Battle of Smolensk (1812). Battle of Krasnoye (1812) Battle of Smolensk during the Patriotic War of 1812

Having failed to defeat the Russian armies led by generals Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, Napoleon wanted to force a general battle near Smolensk. There was no unity between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, and friction arose regarding the further conduct of the war. Bagration supported the plan of the Quartermaster General of the First Army K.F. Tol. According to this plan, Russian troops were to act in the direction of Rudnya, break through the center of Napoleon's army, "remove the internal position in relation to the scattered French corps, and then break into pieces the entire French army." At the military council, it was decided to support Tol's plan.

At the same time, Barclay de Tolly, who did not entirely agree with him, stated that the army should not move more than three marches away from Smolensk. None of the generals knew which route Napoleon would take to Smolensk. Three roads led from Vitebsk to Smolensk: one through Porechye (now the city of Demidov), another through Rudnya and the third through Krasny. In the Porech direction, in the area of ​​​​the village of Volokova, located on the shore of Lake Kasplya, the first army led by Barclay de Tolly was stationed, in the Rudnyansky direction, in the area of ​​​​the village of Nadvy, Bagration’s 2nd Army was located, and the Krasninsky direction turned out to be almost unprotected. This gave Napoleon the opportunity to make changes to his plans and direct his main forces to Krasnoye and through it to Smolensk.

In this direction, he concentrated five infantry, three cavalry corps and a guard, with a total number of 185 thousand people. At the head of these troops were three cavalry corps of Murat. Red was defended by the 27th Division of General D.P. Neverovsky, a detachment consisting of Cossack and Dragoon regiments, Leslie’s Smolensk militia. In total, Neverovsky had at his disposal five infantry and four cavalry regiments (which amounted to about 7.2 thousand people) and 14 guns. On the morning of August 2, Murat's cavalry began an attack on Krasny. A fierce battle ensued, but the forces were unequal. And although Neverovsky fought off one attack after another, he still had to leave the city and launch military operations in its environs. At this time, Nazimov’s 50th Jaeger Regiment joined him. They managed to delay Napoleonic troops for almost a day.

Napoleon was extremely dissatisfied with the actions of his troops near Krasnoye, he sent additional troops here and demanded that Murat defeat Neverovsky and approach Smolensk. Murat led his cavalry into the attack forty times. At the same time, the infantrymen of Marshal Ney increased pressure on Neverovsky’s army. Neverovsky was forced to retreat, but, as the French general V. Segur testifies, “retreating like a lion,” and not reaching 6-7 km to Smolensk, he entrenched himself in a new firing line and stopped the advance of the French cavalry of Marshal Murat.

The 7th Corps of General N.N. Raevsky, consisting of 15 thousand people with 76 guns, came to the aid of Neverovsky from Smolensk. Neverovsky and Raevsky were supposed to block Napoleon's road to Smolensk and enable the main forces of the 1st and 2nd armies to approach the city and take part in military operations. The active military actions of these troops made it possible to defend Smolensk. Napoleon was forced to bring up additional forces and begin artillery shelling of the city on August 4. At the same time, attacks by French infantry began from Klovka to Rachevka.

Marshal Ney moved to the Royal Bastion. In stubborn battles, the French troops managed to capture a ditch, a rampart and part of the Royal Bastion in a number of places. However, the invaders were repulsed from the fortress wall, moat, rampart and bastion. Even the personal participation and courage of Marshal Ney in the attack on the Royal Bastion did not give the desired result. Attacks by French troops were repulsed in other areas. Many years later, Napoleon, while staying on the island of St. Helena, recalled: “a fifteen thousand strong Russian detachment, which happened to be in Smolensk, had the honor of defending this city for 24 hours, which gave Barclay de Tolly time to arrive the next day. If only the French army had managed "To take Smolensk by surprise, it would have crossed the Dnieper there and attacked the rear of the Russian army, which at that time was divided and marching in disorder. This decisive blow was not carried out."

Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies entered Smolensk. There was a stubborn struggle for two days. The city was surrounded on 3 sides, like a horseshoe, by the French army. Napoleon wanted to force a general battle on the Russian army. A stubborn struggle unfolded at the Molokhov Gate, which was defended by the battery company of Lieutenant Colonel Liushkin, the 72nd Irkutsk Dragoon Regiment led by Major General Skalon and the 4th Jaeger Regiment from Barclay de Tolly's group of troops. Russian troops repulsed enemy attacks. Napoleon was convinced that it was impossible to take the city by storm, and gave the order to open fire from 300 guns. “The villains,” wrote F. Glinka, “immediately carried out the monster’s order, clouds of bombs, grenades and repaired cannonballs flew towards houses, towers, shops, churches. And houses, churches and towers were engulfed in flames and everything that could burn was in flames!” .

The entire city was on fire. “This huge bonfire of churches and houses was amazing. The brilliance of a blinding fire penetrated through closed eyelids,” recalled an eyewitness. Out of 2,500 houses, 350 remained on the outskirts of the city and in the gardens. In the two-day battle for Smolensk, Napoleon lost over 16,500 soldiers and officers killed and wounded. During the same time, the Russians lost 10,667 people killed and wounded. Assessing the role of the Russian army and the people's militia, Bagration wrote that “our heroes in the case near Smolensk showed such courage and readiness to defeat the enemy that there were hardly any similar examples.”

In the Battle of Smolensk, the first female officer distinguished herself, the Russian writer Nadezhda Andreevna Durova, the daughter of a hussar officer, who mastered horse riding from childhood, and later became acquainted with the weapons system of the Russian army. In her “Notes of a Cavalry Maiden,” she wrote that her first childhood toys and amusements, her first cradle, were “a horse, weapons and regimental music.” Having run away from home, she, under the name of Alexander Vasilyevich Sokolov, joined the Uhlan regiment, soon received the rank of cornet and took an active part in the battles for Smolensk. For the courage and courage shown during the defense of Smolensk, she was awarded the St. George Cross. In the battle with the enemy, Major General A.A. heroically defended himself and died in the battle. Skalon, General Dokhturov’s corps fought courageously, and the population of the city provided active support to the army. The head of the French convoy, Guizot, wrote that “Smolensk was bought by us at a high price.” The Battle of Smolensk led to the weakening of Napoleon's army, which could not but affect the Battle of Borodino later.

The Russian command decided to leave the city on the night of August 5-6. Barclay de Tolly reported to the Tsar that further “holding Smolensk could not be of any benefit; on the contrary, it could entail the needless sacrifice of brave soldiers.” Napoleonic soldiers, having captured the Molochov and Nikolsky gates, entered the destroyed and burned city. Napoleon's attempt to cut off the retreat of the Russian army and force a general battle on it ended in failure. When the Russian army retreated, 10 kilometers from Smolensk near the village of Valutina Gora, a rearguard battle of the Russian army took place with large forces of the infantry corps of Ney and the cavalry corps of Marat and Yuzhno. There were more than 35 thousand people in the French army. The group of Russian troops consisted of the division of Major General Tuchkov, three hussar regiments of Major General Konovnitsyn and the Cossack detachments of Karlov and Orlov-Denisov. Their total number did not exceed 15 thousand people. The battle began on August 7 (19) at 10 a.m. and continued until late in the evening.

Giving an analysis of this battle, in which the French lost more than 9 thousand, and the Russians - 5 thousand, Barclay wrote: “The battle of August 7, known from my reports, can be considered a complete victory; the enemy was repelled at all points, and the victorious troops rested on the field battles." The battle at Valutina Mountain was the final stage of the Battle of Smolensk. “The main forces of the 1st Army crossed the Dnieper by the evening of August 8 (20) ... The 2nd Army, moving towards Dorogobuzh, reached the city on August 9 (21) and joined the left flank of Barclay’s army.” The Russians retreated exceptionally, waiting for a favorable situation to destroy the enemy.

