Andrey Ignatov. battle of the battleships

We have all heard recently about tragedies in the army that are associated with modern weapons. The feeling of pride that grips Russians at the launch of the newest nuclear submarine "Gepard", naturally the best in the world, or about the news about the latest domestic developments in the field of weapons gives way to bewilderment from reports when an unsinkable submarine sinks during an exercise or unexpectedly for everyone The most reliable plane crashes on takeoff. It becomes clear that the sudden saturation of the Russian army with the latest military equipment, the lack of which generals constantly complain about, will not solve the problem of its combat effectiveness. Historian V.I. Klyuchevsky wisely warned that “history is not a teacher, but a supervisor...: it does not teach anything, but only punishes for ignorance of the lessons.” The military history of Russia of the 20th century has many tragic examples, given to us to learn lessons, but, unfortunately, we have not learned, dooming us to repeat them again and again. One such example when the human factor had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war was the terrible defeat of the Russian imperial fleet in the war with Japan of 1904-1905.

Our ideas about the terrible defeat of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan are so firmly established that, at first glance, they do not require much discussion on this topic. Indeed, if we summarize the reasons for the defeat of the Pacific squadron during the Russo-Japanese War, the conclusion seems simple and clear - the Japanese fleet of Admiral Togo, which had superiority in strength, artillery and speed, won. In Russian historiography, there has already been a tradition of justifying and seeking the reasons for the military defeats of the Russian army and navy in the “quantitative superiority of the enemy,” the presence of “outdated military equipment,” “rotten autocracy,” the enemy’s superiority “in strength, artillery and speed,” etc. Of course, it is very tempting to attribute the reasons for the terrible catastrophe of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan to the tsarist regime and the technical superiority of the enemy.

However, in his work “Witnesses of Tsushima,” the historian Westwood N. rightly noted that in the ideas of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian fleet “was a collection of technically obsolete battleships commanded by idiots and controlled by anarchists, the other was the pinnacle of English shipbuilding, controlled by impeccably trained people under the command of Nelson " And further, summing up the study, he concludes that “neither Russian artillery fire nor the designs of Russian ships were as bad as is usually imagined, Russian officers as a whole were not incompetent.” Disputes are still raging about how to explain that the Russian fleet, one of the largest in the world, lost the battle at sea.

On October 2, 1904, the 2nd Pacific Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky set off from the port of Libau on a campaign to the Far East from the Baltic. The hike was difficult and long. Only on December 8, having passed the Cape of Good Hope in a storm, the squadron entered the Indian Ocean. On April 25, 1905, off the coast of Indochina, all ships, including the squadron of Admiral Nebogatov (battleships “Emperor Nicholas I” (1892), “Admiral Ushakov” (1895), “Sisoy the Great” (1896), “Navarin” (1891)) , connected. In historiography, there is an opinion that the ships of Nebogatov’s squadron “having no combat value, ... at best, could only count on diverting part of the Japanese forces to themselves.” However, the “old men” have proven that they are capable of more. In just two and a half months, Nebogatov’s detachment managed to catch up with Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, completing an exemplary long-distance ocean crossing.

The power of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was impressive. The battle column included 4 new battleships: “Borodino” (1903), “Prince Suvorov” (1904), “Emperor Alexander III” (1904), “Eagle” (1904). Seven battleships complemented the main strike force: Admiral General Apraksin (1895), Oslyabya (1898), Admiral Senyavin (1895), Admiral Ushakov (1895), Navarin (1891), Sisoy the Great "(1896) and "Emperor Nicholas I" (1892). In addition to 11 battleships, the squadron included armored cruisers: Admiral Nakhimov (1888), Vladimir Monomakh (1884) and Dmitry Donskoy (1885). Armored, light and auxiliary cruisers: Oleg (1904), Aurora (1902), Zhemchug (1904), Svetlana (1898), Izumrud (1904), Almaz (1901) and Ural" (1890), as well as 9 destroyers - "Brave" (1901), "Buiny" (1901), "Bystry" (1901), "Bedovy" (1902), "Bodriy" (1902), "Impeccable" ( 1902), “Brilliant” (1901), “Terrible” (1901), “Loud” (1901). Thus, the Russian squadron of Admiral Rozhestvensky, which entered the Tsushima Strait, consisted of 38 pennants, taking into account transports (Irtysh, Korea, Anadyr), hospital ships (Eagle, Kostroma), tugs (Rus ", "Svir") and the transport workshop "Kamchatka".

The main task set by St. Petersburg for Admiral Rozhestvensky was to “gain dominance in the Sea of ​​Japan,” that is, to defeat the Japanese fleet and turn the tide of the Russo-Japanese War in favor of Russia. But the death of the Arthur squadron greatly complicated the task. In December 1904, all the ships of the Pacific squadron were sunk in Port Arthur Bay. Ironically, the last battleship that voluntarily “committed suicide” on the outer roadstead from Japanese torpedoes bore the fatal name “Sevastopol.” Soon after the end of the war, the Japanese will raise and repair almost all the Russian ships sunk in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur, and introduce them into their fleet.

The entire enemy fleet under the command of the “Japanese Nelson” Heihachiro Togo had 4 battleships, 2 obsolete coastal defense battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 14 armored and light cruisers, several auxiliary cruisers and about 30 destroyers.

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. The main striking force of the fleets were battleships and armored cruisers. Light cruisers and destroyers played a supporting role in the decisive squadron battle and did not take an active part in naval battles. If we take into account the battleships and armored cruisers of the main battle columns of the opponents, then the balance of forces of the Russian and Japanese squadrons will be as follows:

Quantitative ratio of main caliber artillery of Russian and Japanese combat columns on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima

Artillery caliber in inches (mm) 12 // (305 mm) 10 // (254 mm) 8 // (203 mm) 6 // (152 mm)

Russian battle column (12 ships - 11 battleships and 1 armored cruiser) 26 20 8 91

Japanese battle column (12 ships - 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers) 16 1 30 158

Consequently, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had an advantage in modern large-caliber artillery of 305 and 254 mm, but were inferior in speed due to the presence of transport and slow-moving ships. In an order on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Rozhdestvensky correctly characterized the balance of forces: “... We and the Japanese each have 12 ships in the battle column, but we outnumber them in the number of heavy guns that decide the outcome of the battle. True, we are inferior to the Japanese in speed, but this does not matter much, since we are not going to run away.”

It is also necessary to take into account that the enemy ships were pretty battered by the battles with the 1st Pacific Squadron and the blockade of Port Arthur. The decisive advantage of the Japanese was military experience and knowledge of the enemy. Japanese ships could conduct accurate shooting at a distance of over 30-40 cables. Consequently, in order to paralyze this advantage, the command of the Russian squadron needed to strive for a quick and maximum approach to the Japanese combat column in the upcoming battle. At the same time, the combat potential of the Russian squadron made it possible, if not to defeat the Japanese fleet, then to inflict significant damage on it and achieve victory in an open naval battle.

On the afternoon of May 13 (the day before the battle (?!) Admiral Rozhdestvensky for the first time!) decided to carry out a squadron check of the rangefinder installations on all warships of the battleship column. The cruiser "Svetlana" was sent to the horizon, and at the signal, all ships were simultaneously supposed to show the distance measured to the cruiser, determined by rangefinders. While on the battleship Suvorov the distance was determined to be 100 cables, other ships showed 60-70. The results demonstrated the squadron's unpreparedness for a decisive battle on which the outcome of the war depended. What prevented the rangefinders for artillery from being checked and put in order during the six-month campaign remains a mystery? This fact can be explained by only one thing - the negligence of the officers of Russian ships.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky understood that with such poor combat training it was impossible to complete the task of conquering the Sea of ​​Japan. Therefore, moving towards the Tsushima Strait, the task was set to try to break through to Vladivostok. In studies about the tragedy of the Russian squadron, the dominant opinion of historians is about the complete mediocrity of Admiral Rozhestvensky. In fairness, it should be noted that it is unlikely that the “mediocre” admiral would have been able to lead the 2nd Pacific Squadron across three oceans to the shores of Japan in the most difficult conditions without losses.

