Losses in the Second World War. German losses in World War II - myths and reality

Part 1. USSR losses

The armed forces of the Soviet Union suffered the greatest loss of life in World War II. It would seem that our duty to the dead required the fastest and most complete account possible of all those who fell in the fight against fascism. However, for several post-war decades, the very topic of Soviet military losses was strictly prohibited: the documentary base was classified, no open publication of relevant research was allowed, and there were no official figures for our military losses. The official figures for overall demographic losses were falsified. At the beginning of 1946, it was announced that the total losses (army and population) in the just ended war were about 7 million. 15 years later, in 1961, the figure was given as more than 20 million. From books and magazines about the statistics of German military losses, one could compile a small library. About our military losses it was possible to glean only fragmentary data from the memoirs of German generals and some Western historical works, where each time such references were accompanied by an editorial note that all “this data is pure fiction and in no case can be taken into account ".

The situation is both absurd and shameful. Let me give you a few examples out of many. The largest Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis published in 1960 a fundamental study “Wars and the population of Europe. Human losses of the armed forces of European countries in the wars of the 17th-20th centuries.” Trying to find out how many German soldiers died during the Second World War, on 25 pages, citing dozens of scientific works of German, American, English, Soviet scientists, archival documents and census results, he critically analyzes and compares numerous data. Lists Germany's military losses by year, by front and region, and by type of armed forces. And one gets the impression that you are reading an ordinary scientific work, with some of its conclusions you agree with, and with others you don’t. Urlanis writes in no less detail about the military losses of Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Great Britain, the USA, France, etc. At the same time, the losses of our allies in the Anti-Hitler Coalition are given with an accuracy of one person and broken down by year of war. By the way, our allies already during the war began publishing name lists of the dead and soon after the war they basically completed this noble work. Although, of course, these lists can be refined indefinitely.

So, when Urlanis comes to the military losses of the Soviet Union, all the numbers evaporate. Only one number is given. I quote: “Party members have always been in the most responsible and difficult sectors of the fight against the enemy. In the first year of the war alone, 400,000 communists gave their lives in battles for the Motherland. This figure alone speaks of the scale of the sacrifices made by the Soviet people on the altar of victory.” That's all. Our scientist himself took this figure from the book “History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” M., 1959, p. 576.

I wasn’t too lazy and looked at what source “History of the CPSU” itself refers to. Not at all. "History of the CPSU" is the source itself. This was our Khrushchev era.

Now let's see with what scientific successes on the topic of interest to us the Brezhnev era ended. So, I’m looking at the most complete Soviet study - “The History of the Second World War” in 12 volumes, the authors of which were more than 20 Marshals of the USSR and academicians and the ministries, departments and institutes behind them. Of the almost 500 pages of the 12th volume, which is entirely devoted to the results of the Second World War, only two (!) speak about the human losses and demographic consequences of the greatest massacre in human history. Nothing is said at all about the losses of the armed forces of the countries participating in the war (!). And this is understandable. In this way, the dissonance that was so striking when reading Urlanis’s book is overcome.

In 1985, after a series of deaths of the General Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, on the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory, the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Military Academy of the General Staff, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR and many academic institutions presented the Soviet people with their next " scientific" creation - "Encyclopedia. The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945". There are, of course, no articles about our demographic losses, and even more so about our military losses. But there is an article about the material damage caused to the state by the Nazi invaders. Already in 1945, it was calculated how many machine tools (175,000), hammers and presses (34,000), looms (45,000), spinning spindles (3 million) were destroyed or stolen, how many were destroyed or looted in agriculture - 7 million horses, 17 million cows, 20 million pigs, 27 million goats and sheep, etc.

I write about this without irony. The volume of material losses had to be determined. And it was defined (though I don’t presume to judge how correctly it was done). But since 1945, in all multi-volume and single-volume histories of the Great Patriotic War (under Stalin, and under Khrushchev, and under Brezhnev), these material losses were necessarily and punctually listed, and it was said about the dead people, or that there were more than 20 million of them, or that “our people paid dearly for victory.” And this, in my opinion, showed the same disdainful attitude of those in power towards human lives that prevailed during that terrible war. However, it remains the same to this day. Only in the introductory military-political essay of the Encyclopedia could one read that the war claimed over 20 million lives of Soviet people, that more than 1 million soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces gave their lives during the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia, and that over 3 million died during the war communists. The entire Soviet military demography was exhausted by this information.

A revolution in our military demography occurred in 1989-1990, when a state commission was working, composed of scientists and specialists from the State Statistics Committee, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. According to her calculations, the country's direct human losses in 1941-1945 amounted to 27 million people. A number of other modern calculations, including those performed abroad, are close to this result. In 1993, the first statistical study of the losses of personnel and military equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts for the period from 1918 to 1989 was published (“The classification has been removed...”, a team of authors led by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheeva, M., Voenizdat, 1993, 415 pp.). This work is now the official Russian point of view on the topic of interest to us.

According to the results of calculations, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East against Japan in 1945), the total irreversible demographic losses (killed, missing, captured and did not return from it, died from wounds, diseases and as a result of accidents) the Soviet Armed Forces, together with border and internal troops, amounted to 8 million 668 thousand 400 people. At the same time, the army and navy lost 8,509,300 people, internal troops - 97,700 people, border troops and state security agencies - 61,400 people. The total irretrievable demographic losses did not include 939,700 military personnel who were counted as missing in action at the beginning of the war, but who in 1942-1945. were conscripted into the army for the second time in the territory liberated from occupation, as well as 1,836,000 former military personnel who returned from captivity after the end of the war. These military personnel (2 million 775 thousand 700 people) are excluded from the total losses.

I have already used information from this statistical study several times when writing my articles, usually emphasizing if they are to be believed. I have reason to believe that these latest official data also underestimate our military losses. I would like to immediately make a reservation that the figure for the country’s total direct demographic losses of 27 million people is most likely correct, since a comparison of the results of general population censuses on the territory of the USSR, taking into account the patterns of our demographic development, is unlikely to allow this figure to be increased. In other words, I think that our military losses are underestimated, and civilian casualties are overestimated.

So, the arguments.

1. The authors of the study “The classification has been removed...” proceeded from the fact that on June 22, 1941, there were 4,826,907 military personnel on the list in the Red Army and Navy. In addition, the People's Commissariat of Defense had 74,945 military personnel and military construction workers serving in the formations of civilian departments on payroll. Over the four years of the war, another 29,574,900 people were mobilized (minus those re-conscripted), and in total, together with personnel, 34 million 476 thousand 752 people were recruited into the army, navy and military formations of other departments. A huge figure (for comparison: in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1939 there were 24.6 million German men aged 15 to 65 years). In fact, it was even higher. The fact is that, for reasons unknown to me, the authors of the study did not take into account the number of air defense troops, border and internal troops as of June 22, 1941. And taking them into account, the total number of the armed forces of the USSR at the beginning of the war amounted to 5 million 700 thousand people (see "Military Encyclopedia" in 8 volumes, vol. 2, M., Voenizdat, 1994, p. 35). The fate of these 798,148 people has not been taken into account satisfactorily. Military losses in the first months of the war, as well as in those cases when reports about them were not received (Kiev, Crimean, Kharkov operations of 1942 and other operations), were determined by the authors of the study by calculation (information was used on the payroll number of personnel of formations and formations defeated by the enemy or found themselves surrounded).

2. The losses of the people's militia divisions before their inclusion in the Red Army were not taken into account. Divisions and regiments of the people's militia suffered huge losses (absolute and relative) during the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Smolensk, Tula, Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad and other cities. In total, at least 4 million people joined the divisions and regiments of the people's militia. Of these, about 2 million subsequently entered the active army. The losses of this half of the total number of militias were taken into account. There were no losses in the first half. That is, hundreds of thousands of people who died with weapons in their hands in the fall of 1941 were not included in the total number of irretrievable losses of the armed forces of the USSR.

3. The methodology for calculating losses of partisan formations is not clear.

4. The losses of active participants in the war are not taken into account - merchant seamen and river workers, railway and road transport workers.

5. All those military personnel who, in one form or another, expressed a desire to help the Wehrmacht and the occupation authorities were not taken into account. We are talking about the fate of at least one million former Soviet soldiers.

6. The fate of 500 thousand people liable for military service, called up for mobilization, but not enlisted in the troops, one part died on the way to the places of formation, and the rest were captured.

