Military-industrial complex. Military industry
COURSE WORK
in the discipline: "World Economy"
on the topic: “Features of the Russian military-industrial complex”
INTRODUCTION
1 Current state of the global arms and military equipment market
2Main arms exporting and importing countries
CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
1 The current state of the Russian military-industrial complex
2 Analysis of the activities of military-industrial complex enterprises (based on OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, OJSC United Aircraft Corporation and OJSC Uralvagonzavod)
3 Export of military products from Russia
1 Prospects for the development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation
CONCLUSION
LIST OF REFERENCES USED
INTRODUCTION
Currently, one of Russia's important specializations in the international division of labor is the production of military products. Even from the USSR, the Russian Federation inherited a colossal, advanced, knowledge-intensive and efficient defense-industrial complex. Russian small arms, missiles, tanks, planes, helicopters, etc. known all over the world. It is the AK-74 and its copies that are in service with almost all countries and armed formations (and in some places the AK-74 is even present on the national flag). It was the T-72 that became the most popular tank in history. It is the MiG aircraft that many countries around the world are trying to copy.
The relevance of this topic lies in the fact that every year Russia is increasing the volume of supplies of military products to the world market. Russian weapons are cheap and of high quality, which is why many countries give preference to Russia when purchasing weapons and military equipment.
In addition, the military-industrial complex is one of the most knowledge-intensive and high-tech industries, and it is this sector that is the center of Russian scientific and technological progress.
The military-industrial complex is one of the priority sectors for Russia at present, which is why this topic is truly relevant.
The purpose of this course work is to determine the prospects for the development of the Russian military-industrial complex and its export policy. Within the framework of this goal, the following tasks are solved:
Analysis of the features of the global arms market.
Analysis of the current state of development of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Analysis of the activities of leading enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Analysis of exports of military products from Russia.
Analysis of the prospects for the development of the Russian military-industrial complex.
CHAPTER 1. FEATURES OF THE WORLD ARMS MARKET
1 FEATURES OF THE WORLD ARMS MARKET
Before the end of the Cold War in 1991, there was no global arms market as such. The world was dominated by the gratuitous transfer of military products by superpowers to regimes friendly to them. Thus, according to experts, by supplying weapons worth 20-25 billion dollars a year, the USSR received about 2-4 billion dollars. The rest of the weapons were supplied by barter or free of charge to support certain regimes. And now secret transfers of such light and compact types as MANPADS, sniper small arms, anti-personnel mines, night vision devices, and closed tactical radio communications continue. Such transfers are one of the types of so-called “gray” or “black” exports, that is, the supply of products partially or completely bypassing international legal norms. “Gray” exports are currently very common in the global arms and military equipment market; the annual sales volume on this market reaches two billion dollars. After the end of the Cold War, the scale of gratuitous arms supplies decreased and, in fact, from that moment on we can talk about the formation of a global arms market as such.
The global arms and military equipment market is a complex system of international economic relations. The arms trade is characterized by the fact that it allows not only to make a profit, but also to significantly influence the military-political situation in various regions or the political course of importing countries.
The main exporters of military products are increasing their efforts to increase export volumes in accordance with their strategic and political guidelines, since, unlike ordinary foreign trade relations, trade in military products makes importing countries dependent on suppliers. Gun buyers need service, supplies of spare parts and ammunition, modernization, etc. Therefore, transactions in this market are mainly concluded for a long period.
The supply of spare parts, the sale of licenses for the production of the latest models, the conclusion of agreements on the modernization of military equipment and the creation of infrastructure for its maintenance are becoming increasingly important. The financial difficulties experienced by many importers force them to focus on purchasing cheaper products and participating in joint production (for example, assembly from imported components), and seeking concessions when concluding contracts. Exporters put forward additional conditions for the provision of preferential loans. Supplies are carried out on leasing terms: for example, Spain and Taiwan have leased American frigates and landing ships.
The forms of competition in the global arms market are also changing. Political pressure, rather than military effectiveness, often plays a decisive role in deal-making. The United States is particularly active in this area, which during the first half of the 90s not only increased its market share, but also increased export volumes in absolute terms. For example, in 1998, the Greek Ministry of Defense announced a tender for the supply of anti-aircraft missile systems. Among the main contenders for victory were Rosvooruzhenie with the S-300PMU-1 complex and the American Raytheon with the Patriot system. Despite the fact that Russian systems are qualitatively superior to American ones, the Greeks chose Patriot because it is easier to operate and also has combat experience in use during the war with Iraq. US political pressure on its NATO allies played an important role in the Greeks’ choice of tender. In the midst of the tender, the Greeks received a message from the US Secretary of State, who very harshly advised them to refuse to purchase the S-300. As a consolation prize, Rosvooruzhenie received a contract to supply Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems to Greece.
So, at the moment, global arms production is characterized by:
a) The presence of traditional centers: Western European (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy), North American (Canada, USA) and CIS (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus).
b) The development of so-called “peripheral” centers for the production of military products in Europe (Switzerland, Spain, Czech Republic), Asia (Turkey, Japan), Latin America (Brazil, Argentina), Africa (South Africa) and Australia.
c) The processes that have begun to re-equip the armies of a number of countries with new or modernized types of military equipment and, as a consequence, the beginning of deliveries of new generation weapons systems.
d) Intensive processes of structural and organizational restructuring of the military-industrial base of NATO member countries, the former Warsaw Warfare, the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
The Western European Quartet seeks to strengthen its competitive position by diversifying military production and participating in joint development and production of complex weapons systems (fighters, military transport aircraft). France and Italy have taken a course towards partial privatization of military enterprises. The processes of military-industrial integration are intensifying in Western Europe. They cover not only aircraft and missile engineering, but also the development and production of armored and artillery equipment, a unified family of small arms and ammunition, power supplies and components. Some of this integration extends beyond Western Europe
The United States of America occupies a leading position in almost all sectors of the military-industrial complex. The main emphasis continues to be on the development of existing systems and the development of new ones. Priority is given to the development of R&D in order to maintain and increase US technological superiority. In the US military industry, key positions are occupied by seven giant corporations with diversified portfolios of military and civilian orders: Lockheed Martin, MacDonеld & Douglas, Nor-trop-Grumman, Boeing, United Technologies, General Dynamics, Litton Industries. The average annual sales of military products of the seven giants is almost twice the average of the seven largest Western European firms. The largest American military manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, produces military products in a volume approximately equal to the total volume of the French military industry.
At the same time, China's military industry has production capacities, a research and production base, and personnel that ensure the production of almost all types of modern weapons, including missile technology. In recent years, China has been completing a reorganization of the management of military sector industries. Industry ministries have been transformed into large companies, each of which includes enterprises specializing in the production of a certain type of product and having general cooperative ties.
So, from all of the above we can draw the main conclusion. Currently, the global arms market is highly competitive. In order to maintain its position and occupy a larger market share in the future, Russia should improve the quality of its products by investing in R&D.
1.2 MAIN ARMS EXPORTING AND IMPORTING COUNTRIES
According to the Center for Analysis of the World Arms Trade (TSAMTO), contracts for the purchase of military products at the end of 2012 were concluded by 70 countries. The volume of global contracts concluded for the export/import of conventional weapons amounted to $67.4 billion. For comparison: in 2011, the volume of global contracts concluded for the export/import of weapons and military equipment amounted to $77.012 billion - the highest result since the end of the Cold War era. In 2010, the volume of concluded contracts amounted to 50.893 billion dollars, in 2009 - 61.089 billion dollars.
The top five importers of military products based on the results of 2012 are India, Iraq, Oman, Australia and Saudi Arabia.
First placeAccording to the results of 2012, India ranks. According to preliminary data, the volume of contracts concluded by India for the import of weapons in 2012 amounted to 13.239 billion dollars or 19.64% of the global volume of contract agreements for the import of military products.
This result in terms of the value of annual contracts for India is a record in recent history. Moreover, judging by the results of ongoing negotiations on already completed tenders, as well as tenders whose results are planned to be announced in the near future, already in 2013 the volume of contracts concluded by India will significantly exceed the result of the record year 2012.
In general, over the last 4-year period, India entered into contracts for the import of military products in the amount of $31.374 billion (12.24% of the world market).
This allows us to say that if the country’s economy develops dynamically, India will remain the world’s largest arms importer for the foreseeable future.
For the period 2009-2012. Iraq ranks 4th in terms of the volume of contracts concluded for the import of military products.
In general, over the last 4-year period, Iraq entered into contracts for the import of military products in the amount of $12.143 billion (4.74% of the world market).
For the period 2009-2012. Oman ranks 10th in terms of the volume of contracts concluded for the import of military products (actually due to contracts concluded in 2012).
For comparison: in 2009, the volume of contracts concluded by Oman for the import of military products amounted to $195 million (0.32% of the world market), in 2010 - $160 million (0.31%), in 2011 - $600 million. (0.78%). In general, over the last 4-year period, Oman concluded contracts for the import of military products in the amount of $6.994 billion (2.73% of the world market).
Fourth placeAccording to the results of 2012, Australia ranks in terms of the volume of concluded contracts for the import of military equipment - $3.839 billion or 5.7% of the global volume of agreements for the import of military equipment.
For the period 2009-2012. Australia ranks 6th in terms of the volume of contracts concluded for the import of military products.
This result for Riyadh is very low compared to the indicators of the previous two years and is explained by the fact that the negotiation process with the United States on transferring a number of programs into firm contracts under the announced “mega-package” of intentions for the purchase of American weapons has somewhat slowed down. According to TsAMTO's forecast, in 2013 Saudi Arabia will significantly increase the value of firm contract agreements, negotiations on which are in the final stage.
In general, for the period 2009-2012. Saudi Arabia ranks 1st in terms of the volume of contracts concluded for the import of military products.
The largest exporters of military products in the world based on the results of 2012 are the USA, Russia and France.
For the period 2008-2011. in the overall balance of US military exports in the amount of 83.436 billion dollars, the first place is occupied by Australia ($8.132 billion), the second place is South Korea ($7.397 billion), and the UAE is the third largest importer of American weapons ($7.335 billion). .). The share of the three largest importing countries in the total balance of US military exports in 2008-2011. amounted to 22.864 billion dollars or 27.4%. Fourth place in the structure of US military exports for the period 2008-2011. Iraq ranks ($6.564 billion), fifth place is Japan ($4.89 billion). In the coming 4-year period, significant changes will occur in the leading group of countries importing American weapons. Based on existing contracts, as well as intentions to directly purchase weapons, first place for the period 2012-2015. Saudi Arabia will take place with a volume of $16.843 billion (7th place in the previous 4-year period). The UAE will take second place - $12.717 billion (3rd place in 2008-2011). India will come in third place - $11.174 billion (21st place in 2008-2011). Fourth place in the structure of US military exports for the period 2012-2015. Taiwan will take the fifth place ($9.384.6 billion), and Australia will take fifth place ($7.215 billion). In general, it can be noted that, on the one hand, the structure of American military exports in the next 4 years will worsen due to the concentration of exports in a limited group of countries. On the other hand, the top five largest importers of American weapons for the period 2012-2015. will include three countries that in 2008-2011. occupied much more modest places. Such a significant update of the leadership group suggests that the United States has managed to expand the range of countries purchasing American weapons in large quantities. At the end of 2012, the volume of US military exports amounted to $25.517 billion.
The final figures for Russia are as follows.
The share of the three largest importing countries in the total balance of Russian military exports in 2008-2011. amounted to 55.47%. Share of the top five importing countries in the total balance of Russian military exports in 2008-2011. amounted to 68.27%. In general, the TsAMTO rating includes 53 countries that received weapons from Russia in 2008-2011. According to existing contracts, as well as intentions for the direct purchase of weapons, the share of the three largest importing countries in the total balance of Russian military exports in 2012-2015. will account for 62.43% of the total projected export volume.
Share of the top five importing countries in the total balance of Russian military exports in 2012-2015. will be 74.9%. Currently, the TsAMTO rating includes 37 countries that have contracts with Russia for the supply of weapons in 2012-2015. In general, it can be stated that Russia, to a much greater extent than the United States, is focused on supplying the majority of its exported weapons to a limited group of countries, and this trend will intensify even more in the coming 4-year period. At the end of 2012, the volume of Russian military exports amounted to $15.2 billion.
As for France, for the period 2008-2011. In the overall balance of French military exports in the amount of $16.727 billion, the United States takes first place ($3.956 billion), Australia takes second place ($2.489 billion), and Singapore is the third largest importer of French weapons ($1.117 billion). ). The share of the three largest importing countries in the total balance of French military exports in 2008-2011. amounted to 7.562 billion dollars or 45.2%.
Fourth place in the structure of French military exports for the period 2008-2011. Malaysia ranks ($1.012 billion), fifth place is Saudi Arabia ($880 million). The structure of French military exports by importing country will experience the greatest changes in the coming 4-year period. In particular, in the group of five largest arms importers, 4 countries will change at once, and the top three importers will be completely renewed. Based on existing contracts, as well as intentions to directly purchase weapons, first place for the period 2012-2015. India will occupy the structure of French military exports with a volume of $2.067 billion (10th place in the previous 4-year period). Second place with almost the same result will be taken by Saudi Arabia - $2.065 billion (5th place in 2008-2011). Brazil will take third place - $2.034 billion (7th place in 2008-2011). The share of the three largest importing countries in the total balance of French military exports in 2012-2015. will amount to $6.165 billion or 33.7% of the total projected export volume of $18.286 billion.
