Fertility is of great importance for every country. If this indicator is low in a state, then a threat is created to the territorial integrity of the country. High and low birth rates improve and guarantee the preservation of the nation. Fertility statistics allow you to track the necessary indicators.

Fertility is also an indicator of a country's level. In poor countries, where people earn a low income, usually a high level, few children are born. In developed countries, where living conditions are good, the population is not afraid to give birth to several babies.

Population dynamics in the Russian Federation

The table shows birth rate statistics in Russia by year. It can be used to judge how natural population growth has changed:

Year	Number of children born	Total population
1927	4 688 000	94 596 000
1939	4 329 000	108 785 000
1950	2 859 000	102 833 000
1960	2 782 353	119 906 000
1970	1 903 713	130 252 000
1980	2 202 779	138 483 00
1990	1 988 858	148 273 746
2000	1 266 800	146 303 611
2010	1 788 948	142 865 433
2015	1 940 579	146 544 710
2016	1 888 729	146 804 372

To find out which gender of children are born more, there are statistics on the birth rate of boys and girls. Let's look at the indicators for the city of Novopolotsk. In 2014, about five hundred female children and almost six hundred male children were born. 2015 was marked by the birth of 595 boys and 537 girls. In other settlements the situation is approximately the same.

Girls Fertility Statistics and boys means that more male babies are being born.

1. Chechen Republic.
2. Ingushetia.
3. Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

The worst indicators are:

1. Tyumen region
2. Pskov region
3. Tula region

The total number continues to decrease, despite the fact that mortality did not exceed the birth statistics in Russia in 2016. At the same time, the state has reached a higher level. Fertility statistics for 10 years show that Russia ranked 63rd in the world (data for 2016) in terms of natural population growth. The table shows the main reasons why Russians died (from January to August 2016):

	Number of people (in thousands)
	716,7
	198,2
	13,5
	5,7
	16,3
	7,2
Infections	21,8

Fertility statistics for 2016 show that the population density in the Russian Federation is 8.6 people per 1 km². This is one of the lowest rates in the world. Huge areas are simply empty. Villages and small towns have died out over the past 20 years, and some areas have never been inhabited.

The situation in the world at the beginning of 2017

According to statistics for the first quarter of 2017, the world birth rate increased by almost 50 million people. Every day several hundred thousand babies are born in the world. E this fact can be checked using the earth's population counter in mode.

Fertility and mortality rates for 2017 in Russia

Russia has always been the largest territorial state in the world. However, the population here is inexorably declining. The country is experiencing a demographic crisis. According to fertility statistics in Russia, at the beginning of 2017, fewer children were born compared to the previous year.

Population growth in Belarus and Ukraine

Fertility statistics by year in Ukraine:

Year	Number of children born	Total population
2000	no data	48 663 600
2005	426 100	47 100 462
2010	497 700	45 782 592
2015	411 800	42 759 300

Below is a diagram with fertility statistics in Ukraine, as well as mortality by year (over the last 25 years). It clearly shows in which years the country's population grew and in which it decreased.

Fertility statistics in Belarus by year:

Year	Number of children born	Total population
2000	93 691	9 988 000
2005	90 508	9 664 000
2010	108 050	9 491 000
2015	119 509	9 481 000

Boy Birth Statistics in the Republic of Belarus is given in numbers in the graph below. Slightly more male babies are born than female babies. But recently the number of boys born has decreased slightly. As for the size of the male and female population, judging by the table, there are more men than women in Belarus.

In recent years, the population in the Russian Federation and Ukraine has decreased, while in Belarus it has increased; birth and death statistics in Russia confirm this fact.

Why does the death rate exceed the birth rate?

Izvestia reader Igor DROZDOV from Germany “I’m surprised by the persistence of the “experts”. They insist that the population decline in Russia can only be compensated by migrants. Why does the mortality rate exceed the birth rate? Is it because the majority of the people, roughly speaking, have nothing to eat, that having a child is an unaffordable luxury “We have to think about how to give our citizens the opportunity to earn a decent living, for themselves and for their children, and the “experts” took the position: at least if you stop everything here, we’ll bring in foreigners!”

Demoscope knows more.

We think that “there is nothing to eat, that having a child is an unaffordable luxury” not only in Russia, which is far from Igor Drozdov, but also in Germany, which is close to him. Just as in Russia 1.2 children are born per woman, so in Germany - apparently, the Germans with Igor Drozdov who joined them also do not have enough grub. Isn't it time for Mr. Schroeder - or whoever is on their farm - to think about how to give his citizens the opportunity to earn a decent living, for themselves and for their children? If necessary, Demoscope can even now write a letter to Die Welt or, there, in Hamburger Abendblat, give advice.

And, most importantly, there is someone to follow by example. For example, the richest country is Niger. There's more than enough grub. The gross national product - and even taking into account purchasing power parity - is over 700 bucks per capita per year, not like $23-24 thousand in Germany. Naturally, Nigerians have the luxury of having children. They give birth to more than 7 of them per woman. After this, who wouldn’t be surprised by the persistence of the “experts”? Instead of pointing the Russians to this positive example, they came up with nothing better than importing foreigners - an easy way that can irritate sensitive skinheads.

