework for signing and ratifying it. In particular, the German side demanded that all of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Estonia and part of Belarus be torn away from Russia, as well as the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland and Ukraine, and the signing of a similar peace treaty with the government of the Central Rada.

On the same day, a new meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was convened, at which the votes on the German ultimatum were distributed as follows: seven members of the Central Committee voted “for” its adoption - V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, G.E. Zinoviev, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga and E.D. Stasova, "against" - four members of the highest party Areopagus - N.I. Bukharin, A.S. Bubnov, G.I. Lomov and M.S. Uritsky, and "abstained" - also four members of the Central Committee - L.D. Trotsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, A.A. Ioffe and N.N. Krestinsky. Thus, at the most critical moment, when the issue of retaining one's own power was being decided, the majority of the members of the Central Committee "trembled" and voted for the conclusion of an "obscene" peace with the Germans.

On February 24, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, after an extremely tense discussion, the Bolshevik resolution on the adoption of new terms of the peace treaty was approved by a small majority. And late in the evening of the same day, a new Soviet delegation consisting of G.Ya. left for Brest-Litovsk to sign a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Bloc. Sokolnikova, L.M. Karakhan, G.V. Chicherin and G.I. Petrovsky.

On March 3, 1918, the leaders of both delegations signed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under the terms of which:

A vast territory of more than 1 million square meters was torn away from Soviet Russia. kilometers, on which more than 56 million people lived - the entire territory of Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, part of Belarus and Turkish Armenia;

Soviet Russia had to pay the countries of the Quadruple Alliance a huge military indemnity in the amount of six billion gold marks and agree to the complete transfer of all industrial enterprises and mines, where before the war 90% of all coal was mined and more than 70% of iron and steel were smelted.

According to V.I. Lenin, in such humiliating and "obscene" conditions of the Brest peace treaty, which the Soviet government was forced to sign, were to blame, first of all, "our unfortunate leftists Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co." Moreover, a number of Soviet and Russian historians (Yu. Emelyanov) argue that not a single theoretical or political mistake of N.I. Bukharin did not have such catastrophic consequences for our country and tens of millions of its citizens.

On March 8, 1918, at the emergency VII Congress of the RCP (b), the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty after a sharp controversy between V.I. Lenin and N.I. Bukharin were adopted by a large majority, since the majority of his delegates agreed with Lenin's argument that the international world revolution was for the time being just a beautiful fairy tale and nothing more. On March 15, 1918, after no less heated and heated discussion at the IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified by roll call and entered into force.

In historical science, there are still diametrically opposed assessments of the Brest peace treaty, which largely depend on the political and ideological views of their authors. In particular, V.I. Lenin, who did not have any sympathy for the patriarchal thousand-year-old Russia, directly called the Brest Treaty "Tilsit" and "obscene" peace, but vital to the salvation of the power of the Bolsheviks. The same assessments were shared by Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, A. Bovin, Yu. Emelyanov), who were forced to talk about the brilliant insight and political wisdom of the leader, who foresaw the imminent military defeat of Germany and the annulment of this treaty. In addition, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was traditionally regarded as the first victory of the young Soviet diplomacy, which laid the foundations for the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR.

In modern science, the assessments of the Brest Treaty have changed significantly.

Historians of the liberal persuasion (A. Pantsov, Yu. Felshtinsky) believe that this agreement was not a victory, but the first major defeat of the Bolshevik course to prepare for the world proletarian revolution. At the same time, this peace became a kind of maneuver in the field of tactics and a short-term retreat of the Bolsheviks on the tortuous and difficult path of struggle for the victory of the world socialist revolution.

Historians of a patriotic persuasion (N. Narochnitskaya) are convinced that for V. Lenin and other leaders of Bolshevism, the Russian proletarian revolution was a kind of "bunch of brushwood" capable of igniting the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Therefore, the Brest Treaty was a direct betrayal of the national interests of Russia, which marked the beginning of its collapse and the most difficult Civil War.

2. "Left SR rebellion" and its political consequences

After the ratification of the Brest peace treaty, the "left communists" did not give up hope for its denunciation. In particular, in May 1918, at the Moscow Conference of the RCP(b), N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Osinsky and D.B. Ryazanov (Goldenbach) again called for the denunciation of the Brest Treaty, but the majority of the delegates of this party forum did not support their proposal.