Fourth place in the structure of French military exports for the period 2012-2015. Russia will take ($1.990 billion), fifth place - the UAE - $1.881 billion. The share of the top five importing countries in the total balance of French military exports in 2012-2015. will be 10.036 billion dollars or 54.88%. In general, it can be stated that France is the only country among the three largest arms suppliers that will improve the structure of military exports by importing countries in 2012-2015. compared to 2008-2011 (improving the structure of exports means a more even distribution of the shares of importing countries in the overall balance of exports). In addition, France will be the largest among the world's three largest arms suppliers to renew the group of five largest arms importers in 2012-2015. compared to 2008-2011 At the end of 2012, the volume of French military exports amounted to $5.613 billion.
CHAPTER 2. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF RUSSIA
1 THE CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MINICAL INDUSTRY
military weapons market exporter
Currently, experts' positions regarding the Russian military-industrial complex are mostly pessimistic. For example, Julian Cooper, a professor at the University of Birmingham, specializing in the problems of the modern Russian economy and the military-industrial complex, argues that the modern Russian military-industrial complex is physically unable to fulfill the ambitious tasks that its leadership sets for it. Cooper cites statistics as proof. Over the past twenty years, the number of people employed in the defense industry has fallen from 5.5 million to 1.5 million. Plus, military-industrial complex workers are aging; their average age at the moment is 55-60 years. The professor is confident that the fact that defense industry workers often receive low wages plays a significant role here. Moreover, military-industrial complex workers work in an atmosphere of strict secrecy, which leads to significant difficulties when traveling abroad. The above factors, of course, do not contribute to attracting highly qualified young specialists to the sector. Often the reason that new people are not hired is a simple lack of money.
The Russian military-industrial complex really does not have enough money. Despite the fact that arms sales abroad generate income of more than $10 billion, very little money is invested in R&D. And Western investors, as usual, are in no hurry to help, since the investment climate in Russia is far from the most favorable. In many ways, the lack of funding is determined by the imperfection of the economic mechanism. Often the money allocated for the modernization of military-industrial enterprises simply does not reach these enterprises due to too high a level of corruption. Plus, since the end of the Cold War, funding for the military-industrial complex has decreased by five to ten times, and even now, during a period of rising defense spending, the Russian military-industrial complex receives only 40% of what it received in 1991.
In the 90s, when there was not enough money to purchase weapons for the army, the Russian military-industrial complex quickly switched to exports, which allowed it to retain advanced technologies and valuable personnel. However, while arming foreign armies, defense industrial enterprises forgot about their own. Now, for example, the aircraft supplied to India are much more technically advanced than the aircraft in service with the Russian Armed Forces due to the fact that they are equipped with a lot of foreign technical equipment. A
According to the law, only Russian technologies can be in service in the RF Armed Forces. Julian Cooper is confident that it is vital for the Russian military-industrial complex to change, become more open, reduce secrecy requirements and pay employees more. Only in this case, according to him, “there is a chance that in 10-15 years the Russian military-industrial complex will not face a situation where there will simply be no one to work in the defense sector.”
However, at the moment there is an explosive growth in state defense orders. It is predicted that by 2014 Russia will be among the top three countries in terms of government spending on weapons. A large-scale rearmament program until 2020 has been adopted, with twenty trillion rubles allocated for it. Compared to other leaders, this figure is small; for example, the United States spends this amount of money (in dollar terms) per year. NATO countries (excluding the USA) - for two. After all, 20 trillion rubles is a small price to pay for 20 years, during which the Russian Armed Forces received almost no new types of military equipment. A significant increase in military spending since 2002 is already producing results; recently, military-industrial complex enterprises have been developing more and more new weapons and military equipment.
The main developments of the Russian military-industrial complex at the moment are:
) The T-50 fighter is on everyone's lips. The developer is Sukhoi Design Bureau. This is a project based on stealth technology, which significantly increases the survivability of the fighter. T-50s were first demonstrated at MAKS-2011. The fighter has a cruising supersonic flight mode, an active phased array radar, and artificial intelligence on board, with which the pilot exchanges information interactively. Plus, the fighter is super maneuverable.
Currently, only two countries in the world can afford such a fighter. If Russia is able to ensure mass production of the T-50, then it will provide itself with significant superiority over all types of combat fighters and will reach parity with the F-22 Raptor. Serial purchases of the fighter are expected from 2016; in the future, this fighter should form the basis of the strike potential of the Air Force.
) S-500 anti-aircraft missile system.
The developer is the Almaz-Antey air defense concern. The system is designed to destroy ballistic targets in near space flying at speeds of up to 7 km/s. The range of anti-aircraft guided missiles is up to 600 kilometers. The system is capable of detecting and simultaneously hitting up to 10 ballistic supersonic targets. The system is planned to be put into service in 2015 as the basis of the military space defense of the Russian Federation. And this system, along with the American Aegis sea-based missile defense system, will be the only one of its kind. The S-500 is characterized by its mobility; it can easily be transferred from one theater of military operations to another.
) Project 885 multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the "Ash" type. It is distinguished by increased secrecy and stealth. Capable of carrying sea-based cruise missiles (8 vertical launchers, each with 3 missiles), ten torpedo tubes of 650 mm and 533 mm calibers. Length - 119 m, maximum width of the hull - 13.5 m, crew - 85 people. This nuclear submarine can conduct reconnaissance in enemy coastal waters, monitor foreign submarines, and launch missile attacks on ground targets and surface ships. Plus, it has excellent hydroacoustics provided by the Ajax complex.
) T-90AM is a deep modernization of the T-90. Detailed technical characteristics of the T-90AM have not yet been disclosed, but we already know about an automatic transmission, lattice protective screens, a remote-controlled machine gun module and new surveillance equipment. The tank's engine became more powerful by 130 hp. (total 1,130 hp). The T-90AM was first presented in the fall of 2011 at an arms exhibition in Nizhny Tagil. The main focus of the modernization is the turret, which is now equipped with an improved cannon, automatic loader and fire control system, as well as additional remote-controlled machine gun armament. Particular attention is paid to the commander's ability to tactically control the tank and unit, search for targets and control the fire of the main weapons in all types of combat, equally effectively day and night. Moreover, the dimensions of the vehicle have not increased, and in terms of weight it continues to remain in the 50-ton class, surpassing all other modern tanks in this indicator. Based on the technical solutions of the T-90AM, it is planned to modernize the entire existing fleet of Russian tanks - both T-72 and T-90.
So, based on all of the above, we can conclude that the Russian military-industrial complex, like any other sector of the Russian economy, suffers greatly from corruption. The capabilities of the military-industrial complex are practically limitless; promising developments are not inferior to leading Western ones, and some surpass them. However, a chronic lack of money, which is allocated but does not reach producers, can put an end to a very promising sector of our economy.
2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF MINICAL INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES (BASED ON OJSC CONCERN PVO “ALMAZ-ANTEY”, OJSC “UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION” and OJSC “URALVAGONZAVOD”)
The Russian military-industrial complex consists of many enterprises. One of the most prominent defense industry enterprises is OJSC "Air Defense Concern "Almaz-Antey""The concern was created by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 412 dated April 23, 2002 on the basis of PC Concern Antey, NPO Almaz and others. At first, the concern included more than forty enterprises, factories, research and production associations, research institutes and design bureaus, the purpose of which was the production of long-, short- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems, radar reconnaissance equipment and automated control systems. Later, in 2007, the concern was enlarged and today it consists of more than sixty enterprises located in seventeen regions of Russia.
The concern divides its activities into four areas: production of reconnaissance and information equipment, production of air defense (air defense) fire weapons, production of control and communication equipment, as well as service, warranty service and disposal. Enterprises in each area (except for service) are in turn divided into development enterprises and manufacturing enterprises.
At the moment, JSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey has significant production capacity and a quality management system that meets the requirements of international standards ISO 9000 series and the state military standard of the Russian Federation GOST RV 15.002, which applies to organizations engaged in research, development, production, supply, maintenance, repair and disposal of defense products according to orders from government customers. OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey has a full range of technologies necessary for the production, modernization, maintenance and disposal of a large range of military, dual-use and civilian products.
Main military products:
1. Anti-aircraft missile systems and systems of long, short and medium range (Antey-2500, Buk-M1-2, Tor-M1, etc.).
Radar equipment for various purposes (Gamma-DE, Nebo-SVU, etc.).
Automation equipment (Baikal-1ME, PPRU-M1-2, etc.).
training complexes,
On-board equipment complexes,
GLONASS/GPS equipment.
Main civil products:
Radar systems and automation equipment for civil aviation air traffic control,
Telecommunications equipment,
Equipment for fuel and energy complex,
Transport equipment,
Lifting and transport equipment,
Climatic engineering,
Medical equipment,
Instruments and equipment for housing and communal services and much more.
The general director of the concern is Vladislav Vladimirovich Menshchikov. The company's turnover in 2011 amounted to 271 billion rubles, the company's net profit amounted to 20 billion rubles. The company's motto: “Peaceful skies are our profession!”
Next company - United Aircraft Corporation (JSC UAC),which completely controls the aircraft industry in Russia, with the exception of the production of helicopters. The goal of the corporation is to preserve and develop the scientific and production potential of the aircraft manufacturing complex of the Russian Federation, ensure the security and defense capability of the state, concentrate intellectual, production and financial resources for the implementation of promising programs for the creation of aviation equipment. The corporation was created by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 140 “On the open joint-stock company “United Aircraft Corporation”” dated February 20, 2006. On November 20, 2006, the corporation was registered as a legal entity.
The main strategic objectives facing the corporation are:
.Full satisfaction of the needs of government customers in modern aviation technology.
.Maintaining parity positions with American and European aviation manufacturers in the markets of third countries.
.Increasing sales of civil aviation on the Russian market through the production of competitive products.
.Gaining more significant positions in open foreign civil aviation markets.
At the moment, the corporation produces four types of aircraft:
.Civil aviation, including long-haul aircraft (IL-96-300/400), medium-haul (MS-21, Tu-204) and short-haul (Superjet-100, An-148).
.Transport includes super-heavy aircraft (IL-96-400T), heavy (IL-76), medium (Tu-204S) and light (IL-112).
.Military includes complexes of front-line aviation, long-range aviation, carrier-based aviation and combat training aircraft.
.Special purpose including amphibious aircraft such as the Be-200.
At the moment, UAC has sufficient production capacity to produce competitive products. The total volume of sales of products, works and services in 2011 amounted to 1,954,125,000 rubles.
One of the most important companies in the Russian defense industry is OJSC Research and Production Corporation Uralvagonzavod named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky".Uralvagonzavod heads a large integrated structure consisting of more than 20 enterprises, research institutes and design bureaus in Russia and Europe. The plant was created on October 11, 1936 and now it is one of the largest production complexes in Russia and the world. It includes metallurgical, car assembly, mechanical assembly, mechanical repair and other industries that make it possible to ensure a closed production cycle. Design bureaus and research institutes allow the plant to fully master and apply the latest technologies. The world-famous T-34 tank was created at Uralvagonzavod, from which the domestic school of tank building began. All subsequent tanks developed and produced at the plant retained the best qualities of the T-34. For the development of the most popular tank of our time, the T-72, the plant was awarded the Orders of Lenin (1970) and the Orders of the October Revolution (1976). The newest domestic T-90S tank is not only not inferior, but also superior to many of its foreign counterparts. Today UVZ is a multidisciplinary machine-building association that produces about 200 types of products. These include rolling stock products (cars, platforms, gondola cars, tank cars), road construction equipment (loaders, excavators), mobile units for repairs and well development, tractors, and special products represented by various types of military equipment.
Uralvagonzavod currently produces the following types of military equipment:
.Engineering clearing vehicle IMR-3M
.Terminator fire support combat vehicle.
.Armored mine clearing vehicle BMR-3M
.Armored repair and recovery vehicle BREM-1M.
Tanks T-72 and T-72M.
.Tanks T-90S and T-90SM.
UVZ is one of the most successful and sought-after companies in the Russian defense industry. The American publication Defense News includes it in the list of the hundred largest military-industrial enterprises in the world.
In 2011, the company's revenue amounted to 67,826,692,000 rubles, and net profit - 8,676,205,000 rubles.
A significant part of the products of the enterprises described above is exported, and often exported products are many times higher in quality than products supplied for Russian needs.
Of course, in addition to the companies presented above, there are other important enterprises in the Russian defense industry, for example, Russian Helicopters OJSC, Severnaya Verf OJSC and many others, but the three companies presented above provide the majority of Russian defense exports.
2.3 EXPORT OF DAMAGE PRODUCTS FROM RUSSIA
Arms export is a very significant item of Russian export; its volumes have recently exceeded $10 billion per year. Russia currently ranks second in arms exports, second only to the United States. Dozens of countries around the world, such as India, Vietnam, China, Venezuela and even the USA (supplies RPG-7) import military products from Russia. The export structure is approximately as follows: 50% - products of the aviation complex, 25% - in the interests of the ground forces, and 10-12% each for the naval segment and the air defense sector. Most export operations are carried out through the intermediary company Rosoboronexport.
