Cultural Revolution in China main stages. Red cannibals: how class enemies were dealt with during the "cultural revolution" in China

Bookstores were closed, it was forbidden to sell any books, except for Mao's quotation book, which became a means of not only ideological, but also physical struggle. Many cases were recorded when prominent party figures were beaten to death with a hardcover book, thus knocking out the “bourgeois poison” from them.

Only "revolutionary operas from modern life" written by Mao's wife Jiang Qing were released at the theater. Thus the campaign for "socialist re-education" was carried out.

Mao Zedong and Jiang Qing. (wikipedia.org)

All the scenery and costumes of the Peking Opera performances were burned. Monasteries and temples were burned, part of the Great Wall of China was demolished. The latter was attributed to a shortage of bricks for "more needed" pigsties.

Riot is right! (c) Mao Zedong.

I was surprised to learn that in Russia there is a (most likely unregistered) Russian Maoist Party - and this is their slogan. In search of materials, I came across the site of one of their cells

Well, what can I say - the next stubborn leftists, whom you don’t feed with bread, but let me find the "light of thought" over the hill - after all, "there are no prophets in their own country."

And this material is dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the process, which will later be called the term "Chinese Cultural Revolution".

In 1958, Mao Zedong proclaimed the economic policy of the "Great Leap Forward", almost returning China to the Stone Age. But the Chinese President did not rest on this. In an effort to strengthen his shaky positions, he (as it is believed, at the suggestion of his fourth wife Jiang Qing) decided to strike at the "bourgeois culture", and in fact - at the centuries-old traditions of the country, which always deeply respected the past and worshiped ancestors. The true goal of the dictator was to instill a cult of his own personality, and it was easiest to do this in an environment of the collapse of all other authorities and values. The events that took place in China in 1966-1969 are most appropriate to compare with a mud stream sweeping away everything in its path. This was another unforgivable mistake of Mao, detrimental to the country's economy, its cultural heritage, education and upbringing of young people. The world, with bewilderment and fear, followed the outrages of the militant politician, who had long since cut himself off from historical roots and was now rapidly turning into a living legend. The "Cultural Revolution" destroyed the lives of millions of Chinese. During it, about 729 thousand people suffered from severe persecution, many of whom were beaten, tortured and executed. Thousands of the most gifted and educated citizens committed suicide in order to avoid repression.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward shook Mao's political position, but he continued to be chairman of the PC of the Communist Party of China (CCP), an idol of the masses, and a founding father of the people's China. In addition, one of his most loyal supporters, Lin Biao, served as Minister of Defense, so there was no need to fear opposition from the military. Nevertheless, after 1960, Mao preferred to go into the shadows for a while.

China was ruled on its behalf, with the full support of CPC General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, by the country's pragmatic chairman, Liu Shaoqi. Not allowing the great man to interfere in the economy, they began to restore the economy destroyed by the Great Leap Forward, although, according to Liu's critics, only a privileged minority enjoyed the fruits of the emerging prosperity. The hopes of the huge masses of Chinese peasants for an improvement in life were clearly in no hurry to come true. Liu never sought to return the country to the mainstream of a market system, but it was his successful economic policy that later gave Mao a reason to accuse his protege of "following the capitalist path of development." Indeed, for some time the CCP was dominated by a right-wing group that was guided not by abstract dogmas, but by common sense. According to Liu and his supporters, increasing labor productivity by all means was more important than ensuring an equal distribution of wealth: the increase in the wealth of a country ultimately improved the standard of living of all its citizens. Bonuses were generously distributed to advanced workers, and qualified personnel - managers, engineers, craftsmen - could earn significantly more than ordinary workers. In the countryside, private household farming was encouraged, which by 1965 gave the peasants a third of all income. In the villages there was even a revival of the layer of middle peasants and kulaks, destroyed in the early 1950s. after the land reform. Unfortunately for China, Mao Zedong didn't like being left in the background for a long time. Liu Shaoqi's popularity grew every year, and it was time to do something about it.

Mao may have been deeply concerned about the resurgence of economic inequality, but he was much more concerned about the state of mind of his compatriots. In truth, he wasn't happy about their intelligence at all. Mao was afraid that public secondary and higher education would lead to the emergence of an intellectual elite in the country who would question the correctness of the ideas of the revolution and begin to neglect them, as happened in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. A new social layer of technocrats was formed there - brilliantly educated scientists, engineers, managers, who were provided with prestigious, well-paid jobs. They believed that they had the right to their own opinion on any issue, and looked down on ordinary hard workers. On the other hand, the party leadership, which enjoyed great material privileges, turned into a ruling class that demanded unquestioning obedience from the people. These social groups lived in large cities, regional and republican centers, where their children had much more prospects for an excellent education, good jobs and enviable positions than the inhabitants of the provincial hinterland. In the USSR, a layer of hereditary nomenklatura elite was emerging - without private property, but with a high social position, solid incomes and access to the best educational institutions. The same process threatened China. Mao realized that it was impossible to delay - the country needed a radical change in political course.

Liu Shaoqi with his wife Wang Guangmei in 1949. During the "cultural revolution", both of them, at the suggestion of Mao Zedong, became the main targets of the rampaging Red Guards. Wang managed to survive, while Liu died in custody due to lack of medical attention.

However, he could no longer expect the CCP to unanimously support his plan. In fact, Mao was going to destroy the "old guard", because he was going to criticize the line of his former closest associates. He said: "It is important to destroy, the construction will go by itself." In the fight against the old party members, he needed allies, and they could only be the least affected by the "bourgeois influence" of the Chinese - poor peasants, soldiers and, above all, young people. The time factor was also very important for Mao: the health of the 70-year-old leader was fooling around. He had long suffered from parkinsonism, and in 1964 suffered a mild stroke. Liu Shaoqi had to be dealt with as soon as possible. But first, Mao decided to demonstrate to the whole world that he was full of energy, and arranged an unprecedented propaganda campaign: surrounded by enthusiastic youth, he made a 14-kilometer swim along the Yangtze River. This event was widely covered by all the media and returned to its former popularity.

Starting the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Mao hoped to protect China from the "mistakes" that led to the collapse of Soviet communism. Mao called the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev the chief revisionist. The Chinese leader accused him of departing from Marxist-Leninist principles, primarily of abandoning the idea of ​​class struggle, and of reviving capitalism. This should not happen in China. The country will be led by a new, truly revolutionary class - the youth, whose consciousness is free from the remnants of the past. The previous generation of Chinese leaders has been “reborn”, so they need to be “re-educated”, and all those who resist will be destroyed.

In June 1966, the main organ of the CCP, the Renmin Ribao (People's Gazette), began to bombard the country with editorials repeating in every way the only thought: absolute power of the CCP Chairman Mao should be established in China and a "cultural revolution" should be undertaken. Lin Biao actively took up the planting of the personality cult of Mao among the soldiers, for the most part semi-literate peasant boys. The army printers hurriedly printed a kind of textbook, Chairman Mao's Thoughts, better known simply as the "quotation book" or "little red book." Memorizing the sayings of a great man has proven to be a great way to brainwash the younger generation. The quote book soon became the bible of the Cultural Revolution. A billion copies of it were printed and distributed even in the West. The growing cult of Mao's personality forced the masses to unconditionally believe his every word. The chairman of the CPC himself proclaimed that the country's problems could only be solved by a brilliant leader - naturally, by himself, the "great helmsman", the father of all Chinese.

The first target of the "cultural revolution" was educational institutions, where the consciousness of young Chinese was formed. It was necessary to establish full control over this still "blank sheet" and fill it with the same text - the thoughts of the "great helmsman". Mao announced to the youth that the abundance of knowledge threatens inequality and counter-revolution. Classes in Chinese schools have practically ceased. The children mostly read quotes, and most of the time they just sat at their desks, listening to the texts of newspaper articles broadcast on the radio and the ingenious sayings of Chairman Mao. Information bulletins were published with photographs of foreign, including European, leaders carefully studying the "little red books": the Chinese should have seen that their "great helmsman" points the way for all progressive mankind. Every day, students and military personnel in chorus, like a prayer, quoted his sayings. Newspapers were full of touching articles about the love of ordinary people for Chairman Mao. For example, one peasant pasted over the walls of the bedroom with 32 portraits of the leader - as soon as he opened his eyes, he wanted to see the dearest face in front of him. True, this fanatic was later reported that he used free images instead of wallpapers that he could not afford. The portraits were taken away, and the sly one was publicly “re-educated” with stick blows.

Mao was well aware that the bulk of the Chinese, that is, the middle and older generations, reacted poorly to propaganda hype, and he found a more effective means. He announced the creation of shock detachments of the "cultural revolution" - Red Guards ("red guards") from schoolchildren and students and zaofans ("rebels") from young workers. These youths unconditionally devoted to him were supposed to conduct explanatory work with the broad masses of the people, or, in other words, to identify and “re-educate” the irresponsible on their own. In fact, ultra-revolutionary youth terrorized the population, including their own parents, exposing confused people in "bourgeois" thoughts and actions. One woman, for example, was beaten up by the Red Guards after a denunciation by her son, who heard his mother complain about the high cost of tomatoes.

Mao demanded that the Red Guards pay special attention to their teachers. They traditionally had a greater influence on young people than their parents, and remained the main source of "bourgeois culture". To win over the minds of the Chinese youth, Mao had to do away with the authority of the teachers. In every Chinese school, there were show trials of “counter-revolutionaries” identified among teachers, who were humiliated, beaten, and even killed. In some schools, children even set up makeshift prisons where teachers were tortured. Teachers were forced to wear caps and collars with inscriptions like “I am a monster”, sent to clean latrines, literally smeared with black paint. Teachers caught in an overly strict, formal or traditional approach to teaching would spend hours on their knees in front of their students apologizing for the "crimes" they had committed.

A large-scale action was held at Peking University. More than 60 professors and associate professors, including the rector, were forced to put on paper caps with various absurd inscriptions after beatings. Their faces were painted with black ink - the color of evil and counter-revolution. All the victims, including elderly men and women, were ordered to stand with their hands tied behind their backs. This torture was called "jet plane". Teachers who criticized student work were accused of being reborn and could be beaten to death in public.

However, having stirred up the uneducated youth, Mao released the genie from the bottle, which, as he himself later admitted, he could not keep in a knot. Between 11 and 13 million Red Guards poured into Beijing, where they were allowed to use public transport for free and eat in revolutionary canteens. In the capital, their main occupation was holding mass rallies, at which quotations from the "little red book" were chanted and toasts were proclaimed to Mao, who acquired almost the status of a living god. Rumors spread about miracles that happened to people who, in difficult times, remembered the wise words of the CCP chairman. The drowning were suddenly saved, the blind regained their sight, the dying were reborn to life. One had only to call on the name of Mao, and incredible things happened. One pilot said that his plane caught fire and began to fall. Already losing consciousness, he thought about the words of Chairman Mao and suddenly seemed to wake up - the flight was normal, everything was in order with the car.

During another rally in Beijing's central Tiananmen Square, Mao's deputy party leader and defense minister, Lin Biao, called on the million-plus listening to him Red Guards to launch an attack on four relics of the past - old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits. This was a signal for a destructive bacchanalia, before which the atrocities of the Vandals, Huns and Goths fade in the era of the fall of the Roman Empire. Throughout China, millions of Red Guards poured into the streets, who, like locusts on crops, pounced on everything that was valued by older generations. Houses were turned upside down - antiques, paintings, examples of calligraphic art, just beautiful things were destroyed as relics of the past. Bonfires from books blazed - Chinese classics and foreign literature. Public libraries were purged of publications that did not quote Mao's brilliant thoughts. An exception was made only for the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and Stalin. Beijing bookstores have changed beyond recognition: now all the shelves were filled with quotes and other works of the "great helmsman". Recordings of ancient and Western music were destroyed. Goldfish were on the verge of extinction - they were exterminated as a symbol of bourgeois decadence. How many goldfish became victims of the class struggle, no one, of course, counted.

In a few weeks, fanatical Red Guards destroyed almost all the valuables from private collections. Chinese writers, artists, scientists committed suicide, not wanting to live in an era of barbarism, to endure bullying and beatings from rabid juvenile vandals. The Manchu novelist Lao She, beaten by the Red Guards, drowned himself in a pond. After suffering bullying, the historian Jian Bo-Zan, his wife, and the parents of the famous pianist Fu Cong committed suicide (he himself managed to escape to England). In one day, 60 teachers from Shanghai University killed themselves. One English teacher was seized by the Red Guards, who found her a typewriter with an English font. They said it was a radio transmitter whose owner was a secret agent of imperialism. After being tortured, she was locked in a barn, where she hanged herself out of desperation. All Chinese museums, palaces, temples and ancient burial places were looted. Raging crowds smashed statues and pagodas with jubilation. Before the onslaught of excited thugs, even the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing could not resist - with the imperial palace full of priceless treasures. He was saved by Premier Zhou Enlai, who ordered the soldiers not to let the Red Guards through the gate.

The Chinese police did not interfere in what was happening. She received clear instructions not to prevent young people from displaying "class hatred", even if it involved inflicting grievous bodily harm or murder. Chinese intellectuals and their relatives were forced to kneel, forced to bow at the feet of the Red Guards, flogged with belts with metal buckles. Many victims had half their heads shaved so that everyone would recognize the “criminals” from afar.

If you look at it, a significant part of the Red Guards were no more interested in Mao's ideas than he was in their problems. Unemployed. impoverished, bored youth found the simplest outlet for their energy and dissatisfaction with life. The best revolutionaries were youngsters with criminal inclinations and an unhealthy psyche, and even former juvenile delinquents, of whom, as it turned out later, there were many among the leaders of the Red Guards. It is not surprising that the "counter-revolutionaries" were persecuted with sophisticated cruelty. For example, Minister of Coal Mining Zhang Linzhi was interrogated 52 times over 33 days and tortured into confessing to anti-people plots. He was also forced to wear a 30 kg cast-iron helmet on his head until he was finally taken to the square, where he was publicly tortured to death. Too scrupulous students who, without due enthusiasm, participated in such bullying, were expelled from cities to remote villages for “re-education”.

Meanwhile, Mao's wife Jiang Qing, a former artist, was busy transforming Chinese art. Its traditional forms had to give way to new ones, imbued with the revolutionary spirit of Maoism. Performances that had been going on for decades were banned, leaving only “politically correct” ones such as “Red Detachment of Women” - one of only eight exemplary plays that were now allowed to be staged by Chinese theaters. The “cultural revolution” that took place behind the scenes was a worthy reflection of street pogroms. One of the make-up artists was severely beaten because she brightly painted the face of a negative hero, making him "unbelievable." Ballet dancers were severely criticized - if they danced "too good", "too traditional", "too individual". They had to change their usual tutus and costumes for military uniforms, slightly altered for greater freedom of movement. Every word Jiang Qing uttered about Chinese culture became law.

Bookstores were closed, it was forbidden to sell any books, except for Mao's quotation book, which became a means of not only ideological, but also physical struggle. Many cases were recorded when prominent party figures were beaten to death with a hardcover book, thus knocking out the “bourgeois poison” from them.

Only "revolutionary operas from modern life" written by Mao's wife Jiang Qing were released at the theater. Thus the campaign for "socialist re-education" was carried out.

Mao Zedong andJiang Qing

All the scenery and costumes of the Peking Opera performances were burned. Monasteries and temples were burned, part of the Great Wall of China was demolished. The latter was attributed to a shortage of bricks for "more needed" pigsties. The owners of shops and shops were also subjected to pressure, who were forced to change their name. Searches were carried out in many houses in order to prove the unreliability of the owners. At the same time, the Red Guards often engaged in looting.

In cities, old street names were replaced with more revolutionary ones. So, the street of Green willows and poplars became the street of the Red East. However, most of the renaming was much less poetic - there were, say, streets of the Destruction of the Old and numerous streets of the Revolution. And the restaurant "The Aroma of Fresh Wind" turned into the "Smell of Gunpowder". The traffic in Beijing plunged into chaos. Red was the symbol of the new China, so using it as a stoplight was considered reactionary. The red light was now supposed to move, and the green light to stand. Moreover, the fight against the "right slope" led to the replacement of right-hand traffic with left-hand traffic, but soon someone remembered that this was the tradition of the British imperialists, and the question of which side to drive on caused heated debate for some time. Drivers preferred not to think about the rules at all, the number of accidents jumped sharply, but this did not seem to bother anyone. However, walking the streets on foot was no less dangerous. Patrols of Red Guards also stopped suspicious ones, cut those who wore too long hair, cut tight trousers, tore elegant skirts, and broke high heels. Mao cleverly took advantage of the atmosphere of general hysteria and wholesale "revelations" and declared the country's leaders Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to be servants of capitalism. Liu Shaoqi was the most prominent victim of the Cultural Revolution. Mao triumphed in complete victory over his rivals. Liu and his supporters were removed from power, stripped of all posts, and subjected to severe persecution. This massacre of the "old guard" clearly demonstrates the situation that prevailed at that time in China. Even such a powerful person as Liu Shaoqi could not stop the storm that the "great helmsman" raised in the country. Liu addressed the CPC Central Committee with derogatory self-criticism, which earned him the praise of the "father of the Chinese people" himself, but this was not enough. Liu hoped for the indulgence of Mao, whose ally he had been since the founding of the Communist Party, but, unfortunately, the all-powerful Jiang Qing fiercely hated the former chairman of the PRC and his wife Wang Guangmei. The younger children of the disgraced couple were expelled from school, the son was sent to prison, and the eldest daughter was sent to a border village. Liu's health deteriorated greatly. The Red Guards continued to persecute his children and his wife, who soon ended up behind bars as well. Only the intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai saved her from death.

