Commanders

Nevel offensive operation- front-line offensive operation of the Red Army against German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from October 6 to October 10, 1943 by part of the forces of the Kalinin Front with the goal of capturing Nevel and disrupting enemy communications on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front.

Situation

German defense

German defensive fortifications in the Nevel area (December 1943)

The German defense was a system of strong strongholds and resistance centers located in terrain with a large number of lakes and deep ravines. From an engineering point of view, the defense was well prepared and included a developed system of trenches, trenches, full-profile communication trenches, as well as dugouts and bunkers with multiple overlaps. A large number of reserve positions were equipped for machine guns, mortars and guns. In the direction where the Soviet troops intended to deliver the main attack, more than 100 firing points, up to 80 dugouts, 16-20 mortar positions, 12 artillery batteries and 12-16 individual guns were located. In addition, up to 8 artillery batteries could fire from neighboring areas. The front line of the defense was covered by two strips of minefields 40-60 m deep and two rows of wire barriers. The second defensive line ran along the river. Six. The total tactical depth of defense was 6-7 km.

The closest reserves of the Wehrmacht amounted to up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

Part of the forces of the Kalinin Front:

• 357th Rifle Division (Major General A.L. Kronik)
• 28th Rifle Division (Colonel M. F. Bukshtynovich)
• 21st Guards Rifle Division (Major General D. V. Mikhailov)
• 78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin)
• 46th Guards Rifle Division (Major General S. I. Karapetyan)
• 100th Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.I. Serebryakov)
• 31st Rifle Brigade (Colonel L.A. Bakuev)

• 2nd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov)
  • 360th Rifle Division (Colonel I. I. Chinnov)
  • 117th Rifle Division (Major General E. G. Koberidze)
  • 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division (Major General V. A. Karvelis)
• Part of the forces of the 83rd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. A. Dyakonov)
  • 47th Rifle Division (Major General V. G. Chernov)
• 236th Tank Brigade (Colonel N.D. Chuprov)
• 143rd Tank Brigade (Colonel A. S. Podkovsky)

• 240th Fighter Aviation Division (Colonel G.V. Zimin)
• 211th Assault Aviation Division (Colonel P. M. Kuchma)

Germany

• 263rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General W. Richter)
• 291st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General W. Goeritz)

Part of the forces of the 2nd air field corps:

• 2nd Air Field Division (Colonel G. Petzold)

To repel the Soviet offensive, the following were additionally brought in:

• 58th Infantry Division (Artillery General K. Sievert)
• 83rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General T. Scherer)
• 129th Infantry Division (Major General K. Fabiunke)
• 281st Security Division (Lieutenant General W. von Stockhausen)
• 20th Panzer Division (Major General M. von Kessel)

Operation plan

The idea of ​​the operation was to quickly break through the German defenses, capture Nevel with a swift attack and take advantageous positions for further fighting. Suddenness and swiftness of action were of decisive importance. Any delay could lead to the failure of the operation, since in this case the German command would have time to transfer reserves to the threatened direction and strengthen the defense.

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army. To ensure the solution to the main task of the operation, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky included four of the existing six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all tanks and almost all of the army’s artillery in the strike force. These forces were concentrated in a 4-kilometer area. The defense of the remaining 100-kilometer section of the army's front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of a strike group was chosen. The first echelon, intended to break through the German defense, included the 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments. To develop the success after the defense was broken through, the 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division and three artillery regiments were assigned. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to secretly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of material resources, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and secretly occupied their starting position in close proximity to the front line. The third stage included artillery preparation, attack, breaking through enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Sixth, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the development echelon of success, which at the fourth stage, with a swift blow, was supposed to capture the inter-lake defile on the approaches to Nevel and take possession of the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold to the north and west of Nevel, organize a strong defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

According to the artillery support plan for the operation, 814 guns and mortars were concentrated in the breakthrough area, which accounted for 91% of all those available in the army. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery and mortar batteries, suppressing firing points at the front line and in the depths of the defense, preventing counterattacks and preventing the approach of reserves. The artillery operations were organized as an artillery offensive, in which 1.5 hours were allocated for artillery preparation and 35 minutes for accompanying the attack with a barrage of fire.

In order to prevent a strike on the flank of the advancing army of K.N. Galitsky and cover its actions, the 4th Shock Army was supposed to attack south of Nevel. The attack was carried out by the 360th and 47th rifle divisions in the direction of Lake Ezerishche and further to Gorodok. The success was to be developed by the 236th and 143rd tank brigades. Their main task was to cut the Gorodok-Nevel highway.

For air support of the troops, the 211th attack and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated from the 3rd Air Army. While the infantry was preparing for the attack, the pilots had to carry out bombing and assault strikes on strong points located in the direction of the main attack. In the future, attack aircraft, under the cover of fighters, were to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was entrusted with the task of providing air cover for the strike group, disrupting enemy railway communications in the Polotsk-Dretun and Nevel-Gorodok sections, and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

Preparing the operation

The front and army commands paid great attention to the careful preparation of the operation. At the headquarters of the 3rd Shock Army, all the details of the upcoming operation were worked out on maps and layouts of the area with the commanders of divisions, brigades and artillery units. In the rifle units that were part of the strike group, training was carried out on individual phases of the battle: covert exit to the starting position, interaction during the attack, overcoming swampy terrain, maximum use of the results of artillery preparation. In the 28th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovich, about 50 company and battalion exercises were conducted, where issues of interaction between infantry and artillery were worked out. Until the start of the operation, intensive reconnaissance was carried out along the entire front of the army, which with sufficient accuracy established the enemy group, its numerical composition, the system of fire and minefields.

Simultaneously with the strengthening of intelligence, measures were taken to keep the intentions of the Soviet command secret. Until the last moment, the decision to attack was known to a limited circle of people. Much attention was paid to operational camouflage. Forests were used to deploy troops in the initial areas, and regrouping was carried out strictly at night. To hide the concentration of a large amount of artillery, only one gun was allocated from each artillery regiment for shooting.

During the day preceding the start of the offensive, partisans operating in the areas of Nevel, Idritsa, Sebezh, and Polotsk carried out a series of sabotage acts, as a result of which military trains with people and ammunition were destroyed, and several enemy garrisons were defeated.

On the night of October 6, all preparations were completed. Formations and units of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the strike group took their starting position for the offensive. The artillery moved into firing positions.

Progress of hostilities

External images
	Map of the Nevelsk operation

The Nevelsk operation began on October 6 at 5 a.m. with reconnaissance in force. In order to confuse the German command regarding the direction of the main attack, it was carried out on several sectors of the front. In the direction of the main attack, two rifle companies, one from each rifle division of the first echelon, went on the attack with the task of attracting enemy fire and thereby identifying new ones and clarifying the location of known firing points, artillery and mortar positions. At 8:40 a.m., guns and mortars opened fire on the German defenses. The destructive shelling of the enemy's front line, strongholds, and positions of artillery and mortar batteries continued for an hour. Then more than 100 guns hit the firing points on the front line with direct fire. At the same time, pilots of the 211th Attack Air Division launched a bombing attack on enemy strongholds.

At 10:00, the infantry of the 28th and 357th Infantry Divisions of the 3rd Shock Army rose to attack and entered the battle to capture the first trench. At the same time, the artillery shifted fire deep into the enemy’s defenses. In certain sections of the front, Soviet artillery managed to completely suppress enemy firing points, which allowed the infantry to overcome the front line on the move and start a battle in the second German trench. An hour after the start of the attack, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through the German defenses in a 2.5 km area and advanced up to 2 km in depth. In the zone of action of the 357th Infantry Division, the German defense was not completely destroyed by artillery fire; the attackers encountered strong resistance and were unable to advance.

The offensive began successfully in the 4th Shock Army. The 360th and 47th rifle divisions also went on the attack at 10 o'clock on October 6 after almost an hour and a half of artillery and air preparation. Without encountering serious resistance, they soon captured the first lines of trenches. At about 11:30, the 236th Tank Brigade of Colonel N.D. Chuprov was brought into battle. After 20 minutes, the second mobile group, led by the commander of the 143rd Tank Brigade, Colonel A.S. Podkovsky, rushed into the breakthrough. The tank crews were tasked with cutting the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

The stubborn resistance of the Nazis in front of the front of the 357th Infantry Division of the 3rd Shock Army threatened to disrupt the entire operation, in which the main factor for success was to be the speed of the offensive. In the current situation, the commander of the 3rd Shock Army decided to use the success of the 28th Infantry Division to introduce a breakthrough development echelon into battle. The 78th Tank Brigade, one regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division in vehicles and reinforcement units rushed forward. Following them, the remaining two regiments of the 21st Guards Division moved on foot. The breakthrough development echelon was headed by Major General Mikhailov. Minefields and marshy areas lying in the path of the attackers greatly reduced the pace of the advance. To overcome them, sapper units were used; infantrymen literally dragged vehicles through the mud and swamps on their hands. By 2 p.m., parts of the breakthrough development echelon overcame the enemy’s defenses and soon, ahead of the retreating German units, reached the Shestikha River and captured bridges across it. The offensive progressed successfully. Individual pockets of resistance encountered along the way were suppressed by fire from ground forces and attack aircraft. The raids of enemy bombers were repelled by anti-aircraft gunners and covering fighters. By 16 o'clock the advance detachment reached Nevel. Taken by surprise, the German garrison was unable to organize resistance and the battle in the city quickly ended. After occupying the railway station, 1,600 Nevelsk residents were released from two trains prepared for shipment to Germany. At 16:40, the commander of the 78th Tank Brigade, Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin, sent a report to army headquarters about the capture of Nevel. Success was achieved so quickly that front commander A.I. Eremenko doubted the accuracy of the report. K.N. Galitsky confirmed the information with a personal report and proposed developing an offensive against Idritsa and Polotsk. But A.I. Eremenko, given the tense situation on the Kalinin Front, did not support him and ordered to consolidate the success achieved. By the end of the day, units had secured a foothold to the north-west and west of the city.

As a result of the first day of the operation, the troops of the 3rd and 4th shock armies completed their tasks and drove out units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Airfield Divisions of the Nazis from their occupied lines. Parrying the blow, the German command hastily began to pull up reinforcements from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. Starting from October 7, units began to appear in the combat area

Chapter Twelve

Results of the combat operations of the 4th Shock Army

Thus, at the beginning of February, the 4th Shock Army was forced to split its forces in three directions and fight protracted battles with fresh units brought up by the enemy.

The neighboring armies, more than 100 km behind us, not only could not help us, but also needed help themselves. The 3rd Shock Army, stretching along its right border, at that time continued fighting for Kholm and on the approaches to Velikiye Luki, and the 22nd Army, with its left flank units, conducted unsuccessful attacks against the Nazi garrison in the city of Bely. The insecurity of the flanks of the 4th Shock Army required the expenditure of forces to cover them, especially in the Nelidov area, and also necessitated the need to have significant reserves in case the enemy broke through our front and reached army communications. For these purposes, the 334th Infantry Division was used in full force, creating a defense in the Nelidovo and Ilyino areas.

The two rifle divisions intended to replenish the army - the 155th and 158th - were still on the way transferred to the 22nd Army, while the 4th Shock Army, which bore the brunt of several offensive operations in the direction of the main attack, did not receive a single replenishment. In this regard, the promise once made by the commander of the Northwestern Front, Lieutenant General Kurochkin, that if our army managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, it would receive as many reinforcements as was requested, looked very strange.

Since February 6, the situation at the army front has stabilized, and the fighting began to be private.

Thus, the goal of the army operation - reaching the area of ​​​​Velizh, Surazh, Demidov - was fulfilled, and the fighting at this line not only attracted the enemy’s large strategic reserves (up to six divisions), intended for the spring offensive, but also inflicted serious damage. A convenient springboard for the development of offensive actions in the future was also occupied.

During the period from January 9 to February 5, troops of the 4th Shock Army conducted two operations: Toropetsk and Velizh. As a result of the success of these operations, army troops wedged themselves into the junction between army groups “Center” and “North”, cutting two roads: Velikie Luki - Toropets - Nelidovo - Nevel and Velizh - Dukhovshchina - Yartsevo. The army entered an area that was most advantageous for striking the flank and rear of enemy troops operating in both the Moscow and Leningrad strategic directions.

An important result of the battles was that the 4th Shock Army turned out to be much closer to the “triangle” of the Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk highways than the fascist German armies operating in the Moscow direction, because the enemy’s Rzhev-Vyazma grouping was at a distance of 150–200 km from Smolensk.

The Toropets operation was completed exactly within the deadlines set by the army. The Velizh operation did not receive full development, mainly due to the lag of its neighbors and insufficient replenishment of the army with personnel, materiel and ammunition.

