On the anti-people nature of the Kolchak regime. The main program provisions of Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak The main activities of the Kolchak government were

Buchko N.P., Tsipkin Yu.N.

POLITICAL VIEWS AND ACTIVITIES OF A.V. KOLCHAK

In 1917 - 1920.

One of the most controversial and odious figures of the Civil War in Russia is Admiral A.V. Kolchak. Leaving aside his merits as an explorer of the North and a naval commander during the years of the Russian-Japanese and World War I, I would like to dwell on his political views and activities during the years of the revolution and the Civil War.

His ideas about politics A.V. Kolchak reflected back in 1912 in the work “The Service of the General Staff”, where he noted: “If we defined politics as the doctrine of struggle in application to state life, then a priori we can be sure that the principles of war, as such, are fully applicable and to politics ..., the essence of state policy rests on the same principles as military affairs, since politics is only a form of the basic idea of ​​\u200b\u200bstruggle, common in application to solving state problems, achieving strategic or tactical goals. Such were the political views of many members of the military elite who put war over politics. Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral A.V. Kolchak accepted the abdication of the king as a fact. He wrote about the changes that were taking place: “For ten days I have been engaged in politics and I feel a deep disgust for it, because my politics is the command of the authorities that can command me.”

In the summer of 1917, right-wing circles were actively looking for a candidate for the post of military dictator. Even then, representatives of the US American Mission in Russia, E. Ruth and J. Glennon, suggested that the Provisional Government send A.V. Kolchak as head of the military mission to the US Navy. In America, the admiral learned about the events of October 1917 in Russia. In March 1918 A.V. Kolchak, who had joined the British Armed Forces and was on his way to Mesopotamia from Japan via Shanghai and Singapore, was sent via Beijing to Manchuria in order to lead the anti-Bolshevik forces along with Semyonov. "English government. found that I needed to be used in Siberia in the form of allies and Russia. ”, - wrote A.V. Kolchak to his civil wife A.V. Timireva in

March 1918 from Singapore. At a meeting of anti-Bolshevik forces in Beijing, held from April 18 to May 3, 1918, its participants stated that the admiral could unite anti-Soviet forces in the region. On May 10, Kolchak was appointed head of the troops formed in the right-of-way of the CER. But the attempt to form a combat-ready military force failed due to the separatism of the Cossack chieftains G.M. Semenov and I.P. Kalmykov, various officer detachments operating on the CER with the open support of the Japanese. This forced Kolchak to give up his command and membership in the board of the CER and go to Japan to "treat his nerves."

On September 29, 1918, at the Ufa State Conference, the Directory was created, which declared itself the Provisional All-Russian Government. It was a temporary and very unstable compromise between the Right Socialists and the Cadets. Admiral A.V., who arrived from Japan together with the English General A. Knox, was invited to the post of Minister of War of the Directory. Kolchak. The directory did not last long. On the night of November 18, 1918, officers and Cossacks, with the support of the English battalion of Colonel Ward, carried out a coup in Omsk. Neither the British, nor the Cadets, nor the officers could put up with the right-wing socialist parties any longer and relied on a military dictatorship.

Close in his political preferences to the Cadets, Admiral Kolchak agreed to the persuasion of the head of the Eastern Department of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party (KDP) V.N. Pepelyaev and right-wing officers and assumed the post of military dictator. The Omsk government formed after Kolchak came to power included representatives of the KDP, among whom were G.K. Gins, G.G. Telberg, V.N. Pepelyaev and others. For some time, the right SRs and Mensheviks remained in the government. Later, in March 1919, V.N. Pepelyaev wrote to the leadership of the National Center cadet organization about the purpose of his mission in Siberia: the National Center sent me to the east to work in favor of the one-man dictatorship and to negotiate with Admiral Kolchak in order to prevent the rivalry between the names of Alekseev and Kolchak. With the death of Alekseev, the candidacy of the admiral became indisputable ... ". A.V. Kolchak became the Supreme Ruler of Russia and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the White Guards, and other leaders

The White movement recognized these titles for him. Kolchak received the rank of full admiral.

Cadets and white generals covered themselves with slogans of non-partisanship and apoliticality of the army, although they purposefully pursued their own policy. The admiral had a negative attitude towards all socialist parties and the Constituent Assembly, "which sang the Internationale from the spot under the leadership of Chernov." He put only one thing to the credit of the Bolsheviks - the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly.

The admiral was a supporter of the use of armed violence as a possible means of political struggle, and he defined war as an invariable manifestation of public life. All these militaristic ideas were reflected in Kolchak's further political activities. Kolchak saw the main reason for Russian disunity in the denial of national interests by society in favor of the party. It was here that Kolchak's misunderstanding of social life and the causes of the social split in Russia manifested itself, which also found expression in the inter-party struggle.

The reaction of the population to Kolchak's coming to power was the fear that "the former tsarist admiral wants to return the tsar and restore the monarchy in Russia." True, A.V. Kolchak and his administration publicly declared the impossibility of restoring the monarchy.

According to Kolchak's supporters, his appearance as Supreme Ruler was to become a unifying principle for all anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia and the Far East. Kolchak was supported by the "Russian Political Conference", created at the end of 1918 in Paris and designed to unite and represent the anti-Bolshevik forces abroad. Kolchak also enjoyed the full support of a number of foreign governments. He was recognized as the new leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces by the Russian military missions abroad.

However, not all anti-Soviet forces supported Kolchak's rise to power. These, in particular, included the command of the Czechoslovak Corps and the Czechoslovak National Council, close to the right-wing socialists. True, their hesitation was short-lived. The most noticeable expression of dissatisfaction with Kolchak's coming to power was the demarche of the Ataman of the Transbaikal Cossack Army and the head of the Far Eastern Union of Cossack Troops G.M. Semenov. He even

threatened to declare autonomy for Eastern Siberia and create the Genghisid empire.

In the initial period of the anti-Bolshevik struggle, the admiral highly appreciated the work of the Zemstvo in organizing power in the East, noted the businesslike nature of the activities of these structures in the field. But later such an assessment did not prevent Kolchak from ignoring the Zemstvo. In solving the internal political problems facing the authorities, he gave priority to his military proteges. It was the military component of power, according to the admiral, that was the key to its existence. Only the crisis of the policy pursued by the Supreme Ruler forced him to agree to the creation of the State Zemsky Conference, which was conceived by some leaders of the regime as a representative body. Such an assessment of the Meeting aroused the indignation of the admiral, he called him a "sovdep" and almost dispersed him.

The most important factor that influenced the formation of the policy of the Kolchak government was the influence of foreign states, which solved the main task for themselves - countering Bolshevism. However, all the help of A.V. The interventionists provided Kolchak only in direct connection with the successes of the White armies and only for currency (with 100% prepayment) and compensation in the form of concessions and trade on preferential terms. Waste of part of Russia's gold reserves, seized by anti-Bolshevik forces in Kazan in 1918, amounted to 242 million gold. rub. out of 651, 5 gold rub. (in 1914 prices). The interventionists imposed on the white governments in Siberia and the Far East a number of unequal treaties on the fishing, extraction and export of minerals. So, in particular, A.V. Kolchak in 1919 extended the Russian-Japanese agreement of 1907 on fishing, which was unequal in nature and damaged the marine reserves of the Far Eastern seas. A.V. Kolchak complained about the dominance of the Japanese in the Far East and the humiliation of the Russian authorities by the Japanese interventionists. When the white armies began to suffer defeats, the “Russian patriot” A.V. Kolchak sent General Romanovsky to Japan with a request for a new dispatch of troops to Russia. In return, Omsk promised the Japanese new concessions and a section of the CER from Changchun to Harbin. The Japanese promised Kolchak to maintain order in the Far East, to settle Omsk's misunderstandings with the Far Eastern chieftains. July 22, 1919 Japan finally refused to send Kolchak

2 divisions west of Irkutsk, and in October Tokyo confirmed the refusal. Japan was still focused on capturing the Far East of Russia, and was not going to go west further than Baikal.

The allies tried, by imposing conditions on assistance to the whites, to reproduce the basic principles of Western democracy, to export to Russia the "matrix" of American and European economic, political and social institutions. On May 26, 1919, the Allies presented Kolchak with a note setting out the conditions under which assistance would be provided to the White regime. After the capture of Moscow, Kolchak was advised to convene a Constituent Assembly, to organize the free election of local governments, to ensure civil liberties and freedom of religion, not to restore estate privileges, not to revive landownership, to recognize the independence of Poland and Finland, etc. Thus, it was not only about giving the Kolchak regime a democratic appearance, but also about the desire of the Entente to put the leaders of the White movement under its control.

Within the framework of administrative management, a system was built with governors, a police apparatus and judicial bodies, similar to those of pre-revolutionary Russia. All these attributes of a new, based on a temporary and personal component, power (but old in content) found expression in the emerging public opinion about a possible return to the old regime Russia after Kolchak's victory. The unviability of the created system of administrative bodies was also confirmed by the actions of the military authorities, various punitive detachments, which often ignored the orders of civil officials. The existing system of power-dictatorial relations assumed the strict subordination of all structures to the higher leadership and the closure of the power pyramid on the control of one person - the dictator. However, the formed structures could not withstand the pressure on them from the military leaders themselves. The weakness of the created system was due both to the lack of practical experience in administrative activities among the majority of the military involved in it, and the lack of those in the region who had experience in managerial work. A characteristic example of such a situation was the established judicial system. Along with the existing civil jury trials and other formal attributes of the legal consideration of controversial issues, the Kolchak regime to maintain public order

resorted to the use of purely military force. Kolchak endowed the commanders of military units with special powers, which resulted in repressions against the local population. Unable to ensure universal observance of the rule of law, local authorities and internal affairs authorities requested military structures to send detachments to the territories under their control to maintain public order. Moreover, the measures taken by the military concerned both the fight against crimes of a criminal-administrative nature, and the elimination of political opponents of the regime. He practiced the regime and recruitment to the positions of heads of city and county structures of law enforcement agencies (police), special forces, military officers, without having a proper legal education.

The Kolchak regime did not correspond to either parliamentary democracy or a presidential republic. He relied on military force and limited the functions of civil power to purely nominal functions. It was an authoritarian military regime. So, in particular, to suppress the partisan movement in the Yenisei and Irkutsk provinces, Kolchak, by his order of March 31, 1919, granted the commander of the troops of the Irkutsk military district, General Artemyev, the rights of the army commander, and the commander of the troops in the areas covered by the partisan movement, General Rozanov, the rights of the general -governor. Rozanov ordered to burn several villages whose inhabitants helped the partisans. Later, during interrogation in Irkutsk, Kolchak stated that his order did not concern the burning of villages, but "during the fighting and the suppression of the uprising, such a measure is inevitable." According to the memoirs of the Chief Executive of the Supreme Ruler and the Council of Ministers G.K. Gins, A.V. Kolchak frankly told him that “the civil war must be merciless. I order the commanders of the units to shoot all captured communists. Either we shoot them, or they shoot us. If I lift martial law, the Bolsheviks, or the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or your own members of the Economic Conference, like Alekseevsky, or your governors, like Yakovlev, will immediately re-arrest you.