In the 80s, 25% of military products produced in the USSR were exported, which amounted to 40% of the world's military exports. In the 80s, the USSR shared the remaining part of the market with the USA (27%), France (12%), Britain (5%) and China (about 3%). However, state revenues from arms exports rarely reached the level of even British ones, since the overwhelming majority of supplies were carried out on a gratuitous or credit basis.
In the 90s, after the collapse of the USSR, the volume of supplies of Russian weapons to foreign markets also decreased. For example, in 1995, the export volumes of military products from Russia amounted to $3.05 billion, in 1996 - $3.52 billion, in 1997 - $2.6 billion. The nineties were characterized by predominant supplies of military products to India and China, 80% of Russian supplies were in these two countries, which certainly caused resentment and called into question Russia's ability to sell its weapons in more competitive markets. In addition, they predicted a reduction in supplies and income after the markets in India and China became saturated.
In the 2000s, Vladimir Putin reformed the defense export system. A decree was signed uniting Promexport and Rosvooruzhenie into a single state company, Rosoboronexport. However, some companies at that time retained the right to independently export military products. The process of bringing all military exports under the jurisdiction of Rosoboronexport took several more years, and finally, in 2007, arms manufacturers lost the right to independently export military products abroad. The 2000s were also marked by an explosive growth in Russian exports to $10 billion. Russian weapons turned out to be very competitive; large contracts were concluded with Venezuela, Malaysia, Kuwait, the UAE, Greece, the Republic of Korea, etc.
The head of Rosoboronexport, Anatoly Isaikin, said that Rosoboronexport’s current portfolio of orders amounts to $38.5 billion. It was also noted that 90% of arms exports from Russia go to the 10 largest buyers, located primarily in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The remaining 10% percent are 60 countries purchasing small quantities of cheap weapons.
At the moment, export dynamics have a clear upward trend; in the first half of 2012, weapons worth $6.5 billion were sold, which is 14% more than the same figure for last year.
The most important items of Russian military defense exports are:
1. Export of tanks.
Russia is the world leader in MBT exports. According to TsAMTO, in 2006-2009, 482 Russian tanks were sold against 292 German and 209 American. In 2010-2013, an increase in exports is projected to 859 units worth $2.75 billion. According to the General Director of Rosoboronexport on special assignments, French Leclerc tanks, American Abrams and German Leopard are now at least one and a half times more expensive than the Russian T-90 and worse in terms of firepower.
The main buyers of domestic tanks are:
Algeria - in the period 2006-2009, 185 T-90S tanks were purchased.
Venezuela - 92 T-72B1 tanks were delivered in 2012.
India - at the end of 2010, 124 T-90S tanks were delivered.
Cyprus - 40 T-80U/UK MBTs were delivered in 2009.
Turkmenistan - 6 T-90S MBTs were delivered in 2010.
One T-90S tank in the export version costs $2-2.5 million, which is certainly one of the competitive advantages of Russian products.
2. Aviation export:
Russian aviation is in high demand on the market, so its export volumes are large. Many brands are popular abroad.
The main buyers of Russian aviation:
Algeria - 28 Su-30 (2011).
Venezuela - 24 Su-30 (2011).
Malaysia - 18 Su-30 (2011).
India - 16 MiG-29K fighters, 16 Su-30MKI aircraft. (2011).
Vietnam - 8 Su-30MK2. (2011).
Uganda - 4 Su-30MK2. (2011).
Argentina - 8 Su-29 aircraft. (1997 contract).
China - at the end of 2011, more than 200 Su-27SK fighters. Currently, aviation exports to China have been stopped and China is mainly trying to clone Russian aircraft based on the Su-27.
Syria - 130 Yak-40 attack aircraft. (2011).
Russia's share of the global market for multirole fighters is approximately 30%. In the period 2007-2010, 197 fighter aircraft were exported worth $8.05 billion.
3. Export of helicopters.
In 2011, helicopter supplies from Russia amounted to $1.73 billion, 99 helicopters were exported. The main buyers include:
.Azerbaijan - 24 Mi-24 military helicopters, 40 Mi-17V-1 military transport helicopters, 15 Mi-8/17, 4 Mi-35M. (2011).
.Afghanistan - 9 Mi-17V-5 transport aircraft. (2011).
.India - 21 Mi-17V-5 transport aircraft, 80 Mi-17 (2011).
.Brazil - 12 Mi-35M (2011).
.China - 9 RLD Ka-31 helicopters. (2011).
CHAPTER 3. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MINICAL INDUSTRY
1 PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
One of the necessary conditions for solving long-term problems facing Russia in the field of defense is the accelerated technological development of the defense-industrial complex. The ultimate goal of the technological development of the defense industry is to equip the Armed Forces with the latest weapons and military equipment in the required quantities and maintain Russia in the list of leaders in the field of military-technical cooperation. In addition to the development and production of weapons, the Russian defense industry, being the most knowledge-intensive and high-tech sector of the Russian economy, must create high-tech products for civilian use, as well as expand their production. In the civilian sphere, the tasks of the military-industrial complex, on the one hand, are determined by the strategic challenges of the coming decade in the field of technological and economic development, for example, increased global competition, which places demands on competitiveness, the ability to attract investment and innovative development, the quality of professional personnel, etc. On the other hand, the tasks of the military-industrial complex are determined by the global interests of Russia, such as the need to create a scientific and technological complex that will give Russia access to high-tech markets, the need to abandon the export of raw materials and increase the role and competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, the need to increase the return on the use of both labor and mineral resources and many others.
Experts' assessments tend to suggest that a decline in Russian defense exports is likely in the current decade. This is the result of uncertainty in the global market and a small number of long-term contracts. Moreover, the dynamics of Russian defense exports is also negatively affected by the chronic lack of funding in the field of R&D, which leads to a decrease in the competitiveness of Russian goods in traditional markets. At the same time, in 2016 it is likely that exports will remain at a level no lower than the current one, however, this requires a set of certain urgent measures related to the expansion of scientific and technological cooperation with the West (Russia is currently actively cooperating in this area with France, an example would be the purchase by Russia four UDC "Mistral" and sets of "soldier of the future" FELIN equipment, used for Russia's own development of such equipment) and financial measures to support the production and scientific potential of the military-industrial complex. Plus, the situation is aggravated by a change in the generation of a number of classes of weapons, the entry into the market of fundamentally new types of military equipment such as UAVs, etc.
By 2030, most likely, a major modernization of the armed forces of various countries of the world will be carried out, as a result of which fifth (possibly sixth) generation military equipment will be in service around the world, implementing modern concepts:
a) integrated communications, intelligence and control systems
b) integrated systems of means to fend off any threats (including in outer space), informatization and intellectualization of means.
c) nanotechnologies in the field of communications, control, intelligence, etc.
By type of military equipment, the following ratio of supply volumes can be expected: aviation equipment and weapons - about 50%; naval equipment - up to 30 percent; conventional weapons - up to 10 percent; air defense weapons, radio electronics and control systems - about 8 percent; ammunition - less than 3 percent.
In the next five to ten years, Russia’s position in the field of aviation, air defense systems, automatic weapons, and the space industry will be quite strong, but if the development of the Russian defense industry is catching up, then leaving the market is inevitable. The most important way for Russia to remain on the market is to implement fundamentally new scientific and technical developments leading to the emergence of new means of armed struggle. In essence, Russia urgently needs a new technological niche, but it cannot refuse to support traditional but promising areas. Among the priority sectors of the defense industry are currently considered: shipbuilding, the rocket and space industry, and aircraft manufacturing.
The implementation of the optimal variant of technological development of the defense industry is characterized by the following indicators:
a) Impeccable implementation of the State Rearmament Program for the period from 2007 to 2015 in terms of volume, timing and nomenclature, plus the implementation of subsequent programs for 2020 and 2015.
b) Growth of the Russian share of the military aviation market to 15%.
c) Increasing Russia's share in the military transport aviation market to 20-30%.
d) Increasing the share of Russian military shipbuilding to 20%.
e) Ensuring a significant presence of Russia in the land weapons market (including air defense and radio-electronic systems for various purposes).) The growth of knowledge-intensive and high-tech production at defense industry enterprises and the number of new technologies transferred to the civilian sectors of the economy.
These indicators show the optimal option for the technological development of the military-industrial complex, which is most consistent with the modern national interests of Russia in the field of science and technology, as well as the tasks of the state in ensuring national security. For the successful implementation of such or a similar project for the technological development of the defense industry, it is necessary to finally overcome its systemic problems.
Main problems of the sector:
a) Inconsistency of the structure, size, level of technological development of the military-industrial complex with the goals and objectives facing it
b) Systematic lag behind leading Western countries in the technologies necessary for the development of advanced weapons.
c) Insufficient use of the potential of the military-industrial complex for the production of high-tech products for both military and civilian purposes.
The dominant technological areas in the global military-industrial complex are:
a) New materials. Ninety percent of materials will be replaced by new ones in the next few decades.
b) Supersonic technologies
c) Technologies for controlling physical fields in all wavelength ranges.
d) Directed energy technologies
d) Nanotechnology
f) Technologies of information-technical, information-psychological and psychophysical influence
g) Technologies of telecommunications, simulation and modeling, distance learning and other information technologies.
The next condition for the implementation of a favorable scenario for the development of the defense industry is the implementation of some federal target programs, which on paper do not have a military focus. Such programs are the Federal Target Program “National Technological Base”, the Federal Target Program “Development of Electronic Component Base and Radio Electronics”, the Federal Target Program “Research and Development in Priority Areas of Development of the Scientific and Technological Complex of Russia”. The importance of these programs is explained by the fact that the results of their implementation will be used to achieve goals in the field of technological development of the military-industrial complex.
As another condition for the implementation of a favorable option for the technological development of the military-industrial complex, one can name the transfer of the Russian economy to an innovative path of development and solution of strategic tasks formulated in “Plan 2020”. This means an increase in funding for education and science and a deep restructuring of the military-industrial complex and related industries.
So, in the end, achieving the ultimate goals in the development of the military-industrial complex and overcoming the problems characteristic of the sector implies solving the following tasks:
a) creation of integrated structures, research centers in the main areas of development of the military-industrial complex or development of existing ones (including the creation of similar structures based on territorial production clusters)
b) development of a highly efficient management system for such structures
c) optimization of military-industrial capacities, incl. reduction of excess capacity
d) determination of the main directions of technological modernization and development of scientific, technical and production potential of integrated structures of the defense industry, development of appropriate long-term corporate strategies and deployment of work on their implementation
e) reconstruction, modernization and re-equipment of military-industrial complex enterprises
f) if necessary, support for the import of the latest equipment necessary for the production of competitive products
g) ensuring the maximum cost-effective level of utilization of military-industrial complex enterprises
h) ensuring improved quality and reduced costs of manufactured products
i) attracting investments into the sector for modernization and development of the life cycle of promising weapons and competitive high-tech products
j) development and mastery of the latest “critical” technologies necessary for the production of competitive military products
k) pursuing a flexible international policy that combines the purchase of technologies and components from technology leaders on the one hand and entering into strategic alliances with countries creating national defense industries on the other hand
l) development and mastery of new promising types of weapons and military equipment
m) legislative and regulatory support for the growth of the military-industrial complex
To maintain Russia's status as one of the world leaders in the field of military industry, it is necessary to select appropriate market niches for the sale of Russian-made weapons. The policy for promoting military products to foreign markets should be active and flexible.
In general, the technological development of the defense-industrial complex with the dominant role of the state. Taking into account current trends, the probability of implementing an optimal technological development plan can be assessed as very high, but associated with many different risks and uncertainties.
CONCLUSION
Based on the study, the following conclusions can be drawn:
) At the moment, the global arms market is highly competitive and therefore Russia needs to improve the quality of its military products in order not to lose its position in it. This can be done by investing in R&D. The largest exporters on the world arms market besides Russia are the USA and France. India, Iraq, Oman, Australia and Saudi Arabia are actively purchasing weapons, and in these markets Russian weapons compete with American ones. It is necessary to constantly increase the level of competitiveness of products of the Russian military-industrial complex.
) The Russian military-industrial complex is very contradictory. On the one hand, there is a steady aging of personnel, a chronic lack of funding from the state, and low salaries. On the other hand, the Russian military-industrial complex is developing more and more new models of weapons and military equipment that are qualitatively superior to foreign analogues, such as the T-90AM tank and the T-50 fighter.
) In the military-industrial complex, there are mainly large concerns operating, consisting of several enterprises and their production capacities are large enough to maintain Russia’s position in the global arms market. The concerns produce a wide range of military and civilian goods and have access to advanced production technologies.
) This is reflected in Russian exports of military products. If in the 90s the products of the Russian military-industrial complex were exported mainly to China and India, now the geography of supplies is much wider; Russian weapons are bought in Venezuela, Malaysia and many other countries. Arms exports have become one of the most important exports from Russia in general and have recently exceeded the $10 billion mark.