It is clear that, after reading the letter from a Russian-German friend, Demoscope decided to no longer have anything to do with the notorious “experts” and to properly understand the question posed in the letter about why the mortality rate in Russia still exceeds the birth rate. And first of all, he thought about what this expression meant, so often repeated by real, without any quotation marks, experts writing letters to various newspapers. And this is what we managed to come up with.

If the number of deaths is greater than the number of births, then everyone will say that the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate, and will be understood. After all, this is as obvious as the fact that the Sun revolves around the Earth. Meanwhile, in Demoscope’s soul, which has not yet been completely cleansed of the previous filth, the persistent “expert” suddenly appears again and says: “That’s not true. The number of births and deaths depends, of course, on the birth and death rates, but it also depends on the age composition population. More young people - more births; more elderly - more deaths. And this is with the same age-specific indicators of fertility and mortality, and we must take the age ones. In post-war Russia, the number of deaths for the first time exceeded the number of births in 1992, and of course, it’s understandable , who is to blame for this. But if the age pyramid of the Russian population had not been distorted by wars and other well-known events of the first half of the last century, then such an excess would have been revealed much earlier. For example (says the “expert”), if our age structure would have been the same as that of the Swedes who had not fought for a long time, then with the same age-specific birth and death rates that we actually had, the number of deaths in Russia would have exceeded the number of births already in 1969. And from then on, instead of natural population growth, there would be a natural population decline, increasing every year, as evidenced by Figure 1. And who is to blame for this is no longer so clear.”

Figure 1. Actual natural population growth in Russia and its natural increase with Russian age-specific levels of fertility and mortality and the Swedish age structure in the corresponding years

“And in general,” the “expert” does not calm down, “you should at least read some book. After all, any student should know that measuring the ratio of fertility and mortality and its influence on population changes, regardless of the age structure, was invented a long time ago - and not just anywhere, but in Germany, where such business letters are written to us, - a special indicator. It is called the “net population reproduction rate" and shows how many girls from the generation of daughters replace one woman of the mother’s generation at the existing level of fertility and mortality... And as soon as this number drops below one, we can say: mortality exceeds birth rate, the generation does not reproduce itself.

Peculiarities of the age structure can mask this excess for a long time; natural population growth can persist for a long time, but if the net coefficient always remains below one, sooner or later natural population growth will be replaced by its natural decline. In post-war Russia, such an excess appeared for the first time already in 1964 and, apart from the three “perestroika” years - 1986, 1987 and 1988, it has persisted for almost 40 years, as can be seen by looking at Figure 2. You can also see there that and Germany was not far behind Russia in terms of timing - its mortality rate began to exceed its birth rate in 1970 - but in terms of the depth of the decline in the indicator it was far ahead of it."

Figure 2. Net population replacement rate in Russia and West Germany since 1960

And all this time, Igor Drozdov from Germany was silent, like a fish, and did not bother the Izvestia newspaper with his piercing letters. And how good his letter would have looked on the pages of this newspaper in those years, remembered for unprecedented food abundance.

But now that these nice shaven-headed guys have appeared, a sign of an awakening national consciousness, he can no longer remain silent. With his letter from afar, he must help find the true culprits of what is happening, and these, of course, are the persistent “experts”.

In 2017, experts, relying on official Russian statistics, said that Russia again found itself in a demographic hole. The reason for this is that the country’s female population is aging, and young people are afraid to have children due to the unstable economic situation and tensions in the political arena.

After the difficult nineties, another population crisis was observed in Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century and only in 2008 it gradually began to decline. Since 1992, only by 2013 the number of citizens of the Russian Federation began to increase. But already in 2014, a new wave of demographic decline began.

Demographic peaks and pits

A demographic hole is usually called an extremely low population indicator, a significant decrease in the birth rate simultaneously with an increase in mortality. Experts attribute all modern problems with the stable reproduction of the population of Russia to the sixties of the last century, when after the post-war peak the birth rate decreased. The situation worsened in the eighties, when, along with a decrease in the birth rate, the mortality rate increased.

In the twentieth century, Russia experienced more than one demographic crisis. The events of the First World War and the Civil War did not cause significant damage to the population, since at that time the birth rate in our country was higher than in Western countries. Further collectivization and famine led to the collapse of the rural way of life for most citizens, and the number of urban residents increased. Many women became hired workers, which undermined the institution of the family. As a result of all these events, the birth rate fell.

Mass mobilization in 1939 also contributed to a decline in the birth rate, since extramarital affairs were frowned upon and early marriage was the normal state of affairs. All this does not yet fully fit the definition of a demographic hole, but the population began to decline even then.

As a result of the post-war famine and the forced deportation of certain peoples, extramarital relationships spread. The birth rate dropped to 20-30% of the pre-war level, while in Germany the rate remained consistently high - 70% of the pre-war years. After the war, a population explosion occurred, but it was unable to stabilize the situation and restore indirect and actual losses.