The Kolchak government did not actually control the territory. Army commanders did whatever they pleased. They were completely independent in their military and civilian policies and actions. Siberia under Kolchak, in essence, turned into a conglomerate

military principalities, only nominally subordinate to the government. The arbitrariness of the white military on the ground only testified to the weakness of the vertical of power, the willfulness of the executors of all structural divisions, and the inefficiency of the judicial and legal system. In addition, the government was also struck by internecine strife. Kolchak's orders to stop mutual accusations of departments and specific strife under pain of punishment, to work together and not to ruin the state were ignored.

In a direct conversation with Prime Minister Pepelyaev, Kolchak described the political situation as follows: “The activity of the chiefs of district police, special forces, all kinds of commandants, heads of individual detachments is a complete crime. All this is aggravated by the activities of the military units: Polish and Czech, who do not recognize anything and stand outside any law. We have to deal with a deeply corrupt contingent of employees who pursue only personal interests, ignoring all notions of duty and discipline. This is the environment in which you have to work.” . But the complaints of A.V. Kolchak, to the arbitrariness of his military, does not relieve him of guilt for the white terror.

In the autumn of 1919, in connection with the successes of the Red Army, the opposition forces: the Bolsheviks, right-wing socialists (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and People's Socialists) in Siberia and the Far East intensified their activities. On November 12, 1919, at the secret “All-Siberian Conference of Zemstvos and Cities”, the “Political Center” (Polittsentr) was created to prepare an uprising against Kolchak and create a buffer state in Siberia. The Bolsheviks decided to take part in the action in order to establish Soviet power in Siberia under favorable conditions. The uprising of the Political Center began in Cheremkhovo on December 21, 1919. The uprising was supported by partisan detachments and worker squads, most of which were subordinate to the Bolsheviks. On December 27, 1919, in Nizhneudinsk, the Czechs took Kolchak “under guard”, his prime minister V.N. Pepelyaev and the gold reserve. On the same day, the uprising of the Political Center swept Irkutsk. The Czechoslovak command sided with the rebels in order to push their echelons through Irkutsk to the East at any cost. The road to salvation lay through the deaf Siberian taiga during the period of severe Siberian frosts and the Circum-Baikal Railway with its many tunnels and other artificial structures. Only the opposition of the Czechoslovak

armored trains and the superiority of the forces of the Czechs helped the Political Center to repel the attacks of the Semenovites from the east.

January 4, 1920 A.V. Kolchak, being in a hopeless situation, transferred the powers of the Supreme Ruler of Russia to A.I. Denikin, and G.M. Semyonov received full power in the East of the country. On February 7, 1920, the former Supreme Ruler was shot by order of the Irkutsk Military Revolutionary Committee in connection with the danger of an offensive by white troops (according to other sources, at the secret request of V.I. Lenin and the chairman of the Sibrevkom, I.N. Smirnov). Together with A.V. Kolchak shot his last prime minister V.N. Pepelyaev.

Recently, attempts have been made to rehabilitate the "heroes of the White Cause." On January 26, 1999, the military court of the Trans-Baikal Military District rejected the request for the rehabilitation of Admiral Kolchak. In January 2001, this decision was confirmed by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. On May 4, 2005, the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office for the fifth time refused to rehabilitate A.V. Kolchak as a person who committed crimes against peace and humanity, the culprit of mass terror against supporters of Soviet power. In 2007, the refusal was confirmed by the prosecutor's office of the Omsk region.

A.V. Kolchak remains today one of the most controversial political and military figures of such a tragic period in the history of our country as the Civil War.

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In the spring of 1918, the Czechoslovak corps revolted. He moved to the Volga, cutting off central Russia from Siberia. In June, the White Czechs took Samara. Anti-Bolshevik parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) set up a provisional government in Samara. In July 1918, the Siberian government was established in Omsk, which ruled Western Siberia. The anti-Bolshevik camp in the East was weakened by the confrontation between the Samara and Omsk governments. Unlike the one-party Komuch, the Provisional Siberian government was coalition. It was headed by P.V. Vologda. The left wing in the government was the Socialist-Revolutionaries B.M. Shatilov, G.B. Patushinsky, V.M. Krutovsky. The right side of the government - I.A. Mikhailov, I.N. Serebrennikov, N.N. Petrov - occupied cadet and pro-monarchist positions.

The government's program was shaped under considerable pressure from its right wing. Already at the beginning of July 1918, the government announced the abolition of all decrees issued by the Council of People's Commissars and the liquidation of the Soviets, the return to the owners of their estates with all inventory. The Siberian government pursued a policy of repression against dissidents, the press, meetings, etc. Komuch protested against such a policy.

Despite sharp differences, the two rival governments had to negotiate. At the Ufa state meeting, a "temporary all-Russian government" was created. The meeting ended its work with the election of the Directory. N.D. Avksentiev, N.I. Astrov, V.G. Boldyrev, P.V. Vologodsky, N.V. Tchaikovsky.

In its political program, the Directory declared the struggle for the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the continuation of the war with Germany as the main tasks. The short-term nature of the new government was emphasized by the point that the Constituent Assembly was to meet in the near future - January 1 or February 1, 1919, after which the Directory would resign.

The Directory, having abolished the Siberian government, now seemed to be able to implement an alternative program to the Bolshevik one. However, the balance between democracy and dictatorship was upset. The Samara Komuch, which represented democracy, was dissolved. The attempt made by the Socialist-Revolutionaries to restore the Constituent Assembly failed.

Settled in Siberia in 1918-1919. the political regime, led by the Directory, headed by the Supreme Ruler of Russia, was more liberal than in the South of Russia. The political bloc on which the Siberian government (with its capital in Omsk) relied included a wide range of parties - from monarchists to socialists (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks). The Constituent Assembly was convened on the territory of the Siberian government, which discussed the issues raised by it back in January 1918. Zemstvo and city self-government bodies, world courts, trade unions and public organizations were restored, as well as the operation of charters and regulations adopted before October 1917.

In September 1918, at the Ufa meeting, an attempt was made to unite all these territories under a single leadership. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Omsk, Samara governments, national (Kazakh, Turkic-Tatar, Bashkir) and Cossack military governments. They signed an act establishing the All-Russian Provisional Government. Power was concentrated in the hands of the Directory with its center in Omsk. On the night of November 17-18, 1918, the leaders of the Directory were arrested. The directory was replaced by the dictatorship of A.V. Kolchak. It seemed that with the promotion to the role of dictator A.V. Kolchak, the Whites had a leader who would lead the entire anti-Bolshevik movement. In the provision on the temporary structure of state power, approved on the day of the coup, the Council of Ministers, the supreme state power was temporarily transferred to the Supreme Ruler, and all the Armed Forces of the Russian state were subordinate to him. A.V. Kolchak was soon recognized as the Supreme Ruler by the leaders of the other white fronts, and the Western allies recognized him de facto.

The political and ideological ideas of the leaders and ordinary members of the white movement were as diverse as the socially heterogeneous movement itself. Of course, some part sought to restore the monarchy, the old, pre-revolutionary regime in general. But the leaders of the white movement refused to raise the monarchist banner and put forward a monarchist program. This also applies to A.V. Kolchak.

To a direct question from the chairman of the commission whether he was a monarchist, Kolchak answered frankly and honestly: “I was a monarchist and do not deviate from this at all ... I ... could not consider myself a republican, because then this did not exist in nature. Before the 1917 revolution, I considered myself a monarchist.” Then the admiral stated that, nevertheless, he welcomed the change of government as a result of the February Revolution, voluntarily took the oath of allegiance to the Provisional Government and the perfect revolution "in conscience" and from that moment began to consider himself "completely free from any obligations in relation to the monarchy » Quoted from: Kolchak Alexander Vasilievich - the last days of life / Compiled by G.V. Egorov. - M., 2005. - S. 135 ..

As for the question of the future state structure of the country, the former head of the all-Russian white movement believed that only “the people themselves should establish a form of government in the constituent body” and whatever they chose, Kolchak would have obeyed. “I believed that the monarchy would probably be completely destroyed,” the admiral concluded further, “it was clear to me that it was absolutely impossible to restore the former monarchy, and in our time they no longer choose a new dynasty, I believed that with this question already finished, and I thought that some kind of republican form of government would probably be established, and I considered this republican form of government to meet the needs of the country. Egorov. - M., 2005. - S. 136 ..

Kolchak agreed to convene a new Constituent Assembly after the restoration of order. He assured Western governments that there could be no "return to the regime that existed in Russia before February 1917." Kolchak A.V. "... Having accepted the cross of this power ...". Appeal to the population / / Reader on the history of Russia 1917 - 1940 / Ed. by prof. M.E. Glavatsky - M., 1995. - P.134., the broad masses of the population will be endowed with land, differences on religious and national grounds will be eliminated. Having confirmed the complete independence of Poland and the limited independence of Finland, Kolchak agreed to "prepare decisions" on the fate of the Baltic states, the Caucasian and Transcaspian peoples. The Supreme Ruler outlined his program as follows: after the "cleansing" of European Russia from the Bolsheviks, it would be necessary to introduce a firm military power with the task of preventing anarchy and establishing order, after which immediately "start elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of government in the state." At the opening of the meeting, he and the government headed by him would have announced the resignation of their powers. The most difficult for the anti-Bolshevik movement was the agrarian question. Kolchak did not succeed in solving it. The war with the Bolsheviks, as long as Kolchak waged it, could not guarantee the transfer of the landlords' land to the peasants. The national policy of the Kolchak government was marked by the same profound internal contradiction. Acting under the slogan of "one and indivisible" Russia, it did not reject "self-determination of peoples" as an ideal.

The demands of the delegations of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, the North Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine put forward at the Versailles Conference were actually rejected by Kolchak. Having refused to create an anti-Bolshevik conference in the regions liberated from the Bolsheviks, Kolchak pursued a policy doomed to failure.

From the middle of 1919, military luck turned away from the admiral and the time came for bitter defeats and betrayals, which ended in the winter of 1919/20. the rapid fall of Kolchak and his personal tragedy. On February 7, 1920, A. Kolchak and his prime minister V. Pepelyaev were shot.

As in the case of the SR-Menshevik governments, there were several white regimes. Siberia and the Far East were under the rule of A.V. Kolchak with its capital in Omsk. Moreover, A.V. Kolchak became the Supreme Ruler of Russia and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the White Guards, and other leaders of the White movement recognized these titles for him.

Formally, the composition of the white governments was non-partisan. However, the Cadets set the tone in the governments. Kolchak had G.K. Gins, G.G. Telberg, V.N. Pepelyaev, N.V. Ustryalov and others. The program and ideology of the Omsk government were Kadet.

It should immediately be noted the political diversity of the White movement. This camp included not only the Cadets, but also supporters of the monarchy and even some right-wing socialists. However, some social strata and political forces were only temporary supporters of the White movement (this primarily applies to right-wing socialists, middle peasants and the labor aristocracy, who initially supported the Kolchak regime). The backbone of the White movement was the monarchically minded officers, who, due to the unpopularity of the monarchy, did not openly declare their political views.