) The main goal facing the Russian defense industry at the moment is the modernization of products and scientific and technological development. In general, based on all of the above, we can be sure that the Russian military-industrial complex, despite some difficulties, is one of the most effective sectors of the economy, capable of creating and selling a high-quality product.
LIST OF REFERENCES USED:
1. Monographs, textbooks, teaching aids
Degterev D.A.: Monograph - Russia and the world arms market. 2009.
Shcherbanin Yu.A.: Textbook - World Economy 2010.
Long-term forecast of scientific and technological development of the Russian Federation (until 2025). - 2013.
2. Publications in periodicals.
1. Cooper D. Military-industrial complex of Russia: one step behind? // Russian Air Force Service - 2011.
Korotchenko I. 10 main new products of the Russian military-industrial complex in 2011. // Business portal slon.ru - 2012.
3. Internet resources
1. Official website of OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey - www.almaz-antey.ru
Official website of JSC United Aircraft Corporation - www.uacrussia.ru
Official website of OJSC "Uralvagonzavod" - www.uvz.ru
Information portal newsruss - www.newsruss.ru
Official website of the Center for Analysis of the Global Arms Trade (TSAMTO) - www.armstrade.org
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To determine what the role of the military-industrial complex is in the Russian economy, it is necessary to understand the meaning of this concept. The first person to coin the term military-industrial complex was the President of the United States of America, Dwight Eisenhower. By the concept he meant not only the scale of production of weapons and military goods, but also other structures that support the power and combat effectiveness of the state’s armed forces.
The military-industrial complex in the modern Russian Federation can be a more narrow-profile term. The Russian military-industrial complex is a structure that includes production facilities, design bureaus, and research institutes that are directly involved in the production of military equipment, guns and shells.
Connection between civil and military sectors
Military-industrial complex enterprises are not only military-oriented objects. Factories and factories that work primarily for civil society also provide the army with everything they need. These are the light, food, woodworking, and chemical industries. One of the key sectors supporting the military-industrial complex is mechanical engineering. This includes the production of vehicles, instruments, and equipment for other industries. Although these branches of the military-industrial complex are not leading in the state’s military industry, they ensure the integrity and productivity of defense facilities.
There is also feedback here. The peculiarities of the Russian military-industrial complex do not end with the work of civilian enterprises for the country's army. It so happened that in the absence of special orders, the factories of the complex are engaged in the production of household and household goods. This is mainly home appliances.
Composition of the Russian military-industrial complex
The structure of the Russian military-industrial complex includes the following components:
- research institutes that engage in theory development and design research;
- design bureaus, whose employees are responsible for creating experimental models and prototypes of real weapons;
- experimental laboratories, bases, testing grounds and airfields, where tests of technical equipment and their elements are carried out before launching into mass production;
- production facilities: factories and enterprises producing defense industry objects;
- consulting firms that help solve commercial, marketing, legal, financial and foreign economic issues.
Formations of the Russian military-industrial complex
The military-industrial complex of Russia was formed at the stage of industrialization in the Soviet Union. Increased ergonomic and strength requirements began to be imposed on the production of defense industry objects. According to government requirements, the weapon had to be as simple as possible so that any soldier without special skills could use it.
In the defense industry, highly skilled workers were highly valued, so wages and social benefits were much higher for workers in this industry.
To understand the role of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy, you need to estimate the number of people employed in this area. At the time of perestroika, about five million people worked in the state's defense sector. This is twenty-five percent of all industrial production employees. Scientific personnel made up one fifth of all specialists.
The role of the military-industrial complex for society
All developments of the military-industrial complex are financed by the population of the country. At the same time, not all products produced by defense enterprises are necessary only for combat operations. The country, first of all, must show the power of its army to others. In this case, weapons act as a deterrent.
One of the main prerequisites for the development of the military-industrial complex is doctrine. This normative document establishes the goals and objectives of defense, defines its role in the international arena, opportunities, and threats from potential adversaries.
The Russian military-industrial complex has always been distinguished by the production of a large number of various weapons. In Soviet times, the country produced defense industry objects many times more than all potential adversaries combined.
The design and production of military equipment helps to introduce new advanced methods into other industries. Based on developments in the defense sector, modern vehicles, ships, aircraft, communications equipment and computers are produced. And this is only because they do not have sufficient potential for the defense sector.
Industry structure
The branches of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation include a set of production and research facilities that provide the army with everything necessary. The military-industrial complex, in addition to the production of objects, is also characterized by a leadership and management apparatus.
It is in this sector that the most qualified personnel work and the best achievements of science are collected. This is due to the fact that the military-industrial complex produces equipment of complex design.
Geographical division
Military-industrial complex enterprises are evenly located throughout the Russian Federation. Each region has at least one link that is part of the defense industry. But depending on the required conditions, different industries are based in different places.
In large cities, there are knowledge-intensive facilities that are difficult to implement and require qualified personnel. In first place is the capital - Moscow, important points for military-industrial production are St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk.
A peculiarity of the geography of elements of the defense sector is the creation of closed towns. Previously, they were listed under assigned numbers, and only now they received names. In such populated areas it is easy to ensure the secrecy regime that is necessary to preserve industrial secrets and technologies. In closed cities, as a rule, the social level is an order of magnitude higher.
The location of industrial facilities was influenced by geographical, strategic and other factors that determine the convenience of the location. For example, the development of nuclear warheads occurs in the most remote corners of the country, and military shipbuilding is developed in places with water areas. The latter include the cities of Taganrog, Severodvinsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The center for the production of small arms is Tula, and the center of artillery is the Urals. Space objects are based in places remote from populated areas.
Aviation industry
Factors influencing the location of aviation industry facilities are:
- the ability to assemble a finished product from parts and assemblies;
- availability of highly professional specialists;
- convenient transport interchange.
Mostly all design bureaus are located in Moscow and the Moscow region. The only design bureau that develops the design and technology of an amphibious aircraft is located in Taganrog.
Basically, the capital is the center of the aviation industry. Companies that produce world-famous aircraft brands such as Yak, Il, Tu, Su and others carry out their work here. In the Moscow region they are engaged in the production of individual parts of aircraft.
The largest aviation facilities are located not only in Moscow, but also in Smolensk, Voronezh, Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Omsk, Irkutsk.
Rocket and space industry
The modern military-industrial complex of Russia cannot be imagined without the rocket and space industry, which is the most knowledge-intensive, expensive and complex to implement. The capital and its surrounding areas are the base for scientific research and technology development. This is explained by the fact that there is access to highly qualified personnel. It is in Moscow that specialists are developing ballistic, cruise, anti-aircraft missiles and engines.
For security and secrecy reasons, rocket and space industry enterprises are not located in close proximity to state borders.
The country's main cosmodrome is located in the Arkhangelsk region. It is from here that military artificial satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles are launched. To support this industry within the framework of international cooperation, the Russian Federation leases the Baikonur cosmodrome from Kazakhstan.
Artillery and rifle complex
The importance of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy cannot be overestimated. Thanks to the production of unique products, the defense industry brings good income to the country's budget. One of the striking examples is small arms, namely the Kalashnikov assault rifle. It is known throughout the world and is the most widespread type of this type of weapon.
Enterprises engaged in the production of artillery and small arms are located near metallurgical plants. This is economically due to a decrease in the number of goods transport operations.
The Urals are rightfully considered the center of artillery production. It is in Yekaterinburg and Perm that the Grad, Smerch, Hurricane multiple launch rocket systems, guns, howitzers, mortars, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles are manufactured.
Armor industry
The influence of the military-industrial complex on the Russian economy may not be positive. For example, the armored tank industry is currently in a period of deep crisis. The authorities are trying to reorient and repurpose the facilities of this complex. Only the plant for the production of armored personnel carriers in Kurgan is distinguished by stability in its work. Many production facilities in this industry are currently engaged in armoring passenger cars.
Military shipbuilding
It is impossible to assess the role of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy without characterizing the shipbuilding complex. Thanks to this branch of the military-industrial sector, construction companies are always provided with work. Most of the enterprises involved in the manufacture of warships are based in the central part of the Russian Federation. This is necessary to increase the level of security of such objects.
The production of submarines is now practically non-existent. The shipbuilding defense complex facilities are located in the northern capital of the state - St. Petersburg. In addition to it, the centers of ship production are Nizhny Novgorod, Severodvinsk, Kaliningrad and Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Enterprises in this sector are characterized by a narrow focus and a monopolized market. Military shipbuilding is one of the first sectors to suffer from the economic crisis.
Nuclear industry
This sector consists of two parts:
- nuclear power;
- nuclear weapons complex.
The nuclear industry is most often secret facilities located in closed military camps. The main goal of their work is to protect the nuclear space and security of the Russian Federation. Previously, these were bases equipped with everything necessary. The people living on their territory, although they were limited in their actions, had a better standard of living.
Now the demand for nuclear products has fallen, so the enterprises are no longer so secretive. They begin to expand the range of products they produce, surprising with their versatility. Many nuclear industry facilities are engaged in the dismantling and elimination of nuclear weapons.
Uranium industry
The uranium industry plays a key role in the entire military-industrial complex. This sector includes:
- extraction of this natural resource;
- enrichment;
- metallurgy.
The main uranium deposits are located in the Irkutsk region.
Finally
In order to understand what the role of the military-industrial complex is in the Russian economy, it is necessary to analyze separately each industry included in it, because all sectors have their own characteristics and focus. For this reason, the production of some objects replenishes the country’s budget with good amounts, while others require additional funding. The defense sector provides jobs for millions of Russian citizens, is the engine of progress and helps bring the country's economy out of the financial crisis. Thanks to the achievements of the military sector, other areas of society are developing.
A week ago, I casually noted here that the thesis about the alleged inability of pre-communist Russia to quickly and successfully develop the defense industry and the absence in Russia before 1917 of large investment funds allocated to defense is refuted by the successful implementation in Russia of programs for the development of military shipbuilding industry in 1910-1917, and the rapid growth of the defense industry in Russia during the First World War (WWI), when Russia was able to achieve a phenomenal growth in military production, which was ensured, among other things, through a sharp expansion of production capacity and the rapid construction of new enterprises.
These remarks of mine have caused numerous angry cries and objections here. Alas, the level of most objections testifies to the extreme ignorance of the public on this issue and the incredible littering of their heads with all kinds of prejudices and completely mossy ideas borrowed from accusatory journalism and propaganda.
In principle, this should not be surprising. The denunciation of the alleged inability of the vile Ancien Régime to cope with the needs of military production was promoted by the liberal and socialist opposition even before February 1917, unanimously supported by the generals who tried (finding themselves on both the red and white sides) to dissociate themselves from the “old regime”, and then became a commonplace of communist propaganda for obvious reasons. As a result, in Russian historiography this has turned into a general historical cliche, practically undiscussed and unexamined. It would seem that almost 100 years have passed, and one could hope for a more objective coverage of this issue now. Alas, the study of WWI (and the domestic military-industrial complex) in Russia is still at an extremely low level; no one is studying the development of the country’s military-industrial complex during WWII, and if this topic is touched upon in publications, then it all comes down to a mindless repetition of memorized cliches. Perhaps only the authors-compilers of the recently published collection “The Military Industry of Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century” (volume 1 of the work “History of the creation and development of the defense industry of Russia and the USSR. 1903-1963”) questioned and criticized this mythology.
It can be said without exaggeration that the development of the Russian military industry in WWII remains a large-scale blank spot in Russian history.
I've been very interested in this topic lately, and I'm even thinking about the possibility of starting to study it more seriously. Nevertheless, even a small acquaintance with the materials is enough to affirm, and repeat it here again: during the First World War, a huge leap in military production was made in Russia, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in Russian history , and were not repeated in any of the periods of the Soviet period of history, including the Second World War. The basis for this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacity in 1914-1917. due to four factors:
1) Expanding the capacity of existing state-owned military enterprises
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production
3) Large-scale program of emergency construction of new state-owned factories
4) Widespread construction of new private military factories, secured by government orders.
Thus, in all cases, this growth was ensured by large-scale capital investments (both public and private), which makes discussions about Russia’s alleged inability to make large-scale investments in the defense industry completely absurd before 1917. Actually, this thesis, as noted, is clearly refuted by the rapid creation and modernization of shipbuilding facilities for large shipbuilding programs before WWII. But in matters of shipbuilding and the fleet, the criticizing public is at a completely profane level, therefore, not having the opportunity to object, it quickly switches to shells, etc.
The main thesis is that few shells were made in Russia. At the same time, as a favorite argument, figures are given for the total production of shells in Western countries for the entire period of WWII - including both 1917 and 1918. The scale of the expansion of the military industry in the West by 1918 and the artillery battles of 1918 are compared with the Russian one that had just begun to unfold military production in 1915-1916 (because in 1917 Russian industry went downhill) - and on this basis they are trying to draw some conclusions. I wonder what these kinds of “argumentators” are counting on to prove. However, as we will see below, even in 1917, with the production and availability of the same artillery shells, things in Russia were not so bad.