The further development of the Velizh operation, which followed immediately after the Toropetsk one, without a pause, was suspended, I repeat, due to the lag of neighbors, insufficient personnel replenishment and extremely weak material support. Even now I experience with pain in my soul that the further operation of the 4th Shock Army, which won victory in the hardest battles and created with its deep invasion a favorable environment for the further development of success in Vitebsk and Smolensk, stalled due to the fact that not a single one arrived person for strengthening. Is it possible for the front command to be so irresponsible in the organization and conduct of army operations! Both then and now I am convinced that Comrade will not be taken away from us. Kurochkin had three divisions, but on the contrary, reinforced with a couple of fresh ones, as he promised, I am sure that both Vitebsk and Smolensk would have been taken, and a different, more difficult situation would have been created for the enemy.

The main thing in leading troops is the ability to maneuver forces and means in order to always be stronger than the enemy in the right direction, creating the opportunity for our troops to realize victory. The command of the Northwestern Front, having such capabilities, apparently did not show the will.

During the 28 days of the offensive, the troops fought in a straight line 250-300 km, liberated about 3 thousand settlements and a number of cities, among them Peno, Andreapol, Western Dvina, Toropets, cut the Velikiye Luki - Rzhev railway, and inflicted serious damage on large forces the enemy, destroying the 416th and 453rd infantry regiments, the SS cavalry brigade “Totenkopf”, the reconnaissance detachment of the 123rd infantry division, the 251st and 253rd infantry divisions; inflicted a serious defeat on the 81st, 83rd, 85th and 406th Infantry Divisions, the 230th Reserve Infantry Division and one division (number not established) that was part of the 59th Army Corps (in full force thrown against the 4th Shock),

10th Infantry Brigade, 547th Infantry Regiment, 579th Landschutzbattalion, 50th Separate Battalion, 512th Railway Battalion, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th Fighter Detachments with a total strength of up to eight divisions, not counting the enemy units deployed to strengthen Vitebsk, Rudnya, Smolensk, Yartsevo and Dukhovshchina. The enemy lost at least 11-12 thousand in killed alone, not counting those covered in snow and prisoners, while our army lost 2,872 people killed and died from wounds.

During the entire operation, given the severity of the winter of that time (the temperature dropped below -40 degrees), 201 people suffered from frost, 423 people went missing.

During the offensive, the army captured large trophies: about 300 guns, approximately the same number of mortars, about 400 machine guns, over 1,200 vehicles, 2 thousand horses, about 1,000 motorcycles, about 1,000 bicycles, 300 railway cars, about 100 platforms, rich ammunition depots and food. During the operations, 40 enemy aircraft were shot down. Our losses in both operations were several times smaller.

At one time, the question was discussed about whether it was advisable to capture Vitebsk at that moment. Many said that the capture of Vitebsk was dangerous, because Velikiye Luki loomed over us on the right, and Rudnya, Smolensk and Dukhovshchina on the left. Proponents of trench warfare expressed similar objections. These people, lacking operational audacity, did not know how to develop strategic success. It was necessary to immediately turn the front in two directions, taking advantage of the extremely favorable situation that developed in February - March 1942, when the 4th Shock Army, in the form of a wedge, crashed into the territories occupied by the enemy. The first direction is Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - Nevel with a simultaneous attack on Kholmy, Loknya, Novorzhev. The second direction is Vitebsk – Rudnya – Dukhovshchina – Smolensk. Needless to say, the operations ahead were difficult, but their success could be decisive for further military operations. It is unlikely that the Germans would have held out in Rzhev, Vyazma, and Sychevka. It is unlikely that they would have been able to intensify their actions in the direction of Voronezh - Stalingrad - the Caucasus, because then the powerful fist of the Red Army would have been brought from the north over their rear communications.

The offensive operations of the 4th Shock Army in difficult terrain and climate conditions allowed us to accumulate valuable experience in organizing an offensive, namely in relation to individual types of weapons, in the field of command and control, the work of headquarters, planning operations, organizing communications, party and political work with troops and local population, work among enemy troops, logistics and logistics work.

Particularly instructive in all respects were the actions of the 249th Infantry Division, which was in fact the striking force of the army, operating in the most critical sectors and managing to successfully complete the tasks assigned to it by the army command.

It is also impossible not to note the actions of the 360th Infantry Division, which has accumulated experience in overcoming inaccessible terrain and fighting in forests against well-fortified strongholds and pre-prepared enemy defensive lines.

A few words should be said about the work of the headquarters. The headquarters of the units and formations that took part in the operations varied in composition and preparedness; The headquarters of those formations whose troops already had combat experience turned out to be the most cohesive and efficient. Therefore, during the operation, the issue of leadership and control over the work of those headquarters that were staffed by officers who had no experience in staff work acquired particular importance during the operation.

The headquarters of the 4th Shock Army was mainly staffed with well-trained and efficient officers and proved to be a well-coordinated apparatus, capable of quickly and correctly solving problems put forward by the command, despite the lack of a reserve of staff officers.

Speaking about the work of the headquarters of the 4th Shock Army, one cannot help but recall the enthusiasm and speed with which the relatively young staff of this headquarters, fulfilling the directives of the front and the decisions of the army commander, developed a plan for their first, Toropetsk, offensive operation.

The planning of the operation, with the very hard work of the staff officers, and especially the head of the operations department, Lieutenant Colonel Beilin, was completed within three days.

The time to prepare for the operation was very limited. Therefore, simultaneously with the planning of this operation, army headquarters officers met the troops arriving in the army and escorted them to the concentration areas along the directions of their upcoming offensive. In addition, army headquarters officers conducted training with the command staff of the arriving troops and took measures to improve the supply of these troops with everything they needed.

One cannot help but recall, for example, how captain Portugalov and junior lieutenant Fetishchev, in very difficult conditions of off-road conditions, severe frost and snowstorm, not only accurately brought out the ski battalions assigned to them, but also provided them with all types of necessary supplies.

Regarding the work of the army headquarters in preparing the operation, it should be noted the very positive work of the communications department of the army headquarters under the leadership of Colonel (then General) K.A. Babkin, who, with the help of his dedicated signalmen, always and on time ensured fairly stable communications through several channels both upward and and with the troops.

I would like to cite the memories of ordinary signalman Kirpichnikov, who wrote to me about this period of his service.

“In mid-December, preparations began for some kind of big operation, which we, signalmen, guessed about from the revived activity of the headquarters. Communication units were intensively laying telegraph lines to the front edge. This work, to our surprise, went on during the day, without any camouflage from enemy aircraft. As it turned out later, the construction of lines was one of the command’s measures to divert the enemy’s attention from upcoming operations. In this way, the appearance of preparation for an offensive in the area of ​​Lake Seliger was created. The army communications department, to which I was assigned, was preparing communications plans for the area adjacent to Ostashkov.

At the end of December, in severe frosts, the army headquarters and along with it our regiment began redeployment towards Ostashkov. The transfer took place in very difficult conditions, along snow-covered forest roads, and even off-road. The regiment's vehicles made part of the journey along the dismantled railroad bed, from which the sleepers had not been removed. Once the location for the command post was chosen, very busy work began. Signalmen, under the leadership of the head of communications, Colonel K. A. Babkin, intensively prepared documentation (call signs, keys), groups of telephone operators and telegraph operators were formed to organize communication centers at observation posts, command and reserve command posts. Communication was established with the arriving units. There was a lot of trouble, since divisions and brigades that were completely new to us arrived, sometimes located outside populated areas. The lack of cable for connecting lines presented considerable difficulties. The battle was literally for every reel. This deficiency was subsequently replenished by rich trophies.

It was January 9, 1942. After a deceptive silence, early in the morning the menacing roar of artillery preparation was heard. We signalmen tried to catch every message from the front line, where the enemy’s defenses were being breached. Finally, the telephone operators said: “Our people have moved forward, the Fritzes have run!” It became joyful. After all, before this, I must frankly admit, I often felt very bad at heart, especially when I read the reports of the Information Bureau - in many places our troops were retreating into the interior of the country.

Following the units, the army headquarters also moved into the breakthrough. His first command post on the territory liberated from the enemy was located in Velikoye Selo, not far from Andreapol. The first prisoners appeared. In those days they were a novelty for us. The German soldiers, in light uniforms not suitable for winter, looked extremely pitiful. Many were frostbitten and wrapped in civilian clothes.

Our troops quickly moved forward. The signalmen had difficulty establishing communications. It must be said that the main burden fell on the wireworms. Thanks to the efforts of the signalmen of our regiment and individual communications companies under the leadership of energetic commanders - Colonel K.A. Babkin, assistant chief of communications, Majors Sachkovsky (who died in 1944) and Tikhonov, commander

The 56th separate communications regiment of R. F. Malinovsky and other army headquarters in most cases had stable communications with divisions and brigades. The main operation was telephone communication and, to a lesser extent, telegraph communication: “Bodo” and “ST-35”.

At the beginning of February, the army command post was relocated to Staraya Toropa, or rather, to the village of Skagovo, 2–3 kilometers from the railway station. A new hot period began for signalmen, caused by offensive operations in the direction of Velizh. Extended communications required a sharp extension of communication lines. They especially lengthened after our troops captured Ilyino, Kresty and other points. This circumstance, as well as the increased actions of enemy aircraft, greatly complicated the work of the signalmen. Due to frequent bombings, cable and permanent lines were interrupted, and often they were disrupted by our tanks and vehicles, moving in a continuous stream from Toropets to the front line. Linemen often had to establish communications under heavy bombing, in deep snow, in forests. A particularly difficult task was establishing contact with the group of Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi, operating in the direction of Demidov - Dukhovshchina, on the left flank of the army.

The hardening received during the attack on Toropets and Velizh served the personnel of the 56th Separate Signal Regiment well and hardened them. Many signalmen received government awards.

The days of offensive operations of the 4th Shock Army are unforgettable. They showed the strength and tenacity of the Soviet people, who overcame a well-armed enemy and the difficulties of an unusually harsh winter, and the ability of military leaders to lead troops forward. Our army fully justified the honorary title of shock and made a tangible contribution to the defeat of the Nazi hordes.”

The offensive began in January 1942. As it progressed, the prepared roads ran out and communications facilities fell behind. Wired communications (cable-pole and permanent lines) did not keep up with the troops and were often destroyed by enemy aircraft, and there was almost no field cable in the army. The radios were also lagging behind. Under these conditions, the army headquarters quickly switched to mobile means of communication (ski relay races, mounted officers from military headquarters to control communication centers), which provided information to the commander and army headquarters.

For the same purpose, as well as to assist the troops with the start of the offensive, officers from the operations department were sent to all formations of the first echelon, who provided regular information to the army headquarters about the progress of the offensive.

One of the features of troop control during the offensive was the nightly issuance of orders and combat instructions for the actions of troops for the night and the next day of battle or to clarify tasks if this was caused by the situation. These orders were delivered to the troops on time by headquarters officers. Cases of delays in the delivery of such orders to the troops were extremely rare.

In addition, the officers of the operational department of the army headquarters continuously monitored the progress of the execution of orders by the troops and often, especially in the battles of Toropets and Staraya Toropa, were among the troops, directly participating in the battles. This method of command and control of troops in those difficult conditions fully justified itself.

With the capture of Toropets, the army headquarters received captured motorcycles with sidecars, which dramatically increased the mobility of its officers. In addition, signalmen installed radio stations on captured all-terrain vehicles. These all-terrain vehicles subsequently always accompanied responsible headquarters officers when they went to the troops.

After the successful completion of the Toropetsk operation, the 4th Shock Army was transferred from the Northwestern to the Kalinin Front and immediately received a new mission.

There was only one night for the troops to sharply turn south and assign them new combat missions. During this night, in accordance with the decision of the army commander, the headquarters developed a new operation plan, combat orders, private combat orders, prepared maps of new areas of operation and immediately after approval by the army commander delivered them to the troops at night.

One cannot help but remember that some of the connections, and in particular

The 39th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Poznyak, was then operating behind enemy lines, and orders could only be delivered to them by plane. And this difficult and dangerous task was successfully completed by the headquarters officers. At the same time, the officer of the operational department of the headquarters, Colonel A. Soroko, distinguished himself with courage and resourcefulness, sent to the headquarters of the 39th brigade, which, according to his reports, was located in the village of Ponizovye. Having landed on the outskirts of this village, Colonel Soroko saw soldiers in helmets running towards him. He realized that these were the Nazis.

Shooting the fascists running up to the plane with a captured machine gun, the pilot quickly turned the plane around and lifted it into the air. After some searching for the 39th Brigade, Colonel Soroko finally found it on the spot and personally handed the army order to the brigade commander Poznyak.

Colonel Soroko and the pilot, who was slightly wounded in the leg, returned to the airfield with several dozen holes in the wings and fuselage of the aircraft.

Before the start of the offensive, the 4th Shock Army received two separate tank battalions for reinforcement: the 141st (consisting of 4 KB tanks, 7 T-34 tanks, 20 T-60 tanks) and the 117th (consisting of 12 MK-2 tanks , 9 MK-3 tanks, 10 T-60 tanks). There were 62 tanks in total, 30 of them light.

The tanks arrived in the army with half-used motor resources, while some tank crews had little knowledge of the new material. MK-3 tanks were not suitable for movement in deep snow; spikes had to be welded onto their track tracks using a makeshift method.