On the night of August 8, the 1st Army approached the Solovyova crossing and during the next day moved to the left bank of the Dnieper. The peasants of the village of Solovyov built two floating bridges and helped the convoy and artillery cross the Dnieper. Bagration with his army headed towards Dorogobuzh. The Battle of Smolensk is over. It showed that Russian armies are capable of inflicting significant defeats on the enemy. The first and second armies, conducting rearguard battles with the enemy, united near Dorogobuzh and began to prepare for the main battle. Napoleon had a numerical superiority. He withdrew about 160 thousand soldiers from Smolensk. The decisive battle near Dorogobuzh did not take place. Barclay de Tolly recognized the chosen position as unsuccessful and gave the order for the armies to retreat to Vyazma. Barclay de Tolly's decision aroused Bagration's indignation, and he sent Moscow to F.V. Rostopchin a letter in which he warned him that with such tactics “Barclay will bring an army to you in 6 days.”

Barclay decided to stop the French army at Vyazma. From Semlev he wrote to the king; “Now I intend to take a strong position of 20-25 thousand people at Vyazma and strengthen it so that this corps will be able to resist the enemy, and then be able to act offensively with greater confidence.” Bagration received Barclay de Tolly's consent to fight at Vyazma. But Barclay did not fulfill his promise. The position near Vyazma turned out to be unsuccessful, the troops moved to the village of Fedorovskoye, but this position “is no good, it’s even worse that there is no water,” Bagration spoke of it. Platov, and then Konovnitsyn near Vyazma and Fedorovsk fought stubborn rearguard battles, holding back the pressure of the French army. The rearguard near Fedorovsk “was attacked by 40 squadrons of first-class French cavalry, operating with the support of two batteries. And this onslaught was contained. The main forces of the Russian army left, breaking away from the enemy who was pressing on them.” It was planned to fight a general battle in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, where militias and sapper units erected field fortifications.

Barclay de Tolly's long retreat caused great discontent among the people and the army. F.V. Rastopchin informed the Tsar: “Moscow wants Kutuzov to command and move our troops.” Alexander I, contrary to his wishes, had to yield to general demands and appoint 67-year-old Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich as commander-in-chief of the Russian army on August 8 (20). Kutuzov's appointment was greeted with delight by the army and people. This is how “cavalry maiden” Nadezhda Durova describes Kutuzov’s meeting near Tsarevo-Zaimishche; “Kutuzov has arrived!... soldiers, officers, generals are all in admiration; calm and confidence have taken the place of fears; our entire camp is seething and breathing with courage...”. Kutuzov's arrival instilled confidence in the success of the fight against Napoleon's invasion. Having received the army and familiarized himself with the conditions of the terrain and the preparation of the bridgehead for the deployment of the battle near Tsarevo-Zaimishche, Kutuzov recognized it as unsatisfactory and gave the order to retreat. The Russian army retreated to Gzhatsk and stopped at the village of Borodino, where a general battle took place.

The Battle of Borodino marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war. Napoleon's plans to defeat the Russian army collapsed. “The Russians, as Napoleon recognized, had acquired the right to be invincible. It was a struggle of giants.” The Battle of Borodino has gone down in history as one of the most striking examples of the heroic struggle of the peoples of our country against foreign invaders, as a patriotic feat in defense of their Motherland. Assessing the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov wrote: “I was not beaten, but won the battle over Bonoparty.” In the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon lost 58,578 soldiers and officers, including 49 generals, Kutuzov lost 38,506 soldiers, officers and 22 generals. The Battle of Borodino was the last stage of the defensive period of the war. After this, the period of counter-offensive begins. With the Battle of Borodino, “the people of Russia, their army and commander Kutuzov wrote a new glorious page in the history of their country, and at the same time in the history of Russian military art.”

After Borodin, Kutuzov decided to leave Moscow. It was necessary to gather forces to launch a counteroffensive, at least at the cost of leaving Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost,” Kutuzov said at the military council in Fili. He considered his first duty to be: to save the army, to get closer to those troops who were coming to reinforce it, and by the very entry of Moscow to prepare the inevitable death of the enemy." In his order, Kutuzov set a specific task for the army, which needed to "prepare for the task, reconsider weapons, remember that all of Europe and the dear Fatherland are looking at us."

On August 7 (19), French troops under the command of Marshal Davout entered Smolensk. The city lay in ruins and was engulfed in fires. This made a depressing impression on Napoleon's troops: in the destroyed Smolensk, soldiers and officers did not have the opportunity to settle down and rest. Of the 15 thousand inhabitants of the city, about a thousand remained in it; the rest died or fled with the Russian army.