Period from the late eighties to the present

According to statistical data, from the beginning of the 50s to the end of the 80s, there was a stable natural population increase, but still the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia had the best rates. In Russia itself, the birth rate has dropped below the 1964 level.

A slight improvement occurred in 1985, but a few years later another demographic hole was recorded. The sharp decline in population in the nineties was the result of the simultaneous overlap of several unfavorable trends. Firstly, the birth rate fell and the mortality rate increased, and secondly, others also had their influence, social and crime, poverty and so on.

The consequences of the demographic hole of the 90s were overcome relatively recently. In the Russian Federation, the rate of population reproduction increased for the first time only in 2013. This was facilitated by active government policy, support for young families and other measures, which will be discussed in more detail below.

In 2014, Russia again suffered a demographic crisis. Thus, the demographic pitfalls (period 1990-2014) are one big fall with an attempt to overcome the crisis, but another failure.

Causes of the demographic crisis

Crises of population reproduction become a reflection of the existence of certain problems in society. The demographic hole is a consequence of social, economic, medical, ethical, information and other factors:

1. General decline in fertility and increase in mortality in developed countries, regardless of quality of life.
2. Replacement of the previously existing traditional social model of society with new trends.
3. General decline in living standards.
4. Deterioration of the environmental situation.
5. Decrease in the general level of health of the population.
6. Increased mortality.
7. Massive alcoholism and drug addiction.
8. State refusal to support health care policies.
9. Deformation of the structure of society.
10. Degradation of family and marriage institutions.
11. An increase in the number of families consisting of one parent and a child or childless couples.
12. Negative impact of new technologies on public health.

Scientists are divided in their opinions about which reasons are dominant in a particular case. Demographer S. Zakharov argues that negative population growth rates are observed in any country at a certain stage of development. Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences S. Sulakshin considers the main reasons for the demographic pitfalls to be the replacement of traditional Russian values ​​with Western ones, the spiritual devastation of the Russian people, and the lack of a common ideology.

Signs of demographic problems

Demographic gaps in Russia and the world are usually defined by the following features:

1. Declining birth rate.
2. Declining birth rate.
3. Decrease in life expectancy.
4. Increasing mortality rate.

Immigration and emigration

The topic of demography is associated with the concept that from Russia to other countries has a negative impact on the population. But, fortunately, all mass emigrations are already a thing of the past. After the collapse of the Union, the number of those leaving decreased and reached a minimum by 2009. Starting next year, the number of immigrants began to increase.

At present, a sharp increase in emigration is unlikely because few people leaving can obtain citizenship in their host countries. This does not mean that the number of people wishing to leave has decreased, it’s just that citizens are faced with quotas in other countries and do not want to live abroad “on a bird’s license.”

As for the pace of immigration, in Russia the number of people entering has long exceeded the number of people leaving. Throughout the twenty post-Soviet years, a significant flow of citizens from neighboring states has been sent to our country, which compensated for the natural population decline. It is noteworthy that the largest part of these immigrants are compatriots who left for the republics of the USSR from the 50s to the 80s, as well as their direct descendants.

Distrust of Rosstat data

Of course, the issue of demographics is not without lovers of “conspiracy theories.” Some even call the demographic hole the last, arguing that statistics are deceiving, and in fact, the modern population of the Russian Federation does not number 143 million citizens, but at best 80-90 million. Rosstat has something to answer here, because statistical data is indirectly confirmed by many sources. Firstly, primary information about civil status is transmitted by all registry offices, secondly, some conspiracy theorists themselves act as co-authors of Demographic Yearbooks, and thirdly, other very authoritative demographic institutions in the world also use official data from Rosstat.

Economic consequences of crises

Demographic holes have both positive and negative consequences on the economy. At the second stage of population decline, the share of citizens of working age exceeds the share of the younger and older generations. The third stage of the crisis is characterized by a negative effect (the share of the older generation exceeds the working-age population, which creates a burden on society).

Consequences in education and military sphere

Due to demographic gaps, the number of school graduates is decreasing, so universities are fighting for every applicant. In this regard, the issue of reducing the number of higher educational institutions (from 1115 to 200) is being discussed; layoffs of teaching staff by 20-50% are coming. Some politicians, however, say that such a step will allow us to get rid of universities that provide insufficiently high-quality education.

It is currently expected that the number of schoolchildren will increase by one million in five to six years, and by another two million in the next five years. After the 2020s, an intensive reduction in the number of school-age children will begin.

Another consequence of demographic crises is a reduction in mobilization resources. All this has an impact on military reforms, forcing them to cancel deferments, reduce the number of troops and switch to the contact principle of recruitment. The risk of China developing a low-intensity conflict is heightened by the low population density in the Far East. Thus, only 4.4% (less than 6.3 million) of citizens live in territories that make up more than 35% of the country. At the same time, 120 million people live in the neighboring regions of Northeast China, 3.5 million in Mongolia, 28.5 million in the DPRK, almost 50 million in the Republic of Korea, and more than 130 million in Japan.