As you can see, the weakness of the 2nd squadron of Admiral Rozhestvensky was not hidden in its insufficient numbers or artillery weapons, as is commonly believed in historical literature. It is not the tons of displacement or the number of guns that will decide the outcome of the main clash in the Tsushima Strait. What is also needed is good combat training, a high level of organization of fighting forces, an understanding of the meaning of the struggle and, most importantly, the will to win. Only if these prerequisites are present do ships acquire combat value and turn into a formidable force for the enemy, and not into helpless targets for enemy artillery. It is significant that already when the squadron left Kronstadt, the commander of the battleship “Emperor Alexander III” N.M. Bukhvostov said: “There will be no victory!.. I’m afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us... I guarantee one thing: we will all die, but we will not surrender” (In the Battle of Tsushima from 900 people of the battleship's personnel, not a single person was saved). With such defeatist sentiments of Russian officers, there really was no chance of victory.

At dawn on May 14, 1905, Rozhestvensky's squadron moved towards the Tsushima Strait. The weather was cloudy and foggy. The marching formation of Russian ships consisted of two columns, which were headed by the battleships Suvorov, the flag of Admiral Rozhestvensky, and the battleship Nicholas I, the flag of Admiral Nebogatov. At 7.30, the Japanese cruiser Izumi appeared on a parallel course to the squadron, transmitting information about the movement of Russian ships to the headquarters of Admiral Togo. When a detachment of light Japanese cruisers under the command of Admiral Dev passed by the squadron, overtaking it, it became clear to everyone that a decisive collision with the main forces of the Japanese fleet could not be avoided. An accidental shot from the gun of the battleship "Eagle" at the flagship of the Dev squadron was perceived by the ships as a signal to open fire. The battleships Admiral Senyavin, Admiral Ushakov and Admiral General Apraksin fired a salvo at the column of Japanese cruisers. One shell hit the flagship cruiser Chitose, but Rozhestvensky gave the order to cease fire.

After the reorganization, the battle order of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was as follows: an armored detachment led by the flagship “Prince Suvorov”, followed in the column by “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”. To their left, in a separate column, were “Oslyabya”, “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin”, “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Nicholas I”, “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov”. Next are the cruisers “Svetlana”, “Almaz” and “Ural”. The cruisers "Pearl" and "Izumrud" accompanied Rozhdestvensky's column. They were followed by transports and destroyers under the cover of the cruisers Oleg (the flag of Admiral Enquist), Aurora, Dmitry Donskoy, and Vladimir Monomakh.

At 13.30, a combat column of the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon from the darkness. Leading the way were the Japanese battleships led by the Mikaza under the flag of Admiral Togo, followed by the battleships Shikishima, Fuji, Asahi and the armored cruisers Kassuga and Nisshin. The first six ships were followed by armored cruisers: Iwate, under the flag of Admiral Kamimura, followed by Izumo, Asama, Tokiwa and Azuma. In total, there are 11 warships in one wake column (the cruiser Yakumo will join later). The Japanese squadron was moving at a speed of at least 16 knots.

The restructuring of the Russian squadron into two columns, when the strongest and fastest battleships (Suvorov, Alexander III, Orel and Borodino) marched in a separate column and could, with the help of a maneuver, paralyze the action of Togo’s squadron, was the correct decision of Rozhdestvensky. Thus, initially Admiral Rozhestvensky, an experienced artilleryman and naval commander, was determined to take decisive action. However, when the Japanese battle column approached, Rozhdestvensky suddenly began to rebuild his detachment of battleships into a common line. The ships led by Oslyabya were forced to slow down in order to let the battleships of the first detachment pass. Rozhdestvensky’s unsuccessful maneuver at the very beginning of the battle led to disruption of the formation of the entire squadron, and the battleship Oslyabya even stalled the vehicles and stopped, turning its left side to the enemy. Admiral Togo took advantage of this moment and successively turned his squadron by 1800.

Refusing decisive action, Admiral Rozhdestvensky submitted to enemy tactics and took the battle at long range, which was extremely disadvantageous for Russian ships. Russian shells had great destructive power at short distances (15-20 kb.). Therefore, it was beneficial for us to fight at the shortest distance, when the accuracy of fire did not depend on the accuracy of the instruments, and the damage to enemy ships would be maximum. Thus, at the beginning of the battle, Rozhdestvensky had the opportunity to decisively attack Togo’s squadron with the latest battleships and confuse the Japanese formation, depriving them of the ability to maneuver. Having pulled up a second column led by the battleship Oslyabya, the battle would have turned into a battle at close range, where the advantage would have been on the side of the Russian battleships.

Having taken aim, the Japanese developed full intensity fire. The thunder of explosions, the clang of tearing steel, and a fiery whirlwind covered the Russian squadron. Basically, the Japanese ships hit the battleships "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyabya", which they literally bombarded with shells. These ships suffered terrible damage and were engulfed in fires. The battleship Oslyabya became the first casualty in the Battle of Tsushima. From the first salvo, the Japanese took aim at the stationary Oslyabya, which began to receive hits from 12-inch heavy shells on the bow along the waterline opposite the conning tower. The ship shuddered from a barrage of enemy shells, snarling in response salvoes. First, all the battleships fired at him, and then six armored cruisers of Admiral Kamimura. As a result of repeated hits by Japanese shells on the Oslyabya, armor plates began to fall off the side, the bolts of which were destroyed by the explosion of high-explosive shells. New hits made a huge hole in the exposed side. The bow of the battleship sank to the upper deck. 30 minutes after the start of the battle, the Oslyabya, with a broken side of the entire bow, with underwater holes along the waterline in the bow, a broken and tilted 10-inch bow turret, with destroyed bow casemates and with a huge fire on the bow bridge, rolled out of formation, plunging with its nose . Going into the water, the ship continued to fall on the left side, and gradually its pipes lay on the water, covering the surface of the sea with clouds of smoke. The Oslyabya team began to rush into the water. The destroyers Buiny and Bystry hurried to the dying ship and began to pick up people. "Oslyabya" disappeared under the water. The ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank V.I., died. Baer, ​​most of the officers, all the mechanics and engine crew who remained under the armored deck. The destroyer Buiny managed to pick up up to 250 people from the water.

The squadron, which saw the death of the battleship Oslyabya, experienced shock. It was impossible to imagine that this huge ship, like an iceberg, could sink so quickly! “The impression of this gigantic battleship capsizing,” recalled an eyewitness, “was stunning. From other ships it was clearly visible how people from the deck were climbing onto its sides, how they were clinging, sliding, falling ... swept away by the fire of enemy shells.” The memoirs of the surviving participants of the Tsushima battle (more precisely, the massacre) are impossible to read calmly. They described the battle as the day of Armageddon.

The flagship battleship Suvorov became the main target of the six leading Japanese ships. The mainmast and aft chimney were knocked down, the aft 12-inch tower was blown up, the roof of which was torn off by the explosion and thrown to the side. All the artillery towers on the left side were already inactive, the entire unarmored side was destroyed, there was an underwater hole against the conning tower, like the Oslyabya, due to the detachment of armor plates. A Japanese shell hit the flagship's conning tower. The officers of the ship and the headquarters of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who was also seriously wounded, were seriously wounded and killed. The ship was engulfed in a complete fire. A tail of smoke trailed across the water behind him. Controlled by machines, he walked out of formation, following the squadron and crossed it twice. After 5 o'clock in the afternoon, both pipes and masts were already knocked down on the battleship. Its appearance became so unrecognizable that Russian ships mistook it for a disfigured Japanese ship and shot at it.

The agonizing Russian squadron rushed to get out, at least temporarily, from under the deadly enemy fire. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" attempted to break through on the enemy's tail. However, this maneuver was quickly noticed by Admiral Togo. His battleships made a turn “all of a sudden” and, with the cruiser “Nissin” as the lead, set on the opposite course. The Japanese squadron clearly performed this complex maneuver at full speed, demonstrating high training and the ability to quickly navigate in battle. At the same time, the Russian squadron lost organized command and became convinced of the enemy's superiority both in the art of maneuvering and in the ability to conduct squadron artillery fire.