Terrain and climate conditions did not allow the widespread use of tanks; tank maneuver was extremely difficult.

Despite all the difficulties in using tanks, the 141st Tank Battalion cooperated well with the 249th Rifle Division in the battles for Okhvat, Lugi, Oleksino, Velikoye Selo and Andreapol. Our wonderful T-34 tank performed especially well, as before.

The 171st Tank Battalion almost did not participate in the battles, since at first it was attached, on the instructions of the front headquarters, to the 360th Infantry Division, which was advancing on the right flank of the army, and then, having received the order to move to the central sector, it was no longer able to catch up with the troops successfully advancing there .

The deputy army commander for armored forces, Lieutenant Colonel Malakhov, played a major role in the management of tank forces. He writes about this period of service:

“As part of the 4th Shock Army, I was appointed deputy army commander for armored forces. In this position, I participated in the Toropets operation of 1942. The army’s offensive began on January 9, 1942 and developed successfully, army troops captured the cities of Peno, Andreapol, Toropets, approached and surrounded the city of Velizh. As part of the 4th Shock Army, the tank forces were represented by the 141st and 171st separate tank battalions. With the approach to the city of Velizh, the 78th Tank Brigade arrived as part of the army troops. The tankers performed excellently, despite snow drifts and forested areas, as well as swampy areas. Many tankers were awarded government awards, in particular, the commander of the 141st brigade, Captain Kuzhilny, was awarded the Order of Lenin by the Front Military Council, and his deputy in the combat unit, Polovchene, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional feats.

In the battles of January 15, Captain Polovchenya, when the retreating fascist units were forced to move along a narrow road, along the edges of which snowdrifts of up to 1–1.5 meters had formed, crashed into the retreating columns in a T-34 tank, inflicting huge losses on them. The road was littered with abandoned equipment and hundreds of killed and wounded fascists. And when one of the fascists quietly climbed onto the tank of Polovchenya and tried to set it on fire with a combustible mixture, he did not lose his head, killed the fascist, put out the fire and continued to destroy the enemy with tracks and weapons.”

The combined arms artillery and reinforcement artillery coped well with their tasks. This was the considerable merit of the army artillery commander, Major General of Artillery Nikolai Mikhailovich Khlebnikov. This is a real combat artillery commander who knew how to think and act in relation to the most difficult situations.

He recalls this period:

“The 27th Army, renamed the 4th Shock Army, advanced in the Andreapol-Toropets direction and in two months broke through deep snow to a depth of 300 km, captured Andreapol, Toropets, Staraya Toropa and, having surrounded Velizh, advanced units reached Vitebsk .

The skillful use of ski battalions, supported by mobile mortar and artillery units on ski installations, made it possible to penetrate deep into the enemy's position and hit him from the rear and flanks. The artillerymen learned to operate so well in these harsh winter conditions that even the heavy regiments (152 mm howitzers) kept up with the troops.

With air defense the situation was more complicated.

Our entire anti-aircraft artillery consisted of only five divisions of 25-mm and 37-mm guns and two batteries of 76-mm guns. There were no means of communication for the warning network. The VNOS service used command communications. Anti-aircraft artillery often lagged behind the infantry and suffered from a lack of ammunition, although this need was partially overcome by the anti-aircraft gunners by using enemy 37-mm shells. It must be said that of the 29 aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft gunners during that period, 19 were the share of the 615th separate anti-aircraft artillery division, commanded by Captain Kalchenko.”

It should also be noted that the 4th Shock Army included the Army Air Force, which consisted of two regiments of Po-2 night bombers, one SB regiment, and two fighter regiments. Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Georgy Filippovich Baidukov, was appointed head of the Air Force of the 4th Shock Army in December 1941.

The Air Force played a positive role in the Army's offensive operation. The army had, as already mentioned, only 53 serviceable aircraft at its disposal. The enemy always had air superiority. The lack of forces to equip an airfield near the front line led to the separation of our aviation, already small in number, from the advancing troops. Unfortunately, this did not allow us to accumulate and generalize any significant experience in the use of aviation when conducting offensive operations in winter conditions and difficult wooded terrain. However, our pilots did not allow the air enemy into the unloading areas during the concentration of units, and skillfully covered the troops on the march. In preparation for the offensive, our aviation influenced enemy concentrations, their strongholds both at the front line and in the depths of the defense. During the aviation offensive, the task was set to cover the main grouping of army troops along the axis of movement of Ostashkov, Peno, Andreapol, Toropets, Velizh. The cover-up was, however, insufficient for reasons already known to the reader. Through assault operations, the fighters destroyed the retreating enemy and tried to prevent the approach of his reserve. Night raids by our bombers exhausted the enemy in concentration areas and in defense.

There were many shortcomings in the recruitment of air force units during combat operations. According to the very strange situation that existed at that time, air units were not systematically replenished with either materiel or personnel, but were completely replaced when all the aircraft failed. It is not difficult to understand that with such a system the army often found itself completely without aviation. And then new people arrived who did not know either the conditions of the combat situation or the terrain, so they were of little use. If we add to this a number of smaller shortcomings, such as the fact that first the new flight personnel arrived, and after some time the technical ones, then it is not difficult to understand how much such a vicious organization reduced the combat effectiveness of the already weak army air forces.

Valuable experience was gained in the use of ski battalions, which performed well in a number of battles, in particular during the capture of Staraya Toropa.

The conduct of both operations, especially Toropetsk, made it possible to further strengthen ski training among the troops.

During the preparation and conduct of the operation, much attention was paid to party political work.

Before characterizing this most important area of ​​troop leadership, I would like to cite a letter sent to me by former army political worker Efim Kononovich Dzoz.

“I transferred to the 4th Shock Army from the 27th, like many other officers who served in this army. At that time I worked in the political department. The head of the political department at that time was divisional commissar Semenov, a very demanding and strict political worker, he spoke very briefly, but clearly and understandably. He gathered the entire apparatus of the army's political department and announced that the 27th Army had been renamed the 4th Shock Army, and told us about the upcoming tasks that the army must perform during offensive operations.

The order from Headquarters to rename our army encouraged all of us, since it was clear that our army was entrusted with large and responsible tasks to defeat the German invaders and that in this direction our army would play the main and decisive role. On the same day, everyone was informed that you had been appointed commander of the army.

I remember such a case. When the redeployment of troops took place, many commanders and political workers of the army were sent to army formations to convey to the personnel the order of Headquarters and the tasks that had to be completed. The morale among the personnel was extremely high. Everyone was burning with the same desire to quickly launch an offensive and achieve the goal.

Despite the harsh December winter, impassable roads and lack of transport, people walked and marched in snowstorms and forty-degree frosts for the sake of victory over the enemy. These high and noble deeds of the soldiers of the 4th Shock Army did not remain without a trace.

Concentrating army troops for an offensive is a complex and difficult task. It was difficult because it was solved in a short time and in harsh winter conditions.

By order of the Army Military Council, on December 29, a group of army staff officers and political workers, including battalion commissar Konotop and I (I don’t remember the names of the other comrades), arrived at the headquarters of the 249th Infantry Division to assist in conveying the order to the personnel. We stayed for three days in total and on January 1, 1942 we returned to army headquarters.

The division commander, Colonel Tarasov, listened carefully to the senior group and then spoke about the combat readiness and political and moral state of the division’s personnel. He was a highly cultured and sincere person, a smart and disciplined officer. The conversation was interrupted by a telephone call. Someone was passing on intelligence information, and he smiled and said in response: “Well, that’s good, our assumptions were confirmed,” after which the whole group of officers went to their units. Talking with the soldiers and commanders of the division, we were convinced that the units were seriously preparing to carry out the combat mission, the soldiers were in a good mood, there was a high morale and the desire of all personnel for one goal - to quickly launch an offensive.

The head of the department for work among enemy troops of the army's political department was the senior battalion commissar Nemchinov.

During the period of offensive operations, Nemchinov, together with the employees of the department, put a lot of effort and initiative into carrying out this important work. She did not remain unsuccessful. It is no coincidence that the Nazis surrendered relatively often for this period of the war, and many of them kept with them propaganda leaflets that were published by the 7th department.”

What E.K. Dzoz told about working among enemy troops can be supplemented with several more facts. Skiers and scouts of the 334th Infantry Division alone scattered 350 thousand leaflets and newspapers at enemy locations. This matter was handled well in the 249th Division. During the offensive, a powerful radio installation sent by the political department of the front operated as part of the army, which conducted dozens of transmissions for enemy troops. The program of such radio broadcasts included speeches by prisoners, an appeal from the Soviet command to German soldiers with a call to surrender, etc. Judging by the testimony of prisoners of war, these radio broadcasts were of great interest to enemy soldiers. There were times when they stopped firing, climbed out of their dugouts and listened to the broadcasts.

Our scouts, having scattered leaflets and disguised themselves, more than once observed how German soldiers secretly from their superiors picked up leaflets, read them, and then hid them. Our leaflets were found among those killed and captured, hidden in their belongings or documents. The prisoners, however, said that they were afraid to share the contents of the leaflets with anyone, as this threatened them with execution. When our leaflets were discovered, Hitler’s command gave orders to write on them: “enemy propaganda” and immediately hand them over to officers.

Our scouts, participating in battles from the beginning of the war until the capture of Staraya Toropa, never encountered defectors among the prisoners. The confidence in success created by fascist propaganda, confirmed by easy victories in the West, led in the first months to the fact that we were able to capture prisoners and even documents with great difficulty. The captured prisoners considered themselves doomed, since they had it drilled into their heads that “the Russians shoot all prisoners,” and during interrogations they behaved defiantly and sometimes ridiculously impudently. Thus, one Bavarian prisoner of war, captured on the Western Front, stated during interrogation that they came to us with the war “to restore order.” His statement sounded like a paraphrase of the famous legend about the calling of the Varangians. He said: “Russia is a big country, but you rule it poorly.” This was not the only attack.

The very first blows of our army began to knock down the arrogance of these “invincibles”. The surrender of an entire company to one platoon is an indicator of fear. A critical revision of the version of the “cruelty” of the Bolsheviks, disseminated by the fascists, also began. One of the first defectors who crossed over to us near Staraya Toropa, when asked why he crossed over and did not retreat with others, replied that it was not yet known whether those who retreated would be able to escape. “Our lieutenant spoke about the destruction of prisoners, but I knew that this was a lie. When I was drafted into the army, my father said: “If there is war, then there is captivity, and the Russians kill only those who resist with weapons,” so I gave up my weapons.”

Corporal of the 189th Regiment of the 81st Infantry Division, Herbert Ulyas, when asked how he was captured, said: “When the officer told us that the Russians were coming and that we needed to get out of here as soon as possible, I replied that I wouldn’t go any further, let them come.” Russians, and I will go over to them. There was another corporal and one chief corporal with me. The officer began to rush us. When the Russians showed up, the officer and some of the soldiers ran to the right, and the three of us ran to the left. The officer fired and the bullet hit me in the arm, but I still surrendered.”

Another corporal from the 83rd division said: “We surrendered because we were morally depressed, hungry, freezing and decided that it was better to work in Russia than to fight in such conditions.”

It must be said that letters from Germany also contributed to the voluntary surrender. Thus, the father of Herbert Freilich, a soldier of the 105th Infantry Regiment of the 253rd Division, wrote to his son: “Your great-grandfather was in Moscow in 1812, but he survived by force. And you, as his great-grandson, follow in his footsteps. Try by all means to preserve yourself and it is better to be captured than to be killed.”

However, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers, although they expressed hidden dissatisfaction with the war due to difficult conditions, continued to remain intoxicated by fascist propaganda. In front-line units, discipline was quite strong, cases of indiscipline were rare. The prestige of officers remained high.

All our other political agencies also worked harmoniously and effectively.

As soon as the order to go on the offensive was received, political workers quickly conveyed its contents to every soldier and commander. On January 8, on the eve of the offensive, employees of the army’s political department, after appropriate instructions, departed for formations. During the operation, they were in critical areas, maintaining a high offensive impulse, assisting unit political workers in developing propaganda work and directing all party political work to successfully support the combat orders of the command. Much attention was paid to the management of daily party work in company party and Komsomol organizations, as well as assistance in establishing the supply of ammunition and food.

Party and Komsomol meetings were held in all units and divisions with the question of the role of communists and Komsomol members in the upcoming offensive.

Special mention should be made of the political department of the 249th Infantry Division, which worked flexibly and purposefully throughout the entire operation. Being constantly aware of events, the political department solved specific problems. His representatives in the units not only controlled the work of political workers, but actually ensured the implementation of combat missions in a certain area.

The political department of the army paid great attention to organizing the work of the rear. Considering the enormous importance that roads have in this matter, political agencies of the rear units assisted the command in ensuring the repair and restoration of roads.

Printed propaganda was also good in the army, in particular the work of the army newspaper “The Enemy on the Bayonet”.