By the twenties of this century, the number of men of military age will decrease by a third, and by 2050 - by more than 40%.

Social sphere and demographic holes

In the life of society, there have been trends towards the Scandinavian model of existence - a bachelor, familyless life. The number of children in families, and families themselves, is gradually decreasing. Until the end of the nineteenth century, Russia was a country with a young population. At that time, the number of children significantly exceeded the number of the older generation; it was customary to have five or more children in a family. Since the sixties of the twentieth century, the process of demographic aging began, which was the result of a decrease in the birth rate. In the nineties, the Russian Federation was already among the countries with high rates of aging citizens. Today the share of people of retirement age in our country is 13%.

Threats of demographic crisis

The pace of the demographic crisis across the country is uneven. Many researchers are inclined to believe that depopulation affects the Russian people to a greater extent. For example, according to researcher L. Rybakovsky, from 1989 to 2002 the number of Russians by nationality decreased by 7%, and the total population - by 1.3%. According to another ethnographer, until 2025, more than 85% of the decline will be among Russians. All regions populated by Russians have recently experienced negative growth.

Given the high level of migration, a likely consequence of the demographic crisis in the Russian Federation will be a change in the national and religious composition of the population. For example, by 2030, every fifth resident of our country will profess Islam. In Moscow, every third birth is already due to migrants. All this can subsequently lead to the loss of the territorial integrity of the country.

Population forecasting

The next demographic hole in Russia (according to the forecast of Igor Beloborodov) is expected in 2025-2030. If the country can stay within its existing borders, subject to a decrease in the permanent population, then only 80 million people will remain in the Russian Federation by 2080. Russian demographer Anatoly Antonov claims that without the revival of the large family, by 2050 only 70 million people will live in Russia. Thus, the demographic hole of 2017 is either an opportunity to revive the country, or another point in the consolidation of population decline trends.

The main ways out of the crisis

Many believe that solving problems in demography is possible only with the systematic strengthening of the institution of the traditional family. Modern Russia so far only provides financial support for parents (one-time assistance and maternity capital are paid). True, according to many politicians and experts, this form of support resonates only with marginal segments of the population or those who already create large families. This is not a motivation for the middle class.

The population can increase as a result of natural or mechanical population movement. The natural movement of the population is characterized by indicators of fertility, mortality, marriage and divorce rates. Birth and death rates are measured in ppm.

Fertility is the number of people born per year per 1000 population. Mortality is the number of people dying per year per 1000 population. The difference between the birth rate and death rate forms the natural increase or natural decrease in the country's population. Depopulation is a natural population decline. Marriage rate is the frequency of marriage. Usually measured by the number of registered marriages per year per 1000 inhabitants or the number of people married per year per 1000 unmarried people of marriageable age. The result of marriage is the number of married people. Divorce rate is the frequency of marriage dissolution. Measured by the number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants per year or per 1,000 existing married couples.

Natural population movement is an integral part of the process of population reproduction - the constant renewal of people. At its core, population reproduction is a biological process. But as historical development progressed in human society, a gradual change in the types of population reproduction was observed. The theory that explains the change in types of reproduction depending on the socio-economic development of the country is called the theory of demographic transition (demographic revolutions). The transition from one type of reproduction to another is called a demographic revolution. We need knowledge of historical types of reproduction and patterns of demographic transition in order to understand the demographic processes taking place in Russia. Global patterns of demographic development are manifested in each country of the world.

The most ancient type of reproduction is archaic (archetype). The economic basis of ancient society was the appropriative economy (hunting and gathering). At the same time, man only used the food resources of the natural landscape. The population in a certain territory was limited by natural resources. The population could exist for a long time if the population remained the same. The archetype is characterized by high fertility and high mortality (40-45 ppm). Natural growth was extremely insignificant. In fact, the number of people increased only as a result of the settlement of new territories.

The archaic type of reproduction was replaced by the traditional one. The transition was associated with the emergence and spread of a productive (agricultural) economy. Archaeologists called it the Neolithic Revolution, the first economic revolution in human history. The economic basis for the development of society has improved, a transition to settled life is taking place, in addition, food and living conditions have improved (permanent settlements have appeared). As a result, the mortality rate dropped to 30-35 ppm, the birth rate remained at the same level at 40-45 ppm. Natural population growth appeared, but it was also insignificant. Low growth was facilitated by low life expectancy (25-35 years) and high infant mortality (mortality of children under 1 year of age - 200-300 ppm).