Another attempt to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the "Left SR rebellion", which took place in Moscow on July 6-7, 1918. The events associated with this rebellion were as follows: The Cheka, under a plausible pretext, entered the German embassy and, having killed the German ambassador, Count V. Mirbach, hid in the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which was headed by their fellow party member Dmitry Popov.

After the accomplishment of this terrorist act, V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov went to the German embassy, ​​and the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest Ya. G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreeva. Upon arrival at the place of F.E. Dzerzhinsky was taken under arrest, and the headquarters of the Cheka troops, on the orders of D.I. Popov was turned into an impregnable fortress, where more than 600 well-armed Chekists dug in.

Upon learning of the arrest of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.I. Lenin instructed to arrest the entire faction of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who took part in the work of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and to take their leader Maria Spiridonova as a hostage in exchange for saving the life of F.E. Dzerzhinsky. At the same time, the commander of the division of the Latvian riflemen I.I. Vatsetis was ordered to storm the mansion of the Cheka troops and suppress the "Left SR rebellion". On the night of July 7, 1918, a division of Latvian riflemen, with the support of field artillery, launched an assault on the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which ended in the complete defeat of the rebels and the release of F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

The trial of the rebels was quick and just: several hundred people, including Ya.G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreev, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the immediate inspirer and leader of this rebellion, Deputy Chairman of the Cheka V.A. Aleksandrovich was shot. The same result ended with the new “Left SR rebellion”, raised in Simbirsk by the commander of the Eastern Front, the Left SR M.A. Muravyov, who was shot dead on July 10, 1918 upon arrival for negotiations in the building of the provincial executive committee.

In Soviet and Russian historical science (K. Gusev, A. Velidov, A. Kiselev), it was traditionally asserted that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk were deliberately organized by the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (M.A. Spiridonova, P.P. Proshyan), who not only wanted to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but also, having provoked a government crisis, to remove from power the Bolshevik Party, which, planting committees, began to pursue a disastrous economic course in the countryside.

In foreign historiography (Yu. Felshtinsky), there is a rather exotic version, which says that the so-called “Left SR rebellion” was organized by “left communists”, in particular, the head of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who also sought to denounce the "obscene" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and kindle the fire of the world proletarian revolution.

In our opinion, there are much more white spots and unsolved mysteries in the history of this rebellion than it seems at first glance, since researchers have not been able to properly answer even two completely obvious questions:

1) why exactly the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky personally went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest the killers of the German ambassador;

2) if the decision to kill the German ambassador was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, then why is its entire faction, including M.A. Spiridonov, calmly waited for her isolation and arrest on the sidelines of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

Speaking essentially, it should be recognized that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk drew a line under the period of development of Soviet statehood on a two-party basis and became the starting point for the formation of a one-party Bolshevik system in the country. During this period, the activities of all Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik and anarchist groups and parties, the existence of which still created the illusion of proletarian-peasant democracy in the country, were banned.

The Brest Treaty itself was denounced by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918, that is, exactly one day after the surrender of Germany and its military allies to the Entente countries, which put a long-awaited end to the First World War.

The direct result of the Brest Peace and the suppression of the "Left SR rebellion" was the adoption of the first Constitution of the RSFSR. According to most authors (O. Chistyakov, S. Leonov, I. Isaev), for the first time the issue of creating the first Soviet Constitution was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 30, 1918. On April 1, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee formed a constitutional commission, in which included representatives of his three party factions (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries) and representatives of the six leading people's commissariats - for military and naval affairs, for nationalities, internal affairs, justice, finance and the Supreme Economic Council. Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov.

During the work on the draft Constitution, which lasted more than three months, a number of fundamental disagreements arose on the following issues:

1) the federal structure of the state;

2) the system of local Soviet authorities;

3) the social and economic foundations of Soviet power, etc.

In particular, representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (V.A. Algasov, A.A. Schreider) and Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries (A.I. Berdnikov) very persistently suggested:

1) to base the Soviet federation on the administrative-territorial principle of state structure with the provision of the broadest possible rights to all subjects of the federation to manage their own territories;

2) liquidate the lower levels of the Soviet state system and replace them with traditional rural assemblies, which, having lost their political functions, turned into municipal authorities;

3) carry out total socialization of property and tighten the principles of universal labor service, etc.

During a heated and lengthy debate, in which many prominent Bolsheviks took part, including V.I. Lenin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, L.M. Reisner, M.F. Latsis and M.N. Pokrovsky, these proposals were rejected. The final draft of the Soviet Constitution was approved by a special commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by V.I. Lenin.