The newspaper of the 27th Army “Battle Strike” (later renamed the newspaper “Enemy on the Bayonet”) was created in the last days of June 1941 in Riga. From here she began her journey with units of the 27th Army. Nikolai Semenovich Kassin headed the newspaper “Battle Strike” from the first days of its existence. The main core of the editorial staff consisted of students sent from Moscow to retraining courses for army newspaper workers at the Military-Political School named after. V.I. Lenin and a group of local Latvian journalists.

In the difficult days of the defensive battles of 1941, the newspaper “Battle Strike” wrote on its pages about the stamina, courage and bravery of the Red Army soldiers who defended their Motherland with their breasts. Together with units of the 27th Army, the newspaper staff fought through Latvia, the Leningrad and Kalinin regions.

Neither headquarters nor editorial offices were located in populated areas at this time. Their place was in the forests. All printing equipment was located in specially adapted vehicles. And at first, before supplies were organized, the editors carried all their supplies of newsprint and printing ink with them. These supplies were replenished by evacuated regional newspapers. The staff of the printing house was also staffed by city and regional newspapers. The editors hired typesetters and printers in Ostrov and Lokne, paper in Kholm, and a printing press in Staraya Russa. It was a formative period.

In the fall of 1941, when the front line stabilized and our units were gathering strength for decisive battles, the editorial office “emerged” from the forests and began to locate in populated areas.

Only the editor, his deputy, and secretariat workers were constantly in the editorial office. The rest of the editorial staff alternately stayed in units. If one group of editorial workers returned from units, the next day the other was sent to the front lines. The length of stay of correspondents in the editorial office was, as a rule, three to five days. During this time, they managed to write about everything they saw and learned at the forefront. This system of work allowed the editors to have fresh materials on the combat operations of the units every day. In addition, the editor had a reserve that he could promptly send to one or another unit.

In addition to the materials organized by the staff, the editors received a large number of letters from soldiers and officers who helped the newspaper better cover the combat life of the units. The newspaper published letters from military officers in every issue. Military correspondents worked more actively during the period of defense.

During the days of the offensive, the newspaper “Enemy on the Bayonet” published daily operational reports on the advancement of army units, reports on the military operations of companies, battalions, regiments, on the courage and heroism of soldiers and officers. In order to get from the advancing units to the editorial office, correspondents used any type of transport: passing vehicles, fuel trucks, tanks, ambulances. And it’s not for nothing that the following poems later became popular among front-line journalists:

Are you alive or are you dead?

The main thing is that in the room

You managed to convey the material.

And so, by the way,

There was a “wick” to everything else,

And don't care about the rest.

Sometimes, without having time to write or type a message, the military journalist dictated it directly to the typesetter.

War correspondents also went along with the units, so that later they could convey on the pages of the newspaper the courage and bravery of the soldiers, their hatred of the enemy, and selfless devotion to the Motherland. Often they, together with companies or battalions, went into battle, repelling enemy counterattacks with weapons in hand. And it is no coincidence that Major G. A. Tevosyan (an employee of the editorial office of the newspaper “Enemy on the Bayonet”) was presented with the government award of the Order of the Red Banner by the command of one of the regiments of the 360th Infantry Division. Government awards for military services to the Motherland were given to majors A. Drozd, A. Goncharuk, I. Yandovsky, captains I. Zaraisky,

R. Akhapkin, Lieutenant Colonel V. Titov, who became the editor of the army newspaper “Enemy on the Bayonet” after N. S. Kassin left for the front-line newspaper, and many others.

Covering offensive battles, the newspaper did not limit itself to short information about occupied settlements and trophies. The pages of the newspaper showed the high moral and fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Red Army, and promoted the combat skills of the best soldiers, officers, and units.

The editors of the newspaper “Enemy on the Bayonet” had good contact with

7th branch of the army's political department. Based on Nemchinov’s materials, the newspaper published many interesting materials showing the face of the Nazis. I remember the articles “Battalion of Criminals in the Square” (about one unit of the Nazis, formed from criminals), “Frau and the Herrs are groaning” (about letters to the fascists from the rear of Nazi Germany).

The editorial staff lost many comrades during the war years. Among them are the writer B. Ivanter, deputy editor I. Kaverin, printer V. Antonov and others.

There were also shortcomings in the work of political agencies, mainly due to the lack of experience of the majority of political workers.

An unusually high offensive impulse, courage, dedication and devotion to the socialist Motherland - that was what was truly a massive phenomenon in the 4th Shock Army in those days. I would like to again remember the courageous, persistent and disciplined 249th Infantry Division. During the offensive, it became even more tempered, and many heroes emerged from its ranks. Lieutenant Mishkin is a master of unexpected raids on the enemy, Lieutenant Colonel Nazarenko and Captain Andreev are combat commanders of the vanguard units, battalion commissar Gavrilov, political instructor Cherenkov are real political leaders and leaders.

Here we should remember the kind words of the Chief of Staff

249th Infantry Division Colonel N.M. Mikhailov, now a retired major general. A good organizer and closest assistant to division commander Tarasov, he did a lot for victory. Ordinary soldiers and junior commanders also distinguished themselves, such as Sergeant Velikotny, Sergeant Fartfuddinov, who destroyed dozens of Nazis, and scouts Devyatkin, Malikov, Prilepin and Polyakov, who destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers in just one battle. The group of artillerymen showed remarkable resourcefulness. Under heavy machine-gun fire, they crawled to a 105-mm battery abandoned by the Nazis and, turning their guns, opened fire on the enemy. More than a hundred German shells were fired by brave artillerymen, destroying six machine-gun points and 10 enemy vehicles.

Even when a difficult situation was created, the warriors did not lose their composure, fought bravely and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy. In one of the battles, more than a company of Nazis, supported by machine gun and mortar fire, attacked Lieutenant Dedov’s battery on the flank. The battery commander turned his guns and met the enemy with volleys. As a result, up to 50 enemy soldiers and two mortars were destroyed. The Nazis fled without looking back. The soldiers of the 332nd Infantry Division fought bravely, and the personnel of the 358th, 360th Infantry Divisions and other army formations performed well.

The troops of the 4th Shock Army liberated several hundred settlements from the Nazi invaders. Residents of cities and villages joyfully welcomed the return of their native Red Army.

We helped local organizations restore Soviet and party bodies, organize their economy, and restore order. Local residents provided material assistance to army units. So, in the village Beglovo collective farmers provided the entire battalion with food for two days. In the village of Kolpino, Zaborovsky Village Council, the population gave us (360th Rifle Division) 20 pounds of rye, 86 pounds of potatoes, fodder and allocated 13 horses for its transportation. In the village of Grishino, collective farmers decided to repair bridges and clear roads to ensure the fastest possible advance of troops.

The deputy head of the army intelligence department, and then the head of the department, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Mitrofanovich Bykov, now a retired colonel, shared with me his notes from that time:

“Big frosts (23.12–28°, 26.12–32°) brought great hardship to our units and units, frostbite appeared, and almost the entire headquarters and political department of the army were thrown into units to help the headquarters of the formations organize temporary housing and rest for the troops. In particular, I was sent to Mishchenko in the 334th Infantry Division. We organized the construction of huts and insulated them with spruce branches. They taught soldiers how to make smokeless bonfires “Nodi”. The soldiers, having removed the snow to the ground inside the hut, used it to line the walls outside, and inside they made a fire from two logs 1.5–2 meters long, laying them one on top of the other with a gap of 3–5 cm, lighting a fire in this gap. These logs, smoldering, gave almost no smoke, turned into coals, and the temperature in the hut was above zero and bearable.

At the same time, reconnaissance platoons of rifle regiments and reconnaissance officers of the division headquarters were briefed. The intelligence officer of the division headquarters here was Major Chuikov, a brave, energetic comrade. Subsequently, he was appointed deputy chief of the army's intelligence department. Chuikov was well versed in the situation and, acting through the lake. Volgo, with his scouts, quickly and basically correctly determined the outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense and the location of his firing points, which then contributed to the successful action of the division.

I also remember such a very characteristic episode, testifying to the high fighting spirit of our soldiers and officers, their determination to complete any combat mission. Through the lake Seliger from the village. The heat was to be crossed over the ice by the 360th Division, 48th Rifle Brigade and tanks. The ice turned out to be not strong enough to allow tanks through, and it was decided to increase it. To cover these works and further joint actions in the Zaborye area, the 66th ski battalion was concentrated on January 10. To check its readiness and security, I was sent by the army commander to this battalion.

My all-terrain vehicle failed. I went on foot, then got a horse and rode it 24 km there and back. I drove along roads under enemy control. A little scary, but, in general, nothing. Found a battalion in Zaborye. People are hungry, but the mood is fighting. By midday the battalion reached its area, where it was supposed to receive food. The trucks with food were stuck in the snow on the ice of the lake, and by the time of the performance the battalion had not received food.

Acting on behalf of the army commander (confirming the importance of the events with an all-terrain vehicle, which by this time was familiar not only to the commanders of formations and units, but also to many privates), I obtained from the commander of the engineer battalion a cargo sleigh with horses for food, having organized the reloading, I myself and two soldiers left forward to the battalion. Having passed through the island and reached the western shore of the lake, we carefully moved along the path, which, apparently, had been paved by German patrols. I found a battalion of skiers concentrated at a small forest guardhouse east of Zaborye. Here the battalion commander, a very young captain Andreev, announced the task to the company commanders and gave the combat order to march. Not a word was said about the fact that the soldiers, and even the commanders, were hungry and there was no food; there was no talk about food in the units. Both commanders and soldiers listened to the order with full attention and determination to carry it out. The untimely delivery of products, according to the battalion commander, was obviously caused by some unforeseen circumstances. “I’m sure,” said the battalion commander, “that the food will soon catch up with us.”

The battalion coped with its task perfectly, but the battalion commander died a glorious death while trying to intercept the Surazh-Vitebsk - Vitebsk road.” Further, from the records of Colonel A. M. Bykov, it is possible to reconstruct a picture of the work of army intelligence.

Ski battalions played a major role in reconnaissance throughout the offensive operations. Making extensive use of their maneuverability, small detachments of skiers entered the enemy's rear through forests, captured prisoners and documents, which gave the army command and staff the opportunity to timely unravel the enemy's plans, especially his attempts to bring up reserves or escape from attack to a new line.

All army troops very quickly developed the desire to help intelligence officers study the enemy. The army's intelligence department received a lot of different documents - soldiers' books, letters, diaries, orders. There were cases of delivery of cigarette labels and recipes, and the heads of intelligence of regiments and division headquarters quickly understood the need to systematize the selected documents and correctly indicated the points of their extraction. The study of these documents greatly helped to reveal individual attempts by prisoners, especially officers, to mislead and misinform us.

Using documents, comparing data obtained from documents with the testimony of prisoners, the army's intelligence department was able to correctly assess the enemy and took advantage of this opportunity.

The head of the 3rd information department was Major Kondakov, a very thoughtful, serious intelligence officer, who had an exceptional memory and a very good rule - to write down in a special book, by the way, started by him, the symbols of enemy units and formations - “oak leaf”, “bear” "", "mountain flower", special, characteristic features in the actions of these units, their numbers, weapons, losses and reinforcements, etc. This assisted in assessing the enemy already during the first offensive of the army and was of exceptionally great importance for the study and assessment enemy in the future. Working in close contact with the translator Captain Markov, Major Kondakov, in a tense situation, knew how to promptly inform the division headquarters about new information about the enemy, whenever possible, and continuously kept the headquarters departments and headquarters of the military branches informed about the events in the army’s offensive zone.

A significant role in reconnaissance of the enemy was played by the 2nd branch of the intelligence department - chief Major Glazkov, assistant captain Evstafiev. Through the intelligence officers of this department, the intelligence department promptly, even before the capture of Andreapol, received detailed information about the garrison of the city and the warehouses that were concentrated there.

Lieutenant Colonel A.N. Guselnikov, who was mortally wounded near Velizh by a shell fragment (in December 1942), left a good memory of himself. It seems that there was not a single reconnaissance platoon where the political officer had not visited, explaining the goals and objectives of reconnaissance. Being an experienced intelligence officer himself, he skillfully directed the actions of reconnaissance units.

We also had things that slowed down the work of intelligence, such as, for example, the almost complete absence of translators not only in rifle regiments, but also in division headquarters. This often prevented the command of regiments and divisions from using fresh information about the enemy immediately after capturing prisoners or documents, and sometimes home-grown translators incorrectly translated the testimony of prisoners, which created confusion.

In the rear of the Nazi troops operating in front of the army front, there were several partisan detachments. During the month of its combat activity, up to a hundred people joined the Penovsky detachment. This detachment's combat record included many destroyed enemy vehicles, blown-up bridges, and killed enemy soldiers and officers. The Serezhinsky partisan detachment raided the Nazi garrison in the village of Usadba and destroyed 40 enemy vehicles there.

The headquarters and political department of the army kept close contact with the partisan detachments, assigned them combat missions, and supervised their political work among the population. Specially trained comrades were sent to partisan detachments. While disrupting enemy communications, the partisans also carried out a lot of work among the population.

