Why did the USSR fail at the beginning of the Second World War. Causes of the first Soviet failures in the Great Patriotic War

Hundreds, thousands of books, articles were written about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, films were made, many "copies" were broken in various disputes. But still there is a question - how so? Why did the powerful Red Army, which, as it turned out in the last two decades, possessed a large number of tanks and aircraft, fail to hold out on its borders and allow the enemy to break through to Leningrad, Moscow, and the Volga?

The anti-Stalinists have a simple answer: they say, the Stalinist regime is to blame for everything - it destroyed the best commanders, believed Hitler, did not believe intelligence, poorly prepared the army, etc. But archival documents and recent studies by Russian authors (for example, you can read the series “War and We ”) say the opposite: there was no exact intelligence data, there was a huge amount of conflicting information; the army, the economy, society were prepared for war for real (without concessions). The "purge" of the officer corps did not worsen the combat capability of the country's officer corps, but rather increased it, opportunists were repressed, drunkards were fired, and so on; real military leaders who had gone through combat school began to come to the fore - from a simple soldier to the commander of a division, corps. For example, you can read about this in Igor Pykhalov's book "The Great Slandered War".

In the field of diplomacy, the USSR also showed its best side, having won a number of victories on the diplomatic (foreign policy) front: the issue of the security of Leningrad was resolved, the borders were significantly pushed to the west, a number of their territories were returned, and they gained time for preparation. In military terms, the Red Army gained experience in fighting in Spain, on Khasan, Khalkin-Gol, in China, in Poland, in the war with Finland, despite all the cruelty of this, but without such a “school” one cannot learn to fight.

An interesting version was put forward by the writer Yuri Mukhin, he suggested that one of the main factors in the defeats of the initial period of the war was the so-called "problem of the military class." This is not only a disease of the Red Army, this problem originated in the Russian Empire, inherited in the USSR, and then in the Russian Federation. Its essence is this: after the nobles got the opportunity not to serve, or to serve immediately from the position of an officer, the officer corps of the empire began to degenerate. Prior to this, the commanders began their service from the bottom (for example, Peter the Great forced the children of the aristocracy to serve from soldiers and sailors), so Suvorov, Kutuzov were the "fathers" to their soldiers. They thoroughly knew their psychology, ate with them, slept with them, stood in the same ranks, “did not bow to bullets”, they were an indisputable authority for the soldiers, they were loved, believed in them and were ready to perform any task. After the liquidation of this system, a mass of inexperienced people, often opportunists and careerists, became officers. For them, the army was a place of “warm”, high-status life, a place for making a career. This became one of the main reasons for the defeat in the Crimean War, when terrifying flaws were revealed behind the outward brilliance and window dressing, when real heroes (such as Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers) died in order to correct the mistakes of others and prevent empire catastrophe. This was the reason for the protracted Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the defeat in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905, and the failures in the First World War. And it became the cause of catastrophic failures in the Great Patriotic War. Mukhin calls the main reasons - incompetence, cowardice, lack of will, unprofessionalism of the senior command staff. And even outright betrayal. So, according to Yuri Mukhin, the command of the Western Military District (front) - Pavlov and K., simply allowed the forces standing in the Central Strategic Direction to be destroyed. Opening the road to Smolensk and Moscow.

Yuri Mukhin

Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the border guards were not ready to strike, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were on alert, the Kyiv military district withstood the blow and even counterattacked, and a catastrophe occurred in Belarus.

But, apparently, the main reason for the catastrophe of the initial period is the power of the blow. None of the armies that existed at that time could stand it. To withstand such a blow, one had to be the Red Army of the 1944-1945 model. People, including a significant part of the commanders, did not have the psychological readiness to die, but not to retreat. Part (everyone knows the heroic example of the Brest Fortress, and there are many such examples) withstood and fought to their last breath. And the majority, especially where there were no passionaries (in Russian, furious, full of vitality), capable of leading and inspiring to a mortal battle, retreated and surrendered. Everything is clear even from the columns taken prisoner - if there are no people who will lead the attack on the few escorts, the rest will simply go to the slaughter.