On July 4, 1918, this project was submitted for consideration by the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and already on July 10, the congress delegates approved the first Constitution of the RSFSR and elected a new composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, consisting entirely of Bolsheviks.

The main provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were enshrined in six separate sections:

2) general provisions of the Constitution of the RSFSR;

3) the construction of Soviet power;

4) active and passive suffrage;

5) budget law;

6) about the emblem and flag of the RSFSR.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was fully included in the Constitution of the RSFSR, determined the political and social basis of the new Soviet statehood - the power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies and "the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in order to completely suppress the bourgeoisie, abolish the exploitation of man by man and establish socialism in the country."

The state structure of the RSFSR was based on the principles of a national federation, the subjects of which were declared national republics, as well as various regional unions, consisting of several national regions. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies became the supreme body of state power in the country, the exclusive competence of which included all issues of state building: approval and amendment of the Constitution of the RSFSR; declaration of war and conclusion of peace; ratification of peace treaties, general management of foreign and domestic policy of the state; establishment of national taxes, duties and fees; the basics of the organization of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and legal proceedings; federal law, etc.

For everyday and operational work, the congress elected from among its members the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK RSFSR), which formed the Council of People's Commissars (SNK RSFSR), which consisted of people's commissars who headed the sectoral people's commissariats (People's Commissariats). And the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars equally had the right to issue legislative acts, which was a direct consequence of the complete denial by the Bolsheviks of the well-known bourgeois principle of separation of powers. Regional, provincial, district and volost congresses of Soviets, as well as city and rural Soviets, which formed their own executive committees (executive committees), became local government bodies.

It should be emphasized that the well-known principle of “democratic centralism” was put at the basis of the organization of Soviet power at all levels, according to which the lower bodies of Soviet power were strictly subordinated to the higher ones, which were charged with the obligation to implement all decisions of the higher Soviets that did not violate their competence.

The Constitution of the RSFSR legislated not only a new type of Soviet statehood, but also a new type of Soviet democracy, since it openly proclaimed the class principle of democratic rights and freedoms. In particular, all "socially alien class elements" were deprived of the right to vote, and the representation from the social groups of working people who were endowed with the right to vote was far from equal. For example, in elections to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, city Soviets had a fivefold advantage over provincial Congresses of Soviets, etc.

In addition, the Soviet electoral system retained the principle of indirect elections that existed in Tsarist Russia. Only elections to grassroots city and rural Soviets were direct, and deputies of all subsequent levels were elected at volost, district, provincial and regional congresses of Soviets.

Peace of Brest-Litovsk 3 March 1918 – peace treaty between Germany and the Soviet government for Russia's withdrawal from World War I. This peace did not last long, since already on October 5, 1918, Germany terminated it, and on November 13, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was terminated by the Soviet side. It happened 2 days after the surrender of Germany in the world war.

Possibility of the world

The issue of Russia's exit from the First World War was extremely relevant. The people largely supported the ideas of the revolution, since the revolutionaries promised an early exit from the country's war, which had lasted for 3 years and was perceived extremely negatively by the population.

One of the first decrees of the Soviet government was the decree on peace. After this decree, on November 7, 1917, he appeals to all the warring countries with an appeal for the speedy conclusion of peace. Only Germany agreed. At the same time, one must understand that the idea of ​​concluding peace with the capitalist countries was in opposition to the Soviet ideology, which was based on the idea of ​​a world revolution. Therefore, there was no unity among the Soviet authorities. And the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 had to be pushed through by Lenin for a very long time. The party had three main groups:

• Bukharin. He put forward ideas that the war must continue at all costs. These are the positions of the classical world revolution.
• Lenin. He spoke about the need to sign peace on any terms. This was the position of the Russian generals.
• Trotsky. He put forward a hypothesis, which today is often formulated as “No war! No peace! It was a position of uncertainty, when Russia disbands the army, but does not withdraw from the war, does not sign a peace treaty. It was an ideal situation for Western countries.

Armistice

On November 20, 1917, negotiations began in Brest-Litovsk on the upcoming peace. Germany offered to sign an agreement on the following terms: secession from Russia of the territory of Poland, the Baltic states and part of the Baltic Sea islands. In total, it was assumed that Russia would lose up to 160 thousand square kilometers of territory. Lenin was ready to accept these conditions, since the Soviet government did not have an army, and the generals of the Russian Empire unanimously said that the war was lost and that peace should be concluded as soon as possible.