The activity of the partisans especially intensified when our offensive unfolded. Partisans came out of the forests to provide direct assistance to Soviet units. They guarded the villages from the enemy, who sought to burn everything during their retreat.

The rear of the army did a tremendous amount of work during the operation. There is no need to say much about the complexity of their activities. It can be said directly that the material supply of the army, especially food, and partly fuel and even ammunition, was provided at the expense of the enemy.

On February 13, when the army troops successfully completed the Toropetsk and Velizh operations, I surrendered the army to Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov and went to the hospital.

Many participants in the Taropetsk and Velizh operations were deservedly awarded. The majority of company and battalion commanders and all regimental and division commanders received awards. The commander of the 249th Division, who particularly distinguished himself in battle, received two orders. The awards were received by the commanders of the military branches, the chief of staff of the army Kurasov, and a member of the Military Council Rudakov.

Many years have passed since then, but I am still proud that I had the honor of commanding the 4th Shock Army, which successfully participated in the Toropetsk and Velizh operations and completed the tasks assigned to it in incredibly difficult conditions.

I was admitted to the hospital, which was located in the building of the Agricultural Academy. Timiryazev, the same one where I was treated after being wounded on the Bryansk Front.

The care here was still excellent. Doctors and other medical workers showed me great care and attention.

During my stay in the hospital, I was visited by many military, party and Soviet leaders with whom I had the opportunity to work together or come into close contact through service, party and Soviet work. So, I was visited by comrades P.K. Ponomarenko, K.V. Kiselev and others - from Belarus; A. Yu. Snechkus, M. A. Gedvilas, Yu. I. Paleckis and others - from Lithuania; From the military there were comrades A.V. Khrulev, F.N. Fedorenko and many others.

I received a lot of notes and letters: they had different contents, but they had one thing in common - to quickly achieve victory over the enemy. Many letters expressed a desire to take a personal part in bringing victory closer.

The hospital was often visited by teams of Moscow artists who performed in the club, and for bedridden patients - right in the wards; we had workers from Moscow factories and collective farmers from villages near Moscow. Complete strangers came into the room, but the conversation started, and after 5-10 minutes it seemed that you were talking with someone close to you. Everyone had the same thoughts - to defeat the enemy.

In all this, our party’s concern for people who were temporarily out of action was visible.

Serving in the 4th Shock Army ended the first period of my activity during the war years, associated with the Western direction. After recovery, I was appointed commander of the front operating between the Don and Volga rivers.

On December 13, an offensive began on the right flank of the Soviet troops stationed on the border of Belarus - the Gorodok offensive operation of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan.

“On the morning of December 13,” recalls the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagromyan, - on the day of our offensive it became warmer again, the sky became cloudy, visibility deteriorated to critical, and the commander of the 3rd Air Army, Lieutenant General of Aviation M.P. Papivin reported to me that using aviation would be very difficult. Thus, the artillery task became more complicated... The artillery preparation of the front line, which began at 9.00, lasted two hours, but with interruptions, because there was not enough ammunition. Then the fire was transferred to the depths of the defense. At the same time, the rifle units moved into the attack.”

To stop the advance of the Soviet troops, the Nazi command transferred new reinforcements to Vitebsk - two infantry divisions. Relying on the defensive lines with which Gorodok was fortified, the enemy offered stubborn resistance. Three lines of defense were created on the approaches to the city.

In the direction of the operation, the Soviet command was waiting for frosts that could facilitate the advancement of tanks and other equipment through the swampy terrain. However, the tankmen of the 5th Tank Corps, operating here as part of the 1st Baltic Front, also sought other ways to overcome the swamps. So, if in Rokossovsky’s troops the infantrymen made peculiar “wet foot” skis, then the tankmen of Bagramyan’s 5th Tank Tank mounted special additional plates on the tracks, increasing their width by about 1.5 times. The tanks carried fascines, logs, and additional cables.

The enemy held 1 tank division and 8 infantry divisions on the Gorodok ledge, and also had 120 tanks and 800 guns and mortars here. The 5th Tank Corps already had experience in fighting in this direction, and not entirely successfully. In November 1943, the 24th brigade of the corps, fighting a night battle (one of the new tactical methods of Soviet tank crews), broke into Gorodok. However, it was not possible to consolidate and develop success then.

On December 13, the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Army (which included the 5th Tank Corps) began the Gorodok offensive operation. The 4th Army, unlike the 11th Guards, was able to break through the main line of enemy defense. However, the pace of the offensive soon slowed down - Soviet troops came under fire from 25 enemy batteries, and the actions of the tanks were complicated by the onset of a thaw. But on December 14, the 1st Tank Corps was brought into battle on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army. On December 16, he reached the Bychikha station, where he linked up with the 5th Tank Corps. Thus the encirclement of the enemy's 4 infantry divisions was completed. Skillfully holding back the pressure of enemy tanks trying to break through the encirclement ring, the 41st Tank Brigade of Colonel P.I. Korchagin 5th shopping mall. The tank crews of the 70th Tank Brigade showed particular courage in the battle for the station. Tank of junior lieutenant V.V. Martens, for example, were rammed by an enemy train trying to leave the station.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front I.Kh. Bagromyan wrote: “Despite unsatisfactory weather conditions, which were completely excluded by the actions of our aviation, the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd armies broke through the German defenses on a 15-kilometer section of the front and on December 16 advanced 25 km deep into the enemy’s defenses The 1st and 5th tank corps brought into battle (commanded by generals V.V. Butikov, M.G. Sakhno) surrounded units of the enemy’s 4th infantry division in the Bychikha station area, which was defeated. Until December 20 Soviet troops liberated more than 500 settlements.

Army General I.Kh. Bagromyan also pointed out in his memoirs the failures during the offensive operation. So he noted: “Nevertheless, we did not achieve the full expected successes. The town was not taken, and our plan to encircle the main enemy forces defending on its outskirts was in jeopardy. The enemy skillfully maneuvered and stubbornly resisted. The matter also became more complicated. "the need to withdraw the 1st Tank Corps from the battle. Unfortunately, shortcomings in troop management also emerged. I had to go to the command post of K. N. Galitsky and provide him with assistance on the spot."

Marshal Bagramyan recalls: “The decisive battle for Gorodok began on December 23, 1943. Before the attack, reconnaissance in force was carried out. It identified the most dangerous centers of German resistance. At 11.00 o’clock on December 23, artillery preparation began. After an hour’s artillery preparation, formations of the 11th Guards went on the offensive and the 43rd Army. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out in the trenches and passages of formations. The battle lasted 36 hours and was fought not only during the day, but also at night."

The attack was not easy; the Nazis clung to the city, which was an important strategic railway junction. THEIR. Bagramyan recalled: “The attack of the guards was fierce and unstoppable. Having crossed the riverbed on ice, they broke into the northern outskirts of the city. The battalion of Senior Lieutenant S. Ternavsky was the first to do this. The fighters of the nearby battalion of Senior Lieutenant F. also performed well in the night battle. Merkulova He and his political commander, Captain Rudnev, were inseparably in the ranks of the attackers, inspiring them by personal example.

Having burst into the city, both of these units fought assertively and boldly: breaking through to the flanks and rear of strong points, they fired at them with continuous mortar and machine-gun fire. Suffering heavy losses and fearing isolation and encirclement, the fascist garrisons began to flee. Seeing this and not having free reserves, the enemy command withdrew part of the forces from the eastern front of the city perimeter. This was immediately used by Major General A.I. Maksimov, commander of the 11th Guards Division. He put machine gunners on several tanks assigned to him and threw them on the south-eastern outskirts of the city. In a short but fierce battle, tankers and machine gunners knocked out the Nazis, who were holed up in stone houses turned into pillboxes."

On the evening of December 24, Moscow saluted the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, who stormed the city and the large Gorodok railway station. In total, during the Gorodok operation, 1220 settlements were liberated, more than 65,000 were destroyed and 3.3 thousand Nazis were captured.

On December 24, the town was taken. In the battles near Gorodok, the 5th Tank Corps suffered heavy losses. So, in the 24th brigade only 12 tanks remained in service. The experience of the Gorodok battles also showed that in the conditions of a swampy and wooded area, a timely, quickly and secretly carried out maneuver was of exceptional importance. And what is also very important is continuous artillery support of combat vehicles throughout the entire depth of their operations to suppress enemy defenses. Therefore, here each tank battalion, as a rule, was assigned a battery, and sometimes 2 batteries of self-propelled guns. This made it possible to move forward faster, carry out wide maneuvers, unexpectedly launch frontal and flank attacks on the enemy, and capture large populated areas.

During the Gorodok operation, in the most difficult terrain and weather conditions, overcoming exceptionally stubborn German resistance, front troops liberated over 1,220 settlements, destroyed over 65,000 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 3,300 Nazis, and captured a lot of military equipment and other military equipment.

The main executor of the Gorodok operation I.Kh. Bagromyan recalled: “The Gorodok operation, not large in scale, remained in my memory as one of the most difficult among those carried out under my leadership during the last war. This is due not only to the fact that it was the first one carried out by me as a front commander. "There were many purely objective reasons that determined its complexity. Firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in extremely difficult conditions against large enemy forces, which, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified themselves in an area favorable for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops."

Thus, it is obvious that the offensive operations in the fall - December 1943 were important both militarily and politically.

The Nazis pinned great hopes on the autumn thaw and the lack of roads in this wooded and swampy area. The fascist generals, not without reason, believed that in the mud and slush, Soviet troops would not be able to overcome the defenses and successfully advance along broken dirt roads.

But, despite their calculations, the Red Army's offensive began in October and was waged on a wide front until the end of 1943.

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I. The offensive of the Kalinin (1st Baltic) Front in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Vitebsk directions

Having repelled enemy attacks in the Kursk salient area in July 1943, the Soviet Armed Forces launched large-scale offensive operations. In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the main blow in the summer-autumn campaign was delivered in the southwestern direction with the goal of liberating Donbass and the richest agricultural regions of Left-Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and capturing bridgeheads on its right bank. At the same time, an offensive began in the western direction. This created the preconditions for the transfer of military operations to the territory of Belarus and the advance of the Red Army to the borders of East Prussia and Poland.

Assessing the future prospects of the armed struggle, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, not without reason, believed that an attack by the Soviet fronts in the western direction could lead to serious consequences. In this regard, the Department of Foreign Armies of the Countries of the East, considering the situation in the zone of Army Group Center, emphasized in its conclusions that after the capture of Smolensk, “new operational opportunities...” would open up for the command of the Red Army. Using them, Soviet troops will strive to “break through as far as possible to the west and provide... advantageous starting areas for subsequent operations against the Minsk region...”.

Therefore, even before the end of the summer of 1943, the enemy began preparing numerous echeloned defensive zones and lines. On August 11, A. Hitler gave the order for the immediate construction of a defensive line of strategic importance, the so-called Eastern Wall, which was supposed to run from the Kerch Peninsula along the Molochnaya, Dnieper and Sozh rivers to Gomel, further east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and north of Lake Peipsi along the river Narva. In pursuance of the Fuhrer's instructions, German troops launched intensive work to create long-term and field fortifications, focusing mainly on road junctions and river banks, populated areas and tank-hazardous areas.

In such a situation, the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, having launched the Smolensk (August 7 - October 2) and Bryansk (August 17 - October 3) offensive operations in August, by the beginning of the third ten days of September overcame the stubborn resistance of Army Group Center and reached the north -eastern and eastern borders of Belarus. At the same time, the armies of the Central Front created favorable conditions for the liberation of the southeastern regions of the republic. The results achieved in the western direction, as well as intelligence reports that the enemy had suffered heavy losses here, was demoralized and had no reserves, prompted the Supreme Command Headquarters to decide to continue the offensive to greater depths in order to capture Riga, Vilna (Vilnius - Note. ed.) and Minsk. But first it was planned to defeat groups of German troops in Eastern Belarus. To do this, the troops of the Kalinin Front had to strike in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction in order to cover Army Group Center from the north. From the south, moving towards Gomel and Bobruisk, it was supposed to be covered by the Central Front. The Western Front received the task of operating in the Orsha and Mogilev directions.

It should be said that the Headquarters did not have sufficient grounds for optimistic forecasts and setting such decisive tasks for the fronts. They did not have much superiority over the enemy: in terms of people only 1.1 times, tanks - 2 times, guns and mortars - 1.8 times. Only for airplanes it was noticeable - 3.7 times. In addition, during the previous long offensive, formations and units suffered heavy losses and lacked people, equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and other material resources. The situation was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain, which made it difficult to maneuver and supply troops, and the onset of the autumn thaw. All this had a negative impact on subsequent military operations of the Kalinin (1st Baltic), Western and Central (Belarusian) fronts.

Back in August 1943, long before the end of the Smolensk offensive operation, the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front, Army General A.I. Eremenko received from the Supreme High Command Headquarters the task of developing a preliminary plan for an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction. At the same time, it was planned to launch another attack on the right wing of the front with the aim of capturing the city of Nevel. Such actions made it possible to cut off enemy communications on the adjacent wings of Army Groups “North” and “Center”, disrupt interaction between them and thereby isolate German troops in Belarus from the receipt of reserves.