“About 3 o’clock. 20 minutes. "Alexander", severely beaten on the left side, with a huge fire, broke down to the right, that is, in the direction opposite to the enemy. At first he tried to enter the wake of the Eagle, but rolled to the left. "Eagle" overtook him at a distance of one cable length. On the Alexander, many holes were visible in the thin side; a particularly large hole, apparently from two 12-inch shells fired in salvo from the guns of one turret, was against the forward 12-inch turret. In many places around the holes, the old red lead primer from the time of construction has burned away and exposed. The ship therefore seemed bloody. Flames and clouds of thick smoke poured out from the side holes. Pipes and masts stood on it. Most of the towers were still in operation.”

The lead battleship remained the Borodino, which had not yet suffered serious damage. Turning south, where at that time the transports were crowded together, and the light cruisers were fighting off numerous enemy cruisers, the squadron approached the Suvorov. “Suvorov” without a mainmast and a rear funnel, with a fragment of the foremast, with destroyed bridges and bow, huge fires, cut through the Russian column like a blind man.

“About 4 o’clock. 20 minutes. "Suvorov" once again cut through our formation. By this time, he had lost both pipes and masts and was a continuous fire from bow to stern. His appearance was unrecognizable and terrible. Since the appearance of the Suvorov near our column seemed unexpected to many, some ships mistook it for a destroyed Japanese ship and fired several shots at it. The Japanese launched vigorous mine attacks against the Suvorov. It fired back with one surviving 75-mm cannon from the aft casemate. To cover the Suvorov, Borodino and Orel opened rapid fire on the enemy destroyers from all guns on the left side. Even the servants of the 47 mm guns were called to the bridges. They fired segmented shells from 6-inch turrets, and the enemy destroyers retreated.”

When the battleship Suvorov signaled the need to remove the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff from the doomed ship, the destroyer Buiny approached the ship. Commander of the destroyer “Buiny”, captain 2nd rank N.N. Kolomeytsev later recalled: “The masts are knocked down, the pipes are knocked down, the entire side is battered and holed, the paint on the side is scorched, and flames are bursting out from inside... The picture reminds me of a brazier with coals.” The wounded admiral and 19 officers and orderlies of the headquarters were taken from the Suvorov to the destroyer Buiny. At this time, only one gun in the stern casemate was operational on the battleship. With a signal from the Bystry, Admiral Rozhestvensky notified the squadron that he was transferring command to Admiral Nebogatov.

Helpless and abandoned by the squadron, the flagship "Prince Suvorov" was attacked at 19:00. 29 min. evening by a detachment of Japanese destroyers and was sunk by an explosion of four torpedoes fired at point-blank range. Not far from the Suvorov, the Kamchatka transport, which was trying to protect it, sank. The ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Ignatius, all the officers and personnel of the Suvorov died with the flagship.

Around 7 p.m. The battleship "Alexander III", with huge holes, with a large list and fire, signaling "I am in distress!", was out of action. The battleship quickly fell to starboard, firing a final salvo from the two surviving guns of the middle turret. Its bottom appeared above the water, and several dozen people managed to climb onto it, all of whom died when the ship sank. Cruisers and destroyers rushed towards him, but the enemy fired heavily at them. There were no survivors from the battleship Emperor Alexander III.

Taking advantage of the retreat to the south of a detachment of Japanese battleships that had temporarily lost the Russian squadron, Borodino gathered the remaining ships and led them to the north. When the Japanese battleships, coming from the south on a parallel course, caught up with the convoy, the Borodino was subjected to concentrated fire, but stubbornly continued to move towards Vladivostok, no longer maneuvering. The Borodino artillery began to gradually fall silent. Severe fires started on it. The wardroom, admiral's quarters, bow casemates, and aft bridges were on fire, on which 47-mm shells were exploding. His waterline was continuously hit by volleys of 12-inch Japanese guns. Huge columns of water rose at the side, shrouded in smoke and flame. Huge tongues of fire burst out from the gun casemates of the battleship. At the last moment there was an explosion of ammunition, a fiery flame shot up from the water near the waterline and the battleship fell on the starboard side in one minute. For some time the ship still floated upside down, and its propellers continued to rotate. People running along the bottom waved their arms and cried out for help. Suddenly, an internal explosion of ammunition occurred, the hull went under water and everyone died.

As darkness fell, the battle stopped. At night, the surviving ships of the Russian squadron lost each other. Only a small detachment under the command of Admiral Nebogatov, fighting off enemy mine attacks, continued to maintain organized control. As a result of night mine attacks, the battleships Navarin and Sisoy the Great, the cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, and the destroyer Bezuprechny were sunk.

On the morning of May 15, a detachment of five ships of Admiral Nebogatov (battleships Emperor Nicholas I, Orel, Admiral General Apraksin, Admiral Senyavin and the cruiser Izumrud) found themselves surrounded by Japanese ships led by Admiral Togo. All enemy ships had no external damage! From a great distance, the cruiser Kasuga opened fire on the flagship Emperor Nicholas I. The Russian column stopped and stopped the cars. “Nikolai” did not respond to enemy fire and raised the signal: “Surrounded, I surrender.” Then it was transmitted to the detachment: “Surrounded by superior enemy forces, I am forced to surrender.” Only the battleship "Eagle" opened fire from its gun turret even before the surrender signal was raised. The Japanese did not immediately understand Nebogatov’s signal and continued shelling the stationary flagship. The chimney on it was broken, there was a huge hole in the bow at the waterline, and a fire broke out on the bow bridge. Admiral Nebogatov ordered the Japanese flag to be raised. The cruiser "Emerald" went into full swing, rushing to break through the closing line of Japanese cruisers. Two Japanese cruisers chased after him, but the Emerald escaped the ring. Having broken through to the Russian shores, the team sank the cruiser Izumrud in St. Vladimir Bay. The Japanese also managed to capture the destroyer Bedovy with the wounded Admiral Rozhestvensky. The transport "Irtysh" and the destroyers "Buiny" and "Brilliant" were sunk by personnel to avoid capture by the enemy.

On the afternoon of May 15, the Japanese single-handedly finished off the scattered ships: the battleship Admiral Ushakov, the cruiser Svetlana, and the destroyers Bodriy and Gromky. The cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" entered into an unequal battle with 6 enemy cruisers. And only after the ammunition was used up, the Dmitry Donskoy was sunk by its crew. The cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny broke through to Vladivostok. The cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Pearl" went to a neutral port in the Philippine Islands, the destroyer "Bodriy" went to Shanghai and disarmed

The Battle of Tsushima on May 14-15, 1905 ended in disaster for the 2nd Pacific Squadron and the Russian naval forces. In the battle, 21 ships out of 38 were sunk, 5 ships were captured, 6 ships were disarmed, 4 ships broke through, one of them was sunk by personnel, 1 hospital ship was detained by the Japanese, 1 ship was released by the Japanese, 1 ship returned to the Baltic Sea. In total, the squadron's personnel numbered 16,170 people. Losses of squadron personnel: 208 officers were killed and drowned, 75 artillerymen, 4761 lower ranks, and a total of 5044 people. 225 officers, 87 artillerymen, 5670 lower ranks, a total of 5982 people were captured. There were 2,110 people left on the disarmed ships. 870 people broke through to Vladivostok.

The Japanese fleet lost three destroyers in the Battle of Tsushima!