Results of the battle. Perpetuation of memory

The Smolensk battle thwarted Napoleon's plan - to impose a general battle on the Russian army in conditions that were obviously unfavorable for it. The emperor himself subsequently admitted that he failed to “take Smolensk by surprise.” After the battle of Smolensk, the emperor began to seek peace with Russia. Russian military leaders and officers showed high skill in commanding troops in a difficult defensive battle in conditions of significant superiority of the enemy in forces and means. Napoleon's troops lost a total of about 10-12 thousand people in the battles near Smolensk, and the Russians lost 6-7 thousand people.

K. Clausewitz wrote that the defense of Smolensk was a “strange phenomenon”: “It could not turn into a general battle, because, naturally, after the loss of Smolensk, the Russians, who sent back one third of their forces with Bagration, would not get involved in a new business ; and even if the Russians had not lost Smolensk, then here they could in no way go on the offensive against the French army, since it would be contrary to reason to allow the French to gradually expose themselves to extermination by storming the walls of this city and thereby preparing themselves for defeat . Consequently, only a private battle could take place here, which could not make changes to the general position of both sides, expressed in the advance of the French and the retreat of the Russians. The advantages that Barclay had here were, firstly, that it was a battle that could in no way lead to a general defeat, which can easily happen when one is completely involved in a serious battle with an enemy with a significant superiority strength."

The first monument to the defenders of Smolensk appeared in the city on November 5, 1841, on the anniversary of its liberation from the French. The author of the monument in the Byzantine style was A. Adamini. On the eight faces of the pyramidal monument, the icon of the Smolensk Mother of God “Hodegetria” and the battle plan were depicted, as well as the names of Russian military leaders, the number of troops and losses of both sides in the Smolensk battle.

In 1912, in the year of the centenary of the war with Napoleon, the city boulevard of 1812 was inaugurated in Smolensk, and in it - a bust of M.I. Kutuzova. I was present at the opening ceremony myself. In the same year, a monument to the Second Infantry Emperor Sofia Regiment was unveiled in the city, which received a baptism of fire just during the defense of Smolensk. Finally, in 1913, the famous monument to the defenders of Smolensk in the War of 1812 by N. S. Shutsman, founded a year earlier, appeared in Smolensk. For the centenary of the Battle of Smolensk, books and brochures dedicated to this event were published in the city, performances and folk festivals were organized, and three car rallies were held.

In the area through which Murat was breaking through, the Russians had only one 27th Infantry Division under the command of General Dmitry Neverovsky (7 thousand people). It consisted entirely of recruits. But it was they who stood up on August 2 near the village of Krasnoye as an insurmountable wall on the path of Murat’s cavalry. Neverovsky took a position on the road, on the sides of which there was a birch forest, which prevented the cavalry from making a flanking move. Murat was forced to attack the Russian infantry head-on. Having lined up the soldiers in one column, Neverovsky addressed them with the words: “Guys, remember what you were taught. No cavalry will defeat you, just take your time when firing and shoot accurately. No one dare start without my command!” Bristling with bayonets, the Russian infantry repelled all attacks of the French cavalry. During the break between fights, Neverovsky encouraged his soldiers, conducted battle analysis and divisional exercises with them. The division did not allow a breakthrough of Murat's corps and retreated in an orderly manner to Smolensk y, covering himself with unfading glory. According to Napoleonic general Segur, "Neverovsky retreated like a lion." The damage to the Russians amounted to 1 thousand people, the French (according to their data) - 500 people. Thanks to the steadfastness of the 27th Division, the 1st and 2nd Armies managed to retreat to Smolensk and take up defense there.