However, the Red Guards did not calm down. They broke into Liu's home and plastered the walls of the rooms with incriminating posters. An elderly man was dragged out into the street, forced to recite Mao by heart, and beaten for inaccurate wording. Upon learning of this, on January 13, 1967, Mao summoned Liu to the Great Hall of the People, where he advised him to "read a few books" to better understand communist ideas. Liu was dragged to crowded meetings, where in the course of "criticism" they hit her on the cheeks with a "little red book." And when he tried to justify himself, they ordered him to shut his mouth and "not spread poisonous ideas." Wang Guangmei was taken to Tsinghua University, where she was accused of bourgeois views, beaten and humiliated in front of 300,000 people: she was wearing a ping-pong ball necklace around her neck. And on August 5, 1967, the long-suffering spouses were finally separated. Liu realized that he didn't have long to live. When the Red Guards hung a banner with a noose and clenched fists around his neck, he tried one last time to ask Mao for mercy, but received no answer. Liu never saw his wife and children again. For some time he remained under house arrest, and the security around his house was doubled, forbidding her to show the slightest indulgence to the prisoner. Liu was very weak, could barely walk, and had difficulty eating. The moldy bread and uncooked rice given out as "rations" gave him a terrible stomach ache. The whole body shook continuously. Doctors did not miss a chance to offend the patient once again. Security stopped giving him vitamins and even the medicine he was taking for diabetes. Soon he could no longer eat on his own - he was transferred to the basement and force-fed through a tube inserted through his nose. In 1969, former Chinese President Liu Shaoqi, who played perhaps as much a role in the creation of communist China as Mao himself, died in prison, becoming another martyr of the "cultural revolution".

Most of the Red Guards were children from dysfunctional families. They were accustomed to cruelty from childhood and gladly carried out the instructions of Mao and his supporters. However, soon in their environment there was a stratification on the basis of origin. The gangs were divided into "reds" (come from families of the intelligentsia and party workers) and "blacks" (children from dysfunctional families). Soon they began to quarrel with each other.

Meanwhile, it became more and more difficult to control its course. Mao ordered the Red Guards to go to the villages and shake up the rural party leadership in search of revisionists. Needless to say, the revolutionaries behaved like bands of robbers, terrifying ordinary Chinese. One of the Red Guards proudly said: “We were afraid that people would hide forbidden things, so we searched their houses very carefully. Some of us peeled the wallpaper off the walls and looked to see if there was anything underneath. Others, taking picks and shovels, dug up the cellars. Two or three guys from my group were squeezing toothpaste out of tubes in search of jewelry. Our goal was to humiliate the suspects."

All this, of course, did not contribute to the recovery of the economy, and a murmur of discontent began to be heard among the population. In large cities, workers united in independent trade unions and demanded participation in the government of the country. The center of this movement was Shanghai, with its largest industrial enterprises in China and the most "politically conscious" proletariat. From there, the loudest were complaints about unfair pay and the inaction of official, state-controlled trade unions.

Excerpt from a propaganda newspaper, June 1, 1966: “Resolutely, radically, completely and completely eradicate the dominance and malicious plans of the revisionists! Let's destroy the monsters - the Khrushchevite revisionists!"

In 1967, the Shanghai Commune was proclaimed, modeled on the Paris Commune of 1871, which refused to submit to Beijing. While verbally welcoming this initiative of the working people, Mao did not at all want it to be extended to other industrial centers of China, which could lead to a complete loss of control over the country. He feared a real civil war, since in some provinces Liu Shaoqi's supporters remained in power. The time has come to consolidate the party and restore its solid power, and therefore to put an end to anarchy. The "moderate" premier Zhou Enlai called for an end to violence, and the Chinese army set out to disperse the Red Guard gangs, establishing relative order.

Ultimately, Mao was forced to use the army against the Red Guards that had become uncontrollable. They were deemed "incompetent" and "politically immature". The gangs entered into a fight with the army, for which they were threatened with complete annihilation. In September 1967, the detachments and organizations of the Red Guards were disbanded. The ringleaders were sent to agricultural work in the provinces (in the autumn of 1967 - about 1 million people, in 1970 - 5.4 million), some were publicly shot.

However, by 1968 the education system in China was practically destroyed. Qualified teachers who survived the attacks of the Red Guards were prohibited from professional activities. There are almost no textbooks left - they were destroyed as a source of "bourgeois poison". Studying in schools was reduced to memorization and choral chanting of the sayings of the "great helmsman" and the performance of revolutionary dances. In universities, things were not much better. In the end, the government decided to issue diplomas to all students without examinations and distribute them away from large cities, in which the accumulation of relatively literate youth could lead to a revival of "revisionism". Graduates were sent to the most difficult work, for example, in mines, where there was a catastrophic lack of equipment and almost everything had to be done by hand. Men and women crawled along narrow drifts, dragging baskets of coal behind them. Barefoot doctors with qualifications of paramedics at best, who replaced experienced doctors, who, if they survived, ended up in prisons or underwent “labor re-education”, traveled around the villages.

Mao was afraid that party bureaucrats, especially of the younger generation, not hardened by the revolutionary struggle of the 1930s and 1940s, would hasten to forget their worker-peasant origins and turn into "inaccessible head clerks" and "arrogant gentlemen." Only a return to the roots could remind them of communist principles. As a result, a dense network of "personnel schools on May 7" was created in rural areas. It is believed that by 1970, 95% of party functionaries managed to “improve their health” in them. The fate of top managers was even harder. They were taught to appreciate the work of ordinary people. These specialists were not suitable for working in the fields or in the mines, so they were given brooms, mops and buckets. One of the responsible workers began cleaning public latrines in his area, where every child knew him. One can only guess what moral agony it cost him. Mao moved from repression to insane social engineering. The bosses had to change places with their subordinates. Administrators swept floors, engineers painted walls,
surgeons were emptying chamber pots. Who cared about the death of a patient if the operation was performed by a politically literate orderly. Even urban workers were "reeducated" - they were sent by the millions to the countryside to learn agricultural professions. The results of such a policy were deplorable. The villagers were once again convinced of the truth, perhaps already known to them: all the townspeople are white-handed people who can only eat around the village. And those, in turn, learned that sleeping on straw is cold, and removing manure is like moving mountains with your bare hands.

The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” dragged on for a whole decade, although in recent years the seriously ill Mao Zedong was more and more retired. But the pernicious influence of his wife Jiang Qing increased in the country. As part of the so-called "gang of four," after 1973, she actually headed the CCP, declaring many of her rivals, including the loyal but too popular Lin Biao, enemies of the people. Mao died in 1976. Fortunately, pragmatists again took over in the Communist Party, and not one of the leaders of the “cultural revolution” managed to take the place of the “great helmsman”. The country breathed a sigh of relief. Informally, but in fact, power passed into the hands of the miraculously survived Deng Xiaoping. In 1978, the elderly Wang Guangmei, who had heroically endured all the trials, was released from prison, and in 1980 her husband, Liu Shaoqi, was posthumously rehabilitated, admitting that the accusations against him "were not confirmed."

In addition, the "rebels" destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples of the PRC: thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, monasteries and temples in Tibet.

From the decision of the CPC Central Committee, 1981: “The Cultural Revolution was not and cannot be a revolution or social progress in any sense. It was a turmoil caused from above through the fault of the leader and used by counter-revolutionary groups, a turmoil that brought serious disasters to the party, the state and the entire multinational people.

It seems to me that Mao Zedong wanted to resolve the growing conflict between the ruling class and the people through the Cultural Revolution. Mao tried to overthrow the ruling class and form a new one - he believed that the goals of the Cultural Revolution were identical to those set by the communists in the twenties. He was afraid that the communists would become an elite that would sit on the neck of the people: the new revolutionaries very quickly become the ruling class, and after that everything repeats itself. The revolutionaries said that the main thing is equality, but when they came to power, they changed, and Mao Zedong wanted to overcome this cyclical history by means of a cultural revolution. As you know, modern Chinese also oppose corrupt officials - they can certainly understand the logic that guided Mao Zedong. The problem is that high ideals led to a huge tragedy...

To assert the views of their group in the leadership of the CCP (Maoism) as a state ideology and in the framework of the fight against the views of the political opposition. The objective content of the "cultural revolution" was the destruction of traditionalism and the creation of a generational conflict.

The very term "cultural revolution" was first used by V. I. Lenin in 1923 in his work "On Cooperation".

Causes of the "cultural revolution"

international background

The struggle for sole leadership in the party

Most researchers of the "cultural revolution" [ who?] agree that one of the main reasons for the unfolding "cultural revolution" in China was the struggle for leadership in the party.

Although the bourgeoisie has already been overthrown, it is nevertheless trying, with the help of the exploitative old ideology, old culture, old mores and old customs, to corrupt the masses, win the hearts of the people, strenuously strives for its goal of carrying out restoration. In contrast to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must respond to any of its challenges in the field of ideology with a crushing blow and, with the help of a new proletarian ideology, new culture, new mores and new customs, change the spiritual image of the whole society. Today we set ourselves the goal of crushing those invested with power who follow the capitalist path, to criticize the reactionary bourgeois "authorities" in science, to criticize the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, to transform education, to transform literature and art, to transform all areas of the superstructure that do not correspond to economic basis of socialism in order to contribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system.

The application of Mao's class theory in practice led to a real "war of all against all". Under the demagogic by nature, vague definitions of the class enemies of the proletariat, coming from Mao, anyone could fall: from an ordinary peasant to a top party worker. But the bearers of traditions were the worst of all: the former feudal lords, the clergy, the intelligentsia, etc. Power, given into the hands of the masses, turned into elementary anarchy. It was captured by those who were simply stronger: gangs of young "rebels" (Hongweiping (from schoolchildren and students) and Zaofan), who were eventually allowed to operate with virtually impunity.

On June 1, 1966, after reading on the radio a dazibao composed by Nie Yuanzi, a professor of philosophy at Peking University: “Resolutely, radically, completely and completely eradicate the dominance and evil designs of the revisionists! Let's destroy the monsters - the Khrushchevite revisionists!" millions of schoolchildren and students organized themselves into detachments and easily began to look for “monsters and demons” to be eradicated among their teachers, university leadership, and then among local and city authorities who tried to protect teachers. They hung datsibao on “class enemies”, put on a jester’s cap, sometimes put on humiliating rags (more often on women), painted their faces with black ink, forced them to bark like a dog; they were ordered to walk bent over or crawl. The dissolution on July 26, 1966 of students of all schools and universities for a six-month vacation contributed to the revelry of youth and replenishment of the ranks of the Red Guards with an additional 50 million underage students.

Detachments of the Red Guards cut off women's braids and shaved off dyed hair, tore at too tight trousers, broke off high heels on women's shoes, broke sharp-toed shoes in half, forced the owners of shops and shops to change their name. The Red Guards stopped passers-by and read Mao's quotes to them, searched houses in search of "evidence" of the unreliability of the owners, while requisitioning money and valuables.

During the "village surrounds the cities" campaign, between 10 and 20 million young people with or receiving higher education were forcibly removed from their homes and deported to work in remote villages, districts and mountains.

The system of state control over society has actually eliminated itself. The law enforcement and judicial systems were inactive, so the Red Guards and Zaofans were given complete freedom of action, which resulted in chaos. Initially, the Red Guards operated under the control of Mao and his associates. There were many careerists among them, and many of them managed to make a quick career for themselves on the wave of revolutionary demagogy and terror. They climbed over other people's heads, accusing their university teachers of "counter-revolutionary revisionism", and their "comrades in arms" of insufficient revolutionary spirit. Thanks to the courier detachments of Kang Sheng, contact was made with the leaders of the Red Guards.

Many Red Guards were children from dysfunctional families. Poorly educated and accustomed to cruelty from childhood, they became an excellent tool in the hands of Mao. But at the same time, for example, 45% of the rebels in the city of Canton were children of the intelligentsia. Even the children of Liu Shaoqi once told their father, who was already under house arrest, about what interesting things they managed to expropriate in a family of bourgeois elements.

Soon, among the Red Guards, stratification began on the basis of origin. They were divided into "red" and "black" - the first came from families of the intelligentsia and party workers, the second - the children of the poor and workers. Their gangs began an uncompromising struggle. Both of them had the same quotes with them, but they all interpreted them in their own way. After the clash of the gangs, the killer could say that it was "mutual assistance", the thief who stole bricks from the factory justified himself by saying that "the revolutionary class must bend its line." Mao controlled the bulk of the "generals of the cultural revolution" worse and worse, but the main directions of the development of chaos remained under his control.

The Red Guards then unleashed more violence and factional fighting. Even in the small village of Long Gully, under the guise of a revolutionary struggle, there was a struggle between the clans that controlled the south and north of the village. In Canton in July-August 1967, in armed clashes between detachments of the Red Banner organization, on the one hand, and the Wind of Communism, on the other, 900 people were killed, and artillery was involved in the skirmishes. In the province of Gansu, people were tied to 50 cars with wire or wire and stabbed with knives until they turned into a bloody mess.

In the autumn of 1967, Mao used the army against the Red Guards, whom he now denounced as "incompetent" and "politically immature." Sometimes the Red Guards offered resistance to the army. So, on August 19, 1967, 30 thousand soldiers and fighters of the people's peasant militia entered the city of Guilin after a long positional war. Within six days, almost all the Red Guards were exterminated in the city. Mao threatened that if the Red Guards fought the army, killed people, destroyed vehicles, or burned fires, they would be destroyed. In September 1967, the units and organizations of the Red Guards disbanded themselves. Five leaders of the Red Guards were soon sent to work on a pig farm in a remote province. On April 27, 1968, several leaders of the "rebels" in Shanghai were sentenced to death and publicly shot. In the autumn of 1967, a million young people (and in 1970 5.4 million) were exiled to remote areas, many of them staying there for more than ten years.

At the 9th Party Congress, held from April 1 to April 24, 1969, the Maoist ideology was finally consolidated at the official level. The policies of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were finally condemned. The thesis that Lin Biao is the "successor" of Mao Zedong was included in the general provisions section of the party charter. The congress, which contributed to the legitimization of the theory and practice of the "cultural revolution", strengthened the position of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their supporters in the Central Committee.

The second stage - Schools of Personnel May 7, "Up in the mountains, down in the villages"

The second stage of the "cultural revolution" began in May 1969 and ended in September 1971. Some researchers take the second stage out of the actual “cultural revolution” and date its beginning to the middle of 1968.

School personnel May 7th. The first cadre schools appeared on May 7 towards the end of 1968 . They received such a name from Mao Zedong's "Remarks ..." made on May 7, 1966, in which he proposed to create schools in which cadres and intellectuals would undergo labor training with practical exercises in useful physical labor. 106 cadre schools were built for senior officials on May 7 in 18 provinces. 100,000 central government officials, including Deng Xiaoping, and 30,000 family members were sent to these schools. For officials of lower rank, there were thousands of cadre schools in which an unknown number of medium and small officials were trained. For example, by January 10, 1969, almost 300 cadre schools were built in Guangdong Province on May 7, and more than one hundred thousand cadres were sent to the lower classes for labor.

The main system practiced in cadre schools was the "three-thirds" system. It consisted in the fact that a third of the working time of the former cadres was engaged in physical labor, a third - in theory and a third - in the organization of production, management and written work.

During the "cultural revolution", about 5 million party members were repressed, and by the 9th Congress of the CCP, there were about 17 million people in the party. During the 10th Congress in 1973, the membership of the CCP was already 28 million people, that is, in 1970-1973, about 10-12 million people were accepted into the CCP. Thus, Mao replaced the "old" party members, who were capable of at least some dissent, with the "new" - fanatical followers of the personality cult.

"Rebels" and Red Guards destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples. For example, thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, etc. were destroyed. Almost all the monasteries and temples in Tibet that had survived to the beginning of the “cultural revolution” were destroyed.

The "Cultural Revolution" was not and cannot be a revolution or social progress in any sense... it was a turmoil caused from above through the fault of the leader and used by counter-revolutionary groups, a turmoil that brought serious disasters to the party, the state and the entire multinational people. /From the decision of the CPC Central Committee (1981)/

By placing the responsibility for the "cultural revolution" only on Mao Zedong and party groups declared "counter-revolutionary", the CCP legitimizes its power in the conditions of the Chinese market economy.

see also

Notes

Literature

• Zhelokhovtsev A. "Cultural Revolution" at close range. Moscow: Politizdat, 1973, 265 p.
• Usov V.N. "Cultural Revolution in China". China: History in Persons and Events. M.: 1991.
• Usov V. N. China: from the "Great Leap Forward" to the "Cultural Revolution" (1960-1966) IFES RAS. Moscow, 1998. Part 1, 221 pages; Part 2. - 241 p.
• Usov V.N. China: from the “cultural revolution” to reforms and openness (1976-1984). IFES RAS, Moscow, 2003. - 190 p. - ISBN 5-8381-0064-8
• Sneath D. The Impact of the Cultural Revolution in China on the Mongolians of Inner Mongolia. - Modern Asian Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 1994, p.409-430.
• Dittmer, Lowell. China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981

Links

• Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (August 8, 1966)
• Paul Johnson. Modernity. CHAPTER SIXTEEN
• The Black Book of Communism. Chapter "China: Long March into the Night"

Introduction

1.1 Formation of the PRC. Establishing friendly relations with the USSR

2 Great Leap Forward policy and its implementation

3 Strengthening the power of "pragmatists" and weakening the position of Mao

. "Cultural Revolution" in China. Policy and practice

1 Beginning of "cultural transformation"

2.2 The movement of "Red Guards"

Conclusion

Introduction

The "cultural revolution" is one of the worst tragedies in the history of the last century, comparable only to the genocide of Jews in Nazi Germany and Stalin's purges. It was unleashed by Mao Zedong to maintain his despotic power over the Chinese people.

The terrible events of the dark decade of the "cultural revolution" have demonstrated how unpredictable and cruel the actions of youth, zombified by a dictator, can be. Unleashing the "cultural revolution", Mao pursued the goal of eliminating from the leading bodies of the party all those who disagreed with his policy of forming barracks communism in China.