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the signing of peace in Portsmouth on difficult terms for Russia, in St. Petersburg they decided to hold a trial regarding the surrender of ships in Tsushima. In addition to Admiral Nebogatov, the commanders of the surrendered battleships and their entire officer corps were brought to justice. In addition, an investigation was underway into the case of the surrender of the destroyer Bedovy, in which Admiral Rozhdestvensky, his staff officers, the commander and officers of the destroyer Bedovy were accused. Thus, Rozhdestvensky, Nebogatov, their staffs, the commanders of the captured ships and all officers must be punished for the death of the fleet in Tsushima. Admiral Nebogatov and the commanders of the ships “Nikolai I”, “Admiral Apraksin” and “Admiral Senyavin”, who received minor damage in the battle, retained artillery, shells and life-saving equipment, were sentenced by the court to death with a replacement by imprisonment in a fortress for a period of 10 years. The officers of the surrendered ships were exempt from responsibility, since they obeyed the orders of their superiors and their condemnation would be tantamount to a demand for mutiny and disobedience on the ship. Admiral Rozhdestvensky, captured unconscious on the destroyer Bedovy, was released from responsibility for the surrender. The organizers of the surrender were found guilty and sentenced to death, replaced by imprisonment in a fortress for 10 years - the chief of staff of Admiral Rozhestvensky, captain 1st rank Clappier de Colong, flag navigator Colonel Filippovsky, flagship miner Lieutenant Leontiev and destroyer commander captain 2nd rank Baranov . All officers of Bedovoy and other ranks of Rozhdestvensky’s headquarters were released from responsibility. All convicts were released under an amnesty after 2 years in 1909.

The defeat of the Russian squadron in the Battle of Tsushima in historical science is determined by the following reasons: “The defeat of the squadron was due to the significant superiority of the enemy in forces, the technical imperfection of Russian ships, insufficient combat training of personnel, and the mediocrity of the command. In a word, defeat was predetermined by the economic backwardness of tsarist Russia, the rottenness of its political system and the adventurism of the autocracy’s foreign policy.”

What kind of technical imperfection of Russian ships can we talk about when, during the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese flagship battleship Mikaza was hit by 36 shells, and, for example, the battleship Orel was hit by 142! "Eagle" stayed afloat and did not die only because night fell and the battle temporarily stopped. Consequently, the Russian battleships that died in the Battle of Tsushima during the battle received many more hits from Japanese shells than the battleship "Eagle"! According to the Japanese themselves, on Admiral Togo's flagship "Mikaza" the conning tower, front and rear bridges were damaged, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, pipes were broken, gun barrels were damaged, casemates and the deck were broken. One can imagine what would be left of the battleship Mikaza (and, accordingly, of other Japanese ships) if at least 142 Russian shells hit it!

One should also object to the supposedly weak armor of Russian ships. The Japanese spent the entire battle using high-explosive shells alone, without using armor-piercing shells. During the battle, not a single Russian ship had its armor breached. The death of the battleship Oslyabya occurred as a result of the failure of the armor plates of the upper protection belt. This was due to a large number of hits from Japanese 12-inch high-explosive shells. The armor belt of “Prince Suvorov”, “Emperor Alexander III” and “Borodino” remained unharmed and allowed them to remain survivable for a long time. Their capsizing and death (“Emperor Alexander III” and “Borodino”) occurred as a result of the accumulation of water during firefighting and tilting. By the way, after the battle, Japanese officers expressed extreme surprise at the resilience of our battleships, which remained in service, even after receiving such heavy and numerous damage.

The overall losses of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan were terrible. In the war at sea, the Japanese United Fleet managed to destroy the ships of the Pacific and Baltic fleets (2nd Pacific squadron) almost in their entirety.

Irreversible losses of Russian and Japanese warships in the war of 1904-1905.

battleships armored cruisers light cruisers gunboats destroyers Total

If we compare enemy losses in battleships, the main striking naval force of that time, then the ratio of losses of Russian ships compared to Japanese ones will be simply fantastic - 17:2! The Russian Navy paid a heavy price for tactical illiteracy and shortcomings in the organization of the army, which lagged behind the rapidly growing technical equipment of modern weapons of that time.

Admiral Makarov S.O. in the book “Reflections on Naval Tactics”, he quite correctly noted one of the decisive factors for victory in a naval battle: the absolute and decisive role of naval commanders in achieving victory. Thus, the main reasons for the inglorious defeat of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima were the lack of will to win, both among the high naval command and among the majority of the officers of warships, low combat training and backward organization of the armed forces.

History has never seen a more tragic and bloody naval battle than the Battle of Lepanto. Two fleets took part in it - the Ottoman and the Spanish-Venetian. The largest naval battle took place on October 7, 1571.

The battlefield was the Gulf of Prats (Cape Scrof), which is near the Peloponnese, a peninsula of Greece. In 1571, the Union of Catholic States was created, whose activities were aimed at uniting all peoples professing Catholicism, with the aim of repelling and weakening the Ottoman Empire. The Union lasted until 1573. Thus, the largest Spanish-Venetian fleet in Europe, numbering 300 ships, belonged to the coalition.

The clash between the warring parties occurred unexpectedly on the morning of October 7. The total number of ships was about 500. The Ottoman Empire suffered a crushing defeat inflicted by the fleet of the Union of Catholic States. More than 30 thousand people died, the Turks accounted for 20 thousand killed. This largest naval battle showed that the Ottomans were not invincible, as many believed at that time. Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire was unable to regain its position as the undivided master of the Mediterranean Sea.

History: Battle of Lepanto

The Battles of Trafalgar, Gravelines, Tsushima, Sinop and Chesma are also the largest naval battles in world history.

On October 21, 1805, the battle took place at Cape Trafalgar (Atlantic Ocean). The opponents are the British fleet and the combined fleet of France and Spain. This battle led to a series of events that sealed the fate of France. The most surprising thing was that the British did not lose a single ship, unlike France, which suffered twenty-two losses. It took the French more than 30 years after the above events to increase their shipping power to the level of 1805. The Battle of Trafalgar is the largest battle of the 19th century, which practically ended the long confrontation between France and Great Britain, which was called the Second Hundred Years' War. And it strengthened the latter’s naval superiority.

In 1588, another major naval battle took place - Gravelines. By custom, it was named after the area in which it occurred. This naval conflict is one of the most important events of the Italian War.

History: Battle of Gravelines

On June 27, 1588, the British fleet completely defeated the fleet of the Great Armada. It was considered as invincible as the Ottoman Empire would later be considered in the 19th century. The Spanish fleet consisted of 130 ships and 10 thousand soldiers, and the British fleet of 8,500 soldiers. The battle was desperate on both sides and the British forces pursued the Armada for a long time with the goal of completely defeating the enemy forces.

The Russo-Japanese War was also marked by a major naval battle. This time we are talking about the Battle of Tsushima, which took place on May 14-15, 1905. The battle was attended by a squadron of the Pacific Fleet from Russia under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky and a squadron of the Imperial Japanese Navy, commanded by Admiral Togo. Russia suffered a crushing defeat in this naval duel. Of the entire Russian squadron, 4 ships reached their native shores. The prerequisites for this outcome were that Japanese guns and strategy significantly exceeded the enemy's resources. Russia was eventually forced to sign a peace agreement with Japan.

History: Sinop naval battle

The Sinop naval battle was no less impressive and historically important. However, this time Russia showed itself from a more favorable side. A naval battle took place between Turkey and Russia on November 18, 1853. Admiral Nakhimov commanded the Russian fleet. It took him no more than a few hours to defeat the Turkish fleet. Moreover, Türkiye lost more than 4,000 soldiers. This victory brought the Russian fleet the opportunity to dominate the Black Sea.

The maritime history of the 18th century was marked by the emergence of another, in addition to the fleet of England, Holland, Sweden, and France, a strong representative, namely the Russian fleet.

And if the English fleet regained its interests along the coast from the English Channel to Gibraltar, and further to the Mediterranean Sea, the Danish Royal Navy and the Swedish Navy dominated the Northern Seas, starting the Northern War, by the end of which the Russian Empire became the hegemon in the waves of the Baltic and a future enemy English fleet.

The most powerful ships at the beginning of the 18th century

By the beginning of the 18th century, each fleet had flagships that instilled fear in the enemy.