The traditional type of reproduction has been replaced by a modern one. The transition began in the 17th century. in Western Europe due to industrialization and urbanization of society. At the same time, the nutrition and living conditions of people have sharply improved, and the incidence of infectious diseases has decreased. As a result, life expectancy has increased and infant mortality has decreased. A rapid decrease in mortality while maintaining high birth rates leads to a sharp increase in natural increase at the initial stage of the demographic transition. This period, which is characterized by a sharp increase in population growth rates, is called the “demographic explosion.” After some time, following the decrease in mortality, the birth rate also decreased. The following reasons for the decline in fertility can be identified:

a reduction in child mortality (as a result of which there is no need to have “spare children”);

social security organization (i.e., the state takes care of the elderly, and children are no longer the only breadwinners in old age);

s the collapse of the old patriarchal family (which was a reproduction unit) and the emergence of small families, where raising a large number of children is difficult;

the emancipation of women and the emergence of a new system of values, the main of which are now located “outside the home”;

growth in the level of education and expansion of the range of interests of people;

There is an increase in the costs of raising and educating children (if in an agrarian economy children from an early age “pay for themselves” by working on the land, now they only need to “invest” money in them until they are 20 years old);

Urbanization is a kind of integral indicator of changes in conditions and lifestyle: in urbanized areas (and especially in large cities) all of the above factors are more powerful.

Thus, the modern type of reproduction is characterized by low birth and death rates (about 10 ppm) and, as a consequence, low natural increase or natural loss. A characteristic feature of the modern type of reproduction is the regulation of the number of children in the family.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia was close to the traditional type of population reproduction. The birth rate was about 45 ppm, the average life expectancy was about 35 years. Over the next decades, there was a demographic transition that began in the northwestern and central provinces, the most industrialized and urbanized. The transition to a modern type of reproduction was complicated by several demographic crises - periods with negative natural growth.

The first demographic crisis was observed in 1914-1922. and was associated with the First World War and the Civil War. The mortality rate in these years exceeded the birth rate, and the country's population declined sharply. The second crisis took place in 1933-34. and was associated with the famine that followed forced collectivization. There was a natural population decline again. The third crisis occurred in 1941-1945. and is associated with the Great Patriotic War. Over the years, the country's population has decreased by more than 10 million people.

Currently, Russia is experiencing its fourth demographic crisis in this century. The birth rate is approximately 9-10 ppm, and the mortality rate is 14-15 ppm. That is, about a million more people die in Russia every year than are born. This demographic crisis began back in 1992. Its causes are the socio-economic crisis in the country, narrowed population reproduction (in each next generation fewer people are born than in the previous one), the “demographic wave” of the crisis of 1941-1945, when very few people were born, and, accordingly, children ( 60s) and grandchildren (90s) they also have few.

Accompanied by the modern demographic crisis and a decrease in life expectancy. If in the 70s and 80s. it was about 70 years, then by 1995 there was a decrease to 64 years (including 57 years for men and 71 years for women). Since 1996, there has been a slight increase in average life expectancy. The period of demographic explosion in Russia as a whole practically did not manifest itself.

Within Russia, there are significant differences in the demographic situation associated with differences in the national and gender-age composition in the regions of the country. We can distinguish 4 types of regions based on their demographic situation.

The first type is national autonomies in the south of the country. This type includes the republics of the North Caucasus, Kalmykia, Tyva, Altai, and Buryat Autonomous Okrug. The indigenous population of these regions is at the final stage of transition from the traditional type of reproduction to the modern one. Accordingly, here, with low mortality (7-9 ppm), there is a fairly high birth rate (15-20 ppm) and a noticeable natural increase. The age structure of the population is “young”, with the highest proportion of children in Russia.

The second type is the most urbanized regions of the country. These are Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow region and some other areas. Here the birth rate is minimal (6-8 ppm), mortality is above average (15-17 ppm), natural decline is higher than average (9-10 ppm). The age structure of the population is similar to the average Russian one, but the population has “advanced” the demographic transition to the greatest extent, which is why the existing differences from others are associated. In particular, it is in these regions that the minimum proportion of children in the population is observed.

The third type is Russian regions with a “young” age structure of the population, which was formed as a result of the influx of population, mainly young people, over the previous several decades. This type includes the regions of the European North, as well as most regions of the Asian part of Russia. In these regions, there is a reduced birth rate (7-10 ppm), but low mortality (9-11 ppm). As a result, the increase is about zero. Regions of this type are distinguished by the maximum share of the working-age population and the minimum share of elderly people.

The fourth type is Russian regions with an “old” age structure of the population, which was formed as a result of the migration outflow of the population over several decades. Most regions of the European part of Russia belong to this type (except for regions included in other groups). Here the average birth rate (9-10 ppm), but the highest mortality rate (18-22 ppm). Regions of this type are characterized by maximum natural population decline (10-13 ppm) and the maximum proportion of elderly people.

General demographic indicators of Russia

https://www.site/2017-08-25/demograf_anatoliy_vishnevskiy_o_krizise_rozhdaemosti_roste_smertnosti_i_probleme_migracii

“What will happen to Russia if only a few large cities remain?”

Demographer Anatoly Vishnevsky - about the birth crisis, rising mortality and the problem of migration

Konstantin Kokoshkin/Global Look Press

In the first half of this year, natural population decline tripled compared to 2016 - Rosstat published these statistics in mid-July. Birth rates decreased by 11%, and the number of deaths on average exceeded the number of births by 1.2 times - and losses in population are not compensated even by the migration influx. Demographers note that due to high mortality and low life expectancy, the population curve will decline in the near future. Anatoly Vishnevsky, director of the Institute of Demography at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, spoke about what is wrong with demographic policy in Russia and why the issuance of maternity capital did not work.