1. Battle of Smolensk (1812)

On August 3, the Russian army retreated to Smolensk u. Bagration considered it necessary to fight a general battle here. But Barclay de Tolly insisted on continuing the retreat. He decided to give a rearguard battle in Smolensk and withdraw the main forces beyond the Dnieper. The first to enter the battle for Smolensk on August 4 was the corps of General Raevsky (15 thousand people), which repelled the attacks of the French corps of Marshal Ney (22 thousand people). On the evening of August 4, Barclay’s main forces (120 thousand people) arrived at Smolensk from near Rudnya. They are located north of the city. The weakened corps of Raevsky was replaced by the corps of Dokhturov, divisions of Neverovsky and Konovnitsyn (20 thousand people in total). They were supposed to cover the retreat of the 1st and 2nd armies to the Moscow road. All day on August 5, the Russian rearguard heroically held back the brutal onslaught of the main forces of the French army (140 thousand people). On the night of the sixth, the Russians left Smolensk. The bitterness of the soldiers was so great that they had to be taken by force to the rear, since they did not want to carry out the order to retreat. The division of General Konovnitsyn was the last to leave the burning city, conducting rearguard battles on August 6. While retreating, she blew up powder magazines and a bridge across the Dnieper. The Russians lost 10 thousand people in this battle, the French - 20 thousand people.

1. Battle at Valutina Mountain (1812)

After the Battle of Smolensk, on August 7, Napoleon once again tried to cut off the retreat routes of the 1st Army, which had not yet managed to cross the Dnieper and retreat to Dorogobuzh. To capture the Dnieper crossing, Napoleon sent forward Ney's corps (40 thousand people). To contain the French, Barclay advanced to the village of Valutina Gora (10 km east of Smolensk a) rearguard under the command of General Pavel Tuchkov (over 3 thousand people). Ney intended to immediately crush the small Russian detachment that had taken up positions near the village, but Tuchkov’s soldiers stood unshakably and valiantly repelled the onslaught of the French. By evening, due to reinforcements that arrived in time, the number of Russian troops at Valutina Gora was increased to 22 thousand people. The fierce battle lasted here until late at night. During the last attack in the moonlight, Tuchkov, wounded by bayonets, was captured. By that time, the main forces of the 1st Army had already managed to cross the Dnieper. The Russian losses in this battle amounted to 5 thousand people, the French - over 8 thousand people. The Battle of Valutina Gora ended the two-week Smolensk operation, as a result of which the “key to Moscow” fell and the Russians retreated again without fighting a general battle. Now the French army, gathered into one fist, moved towards Moscow.

The Battle of Smolensk in 1812 was the first major clash between the Russian and French armies during. It is interesting in that it largely determined the further course of the campaign, but none of the participants got what they wanted.

Objective and subjective prerequisites

Objectively, Smolensk was a suitable place to delay the Russian army for several reasons.

1. Although it was outdated, it was a fortress - during the Polish intervention, the city was surrounded by a brick wall.
2. Smolensk served as the “key to Moscow”, covering the path to the first capital in the direction of Napoleon’s main attack.
3. The Russian army on the approaches to the city was quite numerous (it managed to unite with Bagration), so it had a chance to resist the French.

But at the same time, the commanders of the two armies had radically different plans for Smolensk. Napoleon needed a general battle, and he was looking for a way to force the Russian army to give it. The Battle of Smolensk may have suited him - although the French forces were greatly stretched, they were still superior to the Russians.

The Russian “war party” led by Bagration also dreamed of a general battle. They can be understood - the enemy has tested their patience for too long. But they did not take into account the unpreparedness of their own army. It was not a matter of the number of soldiers, but of their equipment. And the Smolensk fortress was not ready for a siege. A significant part of the city was made up of unprotected wooden suburbs.

But Barclay de Tolly categorically did not want a general battle. You can’t get into his head - consciously or not, but with this he broke the enemy’s plans. But he could not personally give orders in the army - formally Bagration was subordinate to him, but in reality the army listened more to Bagration.

Main stages of the battle

Several key episodes can be distinguished in the Battle of Smolensk. Both armies did not act flawlessly. Barclay (as it turned out) had poor reconnaissance; he had no information about the enemy’s location. Napoleon had complete information about the enemy (his reconnaissance worked), but did not understand his plans and relied on the methods of “imposing” a general battle that had worked in the past.