“King Charles” – Sweden

Konung Karl - built in 1694 - was one of the five battleships of the 1st rank available at the beginning of the Northern War. Its parameters:

• Displacement 2650-2730 Swedish tons.
• A team of 850 sailors.
• Fortified guns: 100, with upgrade to 108.
• Gun calibers: 10x36, 22x24, 30x18, 28x8, 18x4 in pounds.
• Firepower: 1724 pounds from 108 guns, with the Swedish pound measuring 425.1 grams.

“Fredericus Quartus” Denmark-Norway

The Danish-Norwegian flotilla had a new ship of the line, launched in 1699, which had:

• Displacement 3400-3500 tons.
• Gun caliber: 28×36, 32×18, 30×12, 20×6 pounds, with the Danish pound measuring 496 grams.
• Salvo gun power: 2064 lbs.
• There are 110 guns.
• A crew of 950 sailors.

“HMS Royal Sovereign” British Empire

The Royal Sovereign is a one-gun battleship of the first rank, sail-powered, which left the Woolwich shipyard in 1701. Possessed:

• Displacement 1883 tons.
• 53 meters long (174 feet on the gondeck).
• 15 m wide (or 50 ft. at midship).
• The depth of the interior is 20 feet. (about 6 m).
• The artillery was distributed: 28 on the gondeck of 42- and 32-pounder guns, 28 on the midships battery of 24-pounders. guns, 28 on the next lower deck of the operdeck 12 pounds. guns, 12 on the quarterdeck and 4 on the forecastle 6 lb. guns.

Before the subsequent perestroika, he took part in the War of the Spanish Succession.

The most powerful warship at the end of the 18th century

British shipbuilding adhered to the serial production of the HMS Victory prototype until the last hundred-gun Queen Charlotte model left the shipyard in 1787, when construction began on larger examples of 1st rank flagships equipped with a larger number of heavy weapons.

This was the descendant of the French battleship in the British design “hms royal sovereign”, after 6 years of construction at the Chatham shipyard, which launched in 1795. Despite the possession of high-sail equipment, its performance, maneuvering and maximum speed could not serve as a guarantee of advantage for such ships . But the undoubted main advantage and the main and decisive guarantee of victory was the most powerful weapons:

The number of 110 guns was distributed:

• 32 lb. 30 guns on the gondeck,
• 24 lb. number of guns 30 on the middeck,
• 18 lb. number of guns 32 on the forward deck,
• 12 lb. number of guns 14 on the quarterdeck, and 4 on the forecastle.

HMS Ville de Paris became the largest three-masted battleship of the time. It had impressive parameters:

• Displacement 2390 tons.
• 190 eng.ft. a gondeck in length.
• 53 English feet amidships beam.
• 22 eng.ft interior depth.

History favors English ships over Spanish ones, despite their more impressive equipment and armament, as no British ships were destroyed in battle during the entire 18th century. The skillful tactics of naval combat and the talent of the admirals of the Royal Navy turned out to be important.

New types of ships of the 18th century

At the beginning of the 18th century, a typical British ship of the 1st rank was three-deck, 90-100 guns, with a displacement of 1900, and later over 2000 or more tons, with a requirement of more than 500 units in the crew.

By the end of the century, in the First Rate classification, a three-deck battleship had up to 130 guns. When fully equipped, the ships exceeded 2,500 tons with heavy 40-pounder guns located on the lower deck. However, the ships' low draft and rough waves did not always make it possible to use the power of the batteries on the lower deck.

The linear tactics of naval warfare, invented by the Dutch, with ships lining up in a line and firing heavy artillery fire, determined the tactics of battle for a century using the class of battleships of the highest rank and frigates.

The ranking class adopted by the Admiralty in terms of size, requirements for the number of crew, the number of guns on gun decks, and the power of weapons corresponded to:

• Three-deck ships of the 1st and 2nd rank, with a number of 100 guns;
• Double-decker ships of the 3rd and 4th ranks, numbering less than 100 pieces with the most practical 32 pounds. and 24 lbs. guns.

In 1793, the three-deck British battleship Queen Charlotte with a displacement of 2,280 tons carried batteries of guns in the following quantities:

• 30x 32-lb. on the gondeck
• 30x 24-lb. on the middeck,
• 30x 12-lb. on the front deck,
• 4x 12-lb. and 20 carronades on the forecastle, quarterdeck, poop.

ship "Santisima Trinidad"

The Spanish fleet looked impressive: a super-powerful 136-gun. four-deck giant "Santisima Trinidad" and ten 112-guns. ships. French ships with larger size and weight could surpass them in displacement. The Commerce de Marseille weighed about 2,750 tons and was powerfully armed with a 36-pounder. (denominated in 40 British pounds) with cannons.

New technologies in naval affairs

The contribution of British shipbuilders to the design of battleships was great. Construction at the royal shipyards took a long time and carefully; selected ship timber required many years of aging. These expensive pieces of naval art remained in service for several decades.

Strict adherence to the basic principles of shipbuilding made the process of improvement slow until the very end of the 18th century. In fact, the designs of not only British battleships were improved; the achievements of the Spaniards should be noted.

The ship “HMS Victory” on the slipway

To improve the handling of large ships with high decks, Dutch steering wheel configurations have become widespread. In Britain, when building new ships from 1703, they began to use a steering wheel, which replaced the calderstock. In Spain, this process took a long time.

By the period of the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon I, Britain had the world's largest military force at sea: one and a half hundred ships of the line and several hundred lower-ranking vessels.

The very definition of a “ship of the line” was established by the tactical scheme of linear combat invented by the Dutch, designed for structural strength and penetrating power: the ships, lined up and relying on the strength of the hulls, withstood enemy artillery fire. At the same time, the enemy fleet was destroyed by return fire from heavy weapons.

Over the course of the century, the size of ships participating in linear battles changed towards increasing, equipping additional decks to accommodate fire batteries, and the number of crew grew with the increase in the number of guns. The advantage of a larger number of guns over increasing the caliber and weight of weapons was tested experimentally.

In this century, the tactical understanding of naval combat has shifted from the adventure of bold maneuvers in battle to achieve victory to maintaining the harmony of the battle line and the strategic safety of the flotilla to quickly restore the squadron's combat capability for new attacks.

Evolution of shipbuilding

You can understand the evolution of ship designs in the 18th century using the example of the Spanish giant Santisima Trinidad. The battleship was built in Havana in 1769 at the largest shipyard of that time during the period of improvement of three-masted round ships.

The success of the construction of all navios depended on the availability of hardwood from the Cuban and colonial coasts. While the British and French made hulls from European oak and built yards and masts from pine, Spanish shipbuilders used excellent mahogany materials, which are more resistant to fungal dry rot in high humidity conditions, which quickly turns oak wooden structures into rotten wood material. Such destruction is typical for all wooden ships, so having reserves of hardwood timber for the construction and repair of ships was an important advantage.

The keel of the ship was the longitudinal connecting part of the skeleton, providing longitudinal strength, fastening the stem in front and the sternpost in back. Frames were attached on top - ribs, mutually attached inside and outside. Next came parts of the connections: beams, wales, deck cross members, elements of side sets of beams, carlings, branches of frames.

The use of dowels and forged bolts was supposed to ensure reliable fastening of thousands of parts of ships and skeletons. The transition to metal bolts and dowels and from wooden nuts to metal, ensuring the strengthening of twisted cables and ropes for fastening masts and sails determined the dynamic balance and stability of heavy ships.

"Santissima Trinidad" became the only warship of the 1st rank with four decks, designed to accommodate up to 144 guns. The rest were three-masted and three-decker. Navios of the 2nd rank were three-deck, with a capacity of 80–98 guns. Ships of the 3rd rank were double-decker with 74–80 guns.

The height of a 1st rank navy from the keel to the upper deck is comparable to a 5-story building.

During the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763. the largest battleships were equipped with 50–60 guns. However, towards the end of the century, ships with 64 guns were classified as small among the participants in a linear battle, and one or two stop-gunners were no longer enough. A core squadron with a hundred guns on board was required. During the era of revolutions and Napoleonic wars, 74 guns became the standard equipment of a battleship. At the same time, a ship with a structure of at least 2 gun decks running along the length from the bow to the stern began to be ranked as linear.