The negotiations were led by Trotsky, in his capacity as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Noteworthy is the fact that secret telegrams between Trotsky and Lenin were preserved during the negotiations. On almost any serious military question, Lenin answered that Stalin should be consulted. The reason here is not the genius of Joseph Vissarionovich, but the fact that Stalin acted as an intermediary between the tsarist army and Lenin.

Trotsky during the negotiations in every possible way dragged out time. He talked about the fact that a revolution was about to happen in Germany, so you just need to wait. But even if this revolution does not happen, Germany does not have the strength for a new offensive. Therefore, he was playing for time, waiting for the support of the party.
During the negotiations, an armistice was concluded between the countries for the period from December 10, 1917 to January 7, 1918.

Why did Trotsky play for time?

Taking into account the fact that from the first days of the negotiations, Lenin took the position of unambiguously signing a peace treaty, Troitsky’s support for this idea meant the signing of the Brest Peace and the end of the saga of the First World War for Russia. But Leiba did not do this, why? Historians give 2 explanations for this:

1. He was waiting for the German revolution, which was to begin very soon. If this is true, then Lev Davydovich was an extremely short-sighted person, expecting revolutionary events in a country where the power of the monarchy was quite strong. The revolution eventually happened, but much later than the time when the Bolsheviks expected it.
2. He represented the position of England, the USA and France. The fact is that with the beginning of the revolution in Russia, Trotsky came to the country from the United States with a large amount of money. At the same time, Trotsky was not an entrepreneur, he did not have an inheritance, but he had large sums of money, the origin of which he never specified. It was extremely beneficial for Western countries that Russia delayed negotiations with Germany for as long as possible, so that the latter would leave its troops on the eastern front. This is a little more than 130 divisions, the transfer of which to the western front could drag out the war.

The second hypothesis may at first glance smack of conspiracy theory, but it is not without meaning. In general, if we consider the activities of Leiba Davydovich in Soviet Russia, then almost all of his steps are connected with the interests of England and the United States.

Crisis in negotiations

On January 8, 1918, as was due to the armistice, the parties again sat down at the negotiating table. But literally right there, these negotiations were canceled by Trotsky. He referred to the fact that he urgently needed to return to Petrograd for consultations. Arriving in Russia, he raised the question of whether to conclude the Brest peace in the party. Lenin opposed him, who insisted on signing peace as soon as possible, but Lenin lost 9 votes to 7. This was facilitated by the revolutionary movements that began in Germany.

On January 27, 1918, Germany made a move that few expected. She signed peace with Ukraine. It was a deliberate attempt to play off Russia and Ukraine. But the Soviet government continued to stick to its line. On this day, a decree was signed on the demobilization of the army

We are withdrawing from the war, but we are forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty.

Trotsky

Of course, this caused her a shock from the German side, which could not understand how to stop fighting and not sign peace.

On February 11, at 17:00, a telegram from Krylenko was sent to all headquarters of the fronts, stating that the war was over and that they had to return home. The troops began to retreat, exposing the front line. At the same time, the German command brought Trotsky's words to Wilhelm 2, and the Kaiser supported the idea of ​​an offensive.

On February 17, Lenin again makes an attempt to persuade party members to sign a peace treaty with Germany. Again, his position is in the minority, since opponents of the idea of ​​​​signing peace convinced everyone that if Germany did not go on the offensive in 1.5 months, then it would not go on the offensive any further. But they were very wrong.

Agreement signing

On February 18, 1918, Germany launched a large-scale offensive in all sectors of the front. The Russian army was already partially demobilized and the Germans were quietly moving forward. There was a real threat of complete seizure by Germany and Austria-Hungary of the territory of Russia. The only thing that the Red Army was able to do was to give a small battle on February 23 and slightly slow down the enemy’s advance. Moreover, the battle was given by officers who changed into a soldier's overcoat. But it was one center of resistance, which could not solve anything.

Lenin, under the threat of resignation, pushed through the decision to sign a peace treaty with Germany in the party. As a result, negotiations began, which ended very quickly. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918 at 17:50.

On March 14, the 4th All-Russian Congress of Soviets ratified the Brest peace treaty. In protest, the Left SRs withdrew from the government.