However, the difficult situation that developed at that time in the western direction did not allow these plans to be implemented as soon as possible. The command of the Kalinin Front was able to return to them only at the end of September, when they began preparing the Nevelsk offensive operation (carried out with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus. - Author's note). In accordance with the plan of Army General A.I. Eremenko, the main role in it was assigned to the 3rd Shock Army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. It was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Nevel, capture the city, and then gain a foothold to the north and west of it in the inter-lake defile. Another blow, in the direction of Gorodok, was delivered by the 4th Shock Army of Major General V.I. Shvetsova.

By October 1943, the 3rd Shock Army operated in a zone 105 km wide. It was opposed by five divisions of the German 2nd Airfield and 43rd Army Corps. Being in a state of defense for six months, they created several echelon defensive lines and lines equipped with trenches, full-profile communication passages, dugouts and wood-earth firing points. The front edge was covered with two strips of minefields, each 40-60 m deep, as well as two rows of wire fences. The total depth of the first strip reached 6-7 km.

The creation of a stable defense with relatively small forces was also facilitated by the wooded, swampy, heavily rugged terrain with an abundance of natural barriers. Nevel itself was bordered on all sides by numerous lakes, separated by several defiles no more than 2 km wide. The enemy dug anti-tank ditches between the lakes, and placed mines and reinforced concrete piers in 5-8 rows on the roads. He turned the settlements on the outskirts of the city into centers of resistance. The Nevel garrison consisted of the 343rd security battalion, the construction battalion of the 43rd Army Corps, rear units and institutions - in total more than 2 thousand people.

The 3rd Shock Army consisted of five rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one tank brigade, seven cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, a fighter anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment and two field fortified areas. The number of rifle divisions averaged 5-6 thousand, rifle brigades - 3-4 thousand people. It was impossible to carry out an offensive with such limited forces throughout the entire zone. Therefore, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow area, the width of which was only 4 km. In a short time, in compliance with camouflage measures, essentially all combat-ready formations, as well as all tanks (54 units) and almost all of the army’s artillery (814 guns and mortars out of 886) were concentrated there. In the rest of the zone, two field fortified areas, an army reserve regiment, four barrage detachments and two poorly staffed rifle divisions took up defense.

The operational formation of the army included: the first echelon (28th and 357th rifle divisions); success development echelon (78th Tank Brigade, 21st Guards Rifle Division, one of whose regiments was supposed to operate in vehicles, three artillery regiments); reserve (46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades). Such echeloning of forces and means was determined by the conduct of combat operations in wooded and swampy areas, when maneuver along the line of contact of the parties was extremely difficult, and the need, in connection with this, to continuously increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The transition of the main forces to the offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began at 5 a.m. on October 6. To carry it out, one rifle company, supported by artillery, was allocated from each of the two divisions of the first echelon. And although the advanced units were unable to capture individual sections of the first trench, their actions made it possible to clarify enemy firing points and identify several mortar and artillery batteries, as well as observation posts. At 8:40 a.m., artillery preparation for the attack began, which lasted 1 hour, 35 minutes and ended with a salvo from two rocket artillery regiments. After this, several groups of 6-8 aircraft of the 211th assault aviation division, Colonel P.M. Kuchma attacked the strongholds of German units at the front line and in the tactical depth.

After artillery and aviation strikes, the 357th and 28th rifle divisions of Major General A.L. Kronik and Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovich went on the attack. Within two hours, units of the 28th Infantry Division penetrated the enemy’s defenses in an area 2.5 km wide and advanced up to 2 km. But the 357th Division did not achieve success: its advanced units were stopped in front of barbed wire barriers by heavy fire from tactical reserves deployed by the enemy command. In order to prevent the strengthening of the group of German troops in the direction of the emerging success and the reduction in the pace of the offensive, the army commander decided to introduce a success development echelon into the battle. At 12 o'clock, the battalions of the 78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya.G. Kochergin) with a landing of machine gunners began to be drawn into the narrow neck in two columns, and behind them - the regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division, whose units moved in vehicles. In each column, in addition to tanks and vehicles, there were artillery and mortar batteries, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as sappers.

At first, the group's pace of advance was slow due to the presence of wetlands and minefields. In the current situation, a responsible task was assigned to sappers. Under artillery and machine-gun fire, they reconnoitred and cleared the road, moving ahead of the tanks. The battalions of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel N.P. also relentlessly followed the combat vehicles. Chebotareva.

Close interaction between tank crews and sappers, rifle units and artillery, and their decisive joint actions ensured success. By 14:00 on October 6, the mobile group overcame the defenses of the German troops and rushed to Nevel at top speed, destroying retreating convoys and artillery and throwing back the surviving small groups of the enemy to the north and south. The tankers went to the river. Six of them forestalled the 2nd Air Field Division, which was retreating towards it, in occupying an advantageous defensive line, crossed over serviceable bridges across the river and captured artillery pieces abandoned by the enemy at firing positions.

Already at 16:00, tank battalions with a landing of machine gunners, having defeated German units on the approaches to Nevel, entered the city, captured the telegraph, station and bridges. They were followed by the advanced units of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. By the end of October 6, Nevel was cleared of the enemy. Soviet troops destroyed up to 600 of his soldiers and officers and captured about 400 prisoners.

In fact, the 3rd Shock Army achieved the goal of the operation within one day, moving forward more than 35 km, which was a great success in conditions of well-prepared engineering defense and wooded and swampy terrain. Without giving the enemy the opportunity to restore the position and control of the troops, the army commander brought the 31st Rifle Brigade into the battle. Destroying retreating enemy groups, by the morning of October 7, it expanded the breakthrough to 10-12 km. By the end of the day, the brigade captured the Pechische line, Lake. Yemenets (south of Nevel). To the north of the city, the 46th Guards Rifle Division, brought into battle on the morning of October 8, under Major General S.I., was entrenched. Karapetyan.

In an effort to prevent the further advance of the 3rd Shock Army in the northwestern direction, the German command began hastily transferring reserves from other areas to the threatened direction - the 58th and 122nd infantry divisions from the Volkhov and Staraya Rusa areas, the 281st security division from near Novorzhev. At the same time, large aviation forces were aimed here, which, operating in groups of 20-40 aircraft, began to strike at the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

On the morning of October 8, the enemy brought newly arrived units into the battle with a total strength of at least two divisions. He delivered the strongest blow west of Nevel against the positions of the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. Here, up to an infantry regiment with twelve tanks, supported by aviation, took part in the counterattack. They managed to get closer to the city at one of the sites. However, the further advance of this group was stopped by units of the 47th Guards Artillery Regiment and the 78th Tank Brigade. With their support, the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment regained its lost position. But even after this, the enemy did not give up hope of breaking through to Nevel, continuously attacking for two days, on October 9 and 10.

Having switched part of its forces to the defensive, the army at the same time tried to develop an offensive. On October 9, the 46th Guards Rifle Division liberated ten settlements and expanded the breakthrough to 20-25 km. The next day, her regiments, having crossed the river. Yemenka, occupied the Opukhliki railway station and reached the river line. Balazdyn. The 28th and 357th Infantry Divisions continued to push back the enemy, as well as the 185th Infantry Division and the 153rd Army Reserve Regiment, which carried out an auxiliary attack. However, in all directions, numerical superiority has already passed to the enemy.

This completed the Nevel offensive operation. During its course, the 3rd Shock Army inflicted serious damage on the German 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions, which lost more than 7 thousand people killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured more than 400 prisoners, 150 guns and mortars, over 200 machine guns, up to 40 different warehouses, a large number of small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. At the same time, the army's losses were relatively small - almost 2 thousand people, of which about 500 were irrevocable. In the 78th Tank Brigade, out of 54 tanks, only seven were lost.

At the same time, the successful offensive in the Nevel area could not compensate for the failures of the Kalinin Front in the direction of the main attack, in the center and on its left wing, where military operations were carried out with the goal of capturing Vitebsk. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated October 16 noted on this matter: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not fulfill their assigned task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10. One of the reasons for this is the disorganization of the offensive... It is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, but by separate armies in separate sectors... which allows the enemy to maneuver with his own forces and create fists for counteraction.” In the October battles, the front lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing. Despite this, he was forced to quickly prepare an offensive in two directions at once - Vitebsk and Gorodok.

After the completion of the Nevel offensive operation, the unification of the right wing of the Kalinin Front until the end of October repelled the attacks of the German troops, which they undertook in order to restore the lost position on the adjacent wings of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. Only at the beginning of November did the 1st Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Kalinin Front) resume its offensive. In the middle of the month, his 4th Shock Army, in cooperation with the 3rd Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Baltic Front), broke through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow area west of Nevel and wedged into his position at 45- 55 km. However, with formations of the 4th Shock Army reaching the Dretuni area, on the distant approaches to Polotsk, and the 3rd Shock Army reaching Pustoshka, their further advance was stopped, as a result of which both armies, numbering up to fifteen divisions, found themselves in a very difficult situation . They occupied an area stretching 100 km from north to south and 55 km from west to east, despite the fact that the width of the breakthrough area at the base of the wedge was only 9-10 km. In essence, this group found itself in a huge “sack” and was under threat of encirclement. The configuration of the line of contact between the parties and two years of war experience indicated that the enemy was unlikely to miss such an opportunity. This was also evidenced by intelligence data, according to which he was preparing a strike with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the resulting ledge.

In such conditions, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan sought to deprive the German command of the initiative in combat operations and forestall it in going on the offensive. To do this, he decided to conduct an offensive operation (received the name “Gorodokskaya”) with the goal of encircling and defeating the enemy group south of Nevel and in the Gorodok area. The headquarters supported the idea of ​​the Front Military Council and transferred the 11th Guards Army to its composition, the commander of which was appointed the former commander of the 3rd Shock Army, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. According to I.Kh. Bagramyan, this army was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kudena, Bychikha station, Gorodok, and to meet it from the “bag” - the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsova in the direction of Bychikha station. As a result, it was planned to encircle six German divisions occupying defenses in the ledge north of Gorodok and defeat them. Subsequently, the 11th Guards Army was given the task of capturing Gorodok and conducting an attack on Vitebsk, bypassing it from the north-west, and the 4th Shock Army was to assist it, moving towards Shumilino from the north. The 43rd Army was planning to attack from the east towards Vitebsk.

The 11th Guards Army included four rifle corps (eleven rifle divisions), the 1st Tank Corps (97 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 10th Guards Tank Brigade (46 tanks), the 2nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (17 tanks) , two breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, three M-31 guards mortar brigades, five M-13 guards mortar regiments, four cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an engineer brigade, three separate sapper battalions. In addition, it was supported by two assault aviation divisions and covered by front fighter aircraft.

The army was opposed by an enemy group consisting of units of the 211, 129, 87th Infantry, 2nd and 6th Airfield Divisions. In the operational depths, the German command concentrated the 20th tank and 252nd infantry divisions. According to intelligence data, in the direction of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy prepared two lines in the main defense line. The first consisted of several echeloned trenches equipped with dugouts, communication passages, wood-earth firing points and engineering obstacles. On the second defensive line there were separate trenches, machine gun platforms, and artillery firing positions. To the east of the Bychikha station, several intermediate lines were created, consisting of separate strongholds located along the highway and railways. A serious advantage of the defending side was the inaccessible terrain, saturated with numerous rivers, streams, and swamps, most of which did not freeze until the end of December.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to deliver the main blow in the center of the army with the forces of the 36th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, two auxiliary strikes were envisaged on the flanks: on the right - by the 29th and 5th Guards Rifle Divisions, united under the command of Major General A.S. Ksenofontova; on the left - the 83rd Rifle Corps. After breaking through the tactical defense zone, it was planned to introduce a mobile group into the battle - the 1st Tank Corps of Major General V.V. Butkova.

The 4th Shock Army, which occupied the defense in a wide zone, could attract only two rifle corps (five rifle divisions), the 5th Tank Corps (91 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 34th Guards Tank Brigade (24 tanks) and 3 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, although significantly weakened in previous battles and numbering about 12 thousand people. It received eight artillery and mortar regiments for reinforcement, including the M-13 regiment, and three separate sapper battalions. An assault aviation division was allocated to support the army.

In accordance with the plan of Major General V.I. Shvetsov, the main blow was delivered from the isthmus between lakes Bernovo and Chernovo in the direction of Bychikha station by the forces of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 5th Tank Corps. Behind them were the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 166th Rifle Division, intended to build on the success. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 34th Guards Tank Brigade operated in the direction of the other attack.

Due to the onset of mud, the start of the operation was postponed several times. Since dirt roads became impassable, ammunition was delivered to firing positions by horse-drawn vehicles, and often by hand. Every day in the 11th Guards Army, up to 2 thousand soldiers were allocated from each division to carry shells, mines and other cargo. This made it possible to accumulate about 1.5 rounds of ammunition for guns and mortars. However, in the 4th Shock Army the supply of artillery did not exceed 0.6-0.9 rounds of ammunition.