To deal with his potential opponents, he used politically immature youth, from which the assault detachments of the Red Guards were formed. "The ideas of Mao Zedong are the highest guidelines in all our actions. We swear that for the sake of protecting the Central Committee, protecting the great leader Chairman Mao, we will not hesitate to give the last drop of blood, resolutely bring the cultural revolution to an end," the Red Guards urged.

Classes in schools and universities were discontinued so that nothing would interfere with the implementation of "revolutionary activities." School teachers, writers and artists, party and state workers were taken to the "court of the masses" in jester's hats, beaten, mocked at them, accusing them of "revisionist actions."

By the end of 1966, there were already more than 10 million Red Guards. According to the Beijing branch of the Ministry of State Security, in the first months of the "cultural revolution" the Red Guards killed about 2,000 people in Beijing alone. Hundreds of thousands of citizens were expelled from major cities. During the Cultural Revolution, a million people were killed or committed suicide.

The ability of young people to decide the fate of other people led to the manifestation of their most negative qualities. Permissiveness and impunity involved the most marginal and criminal part of the urban population in this movement.

At the same time, as millions of young people were involved, Mao was losing control of the genie of violence he had released. In various provinces of China, spontaneous resistance began to the actions of the distraught youth on the part of workers and employees. At the call of local committees of the CPC, and sometimes spontaneously, they rebuffed the Red Guards, engaging in battles with the pogromists.

Only the death of Mao in 1976 stopped this tragedy, which lasted 10 years and brought so much grief and sacrifice to the Chinese people. The Chinese leadership that came after Mao's death, unlike their Soviet counterparts, refused to expose the cult of the "great helmsman."

The relevance of the research topic of the Chinese Cultural Revolution lies in the fact that knowledge of this problem makes it possible to avoid a repetition of the tragedy. Humanity must remember the events of the past years in order not to make the same mistakes.

The object of research of the thesis is China during the "Cultural Revolution".

The subject of the study is the course of the "Cultural Revolution" movement in China.

The purpose of this thesis: to study the cultural development of China in 1965-1976.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks were put forward:

Consider the preconditions for a "cultural revolution" in China;

To study the socio-economic and political essence of the "cultural revolution";

Analyze the consequences of the "cultural revolution".

The structure of the work is determined by the subject, purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The introduction reveals the relevance, defines the object, subject, purpose, and objectives of the study.

The first chapter examines the prerequisites for the "cultural revolution" in China. The second chapter reveals the features of the socio-economic and political essence of the "cultural revolution" in China. The third chapter is devoted to the analysis of the consequences of the "Cultural Revolution".

In conclusion, the results of the study are summed up, final conclusions on the topic under consideration are formed.

1. The formation of the PRC and the first steps in socio-economic and political development

1 Formation of the PRC. Establishing friendly relations with the USSR

On October 1949, the leaders of the country that the world would later call "Red China" gathered at the gates of heavenly tranquility leading to Tiananmen Square to announce the creation of a new communist state. The Chinese Government has stated that the Council of the People's Government of China has decided to announce to all the governments of the world that it is the one legitimate government representing all the people of the People's Republic of China. A parade was held demonstrating the military power of the state. All weapons shown at the parade were captured from the Nationalist army. The air parade was attended by nationalist pilots who defected to the communists and planes that the US government sent to help Chiang Kai-shek. The parade was supposed to impress not only the West, but also Moscow. Mao Zedong suggested finding a supporter. The main goal of his policy was to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Most of all, he was afraid that after the victory of the revolution, no one would recognize the new government of China. When Mao visited Moscow, Stalin pretended for several weeks that he could not receive him, until, in the end, Mao became indignant. After that, both countries signed a treaty of friendship. (22, p. 58)

The People's Republic of China was formed as a result of a long revolutionary process, which initially developed in remote rural areas. The new state first united the liberated regions, which were called Soviet (Suweiai qu). From the first years of their existence, they were under the leadership of the Communist Party, but for a number of years they did not have common authorities, administration and courts. It was only in 1931 that such bodies were created at the All-Chinese Congress of Soviets held in Ruijin in November 1931. The congress formed the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the Chinese Soviet Republic (CSR). Both of these bodies could legislate. At the same time, the Supreme Court was formed. Local authorities proclaimed the Councils of Deputies, which formed the executive committees. In the newly liberated and front-line regions, all power was concentrated in the hands of the revolutionary committees. (13, p. 23)

At the 1st All-China Congress of Soviets, the draft Basic Constitutional Program of the CSR was approved. In its final form, it was adopted at the Second All-China Congress of Soviets in 1934, proclaiming "democratic freedoms for the working people", national equality, equal rights for men and women, as well as the right of all the peoples of China to self-determination up to state secession and the creation of independent states. The independence of Outer Mongolia was unconditionally recognized. (25, p. 102)

In accordance with the Basic Constitutional Program, the Regulations and the Provisional Law on Elections to the Soviets (1931 and 1933, respectively), "only working people" enjoyed active and passive suffrage. The workers were given special advantages in the elections to the Soviets. Elections of deputies were held at special meetings according to the production-territorial principle: workers - at enterprises, and peasants, artisans, etc. - at their place of residence. The principles of the work of the Soviets were established by special acts adopted at the I and II Congresses of Soviets (the Regulations and the resolution on Soviet construction). (15, p. 68)

The unfavorable military situation that developed for the Red Army of China in the southern part of the country required the redeployment of the armed forces of the communists to northwestern China, which was completed in 1936. On the border of the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia in the old forces of the Red Army, the main revolutionary base was created - the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The next stage of the Chinese revolutionary war against the Japanese invaders began. (21, p. 90)

In accordance with the terms of the agreement on internal peace between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, the Northwestern Chancellery of the Central Soviet Government of China was transformed into the government of the Special Region of the Republic of China, and the Red Army of China into the People's Revolutionary Army (soon it received the name of the 8th Army, later The Communists formed the 4th New Army). A regime based on universal suffrage was proclaimed on the territory of the liberated regions. For the duration of the war, in the liberated areas - anti-Japanese revolutionary bases - the confiscation of land from the landowners was stopped. But this did not mean the return of the already confiscated lands to the landowners: any attempts in this direction were strictly suppressed. At the same time, a policy of reducing rents and loan interest was pursued for the peasants. (48)

In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, as well as in other liberated regions, where conditions allowed, local representative bodies were elected - People's Political Councils. In between sessions of the Soviets, their functions were performed by standing committees. Governments (government councils) were formed as executive bodies, possessing the necessary administrative apparatus. (32, p. 30)

The government bodies of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and other anti-Japanese revolutionary bases adopted constitutional documents called administrative-political or political programs. The programs included measures to strengthen the anti-Japanese united front and improve the lives of the people, protect their rights, and develop agricultural and industrial production. They proclaimed the equality of nationalities and genders, the policy of eradicating illiteracy, reforming the judiciary and the entire state apparatus. (41, p. 50)

In September 1945, the eight-year-long war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders ended. The Soviet Union provided decisive assistance to the Chinese people in the victorious end of the anti-Japanese war. The main revolutionary base of the communists was the Northeast of China (Manchuria). In the civil war that broke out again (1946-1949), the Kuomintang was defeated. (27, p. 69)

In 1948-1949. in the most important economic, political and cultural centers of the country, revolutionary power was established, the main support of which was the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) (this name was adopted during the new civil war by the armed forces of the Chinese Communists). The main form of revolutionary power was the military control committees (VKK) of the PLA, which were appointed directly by front-line military and political bodies. The VKK were the main organs of local power throughout the entire period of military control. All other local bodies, including government ones, were subordinate to them, and military tribunals were formed under them, the sentences of which were usually not subject to appeal. The VKK issued a large number of normative acts regulating various aspects of life in the liberated cities. (41, p. 58)

In the process of liquidating the Kuomintang administration, the VKK created a new government: local people's governments and mass representative bodies - conferences of people's representatives. They differed from the people's political councils of the period of the anti-Japanese war both in terms of their social composition and functions. The delegates of the conferences could not be landowners and representatives of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The functions of the conferences were rather advisory, and they gradually began to assume the powers of local people's congresses later, already in the 1950s. (29, p. 107)

In the spring and summer of 1949, the People's Political Consultative Council of China took shape organizationally. By the autumn of this year, only one large city remained in the hands of the Kuomintang - Guangzhou (Canton). The time has come for the unification of the liberated regions of the country into a single state. In the process of unification of the revolutionary forces and the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the governments and military-administrative committees of the large liberated regions played an important role. People's governments were established in the previously liberated Northeast and North China. Military administrative committees were established in Northwest, East, South-Central and Southwest China. (31, p. 98)

The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949 by decision of the plenary session of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC), which assumed the functions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and played the role of the Republic's Constituent Assembly. (36, p. 127)

The session adopted the General (Joint) Program of the CPPCC, its Organizational Statute, the Law on the Organization of the Central People's Government, decrees on the national flag, anthem, new chronology and transfer of the capital of the state to Beijing with the return of its old name. The general program was considered the interim constitution of the country. She proclaimed the People's Republic of China "the state of new democracy". The program proclaimed the state sector of the economy as the basis of the country's economic development. At the same time, the ways of developing the cooperative, small-scale commodity, state-capitalist and private capitalist sectors were determined. The General Program did not speak directly about the transition to socialism. (28, p. 225)

The main principles of the organization and activities of state bodies were proclaimed democratic centralism and participation in the management of state affairs by the broad masses of the people representing all the nationalities of the country, etc. The program did not include the principle of national self-determination of the peoples living in China. The solution of the national question was carried out in the form of the creation of territorial autonomies. (34, p. 60)

The General Program was the starting point of the legislation of the PRC in the period before the adoption of the Constitution of 1954. All laws of that time were issued with reference to this program. In accordance with Art. 17 of the General Program, all previous Chinese legislation was repealed.

The session of the National People's Congress elected the Central People's Government Council (TsNPS), which was the highest authority during the restoration period. He represented the PRC outside, and inside the country he exercised all the powers of the highest state authority (legislation, ratification of international treaties, approval of the budget and report on its implementation, appointment of senior state officials, resolution of issues of war and peace, etc.). The functions of the head of state were performed by the TsNPS, but they were realized mainly through the activities of the chairman of the Central People's Government (TsNP). Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Mao Zedong became the chairman of the CNP. He also took the post of chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. (7, p. 121)

After the signing of the friendship treaty between China and the USSR, a serious test awaited the new ally. North Korea attacked South Korea, prompting a massive US intervention. And since China and North Korea were neighbors and had friendly relations, China decided that it was its international duty to help. The Korean War brought Mao undoubted success. China has risen against the US, the most powerful country in the world. China can be proud of this. (3, p. 32)

In the last years of his life, Stalin recognized that Mao was a loyal comrade and that China was a reliable ally. China wanted to learn from the USSR, to study its economy. Mao Zedong: "The citizens of our country should work hard, they should make every effort to learn the best practices of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries. We should turn our country with a backward culture and economy into an industrialized state in just a few five years." Now the Chinese economy was built entirely on the Soviet model. Shops and factories were nationalized to loud demonstrations of popular approval. In the countryside, peasants are being persuaded to join cooperatives, the equivalent of Soviet collective farms. By 1956, China had become, in effect, a traditional Soviet bloc state. (46)

Having ousted Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan and seized power in the country, expelled reactionary foreigners from the territory of China, and announced to all governments of the world about the creation of a new communist state, the communists established friendly relations with the USSR. They began to adopt the experience of the Soviet Union, to study its economy. The Chinese economy began to be built entirely on the Soviet model. China has essentially become a new state of the Soviet bloc.

2 Politics "Great Leap Forward and its implementation

Mao Zedong had doubts whether the path of development of the Soviet Union was suitable for China, or whether it should choose its own unique, Chinese path of development. After Stalin's death, the new leaders of Russia declared him a cruel paranoid dictator, and a monument to Stalin was destroyed in Budapest. The intelligentsia and students incited people to revolt. This led Mao to think about how to avoid such revisionism in China. (fifty)

In the spring of 1957, he launched a new political campaign, radically different from those previously carried out in the Soviet state. The slogan was: "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools compete." Peking University was talking about this, and all the students were happy that they could freely express their thoughts. Mao decided to let the people let off steam by allowing them to openly criticize the brutal arbitrariness of party officials. And student leaders such as Lin Xilin argued that the problem was not with officials, but with the communist system itself. Soon the unrest was suppressed, and the students were behind bars. Mao admitted that his goal was to expose internal enemies. "Create the snakes out of their holes." Half a million so-called reactionary intellectuals were sent to work in the fields like peasants for twenty years. The threat was eliminated and Chairman Mao conceived a new campaign. (40, p. 215)

In 1958, another nationwide campaign began in China. This time it was flies, mosquitoes, sparrows and rats. Millions of Chinese went out and scared the birds until they dropped dead from exhaustion. The campaign was not without consequences. Insects, which sparrows used to eat, caused enormous damage to the crop. The next year, efforts were carefully redirected to the fight against bed bugs. Each Chinese family had to demonstrate their participation in the campaign and collect a large bag filled to the brim with these pests. The attack on sparrows was especially intense. His strategy was to keep the sparrows from landing, to keep them in the air all the time, in flight, until they collapsed in exhaustion. But suddenly the whole thing turned into an environmental disaster. The inhabitants of China began to observe something incredible: the trees were covered with a white cobweb produced by some kind of worms and caterpillars. Soon, millions of disgusting insects filled everything: they climbed into people's hair, under clothes. Workers in the factory canteen, getting lunch, found caterpillars and other insects floating there in their plates. And although the Chinese are not very spoiled, they were also disgusted by it. Nature has avenged her barbarous treatment of herself. The campaign against sparrows and insects had to be curtailed. (44, p. 167)

But another campaign was in full swing. Its object was people - 500 million Chinese peasants, who were subjected to an unprecedented experiment of familiarization with new forms of existence unknown to them. They decided to try out an idea that had sunk into the mind of the leader. It was the idea of ​​the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes. The goal pursued by Mao Zedong when starting the organization of the "Great Leap Forward" consisted in the transition to communism in the shortest possible time based on the establishment of such forms of social organization that would allow achieving unprecedented economic efficiency of production, implementing the main principles of the communist utopia, and contributing to the strengthening of the dominant position of Mao Zedong in the CPC, and the CPC and the PRC in the international communist movement and the world. It was a utopian program with a clear nationalist and messianic slant. At the beginning of 1958, another noisy campaign began in China under the slogan "give your hearts." To whom to give? Of course, Mao Tse-tung. On the walls of houses throughout China, dazibao (newspapers in large characters) were hung with countless quotations from his writings. Enthusiasts - peasants and workers, employees and students - as if on command, began to call on each other to work as much as possible for less pay. (37, p. 79)

Shortly thereafter, Mao Tse-tung went to Henan Province. During this voyage, the first Chinese "commune" appeared. She was born in April 1958, when 27 collective farms numbering 43.8 thousand united in the first commune, which was named "Sputnik". This is how the campaign to realize Mao Tse-tung's social utopia began. Adopted by the VIII Congress of the CPC in 1956, the second five-year plan in 1958. was considered "conservative". Ultimately, the leadership of the CPC decided to increase the volume of gross industrial output by 6.5 times over the five-year period, and by 2.5 times in agriculture. If at the 2nd session of the VIII Congress of the CPC the task was set to catch up with and overtake England economically in 15 years or a little longer, then a few months later this task was planned to be completed in 5 years or even faster. In August 1958, at the suggestion of Mao, a decision was made by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee to create "people's communes", and after 45 days an official announcement appeared that practically the entire peasantry - 121936350 families, or more than 500 million people - joined the "communes". In other words, the policy of "communization" pursued, according to the plan of its organizers, both economic goals - increasing the efficiency of social production, and social goals - accelerating the construction of a socialist and communist society. As for the methods of accelerating the pace of economic construction, this issue is shed light on the mass propaganda campaigns that were carried out during this period. Newspapers, magazines, dazibao, hung on the walls of houses, contained stereotypical calls: "work like an ant moving a mountain." The organizers of the "communes" set themselves the task of introducing the people of China to completely new forms of labor relations, social life, everyday life, family, morality, which they passed off as communist forms. It was assumed that the "commune", which was subsequently to spread to the urban population, would become a universal production and household unit of the existence of each person. All previously existing public and personal forms of relations were doomed to destruction: cooperative property and personal plots, distribution according to work and preservation of household income, participation in the management of cooperative affairs, etc. Even the family, this institution highly respected from time immemorial in China, must be destroyed. Zealous performers in the localities not only managed to carry out the "communization" of the entire rural population of the country within a few months, but also moved decisively forward, nationalizing the property of the cooperatives, the personal property of the peasants, militarizing their work and life. At the end of 1959, urban "communes" began to emerge. Soon the movement for "communization" in the cities intensified, it was carried out under the slogan "everything belongs to the state, except for the toothbrush." In other words, the total nationalization of property is the most characteristic feature of the ongoing campaign. Another feature of the "communes" is the militarization of labor, the creation of labor armies and the rejection of the socialist principle of distribution according to work. Peasants - men and women were obliged to undergo military training, they were united in companies and battalions and often went armed, in the ranks, with a soldier's step for field work. (18, p. 44)