The measures of A. V. Kolchak to establish the cause of legality were naturally intertwined with the restoration and improvement of administrative and judicial bodies. The Governing Senate was restored, the courts for which qualified lawyers were selected, dispersed under the Bolsheviks. The status of local administrators was raised. Governors (mostly former commissars of the Provisional Siberian Government) were at the head of the provinces (oblasts) and uyezds. In the front-line regions, in the Urals, the institute of the Chief Commanders of the Territory was introduced (Uralsky - S.S. Postnikov, Samara-Ufimsky - E.K. Vishnevsky, Yuzhnouralsky - A.I. Dutov), ​​with the functions of governors-general. Exceptionally great attention was paid to the revival of local self-government bodies - city dumas with their councils and the widest network of zemstvos. In Siberia, before the revolution, they did not exist everywhere, and now in many places they were created for the first time. Zemstvos existed in the Urals for many years and, in terms of scope and results of their activities, were among the best in the country. Now they are here and respawn much faster.

Despite military conditions, local governments had broad rights. True, on the ground, military workers, especially in the front line, they were often trampled on, in connection with which numerous conflicts arose, more often resolved in favor of the military.

In local self-government bodies, as well as in cooperatives, there were many Socialist-Revolutionaries and representatives of other left parties, and sympathizers with them. In this regard, conflicts between the central government and them were generally inevitable. However, in general, they were somehow resolved. The situation was more complicated with the military bodies, which allowed arbitrariness on the ground - the dispersal of self-government bodies, arrests and even flogging of their representatives.

The Kolchak government, which claimed the role of the all-Russian, and then recognized as such, was carried away by state building, the formation of staffs for ministries and other institutions without any measure. The state structure was formed as an all-Russian one, to serve the entire country. Its states turned out to be excessively inflated. Moreover, numerous institutions were filled with people, often with low qualifications. The bulky apparatus became ineffective. A mass of young men who were capable of fighting at the front were sitting at the office desks. This unrestrained unhealthy process, by the way, was also observed in the Bolshevik system of power, was noted by many. Almost unsuccessfully, Kolchak also tried to fight him. So state building was complex, unfolded contradictorily, negative phenomena were observed in it. But in general, it still gave its results. The most valuable thing was that many democratic traditions were being revived, not formal, but actual involvement in the management system through elections and other forms of the active part of the population. The independence of the masses was revived, which had been trampled under Soviet rule both in state and public organizations by communist party committees and various emergency, including military, bodies.

A. V. Kolchak, despite the official status of the Supreme Ruler-dictator, could not, of course, single-handedly decide the issues of managing vast regions, the army, relations with allies. Nevertheless, he increasingly regarded the Council of Ministers as an executive body. He gradually limited his rights, recorded in the "Regulations on the temporary structure of state power in Russia." For example, the clause stating that “all draft laws and decrees are considered by the Council of Ministers and, upon their approval, are submitted for approval by the Supreme Ruler,” Kolchak actually ignored, more and more often adopted and signed the laws individually. The Council of Ministers silently agreed with this violation. At the beginning of 1919, Kolchak established the Council of the Supreme Ruler, which G.K. Gins calls the "star chamber". Some of the ministers were included in this council. The Council was a kind of advisory body under the Supreme Ruler, a group of his highest advisers on the most important issues.



Until October 1917, Russia was the greatest reserve of Western capital. England, France, Germany and other states invested heavily in the Russian economy. The total amount of foreign investment in Russia on the eve of 1917 amounted to 2.5 billion rubles, and the external debt exceeded 16 billion gold rubles.

The Bolsheviks, having come to power, declared all these loans invalid, which caused dissatisfaction among the members of the Entente. The conclusion of the Brest Peace marked the transition to open intervention by the Entente troops.

Following the landing in the north, an invasion began in the Far East.

An important milestone during the civil war was the performance in May 1918. Czechoslovak Corps.

Even during the First World War, about two million prisoners of war ended up in Russia. A considerable part of them were from the Slavic countries, which were then under the rule of Austria-Hungary. In the second half of 1916 on the initiative of the Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia, the tsarist government decided to form the Czechoslovak Corps from the prisoners of war of Czechs and Slovaks in order to use it against the Austro-German troops.

In connection with the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, January 15, 1918. the corps was declared an autonomous part of the French army and accepted for the maintenance of the Entente. As early as December 16, 1917. The French government recognized the Czech Legion in Russia as an independent part of the Czechoslovak army, under the direct supervision of the French High Command. This command believed that it would be more expedient to evacuate the Czech Legion to France through the Far East. In April, it began to be transferred along the Siberian Railway, across the whole of Siberia, to Vladivostok with the aim of further shipment by sea to Europe.

The soldiers of the Czechoslovak corps were well armed with Russian and captured weapons. People's Commissar L. Trotsky decided to disarm the Czech units. The rumor about this reached the command and soldiers of the corps before the official orders arrived. The Czechoslovaks feared that after disarmament they would be arrested and handed over to the Austro-Hungarian authorities, so they decided: “Don’t hand over your weapons!” .

• May 26, 1918 in Omsk, the Czechs fired on the Red Army detachment, which came to disarm them. On the same day they arrested members of the Soviet in Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk). Between Chelyabinsk and Omsk, the Czechs seized the train in which the People's Commissar for Food A.G. was traveling. Schlichter, and kept him for a whole day. On the night of May 26-27, the Czechoslovaks captured Chelyabinsk.
• On May 28, the performance of the Czechs, who were in the Syzran region, began.

The Soviet authorities tried to block the trains at the station. About five thousand Czechoslovaks launched an attack on Penza and two days later occupied the city and launched an offensive with the aim of capturing the Samara-Ufa railway.

In a relatively short time, the Czechoslovaks captured Mariinsk, Chelyabinsk, Novonikolaevsk (Novosibirsk), Nizhneudinsk, Kansk, Penza, Petropavlovsk, Art. Taiga, Tomsk.

On June 8, 1918, after several days of stubborn fighting, the Czechoslovaks occupied Samara. Together with the Czechoslovaks, the right SRs I.M. arrived in Samara. Brushvit, B.K. Fortunatov, V.K. Volsky and I.P. Nesterov. They formed the "Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly" (Komuch), which declared itself the supreme power in Russia. This is how an anti-Bolshevik political force appeared, openly opposing itself to the Soviet government.

Samara Komuch immediately supported the All-Siberian Regional Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Komuch also appointed his own government of 16 heads of various departments. There were many prominent figures with all-Russian fame, for example, the chairman E.F. Rogovsky, P.G. Maslov, I.M. Maisky, V.K. Volsky, M.Ya. Gendelman. Komuch and his government tried to put into practice much of the program developed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (the restoration of basic democratic freedoms was declared, the activities of workers' and peasants' congresses, factory committees were allowed, an 8-hour working day was established and the red state flag was adopted).

June 29, 1918 they carried out a counter-revolutionary coup in Vladivostok, arresting the entire composition of the city council. Capturing the city of their 6-thousand. the detachment moved north along the Ussuri railroad.

Thus, the Czechoslovaks captured almost the entire Trans-Siberian Railway. Soviet power in the occupied areas was overthrown. This was facilitated by the military and political weakness of the Soviet government.

On the territory occupied by the Czechoslovaks, up to 30 predominantly Socialist-Revolutionary governments were created. As a result, an anti-Bolshevik front arose in the Volga region and Siberia, where Soviet power was overthrown.

Thus, for the first time after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet government faced an organized struggle of anti-Bolshevik forces, having received the "Eastern Front". June 13, 1918 The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR created the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front to fight the Czechoslovak Corps - as a single command and control body.

July 2, 1918 The Supreme Council of the Entente, in order to support the Czechoslovaks and establish control over Siberia, decided to expand the intervention in Russia.

Representatives of the command of the interventionist troops in the Far East on July 6 published a joint declaration on the taking of Vladivostok and its environs under temporary power. On the same day, the US government decided on the participation of its troops in the occupation of the Far Eastern Territory (initially, the American expeditionary force numbered about 9 thousand people). One of the reasons for this decision was the desire to limit the expansion of Japan. In August, a large-scale intervention of the Entente troops began in the region. New contingents of Japanese, British and American troops arrived in Vladivostok, the number of which in Siberia and the Far East soon reached over 150 thousand people.

Foreign troops concentrated in Murmansk also went on the offensive. July 3, 1918 the English detachment captured Kem, on July 20 - the Solovetsky Islands, on July 31 - Onega.

On August 2, in Arkhangelsk, members of the Socialist-Revolutionary, Popular Socialist and Kadet parties carried out an anti-Bolshevik coup. Power was taken over by the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region headed by the People's Socialist N.V.

On the same day, about one thousand British, French and American soldiers and sailors landed in the city. The number of interventionist troops in the North of Russia reached 16 thousand people, doubling in a month. The offensive of the interventionist troops, acting together with the White Guard units (initially outnumbered by the troops of the Entente), developed in three directions: along the river. Northern Dvina in the direction of Kotlas and Vyatka to connect with the Czechoslovak corps and other troops operating in the east; along the Arkhangelsk-Vologda railway (the capture of Shenkursk) and along the Murmansk-Petrograd railway.

In the East of the country, both Komuch and the Siberian government claimed all-Russian power. They did not agree on political issues either. The essence of the differences was formulated at one time by Cadet L. Krol: "Samara wanted to keep the revolution at the level of the Socialist-Revolutionary requirements, and Omsk strove back from the revolution, even flaunting a return to the old external forms."

The programs of the Socialist-Revolutionary governments, which included the Mensheviks, included demands for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the restoration of political rights, denationalization and freedom of trade, and social partnership. Characteristic was the evolution of all governments towards the tightening of the political regime and the elimination of the initially proclaimed democratic freedoms.

Under the leadership of Komuch, the "People's Army" was created, which, together with the Czechoslovak detachments, organized a successful offensive against the Reds in the summer of 1918 and dealt serious blows to the Bolshevik forces. On July 5, the Volga group of Czechoslovaks occupied Ufa. On July 8, the Volga group joined with the Chelyabinsk group. The Cossacks of Ataman Dutov also achieved success, who, taking advantage of the performance of the Czechoslovaks, again began to advance on Orenburg (the number of Orenburg and Ural Cossacks at the end of June was 12-15 thousand people). On July 3, parts of Dutov captured the city.

On July 22, the Volga group of Chechek and the "People's Army" of Komuch took Simbirsk, and on July 25 the Chelyabinsk group and the Yekaterinburg White Guard Army took Yekaterinburg. July 18, 1918 in connection with the threat of the capture of the city by the White Guards, the Bolsheviks shot the former emperor Nicholas II and members of his family.

June-August 1918 Komuch's power extended to Samara, part of Saratov, Simbirsk, Orenburg, Kazan and Ufa provinces. On August 7, Kazan was taken. They got the state gold reserve located in the city (651.5 million rubles in gold and 100 million rubles in bank notes). It remained to cross the Volga - then the way to Moscow opened. The troops of the Red Army were also defeated in other regions. An attempt by the troops of the Eastern Front in August to go on the offensive ended in failure.

The Soviet government is taking emergency measures.

September 2, 1918 The All-Russian Central Executive Committee declares the Soviet Republic a "military camp". The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, headed by L. Trotsky, is being created from the military-party workers. The commander of the Eastern Front, I. Vatsetis, is appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army. Mass terror begins against the "enemies of the revolution".