7. The situation with determining the number of Soviet prisoners of war is very confusing. The authors of the study claim that a total of 4,059,000 Soviet military personnel were in captivity, of which 1,836,000 returned from captivity after the end of the war, 939,700 military personnel from among those who were captured were called up again in the territory liberated from occupation. Thus, 1,783,300 people did not return from captivity (perished, died, emigrated to other countries). It was this figure that was included in the final data of our direct military losses. However, the same author, Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, in his latest publication in the book “Human Losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War”, St. Petersburg, Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995, on page 80, writes that 2,700,000 people did not return from captivity. That is, having increased the initial number by 916,700 people (which is quite a lot), he nevertheless did not revise the final total figure of our direct losses of 8,668,400 military personnel (!?). German researchers, relying on an impressive documentary base, claim that during the period from June 22, 1941 until the end of the war, 5,700,000 Red Army soldiers were captured by the Wehrmacht. By the beginning of 1945, 930 thousand of them were in German prisoner of war camps. 1 million prisoners were released from the camps mainly in exchange for agreeing to serve in the Wehrmacht as “willing to help” (Hilfswillige). 3.3 million (57%) died, almost 2 million of them before February 1942. The rest were liberated by the Red Army (for the latest publication in Russian, see the book "World War II. Discussions. Main trends. Research results", M., Ves Mir Publishing House, 1997, - article by Christian Streit "Soviet prisoners of war - mass deportations - forced laborers").

8. And, finally, the most important argument against the official figure of our direct military losses. In accordance with the program for the preparation and publication of books of Memory, in September 1990, a powerful computer center was formed at the All-Russian Research Institute of Documentation and Archival Science to create a Central Automated Data Bank (CDB) on irretrievable losses of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. As of March 15, 1995, about 19 million personal records were entered into the Central Database about the dead, missing, and died in captivity and from wounds of military personnel of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. The formation of the Data Bank ends: according to rough estimates, based on the volume of remaining unprocessed documents, about 500 thousand more records need to be entered into the CDB and then their total number will reach 19.5 million (!). And this, apparently, has already been done.

Scientists and specialists working on the creation of CBD claim that this result is the closest to the truth. I quote: “This result is the closest to the truth. It may or may not coincide with the logical constructions, inferences and extrapolations of those who study this topic, we have deep respect for these studies, but we believe that more accurate data cannot be obtained now no other way" (for more details, see the book "Human Losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War", pp. 68-70).

I myself visited this computer center two years ago and I must say that the people working there accomplished a real feat. The only strange thing is that the holder of the official point of view on our military losses during the Second World War, the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, does not react in any way to the existence of the Central Database and 19.5 million personal records.

To be continued. The next part of the article will talk about Germany's irretrievable military losses in World War II, on the Eastern Front in particular.

Part 2. German losses

More than fifty years of studying the problem of German military losses during the Second World War have generated a truly boundless stream of publications. Under these conditions, the thesis that there is no universally accepted final figure for these losses may seem dubious. But, nevertheless, it is so. If the information from German headquarters about losses was objective until approximately January 1945, then at the last stage of the war, when the German armed forces suffered major defeats, the headquarters mechanism lost its former clarity in its work, and the systematic documentary recording of losses was disrupted. Contradictions and inaccuracies appeared in information about them. This is especially true for the statistics of rear and service units, units and institutions, as well as police and other paramilitary forces, which were staffed by citizens of other countries (Serbs, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch, Spaniards, etc.). The losses of the Volkssturm units and military formations of the so-called volunteer helpers of Germany from among the representatives of the peoples of the Soviet Union (Baltic, Muslim, Ukrainian, Russian Liberation Army, etc.) were not included in the reports. It is still very difficult to determine the number of military personnel who died in Soviet captivity. Therefore, first I will provide fairly accurate information about the military losses of the German armed forces until January 1945, and then how much, after all, was irretrievably lost in the last months of the war.

According to the Central Bureau for Recording Losses of Armed Forces Personnel at the General Staff of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces, from September 1, 1939 to December 31, 1944, the following were lost:

by ground forces together with SS troops - 1,750,281 people killed and died from wounds, 1,609,698 people missing or captured; by the navy - 60,029 people killed and died from wounds, 100,256 people missing or captured;

air force - 155,014 people killed or died from wounds, 148,450 people missing or captured; total by the German armed forces - 1,965,324 people killed and died from wounds, 1,858,404 people missing or captured.

For the most significant military campaigns and periods of the Second World War, the above losses of ground forces and SS troops are distributed as follows:

capture of Poland (1939) - 16,343 people killed and 320 people missing;

capture of Norway (1940) - 4,975 killed and 691 missing;

the defeat of France and the British expeditionary forces, the capture of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg (1940) - 45,774 killed and 635 missing;

losses in the Western Theater of Operations (after the defeat of France and before May 30, 1944) - 20,512 killed and 2,583 missing;

air battle for England (July-October 1940) - 1,449 killed and 1,914 missing (only Air Force losses are given);

capture of Yugoslavia and Greece (1941) - 1,206 killed and 548 missing;

capture of the island of Crete (May 1941) - 2071 killed and 1888 missing;

the death of the battleship "Bismarck" (May 27, 1941) - 2180 killed and 110 captured (Navy losses);

military operations in Africa (March 1941 - May 1943) - 12,808 killed and 90,052 missing or captured;

fight against partisans in the Balkans (1941-30 November 1944) - 23,061 killed and 11,512 missing;

military operations against the USSR (from June 22, 1941 to November 30, 1944) - 1,419,728 killed and died from wounds and 997,056 missing or captured, totaling the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front amounted to 2,416,784 people (for comparison , according to official Soviet data, from June 22, 1941 to December 31, 1944, the Red Army (without the Navy) lost 10,472,300 people killed, died from wounds, went missing or captured, that is, the ratio of irretrievable losses was 1:4 ,3;

military operations in Italy (from May 1943 to November 30, 1944) - 47,873 killed and 19,154 missing or captured; military operations in the West, from the moment of the Allied invasion (June 6, 1944) to November 30, 1944 - 54,754 killed and 338,933 missing or captured;

losses incurred on the territory of Germany proper (from September 1, 1939 to November 30, 1944) - 64,055 killed and 1,315 missing;

Ardennes offensive (December 1944) - 12,610 killed and 9,154 missing or captured.

As I already wrote, the main problem in determining the total losses of the German armed forces in World War II is the uncertainty regarding military losses in January-May 1945. Although even then - in May 1945 - an attempt was made to solve this problem. The central loss accounting authorities made an approximate estimate of the losses suffered by the armed forces for the period from January 1, 1945 to April 30, 1945, on the basis of current reports and other reports of losses. It was calculated that the ground forces, SS, air force and navy lost 265,000 people killed or died from wounds, and 1,012,000 missing or captured.

If we consider these indicative data to be sufficiently justified, then the total losses of the German armed forces for the period from September 1, 1939 to April 30, 1945 will be the following figures: 2,230,324 military personnel were killed or died from wounds, 2,870 were missing or captured. 404.

However, these total loss data are not exhaustive. Data on losses during the last days of the war (from May 1 to May 11) are completely ignored. It is extremely difficult to count them, but they were significant, primarily in the Berlin region, in Silesia, the Czech Republic and Austria. The information about the mass surrender of German military personnel in March-April on the Western Front and about military losses in April on the Eastern Front was taken into account extremely unsatisfactorily. Finally, no count was made of the missing who were actually killed.

According to Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand, in January-May 1945, on the Eastern Front alone, 1.5 million people were lost as missing or captured, and not 1,012,000 on all fronts.

According to the Soviet General Staff, during the period from January 1 to May 9, 1945, 1,940,900 people were captured, most of whom surrendered in late April and early May. After May 9, another 1,284,000 troops surrendered on the Eastern Front.

According to calculations by S.N. Mikhalev from the Institute of Military History of the RF Ministry of Defense, on the Eastern Front alone in January-May 1945, the Wehrmacht lost 250 thousand killed, and not 265 thousand on all fronts (for comparison, according to official Soviet data, in January-May 1945 the Red Army lost killed and 557,643 people died during the sanitary evacuation stages, by the way, more than she lost in killed and died during the sanitary evacuation stages for the entire 1941).