In relation to the Spanish Navios, the concentration of powerful combat artillery on the decks did not reduce the ability of this type of ships to withstand the pressure of close combat for a long time. As an example, the Spanish flagship Santissima Trinidad. In the battle of 1797 at Cape St. Vincent, during the blockade of Gibraltar (1779 - 1782), at Trafalgar, resistance to the most powerful salvo cannonade of British battleships did not allow the huge Spanish ship to be sunk.

However, still in the age of sail, the mobility of flotillas was determined by the laws of the wind, although progress in the development of sailing equipment and the reliability of rigging made it possible to control very heavy ships.

The most powerful fleet of the 18th century

Defining the naval forces of the century, the British Wars of Spanish Succession date back to 1704, where the main goal was to establish British dominance along the coast of France - Spain, take control of the Mediterranean key Gibraltar and designate the superiority of the Royal Fleet in the Mediterranean to the African shores.

By the end of the century, Britain had acquired the status of a powerful naval power. If no one could resist Napoleon's army on land, then the British armada of 146 battleships alone reliably controlled the European coast, forming an impregnable shield for the island empire, and threatening any enemy at sea.

England became the undisputed naval power, occupying first place. The fleet became the force that ensured victory when a squadron appeared under the British flag. The pressure of the fleet and the risk of a lightning-fast amphibious landing with fire support from linear artillery made it possible to solve military problems at the expense of undeniable power at sea.

Regarding the differences between the Spanish, French and British ships, there is an obvious difference in the design of the ship's space. The Spanish Navio and French battleships were not adapted to cruising for a long period of time, due to the lack of space required for storing provisions, and excluded a long stay on the open sea. It was intended to use escort ships for these purposes.

British warships had the opportunity to go on long expeditions and stay on the open seas for quite a long time. Which provided the preconditions for a protracted siege and blockade of ports by several ships. This was demonstrated at the siege of Toulon (1793), when only Bonaparte's artillery talent and courage surpassed the tactics of the British.

Naval battles and wars of the 18th century

Anglo-French confrontation at the beginning of the century

An illustrative example is the naval battle in Gibraltar in August 1704.

The French fleet consisted of 51 battleships ranging from 50 to 96 guns, including 16 three-deck ones, with a total of over 3,600 pieces of artillery. It had twenty French and Spanish galleys equipped for ramming. Galleys with 4-6 heavy guns on the forecastle and a crew of over 500 people each, consisting of three squadrons, represented an impressive force.

The Allies - the Dutch and the British - also had 51 battleships with 3,600 guns, but only 8 three-deck ones. In general, conditional equality of enemy forces was ensured: nine 80-gun English ships were equal in strength to three-deck French ships with 84-88 guns, the remaining forces were approximately equal.

The English ships lined up as a vanguard, a center with Commander-in-Chief Rooke, and a rearguard of Dutch ships. And twenty enemy heavy galleys were opposed by 2 small battleships.

The battle began with a battle of the vanguards and the desire to maneuver from the wind. After 10 hours of cannonade of the centers in a fierce fire, ship against ship, despite the fires and significant destruction, there were no ships sunk or captured. Due to the rapid consumption of their arsenal of warheads, the British suffered more noticeable damage.

The British naval combat tactics - shooting ship hulls and manpower - brought great losses to the enemy. The French tactics of damaging masts and rigging deprived the enemy of maneuverability and provided the opportunity for boarding.

Thus, if forces were equal, superiority in battle was achieved by tactical calculation.

Anglo-Spanish naval battles at the end of the century

At the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797, the British forced the Spanish ships to retreat. The Spaniards saved the fleet from complete defeat, including the retreat of the Santissima Trinidad to Cadiz, where the flotilla consisted of 26 battleships.

Count Saint Vincent, on board the 110th gunner "Ville-de-Paris", having received reinforcements, led a squadron of 21 battleships from Lisbon to Cadiz. In the summer, with the addition of Horatio Nelson's internal squadron, a naval blockade of the Spanish port was organized, which lasted for several years.

Battle of 1797 Cape St. Vincent

The goal was to force the Spaniards to leave the harbor and impose open battle, but they made no attempts to break the blockade, successfully repelling the attacks of British ships and inflicting significant damage on them from the fort's batteries. However, the British managed to force the Spaniards into battle by organizing an attack on the bay.

After the first bombardment by mortars from approaching ships, when the approaching Spaniards got involved in hand-to-hand combat and Commander Nelson was close to death, a second followed. Using three bombardment ships, under the cover of 74 guns of a battleship and 2 frigates, the British managed to inflict damage on the port and fleet, forcing the enemy fleet to withdraw beyond the reach of British guns. Subsequently, unfavorable winds prevented the British from making new attacks and dampened their enthusiasm.

Nelson decided to profit from the booty of galleons from the New World, going from Gibraltar to the Canary Islands, where in the battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife he almost lost his life again, was defeated and lost an arm.

Prior to this, in clashes, including pitched battles, boarding skirmishes, and landing operations near their shores, the Spaniards suffered defeats. The exceptions were the failures of the British in the colonies of San Juan, Puerto Rico and Tenerife, in the Caribbean.

Having undertaken deceptive maneuvers, the British landed troops, one of which was knocked out of the pier, the other made its way into the city, where it was surrounded. And the second column of English ships was thrown back outside the harbor. Nelson was forced to capitulate and, with the permission of the governor of the capital, leave Tenerife.

The failure in Tenerife serves as a symbol of the island's triumph to this day.

The role of the ship's weapons

The difference in weapons determined the actual firepower. Heavy guns had short range. And large-caliber salvos shook the ship’s fortress. The quality of the gun's manufacture determined its accuracy, range, and durability. Therefore, with an equal number of guns, the firepower could be different for different tactics. In ship classifications, only deck guns with ports were often taken into account, and additional guns on the forecastle and quarterdeck were not considered.

Therefore, the fluctuation in the number of guns was not a reflection of the strength of the battleship, and the formal total mass of the broadside of a battleship did not reflect the destructive power and degree of danger.

18th century English fleet

The significance of the military presence at sea was great, and the influence of the fleet on the outcome of events on the shore, through rapid movement across the water and landing troops with fire support, is widely seen. At sea, no one risked getting in the way of the British flotilla: having unhindered domination of the sea, goals were achieved without a fight.

In the Seven Years' War, battleships were equipped with artillery of 50–60 guns. By the end of the century, ships with 64 guns were relegated to the rank of small ones; the strength of a squadron was determined by the presence of more than two hundred-gun battleships. During the reign of Napoleon, the class of battleships was ranked by 74-gun ships and a design of 2 decks of gun batteries extending from bow to stern.

British ships of the Colossus class played a significant role during the wars with the Bonapartists. At that time, the world's largest navy consisted of 146 battleships and several hundred ships of a lower rank. No open opposition was heard at all.

18th century French fleet

French flotillas after the battles of Gibraltar and Malaga avoided major naval battles, participating only in cruising skirmishes. In subsequent decades, no major naval battles were recorded. The importance of the French navy was weakening; The participation of individual squadrons in cruising operations was occasionally noted. An attempt during the Napoleonic period to defeat the British flotilla at Cape Trafalgar ended in failure for the French and the death of Nelson for the British, who were guaranteed success everywhere in the years following this period.

In the last decade of the 18th century, the French fleet had five battleships with 110 guns and three with 118 guns.

French ships with 74 guns were recognized as the best in this class, and their lines were used in projects at the beginning of the next century.

Russian fleet of the 18th century

The evolution of the Russian fleet covered a long distance over the course of the 18th century: from the ships of the Arkhangelsk Pomors to the imperial flotilla on, Azov and. Important milestones for the Empire's fleet were:

• Northern War 1700 - 1721
• Russian-Turkish War 1768 - 1774
• Russian-Turkish War 1787 - 1791
• Russian-Swedish War 1788 - 1790

The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1710 consisted of 3 linear 50 cannon ships with 18, 8, 4-pound caliber guns. In 1720 there were already 25 combat-ready battleships.