The strengthening of repressive measures by the Soviet government has become a trend since the summer of 1918. Rigid centralization of administration, tougher punitive measures, regulated terror were opposed to the anarchy of the home front.

The uprisings of the peasants and those mobilized into the army were mercilessly suppressed. The autumn of 1918, in Soviet Russia, became a period of red terror, introduced in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "On the Red Terror" on September 5, 1918. The resolution required to ensure the rear by terror, to shoot all those involved in the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions, to isolate all class enemies in concentration camps.

Harsh measures at the front and in the rear, the reorganization of the Red Army and the mass mobilization into its ranks, gave their results. Already at the beginning of September 1918. in bloody and stubborn battles, the troops of the Eastern Front (under the command of I.I. Vatsetis and S.S. Kamenev) stopped the enemy and on September 5 went on the counteroffensive. Kazan was taken on September 10, then Simbirsk on September 12 (the operation was led by M.N. Tukhachevsky). With the fall of Syzran on October 3, the fate of Samara was also sealed, which the Reds entered on October 7. The Bolsheviks successfully advanced from the middle Volga to the Urals. The results of the campaign on the Eastern Front in 1918. meant for the whites the loss of the Volga region and a retreat to the Urals. The fate of the SR-Menshevik governments was sealed. None of them managed to create a combat-ready army, resolve land and labor issues, create a statehood comparable in efficiency to the Bolsheviks.

The mass mobilizations carried out by Komuch did not give a tangible effect. Faced with resistance to military conscription and requisitions, as well as a growing labor movement, Komuch turned to harsh punitive practices.

September 23, 1918 At the Ufa State Conference (September 8-23, 1918), anti-Bolshevik parties and organizations, the main participants of which were Komuch and the Siberian government, the All-Russian Provisional Government was formed. However, the created Directory actually represented only members of the various groups included in it, and not all-Russian parties and movements. Among the officers of the armies, the idea was openly expressed about the need to change the "rotten democracy", unable to organize the fight against the Reds, and establish a firm power of military dictatorship.

On the night of November 17-18, 1918. in Omsk, where the "All-Russian Provisional Government" was moving from Ufa from the advancing Bolsheviks, a coup was carried out. Members of the Directory, the Socialist-Revolutionaries Avksentiev and Zenzinov, were arrested, and Admiral A. V. Kolchak, who had recently returned from abroad (formerly the Minister of War of the Directory), came to power.

As a result of the coup, all the fullness of state power in Siberia passed to Alexander Kolchak, who was awarded the title of Supreme Ruler and the title of Supreme Commander and Full Admiral. As a politician, the admiral fully corresponded to the mood of the officers. His government could count on full support in military circles. Soon, other leaders of the anti-Bolshevik struggle recognize him as the Supreme Ruler: A. Denikin in the South, E. Miller in the North, N. Yudenich in the North-West. He had unlimited rights in the military field, to resolve civil cases, a Council was established under him, consisting of five prominent public figures of the Cadet orientation (P. Vologodsky, A. Gattenberg, Yu. Klyuchnikov, G. Telberg and M. Mikhailov).

The Cadets put forward the slogan "dictatorship in the name of democracy" and managed to unite around Kolchak representatives of various political parties, groups and organizations from right-wing socialists to monarchists.

Kolchak claimed to express a national state idea and emphasized that he would not follow the path of reaction, nor the disastrous path of party spirit. “My main goal,” he declared, “I set the creation of a combat-ready army, the victory over Bolshevism and the establishment of law and order, so that the people can freely choose for themselves the form of government that they wish ...” .

Thus, the core of the official ideology of the Kolchak regime was the idea of ​​the revival of the great statehood, the slogan "one and indivisible Russia." Relying on the help of the Entente, Kolchak intended to achieve a turning point in favor of his troops on the outskirts of the Urals. To this end, he decided to carry out new mobilizations and accelerate the reorganization of the Yekaterinburg and Kama White groups into the Siberian army.

1.2 Program, goals and objectives of the Kolchak movement

In November 1918, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, in order to centralize control during the war, abolished the Directory and assumed the title of Supreme Ruler.

In this regard, his appeal to the population said: “On November 18, 1918, the All-Russian Provisional Government collapsed. The Council of Ministers accepted full power and handed it over to me, Admiral of the Russian Navy Alexander Kolchak. Having accepted the cross of this power in the exceptionally difficult conditions of the civil war and the complete breakdown of state life, I declare:

I will not take the path of reaction, nor the disastrous path of partisanship. My main goal is to create a combat-ready army, defeat the Bolsheviks and establish law and order, so that the people can freely choose for themselves the form of government that they wish, and implement the great ideas of freedom, now proclaimed throughout the world.

Explaining his political program to representatives of the press on November 28 of the same year, Kolchak, in particular, noted that after the liquidation of the Bolshevik power in Russia, the National Assembly should be convened "for the reign of law and order in the country."

In the Order of the Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Admiral A.V. Kolchak dated July 28, 1919 was confirmed: “We are fighting for the Russian national cause of restoring the Motherland as a free, united and independent state. We are fighting for the right of the people themselves, through free elections and voting in the Constituent National Assembly, to determine their fate in the structure of state power ... ".

The demand for constitutional reforms stipulated the assistance of the Entente to the White movement. In particular, in the Note of the Supreme Council of the Entente to Admiral A.V. Kolchak on the conditions on the basis of which the allies will provide assistance to the anti-Bolshevik forces, dated May 26, 1919. It was noted:

“At present, the Allied Coalition Powers wish to formally state that the aim of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to gain control over their own affairs with the help of a freely elected Constituent Assembly... To this end, they ask Admiral Kolchak and his allies answer whether they agree to the following conditions of the powers of the allied coalition:

First, the government of Admiral Kolchak must ensure that, as soon as Kolchak's troops occupy Moscow, a Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of universal, secret and democratic suffrage, is convened as the supreme legislative body in Russia, to which the Russian government should be responsible. . If, by that time, order in the country has not yet been finally restored, then the Kolchak government must convene the Constituent Assembly, elected in 1917, and leave it in power until the day when it is possible to organize new elections.

Secondly, that in all the space that is currently under its control, the Kolchak government should allow free elections to all freely and legally organized assemblies, such as city governments, zemstvos, etc.

Thirdly, that the Kolchak government will not support any attempt to restore the special privileges of certain classes or estates in Russia.

1.3 Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Kolchak movement

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (the governing body of the Kolchak government) was formed by the Supreme Ruler of the Russian State - Admiral Kolchak A.V., under whose leadership it coordinated all military operations of the Siberian White armies from 12/24/1918 to 01/04/1920. The posts of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters were occupied by the following generals: Lebedev D.A. (12/21/1918 - 08/09/1919), Diterikhs M.K. (09.08-17.11.1919), Zankevich M.I. (11/17/1918-01/04/1920). The military ministry of Kolchak was headed by generals: Surin V.I. (12/21/1918 - 01/01/1920), Stepanov N.A. (03.01-23.05.1919), Lebedev D.A. (23.05-12.08.1919), Budberg A.P. (12-25.08.1919), Diterichs M.K. (25.08-06.10.1919, Khanzhin M.V. (06.10.1919-04.01.1920) .

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was disbanded on 11/14/1919. The leadership of military operations passed to the headquarters under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Kolchak), which was headed by General Zankevich M.I. (11/17/1919 - 01/04/1920). The headquarters was located in one of the cars of a special train in which Admiral Kolchak left Omsk. At the same time, he ordered General Lokhvitsky N.A. prepare and ensure the reception and accommodation in Irkutsk by the governments of their headquarters, including the selection of premises both for the admiral himself and for the members of the government accompanying him and the headquarters of the High Command. At the same time, General Lokhvitsky was ordered to preliminarily prepare the relocation of Admiral Kolchak, his government and headquarters to Chita, in Transbaikalia, under the protection of the troops of Ataman Semenov, if the troops of the Russian (Siberian) Army did not stop the rolling shaft of the offensive of the Red Army and they (the troops) would also have to seek refuge in Transbaikalia.

Directly under the operational subordination of the Stavka during 1919 were:

The Siberian Army (Lieutenant General Gaida R., 12/24/1918 - 07/10/1919; Lieutenant General Diterichs M.K., 07/10/22/1919, 07/22/1919 was transformed into the 1st and 2nd armies of the Eastern Front.

Western Army (Lieutenant General Khanzhin M.V., 01.01 - 06.20.1919; Lieutenant General Sakharov K.V., 06.21-22.07.1919). 07/22/1919 transformed into the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front.

Orenburg Army (Lieutenant General Dutov A.I., 10/16/1918-05/03/1919). 05/23/09/18/1919 acted as the Southern Army (Lieutenant General G. A. Belov); 09/18/1919-01/06/1920 (Lieutenant General Dutov A.I.). 01/06/1920 became part of the Semirechensk Army (Major General Annenkov B.V.) as the Orenburg detachment, having made the "Hunger March" through the Turkestan steppes.

Semirechensk Army (Major General Annenkov B.V., 08/25/1919-04/03/1920). Formed on the basis of the Steppe Group of the Eastern Front and the 2nd Steppe Siberian Corps, interned in China after crossing the Turkestan-Chinese border on 04/03/1920.

Ural Army (Lieutenant General Savelyev N.A., 11/15/1918-04/08/1919; Lieutenant General Tolstov B.C., 04/08/1919-20.05.1920). 07/22/1919 transferred to the operational subordination of the Armed Forces of South Russia (Lieutenant General Denikin A.I.).

Southern Army (Lieutenant General Belov G.A., 05/23/1919-12/01/1920). Reorganized 05/23/1919 from the Southern Group of the Western and Orenburg armies. 07/22/1919 became part of the Eastern Front, and from 10/10/1919 - as part of the Moscow Group of the Eastern Front.

07/22/1919 Siberian and Western armies, reorganized into the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies, as well as the Southern Army and the Steppe group of General Annenkov B.V. were transferred and merged into the newly created Eastern Front (Lieutenant General Diterichs M.K.). After the withdrawal of the 1st Army to the rear, to the Tomsk region (to replenish, reorganize and protect the Siberian Railway), as well as the defeat of the Southern Army (General Belov G.A.), on 10/10/1919, the rest of the Eastern Front was transformed into the Moscow Group of Forces (Lieutenant General Kappel V.O., 10/10/1919-01/21/1920; Voitsekhovsky S.N., 01/21/04/27/1920) and continued to resist the Red Army, having made the "Great Siberian Ice Campaign" (10/14/1919 - 03/03/1920) during the retreat of the Kolchak army from Siberia to Transbaikalia.

In addition, their subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Supreme Ruler of the Russian State was legally recognized and / or included in the Russian army:

Armed Forces of the South of Russia - VSYUR, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Denikin A.I. (he announced his submission to the Supreme Ruler Admiral Kolchak on 06/12/1919).