Taking into account those killed on the Western Front and in Italy, the Wehrmacht lost 320 thousand people in 1945, which is not much higher than the German estimated loss of 55 thousand. It is more difficult to calculate how many of the missing were captured, and how many died on the battlefield, and how many died in captivity, broken down by time - during the war and after it. And in this, German archives can help little - it is necessary to turn to Soviet documents, and they are traditionally confusing. According to the General Staff, in 1941-1945, 4,540,900 people (not only Germans) were captured, including 1,940,900 during the period from May 1 to May 9. In the report of the Chief of the General Staff, Army General A.I. Antonov, who summarized the reporting and statistical data of the fronts, fleets and armies, the total number of prisoners was estimated at 5,061,850 people (that is, he had 520,950 more prisoners), including 3,777,850 who were captured before May 10, 1941, from There were only 2,389,560 Germans. According to the records of the UPVI NKVD of the USSR, only 3,438,500 people (not only Germans) were admitted to prisoner of war camps. According to calculations by V.V. Gurkin from the RF Ministry of Defense, 3,127,380 people (Germans only) were kept in Soviet camps, of which 2,652,413 people returned to their homeland after the war, and 474,967 died in captivity. And in the official statistical collection of the Moscow Region, in the compilation of which Gurkin took part, it is said that out of 2,389,600 people, only 1,939,000 returned to their homeland, and 450,600 died in captivity.

The Germans themselves cite significantly higher numbers of those killed in Soviet captivity - from 800 thousand to 1.5 million people (according to various sources).

The most reliable data in Western historiography is now considered to be data on the losses of the German armed forces in World War II, prepared for the 40th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe by the German Federal Office for the Calculation of Military Losses. This institution, continuing the activities of the Central Bureau for Registration of Personnel Losses of the German Armed Forces of the war era, compiled lists of names of those killed in 1939-1945 and those who died in captivity after the war (similar to those that would later become part of the Central Automated Data Bank for irretrievable military losses us - see part 1 of the article).

The result of many years of work of the German Federal Administration was the following final figures of military losses on all fronts, at sea and in the air: 3,100,000 soldiers and officers died or died from wounds (the highest figure among all German sources), went missing and died in captivity (most died after the war) - 1,200,000.

Unfortunately, I do not yet have a breakdown of this figure by war period and theater of operations. According to our official data, the picture emerges completely different: the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Eastern Front alone lost 2,869,300 people killed, died from wounds and illnesses in 1941-1945; missing and died in captivity 1,423,400. In total, the total demographic irretrievable losses amounted to 4,292,700 people. But already 2 years after the publication of this official figure, one of its developers (V.V. Gurkin) reduces German losses by 793,157 people, claiming that the Germans lost 3,024,576 people killed, died from wounds and diseases, missing in captivity 474,967.

Sources:

B. Müller-Hillebrand "German Land Army. 1933-1945", vol. 3, M., Military Publishing House, 1976, p. 338.

Ibid., pp. 223, 341, 343; K. Tippelskirch "History of the Second World War", vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1994, pp. 28, 93, 156; William Shirer "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", vol. 2, M., Military Publishing House, 1991, p. 93; F. Halder "Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. 1939-1942", vol. 3, M., Military Publishing House, 1971; "Losses of ships of the main combat classes in the Second World War. 19939-1945", part 2, M., 1995, p. 7.

B. Müller-Hillebrand, op. cit., p. 343.

"The secrecy has been lifted...", pp. 157-158.

The losses of the allies of Germany and the USSR are not taken into account here. The 1st and 2nd Polish armies fought as part of the Red Army (at the end of 1944 they numbered 300,000 soldiers and officers), the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the 1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division, 20 Hungarian companies, etc. Together with the Red Army they fought on the Eastern Front: the armed forces of Bulgaria (290,000 people) - from October 1944; Armed forces of Romania (20 divisions, air corps, separate armored units) - since August 1944. In the war with Germany, Romania lost only 170 thousand people killed, the 1st Polish Army lost 18 thousand people killed in Poland alone, the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps lost 4 thousand people in Czechoslovakia alone. But, of course, the contribution of our allies on the Eastern Front to the victory over Germany was still very small. Now about the losses of Germany's allies on the Eastern Front. According to a certificate from the USSR Minister of Defense dated December 16, 1988, irretrievable losses (killed, died from wounds, missing, died in captivity) of Finland amounted to 85 thousand people, Italy - 90 thousand, Hungary - 350 thousand, Romania - 480 thousand. Total - 1,005,000. However, in the official statistical study “The classification of secrecy has been removed...” different figures are given: Romania irretrievably lost 520 thousand, Hungary - 404,700, Italy - 45 thousand, Finland - 84 thousand. Total - 1,053,700 (p. 392). Statistical studies of the countries themselves that were allies of Germany in World War II give us a third group of figures: Finland irretrievably lost 52,500 people, Italy - 89,800, Romania - 361,100, Hungary - about 150 thousand. Total - 653,400 people. According to calculations by S.N. Mikhalev from the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the demographic irretrievable losses of the armed forces of Germany together with its allies on the Eastern Front are determined at 2.7 million people (the Germans themselves - 1.8 million, the rest - 0.9 million) . In this case, the ratio of losses of Soviet troops (without allies) and enemy troops for the entire war will be equal to 8.7 million to 2.7 million, or 3.2: 1 (“human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War”, p. 93).

“The classification has been lifted...”, page 392.

"Human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War", p. 109.

The change in the balance of power in the international arena is also associated with the process of revising the role of the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition in the victory over Nazi Germany. Not only in modern media, but also in a number of historical works, old myths are supported or new myths are created. The old ones include the opinion that the Soviet Union achieved victory only thanks to incalculable losses, many times greater than the losses of the enemy, and the new ones include the decisive role of Western countries, mainly the United States, in victory and the high level of their military skill. We will try, based on the statistical material available to us, to offer a different opinion.

The criterion used is total data, such as, for example, the losses of the parties during the entire war, which, due to their simplicity and clarity, confirm one or another point of view.

In order to select from sometimes contradictory data those that can be relied upon with a significant degree of reliability, it is necessary to use specific values ​​in addition to total values. Such values ​​may include losses per unit of time, for example, daily, losses falling on a certain section of the front length, etc.

A team of authors led by Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev in 1988-1993. a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about human losses in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD was carried out. The results of this major research were published in the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century.”

During the Great Patriotic War, 34 million people were drafted into the Red Army, including those drafted in June 1941. This amount is almost equal to the mobilization resource that the country had at that time. The losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 11,273 thousand people, that is, a third of the number conscripted. These losses are, of course, very large, but everything can be learned in comparison: after all, the losses of Germany and its allies on the Soviet-German front are also great.

Table 1 shows the irretrievable losses of Red Army personnel by year of the Great Patriotic War. Data on the magnitude of annual losses are taken from the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century”. This includes killed, missing, captured and those who died in captivity.

Table 1. Losses of the Red Army

The last column of the proposed table shows the average daily losses suffered by the Red Army. In 1941, they were the highest, since our troops had to retreat in very unfavorable conditions, and large formations were surrounded, in the so-called cauldrons. In 1942, losses were significantly less, although the Red Army also had to retreat, but there were no longer large cauldrons. In 1943 there were very stubborn battles, especially on the Kursk Bulge, but from that year until the end of the war, the troops of Nazi Germany had to retreat. In 1944, the Soviet High Command planned and carried out a number of brilliant strategic operations to defeat and encircle entire groups of German armies, so the losses of the Red Army were relatively small. But in 1945, daily losses increased again, because the tenacity of the German army increased, since it was already fighting on its own territory, and German soldiers courageously defended their fatherland.

Let us compare the losses of Germany with the losses of England and the USA on the Second Front. We will try to evaluate them based on the data of the famous Russian demographer B. Ts. Urlanis. In the book “History of Military Losses,” Urlanis, speaking about the losses of England and the United States, provides the following data:

Table 2. Losses of the British armed forces in World War II (thousands of people)

In the war with Japan, England lost “11.4% of the total number of dead soldiers and officers,” therefore, in order to estimate the amount of England’s losses on the Second Front, we need to subtract the losses for 4 years of war from the total amount of losses and multiply by 1 – 0.114 = 0.886:

(1,246 – 667) 0.886 = 500 thousand people.

Total US losses in World War II amounted to 1,070 thousand, of which approximately three quarters were losses in the war with Germany, thus

1,070 * 0.75 = 800 thousand people.

The total total losses of England and the USA are

1,246 + 1,070 = 2,316 thousand people.

Thus, the losses of England and the United States on the Second Front amount to approximately 60% of their total losses in World War II.