On August 8, Barclay launched an attack on Rudnya, but it was not successful - the commander-in-chief made a mistake in assessing the enemy’s forces near Porechye (or perhaps he deliberately delayed an offensive that was unnecessary in his opinion). On August 14, Napoleon left Rudnya, Porechye and Velizh, crossed the Dnieper and began to capture Smolensk. If the entire Russian army had been there and decided to defend itself, the French emperor would have had his pitched battle.

On August 14, the battle of Krasnoye took place - General Neverovsky’s detachment repelled 40 attacks and delayed the enemy for a day, inflicting noticeable (but only tactical) damage on him.

On August 16-18, the battle for the city itself took place. Fearing encirclement, Barclay on the very first day sent Bagration’s troops to hold the road to Moscow, and the warlike general did an excellent job with this. In the city itself, generals Raevsky (the future hero of Borodin) and Neverovsky, who made their way there with the remnants of their division, distinguished themselves. It was almost impossible to hold the city - the French had heavy artillery and numerical superiority. But the battle for Smolensk turned into a kind of rearguard defense - thanks to it, the vast majority of the townspeople and almost the entire army managed to escape.

Unobvious results

The significance of the Battle of Smolensk did not immediately become obvious. Barclay was considered almost a traitor for him, but after Smolensk the “scorched earth” tactic was widely used, and coupled with the retreat in the name of preserving the army, it fully justified itself. Residents of cities along the Smolensk Highway managed to leave, leaving the enemy devastated land.

The warlike generals “let off steam” and tested the enemy’s strength. It became obvious that Napoleon could be defeated.

Napoleon won, but did not receive a general battle and did not inflict significant damage on the Russians. The losses of the armies are estimated differently, but in general they are approximately equal and insignificant (6-7 thousand killed each).

Later, experts noted that Smolensk characterized the entire campaign of 1812 as a whole, as the Russians saw it: scorched earth, exhausting the enemy and retreating until it was possible to adequately arm the army and receive reinforcements.

The total number of their troops reached 120 thousand people. Commander-in-Chief Barclay expressed his intention, to the general joy of the soldiers, to finally launch an attack on the enemy; the army moved forward in a direct direction to Vitebsk. But she had barely made a few transitions when news was received that enemy troops were stretching between the Dvina and the Dnieper to Porechye; Barclay took the right, north of Smolensk. The news, however, was false: Napoleon walked in the opposite direction, to Krasny, easily transferred up to 200 thousand people across the Dnieper and rushed to Smolensk from the south in the undoubted hope of taking it by surprise, going to the rear of the Russian army and cutting it off both from Moscow, and from the southern provinces.

Military actions near Smolensk in 1812. Plan

His skillful movement was almost crowned with complete success: one regiment was in Smolensk. The Russian commander-in-chief stood 40 miles away, not at all suspecting the danger that threatened him, and the enemy was already in Krasnoye, from where he could reach Smolensk before the Russian army. The road was almost open: at Krasny there was only a detachment of seven thousand, composed mostly of recruits who had not yet seen fire. Napoleon didn't even think about him. But this detachment was commanded by a general Neverovsky. With a handful of men, he decided to hold off the enemy for at least a few hours and entered into a fierce struggle with the entire vanguard of the French army. Numerous enemy cavalry, led by Murat himself, quickly attacked him on August 2 (14), 1812 in huge masses from the front, flanks, and rear. At the very beginning of the battle, Neverovsky lost all the guns that were with him, but did not lose his presence of mind. Having folded the battalions into a square, he met the enemies with the courage of a hero, overthrew them and began to retreat slowly, orderly, delaying the enemy at every step, repelling him with rifle fire and bayonets; he retreated like a lion, according to the French. Murat launched his cavalry into the attack forty times, exhausted all his efforts, and all in vain: Neverovsky fought back, giving time to Raevsky’s corps to occupy Smolensk.