It should be noted here that one of the reasons for distorted ideas about the work of Russian industry in WWII is the work of Barsukov and Manikovsky (that is, partially Barsukov again) - in fact, partly because since then nothing new has appeared on this topic. Their works were written in the early 20s, kept in the spirit of those years and, in matters related to the defense industry, concentrated to a large extent on the shortages of military supplies of the period 1914-1915. Actually, the very issues of developing weapons production and supply are reflected in these works insufficiently and contradictorily (which is understandable from the conditions of writing). Therefore, the “suffering-accusatory” bias taken in these works has been uncritically reproduced for decades. Moreover, both Barsukov and Manikovsky contain a lot of unreliable information (for example, about the state of affairs with the construction of new enterprises) and dubious statements (a typical example is howls directed against private industry).
For a better understanding of the development of Russian industry in WWII, in addition to the mentioned collection “The Military Industry of Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” I would recommend the recently published “Essays on the History of the Military Industry” by Gen. V.S. Mikhailova (in 1916-1917, head of the military chemical department of the GAU, in 1918, head of the GAU)
This commentary was written as a kind of educational program to educate the general public on the issues of mobilization and expansion of the Russian defense industry during WWII and is intended to demonstrate the scale of this expansion. In this commentary I do not touch upon issues of the aircraft and aircraft engine industries, as well as the automotive industry, because this is a separate complex topic. The same applies to the fleet and shipbuilding (also a separate topic). Let's just look at the army.
Rifles. In 1914, there were three state-owned arms factories in Russia - Tula, Izhevsk (actually a complex with a steel foundry) and Sestroretsk. The military capacity of all three factories for the summer of 1914 was estimated based on equipment at a total of 525 thousand rifles per year (44 thousand per month) with 2-2.5 shifts (Tula - 250 thousand, Izhevsk - 200 thousand, Sestroretsk 75 thousand). In reality, from August to December 1914, all three factories produced only 134 thousand rifles.
Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles at them from December 1914 to December 1916 was increased fourfold - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three factories was doubled, and the actual delivery amounted to: Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsk - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916 (figures excluding those being repaired).
The increase in capacity was achieved by expanding the machine tool and energy park of each plant. The largest scale of work was carried out at the Izhevsk plant, where the machine park was almost doubled and a new power plant was built. In 1916, an order was issued for the second stage of reconstruction of the Izhevsk plant worth 11 million rubles. with the goal of bringing its production in 1917 to 800 thousand rifles.
The Sestroretsk plant underwent a large-scale expansion, where by January 1917 the output of 500 rifles per day was achieved, and from June 1, 1917 it was planned to produce 800 rifles per day. However, in October 1916, it was decided to limit the production of rifles to 200 thousand units per year, and to focus the increased capacity of the plant on the production of Fedorov assault rifles at a rate of 50 units per day from the summer of 1917.
Let us add that the Izhevsk Steel Plant was a supplier of weapons and special steel, as well as gun barrels. In 1916, the production of steel compared to 1914 was increased from 290 to 500 thousand pounds, gun barrels - six times (up to 1.458 million units), machine gun barrels - 19 times (up to 66.4 thousand) , and further growth was expected.
It should be noted that a considerable part of the machines for weapons production in Russia were produced by the machine tool production of the Tula Arms Plant. In 1916, the production of machine tools on it was increased to 600 units. per year, and in 1917 it was planned to transform this machine-building department into a separate large Tula state-owned machine-building plant with an expansion of capacity to 2,400 machines per year. 32 million rubles were allocated for the creation of the plant. According to Mikhailov, of the 320% increase in rifle production from 1914 to 1916, only 30% of the increase was achieved by “forced work,” and the remaining 290% was the effect of equipment expansion.
However, the main emphasis in expanding rifle production was placed on the construction of new weapons factories in Russia. Already in 1915, appropriations were authorized for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula Armory with a total total capacity of 3,500 rifles per day. The estimated cost of the plant (3,700 units of machine tool equipment) amounted to 31.2 million rubles; by October 1916, allocations increased to 49.7 million rubles, and an additional 6.9 million rubles were allocated for the purchase of equipment from Remington ( 1691 machines) for the production of another 2 thousand rifles per day (!). In total, the entire Tula arms complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. Construction of the 2nd plant began in the summer of 1916 and should be completed by the beginning of 1918. In fact, because of the revolution, the plant was completed already under the Soviets.
In 1916, construction began on a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav arms factory near Samara with a capacity of 800 thousand rifles per year. At the same time, it was planned to transfer the facilities of the Sestroretsk arms plant to this site, which was later abandoned. The estimated cost was determined at 34.5 million rubles. Construction was carried out intensively in 1916, by 1917 the main workshops were erected, then collapse began. The Soviet government tried to complete the construction of the plant in the 20s, but failed.
Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have amounted to 3.8 million units, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacity of 1914 and tripling in relation to issued in 1916. This overlapped the requests of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.
Machine guns. The production of machine guns remained a bottleneck of Russian industry throughout WWII. In fact, right up to the revolution, only the Tula Arms Plant produced heavy machine guns, which increased production to 1,200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the increase was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 g. - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 pieces), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns. Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of Headquarters. In exaggerated hopes for imports, proposals from private industry for the production of heavy machine guns were rejected by the GAU.
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov machine gun plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to a syndicate of 15 thousand hand rudder wheels for 26 million rubles was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The first batch of machine guns was assembled in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the revolutionary chaos, the plant was practically ready - according to the plant inspection report dated August 1919 (and nothing had changed there in a year and a half), the readiness of the plant’s workshops was 95%, power plants and communications – 100%, equipment was delivered 100%, installed 75%. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 pieces in the first half of the year, followed by 1,000 pieces per month and increasing to 2.5-3 thousand light machine guns per month when working in one exchange.
Ammo. In 1914, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges in Russia - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million rounds of ammunition per year during single-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three factories should have already produced a third more in total in the peaceful year of 1914 - the state defense order amounted to 600 million rounds of ammunition.
The production of cartridges was largely limited by the amount of gunpowder (more on this below). From the beginning of 1915, enormous efforts were made to expand the capacity of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian 3-lin cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million units (in this number does not include the production of Japanese cartridges in Petrograd).. In 1916 alone, the total volume of production of Russian cartridges was increased by one and a half times (to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, the supply of 1.8 billion cartridges was expected, plus the arrival of approximately the same number of Russian imported cartridges. In 1915-1917 the number of pieces of equipment from all three cartridge factories doubled.
In 1916, the headquarters made clearly inflated demands on cartridges - for example, at the inter-union conference in January 1917, the need was calculated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave a cost of 6 billion . per year, or twice the consumption of 1916, and this with a sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, construction began on the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant (capacity 840 million rounds per year, estimated cost 40.9 million rubles), planned for commissioning in 1917, but due to collapse, it was put into operation only under the Soviets in October 1918. In general, the total expected capacity of the Russian cartridge industry in 1918 can be calculated at up to 3 billion cartridges per year (taking into account the production of foreign cartridges).
Light guns. The production of light and mountain 3-dm artillery was carried out at the Petrograd State and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov plant (eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private “Tsaritsyn group of factories” (Sormovsky plant, Lessner plant, Petrograd metal and Kolomensky plant) were connected to production. Monthly production of guns mod. 1902 eventually grew in 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!) - from 35 to 472 systems. At the same time, for example, the Perm plant increased the production of 3-dm field guns in 1916 by 10 times compared to 1914 (bringing up to 100 guns per month by the end of 1916), and carriages for them by 16 times .
The production of 3-dm mountain and short guns at Russian factories for 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) was tripled (from 17 to about 50 months), and plus the production of 3-dm began in the fall of 1916 anti-aircraft guns. In 1916, the annual total production of 3-dm guns of all types was three times higher than the production of 1915.
The Tsaritsyn group, having started production from scratch and delivered the first six 3-dm guns in April 1916, already six months later (in October) was producing 180 guns per month, and in February 1917, 200 guns were manufactured, and there were reserves for further increasing production. The Putilov plant, having resumed production of the 3-dm gun only in the second half of 1915, reached a capacity of 200 guns per month by the end of 1916, and in mid-1917 it was expected to produce 250-300 guns per month. In fact, due to the sufficiency of the production of 3-dm guns, the Putilov plant’s program for 1917 was given only 1214 guns mod. 1902, and the remaining capacities were reoriented to the production of heavy artillery.
To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, construction began on a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory with a yearly capacity of: 3-dm field guns - 1450, 3-dm mountain guns - 480, 42-dm guns - 300, 48-dm howitzers - 300, 6-dm howitzers - 300, 6-dm fortress guns - 190, 8-dm howitzers - 48. The cost of the enterprise was determined at 37.5 million rubles. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Thus, with the monthly requirement for 1917, declared by Headquarters in January 1917, for 490 field and 70 mountain 3-dm guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, would likely significantly exceed this need. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, one could expect a total output of at least about 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (when estimating the disposal of 300 guns per month by firing squad without taking into account combat losses)..
It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began development of the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the delivery of the rest was scheduled for 1917. There is no doubt that this would be followed by new mass orders for these guns.
Heavy weapons. As we all know, the production of heavy artillery in Russia during WWI is a favorite topic of all denouncers of the “old regime”. At the same time, it is hinted that the vile tsarism could not organize anything here.
By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-line howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910 was carried out at the Putilov plant, the Obukhov plant and the Petrograd gun factory, and the 6-dm howitzer mod. 1909 and 1910 - at the Putilov and Perm factories. After the start of the war, special attention was also paid to the production of 42-lin cannons mod. 1909, under which the Obukhov and Petrograd factories were expanded, and their mass production began at the Putilov factory. In 1916, the Obukhov plant began producing a 6-dm Schneider gun and a 12-dm howitzer. The Putilov plant was the leading manufacturer of 48-lin howitzers throughout the war, producing up to 36 of these guns per month by the fall of 1916, and was supposed to increase their production in 1917.
The production of heavy artillery increased very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery guns were manufactured (and all of them were 48-lin howitzers), and in the second half of 1916, already 566 heavy guns (including 21 12-dm howitzers), in other words, in the calculated coefficients Manikovsky's output increased 7 times (!) in a year and a half. Moreover, this number apparently does not include the supply of land guns (including 24 6-dm howitzers) for the Naval Department (mainly the IPV Fortress). In 1917, a further increase in production was to continue. First of all, 42-line guns, the output of which at all three manufacturing plants in 1917 should have been an estimated 402 units (versus 89 in 1916). In total, in 1917, if the revolution had not happened, the GAU (without Morved) industry should have supplied up to 2,000 Russian-made heavy guns (versus 900 in 1916).
Only one Putilov plant in its main production according to the 1917 program was supposed to produce 432 48-lin howitzers, 216 42-lin cannons and 165 6-dm howitzers for the army plus 94 6-dm howitzers for Morved.
Additionally, with the nationalization of the Putilov plant, it was decided to create a special heavy artillery plant there for the production of 6-dm and 8-dm howitzers with production volumes of up to 500 howitzers per year. The construction of the plant was carried out at an accelerated pace in 1917, despite the revolutionary chaos. By the end of 1917, the plant was almost ready. But then the evacuation of Petrograd began, and by the decision of the State Administration of December 14, the new plant was subject to priority evacuation to Perm. Most of the enterprise’s equipment was ultimately delivered to the Perm plant, where it formed the basis of Motovilikha’s heavy gun production capacity for the next decades. However, a considerable part was scattered throughout the country during the civil war of 1918 and lost.
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to become the aforementioned Saratov state-owned gun factory with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-dm howitzers - 300, 6-dm fortress guns - 190, 8-dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private Tsaritsyn Group of Plants, as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-dm howitzers and new “light” 16-dm howitzers at the Tsaritsyn plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers, whose construction was carried out sluggishly during WWI, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916 for commissioning in the spring of 1917. A production project there was also put forward since 1918, 42-lin cannons and 6-dm howitzers (note that the production of 42-lin cannons and 6-dm howitzers was eventually mastered at the “Barricades” by the Soviets in 1930-1932).
With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry would have reached an annual output of at least 2,600 heavy artillery systems in 1918, and more likely - more, taking into account the fact that, apparently, in 1917-1918. Serious efforts would be made to expand the production of 48-lin howitzers. And this does not take into account the Saratov plant, the possibility of commissioning it before 1919 seems doubtful to me.
In fact, this meant that the 1916 Headquarters requests for heavy artillery could be covered by Russian industry by the end of 1917, and the massive production of 1918 could be turned, along with covering losses, into a sharp (in fact, multiple for many artillery systems) increase TAON states. Let us add to this that in 1917 and early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported (and this does not take into account possible new orders abroad). In total, the total number of Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach 5,000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.
Let us note that at the same time in Russia (mainly at the Obukhov plant, as well as at the Perm plant) the very large-scale production of powerful large-caliber naval artillery (from 4 to 12 dm) continued, the production of 14-dm naval guns was mastered, and despite WWI, reconstruction continued in full swing Perm plant to organize the production of 24 naval guns of 14-16 dm calibers per year.