As mentioned above, the losses of the USSR amount to 11.273 million people, that is, at first glance, incomparable with the losses amounting to 1.3 million people suffered by England and the USA on the Second Front. On this basis, the conclusion is drawn that the Allied command fought skillfully and took care of people, while the Soviet High Command allegedly filled the enemy trenches with the corpses of its soldiers. Let us allow ourselves to disagree with such ideas. Based on the data on daily losses given in Table 1, it can be obtained that from June 7, 1944 to May 8, 1945, that is, during the existence of the Second Front, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 1.8 million people, which is only slightly higher than the losses of the Allies. As is known, the length of the Second Front was 640 km, and the Soviet-German Front was from 2,000 to 3,000 km, on average 2,500 km, i.e. 4-5 times greater than the length of the Second Front. Therefore, on a front section with a length equal to the length of the Second Front, the Red Army lost approximately 450 thousand people, which is 3 times less than the losses of the allies.

On the fronts of World War II, the armed forces of Nazi Germany itself lost 7,181 thousand, and the armed forces of its allies - 1,468 thousand people, a total of 8,649 thousand.

Thus, the ratio of losses on the Soviet-German front turns out to be 13:10, that is, for every 13 killed, missing, wounded, or captured Soviet soldiers, there are 10 German soldiers.

According to the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder, in 1941-1942. The fascist army lost about 3,600 soldiers and officers every day, therefore, in the first two years of the war, the losses of the fascist bloc amounted to about two million people. This means that over the subsequent period, the losses of Germany and its allies amounted to about 6,600 thousand people. During the same period, the losses of the Red Army amounted to approximately 5 million people. Thus, in 1943-1945, for every 10 Red Army soldiers killed, there were 13 fascist army soldiers killed. These simple statistics clearly and objectively characterize the quality of troop leadership and the degree of care for soldiers.

General A.I.Denikin

“Be that as it may, no tricks could detract from the significance of the fact that the Red Army has been fighting skillfully for some time now, and the Russian soldier has been selflessly fighting. The successes of the Red Army could not be explained by numerical superiority alone. In our eyes, this phenomenon had a simple and natural explanation.

From time immemorial, Russian people were smart, talented and loved their homeland from the inside. From time immemorial, the Russian soldier was immensely resilient and selflessly brave. These human and military qualities could not drown out twenty-five Soviet years of suppression of thought and conscience, collective farm slavery, Stakhanovite exhaustion and the replacement of national self-awareness with international dogma. And when it became obvious to everyone that there was an invasion and conquest, and not liberation, that only the replacement of one yoke with another was foreseen, the people, postponing accounts with communism until a more opportune time, rose for the Russian land just as their ancestors rose during the invasions Swedish, Polish and Napoleonic...

Under the sign of the international, the inglorious Finnish campaign and the defeat of the Red Army by the Germans on the roads to Moscow took place; under the slogan of defending the Motherland, the German armies were defeated!”

Opinion of General A.I. Denikin is especially important for us because he received a deep and comprehensive education at the Academy of the General Staff, and had his own wealth of combat experience acquired in the Russo-Japanese, World War I and Civil Wars. His opinion is also important because, while remaining an ardent patriot of Russia, he was and until the end of his life remained a consistent enemy of Bolshevism, so one can rely on the impartiality of his assessment.

Let's consider the ratio of losses of the Allied and German armies. The literature provides the total losses of the German army, but data on German losses on the Second Front is not given, probably deliberately. The Great Patriotic War lasted 1418 days, the Second Front existed for 338 days, which is 1/4 of the duration of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, it is assumed that Germany’s losses on the Second Front are four times less. Thus, if on the Soviet-German front German losses amount to 8.66 million people, then we can assume that German losses on the Second Front are about 2.2 million, and the loss ratio is approximately 10 to 20, which would seem to confirm point of view about the high military art of our allies in World War II.

We cannot agree with this point of view. Some Western researchers also disagree with her. “Against the inexperienced, albeit eager, Americans and the war-weary, wary British, the Germans could field an army that, in the words of Max Hastings, “won a historical reputation for being undaunted and reaching its zenith under Hitler.” Hastings states: “Everywhere during the Second World War, whenever and wherever British and American troops met head-on with the Germans on equal terms, the Germans won.”<…>What struck Hastings and other historians most was the loss ratio, which was two to one or even higher in favor of the Germans.”

American Colonel Trevor Dupuy conducted a detailed statistical study of German actions in the Second World War. Some of his explanations for why Hitler's armies were so much more effective than their opponents seem unfounded. But not a single critic questioned his main conclusion that on almost every battlefield during the war, including Normandy, the German soldier was more effective than his opponents.

Unfortunately, we do not have the data that Hastings used, but if there is no direct data on German losses on the Second Front, we will try to estimate them indirectly. Considering that the intensity of the battles waged by the German army in the West and in the East was the same, and that the losses per kilometer of front were approximately equal, we obtain that German losses on the Eastern Front should not be divided by 4, but, taking into account the difference in the length of the front line, at about 15-16. Then it turns out that Germany lost no more than 600 thousand people on the Second Front. Thus, we find that on the Second Front the ratio of losses is 22 Anglo-American soldiers to 10 German ones, and not vice versa.

A similar ratio was observed in the Ardennes operation, which was carried out by the German command from December 16, 1944 to January 28, 1945. As German General Melentin writes, during this operation the Allied army lost 77 thousand soldiers, and the German army lost 25 thousand, that is, we get a ratio of 31 to 10, even exceeding that obtained above.

Based on the above reasoning, it is possible to refute the myth about the insignificance of German losses on the Soviet-German front. It is said that Germany allegedly lost about 3.4 million people. If we assume that this value corresponds to the truth, then we will have to accept that on the Second Front German losses amounted to only:

3.4 million/16 = 200 thousand people,

which is 6-7 times less than the losses of England and the United States on the Second Front. If Germany fought so brilliantly on all fronts and suffered such insignificant losses, then it is unclear why it did not win the war? Therefore, assumptions that the losses of the Anglo-American army are lower than the German ones, as well as that the German losses are significantly lower than the Soviet ones, must be rejected, since they are based on incredible figures and are not consistent with reality and common sense.

Thus, it can be argued that the power of the German army was decisively undermined by the victorious Red Army on the Soviet-German front. With an overwhelming superiority in people and equipment, the Anglo-American command showed amazing indecisiveness and ineffectiveness, one might say mediocrity, comparable to the confusion and unpreparedness of the Soviet command in the initial period of the war in 1941-1942.

This statement can be supported by a number of pieces of evidence. First, we will give a description of the actions of the special groups, which were led by the famous Otto Skorzeny, during the offensive of the German army in the Ardennes.

“On the first day of the offensive, one of Skorzeny’s groups managed to get through the gap made in the allied lines and advance to Yun, which was located near the banks of the Meuse. There, having changed her German uniform to an American one, she dug in and fortified herself at the intersection of roads and observed the movement of enemy troops. The group commander, who spoke fluent English, went so far as to take a bold walk around the area to “get acquainted with the situation.”

A few hours later, an armored regiment passed near them, and its commander asked them for directions. Without blinking an eye, the commander gave him a completely wrong answer. Namely, he stated that these “German pigs have just cut off several roads. He himself received an order to make a big detour with his column.” Very happy that they were warned in time, the American tankers actually headed along the path that “our man” showed them.

Returning to their unit, this detachment cut several telephone lines and removed signs posted by the American quartermaster service, and also laid mines here and there. Twenty-four hours later, all the men and officers of this group returned to the lines of their troops in perfect health, bringing interesting observations about the confusion that reigned behind the American front line at the beginning of the offensive.

Another of these small detachments also crossed the front line and advanced all the way to the Meuse. According to his observations, the Allies could be said to have done nothing to protect the bridges in the area. On the way back, the detachment was able to block three highways leading to the front line by hanging colored ribbons on the trees, which in the American army means that the roads are mined. Subsequently, Skorzeny's scouts saw that the columns of British and American troops actually avoided these roads, preferring to make a long detour.

The third group discovered an ammunition depot. After waiting until dark; The commandos "removed" the guards and then blew up this warehouse. A little later they discovered a telephone collector cable, which they managed to cut in three places.

But the most significant story happened to another detachment, which on December 16 suddenly found itself directly in front of the American positions. Two GI companies prepared for a long defense, built pillboxes and installed machine guns. Skorzeny's men must have been somewhat confused, especially when an American officer asked them what was happening there on the front lines.

Pulling himself together, the detachment commander, dressed in the fine uniform of an American sergeant, told the Yankee captain a very interesting story. Probably, the Americans attributed the confusion that was visible on the faces of the German soldiers to the last skirmish with the “damned Boches.” The detachment commander, a pseudo-sergeant, stated that the Germans had already bypassed this position, both on the right and on the left, so that it was practically surrounded. The amazed American captain immediately gave the order to retreat."