The consequences of the Great Leap Forward were severe. Perhaps its most terrible consequence was the fall of agriculture. Agriculture developed so much that only strict food rationing allowed people to make ends meet. The moral character of the people has changed. Speculation and the black market flourished. Riots of peasants, flight from the "communes", the destruction of houses for fuel, trade from under the floor. In 1958-1960. construction of small enterprises began on a large scale. Small and medium-sized enterprises produced 40-50% of pig iron production during these years. During the years of the Great Leap Forward, hundreds of thousands of primitive blast furnaces, iron-smelting and steel-smelting furnaces, small coal mines, etc. were built in China. in industrial construction in 1957 amounted to only 7.2 billion yuan). In September 1958, about 100 million people, including 50 million directly involved in smelting, were involved in the production of metal by artisanal methods, as well as in the extraction and transportation of raw materials. As a rule, these were people who did not have any experience in the iron and steel industry. The idea led to the useless consumption of many tens of millions of tons of coal, iron ore, billions of yuan, billions of man-days of labor. According to Soviet economists, in the period 1958-1960. a significant quantitative growth in industrial output was achieved due to low-quality products. But as early as the second quarter of 1960, the situation in industry deteriorated sharply. From April 1960, chaos and a decline in production began in China's industry. (4, p. 102)

The 1st Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1961, at which the course of the so-called "settlement" was adopted, recognized that serious economic and political difficulties had arisen in the country. The scale of capital construction was sharply reduced, and most construction projects were mothballed. The restructuring of the "people's communes" began, and household plots were returned to the peasants. Initially, the Chinese leaders assumed that the severe consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" could be eliminated in two years (1960-1962), but these calculations turned out to be unrealistic. In fact, the "settlement" officially continued until the end of 1965 and covered even most of 1966. In 1957, the grain harvest reached 187 million tons, which roughly corresponded to the harvests that were harvested in China before 1937. The 1958 harvest was the highest in the history of the country. However, it was not equal to 375 million tons, as it was announced by the Maoists in August 1958. The harvest in 1958 amounted to 200-210 million tons. In 1961, 200 million tons. Taking into account population growth, there was even some reduction in per capita consumption compared to pre-war China. In lean years, the calorie intake was below 1,500 per day, and famine would have threatened the country if strict food rationing had not been introduced. Food production has stabilized at about the level that existed before the revolution. (33, p. 50)

Such were the economic results of the experiment on 500 million Chinese workers. The initiator of all these experiments was Mao Tse-tung. The first symptoms of the defeat of the policy of "leap" and "people's communes" appeared very quickly. This allowed the opponents of the extremist line to intensify their actions. At the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, which was held in Wuhan (November-December 1958), a lengthy resolution "On Certain Issues Concerning People's Communes" was adopted, which was directed against "running ahead", criticizing people who " overzealous", thinking that the building of communism is "a very simple matter". The resolution confirmed the gradual process of transition to communism, indicating, in particular, that the process of "planting communes" would take at least 15-20 years. (26, p. 187)

In Moscow, Mao promised that China would overtake Britain in steel production within fifteen years. At a meeting in Bai DaHe in 1958, they approved a doubling of steel production and at the same time introduced new rules, according to which party committees were responsible for not fulfilling the plan. As a result, inflated figures were published in the newspapers every day to convince people that they could indeed double their steel production. Then China produced 5 million tons of steel per year. Mao set a new goal - 100 million tons, which was supposed to be reached in just three years. Smelting furnaces needed fuel and the whole country began to mine coal. In order to embody Mao's pran, people were encouraged to build their own primitive smelting furnaces. Soon every factory, every workshop, every neighbor had them. All personal belongings containing iron were destroyed and ended up in furnaces. But everything was useless - sometimes the ore that was put into the furnace turned out to be of such poor quality that nothing could be extracted from it. In these furnaces, pots, pans, iron fences, and various tools were melted down to produce steel. (47)

In the summer of 1959, local authorities throughout China reported unprecedented harvests not only of grain and cotton, but also of other industrial crops. But real yields were much smaller. Reported about one and a half tons of grain from four thousand square meters. In fact, no more than a ton of rice was harvested from 4 thousand square meters. But there were reports about 20 tons, which is basically impossible. There were many exaggerations. (5, p. 163)

The production indicators with which people were stuffed were taken from the ceiling and this was a problem, since taxes had to be paid in grain, and the peasants could not give so much grain. They had to take grain from their stocks to pay the tax. As a result, they had nothing to eat the following spring. Hunger reigned and it was exacerbated by natural disasters. (20, p. 84)

Mao was aware of the difficulties involved. That the inhabitants of some provinces were starving, but he had not been to these areas, and the government assured him that, in general, the situation was not bad. Ministers, vice-premiers and the prime minister himself reported only good news to the chairman. They did not dare to speak openly. (38, p. 77)

And Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, thanks to military intelligence, was better informed than anyone else and sent a letter to his colleagues expressing his concern about the consequences of the Great Leap Forward. But according to Mao-Peng, Dehuai had too left-wing views.

Therefore, Peng and his supporters were stripped of power and disappeared from the political arena. This was the turning point. No other member of the Politburo dared to openly criticize Mao. From now on, open disagreement was assessed as political opposition and punished. Mao's authority became indisputable. (24, p. 342)

The famine began in the winter of 1958. The provinces of Shandong and Henan were the first to suffer. According to official statistics, the death toll rose from 1440,000 in 1958 to 4,620,000 in 1959, and in 1960 the number of victims was almost 10,000,000, in 1961 2,700,000 and in 1962 the death toll was 244,000. The total number of deaths in that period is about 38,000,000 people. (49)

Officially, record grain harvests are in abundance in the country - public kitchens supply the peasants with everything they need. In reality, there is nothing. Cannibalism has become commonplace. There is no visual evidence of famine. There is not a single photo. Hunger remained a terrible secret hidden behind images of abundance. In Qingyang, a model region, a million people died of starvation (one-eighth of the total population). (23, p. 134)

The "Great Leap Forward" policy oriented the national economy towards accelerated growth, regardless of either the previously approved plans or the costs. Trade turnover after the creation of "people's communes" decreased by 30-50%, according to Chinese economists. The general situation in economics since the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward" is characterized by the fact that economic research has begun to lose scientific objectivity. In economic theory, many "forbidden zones" have arisen. In the course of implementing the "Great Leap Forward" policy, the economy faced serious disproportions, and not only did not accelerate the pace of the country's economic and social development, and did not lead it to a more developed communist way of life, but also led to a drop in the pace of economic development, and caused famine that claimed more ten million lives in China.

1.3 Gain authorities "pragmatists " and weakening positions Mao

In 1960, three high-ranking government officials analyzed the population figures and compiled a report according to which the population had decreased by more than 10,000,000. They sent it to Zhouenglai and Mao Zedong, the only ones who were aware of the whole situation. Zhouenlai ordered that the report be destroyed immediately. Other leaders of the country - even Lushaoqi - were not informed about the true scale of the tragedy. Liu only realized how terrible it was a year later, when he visited his native village in Hunan province and talked to the peasants there. When Lushaoqi arrived, the officials told him that the main problem was drought, but Liu grew up in the countryside and knew that during a drought the ponds were empty, but now they were half full. So, if drought was a problem, it wasn't the main one. He began to ask the peasants what had happened, but they did not dare to tell him. But after a few meetings, the truth was finally revealed. One of the peasants told him that this famine was three-tenths a natural disaster, and seven-tenths the work of man. Shortly after this meeting, a card system was introduced, but at the height of the famine, there was nothing to give out even on cards. (12, p. 84)

At a party leadership meeting in 1962, Lushaoqi quoted a peasant interlocutor that the famine was 30% a natural disaster and 70% the work of man. Enraged Mao speaks with forced self-criticism. Nobody questions his authority. But he himself begins to wonder - will Liu be a worthy successor? Liu Shaoqi introduced new political measures one after another. Including the provision of certain freedom to individual farms and the allocation of personal plots to peasants, where they could grow crops suitable for food. Chairman Mao later criticized some of these measures. (35, p. 91)

By the mid 60s. Thanks to the efforts of the "pragmatists", the consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" in the economy were largely overcome. China has approached the level of 1957 in terms of both agricultural and industrial production. During 1963-1964. China showed high rates of development. Agricultural production grew by 10% annually, while the growth rate of industrial production was almost 20%. (51)

A general return to the old methods of managing did not mean that Mao Zedong abandoned his plans. In the first half of the 60s. in China, the experience of a large production team Dazhai in prov. Shanxi and Daqing oil fields (Prov. Heilongjiang). The essence of the "experience of Dazhai and Daqing" was the creation of economic structures that combine elements of both agricultural and industrial production, focused on almost complete self-sufficiency. In this case, all profits were to be transferred to the state. Thus, it was again a question of creating semi-subsistence economic units, within which, with negligible investments from the state, it was possible to bring the exploitation of workers to the limit. Behind the "experience of Dazhai and Daqing" the outlines of the people's communes of the period of the "jump" were definitely visible. (30, p. 350)

In trying to get China back on its feet after the damage from the Great Leap Forward, Liu Shaoqi relies heavily on Zhou Enlai. Deng Xiaoping, who angered Chairman Mao by saying "it doesn't matter what color the cat is, as long as it catches mice," becomes Liu's closest ally. None of them understood that the chairman was setting the stage for Liu's political suicide. He will portray him as a revisionist who wants to put China on the capitalist path of development. Mao steps aside. He became more and more isolated and spent less and less time at the helm.

He no longer carried out daily management of the party and government. In the meantime, Mao deliberately remains in the background, Liu Shaoqi becomes China's official in relations with the outside world. Many consider him Mao's best friend and future successor, but throughout 1965, Mao Zedong prepared in secrecy to start an open struggle with his rivals. By this time, the "pragmatists" managed to concentrate considerable power in their hands. They enjoyed great influence in the central organs of the Party due to the positions held by Liu Shaoqi (President of the People's Republic of China, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee) and Deng Xiaoping (General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee). They controlled the propaganda system, relying on the head of the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee, Lu Dingyi, including the country's central party publication, the People's Daily. They were supported by some army figures who were widely popular in the PLA, in particular Marshal Zhu De and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Luo Ruiqing. The positions of Mao's opponents in the capital were very strong. They were supported by the secretary of the Beijing city party committee Peng Zhen, who was close to the deputy mayor of the capital, the writer and party leader W. Han, the author of the well-known drama about the fate of the disgraced Minsk dignitary Hai Rui. (8, p. 283)

In the unfolding struggle, Mao Zedong could count on his still unquestioned authority as the charismatic leader of China, the founder of the PRC, on the loyalty of such leaders of the CPC as Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and the loyalty of Defense Minister Lin Biao. However, his position in the central organs of the party, his authority in society weakened as a result of the failure of the "jump". Thus, for him, the coming internecine clashes were not only a means of establishing in the country his ideas about the appearance of "Chinese communism", but were also a struggle for elusive power. (17, p. 33)

Evidence of the weakening of Mao Zedong's influence in party structures was the narrowing of the circle of party leaders during this period, on which he was forced to rely. It is precisely with this that the strengthening of the influence of his wife Jiang Qing, who had not previously been involved in political activities, is connected during the years of the "cultural revolution". It was her Mao Zedong used to organize the first strike against his opponents. (43, p. 52)

Realizing that it would hardly be possible to turn Beijing into a base for starting the struggle, Mao Zedong found support in Shanghai, where a group of his faithful supporters formed, who were destined to play a key role in the dramatic events of the "cultural revolution". In Shanghai, he could count on the support of the secretary of the city committee Ke Qingshi, the head of the propaganda department of the city committee Zhang Chunqiao, the editor-in-chief of the organ of the Shanghai city committee of the CPC newspaper "Jefang Ribao", and the publicist Yao Wenyuan. (19, p. 380)

It was with them, on the instructions of Mao Zedong, that Jiang Qing discussed in deep secrecy the content of the article on the criticism of W. Han's play. This publication took several months to prepare and was published on November 10, 1965, the day Mao Zedong arrived in Shanghai, where he remained until the next spring, directing the fight against his opponents from there. The publication of Yao Wenyuan's article "On the New Edition of the Historical Drama 'The Demolition of Hai Rui'", the text of which was repeatedly penned by Mao Zedong personally, was perceived by the party as the beginning of a new political campaign, the results of which at that time could only be guessed at. However, it was clear that the attack against W. Han was a blow to Peng Zhen and, ultimately, to Liu Shaoqi and those forces in the CCP that tried to oppose the implementation of the ambitious and utopian plans of Mao Zedong. and soon removed from all military and party posts. He was accused of preparing a conspiracy, "... an attempt to usurp power in the army, speaking out against the party." November, which testified to the unwillingness of the central and local party leadership to aggravate the internecine struggle and at the same time spoke about the scale of opposition to the course of Mao Zedong. The only newspaper that gave the assessment that the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee sought was the army's "Jefangjun pao". In it, the play was called "big poisonous grass." (6, p. 277)

Over the following months, Mao Zedong and his inner circle sought to intensify the campaign of criticism of Wu Han, while his opponents tried to keep it within the framework of the "scientific discussion". The attitude in the center and in the localities towards what was happening was dispelled by Mao Zedong's last doubts that the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee, which enjoyed great influence, the Beijing City Party Committee, did not support his course. (45)

Having ousted Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan and seized power in the country, expelled reactionary foreigners from the territory of China, and announced to all governments of the world about the creation of a new communist state, the communists established friendly relations with the USSR. They began to adopt the experience of the Soviet Union, to study its economy. The Chinese economy began to be built entirely on the Soviet model. China has essentially become a new state of the Soviet bloc. Regardless of the plans approved earlier, or with the costs, the policy of the "great leap" oriented the national economy towards accelerated growth. In the course of implementing the "Great Leap Forward" policy, the economy faced serious disproportions, and not only did not accelerate the pace of the country's economic and social development, and did not lead it to a more developed communist way of life, but also led to a drop in the pace of economic development, and caused famine that claimed dozens of million lives in China. The total death toll during that period is about 38,000,000. Chairman Mao Zedong, who undermined the country's economy with a "big leap", did not want to give way in the political arena to enterprising pragmatists led by Liu Shaoqi, who found ways to resolve the situation and tried to eliminate the consequences of the mistakes made. He steps aside and gives them free rein, waiting for them to make a "mistake" to strike. Neither Liu nor his supporters are aware of the political "firestorm" that Mao is preparing.

2. "cultural revolution "in China. Policy and practice

1 Start "cultural transformations"

The first call for a "cultural revolution" was made on April 18, 1966 from the pages of the main army newspaper. By this time, Mao Zedong's basic ideas about its goals had obviously formed. Mao Zedong saw the immediate task of the "cultural revolution" in the fight against "sedition" that settled among the artistic, teaching, scientific intelligentsia, which allowed itself to be critical of Mao Zedong and thereby undermined the prestige of the regime of personal power established by him. His more far-reaching goal was to eliminate resistance to the political course he was imposing on the part of a number of top party leaders who occupied "pragmatic" positions. As well as those leaders in the structures of the party and state apparatus who supported them. (16, p. 387) On May 7, in a letter to Lin Biao, Mao Zedong outlined his socio-economic program, the implementation of which was also to become one of the goals of the "cultural revolution". Its essence boiled down to the creation of closed agro-industrial communities throughout the country, which was a continuation of his ideas of the "Great Leap Forward" period and was partly realized in the "experience of Dazhai and Daqing." A new element of this program was the role that was to be played in the public life of the army, which was called upon to become a model for the organization of society. The PLA was supposed to be turned into "the great school of ideas of Mao Zedong." (9, p. 250)

The goals of the "cultural revolution" Mao Zedong outlined at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in May 1966 in Beijing. The pathos of the meeting consisted in declaring an open struggle against persons "... who are in power in the Party and are following the capitalist path." Personally at the meeting, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, who were removed from their party posts, were criticized. Immediately after the end of the meeting, a new "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs" was formed, made up of persons whom Mao Zedong could completely trust. It was led by Chen Boda and included Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Kang Sheng. Since the end of August, the functions of the head of the group, which was the key structure in unleashing and carrying out the "cultural revolution", began to be performed by Jiang Qing, who formally did not hold prominent posts in the CCP. Thus, the head of the largest political campaign, announced on behalf of the party, was supposed to be a structure that did not have any legal status. The victory won by Mao Zedong at the meeting was hard on him and led to the conviction that a minority of the party leadership was on his side, and the majority would resist the implementation of his plans. Therefore, Mao decided that a new generation of revolutionaries should be trained to continue his work. (14, p. 45)

The youth had to rise up against the government and the party. It all started with a protest movement of high school students. They condemn the leadership of educational institutions and, above all, the party bureaucracy. In May, a young philosophy teacher hangs a poster on the wall calling the university administration reactionaries. Mao comes out in support of her and the woman Nei Yangqi becomes famous throughout the country. The first volley of what would later become known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution" was fired. Mao's last attempt is to ensure that revolutionary ideas live on in China after his death. In just a few days, the movement will gain extraordinary strength. (10, p. 299)

Six weeks later, Mao again intervenes in the life of the country. This time on my own. After waiting four years in the shadows, Mao returned.

The army, where Mao's personality cult formed first, sets the tone. Mao returns to Beijing. In early August, he criticizes Liu and Deng for failing to solve students' problems. Appoints Defense Minister Lin Biao. And the Dauphin Liu Shaoqi is pushed into the shadows. To Mao's delight, China's political center of gravity is beginning to shift. (11, p. 43)

At dawn on August 18, 1966, Mao personally inspects his young supporters. A strike force of more than a million, responding to his call to stand up for the purity of the Chinese revolution.

The Red Guards, whose movement will soon split into warring factions, take an oath to give their lives for the just cause of the party chairman. (25, p. 290)

After being in the shadows for some time, Chairman Mao returned to governing the country, resumed his indisputable authority and gathered an army to conduct a global purge in the ranks of the Chinese government, further strengthen his power and continue his work in the future.