The terms of the Brest Peace were as follows:

• Complete separation from Russia of the territory of Poland and Lithuania.
• Partial separation from Russia of the territory of Latvia, Belarus and Transcaucasia.
• Russia completely withdrew its troops from the Baltic states and Finland. Let me remind you that Finland had already been lost before.
• The independence of Ukraine was recognized, which passed under the protectorate of Germany.
• Russia ceded eastern Anatolia, Kars and Ardagan to Turkey.
• Russia paid Germany an indemnity of 6 billion marks, which was equal to 3 billion gold rubles.

Under the terms of the Brest Peace, Russia lost an area of ​​789,000 square kilometers (compare with the initial conditions). 56 million people lived in this territory, which accounted for 1/3 of the population of the Russian Empire. Such heavy losses became possible only because of the position of Trotsky, who at first played for time, and then brazenly provoked the enemy.

The fate of the Brest peace

It is noteworthy that after the signing of the agreement, Lenin never used the word "treaty" or "peace", but replaced them with the word "respite". And it really was so, because the world did not last long. Already on October 5, 1918, Germany terminated the treaty. The Soviet government terminated it on November 13, 1918, 2 days after the end of the First World War. In other words, the government waited for the defeat of Germany, made sure that this defeat was irrevocable and calmly canceled the treaty.

Why was Lenin so afraid to use the word "Brest Peace"? The answer to this question is quite simple. After all, the idea of ​​concluding a peace treaty with the capitalist countries was in opposition to the theory of socialist revolution. Therefore, the recognition of the conclusion of peace could be used by Lenin's opponents to eliminate him. And here Vladimir Ilyich showed a rather high degree of flexibility. He made peace with Germany, but in the party he used the word respite. It was precisely because of this word that the decision of the congress on the ratification of the peace treaty was not published. After all, the publication of these documents using Lenin's wording could be met negatively. Germany made peace, but she did not conclude any respite. Peace puts an end to the war, and a respite implies its continuation. Therefore, Lenin acted wisely not to publish the decision of the 4th Congress on the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk agreements.

Contrary to the promises of the Bolsheviks, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded on the terms of Germany and its allies, which were extremely difficult for Russia. Most of Ukraine, the Estonian, Livonian and Courland provinces, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland became German protectorates or became part of Germany. The Baltic Fleet abandoned its bases in Finland and the Baltics. Russia paid 6 billion marks in reparations.

Peace treaty
between Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand
and Russia on the other

Since Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and Russia on the other, agreed to end the state of war and end the peace negotiations as soon as possible, they were appointed plenipotentiaries:

from the Imperial German Government:
State Secretary of the Office of Foreign Affairs, Imperial Privy Councillor, Mr. Richard von Kühlmann,
Imperial Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Dr. von Rosenberg,
Royal Prussian Major General Hoffmann,
Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern Front, Captain 1st Rank Gorn,

from the Imperial and Royal General Austro-Hungarian Government:
Minister of the Imperial and Royal House and Foreign Affairs, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Privy Councilor Ottokar Count Czernin von zu Hudenitz,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Privy Counsellor, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Mr. Kajetan Merey von Kapos-Mere,
General of the Infantry, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Privy Councillor, Mr. Maximilian Cicerich von Bachani,

from the Royal Bulgarian Government:
Royal Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna, Andrey Toshev,
Colonel of the General Staff, Royal Bulgarian Military Plenipotentiary under His Majesty the German Emperor and Adjutant Wing of His Majesty the King of Bolgars, Petr Ganchev,
Royal Bulgarian First Secretary of the Mission, Dr. Teodor Anastasov,

from the Imperial Ottoman Government:
His Highness Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, Former Grand Vizier, Member of the Ottoman Senate, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Sultan in Berlin,
His Excellency, General of the Cavalry, Adjutant General of His Majesty the Sultan and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Sultan to His Majesty the German Emperor, Zeki Pasha,

from the Russian Federative Soviet Republic:
Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin; Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and
Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs.

The plenipotentiaries met at Brest-Litovsk for peace talks, and after presenting their credentials, found to be in correct and proper form, came to an agreement on the following decrees.

Article I

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other declare that the state of war between them has ended. They decided to continue to live among themselves in peace and friendship.

Article II

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the government or state and military establishments of the other side. Since this obligation concerns Russia, it also extends to the areas occupied by the powers of the quadruple alliance.

Article III

The areas lying to the west of the line established by the contracting parties and previously belonging to Russia will no longer be under its supreme authority: the established line is indicated on the attached map (Appendix 1), which is an essential part of this peace treaty. The exact definition of this line will be worked out by the German-Russian commission.