Let us also use the observations of the German tankman Otto Carius, who fought against Soviet soldiers from 1941 to 1944, and against Anglo-American soldiers from 1944 to 1945. Let us cite an interesting event from his front-line experience in the West. “Almost all of our Kubel passenger cars were disabled. Therefore, one evening we decided to replenish our fleet with an American one. It never occurred to anyone to consider this a heroic act!

The Yankees slept in their houses at night, as “front-line soldiers” were supposed to do. There was at best one sentry outside, but only if the weather was good. Around midnight we set off with four soldiers and returned quite soon with two jeeps. It was convenient that they did not require keys. All you had to do was turn on the switch and the car was ready to go. Only when we returned to our positions did the Yankees open indiscriminate fire into the air, probably to calm their nerves."

Having personal experience of the war on the eastern and western fronts, Carius concludes: “In the end, five Russians posed a greater danger than thirty Americans.” Western researcher Stephen E. Ambrose says that casualties can be minimized “only by ending the war quickly, rather than by exercising caution during offensive operations.”

Based on the evidence given and the relationships obtained above, it can be argued that at the final stage of the war, the Soviet command fought more skillfully than the German and much more effectively than the Anglo-American, because “the art of warfare requires courage and intelligence, and not just superiority in technology and number of troops."

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 246.
B. Ts. Urlanis. History of military losses. St. Petersburg 1994 228-232.
O'Bradley. Notes of a soldier. Foreign literature. M 1957 p. 484.
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 514.
Colonel General F. Halder. War diary. Volume 3, book 2. Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. P. 436
D. Lekhovich. Whites against reds. Moscow “Sunday”. 1992 p. 335.

F. Melentin. Tank battles 1939-1945. Test site AST. 2000
Otto Skorzeny. Smolensk Rusich. 2000 p. 388, 389
Otto Carius. "Tigers in the mud." M. Centropolygraph. 2005 p. 258, 256
Stephen E. Ambrose. D-Day AST. M. 2003. pp. 47, 49.
J. F. S. Fuller World War II 1939-1945 Publishing House of Foreign Literature. Moscow, 1956, p.26.

Military losses during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War have been the subject of both controversy and speculation for many years. Moreover, the attitude towards these losses changes exactly the opposite. So, in the 70s, the propaganda apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee for some reason almost proudly broadcast about the heavy human losses of the USSR during the war. And not so much about the victims of the Nazi genocide, but about the combat losses of the Red Army. With completely incomprehensible pride, the propaganda “canard” was exaggerated about supposedly only three percent of front-line soldiers born in 1923 who survived the war. They talked with ecstasy about entire graduating classes, where all the young men went to the front and not a single one returned. An almost socialist competition was launched among rural areas to see who had more villages, where all the men who went to the front died. Although, according to demographic statistics, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War there were 8.6 million men of 1919-1923. birth, and in 1949, during the All-Union Population Census, there were 5.05 million of them alive, that is, the decline in the male population of 1919-1923. births during this period amounted to 3.55 million people. Thus, if we accept that for each of the ages 1919-1923. If the male population is equal, then there were 1.72 million men in each year of birth. Then it turns out that conscripts born in 1923 killed 1.67 million people (97%), and conscripts born in 1919-1922. births - 1.88 million people, i.e. about 450 thousand people. of those born in each of these four years (about 27% of their total number). And this despite the fact that the military personnel of 1919-1922. births made up the personnel Red Army, which took on the blow of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 and was almost completely burned out in the battles of the summer and autumn of the same year. This alone easily refutes all the speculations of the notorious “sixties” about the supposed three percent of surviving front-line soldiers born in 1923.

During “perestroika” and the so-called. “reforms” the pendulum swung in the other direction. The unimaginable figures of 30 and 40 million military personnel who died during the war were enthusiastically cited; the notorious B. Sokolov, a doctor of philology, by the way, and not a mathematician, is especially zealous with statistical methods. Absurd ideas were voiced that Germany lost only almost 100 thousand people killed during the entire war, about the monstrous ratio of 1:14 dead German and Soviet soldiers, etc. Statistical data on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, given in the reference book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” published in 1993, and in the fundamental work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century (Loss of the Armed Forces),” were categorically declared falsification. Moreover, according to the principle: since it does not correspond to someone’s speculative concept of the losses of the Red Army, it means falsification. At the same time, enemy losses were and are being underestimated in every possible way. With calf delight, numbers are announced that do not fit into any goal. For example, the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf during the German offensive near Kursk in July 1943 were given as only 6,900 killed soldiers and officers and 12 burned tanks. At the same time, poor and ridiculous arguments were invented to explain why the tank army, which had practically retained 100% combat capability, suddenly retreated back: from the Allied landings in Italy, to the lack of fuel and spare parts, or even about the beginning of the rains.

Therefore, the question of the human losses of Germany during the Second World War is quite relevant. Moreover, interestingly, in Germany itself there is still no fundamental research on this issue. There is only indirect information. Most researchers, when analyzing German losses during the Second World War, use the monograph of the German researcher B. Muller-Hillebrandt “German Land Army. 1933-1945". However, this historian resorted to outright falsification. Thus, indicating the number of conscripts into the Wehrmacht and SS troops, Müller-Hillebrand provided information only for the period from 06/01/1939 to 04/30/1945, modestly keeping silent about the contingents previously called up for military service. But by June 1, 1939, Germany had already been deploying its armed forces for four years, and by June 1 of that year there were 3214.0 thousand people in the Wehrmacht! Therefore, the number of men mobilized into the Wehrmacht and SS in 1935-1945. takes on a different appearance (see Table 1).

Thus, the total number mobilized into the Wehrmacht and SS troops is not 17,893.2 thousand people, but about 21,107.2 thousand people, which immediately gives a completely different picture of Germany’s losses during the Second World War.

Now let's turn to the actual losses of the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht operated three different systems for recording losses:

1) via channel “IIa” - military service;
2) through the health service channel;
3) through the channel of personal accounting of losses in the territorial bodies for the list of military personnel in Germany.

But at the same time, there was an interesting feature - the losses of units and subunits were not taken into account in total, but according to their combat mission. This was done so that the Reserve Army had comprehensive information about which contingents of military personnel needed to be submitted for replenishment in each specific division. A fairly reasonable principle, but today this method of accounting for the loss of personnel makes it possible to manipulate the figures for German losses.

Firstly, separate records were kept of the so-called personnel losses. “combat strength” - Kampfwstaerke - and support units. Thus, in the German infantry division of the state in 1944, the “combat strength” was 7160 people, the number of combat support and logistics units was 5609 people, and the total strength - Tagesstaerke - 12,769 people. In the tank division according to the 1944 staff, the “combat strength” was 9,307 people, the number of combat support and logistics units was 5,420 people, and the total strength was 14,727 people. The "combat strength" of the active Wehrmacht army was approximately 40-45% of the total number of personnel. By the way, this makes it possible to very cleverly falsify the course of the war, when the Soviet troops at the front indicate their total strength, while the German troops only indicate their combat strength. Like, signalmen, sappers, repairmen, they don’t go into attacks...

Secondly, in the “combat strength” itself - Kampfwstaerke - the units “directly leading the battle” - Gefechtstaerke - were separately allocated. The units and subunits “directly leading the battle” within the divisions were considered to be infantry (motorized rifle, tank-grenadier) regiments, tank regiments and battalions, and reconnaissance battalions. Artillery regiments and divisions, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions belonged to combat support units. In the Air Force - Luftwaffe - the flying personnel were considered “units directly leading the battle”, in the Navy - Kriegsmarine - the sailing personnel belonged to this category. And the accounting for the losses of “combat strength” personnel was kept separately for the personnel “directly leading the battle” and for the personnel of the combat support units.

It is also interesting to note that only those killed directly on the battlefield were taken into account in combat losses, but military personnel who died from severe wounds during the evacuation stages were already included in the losses of the Reserve Army and were excluded from the total number of irretrievable losses of the active army. That is, as soon as the injury was determined to require more than 6 weeks to heal, the Wehrmacht soldier was immediately transferred to the Reserve Army. And even if they did not have time to take him to the rear and he died close to the front line, he was still counted as an irretrievable loss in the Reserve Army and this serviceman was excluded from the number of irretrievable combat losses of a particular front (Eastern, African, Western, etc.) . That is why almost only the killed and missing appear in the accounting of Wehrmacht losses.