2.2 Movement "Red Guards "

The force used in the struggle against revisionism was the youth, primarily students and secondary school students. Behind this was a precise political calculation to take advantage of the worldly inexperience and impatience of young people who, to a certain extent, felt the hopelessness of the situation when the party turned into a corporation that exists according to its own internal laws, the main of which is to preserve the acquired position and the privileges that accompany it. It is impossible to exclude some romantic motives connected with the hope that young people, not burdened with posts and pragmatic considerations, will be able to become the force that is capable of carrying out revolutionary utopian plans. (19, p. 34)

"Chairman Mao is our commander. We obey the orders of the great commander and must carefully listen to Chairman Mao. Then the cultural revolution will progress smoothly and great victories await us. We want to destroy the old thoughts, culture, habits and old customs of the exploiter class. Let us get rid of pests. Let me destroy all obstacles." (34, p. 190)

Lin Biao's orders to destroy everything are being voiced all over China.

Signboards that the Red Guards consider bourgeois, they remove and destroy. Street names are being changed, older signs are being torn off and smashed with hammers. People are treated the same as things.

When the protests of the Red Guards began, a new wave of searches and confiscations began. (48)

Lin Biao: "Chairman Mao teaches us that we must rely on ourselves to create a revolution. Free ourselves, rise to our full height and study, whoever you are - revolutionary teachers and students from Beijing or from other parts of the country, we call on you to destroy all bourgeois Raise the thought of Mao Zedong! Long live the Communist Party of China! Long live the victorious thought of Mao Zedong! this is a spontaneous youth movement directed against the leadership of the party committees, professors and teachers who are not loyal enough to the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. In fact, the Red Guard movement was inspired from above by those who were in the closest circle of Mao Zedong. The first leaflet (dazibao) directed against the rector of Peking University, Lu Ping, who enjoyed the support of the city party committee, published at Peking University at the end of May, was inspired by Kang Sheng's wife. It was she who gave this idea to the secretary of the party committee of the Philosophical Department of Nie Yuanzi University. Soon the Hongweibing movement spread to other educational institutions of the capital. (25, p. 82)

The criticism that was subjected to the management of educational institutions extended to the regional party leadership, primarily related to ideological work. There was a massive change of leaders of the provincial press. Additional military units were sent to Beijing to strengthen the positions of the "leftists". In the summer of 1966, the "cultural revolution" reached a large scale: mass trials were held in educational institutions, during which party workers, famous professors were not only criticized, forced to confess to imperfect crimes, but also humiliated, dressed in jester's caps, and simply beaten . There were also the first victims. Not only the party committees, but also the organs of the Chinese Komsomol were subjected to rout. From the very beginning, the movement of the Red Guards was given an organized character similar to military structures. The army took a direct part in its development, creating special points for the reception of Red Guards, communication centers equipped with vehicles, printing equipment, and finances. Each group of 20-30 people was assigned a serviceman, who was called upon to teach them military discipline and exercise control. To spread the experience of the capital, the "red guards" were allowed to travel around the country at public expense on all modes of transport. During the period from the autumn of 1966 to the spring of 1967, more than 20 million members of the Red Guard movement were transported by rail alone, which used about 30% of all rail transport. In this situation, the next XI plenum of the CPC Central Committee (August 1966) was held. Members of the Central Committee, who had been repressed by that time, no longer participated in its work, and representatives of "mass revolutionary organizations" took their place. In response to Liu Shaoqi's report, which did not arouse the support of Mao Zedong, the latter published his own dazibao, entitled "Open Fire on Headquarters." The name of the chief leader of the "bourgeois headquarters" against whom the leaflet was directed was not yet openly named, but it was clear to those present who exactly was meant. The plenum supported Mao Zedong in unfolding the "cultural revolution", reiterated his "ideas" as the party's guiding ideology, and changed the leadership. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun lost their positions as vice-chairmen of the party, only Lin Biao managed to keep this post. As a result of the decisions taken, the secretariat of the Central Committee, headed by Deng Xiaoping, actually ceased to function, and power in the center was completely in the hands of Mao Zedong and his associates. In the autumn of 1966, Beijing was overrun by Red Guards from all over the country. A series of rallies was organized here, in which a total of more than 10 million people participated, before which the country's top leaders, led by Mao Zedong, spoke. At one of the rallies, addressing the youth, who were responsible for the bullying and often torture of those who were considered opponents of Mao Zedong, the defeat of party committees, Mao Zedong said: "I strongly support you!" (19, p. 65)

In December 1966, detachments of "rebels" (zaofan) began to be created in the cities. They included working youth, who were tasked with spreading the "cultural revolution" beyond the educational institutions to enterprises and organizations, which would cover all social structures.

The first Red Guards appeared on May 29. They were 12-13 year old middle school students wearing red cotton armbands with yellow "Hong Wei Bing" signs on their sleeves. Their first act was an attack against Qin-hua University. They were soon joined by children of all ages, students and, most importantly, members of the CCP Youth Union who, with Mao's approval, rebelled against their official leadership and whose gangs took over the streets. At the beginning of the summer, the entire education system came to a standstill, as teachers and teachers fled in horror (those who were lucky enough not to be captured and "re-educated").

Later, there was some misunderstanding of the Cultural Revolution in the West. It was presented as a rebellion of intellectuals. In fact, everything was quite the opposite. It was a revolution of the illiterate and semi-literate against the intellectuals or, as they were also called, "bespectacled". It was a xenophobia directed against those who "thought that the moon was fuller abroad."

The country's leadership knew that the Red Guards were beating people. However, it was constantly said that people should learn from the Red Guards and welcome them. The implied distinction between the destruction of bourgeois ideas and the elimination of the bearers of these ideas is quickly forgotten. Over the following weeks, tens of thousands of people in Beijing were charged and beaten to a pulp, hundreds died. This spirit was fueled and supported in every possible way in the first year of the "cultural revolution". The army, like the police, was ordered not to touch. Mao said let young champions make their own mistakes, learn from them and correct themselves. We should not stand behind them pointing and criticizing. China is slowly but surely descending into chaos. Journalists were forbidden to photograph executions and beatings. And the newspapers wrote only about good events and placed pictures of cheering crowds. Victims of high-ranking officials are publicly humiliated at mass gatherings that are held in football stadiums. Posters are hung around their necks with their names crossed out, like ordinary criminals awaiting execution. (13, p. 80)

The first "dazibao" in Beijing, addressed to and full of attacks against the university authorities, was pasted up by philosophy teacher Nie Yuancu.

On the dazibao one could read: "Why are you so afraid of the dazibao? This is a life-and-death struggle against the Black Gang!" In one week, 10,000 students hung up 100,000 "door-sized" dazibao, where characters often reached a height of four feet. The phrases were repeated: "It won't work for you... our patience is exhausted." Then the first violence began. Raging street gangs cut off the girls' long hair, tore the young men's trousers, sewn in foreign fashion. Hairdressers were forbidden to make ponytail hairstyles, restaurants were ordered to prepare simpler menus, and shops were ordered not to sell cosmetics, slit skirts, dark glasses, fur coats and other chic goods. Smashed neon signs. Huge bonfires were burned along the streets, on which prohibited goods were destroyed, among them (as shown at the exhibition of "confiscated goods") were rolls of silk and brocade fabric, gold and silver jewelry, chess, antique chests and cabinets, playing cards, nightgowns , tailcoats, top hats, jazz records and all kinds of works of art. The Red Guards closed tea houses, cafes, independent private theaters and all private restaurants, did not allow itinerant musicians, acrobats, artists to work, forbade weddings and funerals, it was also forbidden to hold hands and fly kites. In Beijing, the ancient walls were destroyed, the Bei Han Park and the National Gallery of Fine Arts were closed. Libraries were turned upside down and closed, and books burned. But, although some libraries were still open, few dared to visit them. Ten years later, Deng said that during the Cultural Revolution, out of the eight hundred engineers at the Nonferrous Metals Research Institute, only four dared to visit the Institute's library.

There was no power that could oppose these actions. When shopkeepers and other affected strata approached the police, they were reminded of the "Decision of the CCP Central Committee on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (August 1, 1966), which read: "The only method is the self-liberation of the masses... believe the masses, count on them and respect their initiative.... Do not be afraid of riots... Let the masses educate themselves... Do not take any measures against university students, students in middle and primary schools...". Even party leaders who tried to curb the Red Guards were led through the streets wearing caps and carrying placards, which lazy students usually wore as punishment.

After the movement picked up speed, violence became commonplace, and then ubiquitous. The leaders of the Red Guards probably came from the lowest social strata. Some of them were just street pickpockets and hooligans, sporting thick leather belts with brass buckles. Their dazibao were called: "Boil him in oil", "Crush his dog's head" and the like. Women and men classified as "spirits and monsters", "bad elements", and "counter-revolutionaries" had their heads shaved. Later, in some excerpts from the "political debate" one could read: "Of course, he is a capitalist. He has a set of a sofa and two armchairs." Hundreds of thousands of private houses were broken into and robbed for this reason. But the Red Guards also attacked state institutions and forced officials to hand over archives to them, threatening to expose them as "tools of the revisionists." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was taken over by the gang of the former petty official Yao Teng-shan. He recalled all the ambassadors, with the exception of one, demoted them and sent them to perform minor assignments. His notes to other states were written in the style of the Hongweiping dazibao and were politely returned with a request that in the future all letters be signed by the chairman of the council of ministers, Zhou. But Zhou, always the calm center of Chinese life in all Mao's theatrical productions, now seemed to be in danger too. Although the Red Guards were not allowed to kill any of the top people, still many died in prison. Liu himself was left to die (1973) in his own filth on the icy floor of a concrete chamber. And at a lower level, the deaths became increasingly catastrophic. About 400,000 people were killed. (44, p. 29)

Meanwhile, Jiang Qin ruled the world of culture and spoke at crowded rallies, denouncing capitalism (which she claimed to have destroyed art), jazz, rock and roll, striptease, impressionism, symbolism, abstract art, modernism - "in a word, decadence and abominations that poison and corrupt the minds of men." Her speeches from the stands were built in the manner of the chief of the secret police, Kang Sheng, with whom she was often seen.

In the second half of 1966, practically all the main cultural organizations of China were subordinated to its army organization. All old scores were settled, some dating back to the 1930s, in the world of theater and cinema. Leading directors, screenwriters, poets, actors, and composers have been accused of "subservient to foreigners," praising "second-rate foreign devils," "ridiculing the Boxers" (who were then viewed as cultural heroes), and portraying ordinary Chinese as " prostitutes, opium-smokers, swindlers, and mincing women," thus creating an "inferiority complex in the nation." "Boxers" - members of a secret anti-colonial society who raised the "Boxer Rebellion" in 1900. She ordered the Red Guards to "root out the Black Line," "tear off the masks," destroy the films, songs, and plays of the "Line of National Humiliation," and "pull out" members of the "Black Gang." (31, p. 383) On December 12, 1966, many "public enemies", the former mayor of Beijing, and all theater and film directors whose paths had ever crossed with Jiang Qin were forced to march in the Workers' Stadium in front of 10,000 people, with heavy wooden posters around their necks. One of the worst aspects of the Cultural Revolution was the treatment of wives, who were subjected to more severe humiliations than their husbands. On April 10, 1967, for example, Liu's wife was dragged out in front of 300,000 people on the Tsinghua campus, dressed in a tight evening dress, high-heeled shoes, an English straw hat, and ping-pong ball beads with skulls painted on them. . The crowd chanted: "Down with horned devils and serpent gods!" Jiang Qin's detachments seized radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines; they confiscated cameras and films, turned studios upside down looking for clues, confiscated films and released them re-edited, denied access to scripts, prompters, and musical scores. Most artists did not dare to sign their names under the paintings, but instead used the slogan "Ten thousand years of the life of Chairman Mao." “I order,” said Jiang Qin, “with a hammer in hand, to attack all the old rules.” She attended the rehearsals of the Central Philharmonic Orchestra and interrupted them, forcing the chief conductor Lee Te-long to yell furiously: "You hit me with a hammer!" She forced composers to write works that were first released to the “masses”, and then reworked taking into account their reaction. She complained that she had to "beat them with a hammer" to force them into submission and overcome "foreign influence". Some of her followers took her words literally and smashed the hands of a Western-trained pianist. Hammers, fists, blows and fighting were the signs of the revolutionary art. After taking up ballet, Jiang Qin forbade the "orchid-shaped" fingers, as well as the palms open up, preferring fists and sharp movements, emphatically depicting "hatred of the landowning class" and "determination to take revenge." (21, p. 190) By banning almost all forms of artistic expression in 1966, Jiang Qin desperately tried to fill the void. There were few works written: two orchestral pieces, the Yellow River piano concerto and the Sha Chia-ping symphony, four operas and two ballets - all eight were called yang-pan si or "exemplary repertoire". There was also one series of sculptures called "The Court of the Rent Collectors" and several paintings, the most famous of which is a portrait of Mao in a blue robe examining working conditions in a mine in the early 1920s. Few films were made, due to "sabotage" (she complained later); her actors and actresses were given "bad dressing rooms", not given warm meals, and her stages and film sets had frequent power outages.

The Cultural Revolution was first and foremost an attempt to change the way people thought, to eradicate the old way of thinking and the behavior that went with it. Former landlords and capitalists were forced to wear shirts with the inscription "bourgeois element"; militant youth were engaged in their forced retraining. One of Mao's most popular phrases among the rebels was "without destruction there is no creation" - first destroy, and then something new will grow on the remaining foundation. And then the world was supposed to get better, but of course it didn't. Everything got much worse. The centuries-old history of China has not yet known destruction on a scale equal to that committed by the Red Guards. Throughout the country to Tibet, they ravaged and razed monasteries to the ground. The most important monuments, such as the Forbidden City, were guarded by the order of Zhou Enlai. Otherwise, Mao's shock troops were given free rein. Mao was considered the personification of truth. Everything he said was taken on faith. One sentence of Chairman Mao was worth ten thousand words of any other person. If someone dared to doubt, ask questions - such a person could immediately be considered dangerous, like a wild beast, and he usually literally did not stay alive for long. All ideas contrary to Mao's thoughts and objects embodying them were required to be destroyed. Churches are being closed all over the country, religious symbols are being destroyed. In place of the statues of the Virgin Mary, portraits of Mao appear. One form of worship is replaced by another. This is not just a leader's personality cult, but a full-fledged religion. Every day, all Chinese should look to Mao's writings for guidance. From simple railroad workers to high-ranking officials, every Chinese had to constantly demonstrate that his heart was full of love for Mao. But the state was in a state of stagnation. Since the beginning of 1967, in the cities and provinces of China, the former party organizations, now proclaimed strongholds of revisionism, have been replaced by new authorities - the so-called "revolutionary committees", which consist of soldiers, workers and party veterans blindly loyal to Mao. In 1967, the grandiose purge launched by Mao also affected the highest echelons of party power. Marshal Peng Dehuai was Mao's ally from 1928 until he dared to criticize the chairman's Great Leap Forward policy. Now he has become the object of persecution. Zhang Wentian, Mao's predecessor, who served as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in the 1930s, also did not escape accusations. In April, Liu Shaoqi was accused of being an apostate and a traitor hiding his true colors. Released from all positions held inside and outside the party. In the fabrication of the case against Liu Shaoqi, Jiang Qingn played a leading role along with the head of the security committee, Kang Shen. His secret police collected evidence not only against Liu, but also against other senior party officials who fell out of favor with Mao. (28, p. 293)

Following the rapture of 1966, when Mao swam across the river and his personality cult reached its climax, China began to slide into civil war. On February 5, 1967, Mao's minions in Shanghai founded a "commune" - a sign that he was still sighing on the "Great Leap Forward" policy. At the heart of the commune were dock workers, in particular the 2,500 militant workers of the Fifth Loading and Unloading Zone, who in one day (June 1966) wrote and hung 10,000 dazibao. 532 workers in this zone refused to join the commune. Dazibao were written against them, and as punishment they were forced to wear high caps and wear infamous dazibao with the inscriptions "Village of the Four Families" and "Anti-Party Clique". Their houses were looted, and they themselves were sentenced to a "symbolic" death, which could easily turn into a real one. The purpose of the Shanghai Commune was to signal the founding of other communes in China. But the workers did not respond to this. In fact, they often resisted attacks by the Red Guards on their factories. Even in Shanghai, the city authorities organized "Scarlet Squads" against the Red Guards. Both sides had a large number of loudspeakers, from which deafening battle slogans were heard from morning to evening: "The February seizure of power is illegal", "We welcome the February seizure of power." Abductions, tortures and massacres were committed with the use of bicycle chains and brass knuckles, "troops" were transferred from one end of the city to the other. Universities formed private armies. The "Chin-Kangshan Battalion" of Tsinghua University, an "elite group" of the extreme left, waged constant battles against "spirits and monsters" using bamboo spears, makeshift weapons, and armored vehicles. There were other subdivisions: Five-One-Six, the commune of New Peita, the commune of the Institute of Geology "Aleet Vostok" and the faction "Sky" from the Institute of Aeronautics. They were imitated in factories and non-university towns.

With China's retreat back to organized gang warfare and military dictatorship, something akin to feudal anarchy began to develop. In July 1967, the so-called "riot" took place in Wuhan. In reality, it was a large-scale battle between the Red Guard workers and a conservative group of workers known as the "Million Heroes". The commander of the local army unit sided with the Heroes. Chou En-lai was sent to restore peace. Luckily, he managed to escape and save his life. Two of his escorts were caught and tortured. As a result, Jiang Qin put forward the slogan "Injure wisely, but defend with force" and distributed a large number of weapons to the Red Guards.