General Dmitry Petrovich Neverovsky. Portrait by J. Doe, 1823-1825

But the danger has not yet passed. The commander-in-chief, not having correct information about what was happening on the left bank of the Dnieper, remained in his previous position, while all of Napoleon’s forces surrounded Smolensk on three sides like a menacing cloud, in order to take it the next day and, having captured the Moscow road, strike at the rear of our main army. General Raevsky, having informed Barclay de Tolly about the current state of affairs, he decided with a 16,000-strong corps to defend, until the army arrived, a vast city, surrounded by dilapidated fortifications erected at the end of the 16th century, against 200,000 people. On August 4 (16), 1812, at dawn, the French launched an attack in many places; The main attack was on the royal bastion, where Paskevich stood. Raevsky wanted to die under the ruins of Smolensk rather than lose it to his enemies, fought all day and in the evening repulsed the enemy, already in sight of the main army, which did not march, but fled to the battlefield and concentrated on the opposite bank of the Dnieper.

Napoleon expected that Barclay de Tolly would decide to fight to save Smolensk, and prepared to meet him in an open field, celebrating the victory in advance. The commander-in-chief thought differently: less than ever did he consider it possible to engage in battle with an enemy almost twice as strong; His main concern was to again take possession of the Moscow road, which was almost occupied by enemies, and to get closer to the militia, which was hurrying from Moscow and Kaluga, in order to at least somewhat balance its forces with those of Napoleon. As a result, it was decided: the army would retreat towards Dorogobuzh; and to cover the retreat of the corps Dokhturova, who replaced the tired troops of Raevsky, defend Smolensk to the last opportunity.

Battle of Smolensk 1812. Painting by P. von Hess, 1846

At dawn on August 5 (17), 1812, Napoleon resumed attacks, albeit weakly, in the hope of luring Barclay into an open field; Having finally learned that the Russian army was reaching out along the right bank of the Dnieper to Dorogobuzh, he hurried to capture Smolensk in order to attack it, and led a general attack; half the French army went into action. The attack failed; Dokhturov repulsed enemies at all points. The day was approaching evening. Napoleon, beside himself with rage, ordered to go ahead, and on the eve of the Transfiguration of the Lord the fate of Smolensk was decided. A terrible cannonade thundered; the city burst into flames in many places; the fire spread like a river; bombs fell like a hail on houses and churches, where unfortunate Smolensk residents with their wives and children crowded, emitting cries of despair. Buildings were destroyed, towers fell; but the Russian army stood unshakably along the walls and with cold-blooded courage repelled the enemies who were breaking into the city. Dokhturov and Konovnitsyn fought off the French; Neverovsky - Poles. At nightfall the enemy withdrew with the loss of 12,000 men.

The commander-in-chief, having achieved his goal, ordered Dokhturov to leave the ruins of Smolensk and join the army, which was in full motion towards Dorogobuzh. Napoleon, still hoping to overtake her, occupied the deserted Smolensk and transferred his main forces to the Moscow road in the intention of catching up with our scattered corps. In fact, Marshal Ney and Murat managed to cut off our rearguard; but brave Pavel Tuchkov(Tuchkov 3rd) managed to save him, sacrificing his detachment and his own freedom (he was captured by the French). The army retreated to Dorogobuzh, from there to Vyazma, and finally to Tsarev-Zaimishch in such an order that Napoleon, following on its heels and having almost continuous skirmishes with our rearguard, did not manage to recapture a single gun or cart.

On the way from Smolensk, the enemy found only the ruins of villages and hamlets, burned by the inhabitants themselves, who were hiding in the forests, setting on fire everything that they could not take with them. He walked without guides and often wandered along country roads. The war itself took exactly the same form as more than a hundred years earlier, during the invasion of Charles XII, with the only difference that Peter the Great acted according to a predetermined plan, with full and clear conviction of the need to avoid a decisive battle until the enemy, lured into deserted deserts, will not weaken in his strength. Peter did not spare either the cities or the villages, he set them on fire, strictly ordered the people to retire into the forests, and Karl found ashes, ruins and deserted deserts everywhere on his way. Napoleon also encountered the same thanks to the selflessness of the Russian people, who, according to the desire of their own mind and heart, tried to harm the enemy, not sparing their blood or their last property. The consequences were inevitably the same as those experienced by Charles XII at Poltava, and impartial posterity will never forget the great merit of Barclay de Tolly, who saved the Russian army by constantly avoiding a battle that would have destroyed it irrevocably, along with Russia and Europe.

Based on materials from the works of the outstanding pre-revolutionary historian N. G. Ustryalov.