Troops of the North-Western Region (General-of-Infantry Yudenich N.N., 07/10/1919-01/22/1920). By decree of the Supreme Ruler Admiral Kolchak on 07/10/1919, Infantry General Yudenich was appointed commander of all troops of the North-West, including the North-Western Army (Major General Rodzyanko A.P., 07/06-02/10/1919; Infantry General Yudenich N.N., 02.10 - 11.28.1919) and the Western Volunteer Army (Major General Bermondt-Avalov P.R., 09-11.1919).

Northern Army - Troops of the Northern Region, Northern Front (Lieutenant General Marushevsky V.V., 11/19/1918-01/13/1919; Lieutenant General Miller E.K., 01/13/1919-02.1920). Lieutenant General Miller E.K. On June 10, 1919, Admiral Kolchak was appointed commander of all the troops of the Northern Region, including the Northern Army, which was simultaneously under operational control of the command of the Northern Front and the Expeditionary Force of the British Forces (General Ironside).

Murmansk Volunteer Army - Troops of the Murmansk region (Major General Zvegintsev N.I., 01.06 - 03.10.1918; Colonel Kostandi L.V., 11.1918-06.1919); was under operational control of the Northern Army, as well as the commander of the British Expeditionary Force in Arkhangelsk - General Ironside (and directly in Murmansk - General Poole). 06.1919 The Murmansk Volunteer Army was renamed the Troops of the Murmansk Region and soon merged with the troops of the Olonets Volunteer Army under the general command of Lieutenant General Skobeltsyn B.C.

Olonets Volunteer Army (Lieutenant General Skobeltsyn B.C., 02.1919-02.1920). After the defeat of the Red Army in Karelia on 07.1919, the Olonets Army was merged with the Murmansk Volunteer Army. The composition and military operations of the Siberian armies of Admiral Kolchak are given in the chapters "Eastern Front", "Moscow Group of Forces", as well as in separate references about these armies.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief Admiral Kolchak on 01/03/1919, the new Russian army was to have the same structure and composition as the former Russian army under Emperor Nicholas II. That is, the structure of the Russian army provided for the creation of companies (150 bayonets each), battalions (4 companies each), regiments (4100 bayonets, in 4 battalions or 16 companies), divisions (16,500 bayonets in 4 regiments) , corps (37,000 in 2 divisions each). By 05/01/1919, the strength of the Russian army was 680,000 bayonets and sabers, of which 8 corps had been formed in the active armies of Siberia by that time. During 1919, it was planned to increase the number of troops to 2,000,000 soldiers and officers.

Thus, in the East of Russia, the one-man dictatorship was established as a result of a coup d'état carried out on November 18, 1918 by the Council of Ministers of the All-Russian Provisional Government (Directorate) with the active participation of the military. Before the coup, the bearer of supreme power was a collegiate body of five people. Most of the members of the Directory - four out of five - were civilians, well-known political figures. The Council of Ministers, headed by the chairman (he was a member of the Directory), carried out executive and administrative functions. The transfer of supreme power to one person - the Minister of War, Admiral A.V. Kolchak (he accepted the title of Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander) - did not mean, however, the establishment, as in the South of Russia, of a military dictatorship. The Council of Ministers, its head, as before, was the Prime Minister, being the source of power of the Supreme Ruler, not only retained its powers, but also significantly expanded them. Together with the Supreme Ruler, he began to exercise legislative power. Formally, all the fullness of state power in the territory from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean belonged to the Russian government as part of the Supreme Ruler and the Council of Ministers.

Printed analogue: Shishkin V.I. Military and Naval Minister of the Provisional All-Russian Government A. V. Kolchak // Bulletin of NSU. Series: History, Philology. Novosibirsk, 2008. T. 7. Issue. 1. History). pp. 54-65. , 146 Kb.

The article was prepared with the financial assistance of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (Project No. 07-01-00751a).

The great interest shown by the post-Soviet national historiography to the personality of A. V. Kolchak, if we evaluate the situation strictly formally, gave positive results. To date, there are dozens of articles and documentary publications, as well as several monographs devoted to various periods, main directions and even individual episodes of his life. It is quite natural that historians paid the most attention to such key stages in the biography of A. V. Kolchak as participation in the Polar Expedition of Baron E. Toll, in the Russian-Japanese and World Wars I, and especially his activity as the Supreme Ruler of Russia.

Nevertheless, gaps remain in the biography of A. V. Kolchak, which, without any exaggeration, can be called significant. Perhaps the main and strangest of them is the short period of time from November 4 to November 17, 1918, when A.V. Kolchak served as Minister of War and Naval Affairs of the Provisional All-Russian Government (Directorate). It is curious that in the monographs of K. A. Bogdanov and I. F. Plotnikov there are even special sections called, respectively, “Military and Naval Minister” in the first case and “Omsk Minister” in the second, but they do not contain a single fact about the activities A. V. Kolchak at the ministerial post.

The latter circumstance convincingly indicates that historians do not know what A. V. Kolchak was doing at that time. Of course, it can be assumed that the gap in the biography of the admiral did not arise at all by chance and is explained by the fact that the Minister of War and Naval Affairs did absolutely nothing. However, such a hypothesis does not correlate well with subsequent events, as a result of which A. V. Kolchak turned out to be the Supreme Ruler of Russia. To understand the emerging historiographical paradox and fill the existing gap in the biography of A. V. Kolchak - these are the goals of this article.

A. V. Kolchak (photo 1919)

It must be admitted that it is very difficult to restore the activities of A. V. Kolchak during his tenure as a minister because of the paucity of relatively reliable archival sources, and also because of the inconsistency and outright tendentiousness of most of the memoirs written by associates of the former Supreme Ruler of Russia. A lot of elementary factual errors and one-sided interpretations contain the testimony of A. V. Kolchak himself, given by him in late January - early February 1920 in Irkutsk to the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, which most researchers uncritically use as the most important source. However, this two-week period is extremely important for understanding the personality of A. V. Kolchak: his character, plans, behavior, motivation of actions, means of achieving goals. It also seems that it is in this period that many problems, difficulties and failures are rooted, which literally from the first steps pursued A. V. Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler of Russia.

Recall that A. V. Kolchak appeared in Omsk on October 13, 1918. Four days before him, on October 9, the Provisional All-Russian Government arrived in Omsk. It was elected on September 23, 1918 at the State Conference held in Ufa, consisting of five people: a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party N. D. Avksentiev, a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party N. I. Astrov, one of the leaders of the Union for the Revival of Russia, Lieutenant General V. G. Boldyrev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Siberian Government of the non-party P. V. Vologodsky and Chairman of the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region, member of the Central Committee of the Labor People's Socialist Party N. V. Tchaikovsky. However, due to the absence of N. I. Astrov and N. V. Tchaikovsky, a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party V. A. Vinogradov and a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Central Committee V. M. Zenzinov actually began to work in the Provisional All-Russian Government instead of them. Prior to the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the Directory was endowed with full power "over the entire space of the Russian state." In other words, she was, as it were, a collective dictator in the territory liberated from the Bolsheviks. The creation of the Provisional All-Russian Government was a compromise in the camp of counter-revolution between those supporters of democracy and part of the more "right" elements who shared the platform of the Union for the Liberation of Russia, but caused discontent on the part of both more "left" and more "right" political forces. At the first meeting of the Directory, which took place on the night of September 24, 1918, N. D. Avksentiev was elected its chairman, and V. G. Boldyrev was elected Supreme Commander of all land and naval armed forces of Russia.

The first and most important task of the Provisional All-Russian Government after moving from Ufa to Omsk was the formation of an executive apparatus that was absent from it - the Council of Ministers. It took almost three weeks of intense consultations and negotiations with the Provisional Siberian Government and its Administrative Council to complete this task. On November 4, 1918, the Provisional All-Russian Government signed a decree in which it determined the personal composition of the All-Russian Council of Ministers. It assigned the duties of chairman of the Council of Ministers to P. V. Vologodsky, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers - to V. A. Vinogradov, military and naval minister - to A. V. Kolchak. Moreover, the initiative to appoint A. V. Kolchak as minister came from N. D. Avksentiev, and V. G. Boldyrev made a direct proposal to the admiral.

Even before his official appointment to the ministerial post, A. V. Kolchak developed high political activity in Omsk, although such activity clearly contradicted one of his own requirements, which was that the army and the military should be out of politics. Meanwhile, during the formation of the All-Russian Council of Ministers, it was A. V. Kolchak who most resolutely lobbied for the promotion to the ministerial position of the Minister of Finance of the Provisional Siberian Government, I. A. Mikhailov, whose candidacy was blocked by the majority of the members of the Directory. And, on the contrary, he resisted the appointment of the Socialist-Revolutionary E.F. Rogovsky as Deputy Minister of the Interior for the longest time, almost frustrating the agreements reached with great difficulty. On November 1, 1918, the admiral resolutely rejected the recommendation of P.V. Vologodsky to take Major General P.P. Ivanov-Rinov as an assistant to the commander of the Siberian army and the former acting head of the military department of the Provisional Siberian Government. As a result, on the proposal of A. V. Kolchak, Major Generals N. A. Stepanov, V. I. Surin and B. I. Khoroshkhin were appointed his assistants. Finally, even before his official approval as head of the military department, A. V. Kolchak began to seek from N. D. Avksentiev and V. G. Boldyrev to expand the competence of the military and naval ministers, apparently claiming to participate in the development of military plans and leadership combat operations. All these actions of the admiral, which immediately became the property of the Omsk political beau monde and military circles, were of a provocative nature. They prevented the young government, subjected to attacks from the "left" and "right", to gain self-confidence and stability. At the same time, by such behavior, A. V. Kolchak, as it were, gave signals to the “rightists” and the military that he was their ally in the fight against the Directory.

In principle, the activities of any minister of the Provisional All-Russian Government included three main obligations: to participate in meetings of the Council of Ministers and in the discussion of the issues raised at them, to manage the work of the central apparatus and local bodies of the ministry subordinate to him, and also to exercise representative functions.

On November 5, 1918, A. V. Kolchak participated for the first time in a meeting of the All-Russian Council of Ministers. This meeting, which was also attended by all members of the Directory, was of a ritual and solemn nature and, as it were, crowned the efforts to construct a new supreme power. The next evening, in honor of the formation of the All-Russian Council of Ministers, N. D. Avksentiev gave a reception in the Omsk commercial club. For almost five hours, it featured optimistic speeches by domestic and foreign politicians and the military about the creation of the Russian army and its forthcoming decisive role in the revival of Russia. A. V. Kolchak attracted the attention of those present by the fact that, unlike all the speakers, he limited himself to just a few on-duty phrases. Oddly enough, the admiral was not in the company of several Russian generals and English officers, who, after dinner, continued their conversation with V. G. Boldyrev until almost two in the morning.