This confirms the complete superiority of the Wehrmacht in the main directions of impact - a 3-x-5-fold superiority in manpower and technology.

It is also very important that Wehrmacht soldiers were already a warring army, and not peaceful (like most of the Red Army), they have already "tasted blood" in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Greece. They had the psychological readiness to kill, were absolutely sure they were right– it is very important in battle, to be absolutely confident in your strength. They are the highest race, and against them "subhuman orcs", the program worked.

But soon the situation changed, their tribal memory awakened in the Russians, they again became Warriors. The Russian people, Russia cannot be defeated on their territory, in open battle, the Russian Spirit has awakened, and all the false programs of the Nazis could not withstand his blows.

Sources:
The Great Slandered War - 2. Under the general editorship. A. Dyukov. M., 2008.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten Myths of World War II. M. 2006.
Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers are commanders. M., 2004.
Mukhin Yu. If not for the generals! Problems of the military class. - M., 2006.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crusade to the East - M., 2004.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M, 2006.
Human factor. Under total ed. Yu. I. Mukhina. M., 2003.

The failures of the first months of the Great Patriotic War for the USSR were due to many objective and subjective factors. Many works have been written on this topic, numerous studies have been carried out. An analysis of military operations and an assessment of the tactical and strategic decisions of the command of the Armed Forces and the political leadership of the Soviet Union are of interest even today.

1. Unpreparedness of the Red Army for war

Preparations for a major war that began in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the production of a large amount of military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible the advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.

However, in general, the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 had an incomplete strength and were poorly provided with military equipment, moreover, they also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an effect, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and less competent or inexperienced commanders took their place, in contrast to the German army, in which all generals and most of the officers had combat experience since the First World War , as well as the experience of all campaigns 1939-1941.

The transport capabilities of Germany were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, organize their supply. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than the German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in terms of the number of trucks by about half, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.

In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this preparation lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop the armed forces and the military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal military service was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR only on September 1, 1939.

2. Strategic miscalculations of the command of the Red Army

But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war became one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, they had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (the Battle of Moscow, the liberation of Rostov, the Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht reached its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these defeats was the reassessment by the command (and primarily by Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also left the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in a southerly direction. German active operations in 1942 were also logical in the southern direction - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.

The next failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand soldiers of the Red Army. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - they asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.

An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. The infantry and cavalry broke through the German defenses, but this often ended - there was almost no one and nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both "cauldrons" (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after the arrival of reinforcements. In addition, the encircled German troops in these pockets were supported by transport aircraft, which was difficult to fight due to the huge losses of Soviet aircraft in the first months of the war.

A common mistake was the incorrect determination of the directions of the main attacks of the enemy. Thus, in Ukraine, the command of the Southwestern Front, led by General Kirponos, was constantly afraid of turning the 1st Panzer Group to the south, to the rear of the Lvov salient. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kiev - more than 400 tanks.)

3. Repressions in the pre-war period

According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. were shot, arrested or dismissed from the armed forces from 25 to 50 thousand officers. The highest commanding staff suffered the most significant losses - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war.

The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, Civil Wars (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Yegorov and many others) were subjected to repressions, and young officers came in their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political officers had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, among the commanders of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a specialized secondary education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.

But even solid military experience could not always help to win. For example, General D.T. Kozlov had been fighting since 1915, but could not oppose anything to the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the fighting in the Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same happened with V.N. Gordova - a long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a series of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.

Thus, the already indicated reasons for the defeats of the Red Army were superimposed by the lack of a good experienced command, which together led to the horrific defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943, the Red Army commanders were able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encirclement and destruction large enemy forces, powerful front-line offensives (similar to the German summer of 1941).

In the military history literature and in the memoirs of participants in the Great Patriotic War, many different reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war are mentioned.

One of the main reasons for the failures of military experts called the miscalculations of the military-political leadership of the country in assessing the timing of the attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Despite the regular receipt of information from the middle of 1940 from Soviet intelligence about the preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the USSR, Stalin did not exclude the possibility that in 1941 the war could be avoided and its start could be delayed by various political maneuvers until 1942. Because of the fear of provoking a war, the Soviet troops were not tasked with bringing the border districts to full combat readiness, and the troops did not occupy the intended defensive lines and positions before the enemy attack began. As a result, the Soviet troops were actually in peacetime, which largely predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles of 1941.