There was another specific feature of accounting for losses in the Wehrmacht. Czechs drafted into the Wehrmacht from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Poles drafted into the Wehrmacht from the Poznań and Pomeranian regions of Poland, as well as Alsatians and Lorraineers through personal registration of losses in the territorial bodies of the list of military personnel in Germany were not taken into account, since they did not belong to the so-called . "Imperial Germans" In the same way, ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) conscripted into the Wehrmacht from occupied European countries were not taken into account through the personal registration channel. In other words, the losses of these categories of military personnel were excluded from the total accounting of irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht. Although more than 1,200 thousand people were drafted from these territories into the Wehrmacht and SS, not counting the ethnic Germans - Volksdoche - of the occupied countries of Europe. Six SS divisions were formed from the ethnic Germans of Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic alone, not counting a large number of military police units.

The Wehrmacht also did not take into account the losses of auxiliary paramilitary forces: the National Socialist Automobile Corps, the Speer Transport Corps, the Imperial Labor Service and the Todt Organization. Although the personnel of these formations took a direct part in ensuring combat operations, and at the final stage of the war, units and units of these auxiliary formations rushed into battle against Soviet troops on German territory. Often, the personnel of these formations were added as reinforcements to the Wehrmacht formations right at the front, but since this was not a reinforcement sent through the Reserve Army, a centralized record of this replenishment was not kept, and the combat losses of these personnel were not taken into account through the official channels of loss accounting.

Separately from the Wehrmacht, records were kept of the losses of the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth, which were widely involved in the fighting in East Prussia, East Pomerania, Silesia, Brandenburg, West Pomerania, Saxony and Berlin. The Volksshurm and the Hitler Youth were under the jurisdiction of the NSDAP. Often, units of both the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth also joined the Wehrmacht units and formations directly at the front as reinforcements, but for the same reason as with other paramilitary formations, personal registration of this reinforcement was not carried out.

The Wehrmacht also did not take into account the losses of the SS military-police units (primarily the Felgendarmerie), which fought the partisan movement, and at the final stage of the war rushed into battle against units of the Red Army.

In addition, the so-called German troops took part in the hostilities. “voluntary helpers” - Hilfswillige (“hiwi”, Hiwi), but the losses of this category of personnel were also not taken into account in the total combat losses of the Wehrmacht. Special attention should be paid to “voluntary assistants”. These “assistants” were recruited from all countries of Europe and the occupied part of the USSR, in total in 1939-1945. Up to 2 million people joined the Wehrmacht and SS as “voluntary assistants” (including about 500 thousand people from the occupied territories of the USSR). And although most of the Hiwi were service personnel from the rear structures and commandant's offices of the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories, a significant part of them were directly included in the combat units and formations.

Thus, unscrupulous researchers excluded from the total number of irretrievable losses in Germany a large number of lost personnel who directly participated in the hostilities, but were not formally related to the Wehrmacht. Although the auxiliary paramilitary formations, the Volkssturm, and the “voluntary assistants” suffered losses during the battles, these losses can rightfully be attributed to Germany’s combat losses.

Table 2 given here attempts to bring together the numbers of both the Wehrmacht and German paramilitary forces, and to roughly calculate the loss of personnel in the armed forces of Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

The number of German military personnel who were captured by the Allies and capitulated to them may be surprising, despite the fact that 2/3 of the Wehrmacht troops operated on the Eastern Front. The bottom line is that in captivity by the Allies, both the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS military personnel (the designation of the SS field troops operating on the fronts of World War II) and the personnel of all kinds of paramilitary formations, Volkssturm, NSDAP functionaries, employees were taken into account in the general cauldron territorial divisions of the RSHA and police territorial formations, up to firefighters. As a result, the allies counted up to 4032.3 thousand people as prisoners, although the real number of prisoners of war from the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS was significantly lower than the allies indicated in their documents - about 3000.0 thousand people, but in our We will use official data in our calculations. In addition, in April-May 1945, German troops, fearing retribution for the atrocities committed on the territory of the USSR, quickly rolled back to the west, trying to surrender to the Anglo-American troops. Also at the end of April - beginning of May 1945, formations of the Wehrmacht Reserve Army and all kinds of paramilitary formations, as well as police units, surrendered en masse to the Anglo-American troops.

Thus, the table clearly shows that the total losses of the Third Reich on the Eastern Front in killed and died from wounds, missing, and died in captivity reach 6,071 thousand people.

However, as is known, not only German troops, foreign volunteers and German paramilitary forces fought against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, but also the troops of their satellites. It is also necessary to take into account the losses of “volunteer helpers - “Hiwi”. Therefore, taking into account the losses of these categories of personnel, the overall picture of losses of Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front takes on the picture shown in Table 3.

Thus, the total irretrievable losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front in 1941-1945. reach 7 million 625 thousand people. If we take losses only on the battlefield, without taking into account those who died in captivity and the losses of “voluntary assistants”, then the losses are: for Germany - about 5620.4 thousand people and for satellite countries - 959 thousand people, in total - about 6579.4 thousands of people. Soviet losses on the battlefield amounted to 6885.1 thousand people. Thus, the losses of Germany and its satellites on the battlefield, taking into account all factors, are only slightly less than the combat losses of the Soviet Armed Forces on the battlefield (about 5%), and there is no ratio of 1:8 or 1:14 to the combat losses of Germany and its satellites there is no question of USSR losses.

The figures given in the tables above are, of course, very approximate and have serious errors, but they give, to a certain approximation, the order of losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front and during the war in general. Moreover, of course, if not for the inhumane treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Nazis, the total number of losses of Soviet military personnel would have been significantly lower. With an appropriate attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war, at least one and a half to two million people from among those who died in German captivity could have remained alive.

Nevertheless, a detailed and detailed study of the real human losses of Germany during the Second World War does not exist to date, because there is no political order, and many data regarding German losses are still classified under the pretext that they can cause “moral trauma” to the current German society (it would be better to remain in blissful ignorance of how many Germans died during the Second World War). Contrary to the popular picture of the domestic media in Germany, which is actively falsifying history. The main goal of these actions is to introduce into public opinion the idea that in the war with the USSR, Nazi Germany was the defending side, and the Wehrmacht was the “advanced detachment of European civilization” in the fight against “Bolshevik barbarism.” And there they actively praise the “brilliant” German generals, who held back the “Asian hordes of the Bolsheviks” for four years, with minimal losses of German troops, and only the “twenty-fold numerical superiority of the Bolsheviks,” who filled the Wehrmacht with corpses, broke the resistance of the “valiant” Wehrmacht soldiers. And the thesis is constantly being exaggerated that more “civilian” German population died than soldiers at the front, and most of the civilian deaths allegedly occurred in the eastern part of Germany, where Soviet troops allegedly committed atrocities.

In light of the problems discussed above, it is necessary to touch upon the clichés persistently imposed by pseudo-historians that the USSR won by “filling the Germans with the corpses of its soldiers.” The USSR simply did not have such a quantity of human resources. As of June 22, 1941, the population of the USSR was about 190-194 million people. Including the male population was about 48-49% - approximately 91-93 million people, of this number men 1891-1927. births were about 51-53 million people. We exclude approximately 10% of men who are unfit for military service even in wartime - this is about 5 million people. We exclude 18-20% of the “reserved” - highly qualified specialists who are not subject to conscription - this is about another 10 million people. Thus, the conscription resource of the USSR was about 36-38 million people. This is what the USSR actually demonstrated by conscripting 34,476.7 thousand people into the Armed Forces. In addition, it must be taken into account that a significant part of the conscript contingent remained in the occupied territories. And many of these people were either driven to Germany, or died, or took the path of collaboration, and after the liberation by Soviet troops from the territories subject to occupation, much fewer people were drafted into the army (40-45%) than could have been drafted before the occupation. In addition, the economy of the USSR simply could not stand it if almost all men capable of bearing arms - 48-49 million people - were drafted into the army. Then there would be no one to melt steel, produce T-34 and Il-2, or grow grain.

To have an Armed Forces of 11,390.6 thousand people in May 1945, to have 1,046 thousand people being treated in hospitals, to demobilize 3,798.2 thousand people due to wounds and illnesses, to lose 4,600 thousand people. captured and lost 26,400 thousand people killed, exactly 48,632.3 thousand people should have been mobilized into the Armed Forces. That is, with the exception of cripples completely unfit for military service, not a single man from 1891-1927. births should not have remained in the rear! Moreover, taking into account that some men of military age ended up in the occupied territories, and some worked at industrial enterprises, older and younger men inevitably had to be mobilized. However, the mobilization of men older than 1891 was not carried out, nor was the mobilization of conscripts younger than 1927. In general, if Doctor of Philology B. Sokolov had been engaged in analyzing poetry or prose, perhaps he would not have become a laughing stock.