On November 7, A.V. Kolchak participated in the meeting of the Council of Ministers for the second and last time. Four of the 19 issues on the agenda of this meeting were initiated by the Naval Ministry: on the approval of the states of the central administration of the military department, on the procedure for approving the states of the naval department, on the establishment of positions of chiefs of military regions and on the introduction of the disciplinary charter of 1869. In accordance in accordance with the previously established procedure, the Council of Ministers granted A. V. Kolchak the right to approve the states of the central departments of the military and naval departments, and also instructed - together with representatives of the Ministry of Justice and the legal advisory unit under the Council of Ministers - to revise the disciplinary charter of 1869 "in relation to the existing state formation." As for the question of establishing the posts of chiefs of military regions, at the suggestion of A. V. Kolchak himself, he was removed from discussion. It can be assumed that the reason for the minister's withdrawal of his own submission was the fact that by posing this issue, A.V. Kolchak clearly intruded into someone else's competence and thereby violated the prerogatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

On the same day, A.V. Kolchak issued several of his first orders for the military department: on the disbandment of the military ministry of the Provisional Siberian Government, its structural divisions and the Siberian Military Court Administration; on the provisional bodies of central administration and the distribution of duties between the assistants of the military and naval ministers; about several personnel appointments in the main headquarters, in the department of military repairs and in the department of military educational institutions; on the organization of a meeting of representatives of military public self-governments of the Cossack troops; on a business trip to Vladivostok of N. A. Stepanov, assistant to the military and naval minister for the organizational and inspection part. Then A. V. Kolchak approved the staff of the main headquarters. At the same time, one curious detail attracts attention. In the originals of the last three orders (No. 5, 6 and 7), issued on November 7-8, A. V. Kolchak crossed out the words “Minister of War and Naval Affairs” with his own hand, indicating his then status. A perfectly reasonable question arises as to why the admiral did this. The lack of sources does not allow us to give an exact answer to it, but it is possible to make assumptions ranging from “lost my nerves” and “did not like my position” to the hypothesis that the admiral already “saw” himself in a different role.

It is well known that A. V. Kolchak was extremely dissatisfied with the inheritance that he inherited from the military department of the Provisional Siberian Government.

“The position of the Ministry of War,” V.N. Pepelyaev wrote in his diary on November 5, 1918, the words of A.V. Kolchak following the conversation with the admiral that took place that day, “now it’s impossible - he has no executive bodies.”

A. V. Kolchak, who did not understand the local specifics, unconditionally saw the reasons for this situation in the incompetence and passivity of the former head of the Siberian military department P. P. Ivanov-Rinov and his chief of staff, Major General P. P. Belov. In fact, the embryonic state of the military ministry apparatus was explained by a completely conscious decision, according to which the positions of the commander of the armed forces and the head of the military department of the Provisional Siberian Government were initially in the same hands. Such a concentration of supreme military power, in turn, made it possible to have not two, but only one headquarters - the Siberian Army, which at the same time served as the main headquarters of the military ministry. Given the shortage of General Staff officers in Siberia, such a managerial "move" was quite reasonable.

Having taken only the first steps to form the central apparatus of the ministry, A. V. Kolchak nevertheless made a very strange decision. On November 9, he went to the front to inspect the troops, transferring the execution of his position to the supply and technical assistant V. I. Surin. Thus, the formation of the central bodies of the military department, which was publicly proclaimed by A.V. Kolchak as a priority, was postponed, since both of its main leaders left Omsk: the minister himself and his first assistant. In addition, A.V. Kolchak had absolutely nothing to do at the front, since operational issues were not within the competence of the military department. The duties of the military ministry consisted in solving completely different tasks: in the formation and manning of the army, in the training of its rank and file and command personnel, in providing them with weapons, ammunition, uniforms and food. The fact that the front-line units are poorly provided with everything necessary was well known in Omsk even without the trip of the Minister of War.

Such a strange behavior of A. V. Kolchak - his detachment during and after the reception on November 6, an unexpected departure to the front - is surprising and needs to be explained. It seems that the reasons for such behavior can be understood only under one condition: if we put them in connection with the activities of the admiral, which had nothing to do with his direct official duties. Moreover, the key role in the solution will belong to the already mentioned meeting of A. V. Kolchak and V. N. Pepelyaev, which took place on November 5, 1918.

Recall that a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, VN Pepelyaev, arrived in Omsk on November 1. During the previous month and a half he traveled around the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, re-establishing ties with local party organizations, ascertaining their political positions and giving instructions. V.N. Pepelyaev was an ardent supporter of the need to establish a firm one-man power on the territory liberated from the Bolsheviks. During a few days of his stay in Omsk, he took the first practical steps aimed at removing the Directory from power and establishing a military dictatorship. Of key importance was the agreement between V.N. Pepelyaev on joint actions in this direction with the Minister of Finance I.A. Mikhailov, who had great authority in the "right", officer and Cossack circles.

According to V.N. Pepelyaev, his conversation with A.V. Kolchak was lengthy and interesting. V. N. Pepelyaev immediately clearly outlined not only the subject of the conversation - the need to establish a military dictatorship in the east of Russia, but also his goal - the consent of A. V. Kolchak to become a dictator. The admiral, who first saw V.N. Pepelyaev, observing the rules of politeness, behaved quite cautiously throughout most of the conversation. In principle, he was not against dictatorship, but he gave V.N. Pepelyaev the opportunity to "persuade" himself to accept the role of a dictator. Starting with a statement that “at present it is necessary to support the [existing] authorities,” A. V. Kolchak then entered the proposed role and, according to V. N. Pepelyaev, “with great determination” declared: “If I had power, then, having teamed up with [the former Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.V.] Alekseev, I would have given it to him.” Moreover, during the exposition of his views on the sole military power, the admiral said that "if necessary, I am ready to make this sacrifice", that is, to become a military dictator. True, A. V. Kolchak ended the conversation with what he began with: “The authorities need to be supported.” This meant the existing government - the Provisional All-Russian Government. But both interlocutors were well aware that this rhetoric is only part of the traditional diplomatic etiquette. In fact, an agreement in principle on the main issue - the need to overthrow the Directory and replace it with a one-man military dictatorship - was reached between V.N. Pepelyaev and A.V. Kolchak.

There is a unique document containing the most complete and reliable information about how the conspiracy against the Directory was organized, who and in what roles participated in its implementation. This is a letter written in mid-April 1919 by the former Acting First Quartermaster General of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Syromyatnikov, who considered himself one of the “three main organizers of the November coup” and was responsible for the military unit, to the Minister of Finance I. A Mikhailov. The content of the letter allows us to state that between November 6 and 8 a meeting between A. V. Kolchak and I. A. Mikhailov took place. It is quite obvious that the Admiral and the Minister of Finance were discussing a rough plan for the coup and the candidacies of its main executors.

In any case, it was during this meeting that the conditions were considered under which the head of the Siberian Cossack division, Colonel V. I. Volkov, agreed to arrest the Socialist-Revolutionary part of the Directory. According to the data contained in the letter of A. D. Syromyatnikov, for the provision of this service, V. I. Volkov demanded that he be promoted to major general. Such a promise was given to the colonel. It is not difficult to guess that the only one who could give this guarantee to V. I. Volkov was the future military dictator. Here, however, a completely natural question arises as to why, after reaching agreements with V.N. Pepelyaev and I.A. Mikhailov, at a time when the implementation of the conspiracy entered the stage of its practical implementation, A.V. Kolchak left Omsk. It seems, however, that there is nothing strange in such behavior of the admiral. Rather, on the contrary, it has a completely logical explanation and sufficient factual justification.

First of all, it does not suit the future dictator to deal with the "technical details" of the coup himself. To solve such problems, there are always other people, the lack of which, as a rule, does not happen if the situation is “ripe”.

In addition, the departure of A.V. Kolchak from Omsk cast doubt on the rumors circulating around the city about the preparation of a coup with the participation of the military and naval ministers, disoriented the Directory and allowed it to relax a bit, removed from the admiral any suspicions about his involvement in the conspiracy for decades. On the contrary, the presence in Omsk of A. V. Kolchak, with his intemperance and aggressiveness, could only damage the case, in which Mikhailov, Volkov and Co. already had sufficient experience.

Finally, the conspirators needed to enlist the support of the front command, especially the head of the Czechoslovak Corps. At the end of September 1918 in Vladivostok, A. V. Kolchak had a conversation with the Czech general R. Gaida and found a common language with him on the issue of establishing a military dictatorship. Moreover, according to R. Gaide, then Kolchak "bluntly stated that it was necessary that I take her into my own hands." In the new situation, A. V. Kolchak had to continue the conversation with the ambitious Czech on the topic of military dictatorship, finding the right tone in order to get support from him and at the same time not offend the general by offering the role of a supporting actor. By that time, R. Gaida had commanded the North Ural (Yekaterinburg) group of the Western Front, whose headquarters was in Yekaterinburg, for a little over a month. It was there that on November 9 A.V. Kolchak went, whose carriage was attached to the train of the English Colonel D. Ward, who was following with a company of his subordinates to Yekaterinburg. In Tyumen, the minister of war and navy made a short stop at the railway station, where he was met by the military authorities and received a guard of honor, and then continued on to Yekaterinburg.

Sunday November 10 in Yekaterinburg was painted in special, festive colors. From 10 o'clock in the morning, regiments of the II Czechoslovak division, several units of Russian troops and a company of newly arrived British began to line up on the Monastery Square of the city. Then R. Gaida with his headquarters, the commander of the Western Front, Major General Ya. Syrovy, the leaders of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia, representatives of the local community, etc. arrived at the square.

The leadership of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia and R. Gaid sent in advance to all members of the Directory, as well as P. P. Ivanov-Rinov and A. V. Kolchak, invitations to take part in the celebrations scheduled for November 10. However, all members of the Directory limited themselves to gratitude for the invitation and refused to come to Yekaterinburg, citing urgent business. Chairman of the Council of Ministers P.V. Vologodsky sent a congratulatory telegram to the leadership of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council and said that he had instructed the representative S.S. Postnikov to represent the Council of Ministers at the celebrations. According to the local press, S. S. Postnikov delivered a congratulatory speech at the ceremony on behalf of the Provisional All-Russian Government. As for A. V. Kolchak, his presence on Monastyrskaya Square was not noted by the press. But at a banquet arranged that same evening by the Czechoslovak National Council, which dragged on well past midnight, A.V. Kolchak was there. According to one of the local newspapers, the banquet “was extremely lively. Noisy approvals caused greetings at the address of adm. Kolchak and representatives of the allied nations".

The next day, A. V. Kolchak had a conversation with an employee of the Czechoslovak propaganda department, which was then widely broadcast through the channels of the Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency and published by many newspapers in the Urals and Siberia. The content of the conversation does not give grounds to believe that the admiral deeply understood the problems discussed. Rather, on the contrary: it testified to his lack of awareness and competence in matters of big politics. It is enough to refer to the statement of A. V. Kolchak that if "Germany is finally defeated, Soviet Russia will fall at the same time." On the other hand, most of the reasoning of A. V. Kolchak - despite the fact that they did not differ in originality, but repeated what had been said many times before and looked simply banal - was devoted to caring for the fate of Russia, sounded patriotic and at the same time, as it were, businesslike . In particular, the admiral stated that his main efforts are now directed "to the creation of a ministry and the formation of a strong, healthy army, alien to politics and capable of saving and reviving the fatherland."

In reality, A. V. Kolchak was concerned about completely different problems. This is convincingly evidenced by the content of his first confidential conversation with R. Gaida, which took place on the same day in Yekaterinburg. In front of R. Gaida, unlike V.N. Pepelyaev, A.V. Kolchak did not need to hide, much less dress up in the toga of a democrat. Therefore, the question of the fate of the Directory and the prospects for establishing a military dictatorship immediately became at the center of their short conversation. Both interlocutors recognized the Directory as an "enterprise" artificial and unpromising, and the establishment of a dictatorship as inevitable.