What's happening to the birth rate?

Motherhood has been getting older for us lately. Until recently, we had a high birth rate among women under 20 years of age; the group that gave birth most was the group of 20-25 year olds. In the 90s, the situation changed: the birth rate began to decline among those aged 20-24 years, and began to increase in the group of 25-29 year olds. This trend used to exist throughout Europe, but it came to us in the 90s. Why did this happen? In the past, for a woman to survive two children, she had to give birth to six. In pre-revolutionary Russia, about 250-300 babies died per 1000 people in the first year of life alone. Now infant mortality is very low: in Russia 6-7 babies die per 1000, and this situation still lags behind what we see in more developed countries - there are already 2 babies per 1000. And if earlier such a number of children died, but in Ultimately, somewhere out of all those born to a woman, two survived, but now, if you want to have two children, it is enough to give birth to two children.

But why then are children born later and not earlier? In the 1960s, a contraceptive revolution took place in Europe: people learned to control their fertility and could give birth whenever they wanted. In addition, life expectancy has increased, and if previously parents were afraid to die without getting their children back on their feet, now the situation is different. Women (and not only women) realized this, and in the 70s this shift in maternal age began. This freed up a huge amount of time and energy: a woman can get an education, make a career, and achieve some kind of material wealth. No one organized this on purpose: there was a completely synchronized turn in different countries, this is the logic of life. But we only embarked on this path in the 90s and have only now experienced a shift.

Margarita Vlaskina/website

Statistically, we have been on an upward fertility curve in recent years. But it should have increased - if you look at previous periods, this indicator goes in “waves”. And now the number of births will inevitably decline - this does not depend on anyone. At the same time, the actual “fertility rate” - that is, the number of children per woman - may remain the same. But the number of births is decreasing. Now we have a generation of women who were born in the 90s (during the previous demographic hole) approaching maternal age. There are fewer of them, so they will have fewer children.

There is another graph - a comparison of the birth rate in Russia with other countries. The most reliable indicator is how many children a woman gives birth to in each generation throughout her life. And it is not much different from what we see in Europe; on the contrary, there are countries in which this indicator is lower than in Russia: Germany, Italy, Japan. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is much lower in our country than in other countries.

What about mortality in Russia?

With mortality, things are completely different in our country. In the past, compared to European countries, we have always lagged behind in life expectancy. But around 1960 we became close to them. I think the advent of antibiotics played a big role in reducing the number of deaths due to infectious causes. But after 1960, we began to diverge on this parameter. And - with life expectancy rates steadily rising in other countries - this gap is only widening.

What are people dying from? The general situation is determined by cardiovascular diseases and cancer. Over the past 50 years, the following situation has developed in France: regardless of the cause, people are dying later—life expectancy has increased by 11 years.

Recently, the Russian Ministry of Health announced that we have reached a record for life expectancy - 72 years. This is true. But it is also true that this figure is lower than in many developing countries, such as Mexico.

Nail Fattakhov/website

If you look at the statistics for 50 years in Russia, it turns out that by 1960 life expectancy had even decreased slightly. Only at some ages our mortality rate is lower than in 1965: this cannot be called anything other than stagnation.

Now our main risk population is adult men 35-40 years old, who should not die at all.

Only at some ages our mortality rate is lower than in 1965. This is generally due to the riskier behavior of men and alcoholism, but in general in Russia this mortality rate is unacceptably high. During the anti-alcohol campaign in the USSR, the situation improved slightly, but then the figures went down again. Today we have certain successes in terms of statistics, but mainly due to the decrease in infant mortality - when it decreases, all statistics on life expectancy naturally increase. But this does not compensate for the high mortality rate at older ages.

I must also say about HIV infection - we have a problem with this. In developed countries, the increase in mortality from AIDS has stopped over the past 20 years, but in our country it is increasing, and, in fact, there is an epidemic. In the 90s, the mortality rate from this was zero, but it must be taken into account that death from this factor does not occur immediately: it is delayed for 10 years or more.

In addition, we have a very high mortality rate from external causes. This is not a purely medical reason - these are murders, suicides, accidents, and so on. But even death from an accident depends on several factors - not only the condition of the road and the driver, but also the speed with which the ambulance arrives at the scene. I have seen how in Europe doctors arrive literally immediately after a collision occurs, and I doubt that we have this. The result is complete stagnation in Russia against the backdrop of a continuous increase in life expectancy in all developed countries, to which Russia was quite close in the early 1960s. This is some kind of systemic reason - it’s not like some dashing 1990s or a particular minister did something wrong. Here we need to understand more deeply.