The first full-scale, significant naval victory of the Russian fleet in the history of Russia was won in the Battle of Gangut over the Swedes in 1714 at the Finnish Cape Gangut in the Baltic Sea. And at the end of the Northern War in 1720, near the Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea, in the last battle off Grengam Island, maneuverable Russian ships in shallow water caused significant damage to the enemy. As a result, the undivided Swedish dominance in the northern seas off the coast of the Russian Empire was put to an end.

At the end of the century, at the height of the Turkish War, Sweden, with the support of Great Britain, Holland, and Prussia, tried to take advantage of the apparent advantage by starting hostilities in the Gulf of Finland. As a result, it became obvious that even under favorable circumstances, the fight against Russia is a hopeless cause.

18th century Swedish navy

At the beginning of the Northern War, the Royal Swedish Navy was in service in 1700. 38 battleships, 10 frigates, including 5 ships of the 1st rank. The opposing Royal Danish Navy has 29 battleships and 4 frigates.

The victories of the Russian army on land in confrontation with the Swedish army turned out to be decisive in the outcome of the Northern War. The enemy was driven out from the coast, and its rear resources were exhausted. Therefore, the condition of the fleet became deplorable. A sensitive defeat in 1710 from the newly strengthened Danish fleet in Køge Bay further reduced the size of Sweden's claims in the northern seas. After the Battle of Gangut, concerned about the increased power of the Russian imperial army and flotilla, England, having created a military alliance with Sweden, looked for allies in the south in the Black Sea.

Until 1721, Sweden was able to build only 1 battleship and 10 frigates for its fleet. The number of battleships as combat units of the fleet was reduced from 48 in 1709 to 22 in 1720.

In the Battle of Hogland in 1788, a once strong Swedish squadron of 16 battleships and 7 frigates in the Gulf of Finland was opposed by 17 battleships of the Russian Baltic Fleet.

However, the history of the century presented different versions of alliances and confrontations. So, during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) - a global conflict of interests of major powers - England became an ally of Prussia - the main enemy of Russia - and Prussia did not have its own fleet, Sweden acted on the side of Russia, and the main task of the Russian fleet was to prevent the presence of the English ships in the Baltic.

In the future, the upheaval of alliances has repeatedly characterized the processes in the global confrontation at sea.

The prerequisites for the battle had developed long before Napoleon came to power - there was a continuous struggle between France and Great Britain. Throughout the 18th century, countries competed with each other for primacy in Europe, which caused a number of bloody battles that went down in history as the “Second Hundred Years War.” After the fall of the French monarchy, the struggle reached its peak: Great Britain became for Bonaparte the main obstacle to the subjugation of Europe. To get rid of the most dangerous enemy, whose arsenal included the most powerful navy of that time, Napoleon decided to attack from land. His huge army, many times superior to the troops of any countries, could easily defeat the insignificant forces of Britain.

A 150,000-strong landing force was prepared, which was supposed to land on the British Isles and give a devastating land battle to the British. However, there was a serious obstacle to its implementation: to get to the United Kingdom, the French had to cross the English Channel, which was constantly guarded by British ships. Vice Admiral Villeneuve's attempts to divert the attention of the British from the strait not only did not bring the desired results, but also led the French to a blockade in the harbor of Cadiz. Here the fleet linked up with Spanish troops and stayed for two months. Napoleon was dissatisfied with Villeneuve's passivity and appointed his replacement in the person of Vice Admiral Rosilli. Offended, Villeneuve decided to leave Cadiz, which ultimately led to the French defeat.

On October 21, the French squadron was spotted and attacked by English ships off Cape Trafalgar a few hours after leaving port. The Allied forces outnumbered the British, but they failed to win. This was largely due to another mistake by Villeneuve: contrary to the instructions of his admirals, he built the fleet in one arc-shaped line. This allowed two columns of British ships to attack the Spaniards and French in parallel, divide them and begin to destroy them piece by piece. The scattered actions of the allies did not allow them to resist the coordinated work of the English captains, and by the end of the day the battle was lost.

The British forces were commanded by Vice Admiral Nelson, who had been pursuing Villeneuve for more than two years by the time of the battle. Having learned about the blockade of the French fleet, Nelson personally volunteered to command the British troops. According to one version, before the start of the battle, he ordered the sailors to give a signal: “Nelson trusts that everyone will do their duty,” which, due to the lack of the necessary signal codes, was replaced with “England expects everyone to do their duty.” Subsequently, this phrase became the fighting motto of the British.

The Vice Admiral put on his ceremonial uniform with all the orders, executed his will and took a place on the flagship bridge of the battleship Victory next to Captain Thomas Hardy. When asked to move to a safer place, Nelson refused: he believed that the sight of the commander standing on the deck would inspire the sailors. Nelson's glittering awards attracted the attention of the French riflemen - the vice admiral was mortally wounded. However, he did not relinquish command of the squadron until the very end and demanded from Hardy a constant report on the progress of the battle. Nelson died hearing the captain's words: "My lord, the day is yours."

It was not only the British commanders who showed courage. The innovative plan almost turned into a defeat for the British due to the heroism of the French captain Jean-Jacques Etienne Lucas, who attacked Nelson's flagship with his ship Redoutable (Terrible). The French ship found itself in the most unfavorable place in the formation - in the center towards which both lines of the English formation were directed. But thanks to Captain Lucas’s decision to board, the French got on board the Victoria, where a bloody battle broke out. It is unknown how this battle would have ended for the British if another ship had not come to their aid. With the combined efforts of the two crews, the British managed to disable almost the entire crew of Lucas, killing and wounding more than five hundred sailors. Redoutable was badly damaged and began to go under water, but did not give up and continued to fight until the last. The captain himself was seriously wounded and captured, but in England he was received with great respect. After his release from captivity, the captain was promoted to commander and received the Order of the Legion of Honor from Napoleon.

The results of the Battle of Trafalgar were amazing: the allied forces lost 18 ships and 15 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The British disabled almost the entire Franco-Spanish fleet without losing a single ship. Great Britain remained undefeated, and Bonaparte changed the course of his conquests towards Austria and Russia.

Vice Admiral Villeneuve escaped death on the day of the battle, but upon returning to his homeland he soon died under mysterious circumstances. Officially there was talk of suicide, but 6 stab wounds on his body gave rise to a version of possible revenge on the part of Bonaparte.

The Battle of Gangut, which took place on July 27 (August 7), 1714, became the first victory of the created Peter I regular Russian fleet.

The Baltic, abounding in skerries, required powerful rowing forces along with sailing squadrons. By the campaign of 1714, the Russians managed to create the strongest galley fleet of 99 half-galleys and scampaways, to which the tsar set the task of breaking through to the Åland Islands in order to facilitate the offensive of the coastal flank of the ground forces.

Countering these plans, the Swedish fleet blocked the Russians' exit from the Gulf of Finland near the Gangut Peninsula. The enemy's rowing ships protected the coastal fairway, and the sailing fleet located more seaward covered them from the flank.

To avoid a head-on attack by strong Swedish forces, Peter I decided to build a “transport” (wooden flooring) in the narrowest part of the Gangut Peninsula, designed to transport galleys by dry route to the enemy’s rear. This maneuver forced the Swedes to divide their forces, and the ensuing calm deprived their sailing ships of maneuverability.

Taking advantage of the situation, the Russian vanguard bypassed the Swedes, remaining out of reach of their fire, and attacked a detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Nils Ehrenskjöld, boarding the enemy ships.

The victory off the Gangut Peninsula provided the Russian fleet with freedom of action in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, which made it possible to effectively support the ground forces operating in Finland. Since then, the Swedes have ceased to feel like masters of the Baltic Sea. Success was ensured by the ability to create superiority in forces in the main direction. 11 galleys were concentrated against the Swedish flagship - the Elephant.