Of the 57 divisions intended to cover the border, only 14 calculated divisions (25% of the allocated forces and means) managed to occupy the designated defense areas, and then mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. The construction of the defense was designed only to cover the border, and not to conduct a defensive operation in order to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces.

Before the war, the military-political leadership of the USSR insufficiently developed and mastered the forms and methods of strategic and operational defense. The methods of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were incorrectly assessed. No provision was made for the possibility of the enemy going over to the offensive at once by all available pre-deployed groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic directions.

Difficulties in the preparation of the theater of operations (theater of operations) created the transfer of the border and the withdrawal of the main part of the troops of the western military districts to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia. A significant part of the fortified areas on the old border was mothballed. There was a need for the urgent construction of fortified areas on the new border, the expansion of the airfield network and the reconstruction of most airfields.

The possibility of conducting military operations on its territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation not only of defense, but also of theaters of military operations in the depths of their territory in general.

It also turned out to be a mistake to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops in the southwestern strategic direction by the beginning of the war, i.e. in Ukraine, while in June 1941 the fascist troops delivered the main blow in the western direction - in Belarus. Also unjustified was the decision to bring supplies of material and technical assets closer to the border, which made them vulnerable with the outbreak of war.

Not enough attention was paid to the mobilization preparation of industry. The mobilization plans developed for transferring the national economy to a military footing were designed for too long periods.

Before the war, a major organizational and technical reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces began, which was planned to be completed before 1942. A radical restructuring of the system of operational, combat and political training of the armed forces began. Here, too, major miscalculations were made. Overly cumbersome formations and associations were created without taking into account the real possibilities of equipping them with modern weapons and staffing. The timing of the completion of the formation of most new compounds turned out to be unrealistic. As a result, by the beginning of the war, a significant part of them could not be formed, equipped with equipment and trained. This happened, for example, with almost simultaneously formed new mechanized corps, many of which turned out to be unfit for combat.
The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with command and rank and file, as well as tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles, means of traction for artillery, fuel delivery, equipment repair and engineering weapons.

The Red Army did not have in sufficient quantities such important technical means as radio, engineering equipment, automobiles, and special tractors for artillery.

The Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and artillery, but outnumbered him in the number of tanks and aircraft. However, the qualitative superiority was on the side of Germany. It was expressed in better technical equipment, higher coordination, training and staffing of the troops. The enemy had tactical and technical superiority in the main fleet of aircraft.

Most of the Soviet tanks were no worse, and the new ones (T34, KB) were better than the German ones, but the main tank fleet was badly worn out.
On the eve of the war, enormous damage was done to the personnel of the Soviet armed forces and intelligence: almost 40 thousand of the most qualified commanders and political workers were subjected to mass repressions. Most of the commanders of military districts, fleets, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, members of military councils, and other party and political workers were arrested and destroyed. Instead of them, military personnel who did not have the necessary practical experience were hastily promoted to leading positions.
(Military Encyclopedia. Military Publishing. Moscow, in 8 volumes. 2004)

In the command and control system of the Armed Forces, there were continuous reshuffles of the leadership in the central apparatus and military districts. So, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. In the year and a half before the war (1940-1941), the heads of the air defense department were replaced five times (on average every 3-4 months), from 1936 to 1940, five heads of the intelligence department were replaced, etc. Therefore, most officials did not have time to master their duties associated with the implementation of a large range of complex tasks before the war.

By this period, the command staff of the German army had acquired the necessary practical skills in command and control, in organizing and conducting large-scale offensive operations, in using all types of military equipment and weapons on the battlefields. The German soldier had combat training. As the events of the first weeks of the war showed, the fact that the German army had combat experience played an important role in the first successes of the fascist troops on the Soviet German front.