And, by the way, a little tidbit for those who like to speculate that the fleet devoured the army before WWII, and the unfortunate army suffered from a lack of guns. According to the “Report on the War Ministry for 1914”, on January 1, 1915, the land fortress artillery consisted of 7634 guns and 323 half-mounted mortars (in 1914, 425 new guns were supplied to the land fortresses), and the supply of shells for the fortresses was 2 million pieces The artillery of the coastal fortresses consisted of another 4,162 guns, and the stock of shells was 1 million pieces. No comments, as they say, but it seems the story of the real greatest Russian drank before WWI is still waiting for its researcher.
3 dm caliber artillery shells. Discussions about shells are a favorite topic of critics of the Russian military-industrial complex in WWII, and as a rule, information about the shell famine of 1914-1915. completely unlawfully transferred to a later period. Even less awareness is manifested in the issue of the production of heavy artillery shells.
The production of 3-dm shells before WWI was carried out in Russia at five state-owned (Izhevsk steel foundry, as well as Perm, Zlatoust, Olonetsk and Verkhneturinsk mining departments) and 10 private factories (Metallic, Putilovsky, Nikolaevsky, Lessner, Bryansky, Petrograd Mechanical, Russian Society, Rudzsky, Lilpop, Sormovsky), and until 1910 - in two Finnish factories. With the outbreak of war, shell production underwent a rapid expansion, both by increasing production at the aforementioned factories and by connecting new private enterprises. In total, by January 1, 1915, orders for 3-dm shells were issued to 19 private enterprises, and by January 1, 1916 - already 25 (and this does not take into account Vankov’s organization)
The main role in shell production under the GAU was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united around a number of other private enterprises (Russian Society, Russian-Baltic and Kolomna). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual design capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 – 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced a total of 75 thousand 3-dm shells in 1914, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-inch shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. “The most important reports from the Ministry of War” provide even more significant figures for the supply of Russian-made 3-mm shells to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916 - 29.4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Of particular note is the well-known organization of the GAU Commissioner Vankov, which organized a large number of private enterprises to produce shells and played an outstanding role in the mobilization of industry and the promotion of shell production. In total, Vankov involved 442 private factories in production and cooperation (!). Since April 1915, Vankov’s organization received orders for 13.04 million 3-dm French-style grenades and 1 million chemical shells, as well as 17.09 million igniters and 17.54 million detonators. The issuance of shells began already in September 1915, by the end of the year it produced 600 thousand shells, and in 1916 Vankov’s organization produced about 7 million shells, bringing production to 783 thousand in December 1916. By the end of 1917 there were It manufactured 13.6 million 3-dm shells of all types.
Due to the success of Vankov’s organization, in 1916 it was given orders for the production of an additional 1.41 million heavy shells with a caliber from 48 lin to 12 dm, as well as 1 million shells (57, 75 and 105 mm) for Romania. Vankov’s organization quickly set up production of heavy steel projectiles, new for Russia, from steel cast iron. As is known, it was the mass production of steel cast iron shells that significantly contributed to the resolution of the shell crisis in France. Having started production of such shells in Russia at the end of 1916, Vankov’s organization almost completely fulfilled orders for the casting of all ordered heavy shells by the end of 1917 (although due to the collapse, only about 600 thousand of them were processed).
Along with this, efforts continued to expand the production of 3-dm shells at state-owned enterprises. In 1917, it was planned to increase the production of 3-dm shells at the Izhevsk plant to 1 million per year, in addition, 1 million 3-dm shells per year were planned for production at the new large Kamensk state steel plant under construction (more about it below).
Let us add that 56 million rounds for Russian 3-dm guns were ordered abroad, of which 12.6 million, according to the “Most Submissive Report,” arrived in 1916 (note that Barsukov generally gives lower figures for many positions than “Reports”). In 1917, 10 million shells of the Morgan order were expected to arrive from the USA and up to 9 million of the Canadian order.
It is estimated that in 1917 it was expected to receive up to 36 million 3-dm rounds from Russian industry (taking into account Vankov’s organization) and up to 20 million from imports. Such a quantity exceeded even the maximum possible wishes of the army. It should be noted here that, due to the shell crisis at the beginning of the war, the Russian command in 1916 was seized by something like psychopathy in terms of stockpiling shells. For the entire 1916, the Russian army, according to various estimates, spent 16.8 million 3 dm caliber shells, of which 11 million were used in the five summer months of the most intense fighting, and without experiencing any special problems with ammunition. Let us recall that with such expenditure, up to 42 million shells were actually supplied to the Military Department in 1916. In the summer of 1916, Gen. Alekseev in the note demanded the supply of 4.5 million shells per month for the future. In December 1916, the Headquarters formulated the need for 3-dm shells for 1917 with a frankly inflated figure of 42 million pieces. Upart in January 1917 took a more reasonable position, formulating demands for the supply of 2.2 million shells per month for this year (or 26.6 million in total). Manikovsky, however, considered this too exaggerated. In January 1917, Upart stated that the annual need for 3-dm shells was “satisfied with excess” and that by January 1, 1917, the army had a stock of 3-dm rounds of 16.298 million pieces - in other words, the actual annual consumption of 1916. During the first two months of 1917, approximately 2.75 million 3-inch rounds were sent to the front. As we see, almost all of the above calculations would have been more than covered in 1917 by Russian production alone, and most likely by 1918, Russian light artillery would have come up with a frank overstocking of ammunition, and if the rate of production and supplies were maintained and at least limitedly increased, By the end of 1918, warehouses would have been bursting with huge stocks of 3-dm shells.
Heavy artillery shells. The main producers of heavy ground artillery shells (caliber more than 100 mm) before WWII were the Obukhov plant, the Perm plant, as well as the three other mining department plants mentioned above. At the beginning of the war, four mining plants (including Perm) already had 1.134 million (!) shells of 42 and 48 lin and 6 dm calibers in operation (excluding heavier ones), and the Russian Society had another 23.5 thousand shells on order. With the outbreak of the war, emergency orders were placed for another 630 thousand rounds of heavy artillery. Thus, the statements about the allegedly small number of heavy shells produced before the war and at the beginning of the war are in themselves an absurd myth. During the war, the production of heavy shells increased like an avalanche.
With the beginning of the war, the production of heavy shells at the Perm plant began to expand. Already in 1914, the plant produced 161 thousand heavy shells of all types (up to 14 dm), in 1915 - 185 thousand, in 1916 - 427 thousand, including the production of 48-lin shells since 1914 quadrupled (up to 290 thousand). Already in 1915, the production of heavy shells was carried out at 10 state-owned and private factories with a constant expansion of production.
Additionally, in 1915, mass production of heavy shells (up to 12 dm) began at the Putilov group of factories - in 1915, 140 thousand shells were delivered, and in 1916 - already about 1 million. In 1917, despite collapse began, the group produced 1.31 million heavy shells.
Finally, Vankov’s organization produced more than 600 thousand finished heavy shells in a year from the end of 1916 to the end of 1917, mastering the production of steel cast iron shells, which was new for Russia.
Summing up the production of heavy shells in Russia before the revolution, you need to pay attention to the fact that Barsukov, whom people like to refer to, provides obviously incorrect data on the production of heavy shells in 1914 - supposedly only 24 thousand 48-dm shells and 2,100 11-dm grenades , which contradicts all known data and his own information about the production of shells at individual factories (he has the same incorrect data on 3-dm shells). The tables given in Manikovsky's publication are even more confusing. According to the “Most Submissive Report on the War Ministry for 1914”, from August 1, 1914 to January 1, 1915, 446 thousand shots for 48-lin howitzers, 203.5 thousand shots for 6-lin howitzers were actually supplied to the active army alone. dm howitzers, 104.2 thousand rounds for 42-lin cannons, and this is not counting shells of other types. Thus, it is estimated that at least 800 thousand heavy shells were fired in the last five months of 1914 alone (which coincides with the data on the reserve at the beginning of the war). The 1915 document “Compendium of information on the supply of artillery shells to the army” in the “Military Industry of Russia” gives the production of approximately 160 thousand heavy ground shells in the last 4 months of 1914, although it is not clear from the text how complete these data are.
There are suspicions that Barsukov also underestimated the production of heavy artillery shells in 1915-1916. Thus, according to Barsukov, in 1915, 9.568 million shells of all types (including 3 dm) were manufactured in Russia and another 1.23 million shells were received from abroad, and in 1916, 30.975 million shells of all types were manufactured and about 14 million received from abroad. According to the “Most Submissive Reports on the War Ministry,” in 1915, more than 12.5 million shells of all types were supplied to the active army, and in 1916 – 48 million shells (including 42 million 3-dm). Manikovsky’s figures for the supply of shells to the army in 1915 coincide with the “Report”, but the supply figure for 1916 is one and a half times less - he gives only 32 million shells, including 5.55 million heavy ones. Finally, according to another Manikovsky table, in 1916, 6.2 million heavy shells were supplied to the troops, plus 520 thousand rounds for French 90-mm cannons.
If for 3-inch shells Barsukov’s numbers more or less “beat”, then for shells of larger calibers, when taking Barsukov’s numbers on faith, obvious inconsistencies arise. The figure he gives for the production of 740 thousand heavy shells in 1915, with the release of at least 800 thousand in five months of 1914, is completely inconsistent and contradicts all known data and obvious trends - and the data of the same Manikovsky about the supply of 1.312 million heavy shells to the army in 1915. In my opinion, the release of heavy shells in 1915-1916. Barsukov’s is underestimated by about 1 million shots (apparently due to the failure to take into account the products of some factories). There are also doubts about Barsukov's statistics for 1917.
However, even if we take Barsukov’s figures on faith, then in 1916 4 million heavy shells were manufactured in Russia, and in the crisis year of 1917, despite everything, already 6.7 million. Moreover, according to Barsukov’s data, it turns out that that the production of 6-inch howitzer shells in 1917 increased relative to 1915 by 20 times (!) - to 2.676 million, and 48-lin howitzer shells - by 10 times (to 3.328 million). The actual increase, in my opinion, was somewhat smaller, but nevertheless, the numbers are impressive. Thus, from 1914 to 1917 alone, Russia produced from 11.5 million (Barsukov’s estimate) to about at least 13 million (my estimate) heavy shells, and up to 3 million more heavy shells were imported (from 90 -mm). In real terms, all this meant that Russian heavy artillery quickly overcame the “shell famine”, and in 1917, a situation of oversupply of heavy artillery ammunition began to develop - for example, 42-lin guns in the active army had 4260 rounds in January 1917 per barrel, 48-lin and 6-dm howitzers by September 1917 - up to 2,700 rounds per barrel (despite the fact that a considerable part - more than half - of the huge production of shells of these types in 1917 never reached the troops). Even the massive deployment of heavy artillery in 1917-1918. would hardly change this situation. The most significant thing is that even the extremely inflated and unjustified requirements of the Headquarters from December 1916 for 1917 - 6.6 million 48-lin shells and 2.26 million 6-dm shells - were covered by the actual release of this disastrous 1917 G.
However, as noted, in fact, production was only ramping up, the results of which became evident precisely in 1917. Most likely, without a revolution, one could expect the production of up to 10 million heavy shells in 1917. The production of heavy shells at the Putilov group was being expanded, and the possibility of loading Vankov’s organization with mass production of 48-lin and 6-dm howitzer shells after completing its order for 3-dm grenades was also considered. Judging by the rate of production of these heavy shells by the Vankov organization in 1917, successes here could also be very significant.
Finally, for the mass production of heavy shells, the largest of the Russian defense industry projects implemented in WWII - a large state-owned steel-and-shell plant in Art. Kamensk Region Don Army. Initially, the plant was designed and authorized for construction in August 1915 as a steel foundry for the production of weapons steel and weapon barrels with a design annual capacity of 1 million gun barrels, 1 million 3-dm shells, and more than 1 million pounds of “special steels.” The estimated cost of such production was 49 million rubles. In 1916, the plant's project was supplemented by the creation of the most powerful state-owned shell production in Russia with a planned annual output of 3.6 million 6-dm shells, 360 thousand 8-dm shells and 72 thousand 11-dm and 12-dm shells. The total cost of the complex reached 187 million rubles, the equipment was ordered from the USA and Great Britain. Construction began in April 1916; by October 1917, the construction of the main workshops was underway, but due to the collapse, only a small part of the equipment was delivered. At the beginning of 1918, construction was finally stopped. Finding itself at the epicenter of the Civil War, the unfinished plant was plundered and virtually liquidated.
Another state-owned steelmaking plant was built in 1915 in Lugansk with a design capacity of 4.1 million pounds of weapons-grade steel per year.
Mortars and bomb launchers. The production of mortar and bomb weapons was absent in Russia before the start of WWII and developed on a broad front since 1915, mainly due to the division of private enterprises through the Central Military Industrial Complex. If in 1915 1548 bomb throwers and 1438 mortars were delivered (excluding improvised and outdated systems), then in 1916 - already 10850 bomb throwers, 1912 mortars and 60 Erhardt trench mortars (155 mm), and the production of ammunition for mortars and bomb throwers increased from 400 thousand to 7.554 million shots, that is, almost 19 times. By October 1916, the troops' needs for bomb throwers were covered 100%, and for mortars - 50%, and full coverage was expected by July 1, 1917. As a result, by the end of 1917, the army had twice as many bomb throwers as the state (14 thousand with a staff of 7 thousand), small-caliber mortars - 90% of the staff (4500 with a staff of 5 thousand), large-caliber mortars for TAON - 11% (267 units) of the projected huge need for 2400 systems. There was a clear surplus in ammunition for bomb launchers, and therefore their production was curtailed in 1917 with a reorientation towards the production of mines for mortars, of which there was a shortage. In 1917, production of 3 million mines was expected.