The offensive began on the morning of December 13th. From its first minutes, the weather made adjustments to the developed plan. That day it became warmer, the sky became cloudy, fog fell on the ground, which almost completely eliminated the use of aviation. This greatly complicated artillery operations. In the 11th Guards Army, artillery preparation lasted 2 hours. The fire was quite effective against targets on the front line, but artillery and mortar batteries located in the depths of the defense, as well as strongholds in villages hidden from ground observation, were poorly suppressed. Already 7-10 minutes after the rifle units, supported by tanks, went on the attack, the German artillery opened concentrated and defensive fire. Having captured a number of strong points and trench sections in the first position, the Soviet troops were forced to stop.

We had to organize artillery preparation again and then repeat the attack. This took a long time. In addition, the German command brought up reserves, which put up stubborn resistance. By the end of the day, most divisions and regiments had advanced a small distance. For example, the penetration of the 16th Guards Rifle Division (Major General E.V. Ryzhikov) into the enemy’s defense was only 400-600 m. Only the 84th Guards Rifle Division, Major General G.B. Petersa broke through the first position, covering 2 km in a 1.5 km wide strip.

This development of events required Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, with the permission of the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, change the plan of operation and begin organizing the entry into battle of the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division, which was being promoted from the reserve, not where it was foreseen, but in the direction of the emerging success. They received the task of completing the breakthrough of the enemy defense and reaching the Bychikha station area.

The 4th Shock Army operated more successfully on the first day of the operation. After a 1.5-hour artillery preparation of the formation of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodova, with the support of tanks and under the cover of a smoke screen, attacked the enemy and quickly broke through the first position. By the end of the day, the 47th Infantry Division of Colonel G.I. Chernov with the 24th Tank Brigade of Colonel V.K. Wartkina advanced forward up to 5 km, breaking the main line of defense. At the same time, the 90th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel V.E. Vlasova, wedged to a depth of 3 km, reached the second position. The prerequisites were created for the entry into battle of the 5th Tank Corps of Major General M.G. Sakhno and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Oslikovsky.

The relatively successful start of the offensive by the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front caused alarm among the German command. At dawn on December 14, it began to carry out counterattacks against units of the 11th Guards Army, attracting up to an infantry battalion with the support of 7-15 tanks from the 20th Tank Division. Having met their strong opposition, the 16th, 11th and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions, which tried to conduct an offensive in the center and on the left flank, remained at their previous lines. At the same time, they attracted enemy reserves, which made it possible to develop success on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps under Lieutenant General P.F. Malysheva. Here, two tank and one motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Tank Corps were brought into the battle, which, together with the 84th Guards Rifle Division, by mid-day advanced 4 km and cut the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

The further task of the corps was to strike along the highway to the south, in the direction of Gorodok. While carrying out this task, tank units encountered several enemy strongholds. Trying to get around them, the combat vehicles ended up on swampy soil and got stuck in the muddy ground. It took a lot of time to pull them out, and the pace of the offensive slowed sharply. In the afternoon, the army commander brought the 83rd Guards Rifle Division into the battle on the right flank. By 5 p.m., its units reached the rear of the German 211th Infantry Division.

That day, they continued to build on the success achieved the day before by the formation of the 4th Shock Army. Having broken enemy resistance, the 5th Guards Cavalry and 47th Rifle Divisions reached the Nevel - Gorodok railway. Units of the 90th Guards and 381st (Colonel I.I. Serebryakov) rifle divisions, in cooperation with the 70th Tank Brigade, surrounded up to an infantry regiment in the large settlement of Vyrovlya. At the same time, the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General N.B. began an offensive on the left flank of the army. Ibyansky, who covered 1.5 km in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain.

On December 15, both armies, conducting an offensive in converging directions, defeated the 211th Infantry Division. The next morning, the 1st Tank Corps and the advanced detachment of the 1st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.A. Kropotin) of the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Tank Corps with the advanced units of the 90th Guards Rifle Division of the 4th The shock army united in the Bychikha area. As a result, units of the German 83rd, 87th, 129th, 252nd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions, as well as six separate special and security battalions, were surrounded. During December 16 and 17, after refusing to lay down their arms and accept the ultimatum of the Soviet command, they were destroyed. Only small scattered groups were able to break through to the west.

In general, during the five-day battles, the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front defeated the enemy in the entire northwestern part of the town ledge, successfully completing the task of the first stage of the operation. Thus, the breakthrough throat south of Nevel was expanded to 30-35 km, which, in turn, led to a significant improvement in the operational position of the 3rd Shock Army. At the same time, conditions were created for the development of an offensive in the directions of Gorodok and Vitebsk.

In an effort to prevent the enemy’s Gorodok group from strengthening with reserves, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan already on the morning of December 18 assigned new tasks to the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd armies. He continued to assign the main role in the second stage of the operation to the 11th Guards Army. She was ordered to take possession of Gorodok, by the end of the next day to reach the border of lakes Losvido and Convenient, and subsequently to liberate Vitebsk.

In accordance with the decision of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the main blow was delivered in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, to which the 10th Guards Tank Brigade was attached. He had to conduct an offensive along the railway to Bolshoi Prudok (4-5 km north of Gorodok), bypass the latter from the west with the forces of the 83rd and 26th Guards Rifle Divisions and reach the river. Berezhanka. From the east the city was to be bypassed by the 16th Guards Rifle Corps. It was planned that the 5th Guards Rifle Division would attack it from the north.

However, the army spent not one day, as envisaged by the commander of the front troops, but five whole days to complete the task of capturing the Town. The German command attached great importance to holding the city area. Here the defense areas of the 20th Tank, 256th, 129th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions were occupied. On the approaches to Gorodok and on its outskirts, the enemy prepared four defensive lines. Skillfully using the rugged terrain, replete with commanding heights, lakes and rivers, he offered fierce resistance to the Soviet troops who continued the offensive. Already in the first days, the 1st Tank Corps, which had suffered heavy losses in military equipment, had to be withdrawn from the battle. Only towards the end of December 21, the army’s strike force broke through the first two defensive lines. While the advance of the formations operating in the center of its zone was 35 km, on the right flank it did not exceed 15 km. As a result, it was not possible to carry out the plan to encircle and subsequently encircle the enemy group occupying defenses north of Gorodok.

Fighting to break through the third defensive line, which ran along the southern shore of the lake. Kosho, the Gorozhanka and Palminka rivers and was equipped with full-profile trenches, wire barriers and minefields, began on December 23, were fought all day and were extremely fierce, turning into hand-to-hand combat. Unable to withstand the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops, the enemy, under the cover of rearguards, began to retreat.

The commander of the 11th Guards Army planned to resume the offensive at dawn on December 24. However, the Front Military Council decided to carry out a night assault on the Town. The main argument in favor of this decision was that in the dark the main advantage of the enemy - his firepower - was minimized. At approximately two o'clock in the morning, the 83rd, 26th and 11th Guards Rifle Divisions attacked the town from the west and east. German units, after some consternation caused by the suddenness of the attack, put up strong resistance on both directions with fire and counterattacks using tanks and assault guns. After the fighting on the western and eastern outskirts of the city reached its highest intensity, the 5th Guards Rifle Division began its assault from the north. During the night and morning, the enemy garrison was cut into groups isolated from each other. Gradually his resistance began to weaken. By noon, the town was completely cleared of the enemy, who lost up to 2.5 thousand soldiers and officers in battles for it. In addition, Soviet units captured 29 guns, 2 tanks, 48 ​​mortars, 41 vehicles, many small arms and ammunition.

After the liberation of Gorodok, the front troops continued the offensive without pause in order to capture Vitebsk on the move by December 30-31. By the evening of December 25, formations of the 11th Guards Army, having advanced 4-5 km, reached the first (outer) line of defense of Vitebsk, which ran 25 km from it along the line Belodedovo, Sloboda, Borovka, the Zaluchye, Shpaki junction. 6-8 km to the south there was a second line, stretching from Ovary through Gorodishche to lake. Losvido. The third line was installed 5-8 km from the city. German troops especially thoroughly strengthened the roads leading to Vitebsk from Gorodok, Sirotino, and Polotsk. In addition, the enemy command significantly strengthened the Vitebsk direction by transferring units from other sectors here. By December 26, the 3rd and 4th airfield, 256th and 197th infantry divisions, battle groups of the 87th, 211th and 129th infantry divisions, and part of the forces were operating against the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies 12th Infantry Division, a separate tank battalion, a division of heavy assault guns, an artillery division of the RGK, a number of other separate units and subunits.

The front had a slight advantage in infantry, but was inferior to the enemy in the number of tanks. In addition, the problem of supplying it with ammunition was never resolved, since the distance between warehouses and artillery firing positions began to be 180 km. The divisions and regiments, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were not replenished with people. The combat potential of the front's strike group has significantly decreased, and the enemy's ability to repel its offensive, on the contrary, has increased.

The 11th Guards Army delivered its main blow along the Gorodok-Vitebsk highway, on which the German command concentrated its main defensive efforts. At the same time, in order to mislead the Soviet troops, it deliberately withdrew its units from the northern shore of the lake. Losvido, located west of the highway. After army intelligence established the absence of the enemy in this area, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to bypass its strongest strongholds along the ice of the lake, the length of which from north to south was about 8 km. For this purpose, the 11th and 18th Guards Rifle Divisions, as well as a regiment of the 235th Rifle Division, were allocated.

Without encountering enemy resistance, units of three divisions, moving in columns, crossed almost the entire lake. However, when there were several hundred meters left to the southern shore, they were met by concentrated fire from guns, mortars and machine guns. As a result of shell and mine explosions, the ice on the lake was destroyed, and extensive polynyas and areas of open water formed on its surface. The result of the tragedy that unfolded was the death of virtually the entire group. No more than 30 people were able to escape.

After this, the solution to the problem of capturing Vitebsk by the new year, 1944, was unlikely. And indeed, despite the efforts made, the formations of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies until the end of December 1943 covered only 5 to 7 km in certain directions, after which they went on the defensive. This completed the Gorodok offensive operation. During its course, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of encirclement by the enemy of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, liberated over 1220 settlements, captured 3.3 thousand German soldiers and officers, and captured a lot of military equipment and military equipment.

In his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan called this operation “one of the most difficult” among those that were carried out under his leadership during the war. He motivated this by the fact that “firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in extremely difficult conditions against large enemy forces, which, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified themselves in an area favorable for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops. Due to bad weather and limited visibility, the operation took place with very little participation from aviation and artillery. Secondly, we did not have a significant superiority over the enemy, especially in the second phase of the operation. The possibilities for maneuvering troops, especially mobile formations, during the entire operation were also extremely meager. Thirdly, the front, having a powerful defensive system in front of it, was extremely poorly supplied with ammunition and fuel. Fourthly, our troops carried out active offensive operations at a time when our neighbors - the 2nd Baltic Front to the north and the Western Front to the south - having failed to achieve success in the offensive, went on the defensive.”

In general, in the last months of 1943, the 1st Baltic Front was forced to conduct an offensive in extremely difficult conditions, essentially at the limit of its strength. As I.Kh. Bagramyan later noted: “The setting of tasks that exceeded the capabilities of the troops in scope was a kind of method, a special technique of the leadership, aimed at achieving maximum activity of our offensive actions in Belarus...”. This caused large losses of people at the front. During October - December they amounted to 168,902 people, including 43,551 people - irrevocably.

Considering further prospects for armed struggle, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the northwestern and southwestern directions during the winter and spring of 1944. At the same time, the troops operating in the central sector of the Soviet-German front were assigned a supporting role. They were supposed to attract the main forces of Army Group Center and prevent them from maneuvering to strengthen the Wehrmacht group in Right Bank Ukraine. To this end, the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts were given the task of continuing the offensive operations begun in the fall of 1943 to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus and reach the line of Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, river. Bird. The total depth of the planned advance to the west did not exceed 50-150 km. At the same time, front-line and army formations had to operate in the previous grouping of forces and means, without receiving additional reinforcement from Headquarters, all of whose reserves were deployed near Leningrad, Novgorod and Ukraine.

The immediate task of the 1st Baltic Front was still to capture Vitebsk, which was considered by the command of Army Group Center as the “gateway to the Baltic states.” Attaching great importance to holding the city, it concentrated the 3rd Tank Army on the approaches to it, which included fifteen divisions, including one tank, seventeen separate field artillery divisions of the RGK, six mortar battalions, five brigades of assault guns, two battalions of tanks. Tiger" and two divisions of heavy anti-tank guns.

By the beginning of January 1944, the front united the 4th Shock (Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev), the 11th Guards (Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky), the 39th (Lieutenant General N. E. Berzarin), 43rd (Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev) and 3rd Air (Lieutenant General of Aviation N.F. Papivin) armies. In accordance with the plan of the new offensive operation, it was planned to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies. They were opposed by up to eight to nine enemy divisions. Taking into account the low staffing of formations and units of both armies with people, the Military Council of the Front ordered the creation in all rifle regiments of one assault battalion, reinforced with tanks (eight to ten units), two to three batteries of 45-mm and 76-mm guns, one to two guns 122 mm caliber and a sapper company.