The violence reached its climax towards the end of the summer of 1967. As usual, at this point Mao was worried about what he had done, and at the same time weary of the endless confusion. He probably told Jiang Qin to stop all this. And in September, she announced that violence should be only verbal, and machine guns should only be used when "absolutely necessary." Those who did not obey were accused of "holding a fortress in the mountains." The attacks against the British embassy and its staff were the work of "ultra-leftists, instigated by the May Sixteenth clique". Mao also took over. "The situation has developed faster than I expected," he said before the Central Committee. "I won't be offended if you complain about me." He was annoyed that Foreign Minister Chen Yi lost 12 kg as a result of interrogation by the Red Guards: "I can't show him to foreign guests in this condition." "Young arsonists" and "devils" ordered to return to schools. Dispersed the Shanghai Commune. "Now China is like a country divided into eight hundred principalities," he complained. (10, p. 414)

In November 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party meets in Beijing to prepare for the day when Mao decides that the chaos has been going on for long enough. Lin Biao delivers the keynote speech. Jiang Qingn and other members of the party's left wing have been unofficially slated for certain positions in the bureau. As a result of the voting, Liu Shaoqi, who is under house arrest, is permanently expelled from the party. In his place, Mao appoints Lin. And not only as his deputy, but also as his successor. The Red Guards who have completed the tasks set by Mao are sent to work in the countryside. Before leaving, they pledge allegiance to him. Revolutionary parents, infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao, send their children to the countryside to work as peasants. And many of them were bitterly disappointed. In poor areas, living conditions were worse than they could have imagined. Mao Zedong sent all the students to the rural areas, and that's when they saw that tens of millions of peasants in Chinese villages were dragging out a miserable existence. They lived in terrible conditions. And the former Red Guards began to doubt the superiority of socialism over other systems, and as a result, they were completely disappointed in it. After half a year, Mao was finally able to convene a party congress. The first in 11 years to announce that the Cultural Revolution had been successfully completed. The new party charter named Lin Biao as Mao's closest associate. None of the chairman's colleagues had ever received such an honor before. Mao felt that he had finally created a stable political continuity. Representatives of the army, who became the leading political force in the country during the "cultural revolution", occupied key positions. In his closing speech, his last public address, Mao expresses satisfaction with the way events have turned out. (6, p. 350)

During the 10 years of the "Cultural Revolution" 4,200,000 people were arrested; more than 7,730,000 people died of unnatural death, more than 135,000 people were executed as counter-revolutionaries; over 237,000 people were killed; more than 7,030,000 people have been maimed in armed attacks; more than 71,200 families have completely broken up. In the field of science, China has paid a high price for the ignorant policy of the party leadership, for its incompetence and distrust of scientists. There is a serious shortage of well-educated and well-trained scientists under the age of 50 who could strategically determine the development of Chinese science and who would be recognized by the world scientific community. Thus, there was a very large gap between Chinese science and the science of developed countries. During the "cultural revolution" industrial production declined, coal production declined, the volume of rail transport decreased, the production of steel and chemical fertilizers decreased. Financial income has decreased and expenses have increased. The destruction of traditional culture brought unthinkable material losses to society. "Rebels" and "Hongweipings" destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples. Thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, etc. were destroyed. Almost all the monasteries and temples in Tibet that had survived to the beginning of the "cultural revolution" were destroyed. The Cultural Revolution affected both Christianity and Catholicism. 8840 priests were killed, 39200 were exiled to labor camps.

3. Socio-economic and political consequences of the "cultural revolution"

In the last years of Mao Zedong's life and his tenure in the highest leadership positions in the party, the PRC was in a state of severe crisis. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were seriously ill at that time. This also affected the situation in the country. Mao Zedong, before his death, sought to consolidate his principles for the struggle against "revisionism" within China and within the CCP. (42, p. 50)

At the same time, he and his supporters saw that in the party, as a result of the "cultural revolution", a situation was created of confrontation between the nominees of the "cultural revolution" and the old party leaders, who were gradually returning to power. The first persistently offered to repeat the "cultural revolution". In 1973-1976. several political campaigns were carried out, each of which was conducted under the slogan of "deepening and developing the cultural revolution." Wang Hongwen's report at the 10th CPC Congress specifically quoted words from Mao Zedong's letter to Jiang Qing about the need to launch a "cultural revolution" every seven to eight years. The "Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" campaign was launched first in January 1974 and continued until February 1975 (42, p. 51).

The proponents of the "cultural revolution" did their best to oppose the process of rehabilitation and return to power of such figures as Deng Xiaoping. They paid special attention to the propaganda of the slogan "go against the current", which in a number of places was interpreted as fighting against the "right deviation" that had appeared in the CCP. The popularization of the slogan "go against the tide" encountered certain difficulties, the demands of the rehabilitated leaders of strict observance of party discipline, the subordination of the minority to the majority. The Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CPC, for example, at its meeting in September 1973, specifically emphasized that Mao Zedong was a model of observing Party discipline. "(39, p. 211)

For the first time in the most general form, the idea of ​​linking Lin Biao with Confucius and his veneration was formulated by Mao Zedong in the spring of 1973. Before and after the Tenth Congress of the CPC, Mao Zedong, in the course of conversations, emphasized the idea of ​​the need to link criticism of Lin Biao with criticism of Confucius by his followers and propaganda. (39, p. 211)

A well-known critic of Confucianism, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Sun Yat-sen University, Professor Yang Yongguo, was summoned from Guangzhou to Beijing to participate in the new campaign. On the eve of the 10th Congress of the CPC, with the approval of Mao Zedong, he criticized Confucius and his admirer Lin Biao in the pages of Zhen Ming Ribao. . (39, p. 12)

In addition to Yang Yongguo, among the professional philosophers, Feng Yulian, a professor at Peking University, was involved. After Mao's persuasion, he was forced to publicly renounce his former high assessments of certain aspects of Confucianism and begin to blaspheme Confucius and Lin Biao. The Peking University Bulletin and pseudonymous authors of the group at Peking and Tsinghua University, Fudan University, the Ministry of Culture and other institutions and universities played an active role in fomenting the campaign.

An acquaintance with the articles of Yang Yongguo and other authors shows that the criticism of Confucianism inspired by Mao Zedong was directed not only towards Lin Biao, but also those who tried to revive the previous order that existed before the "cultural revolution", and contributed to the rehabilitation of some figures who suffered in the period of the campaign. (29, p. 76)

For the active conduct and management of the campaign, special bodies began to be created under the party committees of various levels in the form of "offices for criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius." Jiang Qingn personally headed the Central Office of the CPC Central Committee. Such formations as points of contact, groups for analyzing complaints and groups for submitting reports, well known from the period 1966-1968, began to reappear in society. A slogan appeared on the streets: "Do not engage in production for the sake of an erroneous course!" Enterprises, plants and factories began to stop. (39, p. 214)

In order to speed up the campaign in early 1974, a call was made for the convening of so-called mobilization meetings throughout the country. However, this initiative was received rather coldly on the ground.

The campaign of criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius caused serious damage to the country. Became a new blow to its economy. Industrial production declined again. According to statistical data for January - May 1974, coal mining, compared with the previous period of last year, decreased by 6.2%, the volume of rail transport by 2.5%, steel production by 9.4%, chemical fertilizers by 3.7%. %, financial income decreased by 500 million yuan, while expenses increased by 2.5 billion yuan. (21, p. 203)

However, the rehabilitated leaders by that time already had sufficient influence in the center. In March 1974, an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was held in Beijing. On it, Zhou Enlai expressed concern that the campaign could adversely affect the development of the state's economy, leading it to disorganization and a drop in production. (39, p. 215)

March and April 4, 1974, the People's Daily called on the workers to criticize only in their free time, and the peasants to use this campaign for shock spring field work. (29, p. 80)

July 1974, the "Directive on the implementation of the revolution and the stimulation of the development of production" was promulgated, which drew attention to the damage caused by the new campaign to the national economy of the PRC. It criticized misguided slogans such as "do not manufacture for the wrong course" and spoke of the need to expose and criticize the behind-the-scenes organizers of production downtime. (39, p. 216)

"As a result of factional struggle, the low level of industrial discipline, and the irresponsibility of leaders," planned targets for coal mining, the production of steel, iron, non-ferrous metals, chemical fertilizers, cement, and defense industry products were in danger of being disrupted or had already been disrupted. (49)

The last aspect of the campaign became apparent in August 1974, when a series of articles appeared on the pages of the press, the authors of which portrayed Lin Biao as a completely incompetent military leader, and all the successes of the Red and People's Liberation Army of China in the 30s and 40s. attributed exclusively to Mao Zedong. (39, p. 217)

Although criticism of Lin Biao took on a fairly wide scope in the second half of 1974, not a single prominent military leader of the PRC spoke out publicly condemning Lin Biao's military mistakes.

Initially announced as part of the "movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius," the new campaign with the task of "mastering the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" supplanted it and began to play an independent role. As in the previous "critics of Lin Biao and Confucius" campaign, Mao and the "four" fought against Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and their supporters. This time, instead of the idea of ​​fighting "modern Confucians", a call was made to "fight against empiricism", which Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, referring to Mao Zedong, declared "the main danger in the party." A distinctive feature of the campaign was its economic aspect, formulated in the demand for "every possible restriction of bourgeois rights under the dictatorship of the proletariat." Behind this slogan was the intention of the organizers of the campaign to impose on the country a dictate of non-economic, political and administrative methods of management, to discredit the economic levers and material incentives for the development of production.

In this regard, special attention was paid to the criticism of the so-called "platform of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, who demanded that certain norms of agricultural production be assigned to peasant households." (12, p. 35)

Another major object of the campaign was the working class, in relation to which the principle of pay according to work and material incentives were discredited, which were opposed to equalization and poverty. (39, p. 222)

The campaign attacked the "obsolete" eight-point wage scale in industry, which provided for differentiated wages for workers, and advertised a simplified three-point scale that ignored the quality of work, was not beneficial for skilled workers and was more beneficial for low-paid categories of workers, in particular young workers. The payment of bonuses and overtime, which were called "bourgeois evil", was sharply criticized. Political accusations of "bourgeois degeneration" were also brought against some of the workers. (28, p. 260)

The initiators of the campaign demanded that the workers develop a "revolutionary proletarian spirit of squalor", to work without counting hours and without thinking about remuneration, including several hours in addition to regular time without any pay.

Taking advantage of the inclusion in the new Constitution of the right to strike, the workers resorted to strikes and work stoppages. A similar protest movement first gained wide scope in railway transport, and then spread to industrial enterprises and agriculture. In the first months of 1975, as a result of strikes and downtime, railway transportation in the provinces of Anhui, Gansu, Hubei, Henan was seriously damaged, where in the spring and summer of 1975 workers from more than 20 enterprises went on strike and armed clashes between opposing forces took place.

In fact, by the middle of 1975, the campaign began to decline, faced with objective economic laws and the material interests of the working people. The attempts of the promoters of the "cultural revolution" under the mute "fight against empiricism" to weaken the positions of their opponents also failed. In the conditions of growing social tension in the country, and especially the scope and mass actions of the working people of the city and countryside, attacks against the rehabilitated Chinese leaders began to choke. By the middle of 1975, the campaign for "the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" was effectively suspended. In the course of it, acute socio-political problems and contradictions were once again exposed, for the solution of which Mao Zedong and his nominees were unable to offer a positive program for the economic and political development of the PRC. (39, p. 234)

At the same time, a faction of the "old cadres" tried to work out a specific program for the development of the country, aimed at, as planned by Mao Zedong, breaking out of extreme backwardness and turning China into a mighty power by the end of the century with advanced industry, agriculture, defense, science and technology.

In April 1975, on the initiative of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, a decision was made to rehabilitate the cadres. In accordance with which more than 300 high-ranking personnel were released, some of them were sent for treatment, their wages were reimbursed for previous years, and some were given jobs. (39, p. 235)

After the NPC, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China convened a series of meetings on economic issues, including drawing up a plan for the development of the national economy for 1975, improving the work of railway transport, coal, metallurgical and defense industries, and adopted relevant documents.

The steps taken on the initiative of Deng Xiaoping to normalize the situation in railway transport made it possible already in April 1976 to overcome the breakthrough and exceed the planned targets for the transportation of goods for 19 out of 20 railways. (6, p. 150)

As a result of vigorous measures taken, the economic situation in the country began to improve. The gross volume of industrial and agricultural output of the PRC grew in 1975 by 11.9% over the previous year. In particular, the gross volume of industrial production increased by 15.1%, and agriculture - by 4.6%379. (4, p. 290)

Deng Xiaoping and his supporters in the leadership of the CPC also paid great attention to the development of science and technology, public education, culture and art, which suffered in 1966-1969. very significant damage.

Deng Xiaoping came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a special body in the center that would be engaged in the development of theory and political research that would assist the country's leadership. (24, p. 163)

In the field of literature and art, certain restrictions were lifted on the publication of a number of outstanding literary works and the staging of some theatrical plays. Attracted advanced technology and equipment, including from abroad. Deng Xiaoping and his supporters raised the issue of abandoning the practice of "cultural revolution", overcoming its harmful effects, and rehabilitating its victims. Deng Xiaoping's report again raised the question of "all-round ordering," i.e., ordering the army, the periphery, industry, agriculture, culture and education, science and technology. (12, p. 312)

The energetic activity aimed at revising a number of attitudes of 1966-1969 worried Mao Zedong and the promoters of the "cultural revolution". It was for this purpose that a new campaign against "capitulation" was launched, tied to criticism of the popular medieval novel "River Backwaters" (15, p. 56)

In November 1975, on his initiative, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was held, which was specifically devoted to discussing the assessment of the "cultural revolution" and developing a single point of knowledge for this campaign. Before the meeting, Mao Zedong proposed that Deng Xiaoping be chairman and that the Central Committee then adopt a "resolution" positively evaluating the "cultural revolution."

Mao Zedong had already determined in advance the tone in which the resolution should be written. He wanted "the ratio of successes and failures to be 7 to 3, of which 70% were successes, 30% were mistakes. There were two mistakes: "the overthrow of everyone and everything", the second - a general civil war." (39 p. 276)

But Deng Xiaoping refused the chairmanship, saying that he was a person who had lived in isolation for a long time (6 years) and was removed from affairs and political campaigns, and did not yet understand what was happening. He did not participate in the "cultural revolution" and "did not understand" it, which is why it is not advisable to entrust him with compiling the text of the decision.

It was this intransigence that gave Mao Zedong the idea of ​​launching a "criticism of Deng Xiaoping" campaign. (37, p. 155)

In December 1975, Deng Xiaoping was criticized at one after the other meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee in a very heated atmosphere. On December 20, he delivered a "self-criticism", the text of which was sent to Mao Zedong. However, Mao Zedong did not react in any way. On January 3, Deng Xiaoping was forced to speak "self-critically" at the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee for the second time. However, Mao Zedong did not like this option either. After reading the text of the second "self-criticism", on January 14 he imposed his resolution with a proposal to print both texts with "self-criticism" (26, p. 250)

Judging by the statements of Jiang Qing, since Deng Xiaoping returned to work, the "four" was constantly as if locked in a cage, but now they have received freedom and the opportunity to speak out openly. On January 31, the CPC Central Committee decided to convene a meeting with the agenda: "Criticism of Deng Xiaoping and strike back at the right-wing deviationist attempts to revise the correct organizational conclusions."

February, a dazibao appeared at Peking University criticizing Deng Xiaoping's 1961 statement about cats.

In her speeches, Jiaye Qingn called Deng Xiaoping "chief director of a firm for fabricating rumors", "honorary marshal of the counter-revolution", "representative of the comprador and landlord bourgeoisie", "traitor to the motherland", "an agent of international capitalism in China", "fascist" and "counter-revolutionary double-dealer." She urged "together to repulse the enemy, to oppose Deng Xiaoping"

Despite the efforts of the promoters of the "cultural revolution", the campaign unfolded with great difficulty. In February 1976, only the party committee of Heilongjiang held a special meeting on the new campaign. The party committees of the other provinces remained silent until the end of March. (13, p. 258)

Thus, in the spring of 1976, Mao Zedong, being seriously ill, nevertheless continued to occupy the highest post in the CPC. He strongly opposed Deng Xiaoping and his supporters.

Power in the CPC Central Committee passed completely into the hands of the nominees of the "cultural revolution". However, the fact was that the Central Committee of the CPC no longer had power not only over most of the provincial centers and military districts, but also over the capital. There was a kind of anarchy or dual power: the formal power of the promoters of the "cultural revolution", consecrated by the name and instructions of Mao Zedong, and the actual power of their opponents in many provinces of the country and military districts. (31, p. 248)

Approximately from the end of February - beginning of March 1976 in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Guangzhou and other cities of the country, datsibao began to appear criticizing the nominees of the "cultural revolution". For example, Jiang Qing was called the "initiator of turmoil", Yao Wenyuai and Zhang Chunqiao - "hacks", "ambitious", associated with Jiang Qing, "dog-headed commanders". (13, p. 396)

Mass actions of workers, employees and intellectuals took place in the capital and in about 100 cities and towns of the PRC.

Jiang Qing and her closest supporters declared Deng Xiaoping "the main behind-the-scenes scriptwriter of the Tiananmen Square events."

On April 1976, Mao Zedong "secured" Hua Guofeng's position as his successor by handing him a note (due to illness he could no longer speak): "If the matter is in your hands, then I am calm." This was the last known will of Mao Zedong. Since that time, he has become completely incapacitated. (32, p. 235)

The earthquake and drought were used by local cadres to slow down and curtail the political campaign of criticism in order to mobilize everyone to deal with the consequences of natural disasters and help the victims.

However, the promoters of the "cultural revolution" insisted on continuing and deepening the campaign.