For 1917, a reorientation of production from bomb throwers to mortars was envisaged (in 1917, Barsukov produced 1024 mortars, but there are suspicions that his data for 1917 is clearly incomplete, which is confirmed by his own data on the presence of systems in the troops), as well as increasing the production of large-caliber systems (for example, the Metal Plant began producing 155-mm trench mortars of its own production - 100 units were delivered in a year; the production of 240-mm mortars was also mastered). Another 928 bomb throwers, 185 mortars and 1.29 million units of ammunition for them were received by import by the end of 1917 (data may also be incomplete).
Hand grenades. The production of hand grenades was carried out before the start of WWII in small quantities for fortresses. The production of grenades in Russia was mainly carried out by small private industry in 1915-1916. increased in colossal quantities, and grew from January 1915 to September 1916 by 23 times - from 55 thousand to 1.282 million pieces. If in 1915 2.132 million grenades were produced, then in 1916 - already 10 million. Another 19 million grenades were produced in 1915-1916. received by import. In January 1917, the need to supply the army with 1.21 million hand grenades per month (or 14.5 million per year) was stated, which was fully covered by the achieved level of Russian production.
317 thousand rifle grenades were manufactured in 1916 and up to 600 thousand were expected to be delivered in 1917. In January 1917, 40 thousand Dyakonov mortars and 6.125 million rounds for them were also ordered, but due to the collapse that had begun, mass production was never established.
Powder. By the beginning of WWII, gunpowder for the military department was produced at three state-owned gunpowder factories - Okhtensky, Kazansky and Shostkensky (Chernigov province), the maximum productivity of each of which was estimated at 100 thousand pounds of gunpowder per year, and for the naval department - also at the Shlisselburg private plant with a capacity of up to 200 thousand poods. In factories and warehouses, gunpowder reserves amounted to 439 thousand pounds.
With the beginning of the war, work began to expand all four factories - thus, the capacity and number of employees at the Okhtensky plant were tripled. By 1917, the capacity of the Okhtensky plant was increased to 300 thousand pounds, the Kazan plant - to 360 thousand pounds, the Shostkensky plant - to 445 thousand pounds, the Shlisselburg plant - to 350 thousand pounds. At the same time, starting in 1915, next to the old Kazan plant, a new Kazan powder plant was built with a capacity of another 300 thousand pounds, which began operation in 1917.
In 1914, even before the war, the Military Department began construction of a powerful Tambov state-owned gunpowder plant with a capacity of up to 600 thousand pounds per year. The plant cost 30.1 million rubles and began operation in October 1916, but due to the collapse of 1917, it only just began to operate. At the same time, in order to fulfill orders from the Maritime Department, at the beginning of 1914, construction began on the private Baranovsky (Vladimirsky) plant with a design capacity of 240 thousand pounds. in year. After the outbreak of war, equipment ordered in Germany had to be re-ordered in the USA and Great Britain. The Baranovsky plant was put into operation in August 1916, although it continued to be equipped, and by the end of 1917 it produced 104 thousand pounds of gunpowder. At the end of 1916 the plant was nationalized.
The production of smokeless gunpowder (including the Shlisselburg plant) in 1914 amounted to 437.6 thousand poods, in 1915 - 773.7 thousand, in 1916 - 986 thousand poods. Thanks to reconstruction, by 1917 the capacity was increased to 2 million poods, but due to the revolution they did not have time to get a return on this. Before this, basic needs had to be covered by imports, which amounted to 2 million pounds of smokeless gunpowder in 1915-1916 (200 thousand in 1915 and 1.8 million in 1916).
In the summer of 1916, construction began on the Samara state-owned gunpowder plant with a capacity of 600 thousand pounds at an estimated cost of 30 million rubles, using American equipment, and, among other things, the entire pyroxylin plant of the American company Nonabo was purchased. Almost all the equipment arrived in Russia, but in 1917 construction slowed down sharply and came to naught in 1918, and the equipment was eventually distributed among the “old” gunpowder factories under the Soviets. Thus, in 1918, the total capacity of gunpowder production in Russia could reach 3.2 million poods per year, having decreased in comparison with 1914, which made it possible to actually get rid of imports. This amount of gunpowder was enough to produce 70 million charges for 3-dm shells and 6 billion cartridges. It should also be added that the possibility of issuing orders for the development of gunpowder production to private chemical plants was considered. I note that at the beginning of 1917, the total need for the next year and a half of the war (until July 1, 1918) was determined at 6.049 million pounds of smokeless powder and 1.241 million pounds of black powder.
In addition, in 1916-1917. The construction of the Tashkent state-owned cotton ginning plant was carried out at a cost of 4 million rubles, with an initial capacity of 200 thousand pounds of purified material per year with prospects for subsequent sharp expansion.
Explosives. Before WWII, the production of TNT and the equipment of ammunition for the Military Department was carried out by the Okhtensky and Samara explosives factories. Since the beginning of the war, the capacities of both factories were expanded many times. The Okhtensky plant produced 13.95 thousand pounds of TNT in 1914, but its TNT production was severely damaged by an explosion in April 1915. The Samara plant increased its TNT production from 1914 to 1916. fourfold - from 51.32 thousand pounds to 211 thousand pounds, and tetryl 11 times - from 447 to 5187 pounds. The equipment of shells at both factories increased during this period by 15-20 times - so, 3-dm shells at each from 80 thousand to more than 1.1 million units. In 1916, the Samara plant equipped 1.32 million heavy shells, plus 2.5 million hand grenades.
By 1916, the Shlisselburg plant of the Maritime Department produced up to 400 thousand poods of TNT, the Grozny plant of the Maritime Department - 120 thousand poods, in addition, 8 private factories were connected to the production of TNT. Before WWII, picric acid was produced at two private factories, and already in 1915 - at seven, and in Russia a synthetic method for producing picric acid from benzene was developed, mastered by two factories. The production of trinitroxyl and two of dinitronaphthalene was mastered at two plants.
The total number of enterprises producing explosives for the GAU increased from four at the beginning of WWI to 28 in January 1917. Their total capacity in January 1917 was 218 thousand poods per month, incl. 52 thousand pounds of TNT, 50 thousand pounds of picric acid, 60 thousand pounds of ammonium nitrate, 9 thousand pounds of xylene, 12 thousand pounds of dinitronaphthalene. This meant tripling compared to December 1915. In fact, in a number of cases the capacity was even excessive. In 1916, Russia produced only 1.4 million pounds of explosives, but imported 2.089 million pounds of explosives (including 618.5 thousand pounds of TNT) and 1.124 thousand pounds of ammonium nitrate. In 1917, a turning point in favor of domestic production was expected, and in 1918, the estimated volume of Russian production of explosives should have been reached at least 4 million poods, excluding ammonium nitrate.
Even before WWI, the GAU had planned the construction of the Nizhny Novgorod Explosives Plant. Construction began at the beginning of 1916 with an estimated cost of 17.4 million rubles and a planned annual output of 630 thousand pounds of TNT and 13.7 thousand pounds of tetryl. By the beginning of 1917, the main structures were erected and the delivery of equipment began. Because of the collapse, everything stopped, but later, under the Soviets, the plant was already put into operation.
In the fall of 1916, the construction of the Ufa Explosives Plant was also authorized at a cost of 20.6 million rubles and a production capacity of 510 thousand pounds of TNT and 7 thousand pounds of tetryl per year and a filling capacity of 6 million 3-dm per year. and 1.8 million heavy shells, as well as 3.6 million hand grenades. Because of the revolution, things did not go further than choosing a site.
In 1915-1916 a special Troitsky (Sergievsky) equipment plant was built near Sergiev Posad. The cost is 3.5 million rubles, the capacity is 1.25 million hand grenades per year, as well as the production of capsules and fuses. Six equipment workshops were also built to equip hand grenades and mines for mortars and bomb launchers.
To obtain benzene (for the production of toluene and picric acid) in 1915, the Makeevsky and Kadievsky state-owned plants were quickly built in Donbass in 1915, and a program was adopted to build 26 private benzene plants, of which 15 were put into operation by the beginning of 1917. Three of these plants also produced toluene.
In Grozny and Yekaterinodar, by the end of 1916, private production facilities for the extraction of mononitrotoluene from gasoline were organized under a contract with the State Agrarian University, with a capacity of 100 and 50 thousand poods per year, respectively. At the beginning of 1916, the Baku and Kazan plants for producing toluene from oil were also launched, with a capacity of 24 thousand (in 1917 it was planned to increase to 48 thousand) and 12 thousand poods of toluene, respectively. As a result, the production of toluene in Russia increased from zero to 28 thousand poods per month by May 1917. Then the construction of three private factories for this purpose (including Nobel) began in Baku, commissioned in 1917.
For the production of synthetic phenol (for the production of picric acid) there were in 1915-1916. Four factories were built, producing 124.9 thousand poods in 1916.
Before WWII, sulfuric acid was produced in Russia in the amount of 1.25 million poods per month (of which 0.5 million poods in Poland), while ¾ of the raw materials were imported. During the year from December 1915, 28 new private plants for the production of sulfuric acid were commissioned, increasing monthly production in Russia from 0.8 million to 1.865 million poods. The production of sulfur pyrites in the Urals was tripled in a year and a half from August 1915.
Nitric acid was produced in Russia from Chilean saltite, the annual import volume of which was 6 million poods. To produce nitric acid from Russian materials (ammonia), a whole program was launched and in 1916 an experimental state-owned plant was built in Yuzovka with a capacity of 600 thousand pounds of ammonium nitrate per year, based on which a network of plants was planned for construction, of which two were built in Donbass. In the fall of 1916, the construction of a large calcium cyanamide plant in Grozny to produce fixed nitrogen was also authorized.
In 1916, construction began on a large Nizhny Novgorod plant of nitric and sulfuric acids with an output of 200 thousand pounds of nitric acid per year. On the Suna River in the Olonets province, the construction of the Onega plant began in 1915 to produce nitric acid from the air using the arc method. The cost of this enterprise was a hefty sum of 26.1 million rubles. By 1917, only part of the work was completed and due to the collapse everything was stopped.
It is interesting that the main motive for accelerating the construction and modernization of gunpowder production and explosive production since 1916 was the frank desire to get rid of the import of gunpowder and explosives (as well as materials for their production) “for the new Berlin Congress” in the face of possible confrontation with the former allies. This is especially true for the establishment of nitric acid production, which the GAU leadership directly linked with the possibility of a British naval blockade in the event of a confrontation during a future peace settlement.
Poisonous substances. The development of the production of chemical agents in Russia in an accelerated way began in the summer of 1915. First of all, chlorine production was established at two factories in the Donbass by September, and its production by the fall of 1916 amounted to 600 poods per day, which covered the demands of the front. At the same time, construction of state-owned chlorine plants in Vargaus and Kayan was underway in Finland at a cost of 3.2 million rubles. the total capacity is also 600 poods per day. Due to actual sabotage of construction by the Finnish Senate, the factories were completed only by the end of 1917.
In 1915, the Globin State Military Chemical Plant was built in the Donbass in a short time, initially producing chlorine, but in 1916-1917. reoriented to produce 20 thousand pounds of phosgene and 7 thousand pounds of chloropicrin per year. In 1916, the Kazan State Military Chemical Plant was built and put into operation at the beginning of 1917, costing 400 thousand rubles and producing 50 thousand pounds of phosgene and 100 thousand pounds of chlorine per year. Four more private factories were oriented towards the production of phosgene, two of which began producing products in 1916. Chloropicrin was produced at 6 private factories, sulfurin chloride and anhydride chloride - at one plant, tin chloride - at one, potassium cyanide - at one, chloroform - on one, arsenic chloride - on one. In total, 30 factories were already producing toxic substances in 1916, and in 1917 another 11 were expected to be connected, including both Finnish chlorine plants. In 1916, 1.42 million 3-inch chemical shells were equipped.
You can also write separately about the production of tubes and fuses, optics, supplies, etc., but in general we see the same trend everywhere - the absolutely enchanting scale of expansion of military production in Russia in 1915-1916, the massive involvement of the private sector, construction of new large modern state-owned enterprises, which would provide the opportunity for an even more ambitious expansion of output in 1917-1919. with real prospects of completely getting rid of imports. Mikhailov determined the estimated cost of the Great Program for the construction of military factories at 655.2 million rubles; in fact, taking into account a number of other enterprises, it was no less than 800 million rubles. At the same time, there were no problems with the allocation of these funds, and the construction of large military enterprises was carried out in many cases at an accelerated pace.
Brief conclusions:
1) Russia achieved a colossal and still underestimated leap in military production in 1914-1917. The growth of military production and the development of the defense industry in 1914-1917. were probably the largest in Russian history, surpassing in relative figures any jumps in military production during the Soviet period (including the Second World War).
2) Many bottlenecks in supply and military production were successfully overcome and by 1917, and even more so by 1918, Russian industry was ready to abundantly supply the Russian army with almost everything necessary.