Much more difficult was the discussion of the issue of candidates for dictators and their chances. A. V. Kolchak again repeated his judgment that only a person who relies on the army can become a dictator. The delicacy of the situation, however, consisted in the fact that both remembered well the proposal made by A. V. Kolchak to R. Gaide in Vladivostok. Undoubtedly, the admiral was aware that a month and a half ago he had acted extremely recklessly. But R. Gaida also understood perfectly well that he, a foreigner in the Russian service, now that the admiral had taken a higher position in the table of ranks compared to him, had no chance of becoming a military dictator in the territory of Russia liberated from the Bolsheviks.

The latter did not mean at all that the ambitious Czech did not have his own plans and did not lead his “game”. R. Gaida was not averse to pushing other military leaders in the east of Russia and "bypassing" them in the table of ranks. To do this, he made a precisely calculated and strong “move”, declaring to A. V. Kolchak that the Cossack circles had their own candidates for dictators and were doing the corresponding work.

“... But I think,” the general concluded on this issue, “that the Cossack circles are not able to cope with this task, because they look at this issue too narrowly.” It is not difficult to understand that this statement was directed against the commander of the Siberian army, P.P. Ivanov-Rinov, who at the same time was the chieftain of the Siberian Cossack army. There were indeed people in his entourage who pushed the commander to take all power in the east of Russia into their own hands. R. Gaida, having excluded P.P. Ivanov-Rinov from among the candidates for dictators, could now count on the support of the admiral in the fight against the command of the Siberian army, with which the Czech had a sharp conflict.

R. Gaida chose the closest employee of P.P. Ivanov-Rinov, Chief of Staff of the Siberian Army P.P. Belov, who had German roots and previously had the surname Wittekopf, as the main target for his first strike. A. V. Kolchak accepted the conditions of R. Gaida. On the same day, he sent a telegram to V. G. Boldyrev with the following content: “Having familiarized myself with the materials and made sure from a conversation with General Gaida of the anti-state activities of General Belov, for my part, I consider the dismissal of General Belov necessary for the benefit of the Russian cause.”

From the first conversation with A. V. Kolchak in Yekaterinburg, R. Gaida made two important observations that were of fundamental importance. Firstly, the Czech noted that her topic repeated the topic of the conversation that he had had with A.V. myself". Secondly, R. Gaida was sure that A.V. Kolchak understood the main thing from their conversation: "I will not stand in his way."

Apparently, at the same time, A. V. Kolchak had a meeting with the leadership of the Yekaterinburg district zemstvo council and with the representative of the Provisional All-Russian Government in the Urals, S. S. Postnikov. The content of the conversations of the Minister of War and the Navy with the leadership of the Zemstvo Council and S. S. Postnikov can be judged from the reports submitted by them on November 14, 1918 to A. V. Kolchak.

In the first case, it was about the general condition of the zemstvo bodies in the Urals after its liberation from the Bolsheviks and about their urgent needs, in the second - mainly about the situation of the Ural mining industry. The zemstvos mainly petitioned the Minister of War and the Navy for the need to issue loans and benefits from the state treasury to overcome financial difficulties, to immediately send bread routes from Siberia to alleviate the food crisis, and also to provide them with government support in procuring linen for the army, medicines and dressings.

S. S. Postnikov, who was close to the Cadets, paid the main attention to the problems of managing the Ural territory. He argued that "local government bodies, without reliance on the central government, have neither power nor authority and are either inactive or act in disarray." S.S. Postnikov saw the possibility of preventing a further collapse of administrative structures in the Urals in the appointment of "such a military authority to which all civilians would submit." The request, coming from a civil official who had the status of an authorized government, could not but please the admiral and give him additional confidence in the correctness of the planned enterprise.

On November 12, A.V. Kolchak, on an impromptu armored train, went to the front, which took place near Kungur. It would be naive to think that the minister reached the front line and talked with the soldiers who were in the trenches. In reality, the matter was limited to the fact that A.V. Kolchak visited the headquarters of the 1st Central Siberian Corps, commanded by Major General A.N. Pepelyaev, the younger brother of V.N. Pepelyaev, and the operational part of the headquarters of the 7th Ural Division mountain shooters. He was by no means worried about issues related to the state of the troops, but mainly the attitude of front-line commanders towards the Directory and the future military dictatorship.

“I got the impression,” A. V. Kolchak later asserted, “that the army has a negative attitude towards the Directory, at least in the person of those commanders with whom I spoke. Everyone quite definitely said that only military power can now improve the matter ... ".

And in order to nevertheless show the Russian troops the military and naval minister and draw additional press attention to the figure of A.V. Kolchak, apparently, a simple idea was born at the same time. As early as the end of the summer of 1918, officers of the former 3rd Pernovsky Grenadier Regiment of the Russian Army, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. St. George banner of the regiment. They immediately handed over this banner to the head of the 7th Ural Division, Major General V.V. Golitsyn. It was decided that A. V. Kolchak would solemnly present the historical banner of the 3rd Pernovsky regiment to the 28th Irbit-Pernovsky regiment.

On November 13, at 10 am, the Russian troops of the Yekaterinburg garrison were lined up on Monastyrskaya Square. R. Gaida, Inspector General of the Czechoslovak troops in Russia, Lieutenant General V.N. Shokorov, head of the 12th Ural Rifle Division, Colonel R.K. National Council, Major R. Medek, other officers and representatives of civil authorities. After the prayer service, A. V. Kolchak presented the banner to the commander of the regiment, Colonel M. N. Nekrasov. Then a military parade took place, which was also received by A. V. Kolchak.

On the same day, the second meeting of A. V. Kolchak with R. Gaida took place in Yekaterinburg. According to the Czech general, from the front "Kolchak came with a ready-made decision, only to consult." R. Gaida refused to participate in the coup d'état, but promised A. V. Kolchak that the troops of the Siberian army at the front would be neutral in these events. In principle, the conversation was so frank that even the question of the title of the future military dictator was discussed. R. Gaida reacted negatively to the proposal of A. V. Kolchak to be called the “Supreme Ruler” after the coup, motivating his position with the temporary nature of power, and recommended that the admiral limit himself to the title of Supreme Commander with the rights of a dictator.

Here, for the promised neutrality, R. Gaida demanded additional compensation from A.V. Kolchak, seeking the removal of not only P.P. Belov, but also P.P. Ivanov-Rinov. The admiral was forced to fulfill the wish of the Czech. On the morning of November 14, from the headquarters of the North Ural Group, he sent a lengthy telegram addressed to V. G. Boldyrev to Omsk:

“On November 14 [at] 0-20 [min.] Having received information that General Belov is trying to oppose his removal from office and is preparing to leave Omsk to continue intrigues, I consider it absolutely necessary and insist in this case [on] the arrest of General Belov with sending him [to] Yekaterinburg, also [on] the removal from office of General Ivanov [-Rinov], in order to put an end to all the intrigues disastrously reflected at the front at once.

Having reached the necessary agreement with R. Gaida, A. V. Kolchak, together with D. Ward, left for Chelyabinsk, where the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front and the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia were located. Here he had meetings with the chief of staff of the front, Major General M.K. Diterichs and the leadership of the department, which did not encourage A.V. Kolchak. Judging by their subsequent reaction to the coup that took place in Omsk, they were supporters of the Directory, and A. V. Kolchak felt the futility of his stay in Chelyabinsk. In order not to aggravate the situation, the admiral announced that he was leaving for the front. In fact, the minister did not reach the front. Most likely, on November 15, A. V. Kolchak received a telegram from the Stavka officers participating in the conspiracy that V. G. Boldyrev plans to leave Omsk the next day and go to the Ufa front, where in the area of ​​​​Bugulma and Birsk the remnants of the People's Army of Samara Komuch and the Czechoslovak corps with difficulty held back the advance of the Reds. With the departure of V. G. Boldyrev from Omsk, an exceptionally favorable situation developed for the implementation of the planned coup. Therefore, A. V. Kolchak immediately left Chelyabinsk and headed for Omsk along the southern line of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Meanwhile, the flywheel of the conspiracy was gaining momentum. Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Syromyatnikov, who was in charge of the military part of the coup, selected a small group of officers personally known to him, who had previously studied at the Academy of the General Staff and in early November 1918 held key positions at Headquarters, in the headquarters of the Siberian Army and the 2nd Steppe Siberian Corps. It included captains I. A. Baftalovsky, A. A. Burov, A. K. Gaiko, Grinevich (or Grinevsky), A. L. Simonov and G. V. Shchepin. Each of them received a specific task, the implementation of which in the aggregate was to ensure the arrest of the Social Revolutionary part of the Directory and the Council of Ministers, the informational isolation of V. G. Boldyrev, the neutralization of the command staff and military units of the Omsk garrison, which remained loyal to the Provisional All-Russian Government.

The agents at the disposal of E. F. Rogovsky, apparently, had some information about the organization of the conspiracy. In any case, on the evening of November 15, 1918, at the end of the joint meeting of the Directory and the Council of Ministers, when only the members of the Directory remained, E.F. Rogovsky made a report that the “right” circles were preparing to overthrow the government and that unrest was noticed among the officers. But, as P. V. Vologodsky testified, the "directors" to the message of E. F. Rogovsky "in general reacted quite calmly", suggesting that he "strengthen intelligence on this subject and take some precautions." Such infantilism of the Directory to seemingly emergency information is not surprising. Omsk has long been so saturated with rumors of a conspiracy and a coup d'etat that the feeling of their reality, not only among ordinary inhabitants, but also among members of the government, has simply dulled.

To a large extent, the success of the conspirators was also facilitated by the political mood that prevailed among the officers, the general atmosphere of permissiveness and licentiousness, which took deep roots in the officer corps, and the impotence of the highest command staff.

Perhaps the most striking manifestation of the established "orders" was the widely publicized and publicized incident that occurred on November 13, 1918 in the hall of the Omsk garrison assembly. On the occasion of the arrival of French troops in Omsk, a dinner was held here in honor of the French officers. Dinner was attended by dignitaries: from the Russian side, Major General A.F. Matkovsky, the acting commander of the Siberian Army, from the French side, the envoy E. Regnault and Consul Netteman, from the Americans, Consul Gray. After the speeches by A.F. Matkovsky, E. Regno and Nettemann, the orchestra played the French national anthem - Marseillaise, while most of the Russian officers present demanded to play "God save the Tsar!" and even sang along with the orchestra during the performance of the anthem of the former Russian Empire. One of the Cossack officers, who turned out to be the commander of the partisan detachment, military foreman I. N. Krasilnikov, behaved especially defiantly. When, after new speeches, the situation with the performance of both hymns was repeated, A.F. Matkovsky and representatives of the allied powers left the hall of the garrison meeting in protest.