For the aforementioned regions, their former belonging to Russia will not entail any obligations in relation to Russia.

Russia refuses any interference in the internal affairs of these regions. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of these areas by demolition with their population.

Article IV

Germany is ready, as soon as a general peace has been concluded and a complete Russian demobilization has been carried out, to clear the territory lying to the east of the line indicated in paragraph 1 of Article III, insofar as Article VI does not decide otherwise.

Russia will do everything in its power to ensure the speedy clearance of the Eastern Anatolia provinces and their orderly return to Turkey.

The districts of Ardagan, Kars and Batum are also immediately cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of the state-legal and international-legal relations of these districts, but will allow the population of these districts to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially Turkey.

Article V

Russia will immediately carry out the complete demobilization of its army, including the military units newly formed by the current government.

In addition, Russia will either transfer its warships to Russian ports and leave there until the conclusion of a general peace, or immediately disarm. The military courts of states that are still at war with the powers of the quadruple alliance, since these ships are in the sphere of Russian power, are equated with Russian military courts.

The restricted zone in the Arctic Ocean remains in force until the conclusion of a universal peace. In the Baltic Sea and in the parts of the Black Sea subject to Russia, the removal of minefields must begin immediately. Merchant shipping in these maritime regions is free and immediately resumed. In order to work out more precise regulations, in particular for the publication to the public of safe routes for merchant ships, mixed commissions will be created. Navigation routes must be kept clear of floating mines at all times.

Article VI

Russia undertakes to immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the peace treaty between this state and the powers of the quadruple alliance. The territory of Ukraine is immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Estonia and Livonia are also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern border of Estonia runs generally along the Narva River. The eastern border of Livonia generally runs through Lake Peipus and Lake Pskov to its southwestern corner, then through Lake Luban in the direction of Livenhof on the Western Dvina. Estland and Livonia will be occupied by the German police authorities until public security is ensured there by the country's own institutions and until state order is established there. Russia will immediately release all arrested and taken away inhabitants of Estonia and Livonia and ensure the safe return of all taken away Estonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Åland Islands will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and Finnish ports from the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces. As long as the ice makes it impossible to transfer warships to Russian ports, only insignificant crews should be left on them. Russia stops all agitation or propaganda against the Finnish government or public institutions.

The fortifications erected on the Åland Islands must be demolished as soon as possible. With regard to the prohibition to continue to erect fortifications on these islands, as well as their general provisions regarding military and navigation technology, a special agreement must be concluded regarding them between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden; The parties agree that, at the request of Germany, other states adjacent to the Baltic Sea may also be involved in this agreement.

Article VII

Based on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.

Article VIII

The prisoners of war of both sides will be released to their homeland. The settlement of related questions will be the subject of special treaties provided for in Article XII.

Article IX

The contracting parties mutually renounce the reimbursement of their military expenses, i.e., state expenses for the conduct of the war, as well as compensation for military losses, i.e., those losses that were inflicted on them and their citizens in the zone of military operations by military measures, in including all requisitions made in the enemy country.

Article X

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties are resumed immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. As regards the admission of consuls, both parties reserve the right to enter into special agreements.

Article XI

Economic relations between the powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia are determined by the decrees contained in Annexes 2-5, with Annex 2 defining relations between Germany and Russia, Annex 3 between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Annex 4 between Bulgaria and Russia, Appendix 5 - between Turkey and Russia.

Article XII

The restoration of public law and private law relations, the exchange of prisoners of war and civilian prisoners, the question of amnesty, as well as the question of the attitude towards merchant ships that have fallen into the power of the enemy, are the subject of separate agreements with Russia, which form an essential part of this peace treaty, and, as far as possible, take effect simultaneously with it.

Article XIII

When interpreting this Treaty, the authentic texts for relations between Germany and Russia are German and Russian, between Austria-Hungary and Russia - German, Hungarian and Russian, between Bulgaria and Russia - Bulgarian and Russian, between Turkey and Russia - Turkish and Russian.

Article XIV

The present peace treaty will be ratified. The exchange of instruments of ratification should take place as soon as possible in Berlin. The Russian government assumes the obligation to exchange instruments of ratification at the request of one of the powers of the quadruple alliance within a two-week period. A peace treaty enters into force from the moment of its ratification, unless otherwise follows from its articles, annexes to it or supplementary treaties.

In witness thereof, the Commissioners have personally signed this treaty.