On September 1976, at 010 hours Beijing time, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Council of the Central Committee, Honorary Chairman of the CPPCC, who had headed the leadership of the PRC for 26 years, died at the age of 83. The reaction to his death was different: for some, it caused hidden joy in connection with the hope for the end of the ten-year "cultural revolution", which harmed the country's national income of 500 billion yuan, led to a noticeable decrease in the living standards of the population, causing enormous damage to culture, education and science, causing serious damage to the cultural and historical heritage of the country, to an even greater gap between the PRC and the developed countries of the world in the scientific and technical field. The glorious traditions and moral foundations of the people were largely undermined. (39, p. 246)

For others, Mao's death caused fear and confusion. For 26 years, people in all corners of the country shouted "Long live Mao Zedong!", wishing him 10 thousand years of life, they worshiped and believed him, created his cult. "What will happen to China in the future?" they asked. "To whom will the huge power in the state, party and army in this country be transferred?" (20, p. 268)

What legacy did Mao Zedong leave to the Chinese people? He believed that there were two most important things that he did in his life, this is: the first - he expelled Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese from the mainland, the second - he unleashed a "cultural revolution". Despite the fact that he had very few supporters in the last case, and quite a lot of opponents. The well-known oldest Chinese writer Ba Jin said bitterly that this ten-year campaign has brought untold hardships to China and its people. He urged the current generation not to forget this "bloody lesson" in the future. According to him, the country will not survive the second such disaster as the "cultural revolution". (39, p. 310)

A participant in the Nanchang uprising on August 1, 1927, one of the founders of the PLA, the oldest marshal of the People's Republic of China, Minister of Defense Ye. Jianying after the defeat of the "four" named bitter figures according to which 20 million people died as a result of the "cultural revolution", destinies were crippled by repression about 100 million inhabitants, about 800 billion yuan of people's money was thrown away during the campaign. As you know, the standard of living of the population in most regions of the country has dropped sharply. The gap between the PRC and the developed countries of the world in the scientific and technical field has widened even more. (46)

By the time of the Leader's death, there was no democratic mechanism for the transfer of power in the PRC. The country did not determine the terms of office of senior officials, there was no detailed regulation of the rights and obligations of the country's leader in a leading position. Personal power was illuminated not by the laws of the state and the Constitution, but by tradition. As a result, the cult of the Leader was easily generated, his artificial deification, which developed into a cult of an individual. There were no prearranged and constitutionally fixed rules for the replacement of one top official by another. (51)

After the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, Mao single-handedly decided to nominate Hua Guofeng for the premiership of the State Council. Since the spring of 1976, the two main factions have been preparing behind the scenes for a fierce struggle for power after the imminent death of Mao Zedong. (26, p. 248)

April at 20:00, the Central People's Radio Station announced two decisions of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, adopted at the suggestion of Mao Zedong. First, Hua Guofeng is appointed First Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council. Secondly, the Politburo unanimously decided to remove Deng Xiaoping from all posts in the party and the state, while maintaining his membership in the party. (24, p. 215)

Soon Hua Guofeng and the Quartet launched a campaign of criticism of Deng Xiaoping and other "unrepentant Capputists", hoping to consolidate their leading position in the country. (25, p.107)

After the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping, it was the turn of the Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China: Marshal Ye Jianying was declared "sick" and his competent leadership of the daily work of the Military Council was suspended. This work was taken over by the commander of the Beijing Military Region Chen Xilian. However, Ye Jianying, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, continued to participate in the meetings. This enabled him to follow the developments and actions of the Quartet. (23, p. 245)

Outwardly, it seemed as if the course of the "cultural revolution" would continue after Mao's death, and such a line is approved by the entire leadership of the party. Calls were made: "Adhere to the principle - the class struggle is the decisive link", "Defend the main line of the party", "Continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", "Deepen criticism of Deng Xiaoping", "Continue the struggle against the right-wing deviationist craze of revising the correct conclusions of the Cultural Revolution", " Restrict bourgeois right" in reality, behind the stereotyped phrases and slogans, there was a furious behind-the-scenes struggle for leadership in the country. (21, p. 177)

A fierce struggle began for the manuscript legacy of Mao Zedong. His drafts and manuscripts were extremely important in the struggle of factions for power, in choosing a successor, in determining the course of the country's development (not by chance, to this day, far from all Mao Zedong's manuscripts have been published). Referring to the manuscripts, it was possible not only to criticize and overthrow their rivals, but also to substantiate the legality and legitimacy of claims to power.

In October 1976, Jiang Qing went to Tsinghua University, where she stated in her speech that there might still be people advocating the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, referring to the Party Central Committee represented by Hua Guofeng. She vigorously demanded "the expulsion of Deng Xiaoping from the Party" (39, p. 330)

On October 1976, Wang Hongwen, speaking in Pinggu County near Beijing, slightly paraphrasing the words spoken by Mao Zedong on the eve of the "cultural revolution", declared - "Revisionism has appeared in the Central Committee. What are you to do with it? To overthrow it!" On the same day, according to Deng Xiaoping's daughter, the "four" agreed, if necessary, to be ready "at any moment to give the command to the tanks to enter Beijing"

On October 10, Guangming Daily published an article "Always act according to the course outlined by Chairman Mao." It contained covert attacks on Hua Guofeng, as well as accusations of betrayal of some of the top leaders of Marxism, the cause of socialism, etc. "Any actions aimed at undermining the unity of the party and creating a split," the article said, Chairman Mao" (26, p. 105)

October 1976, the same newspaper published an article signed by the pseudonym "Liang Xiao" (a group of authors selected by Jiang Qing and her accomplices): "A black example of a speech against a red banner under a red banner," wholly directed against Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. This group also prepared another article "Act on the course set by Mao Zedong and boldly go forward." It was supposed to be published in the People's Daily.

October 1976 504. Rumors spread by the Quartet began to circulate in society that a "particularly important and joyful announcement" would be published between 8 and 10 October. (51)

By this time, prominent party veterans had visited Ye Jianying. Chen Yun, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Zhen, as well as many top military leaders communicated with him. They insisted on eliminating the Quartet. The absolute majority of the 11 living members and candidate members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee were opposed to the Quartet. The position of the vacillating Hua Guofeng acquired great importance. When Ye Jianying met with the latter, he said bluntly: "Now they will not go to the world. They are eagerly striving to seize power. The chairman is dead. You must stand up and fight them!" Then Ye Jianying personally went to Zhongnanhai to meet and negotiate with Wang Dongxing. A lot depended on him, since he commanded the security department of the CPC Central Committee. Wang Dongxing listened to the guest (before that, he met with Hua Guofeng, Wang Zhen and Hu Qiaomu). Wang suggested that Y. Jianying keep absolute secrecy and not expand the circle of people who are aware of this case, since the matter is very serious. After consulting among themselves, Ye Jianying, Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing came to the conclusion that it is necessary to act decisively using "cunning" (26, p. 96).

The plan proposed by Y. Jianying was as follows: under the pretext of discussing the 5th volume of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Yao Wenyuan (who was not a member of this committee) should be invited and three members from "gangs of four": Yao Wenyuan and two members of the Politburo Standing Committee - Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen. And with regard to Mao Jiang Qing's wife, take separate preventive measures by arresting her in her personal residence. The entire operation was planned to be completed within an hour. Actions were scheduled for October 6, 1976 (14, p. 94)

On October 1976, an hour before the official opening of the meeting (according to the plan, it was supposed to start at 20 pm), Marshal Ye. Jianying and Hua Guofeng arrived at the Huaizhentang Hall in the Zhongnanhai residence, where such meetings were usually held. Wang Dongxing, having carried out the necessary preparatory work, was already waiting for the "guests" with a group of military guards, being near the Huaizhentang Hall. "Ye Jianying and Hua Guofeng silently sat on the sofa in the room behind the meeting room while waiting for the 'guests'. Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan were arrested by the security guards. They were told that they, along with Jiang Qingn and others, had made against the party, against socialism, and thereby committed a crime. The last member of the "four" remained - Jiang Qing. She was arrested in her house in Zhongnanhai. The last one in the residence of Zhongnanhai in the house of Yingyantang, where he temporarily lived, was arrested without much resistance Mao Zedong's nephew Mao Yuanxin, who joined the Quartet in recent years.

Immediately after the arrest of the Quartet and Mao Yuanxin, Geng Biao was summoned to Zhongnanhai. He was instructed, taking a battalion of soldiers, to occupy the Central Radio Station, the Xinhua News Agency and other central media, which had been under the control of the four for a long time.

At an emergency meeting in Xishan, a suburb of Beijing, on October 6, 1976, at 10 p.m. Beijing time, Hua Guofeng announced the defeat of the Gang of Four. The overwhelming majority of its participants greeted these messages with enthusiasm and applause.

It was decided to appoint Hua Guofeng Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Council of the PK.

After the arrest of the Quartet, the new leadership faced a rather difficult problem: how to link the justification for the legitimacy of the coup with the proof of their loyalty to Mao Zedong. To this end, an attempt was made to separate it from the Quartet. The victors try to show that she was plotting criminal acts primarily against Mao Zedong, and, consequently, against the CCP. planned to seize power in the party, the army and the country. (47)

This group sought to preserve the integrity of the authority of Mao Zedong. completely remove him from the fire of criticism even for those orthodox views and actions that were committed before everyone's eyes during the years of the "cultural revolution". (fifty)

But, on many issues of theory and practice, Hua Guofeng shared the views of the "four". He supported the idea of ​​the necessity and timeliness of the "cultural revolution". In particular, he considered it necessary to continue criticizing Deng Xiaoping. At the same time, he spoke out against launching a struggle against Teng's supporters in the localities, defending "broad rallying of cadre workers and the masses." This dual position of his temporarily suited both the “veterans” and “the four” and both were ready to tolerate him in the first roles for a while. Hua Guofeng took the position of the “veterans” only when he felt that the “four” wanted to push him that she is "trying to usurp power," and he may lose his leadership position.

Provincial leaders were prohibited from contacting their provinces so as not to cause further unrest on the ground and to control events. Neither the central nor the local press reported on the arrest of the "gang of four" until October 20. (31, p. 262)

The same editorial published on October 10 in two newspapers - People's Daily, Jiefangjun Pao and Hongqi Magazine - called on everyone to "rally more closely around the Party Central Committee, headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng", "defend the cohesion and unity of the Party ". There was still no official announcement about the defeat of the Quartet, but one could read about it between the lines of the article.

October 1976 Deng Xiaoping demanded his rehabilitation, but was refused. (32, p. 390)

October 1976, the CPC Central Committee for the first time published an official information report on the defeat of the "Group of Four". In fact, it was about the end of the "cultural revolution". Ritual calls for its continuation still sounded. But a fundamental change has occurred. (38, p. 400)

The essence of the accusations brought against the Quartet was as follows. 1) Using the "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" campaign to fight against Zhou Enlai and the older generation of cadres. 2) Conspiracy activities aimed at usurping power in the CCP; 3) Attempts to create their own "government cabinet". 4) "Organization of the army in order to" kindle a fire "to seize power. 5) Unauthorized decision-making on the most important party and state issues. 6) Demanding ranks and power. However, there was no hard evidence in the publications in favor of the main thesis - the struggle of the "four" against Mao Zedong.

A certain fragility of the arguments gave rise to doubts on the ground, primarily among the promoters of the "cultural revolution". Additional efforts were required - the preparation of more materials. (39, p. 380)

The press throughout the country began to retell Mao Zedong's dying instruction regarding Hua Guofeng: "Since the matter is in your hands, I am calm." The central newspapers were full of headlines: "Chairman Mao's wise decision to make Comrade Hua Guofeng the leader of our party." (40, p. 176)

Soon in the provinces, cities prices. The Autonomous Regions also set up "general criticism groups" or "offices to criticize the Quartet and their supporters."

From October 21 to October 24, 1976, celebrations were held in Tiananmen Square in connection with the defeat of the "four".

The purge of the Quartet adherents took the form of armed clashes in many places. In Sichuan, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan. Then there were rallies in support of the new decisions of the CPC Central Committee. They were supposed to testify to the liquidation of the supporters of the "four" in this province. (16, p. 126)

The administrative regions at the provincial level and below were tasked with carrying out the "Basic Provisions of the PRC Agricultural Development Program for 1956-1967." on the production and yield of cereals, cotton, oilseeds and other crops, the number of pigs and subsidiary trades. They were not fulfilled even with a delay of almost 10 years.

At the meeting, there were calls to restore Deng Xiaoping to leading positions in the party and the country. However, Hua Guofeng said: "It is necessary to criticize Deng, Deng Xiaoping made mistakes, and since there are mistakes, it is necessary to criticize." (39, p. 391)

On February 1977, Xu Shiyu and Wei Guoqing, on behalf of the Guangdong Party Committee, sent a decisive letter to the CPC Central Committee, calling into question the authority of Hua Guofeng as the head of the party, demanding the recognition of Mao Zedong's mistakes and the restoration of Deng Xiaoping to all posts. (51)

From July 16 to July 21, 1977, under conditions of gradual stabilization of the situation in the PRC, the Third Plenum of the 10th CPC Central Committee was held. At the plenum, an official decision was made to return to work Deng Xiaoping and reinstate him as a member of the Politburo and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Military Council of the Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. (39, p. 395)

August 1977 The XI Congress was held. And he wore a dual, compromise character. The confrontation between the two groups at the congress was clearly manifested. On the one hand, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping and their supporters, on the other hand, Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing and their supporters. Each of the groups has not yet gained strength to eliminate the other. That is why the congress adopts such compromise documents. The congress announced the completion of the "cultural revolution" in the country, put forward a new task - the course of economic construction and modernization of the country. But at the same time, many political guidelines from the time of the "cultural revolution" were preserved in the documents of the congresses, loyalty to the line of Mao Zedong was declared, the process of revising the previous theoretical, political and economic guidelines of the party was only gaining momentum.

Hua Guofeng was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Dongxing were elected as his deputies. More than a third of the former members of the 10th Central Committee (117 people) were not re-elected. 96 new members are rehabilitated cadres, there is a tendency to gradually increase the influence of old cadres in the leadership of the CCP. For the most part, the leadership of the new Military Council of the CPC Central Committee included people who actively fought against the "four" and supported the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. (36, p. 274)

From February 26 to March 5, the 1st session of the 5th NPC was held in Beijing. She considered two main issues - the development of agriculture and the restoration and strengthening of the rule of law in the country (the constitution of the PRC, the prosecutor's office, the judiciary, limiting and defining the scope of activity of revolutionary committees, etc.). At the session, following the report of Hua Guofeng, the main provisions of the economic development plan for 1976-1986 were approved, a new Constitution of the PRC was adopted (Ye. Jianying made a report on the project), and a new text of the PRC anthem was adopted.

The main task of the new period was the modernization of the country in four areas, the comprehensive development of the economy and the strengthening of order, political stability, and the rule of law. In agriculture, guidelines were put forward to fight against leveling, against the arbitrary and gratuitous use of material and human resources, the need to develop a diversified economy was pointed out, personal subsidiary farming, market trade, etc. were allowed.

Industry spoke about the need to develop the energy, fuel and mining industries, transport, and the importance of streamlining the management system. (39, p. 398)

The decisions of the session clearly showed the ideological influence of Mao Zedong and, first of all, the Great Leap Forward. This was expressed in the plan for the development of the national economy of the PRC presented by Hua Guofeng to the session and the proposed basic measures for its implementation. The plan provided for rapid economic growth and forced accumulation. (16, p. 95)

It was planned to build 120 large industrial facilities, primarily the creation of 10 large metallurgical bases. Steel production was regarded as a "decisive link", it was planned to increase its production in 1985 to 60 million tons (and in 1978, 31.78 million tons were actually smelted), oil production - up to 250 million tons (real production in 1978 was 104 million tons). (7, p. 120)

There was clearly a desire to accelerate the development of the national economy on the existing basis, that is, in practice - the potential for a "new big leap." Later, such plans were called "chasing the West." The principle of proportional development of the national economy has been violated again. The one-sided bias in the development of the metallurgical, oil, chemical and other branches of heavy industry, the unjustified forcing of the pace of development, significant savings and large investments, could not improve the situation, but only exacerbated the disproportions in the development of the national economy. (29, p. 256)

This was confirmed by the meeting of the State Council, held from July 6 to September 9, 1978 in Beijing, where the main issue was discussed - the acceleration of China's socialist modernization. Different points of view were expressed, but they settled on the fact that in order to accelerate modernization it is necessary to use foreign capital, foreign equipment and technology. (39, p. 400)

At the 1st session of the 5th National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC), Deng Xiaoping was elected Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC.

After Dep Xiaoping returned to leadership work, more and more attention was paid to the use of economic methods of management, observance and consideration of objective economic laws. Characteristic is the report of Hu Qiaomu, with which he spoke at a meeting of the State Council in July 1978. He pointed out that economic laws are objective; politics cannot exist in isolation from economic laws; the economy should be managed in accordance with economic laws. (36, p. 216)

At the same time, the adjustment of economic policy continued. In the autumn of 1977, priorities in industry were revised, and it was proposed to give priority to four weak links - the fuel, energy, raw materials and transport industries. The need for the development of agriculture and light industry in the first place was still recognized. (20, p. 92)

In agriculture, there has been a gradual departure from the Dazhai model. In the spring of 1978, by decision of the CPC Central Committee, a campaign began to criticize the "excessive burden" of the peasants. (52)

Deng Xiaoping said that awarding a medal and a certificate of honor is a moral encouragement, it is a political honor. It's necessary. But financial support is also needed. Inventors and all who have special merit should be given monetary bonuses.