3) The accelerated volumes of military production and the real prospects for its further increase allowed in 1918 the Russian army to achieve support parameters for the main types of land weapons (primarily artillery), comparable to the armies of the Western allies (France).
4) The growth of military production in Russia in 1914-1917. was ensured by a huge mobilization of private and state-owned industry, as well as an increase in production capacity and the construction of new enterprises, with a colossal amount of public investment in military production. Many of the military enterprises built or started during this period formed the basis of the domestic defense industry in their specializations for the interwar period and even beyond. The Russian Empire has demonstrated its high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibilities of a gigantic increase in the power and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time. Thus, there are no grounds other than religious ones to attribute such capabilities only to Soviet power. The Soviet government rather continued the traditions of organization and development of the Russian military industry of the late imperial period, rather than fundamentally surpassing them.
And development institutions that develop and produce military equipment, ammunition and weapons.
Before the collapse of the USSR, the military-industrial complex consisted of 1,100 factories with the number working more than 9 million people, more than 900 research institutes (research institutes) and design bureaus (design bureaus), as well as armies consisting of ground, air force, missile forces, navy, border guards, as well as auxiliary (railway, construction) ) troops. The military-industrial complex had its own cosmodromes, air and sea ports, arsenals, testing grounds with a system of laboratories, and a powerful communications infrastructure (transport and communications). The main part of the USSR military-industrial complex was located on territory of Russia and currently constitutes the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.
The military-industrial complex partially includes the production of other complexes, for example in mechanical engineering the share of defense plants is more than 60% (Table 19, Fig. 31).
In turn, branches of the defense industry produce civilian products, while the conversion carried out in defense industries increases the share of civilian products while reducing defense orders.
Let us briefly list the basic principles that determine the geography of the military-industrial complex.
1. The main principle is the safety of the location of its production, taking into account the flight time of missiles and aircraft from abroad. Hence the location of the most important centers and enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the interior regions of the country (Ural, Siberia).
Table 19
The role of inter-industry complexes in the production of defense products
| Intersectoral complex | Defense production | Specialized defense complexes |
| Fuel and energy | Nuclear fuel production | Nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons) |
| Mechanical Engineering | Shipbuilding, aviation, missile, tank, automotive, communications, firearms, electronics, electrical engineering, etc. | Aerospace and rocket space |
| Construction materials: metallurgical Chemical-forest | Production of composites, metal powders and rolled products Production of chemical reagents, compounds, lumber | Chemical weapons |
| Building | Cement and other production | Military construction |
| Agro-industrial | Processing industries (casein production) | |
| Consumer goods and services | Production of technical fabrics and uniforms |
2. The principle of duplication: placement of duplicate enterprises in different regions of the country. For example, aircraft factories producing the same type of fighters (such as MiG or Su) or Tu bombers are located in different parts of the country, ranging from Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod, the cities of the Volga region (Kazan, Samara, Ulyanovsk) to the Far East ( Komsomolsk-on-Amur).
3. Concentration of production and research and production military-industrial complex associations in Moscow and around it, where Russia has the right to create and build up missile defense systems.
In the Soviet Union, as part of the military-industrial complex, there were many special closed secret cities (ZATO - closed administrative-territorial entity), many of which had special names: Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-65 and Chelyabinsk-70, Krasnoyarsk-26 and Krasnoyarsk-35, Tomsk -7.
They concentrated particularly important military-industrial complex objects. Some of them are now becoming promising technopolises where the latest technologies are being developed.
Thus, the main factors for the deployment of the military-industrial complex are: security and preservation of military potential both in peacetime and in wartime, knowledge intensity, highly qualified personnel, and the transport factor.
The military-industrial complex includes systems of industries (complexes). Among them, the nuclear complex is important - a shield that ensures the security of the country. Its main components are two Russian nuclear centers: in Sarov (Arzamas-16) and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
Nuclear weapons themselves were largely designed for use on missile systems. Naturally, the rocket and space industry has become the most important complex of the military-industrial complex. It was especially important to prepare the scientific and technical base for astronautics and rocket science. The first large research and production centers were created in the Moscow region. This is, first of all, the powerful Energia corporation, which was created in the city of Korolev (Kaliningrad). Here, under the leadership of the famous rocket designer S.P. Korolev, work was carried out on the creation of ballistic missiles since 1946, artificial Earth satellites and spaceships were created, including the Vostok, on which the first cosmonaut Yu. A. Gagarin flew. In Moscow at the Research and Production Machine-Building Center named after. M.V. Khrunichev also created ballistic missiles and long-term orbital stations (“Mir”). Based on scientific and design developments, there are factories for the production of ballistic missiles in the Urals (Votkinsk, Zlatoust) and in Siberia (Krasnoyarsk), launch vehicles - in Samara, Omsk. Rocket technology is also produced in St. Petersburg.
The main military cosmodrome of Russia, from which all major military spacecraft were launched and military artificial satellites were launched, is located near the city of Mirny (Plesetsk station) south of Arkhangelsk. There were significantly more space launches here than from Baikonur, although ships with astronauts on board were launched from the latter. There was another cosmodrome - Kapustin Yar - in the Astrakhan region, which was then turned into a testing ground for missiles and military equipment. Currently, a new Russian cosmodrome, Svobodny, has been created in the Amur region.
To manage the Russian military space forces, a center was created in the Moscow region - the city of Krasnoznamensk (formerly Golitsyno-2), and for manned space flights - a Mission Control Center (MCC) in the city of Korolev. Nearby there is a Cosmonaut Training Center - the city of Zvezdny.
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Military-industrial complex of Russia
Regarding this topic, it is initially worth noting that the military-industrial complex can be safely attributed to an industry that has had a more than tangible impact on the development of the economy over many years of the existence of the Russian Federation.
And although some time ago such a concept as the Russian military-industrial complex was somewhat vague, in the mid-2000s progress in this area became obvious. If we talk about the current situation, it is worth mentioning the fact that the military-industrial complex has many progressive industries:
Aviation industry;
Nuclear;
Rocket and space;
Production of ammunition and ammunition;
Military shipbuilding, etc.
The following enterprises can be identified as the main players that deserve attention within the framework of the military-industrial complex:
- "Russian Technologies";
- "Rosoboronexport";
OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, etc.
What does the structure of the military industry look like?
Within the framework of this topic, it is necessary to initially highlight the following information: during the active 90s, the wave of privatization did not bypass the enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia. Therefore, if you now analyze the ownership structure of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, you can easily notice that most of it consists of joint stock companies. More specifically, there are 57% of such joint-stock companies in the entire military-industrial complex. At the same time, there is no state share in 28.2% of such enterprises.
You can also refer to other data provided by the Accounts Chamber. According to this information, approximately 230 enterprises operate within the aviation industry. But only 7 of them belong to the state (we are talking about a controlling stake).
One of the key features of Russian enterprises can be identified as their jurisdiction in various forms to federal organizations. At the moment, the structure of the Russian military-industrial complex includes 5 government agencies that oversee the defense industries and are located in:
RACE. Operates in the field of communications and radio industry.
- "Rossudostroenie". Responsible for supervising shipbuilding production.
CANCER. Controls processes within the rocket, space and aviation industries.
RAV. In this case we are talking about the arms industry.
- "Rosboepripasy". This agency specializes in working with the specialty chemicals and ammunition industries.
Key elements of the military-industrial complex
If we consider the features of the Russian military-industrial complex, we cannot ignore the types of organizations that are part of it:
Design bureaus that are focused on working with prototypes of weapons.
Research organizations. Their main task is theoretical developments.
Manufacturing enterprises. In this case, resources are used to mass produce weapons.
Test sites and testing laboratories. It makes sense to talk about several important tasks here. This is the so-called fine-tuning of prototypes under real operating conditions, as well as testing weapons that have just rolled off the production line.
In order to paint a complete picture of the functioning of the military-industrial complex and identify all the facets that the Russian military-industrial complex has, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that enterprises that are part of the defense sector also produce products that have a civilian purpose.
Now it’s worth taking a closer look at the military-industrial complex
Nuclear weapons complex
It is difficult to imagine the development of military-industrial without this direction. It includes several strategically important areas of production.
First of all, this is the subsequent production of a concentrate from these raw materials. The next important step is the separation of uranium isotopes (enrichment process). This task is performed at enterprises located in cities such as Angarsk, Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk and Seversk.
To be fair, it is worth noting that 45% of all capacities that are concentrated in Russia are located in Russia. At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the production of nuclear weapons is being reduced and the industries described above are focusing on Western customers.
Another task of this military-industrial complex is to both develop and allocate its reserves, concentrated in the Russian Federation, will last for many more years.
Enterprises operating within the nuclear weapons complex are also involved in the manufacture of fuel elements that are necessary for the operation of nuclear reactors, the assembly of nuclear weapons and the disposal of radioactive waste.
Rocket and space industry
It can rightfully be called one of the most knowledge-intensive. Just look at the cost of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) alone, for the full operation of which approximately 300 thousand different systems, instruments and parts are required. And if we talk about a large space complex, then this figure increases to 10 million.
It is for this reason that the largest number of scientists, engineers and designers are concentrated in this industry.
Aviation industry
When studying the military-industrial complex of Russia, the industries and directions of this area, attention must be paid to aviation in any case. Here it is relevant to talk about large industrial centers, since head enterprises are needed to assemble products. Others simply do not have the necessary technical base to organize the processes required for fast and high-quality production.
In this case, two key conditions must always be met: the availability of qualified specialists and well-organized transport links. The Russian military-industrial complex and specifically the aviation sector are in a state of constant development, which allows the Russian Federation to act as a major exporter of weapons, including aviation.
Artillery and small arms
This is also an important industry. The Russian military-industrial complex can hardly be imagined without the famous Kalashnikov assault rifle. This is the most widespread type of small arms currently produced in Russia.
Moreover, outside the CIS it was adopted by 55 states. As for artillery systems, their production centers are located in cities such as Perm, Yekaterinburg and Nizhny Novgorod.
Armor industry
If you pay attention to the centers of the Russian military-industrial complex, then after simple analytics you can draw an obvious conclusion: this direction of the defense industry can be defined as one of the most developed.
The tanks themselves are produced in Omsk and Nizhny Tagil. The factories located in Chelyabinsk and St. Petersburg are at the stage of repurposing. As for armored personnel carriers, their production is carried out by enterprises in Kurgan and Arzamas.
Military shipbuilding
Without it, the Russian military-industrial complex cannot be considered complete.
At the same time, the largest production center in this area is St. Petersburg. Within this city there are up to 40 enterprises related to shipbuilding.
Regarding the topic of nuclear submarines, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that at the moment their production is carried out only in Severodvinsk.
What you should know about military-industrial complex conversion
In this case, we are talking about changes in the military industry, and more specifically, about its transition to the civilian market. This strategy can be explained very simply: the production capacities that currently exist are capable of producing significantly more military products than actual demand requires. That is, neither Russia itself nor its current and potential clients need that much.
Given this prospect, one obvious maneuver remains: to reorient some military enterprises to produce products that are relevant in the civilian sector. Thus, jobs will be preserved, factories will continue their stable operation, and the state will make a profit. Complete harmony.
The use of the military, so to speak, for peaceful purposes is also promising for the reason that at such enterprises there is a significant concentration of advanced technologies and specialists with a high level of qualifications.
Using such a strategy, it is possible to solve at least some of the problems of the Russian military-industrial complex. At the same time, stable production of the most relevant equipment for the army is maintained.
Obvious difficulties
Based on the information presented above, it is easy to conclude that the same conversion is not an easy task. In fact, it can be considered one of the most difficult tasks facing the military-industrial complex. There are no simple solutions here by definition. In order for any progress to be observed in this area, significant efforts must be constantly made.
Another problem that we have to face is the uncertainty of the future financing of military-industrial complex enterprises. The military-industrial complex of Russia can receive funds from the state only for those enterprises that are part of any federal program or are classified as state-owned production facilities.
As for foreign investment, there is no reason to count on it confidently yet. At the same time, factories that have production lines that are already outdated or are not capable of producing a wide range of competitive products, and military products in particular, may find themselves in a particularly difficult situation.
If we try to assess the economic state of defense enterprises as a whole, we can conclude that it is very heterogeneous. The point is that there are factories whose products have a certain demand. At the same time, there are also those enterprises that are in a state of deep production crisis, regardless of the fact whether they belong to the state or not.
Nevertheless, one must be aware that the government is recording the state of some components of the military-industrial complex. This confirms the fact that the Coordination Council approved the main directions of development and stabilization of the situation.
In addition, in Russia there is an active unification of fundamental and applied scientific areas within the framework of the activities of military enterprises, which significantly increases the chances of the military-industrial complex for successful development and full-fledged functioning. Well-organized efforts are also being made to ensure maximum compliance of the products that come off the assembly line of military-industrial complex enterprises with the investment expectations of the Russian and foreign markets.
Results
It is obvious that, despite the difficult situation surrounding the military-industrial complex, there are definitely chances for a bright future and a progressive present. The government is constantly working to make the necessary changes that will allow defense enterprises to operate as efficiently as possible.
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