Combat operations in the Vitebsk direction resumed on January 3 with the 4th Shock Army going on the offensive. During the day, its formations broke through the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 5 km and reached the line of the Pestunitsa and Zaronok rivers. Here their advance slowed down, and the next day, as a result of stubborn resistance from parts of the German 9th Army Corps, it was completely stopped. The 84th and 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major Generals E.V. Dobrovolsky and I.S. Bezugly) from the 39th Army, which carried out an auxiliary attack, also failed to achieve success. Their penetration through the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the west was eliminated by counterattacks of German units.

Only on January 6, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army together with the brigades of the 1st Tank Corps joined the offensive of the 4th Shock and 39th Armies. In some areas they were able to overcome 1-2 km, however, the very next day, as a result of heavy enemy artillery fire, they suffered heavy losses in people and tanks. Thus, in the 89th Tank Brigade, 43 out of 50 combat vehicles were disabled.

The advance of the advancing formations and units was restrained by tank ambushes and individual tanks that frequently changed firing positions, heavy mortars and guns deployed for direct fire, which were widely used by the enemy command. Where Soviet troops achieved success, the enemy immediately launched counterattacks. For example, on January 8, the 29th Infantry Division, Major General Ya.L. Shteiman was liberated by Zapolye, but in the evening German units forced her to leave this settlement.

Until January 18, the divisions of the 4th Shock, 11th Guards, 39th and additionally brought into the battle 43rd armies fought heavy battles. They managed to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Vitebsk, reach the closest approaches to the city, cut a section of the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway and envelop the Vitebsk group of the German 3rd Tank Army from the north-west. But this time the troops of the 1st Baltic Front were unable to capture the city. Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan again had to give the order to temporarily stop the offensive “in order to better prepare and replenish the troops...”.

To carry out the next offensive operation, by decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, troops were involved not only from the 1st Baltic Front, but also from the Western Front. It was planned that their strike groups, concentrated on adjacent wings, would strike in directions converging on Zaozerye (southwest of Vitebsk), surround the enemy in the Vitebsk salient and in a short time complete his defeat. From the 1st Baltic Front, the 4th Shock and 11th Guards Armies were involved in the operation, which were supposed to operate in the same zones, practically without reinforcement with additional forces and means. Only rifle companies and battalions of the first echelon were slightly replenished with people, and even those were at the expense of the rear and special units of regiments and divisions.

The fighting began on February 3. On that day, formations of the two armies attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense in a zone up to 12 km wide, in some directions they penetrated 5-6 km deep and captured heavily fortified strongholds - Volkovo, Zapolye, Gurki, Toporino, Kislyaki, Mashkino, Bondarevo. On this occasion, the commander of the German 3rd Tank Army, Colonel General G. Reinhardt, in his order, was forced to admit that “today’s very difficult combat day, unfortunately, brought us a significant loss of territory.” In an effort to make a difference in the situation, he immediately began to move infantry units, tank battalions, heavy anti-tank and mortar divisions, batteries of assault guns, and engineer units to the threatened direction. In the following days, the reserves of Army Group Center also began to arrive here.

After this, the advantage in forces and means passed to the side of the enemy. The 4th Shock and 11th Guards armies simply did not have the real capabilities to carry out the assigned task. Until mid-February, their rifle formations and units repelled numerous counterattacks by German troops, trying to hold the captured lines. Gradually, positional forms of struggle began to dominate in the actions of the parties, and soon the situation in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front stabilized. It remained almost unchanged until the summer of 1944.

Valery Abaturov,
Leading Researcher at the Scientific Research Institute
Institute (military history) of the Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Candidate of Historical Sciences



January 31 marked the 110th anniversary of the birth of the Soviet military leader, army general, twice Hero of the Soviet Union A.P. Beloborodov. The name of Afanasy Pavlantievich is forever inscribed in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Dozens of newspaper and magazine articles have been written about him, as well as biographical information in many encyclopedias. Finally, many readers are familiar with his books “Through Fire and Taiga”, “Feat of Arms”, “Breakthrough to Harbin”, “Always in Battle”. It seems that we know everything about the life and work of A.P. Beloborodov. But…
The author of these lines focused on unknown and little-known pages of the army commander’s biography. Russian and Belarusian archives, memoirs of the front commanders under whom Beloborodov fought, the army commander’s comrades and other little-known sources helped in this.
In July 1941, Colonel A.P. Beloborodov was appointed commander of the 78th Infantry Division of the Far Eastern Front. In early November, this division arrived on the Western Front, where, as part of the troops of the 16th Army, it took part in the battle of Moscow. Units of the division destroyed dozens of tanks of the 4th German Tank Group on the approaches to Moscow. For the heroism shown during the defense of the city of Ruza and the Snigiri railway station, this division was transformed into the 9th Guards on November 27, and A.P. Beloborodov was awarded the rank of “Major General”
Few people know the assessment of the combat operations of the 78th Division by the enemy, who experienced the steadfastness of the Belorodovites first-hand. The report on the battles of the 4th Panzer Group in the period from October 14 to December 5, 1941 contains the following lines: “Behind each water line, the enemy is lurking in his deep, highly branched trenches and is waiting for the attackers. Everywhere where tanks can pass, mines are laid... Small villages along the highway have been turned into real fortresses...".
But our focus will be on the military activities of Afanasy Beloborodov on Belarusian soil in 1943-1944.
With the name of General A.P. Belo-
Borodov is associated with the liberation of Vitebsk on June 25, 1944, when the troops of his 43rd Army of the Baltic Front united in the Gnezdilovichi area with the troops of the 39th Army of General I.I. Lyudnikov of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In the Vitebsk “cauldron” there were over five divisions and many individual units and subunits of the 3rd German Tank Army. The total number of German soldiers and officers who fell into this inferno was more than 50 thousand people.
Captured commander
General Gollwitzer of the 53rd Army Corps admitted: “It was a beautiful and talented military operation. The Russian army recognized our weak positions."
Few people know that long before the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Army under the command of Afanasy Pavlantievich took an active part in the Gorodok operation, and after the liberation of Vitebsk, the 43rd Army also under his command actively participated in the Polotsk operation .
The Gorodok operation of 1943 was an offensive operation of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Army General Bagramyan in the Gorodok area of ​​the Vitebsk region on December 13-31, 1943. It involved the 11th Army, units of the 4th Shock, 43rd, 3rd Air Armies, 1st, 5th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. It was planned to defeat the enemy's Gorodok grouping with counter strikes from the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Army in the direction of Bychikha station, eliminate the enemy's bridgehead, the so-called Gorodok ledge, and advance in the direction of Vitebsk.
The main blow from the northeast was delivered by the 11th Guards Army of Galitsky, and the auxiliary blow, from the west, under the base of the Ezerischen ledge, was delivered by the 4th Shock Army. This task was assigned to the 2nd Guards Rifle and 5th Tank Corps.
45 years after the Gorodok operation, A.P. Beloborodov recalled: “By December 9, units of the 2nd Guards Corps had fully completed preparations for the Gorodok operation. We received the corresponding order with a clarified combat mission and were only waiting for the order indicating the day and hour of the offensive. On December 13, before dawn, such an order was received. At 10.45, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the corps went on the offensive and broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Malaya Dvornya, Shatiki sector.”
In general, the division advanced 4-6 km that day. The combat success of the 47th Division immediately affected the entire offensive zone of the 2nd Guards Corps. And the 47th Division, continuing to advance to the east, crossed the Nevel-Vitebsk railway on December 15 and, turning its front to the south, covered the main forces of the corps from enemy counterattacks from Gorodok.
The Gorodok ledge was defended by German troops of the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center and the southern wing of the 16th Army of Army Group North. In order to prevent a breakthrough of the front and the connection of Soviet troops with the Belarusian partisans, the German command transferred 2 infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and 1 tank divisions from the southern wing of Army Group Center.
On December 13, the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, with the support of tanks and artillery, began an assault on enemy positions. The troops of the 4th Army, which included the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of General Beloborodov, broke through the main line of enemy defense. Many years later, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, I.Kh. Bagramyan, would write: “In the zone of action of the 4th Shock Army, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of General A.P. Beloborodov distinguished itself, and especially the 47th Nevelsk Rifle Division of Colonel G.I. .Chernova. With a daring strike, together with the tankers of the 24th Tank Brigade, she did not give the enemy the opportunity to gain a foothold on the intermediate lines and by the end of the day she had completely completed her task.”
On December 14, the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division were brought into battle on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army. On December 16, the 1st Tank Corps reached the Bychikha station area, where it linked up with the 5th Tank Corps of the 4th Shock Army. Units of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General Beloborodov captured about 750 prisoners and 80 guns. 98 mortars, including 18 six-barreled ones, 32 tanks, 8 self-propelled guns, over 650 machine guns, 55 various warehouses and many other military equipment.
In those battles, the 87th, 129th and 211th German infantry divisions were defeated, and the 252nd and 20th tank divisions suffered heavy losses. Some of their units and subunits, having broken out of the encirclement, hastily rolled back to the south, to Gorodok.
By December 20, more than 500 settlements had been liberated. On December 24, troops of the 11th Guards Army, relying on the successful combat operations of units of the 4th Shock Army and primarily the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, captured Gorodok and came close to the enemy’s Vitebsk fortified area. As for the 4th Shock Army, it reached the Vitebsk-Polotsk railway on a broad front.
As a result of the Gorodok offensive operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front advanced 60 km, defeated 6 enemy infantry and 1 tank divisions, eliminated the Gorodok ledge, and cut the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway. In addition, conditions were created for an offensive in the Vitebsk region.
In May 1944 - on the eve of Operation Bagration - Afanasy Pavlantievich was appointed commander of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. It included the 1st Rifle Corps consisting of the 179th, 306th and 357th divisions, the 60th Rifle Corps consisting of the 235th and 334th divisions, the 92nd Rifle Corps (145th and 204th 1st Rifle Division), 156th Rifle Division, 155th Fortified Region, 10th and 39th Guards Tank Brigades, 105th Tank Regiment and other units.
Few people know that Lepel’s release is associated with his name.
Having defeated enemy groups breaking through from east to west, units of the 1st Rifle Corps and an army mobile group rushed into Lepel and by June 28 completely cleared the city of German troops. Irrepressible rage filled the hearts of the soldiers of the 43rd Army when they learned that the Nazis had killed about 40 thousand Soviet citizens in the concentration camp set up in Lepel.
For skillful leadership of army troops in breaking through enemy defenses in the area of ​​Vitebsk, Polotsk and crossing the Western Dvina River, on July 22, 1944, Lieutenant General Beloborodov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, the name of Army Commander-43, Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov, is associated with the liberation of many settlements in the Vitebsk region in 1944, including Kozyan, Germanovichi, Berezino, Plissa, Glubokoe, Dokshitsy and, of course, Vitebsk.
The first volume of “Encyclical History of Belarus” notes that in 1936 A.P. Beloborodov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Unfortunately, this publication does not say that in 1926 he graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod infantry courses, and in 1929 - from the Leningrad military-political courses named after. F. Engels. The same publication states that since 1957, Afanasy Pavlantyevich served as head of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The interested reader asks the question, where was A.P. Beloborodov in 1945-1957?
Let's try to answer. After the war, he continued to command the 1st Red Banner Army in the Far East until March 1946. Then Afanasy Pavlantievich in 1946-1947 was the commander of the 5th Guards Army in the Central Group of Forces, assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Central Group of Forces. In 1947, Afanasy Pavlantievich was appointed commander of the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Liaodong Peninsula, in the area of ​​Port Arthur and Dalniy.
Since 1953, Beloborodov headed the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces, was the head of the Higher Rifle-Tactical Advanced Courses for Officers of the Soviet Army "Vystrel" named after B.M. Shaposhnikov, and in 1954-1955 - the chief military adviser to the Ministry of National Defense of Czechoslovakia.
Since October 1955, he served as commander of the Voronezh Military District. Since May 1957, A.P. Beloborodov was not only the head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but also a member of the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The military activities of General Beloborodov were highly appreciated by the famous Soviet commanders G.K. Zhukova, K.K. Rokossovsky, A.M. Vasilevsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan and others.
Afanasy Pavlantievich was an honorary citizen of Irkutsk, Vitebsk and Istra.
In terms of awards, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General A.P. Beloborodov was not inferior and even slightly superior to many marshals of the Soviet Union. He was awarded five Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, five Orders of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st and 2nd degree, Kutuzov 2nd degree, Patriotic War 1st degree, “For service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3- th degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.
According to his will, Afanasy Pavlantievich was buried at the 41st kilometer of the Volokolamsk Highway - where in November 1941 the soldiers of his division heroically fought to defend Moscow.

Emmanuel IOFFE, Doctor of Historical Sciences