Party veterans gradually won more and more new positions, the position of the nominees of the "cultural revolution" became more and more precarious. (27, p. 167)

Steps began to be taken to reform the education system, to train scientists, engineers and technicians. As early as May 24, 1977, Deng Xiaoping, who was responsible for this area of ​​work, spoke about an approximate plan for an integral system of reforming education, science and technology in a conversation with two employees of the CPC Central Committee: "The key to the implementation of modernization is to raise the scientific and technological level ... development of science and technology, without taking up education," he said. The cause of science and technology, as well as education, lagged behind China by as much as 20 years, compared with what has been achieved by developed countries. He called the approximate time frame for the transformation: within 5 years to achieve the first successes in education, within 10 years - average, and after 15-20 years it will be possible to talk about major successes. "Education," he believed, "needs to be made accessible to more and more time to level it up. cultural revolution china mao

Deng Xiaoping suggested creating a system of scientific research institutions, which would involve several thousand of the most qualified workers, for which it was necessary to create conditions for them. Then they will be able to devote themselves entirely to research work (and not as it was during the "cultural revolution": science was engaged in snatches between political campaigns). Those who are experiencing financial difficulties should be paid special allowances. He called for creating in the party an atmosphere of respect for knowledge and specialists. "We must fight against the erroneous views of those who do not respect the intelligentsia," Deng Xiaoping said. into life "the rivalry of a hundred schools" (39, p. 412)

A decision was made to introduce unified entrance examinations in universities for applicants, in accordance with their level of knowledge, abandoning obsolete methods of admission to universities without exams, which were widely practiced during the "cultural revolution". (29, p. 279)

In March 1978, the All-China Science Forum was held in Beijing. Speaking at it, Deng Xiaoping called the persecution of the intelligentsia and the undermining of science during the "cultural revolution" a mistake. He stated that such a policy brought the national economy to the brink of a national catastrophe.

Without modern science and technology, it is impossible to create either modern agriculture, or modern industry, or modern defense, Deng Xiaoping said, calling on the whole country to create an atmosphere of respect for science and technology. (39, p. 414)

Every nation and country should learn everything positive from other nations and countries, he declared, and adopt from everyone the achievements of advanced science and technology. We have to diligently study abroad, not only because today our science and technology are still lagging behind. Even when our science and technology reach the advanced world level, we will still have to adopt the best from others. (52)

The long-term ban on the screening of a large number of films, plays, and the display and publication of outstanding works of Chinese and foreign art, from which the workers had been fenced off by the Chinese wall for a decade, was lifted. (24, p. 256)

In April 1978, a decision was made to rehabilitate several hundred thousand people who had previously been erroneously classified as "right-wing elements" in 1957, as well as those labeled "Hu Feng's anti-Party faction" in 1955.

June 1978, Deng Xiaoping decided to openly oppose Hua Guofeng and his supporters. He demanded that the criticism of the Quartet be deepened and that the main emphasis should be placed on the principle of a "realistic approach" to the matter. He sharply criticized those who "see hard-core criminals in people who adhere to a realistic approach to business, based on reality and combining theory with practice."

A heated discussion about "two absolutes" and "practices as criteria of truth" lasted for several weeks, and on November 13, Hua Guofeng made a self-criticism. He recognized the dogmatism of the "two absolutes" slogan, which fettered the masses and their views. The second point of view won out. And on December 13, victory was secured in the final speech by Deng Xiaoping. The main idea of ​​the speech entitled "Emancipate the mind, take a realistic approach to the matter, unite together and look ahead" was the demand for the "emancipation of the mind" especially of the leading cadres. He called for an end to the ideological stagnation within the party that arose for various reasons; in fact, he demanded a rejection of the attitude towards the "ideas of Mao Zedong" that had developed in the party in the last decade of the leader's life. Deng Xiaoping sharply criticized the "stagnant thinking", bureaucracy, and vicious style widely spread in the CPC and covered up with phrases about "Party leadership," "Party instructions," "Party interests," "Party discipline," and so on. - asserted Deng Xiaoping, - the so-called "strengthening of the party leadership" led to the fact that the party took everything into its own hands, interfered in every little thing, that is, there was a mixture and merger of party and state power, the replacement of the state by the party. The unified leadership of the Central Committee led in fact to “one-size-fits-all unity.” If some local leaders, said Deng Xiaoping, tried to proceed from reality and received the support of the masses, they were immediately condemned for allegedly pursuing a local policy , "not corresponding to a single standard." This led to passivity in work and the desire to "keep your nose in the wind." Meanwhile, this style did not agree well with the party spirit. "Therefore," Deng Xiaoping called - you need to think, think and speak independently, that is, to expand and strengthen democracy. It is an important condition for the "liberation of consciousness" or, simply, the revision of Mao Zedong's attitudes and decisions. Modernization in four areas will not be possible if we do not put an end to the ossification of thought and liberate the consciousness of cadre workers and the masses of the people. Deng Xiaoping, emphasizing the relevance and significance of the ongoing discussion, once again admitted: "The discussion about the criterion of truth is actually a discussion on the ideological line, a discussion on a political issue, on the issue on which the prospects and fate of the Party and the state depend." (39, p. 423)

From now on, the main attention of the CPC should be focused on solving economic problems. Mao Zedong's economic policy led to a crisis. We urgently need to find a way out of it. The slogan of "socialist modernization" became the general formulation of the new course acceptable to the CCP. It reflected both the ideas of "China's national revival" and thoughts about socialist, planned construction. (12, p. 127)

The first official recognition of the revision of the "strategic line of the party" took place. For the first time in many years, the main focus was on the need to achieve a real increase in the living standards of the people. Meanwhile, the concentration of all the Party's efforts on economic construction was still viewed as a return to the guidelines of Mao Zedong in the mid-1950s, as a restoration of the correct line, subsequently distorted by Lin Piao and the Four. (6 p. 224)

Thus, the issue of reforms was raised again. But, no specific program, detailed concept was proposed, except for Deng Xiaoping's speech at the working meeting. A course was proclaimed for carrying out reforms based on one's own strength, with the active development of economic cooperation with various countries of the world.

Deng Xiaoping said at the workshop: "Economic policy should allow that part of the regions and enterprises, that part of workers and peasants who achieve great success through hard work, to increase incomes and raise their standard of living ahead of others. Improving the lives of some people will have colossal attractive force," Deng Xiaoping emphasized. "It will influence the neighbors. And people from other regions and organizations will begin to imitate their example. The entire national economy will then begin to develop continuously, moving forward in waves, and the peoples of the country will more or less soon live in prosperity and contentment" (52)

The "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Issues of Accelerating the Development of Agriculture" analyzes the mistakes of past agricultural policy and their detrimental effect. By the end of the 70s, almost 40% of the production teams in the countryside could keep afloat only by paying their members wages below the officially established subsistence level. The main point was to try to rehabilitate and restore the principles of agrarian policy, which was carried out in the early 60s and allowed the country to relatively quickly get out of the state of chaos and devastation generated by the "great leap" and people's communes. (49)

A call was made to "improve the organization of labor in the countryside and establish a strict system of production responsibility." Forms of team contracts, types of remuneration depending on the results of work have been approved793. As a reinforcement of this line, as early as January 1979, the Central Committee of the CPC decided to remove the labels "landowner" and "kulak" from part of the peasants. The previously widely used formula "class origin decides everything" was discarded.

The next important point in the decisions of the plenum is the revision of assessments of some of the most important events of the period of the "cultural revolution" and before it, the complete rehabilitation of a number of major figures who spoke in one form or another either against some of Mao Zedong's guidelines, or against the "cultural revolution" itself. As a result, nine former major leaders of the Party and the country, who had previously been removed from their posts, were introduced to the Central Committee of the CPC and a little later they occupied key posts in the party, administrative apparatus and in the army. Others entered the Politburo and its party committee. Despite the criticism of the "cultural revolution" itself, it was recognized as necessary not to rush to generalize its negative lessons and experience and to wait 2-3 years. Nevertheless, already in September 1979, the evaluation of the campaign was still given. (39, p. 445)

The most important issues of the ideological and political sphere were the questions of a realistic approach and the emancipation of consciousness, touched upon by Deng Xiaoping. The formulation of these problems and their solution meant a revision of the ideological line of the CPC, enshrined in the 11th Party Congress. This is a serious undermining of the ideological and theoretical heritage not only of the "cultural revolution" but also of Mao Zedong. Opened the scope for the search for new approaches and a new development strategy. The slogan "liberation of consciousness" became the ideological support for the entire subsequent policy of reform and opening up in China. In order not to look like a radical change in the CCP's ideological course, and to somewhat calm the cadres, it was pointed out everywhere: a realistic approach and emancipation of consciousness is in fact the restoration of the true appearance of Mao Zedong's ideas (with extensive quoting of Mao Zedong). The merits of Mao Zedong as a "great Marxist" were specially emphasized. (49)

The issues of developing inner-party democracy and preventing a new cult of personality in the future were interpreted in more detail than before (very relevant in the light of attempts to create a cult of Hua Guofeng). The plenum emphasized the importance of collective leadership in the Central Committee and party committees at all levels and demanded that more space be given to the glorification of the masses, workers, peasants and soldiers, the glorification of the party and the generation of veterans of the revolution, and less places - the praise of individuals.

Thus, at the 3rd Plenum as a whole, control in the party and the country actually passed to the supporters of Deng Xiaoping. The political line of the party was seriously revised, mass political campaigns and class struggle were condemned. Serious prerequisites have been created for ensuring political stability in society. An important new ideological basis for all further policy of reforms and opening up of China was the course towards the liberation of consciousness and a realistic approach. (39, p. 456) the plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee was able to clear the way for finding new methods, forms and models of the country's development. Thus, after two years of "hesitation" and "indecision", which were brought to an end at the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, a more active process began to search for ways to develop the country and methods of building socialism in China. (52)

The history of China after the "cultural revolution" is a series of crisis domestic political situations that constantly feverish the country. This, in turn, gives rise to constant resistance to the Maoist guidelines both among the cadres of the party-state apparatus and military organs, and among the broad masses of the people. (15, p. 390)

Mass campaigns following one after another or going simultaneously were aimed at suppressing the opposition to Maoism. Under the conditions of the Maoist regime, these political and ideological campaigns have become a kind of method of political leadership of society, as well as a form of life support for the regime itself. All of them were aimed at ensuring unquestioning, blind obedience of the entire population of the country to the ruling elite and its anti-people policy. These campaigns reflected the struggle between two tendencies - Maoist and anti-Maoist, and were also associated with rivalry within the Maoist group itself.

Ultimately, the Maoist campaigns of "criticism" were an expression of the contradiction between the fundamental interests of the working people of China and the anti-popular course of the Maoist leadership, which sought by all means to preserve and strengthen its reactionary dominance. A characteristic feature of all campaigns is the propaganda of the Maoist slogan "the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the entire historical stage of socialism." In terms of their goals, the political and ideological campaigns of the 1970s were a continuation of that reactionary upheaval, which was the "cultural revolution". (39, p. 457)

As a result of the anti-democratic processes initiated by the "cultural revolution", a hierarchy of bureaucratic leaders closed by the "leader" was formed in China, controlled only from above, in no way controlled by the people, lower bodies or public organizations. (fifty)

The internal political situation in China continues to be characterized by sharp disagreements in the leadership, internal struggle, generated, as already noted, by the unresolved cardinal socio-economic problems facing the country, and the impossibility of solving them on the basis of Maoism. (52)

In the internal political, especially in the political and ideological, life of China, a peculiar dual approach to the Maoist postulates and dogmas has been outlined. On the one hand, there is the canonization of Maoism by the current Chinese leadership, on the other hand, official publications make statements that the Quartet "turned Chairman Mao's ideas into a religion", "reduced them to a meager set of quotations." At the same time, it is argued that Mao Zedong's attitudes were correct in the historical conditions of the past, and today they need to be "developed" and take from them what is "useful". The political meaning of this pragmatic use of Maoism is to adapt it to the current political line of the Chinese leadership. (29, p. 490)

The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" became one of the most dramatic periods in the history of modern China. Later, the Chinese Communist Party called this period a "10-year catastrophe." Official sources reported that 4 million 200 thousand people were arrested in 10 years; more than 7,730,000 people died of unnatural death, more than 135,000 people were executed as counter-revolutionaries; over 237,000 people were killed; more than 7,030,000 people have been maimed in armed attacks; more than 71,200 families have completely broken up. Employees of research institutions could not devote themselves entirely to research work. Science was engaged in snatches between political campaigns. In the field of science, China has paid a high price for the ignorant policy of the party leadership, for its incompetence and distrust of scientists. There is a serious shortage of well-educated and well-trained scientists under the age of 50 who could strategically determine the development of Chinese science and who would be recognized by the world scientific community. Thus, there was a very large gap between Chinese science and the science of developed countries. With the advent of communism in China in 1949, the destruction of traditional Chinese culture began, culminating in the "decade of the Cultural Revolution". Until 1949, the intelligentsia in China numbered 2 million people. 550,000 intellectuals were repressed. About 5 million party members were repressed. During the "cultural revolution" industrial production declined, coal production declined, the volume of rail transport decreased, the production of steel and chemical fertilizers decreased. Financial income has decreased and expenses have increased. The destruction of traditional culture brought unthinkable material losses to society. "Rebels" and "Hongweipings" destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples. Thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, etc. were destroyed. Almost all the monasteries and temples in Tibet that had survived to the beginning of the "cultural revolution" were destroyed. The Cultural Revolution affected both Christianity and Catholicism. 8840 priests were killed, 39200 were exiled to labor camps. In 1969, Mao Zedong was at the pinnacle of power. But his victory was fruitless. He managed to destroy the old world, but what did he create in return? Yes, during the "cultural revolution" people began to think with their own heads. Before the revolution, no one dared to doubt the Communist Party, but now people began to wonder if the actions of the Communist Party were correct. After the Cultural Revolution, each person had his own mind and everyone was able to independently think about the problems and this is the greatest achievement of the Cultural Revolution. But it came at too high a cost. Too many have lost their lives. The Cultural Revolution, which traumatized all Chinese, was a real disaster for the Chinese people. Many events that happened in the past, people can forget. But the Cultural Revolution will forever remain a bloody mark in Chinese history.

Conclusion

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976. was one of the most dramatic periods in the history of modern China. The Cultural Revolution was a political campaign unleashed by Mao Zedong, then head of the Chinese Communist Party, to regain power. He succumbed to her rivals (the so-called "people in power, following the capitalist path", who were accused of wanting to introduce capitalism.

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists drove the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan and seized power in the country, expelled the reactionary foreigners from China, and announced to all governments of the world the creation of a new communist state. Having established friendly relations with the USSR, they began to adopt the experience of the Soviet Union and study its economy. The Chinese economy began to be built entirely on the Soviet model. China has essentially become a new state of the Soviet bloc. The "Great Leap Forward" policy oriented the national economy towards accelerated growth, regardless of either the previously approved plans or the costs. Trade turnover after the creation of "people's communes" decreased by 30-50%, according to Chinese economists. The general situation in economics since the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward" is characterized by the fact that economic research has begun to lose scientific objectivity. In economic theory, many "forbidden zones" have arisen. In the course of implementing the "Great Leap Forward" policy, the economy faced serious disproportions, and not only did not accelerate the pace of the country's economic and social development, and did not lead it to a more developed communist way of life, but also led to a drop in the pace of economic development, and caused famine that claimed more ten million lives in China. Chairman Mao, who undermined the country's economy with a "big leap", did not want to give way in the political arena to enterprising pragmatists led by Liu Shaoqi, who found ways to resolve the situation and eliminate the consequences of the mistakes made. He steps aside, leaves them free rein, waiting for them to make a "mistake" to strike. Neither Liu nor his supporters are aware of the political "firestorm" that Mao is preparing. Returning to the government in May 1966, Mao Zedong gathered an army to carry out a global purge in the ranks of the Chinese government, further strengthening his power and continuing his work in the future. The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" became one of the most dramatic periods in the history of modern China. Official sources reported that 4 million 200 thousand people were arrested in 10 years; more than 7,730,000 people died of unnatural death, more than 135,000 people were executed as counter-revolutionaries; over 237,000 people were killed; more than 7,030,000 people have been maimed in armed attacks; more than 71,200 families have completely broken up. Employees of research institutions could not devote themselves entirely to research work. Science was engaged in snatches between political campaigns. In the field of science, China has paid a high price for the ignorant policy of the party leadership, for its incompetence and distrust of scientists. There is a serious shortage of well-educated and well-trained scientists under the age of 50 who could strategically determine the development of Chinese science and who would be recognized by the world scientific community. Thus, there was a very large gap between Chinese science and the science of developed countries. The "Cultural Revolution" destroyed Chinese culture. Until 1949, the intelligentsia in China numbered 2 million people. 550,000 intellectuals were repressed. About 5 million party members were repressed. During the "cultural revolution" industrial production declined, coal production declined, the volume of rail transport decreased, the production of steel and chemical fertilizers decreased. Financial income has decreased and expenses have increased. The destruction of traditional culture brought unthinkable material losses to society. "Rebels" and "Hongweipings" destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples. Thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, etc. were destroyed. Almost all the monasteries and temples in Tibet that had survived to the beginning of the "cultural revolution" were destroyed. The Cultural Revolution affected both Christianity and Catholicism. 8840 priests were killed, 39200 were exiled to labor camps. In 1969, Mao Zedong was at the pinnacle of power. But his victory was fruitless. He managed to destroy the old world, but what did he create in return? Yes, during the "cultural revolution" people began to think with their own heads. Before the revolution, no one dared to doubt the Communist Party, but now people began to wonder if the actions of the Communist Party were correct. After the Cultural Revolution, each person had his own mind and everyone was able to independently think about the problems and this is the greatest achievement of the Cultural Revolution. But it came at too high a cost. Too many have lost their lives. The Cultural Revolution, which traumatized all Chinese, was a real disaster for the Chinese people. Many events that happened in the past, people can forget. But the Cultural Revolution will forever remain a bloody mark in Chinese history.

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43."10 year disaster". About the Cultural Revolution 1966-1976 - #"justify">. History of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China -#"justify">. Deformation of the political system of the PRC during the "great leap" and "cultural revolution" - #"justify">. Evaluation of the "cultural revolution" from the moment of the formation of the PRC to the beginning of the "great cultural revolution". - #"justify">. Criticism of economic views of Mao Tse-tung - #"justify">. "Red" China against the Soviet revisionists - #"justify">. Was the "Cultural Revolution" cultural? - #"justify">. And again in the lens of Dazhai - http://www.kitaichina.com