There is such a thing - demographic transition. If the cause of death changes, the age of death also changes. There were two such transitions. One was related to the fight against infectious diseases - and here we succeeded. But the second was associated with non-infectious causes, and at this stage we are stuck. I can’t say that only the health care system is to blame for this. But we need to ask the question: what should she be responsible for? Someone must manage everything related to our health and death. If it is known that our high mortality rate is associated with road accidents, should the Ministry of Health say that this is not our diocese, or set some task for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example? They judge by the results.

How are the authorities reacting to the situation?

Everyone knows that we introduced maternity capital in 2007, and everyone says that then our birth rate began to increase. The total fertility rate, which Vladimir Putin also likes to refer to, has really been growing. The only problem is that it has been growing before - since 1999. If you look at the graph of the increase in the number of births, in 2007 - when maternity capital was introduced - the column of the number of births is growing. But this is the only high column, after which everything fell asleep again. Then it jumped again - although nothing changed in politics. Therefore, it is not possible to detect any significant impact on the birth rate of demographic policy measures.

Maternity capital is a good propaganda move, but in terms of fertility it has not brought much effect.

It is clear that Russians do not give birth to as many children as in China or India. We must give the family the opportunity to have as many children as they want. Therefore, if I were asked how to build a policy, in my opinion, it should be support for families with children. These may be different measures, and I do not rule out that this may cost the state more than maternity capital.

“There should be no such policy when the state “buys” children from families” Daria Shelekhova/website

I think that there should be a social policy that supports families with children, and there should not be a policy where the state “buys” children from the family. Any family should have the opportunity to give birth to a child and feel in a zone of social security. But when they say: “Now we will give people money, and they will give birth to more children,” I think this is a delusion. There are, of course, certain categories of the population who primarily focus on social benefits and give birth with it in mind. But this is not the bulk of the population.

Another thing is what is happening with abortion, the campaign against which has been gaining momentum in recent years. Indeed, in Russia (in the USSR) there was a colossal number of abortions. This is due to the fact that the contraceptive revolution, which took place everywhere in the 60s, did not happen in our country at that time - we did not receive contraceptives, and even when they somehow gradually leaked out, doctors discouraged them from using them. As a result, instead of preventing pregnancy, numerous abortions began. And although the policy of the Ministry of Health did not change in the 90s, the number of abortions began to decline enormously - as a market and contraceptives appeared. Therefore, today's campaign against abortion has no basis - because there are objectively fewer of them. Of course, abortion is evil; abortion has no supporters. But now it is possible to practically get rid of abortions by managing pregnancy.

Another important consequence of the unfavorable situation with mortality is that the planned convergence with European countries in retirement age - apparently inevitable for economic reasons - unlike these countries, is not supported by an increase in life expectancy for older people. Healthcare spending in Russia has long been completely out of step with the challenges it must respond to in the 21st century. In the Netherlands, about 10% of annual GDP is spent on this, in the USA - 8%, in Turkey - about 5%. In Russia, about 3.5% is spent on this. And these savings on health care make it difficult to postpone retirement: people do not live to see retirement, and if they do, they are in such a state of health that they are no longer able to work. If we raise the retirement age from 60 to 65, suppose what do we get? A man can no longer find a job and go to it - and still cannot receive a pension. This means that he will still have to pay some kind of benefit.

Will migrants solve the problem?

Migration is generally a sore point, very complex and very serious. Our population is almost not growing, the territory is huge, the population is aging - we have a lot of problems associated with a lack of labor resources and so on. In Russia there is still such a thing as western migration drift - people migrate from the east to the west, everyone infiltrates to the other side of the Urals. The problem in the Far East is the limited demographic resources. The government should have been concerned that a quarter of Russia's population lived in the Moscow region. It's just not safe. Rural resources have been exhausted, and small towns are now drying up. What will remain of Russia if only a few large cities remain? Russia needs people, but they can only get them in large numbers through migration.

It would seem that this can be solved with the help of migration, but public opinion does not allow this, and I do not yet see anyone resolving this issue. Someone said earlier: we had an age gap in the 90s, we could have patched it up with a migration influx of young people, and we would not have known this problem for a hundred years. But this was not heard - and now we will have this problem for a hundred years.

“Anti-migrant sentiment is emerging. We have them too, although I believe that we have no reason for this.” Joel Goodman/ZUMAPRESS.com/Global Look Press

European countries followed this path, but another problem arose. As the Swiss playwright Max Firsch said: “We wanted to get workers, but we got people.” People came and stayed to live there - and now in European centers you can see that the street crowd is not at all European in appearance. Anti-migrant sentiments arise. We have them too - although I believe that we have no reason for this. Statements begin that they are taking away our jobs, that they are not qualified, that they are terrorists. It is clear that when residents of another move to one country, the problem of integration arises. Despite the excesses that occur in European countries, this is what is happening in many. Therefore, it cannot be said that France is now suffering from migrants, of whom there really are many.