Returning to the losses of the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich as a whole, it should be noted that the issue of accounting for losses there is quite interesting and specific. Thus, the data on losses of armored vehicles given by B. Muller-Hillebrandt are very interesting and noteworthy. For example, in April-June 1943, when there was a lull on the Eastern Front and fighting took place only in North Africa, 1019 tanks and assault guns were counted as irretrievable losses. Despite the fact that by the end of March, Army Africa had barely 200 tanks and assault guns, and in April and May, at most 100 units of armored vehicles were delivered to Tunisia. Those. in North Africa in April and May, the Wehrmacht could have lost at most 300 tanks and assault guns. Where did another 700-750 lost armored vehicles come from? Were there really secret tank battles on the Eastern Front? Or did the Wehrmacht tank army find its end in Yugoslavia these days?

Similar to the losses of armored vehicles in December 1942, when there were fierce tank battles on the Don, or the losses in January 1943, when German troops rolled back from the Caucasus, abandoning their equipment, Müller-Hillebrand cites only 184 and 446 tanks and assault guns. But in February-March 1943, when the Wehrmacht launched a counteroffensive in the Donbass, the losses of the German armored vehicles suddenly reached 2069 units in February and 759 units in March. It must be taken into account that the Wehrmacht was advancing, the battlefield remained with the German troops, and all armored vehicles damaged in the battles were delivered to the Wehrmacht tank repair units. In Africa, the Wehrmacht could not suffer such losses; by the beginning of February, Army Africa consisted of no more than 350-400 tanks and assault guns, and in February-March it received only about 200 units of armored vehicles for replenishment. Those. even with the destruction of all German tanks in Africa, the losses of Army Africa in February-March could not exceed 600 units; the remaining 2,228 tanks and assault guns were lost on the Eastern Front. How could this happen? Why did the Germans lose five times more tanks during the offensive than during the retreat, although war experience shows that the opposite always happens?

The answer is simple: in February 1943, the 6th German Army under Field Marshal Paulus capitulated in Stalingrad. And the Wehrmacht had to transfer to the list of irretrievable losses all the armored vehicles that it had long ago lost in the Don steppes, but which continued to be modestly listed in medium- and long-term repairs in the 6th Army.

It is impossible to explain why, gnawing through the deeply echeloned defenses of Soviet troops near Kursk in July 1943, saturated with anti-tank artillery and tanks, German troops lost fewer tanks than in February 1943, when they launched counterattacks on the lined-up troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts. Even if we assume that in February 1943 German troops lost 50% of their tanks in Africa, it is difficult to admit that in February 1943 in the Donbass the small Soviet troops were able to knock out more than 1000 tanks, and in July near Belgorod and Orel - only 925.

It is no coincidence that for a long time, when the documents of the German “Panzerdivisions” were captured in the “cauldrons,” serious questions arose about where the German equipment went if no one broke through from the encirclement, and the amount of abandoned and broken equipment did not correspond to what was written in the documents. Each time, the Germans had significantly fewer tanks and assault guns than were listed according to the documents. And only by mid-1944 did they realize that the actual composition of German tank divisions must be determined by the “combat ready” column. Situations often arose when in the German tank and tank-grenadier divisions there were more “dead tank souls” than actually available combat-ready tanks and assault guns. And burnt-out tanks, with turrets twisted on their sides, with gaping holes in their armor, stood in the courtyards of tank repair plants, on paper moving from vehicles of one repair category to another, waiting either to be sent for melting down, or to be captured by Soviet troops. But at that time, German industrial corporations were quietly “sawing” the finances allocated for supposedly long-term repairs or repairs “to be sent to Germany.” In addition, if Soviet documents immediately and clearly indicated that an irretrievably lost tank was burned out or broken so that it could not be restored, then German documents indicated only the disabled unit or unit (engine, transmission, chassis), or indicated location of combat damage (hull, turret, bottom, etc.). Moreover, even a tank that was completely burned out by a shell hitting the engine compartment was listed as having engine damage.

If we analyze the same B. Müller-Hillebrandt’s data on the losses of the “Royal Tigers”, an even more striking picture emerges. At the beginning of February 1945, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS had 219 Pz tanks. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II" ("Royal Tiger"). By this time, 417 tanks of this type had been produced. And according to Muller-Hillebrandt, 57 were lost. In total, the difference between produced and lost tanks is 350 units. In stock - 219. Where did 131 cars go? And that is not all. According to the same retired general, in August 1944 there were no lost Royal Tigers at all. And many other researchers of the history of the Panzerwaffe also find themselves in an awkward position when almost everyone points out that German troops admitted the loss of only 6 (six) Pz. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II". But what then to do with the situation when, near the town of Szydłów and the village of Oglendów near Sandomierz, Soviet trophy groups and special groups from the armored department of the 1st Ukrainian Front studied in detail and described, indicating serial numbers, 10 knocked out and burned out and 3 fully operational “Royal Tigers” ? We can only assume that the knocked out and burned out “Royal Tigers”, standing within the direct line of sight of the German troops, were considered by the Wehrmacht to be undergoing long-term repairs under the pretext that, theoretically, these tanks could be repulsed during a counterattack and then returned to service. Original logic, but nothing else comes to mind.

According to B. Müller-Hillebrandt, by February 1, 1945, 5840 Pz heavy tanks were produced. Kpfw. V "Panther" ("Panther"), lost - 3059 units, 1964 units were available. If we take the difference between the Panthers produced and their losses, the balance is 2781 units. There were, as already indicated, 1964 units. At the same time, Panther tanks were not transferred to Germany’s satellites. Where did the 817 units go?

With Pz tanks. Kpfw. IV is exactly the same picture. According to Müller-Hillebrandt, 8,428 units of these vehicles were produced by February 1, 1945, 6,151 were lost, the difference is 2,277 units, and 1,517 units were available on February 1, 1945. No more than 300 vehicles of this type were transferred to the Allies. Thus, up to 460 vehicles are left unaccounted for and disappeared to God knows where.

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. III. Produced - 5681 units, lost by February 1, 1945 - 4808 units, difference - 873 units, available on the same date - 534 tanks. No more than 100 units were transferred to the satellites, so, who knows where, about 250 tanks disappeared from the register.

In total, more than 1,700 tanks “Royal Tiger”, “Panther”, Pz. Kpfw. IV and Pz. Kpfw. III.

Paradoxically, to date, not a single attempt to deal with the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in technology has been successful. No one has been able to analyze in detail by month and year what real irretrievable losses the Panzerwaffe suffered. And all because of the peculiar method of “accounting” for the losses of military equipment in the German Wehrmacht.

Similarly, in the Luftwaffe, the existing method of accounting for losses made it possible for a long time to list in the “repair” column the aircraft that were shot down but fell on their territory. Sometimes even a plane smashed to smithereens that fell in the disposition of German troops was not immediately included in the lists of irretrievable losses, but was listed as damaged. All this led to the fact that in Luftwaffe squadrons up to 30-40%, and even more, of equipment was constantly listed as not combat-ready, smoothly moving from the category of damaged to the category subject to write-off.

One example: when in July 1943, on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, pilot A. Gorovets shot down 9 Ju-87 dive bombers in one battle, the Soviet infantry examined the crash sites of the Junkers and reported detailed data on the downed aircraft: tactical and serial numbers given on dead crew members, etc. However, the Luftwaffe admitted the loss of only two dive bombers that day. How could this happen? The answer is simple: by the evening of the day of the air battle, the territory where the Luftwaffe bombers fell was occupied by German troops. And the downed planes ended up in territory controlled by the Germans. And out of nine bombers, only two disintegrated in the air, the rest fell, but retained relative integrity, although they were mangled. And the Luftwaffe, with a calm soul, classified the downed planes as those that had only received combat damage. Surprisingly, this is a real fact.

And in general, when considering the issue of losses of Wehrmacht equipment, we must take into account that huge amounts of money were made on repairing equipment. And when it came to the financial interests of the financial-industrial oligarchy, the entire repressive apparatus of the Third Reich stood at attention in front of it. The interests of industrial corporations and banks were looked after sacredly. Moreover, most of the Nazi bosses had their own selfish interests in this.