As a result of the defeat suffered by the states of Europe in the first period of the Second World War, the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe fell into the hands of fascist Germany, which significantly increased its military and economic potential.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources.

Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.

Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, laying the responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they "did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops."

An unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by the Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff expected that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the Nazis, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by the German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily due to the powerful strikes of the armored forces, supported by aircraft, which quickly cut through the enemy defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defense capability of the invaded country.
The miscalculation of the command of the USSR led to the fact that German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft and actually secured air supremacy for itself. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The German command achieved its goal: the control of the Red Army troops was violated for some time.

Unfortunate disposition of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of the Soviet troops was very convenient for striking at German territory, but detrimental to a defensive operation. The deployment that took shape at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the plan of the General Staff to deliver preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the Fundamentals of Deployment, such a deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with deployed rears, but were divided into three echelons out of operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy the Soviet troops in parts.

The situation was especially alarming on the "Bialystok ledge", which went for many kilometers towards the enemy. This arrangement of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. Fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counteroffensives

On June 22, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin's directive was issued, which stated: "troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border."

Such an order testified to a misunderstanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when the German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts as well. Few could object to him. Despite the unpreparedness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire length of the front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops were ordered to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction, could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov region, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the capabilities of the enemy and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a "boiler". About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the context of the impending war, the material and technical means needed to be pulled closer to the troops. 340 out of 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in the border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. Only in the area of ​​the Brest Fortress, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the frontline zone, but in training camps.
The course of hostilities showed the recklessness of such a decision. It was no longer possible to withdraw military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants in a short time. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was a large accumulation of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the forward units of the army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km., Then the front-line and long-range aviation units were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces towards Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into a gap in the Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, the Headquarters placed the main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the personnel of the Red Army, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center.
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: to meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then go on the counteroffensive with all available forces. The main task - to keep Moscow at any cost - was completed, however, most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the "cauldrons" near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two "cauldrons" were 7 field directorates of the armies out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but most of the reserves were concentrated not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the southern direction.

Alarming reports of an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked in Japan as a German journalist) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

from other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he was afraid of provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - A special TASS report appeared stating that all rumors about a war with Germany were lies. The troops were not put on alert, although Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War has begun June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided an advantage. German aviation dominated the air - bombing attacks were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the invasion, conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North advanced on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group "Center" advanced on Moscow, advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the ratio of losses was 1: 8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 lost up to half of their composition. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met with desperate resistance. The frontier outposts were the first to take the blow of the enemy - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno for 1 month.

When the situation cleared up, strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles unfolded in all three directions:

June - August - the defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - the defense of Smolensk (on September 5, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counteroffensive, the Soviet guard was born).

Kyiv defended for 2 months.

Odessa defended for 73 days.

250 days - the defense of Sevastopol (the losses of the Germans are greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is waging stubborn defensive battles. Hitler focuses his main forces on the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy:

1. A general military mobilization of men born in 1905-1918 has been announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law has been introduced in the western regions of the country.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special council for evacuation was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ from May 5 he headed the government + head of the party).

6. GKO was created - to manage the activities of all government departments and institutions in a war.

7. Detachments of the people's militia are being formed.

8. The mobilization national economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, holidays were canceled, and mandatory overtime work was introduced.

9. The call of the country's leadership to the deployment of various forms of socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, donations.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing a rebuff to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining the fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, the people's militia, volunteers for the Red Army, duty to help air defense, raising funds and things for the defense fund .

Results of the initial period of the war:

Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic States, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - the loss of areas with large enterprises of various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers has changed (the war in Russia is not a walk around Europe).

Causes of failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The suddenness of the attack for the army, not brought to full combat readiness, and for the population, confident that in the near future there will be no war with Germany.

2. The superiority of the German army (in terms of numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer cadres, there were plans, allies, a huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. The miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

Incorrect timing of the attack,

Ignored intelligence data and reports of a possible outbreak of war,

Mistaken military doctrine

The direction of the main blow is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level of officers (due to repressions).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganization of the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to keep large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to protect prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period, the war is developing extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the tide, but everything possible is being done for this.