Boarding the Elefant pram

In September 1714, the winners solemnly marched in St. Petersburg under the Arc de Triomphe, which depicted an eagle sitting on the back of an elephant. The allegory was explained by the inscription: “The eagle does not catch flies.” Currently, the anniversary of the battle of the Gangut Peninsula (August 9) is celebrated in Russia as the Day of Military Glory.

Battle of Chesme on the night of June 25-26, 1770

After the start of the next Russian-Turkish war in 1768, in order to divert the enemy’s attention from the Black Sea theater, Russia sent its ships to the Mediterranean Sea. This was the first group passage of ships from one sea to another in Russian history. June 23 (July 4), 1770, two Russian squadrons (nine battleships, three frigates, a bombardment ship and 17–19 auxiliary ships) under overall command Alexey Orlov discovered the Turkish fleet (16 battleships, six frigates, six shebeks, 13 galleys and 32 small vessels) in the roadstead of Chesme Bay.

The next day, an artillery duel ensued between the opponents, during which the battleship St. Eustathius tried to board the Turkish ship Real Mustafa. However, the burning mast of a Turkish ship fell on him. The fire reached the crew chamber, and “Eustathius” exploded, and 10 minutes later “Real-Mustafa” also took off. After this, the Turkish forces retreated into the depths of Chesme Bay under the cover of coastal batteries.

The Russian command decided on the night of June 26 to destroy the Turkish fleet with the help of fire ships, into which four ships were hastily converted. The battleships were supposed to fire at the enemy ships crowded in the bay, and the frigates were supposed to suppress the coastal batteries. Soon after being hit by an incendiary shell, one of the Turkish ships caught fire. The enemy fire weakened, which made it possible to launch an attack with fireships. One of them managed to set fire to a Turkish 84-gun ship, which soon exploded. Burning debris scattered across the bay, causing fires on other ships. By morning, the Turkish squadron ceased to exist.

Victory was achieved due to the skillful concentration of forces in the main direction, the bold decision to attack the Turkish fleet, which was protected by coastal batteries, and the use of its crowded location in the bay.

Fedor Ushakov

April 19, 1783 Empress Catherine II signed the Manifesto on the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Empire. In 1878, Turkey presented an ultimatum demanding the restoration of the vassalage of the Crimean Khanate and Georgia and, having received a refusal, again declared war on Russia.

Russian troops besieged the Turkish fortress of Ochakov, and a squadron under the command of Rear Admiral left Sevastopol Marko Voinovich, to prevent the Turkish fleet from providing assistance to the besieged. On July 3 (14), the opponents discovered each other in the area of ​​Fidonisi Island. The Turkish squadron was more than twice as large as the Sevastopol one, and Marko Voinovich had no desire to fight, while confident of his victory Hassan Pasha, adhering to classical linear tactics, began to approach the range of an artillery salvo. However, the commander of the Russian vanguard, brigadier Fedor Ushakov ordered his end frigates to add sails and take on the enemy with two fires. The maneuver of the frigates put the Turks in an exceptionally difficult position. They also added sails, but this led to the fact that their formation was greatly stretched, and the ships lost the ability to support each other with fire.

At the very beginning of the battle, Fyodor Ushakov cut off two Turkish ships, concentrating the fire of the battleship "St. Paul" and two frigates against them. The battle had already unfolded along the entire line. Unable to withstand the Russian fire, the Turkish ships ahead began to leave the battle one after another. Soon the flagship of Hassan Pasha also came under concentrated fire. This decided the outcome of the battle. Following the flagship, the Turkish ships began to leave the formation and, taking advantage of their speed advantage, retreated to the Rumelian shores.

In the battle of Fidonisi, the naval leadership talent of Fyodor Ushakov was revealed for the first time, who perfectly implemented the principles of concentration of fire and mutual support. Soon Grigory Potemkin removed Marko Voinovich, and transferred the Sevastopol squadron to Fyodor Ushakov, who received the rank of rear admiral.

Monument to Ushakov at Cape Kaliakria

The Turks prepared very thoroughly for the campaign of 1791. The fleet under the command of Kapudan Pasha Hussein consisted of 18 battleships, 17 frigates and many small ships. The Algerian Pasha, distinguished by his courage and enterprise, was appointed assistant to the Kapudan Pasha. Saita-Ali. The Turks quite reasonably believed that with such a numerical superiority and led by such famous admirals, they would be able to defeat the Russians. Sait-Ali even promised to deliver the chained man to Istanbul Ushak-pashu(Fedor Ushakov) and carry him around the city in a cage.

On July 31 (August 11), 1791, the Turkish fleet was anchored off Cape Kaliakria. In honor of the Ramadan holiday, some of the teams were released ashore. Suddenly, Fyodor Ushakov’s squadron appeared on the horizon, consisting of six battleships, 12 frigates, two bombardment ships and 17 small ships. The famous naval commander made a bold decision to attack the enemy from the shore. The appearance of the Russian fleet took the Turks by surprise. Hastily cutting off the anchor ropes, they began to retreat seaward in disarray. Sait-Ali with two ships attempted to take the vanguard of Fyodor Ushakov in two fires, but he, having figured out the maneuver, on the flagship ship "Rozhdestvo Khristovo" overtook the head of his squadron and attacked Sait-Ali's ship, starting a battle at the closest range. Then Ushakov skillfully came from the stern and fired a longitudinal salvo at the Turkish ship, knocking down the mizzenmast.

Within an hour, the enemy's resistance was broken, and the Turks fled. Most of the defeated Turkish fleet scattered along the Anatolian and Rumelian coasts, only the Algerian squadron reached Constantinople, while the flagship Saita Ali began to sink. The Russian fleet dominated the Black Sea. Residents of the Turkish capital were gripped by fear. Everyone was waiting for Ushak Pasha to appear at the walls of Constantinople. In this situation, the Sultan was forced to make peace with Russia.

Fortifications of the island of Corfu

In 1796–1797, the French army under the command of a young and talented military leader Napoleon Bonaparte occupied Northern Italy and the Ionian Islands belonging to the Venetian Republic. Russian Emperor Paul I joined the anti-French coalition. In St. Petersburg, a plan arose to send a squadron under the command of Fyodor Ushakov to the Mediterranean Sea. This time the famous naval commander had to act in alliance with his former opponents - the Turks. Napoleon's landing in Egypt forced the Sultan to turn to Russia for help and open the straits to Russian ships.

One of the tasks assigned to the joint Russian-Turkish squadron was the liberation of the Ionian Islands. Soon the French garrisons were driven out of Tserigo, Zante, Cephalonia and Santa Mavra, although the enemy continued to hold the most heavily fortified island, Corfu. The French command was confident that the Russian sailors would not only not be able to take the fortress by storm, but would also be unable to wage a long siege.

First, Fyodor Ushakov decided to storm the rocky island of Vido, which covered Corfu from the sea. On February 18 (March 1), 1799, Russian ships began a massive shelling, under the cover of which they landed troops. With the help of skillful flank attacks, the landing force managed to capture the coastal batteries on the move, and by 14 o'clock the landing forces were already in complete control of Vido.

Now the way to Corfu was open. Russian batteries installed on the captured island of Vido opened fire on Corfu itself, and the landing force began to storm the advanced fortifications of the island. This demoralized the French command, and the next day they sent envoys to Fyodor Ushakov’s ship to discuss the terms of surrender. 2931 people surrendered, including four generals. The Russian trophies included the battleship Leander, the frigate Brunet, a bombardment ship, two galleys, four half-galleys and several other ships, 114 mortars, 21 howitzers, 500 cannons and 5,500 rifles. The victory was achieved thanks to Fyodor Ushakov’s correct choice of the direction of the main attack, the creation of superiority in forces over the enemy in this sector, as well as the bold and decisive actions of the landing force.

Having learned about another brilliant victory of Fedor Ushakov, the great Alexander Suvorov wrote: “Why wasn’t I at Corfu, at least as a midshipman!”

On the liberated Ionian Islands, under the temporary protectorate of Russia, the Greek Republic of the Seven Islands was created, which for several years served as a support base for the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

Andrey CHAPLYGIN