But there is another aspect here. The world has experienced and continues to experience a demographic explosion, with the population in developing countries growing sharply. I was also taught at school that the population of the planet is 2 billion people, now there are 7 billion. That is, 5 billion people have appeared in my lifetime alone. As a result, developing countries have an overhang over developed countries. There is a forecast that by the end of the century the population will increase to 10 billion. Now Nigeria has already surpassed Russia in population, and it is believed that its population may exceed 1 billion. The entire global north is a billion people, and in China there are a billion only Chinese. Some people want to move, knowing that the whole world lives in Europe. The population of developing countries was predominantly peasant and immobile. But when the population grows, there is not enough room for everyone, and they move to cities. Over the past ten years, 2.7 billion people in developing countries have moved to cities. These are people who have experience of migration, they are more mobile, more educated and, on top of everything, they are very young. In Nigeria, the median age is 18 years, half of the population is older than this age, half is younger. This is a population that consists of teenagers. In developed countries, the median age is approximately 35-40 years.

Now imagine that time has passed. At one time the largest cities were New York and Tokyo. Now the largest cities are in Asia. The people there are extremely young, semi-educated - they just left the village and want something in life. This is the environment that feeds terrorism and, in general, any extremist ideas and activities, simply by definition: a mass of young people who are unadapted to life, because the countries are very poor. And nearby there are rich countries in Europe or America. This situation, from my point of view, is completely underestimated. They say that Islam is to blame, but it is not to blame - Islamic countries are simply at the center of a population explosion. A huge young population, uprooted... and there are very deep and far-reaching dangers for the entire world.

“The people there are extremely young, semi-educated - they just left the village and want something in life. This is the environment that feeds terrorism." Osie Greenway/ZUMAPRESS.com/Global Look Press

How should we approach this from Russia's point of view? The answer to this question is generally not only in the hands of Russia or another specific country; it cannot be resolved so simply. Now the conditions of the problem are unclear. Politicians and diplomats do not touch this issue; they only talk about how to prevent this migration from the point of view of their country. But this is still a huge human resource that we could use. Another thing is how to take it? We certainly have a problem with both labor resources and the age structure, but this is a very difficult task: there must be a policy, there must be an understanding, but no one has it, neither here nor in the United States. Everyone is frightened by the growing migration flow and does not know what to counter it.

It is clear that European identity cannot remain untouched - it can develop and be enriched by different cultures. There is no great danger in this as long as it remains within certain limits. There is a demographer who fears that some other elements of legal culture are beginning to penetrate into England along with migrants. But in Russia we see that without any migration from the North Caucasus, some other laws are beginning to penetrate. There is concern about this, but what to do? Some people simply demand that migration be stopped completely. But this is physically impossible.

What's next?

Is it possible to solve demographic problems “starting with ourselves”, rather than blaming the state? If I see a person who has drunk himself to death, I, of course, can tell him: start with yourself, no Ministry of Health will help you. But all this also has some roots. We all depend on the environment in which we live - both infrastructure and social environment. The state itself takes on great responsibility. At one time, in the 90s, there was a slogan “Less government.” Now it has come to naught, the state did not want “less of itself,” and decided that there should be a lot of it. But in this case, he should have a lot of responsibility.

“In Russia there is a very poor structure of alcohol consumption - the so-called “northern type”, when they drink strong drinks in large doses in a short time” Caro/Bastian/Global Look Press

Some time ago, the chief sanitary doctor in Russia was Gennady Onishchenko, and he led a consistent fight against beer. He stated that beer alcoholism was developing and that it was almost more dangerous than ordinary alcoholism. At the same time, it is known that in Russia there is a very poor pattern of alcohol consumption - the so-called “northern type”, when they drink strong drinks in large doses in a short time. In Europe, alcohol consumption does not have such consequences for mortality - because they drink wine or beer, with which you will not get such a strong dose of ethanol. We understand that the first thing to do is not to introduce a “prohibition”, but to change the structure of alcohol consumption to a less dangerous one. And it’s even changing—young people don’t immediately jump on vodka. But at the same time, there was a person in authority who directly tried to prevent this. This is only one particular issue [on which demographics depend], but it is not studied, does not end up in state policy, and the problem of drunkenness is not solved at any level. Instead, we are proud to have invented the Ebola vaccine. But Ebola is not our problem.

In the meantime, the authorities choose only what is convenient for them from the reports of demographers, and the figures they see are embellished tenfold. Some time ago, I was surprised to hear in Putin’s speech that there is such a 25-year cycle of fluctuations in the number of births. Yes, we wrote it. But now it’s convenient to say: “Why are you surprised now by the situation with the birth rate?” Of course, the roots of our troubles grow from the USSR, and the consequences of the war are still very, very felt. In general, a lot in our lives comes from there - we cannot part with this heritage in any way, it is constantly being idealized. At one time it seemed to me that there would be progress in the demographic situation, and the right words were spoken. Now it confuses me that the situation is being embellished all the time, and this does not bring any benefit. Now they are setting a goal that by 2025 life expectancy in Russia will reach 76 years. But this goal is no longer correct - many countries have this indicator that are no match for Russia. There is not even an understanding of what these 76 years are, if many people had 80 years a few years ago. How not to increase it even more if everyone has done this a long time ago? That is the question.

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