One more specific point should be noted. Contrary to popular belief about the pedantry, accuracy and scrupulousness of the Germans, the Nazi elite understood perfectly well that a complete and accurate accounting of losses could become a weapon against them. After all, there is always a possibility that information about the true scale of losses will fall into the hands of the enemy and will be used in the propaganda war against the Reich. Therefore, in Nazi Germany they turned a blind eye to the confusion in accounting for losses. At first there was a calculation that the victors would not be judged, then it became a deliberate policy so as not to give the victors, in the event of the complete defeat of the Third Reich, arguments for exposing the scale of the disaster to the German people. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that at the final stage of the war, a special erasure of the archives was carried out so as not to provide the victors with additional arguments in accusing the leaders of the Nazi regime of crimes not only against other nations, but also against their own, German. After all, the death of several million young men in a senseless massacre for the sake of realizing delusional ideas about world domination is a very compelling argument for the prosecution.

Therefore, the true scale of human losses in Germany during the Second World War is still awaiting its scrupulous researchers, and then very interesting facts may be revealed to them. But on condition that these will be conscientious historians, and not all kinds of corned beef, mlechina, Svanidze, Afanasyev, Gavriilpopov and Sokolov. Paradoxically, the commission to combat the falsification of history will find more work to do inside Russia than outside its borders.

In 1945, the bloodiest war of the 20th century ended, causing terrible destruction and claiming millions of lives. From our article you can find out what losses the countries participating in World War II suffered.

Total losses

The most global military conflict of the 20th century involved 62 countries, 40 of which were directly involved in hostilities. Their losses in World War II are primarily calculated by casualties among military and civilians, which amounted to about 70 million.

The financial losses (the price of lost property) of all parties to the conflict were significant: about $2,600 billion. The country spent 60% of its income on providing the army and conducting military operations. The total cost reached $4 trillion.

The Second World War led to enormous destruction (about 10 thousand large cities and towns). In the USSR alone, more than 1,700 cities, 70 thousand villages, and 32 thousand enterprises suffered from bombing. The enemy destroyed about 96 thousand Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 37 thousand armored vehicles.

Historical facts show that it was the USSR that, of all the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition, suffered the most serious losses. Special measures were taken to clarify the number of deaths. In 1959, a population census was conducted (the first after the war). Then the figure of 20 million victims was announced. To date, other specific data are known (26.6 million), announced by the state commission in 2011. They coincided with the figures announced in 1990. Most of the dead were civilians.

Rice. 1. Destroyed city during World War II.

Human casualties

Unfortunately, the exact number of victims is still not known. Objective reasons (lack of official documentation) complicate the count, so many continue to be listed as missing.

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Before talking about the dead, let us indicate the number of people called up for service by states whose participation in the war was key, and those injured during the fighting:

• Germany : 17,893,200 soldiers, of which: 5,435,000 were wounded, 4,100,000 were captured;
• Japan : 9 058 811: 3 600 000: 1 644 614;
• Italy : 3,100,000: 350 thousand: 620 thousand;
• USSR : 34,476,700: 15,685,593: about 5 million;
• Great Britain : 5,896,000: 280 thousand: 192 thousand;
• USA : 16 112 566: 671 846: 130 201;
• China : 17,250,521: 7 million: 750 thousand;
• France : 6 million: 280 thousand: 2,673,000

Rice. 2. Wounded soldiers from World War II.

For convenience, we present a table of countries' losses in World War II. The number of deaths in it is indicated taking into account all causes of death approximately (averages between the minimum and maximum):

A country	Dead military personnel	Dead civilians
Germany	About 5 million	About 3 million
Great Britain
Australia
Yugoslavia
Finland
Netherlands
Bulgaria

World War II (September 1, 1939 - September 2, 1945) - a war of two world military-political coalitions, which became the largest armed conflict in human history. 62 states out of 73 existing at that time (80% of the world's population) participated in it. The fighting took place on the territory of three continents and in the waters of four oceans. This is the only conflict in which nuclear weapons were used.

One of the most important parts of the Second World War is the Great Patriotic War (June 22, 1941 - May 8-9, 1945) - the war of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Nazi Germany and its European allies (Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Finland) who invaded Soviet territory , Croatia), which ended with the victory of the Red Army and the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces.

For the Soviet people, the Great Patriotic War became a just war for the freedom and independence of their Motherland; the war was truly fought to the death. During the war, the USSR suffered colossal losses both among soldiers and civilians, as well as financial losses.

In addition to the USSR, other countries also suffered losses, both on the side of the Allies and on the side of the Nazi bloc.

Sorting works by all columns

No.	A country	Population (1939)	Soldiers mobilized	Soldier casualties (all causes)	Wounded soldier	Captured soldiers	Civilian casualties (all causes)	Percentage of losses from total population
1	Australia	6968000	1000000	23395	39800	11	700	0.35
2	Austria	6652700	1570000	280000	730000	950000	140000	6.31
3	Albania	1073000	0	28000	50000	0	30000	5.41
4	Belgium	8386600	625000	12500	28000	200000	74000	1.03
5	Burma	16119000	0	30000	60000	0	1070000	6.82
6	Bulgaria	6458000	339760	22000	58000	0	2519	0.38
7	Brazil	40289000	40334	943	2000	0	1000	0
8	Great Britain	47760000	5896000	286200	280000	192000	92673	0.79
9	Hungary	9129000	1200000	300000	450000	520000	270000	6.24
10	TOTAL	1891650493	127953371	24437785	37477418	28740052	46733062	3.76
11	Germany	69622500	17893200	4440000	5435000	4100000	1440000	8.45
12	Greece	7221900	414000	60000	55000	120000	375000	6.02
13	Denmark	3795000	25000	1540	2000	2000	2900	0.12
14	India	311820000	2393891	36300	26000	79500	3000000	0.97
15	Indonesia	69435000	0	0	0	0	4000000	5.76
16	Iraq	3698000	0	1000	0	0	0	0.03
17	Iran	14340000	0	0	0	0	200	0
18	Ireland	2930000	0	0	0	0	200	0.01
19	Iceland	118900	0	0	0	200	0	0
20	Spain	25637000	47000	15070	35000	452	0	0.06
21	Italy	44394000	3100000	374000	350000	620000	105000	1.08
22	Canada	11267000	1086343	39300	53200	9000	0	0.35
23	China	517568000	17250521	3800000	7000000	750000	7900000	2.26
24	Korea (part of Japan)	24000000	100000	10000	0	15000	70000	0.33
25	Cuba	4235000	0	0	0	0	100	0
26	Libya	860000	0	0	0	0	20000	2.33
27	Luxembourg	295000	0	2200	7000	12000	1800	1.36
28	Malaysia	4391000	0	0	0	0	695000	15.83
29	Malta	268700	0	600	0	0	1500	0.78
30	Mexico	19320000	0	0	0	0	100	0
31	Mongolia	819000	0	72	125	0	0	0.01
32	Netherlands	8729000	280000	38000	14500	57000	182000	2.52
33	New Zealand	1628500	194000	11625	39800	26400	0	0.71
34	Norway	2944900	75000	7800	5000	18000	2200	0.34
35	Newfoundland	300000	0	1000	0	0	100	0.37
36	Poland	34775700	1000000	425000	580000	990000	5600000	17.33
37	Portuguese Timor	500000	0	0	0	0	55000	11
38	Romania	19933800	2600000	550500	860000	500000	500000	5.27
39	Singapore	727600	0	0	0	0	80000	11
40	USSR	170557093	34476700	8866400	15685593	5700000	15760000	14.44
41	USA	131028000	16112566	405399	652000	140000	3000	0.31
42	Thailand	15023000	0	5600	5000	0	123000	0.86
43	Pacific Islands	1900000	0	0	0	0	57000	3
44	Philippines	16000300	0	40000	50000	50000	960000	6.25
45	Finland	3700000	530000	82000	180000	4500	1000	2.24
46	France	41300000	6000000	253000	280000	2673000	412000	1.61
47	French Indochina	24600000	0	1000	0	0	2020000	8.22
48	Czechoslovakia	15300000	0	35000	55000	75000	335000	2.42
49	Switzerland	4210000	0	60	0	0	20	0
50	Sweden	6341300	0	0	0	0	50	0
51	Ethiopia	17200000	0	250000	600000	0	610000	5
52	South Africa	10160000	410056	8681	14400	14600	0	0.09
53	Yugoslavia	15400000	3741000	277000	600000	345000	750000	6.67
54	Japan	71380000	9700000	1940000	3600000	4500000	690000	3.68