The Directory and even the Council of Ministers could no longer fail to respond to this rampant military action. On November 15, 1918, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief V. G. Boldyrev issued Order No. 36, in which he once again confirmed the position of the Provisional All-Russian Government: "the army is out of politics", and "any public revelation of one's political sympathies, in whatever direction they lean, completely unacceptable on the part of the representatives of the army. He strongly condemned the incident at the Omsk garrison assembly, qualifying it as "especially unacceptable due to its boundless tactlessness and criminal frivolity on the part of the persons responsible for this incident." V. G. Boldyrev ordered A. F. Matkovsky "to carry out the strictest investigation and definitely find out those persons who, forgetting about the dignity of their country, not embarrassed by friendly allied representation, publicly demonstrate their boundless licentiousness, which must be put to an end." The Supreme Commander in the correct form expressed his dissatisfaction with the behavior of the commanding officials who were present at the banquet, but did not take measures to immediately arrest and bring the perpetrators to the strictest accountability, stating that in the future he would regard such behavior as a criminal inaction of the authorities. The order ended with harsh words:

"Persons who consciously or unconsciously harm the creation of healthy discipline in the army and the peaceful development of the resurgent statehood must be immediately removed from the ranks of the army."

On the night of November 16, V. G. Boldyrev went to the front. Already on the way, he learned that D. Ward's train was coming towards him, which included the car of A. V. Kolchak. V. G. Boldyrev ordered the Minister of War to wait for him in Petropavlovsk if the admiral arrived there earlier. But the train of V. G. Boldyrev was the first to arrive at the Petropavlovsk station. At the station, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was greeted by representatives of the local military authorities. Then the train arrived, in which A.V. Kolchak was. The admiral appeared in the carriage of V. G. Boldyrev. Their conversation lasted about three hours.

The minister reported on his trip, describing in optimistic terms the state of the Russian troops at the front, again raised the question of expanding his rights, inquired about the situation in Omsk, citing the lack of information from there. In turn, the Supreme Commander formulated a list of what he considered possible to do in response to the request of A. V. Kolchak, gave him a number of instructions, expressed concern about the situation on the Ufa sector of the front and political tension in Omsk, created mainly by Cossack circles. True, in the latter case, V. G. Boldyrev expressed the hope that everything would work out.

A. V. Kolchak began a conversation with the Supreme Commander in an aggressive manner, but the meeting ended quite calmly and even kindly. V. G. Boldyrev invited the admiral to dine with him, to which he agreed. They were accompanied by the sister of the wife of V. G. Boldyreva and the doctor of the local children's colony. As a result of this meeting, V. G. Boldyrev wrote in his diary:

“From a long conversation with Kolchak, I became even more convinced of how easily he succumbs to the influence of others ... He already agreed with the fatality and untimeliness of any coups. He is either very impressionable or cunning.

The gullible and ingenuous VG Boldyrev was more inclined towards the first option. Therefore, as he himself wrote, after meeting with A. V. Kolchak, "he allowed himself a rare pleasure - to read Oscar Wilde."

On the morning of November 17, A. V. Kolchak returned to Omsk. Despite Sunday, the admiral went to work - in the military ministry. Here he signed an insignificant order No. 14, informing that the main directorates of artillery, engineering, quartermaster, military sanitary and military veterinary directorates should be considered formed from the present date. All the rest of the time, A.V. Kolchak spent talking with the Stavka employees, naval and Cossack officers who constantly came to him, despite the non-attendance of the day, urging the admiral to eliminate the Directory and create sole power. Most of these visitors, of course, were not privy to the conspiracy and therefore sincerely tried to persuade A. V. Kolchak to carry out a coup. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that among the Sunday interlocutors of the future military dictator there were well-informed people who, knowing the psychological instability of the admiral, by their conversations supported his confidence in the successful outcome of the conspiracy and thus, as it were, exercised control over the behavior of the admiral.

On February 4, 1920, in Irkutsk, during interrogation by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, A. V. Kolchak claimed that he reacted negatively to the persuasion of officers to take power into their own hands, emphasizing that he was in the service of the Directory, which is why he did not consider it possible to "undertake some steps in the sense in which you say.

If A. V. Kolchak actually answered his interlocutors in this way, then he, of course, deceived them in the most trivial way. But the insincerity of the admiral is completely understandable. It was of a forced nature, since A.V. Kolchak was obliged to observe secrecy. In fact, by that time the decision to arrest the Chairman of the Directory N. D. Avksentiev, a member of the Directory V. M. Zenzinov and Deputy Minister of the Interior E. F. Rogovsky had already been made. In any case, A. D. Syromyatnikov, who was in charge of the military side of the coup, gave the last instructions to captains I. A. Baftalovsky and A. A. Burov on the afternoon of November 17 on the implementation of the coup plan. There is no doubt that A. D. Syromyatnikov could not act at his own discretion, without the sanction of the admiral, V. N. Pepelyaev or I. A. Mikhailov.

An analysis of the behavior of A. V. Kolchak during his tenure as Minister of War and Naval Affairs suggests that he did practically nothing to strengthen the armed forces of the Provisional All-Russian Government. However, the admiral quite successfully positioned himself as a supporter of solid state power and actively intrigued both against the Directory and against potential competitors for dictators. The main business of A.V. Kolchak was participation in a conspiracy against the Directory, in which the admiral very clearly and competently performed the role intended for him, remaining beyond all suspicion of both his allies and opponents.

NOTES

1. Forgive me, great admiral! .. (Sketch for the portrait of Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak). Barnaul, 1992; Bogdanov K. A. Admiral Kolchak. SPb., 1993; I. F. Plotnikov Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak. Life and activity. Rostov n/a, 1998; I. F. Plotnikov Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak. Explorer, Admiral, Supreme Ruler. M., 2002; Krasnov V. G. Kolchak. Both life and death for Russia. M., 2000. Book. 1-2; Sinyukov V.V. Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak as an explorer of the Arctic. M., 2000; Sinyukov V.V. Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak: from an explorer of the Arctic to the Supreme Ruler of Russia. M., 2004; Supreme Ruler of Russia: Documents and materials of the investigation file of Admiral A. V. Kolchak. M., 2003; Eastern front of Admiral Kolchak. M., 2004; A. V. Kolchak - scientist, admiral, Supreme ruler of Russia: historical readings dedicated to the 130th anniversary of the birth of A. V. Kolchak. Omsk, 2005; Behind Kolchak. Documents and materials. M., 2005; Cherkashin N. A. Admiral Kolchak: a reluctant dictator. M., 2005; Zyryanov P. N. Admiral Kolchak, Supreme Ruler of Russia. M., 2006; Khandorin V. G. Admiral Kolchak: truth and myths. Tomsk, 2006; Runov V., Portuguese R. Admiral Kolchak. M., 2007.
2. GANO. F.D.-144,. Op. 1. D. 39. L. 1-2; Russian historical archive. Prague, 1929. Sat. 1. S. 247.
3. Bulletin of the Provisional All-Russian Government (Omsk). 1918. 6 Nov.
4. Boldyrev V. G. Directory. Kolchak. Interventions. Novonikolaevsk, 1925. S. 84-88; Serebrennikov I. I. Russian Civil War: The Great Retreat. M., 2003. S. 422-423; Vologodsky P.V. In Power and Exile: The Diary of a Prime Minister of Anti-Bolshevik Governments and an Emigrant in China (1918-1925). Ryazan, 2006, pp. 422-423; Archive of the Russian Revolution / Ed. I. V. Gessen. Berlin, 1923. T. 10. S. 284.
5. Shishkin V.I. Vice Admiral A. V. Kolchak (September 19 - November 4, 1918) // Russia in a globalizing world: Sat. scientific Art. Arkhangelsk, 2006. S. 174-175.
6. Boldyrev V. G. Directory. Kolchak. Interventions. Novonikolaevsk, 1925. S. 92; GARF. F. R-176. Op. 5. D. 42. L. 64-65; Bulletin of the Provisional All-Russian Government. Nov. 9, 1918
7. GARF. F. R-176. Op. 5. D. 42. L. 70-72.
8. RGVA. F. 39597. Op. 1. D. 5. L. 1, 6-12; D. 14. L. 1.
9. Pepelyaev's diary // Krasnye zori. Irkutsk. 1923. No. 4. S. 85.
10. RGVA. F. 39597. Op. 1. D. 5. L. 13.
11. Pepelyaev's diary // Krasnye zori. 1923. No. 4. S. 85.
12. Shishkin V.I.
13. Gajda R. General ruských legií. Moje paměti: Československá anabase. Zpět na Ural proti bolševikùm. Admiral Kolčak Vesmir, 1921, p. 97.
14. Zauralsky Krai (Yekaterinburg). 1918. Nov. 12; Bulletin of the Provisional All-Russian Government. 1918 Nov 13
15. GARF. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 78. L. 25-26, 40, 42.
16. Bulletin of the Provisional All-Russian Government. Nov. 9, 1918
17. Zauralsky region. 1918. 12 Nov.
18. Ural life (Yekaterinburg). 1918. 15 Nov.
19. Archive of the Russian Revolution. M., 1991. T. 10. S. 289.
20. Boldyrev V. G. Directory. Kolchak. Interventions. Novonikolaevsk, 1925, p. 98; GARF. F. R-10055. Op. 2. D. 7. L. 1. V. G. Boldyrev could not stand the joint ultimatums of R. Gaida and A. V. Kolchak and “surrendered” P. P. Belov, however, having expelled the latter to the Stavka reserve due to the submitted report.
21. Gajda R.
22. GARF. F. R-131. Op. 1. D. 357. L. 3-6, 11-12.
23. Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 10. S. 290.
24. Kruchinin A. M. Under the shadow of the old banner // White Army. White business. 2000. No. 8. S. 114-119.
25. Kruchinin A. M. From the Ural Mountains to the Shcheglovskaya taiga: a brief history of the 7th Ural division of mountain riflemen // White Army. White business. 2002. No. 11. P. 40; People's Siberia (Novonikolaevsk). Nov. 13, 1918; Ural life. 1918. 15 Nov.
26. Gajda R. General ruských legií. Moje paměti: Československá anabase. Zpět na Ural proti bolševikùm. Admiral Kolčak Vesmir, 1921, pp. 98-99.
27. RGVA. F. 39499. Op. 1. D. 45. L. 1.
28. Morning of Siberia (Chelyabinsk). 1918. Nov. 17; Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 10. S. 290.
29. Shishkin V.I. On the history of the Kolchak revolution // Izv. Sib. Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Series: History, philology and philosophy. Novosibirsk, 1989. Issue. one.
30. Vologodsky P.V. In Power and Exile: The Diary of a Prime Minister of Anti-Bolshevik Governments and an Emigrant in China (1918-1925). Ryazan, 2006, pp. 116-117.
31. Melgunov S. P. The tragedy of Admiral Kolchak. From the history of the civil war on the Volga, the Urals and Siberia. M., 2004. Book. 1. S. 464-465; GARF. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 3b. L. 2-3.
32. There. D. 20. L. 100.
33. Unity (Petropavlovsk). 1918. 19 Nov.
34. Boldyrev V. G. Directory. Kolchak. Interventions. Novonikolaevsk, 1925. S. 105.
35. RGVA. F. 39597. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 8.
36. Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 10. S. 291.
37. GARF. F. R-5881. Op. 2. D. 242. L. 5.

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