Stock number ist information. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

Declassified in accordance with the order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of May 8, 2007 N181 "On the declassification of archival documents of the Red Army and the Navy for the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" (as amended on May 30, 2009)

mannanov

Hassan Mannanovich

red army soldier

Last duty station

1 anti-tank. up

Retirement date

Reason for leaving

missing

A source of information

Fund number ist. information

Inventory number information

Case number ist. information

· Hannan

· Manar Bakirovich

Red Army soldier

· Last duty station

· 1 anti-tank. up

· Retirement date

until 09/01/1941

· Reason for leaving

· missing

· A source of information

· Fund number ist. information

· Inventory number information

· Case number ist. information

· Faykhotdinov

· Yusup

Red Army soldier

· Last duty station

· 1 anti-tank. up

· Retirement date

until 09/01/1941

· Reason for leaving

· missing

· A source of information

· Fund number ist. information

· Inventory number information

· Case number ist. information

https://cdn.pamyat-naroda.ru/images3/Memorial/VS/001/058-0818883-0009/00000099.jpg

Galiev

Vali Galievich

red army soldier

Last duty station

1 anti-tank. up

Retirement date

Reason for leaving

missing

A source of information

Fund number ist. information

Inventory number information

Case number ist. information

Khusainov

· Bary Vareevich

Red Army soldier

· Last duty station

· 1 anti-tank. up

· Retirement date

until 09/01/1941

· Reason for leaving

· missing

· A source of information

· Fund number ist. information

· Inventory number information

· Case number ist. information

Sharafutdinov

Reda Sharafutdinovich

red army soldier

Last duty station

1 anti-tank. up

Retirement date

Reason for leaving

missing

A source of information

Fund number ist. information

Inventory number information

Case number ist. information

Information from the report
about irretrievable losses

· Nardynov

· Gary Nardynovich

Red Army soldier

· Last duty station

· 1 anti-tank. up

· Retirement date

until 09/01/1941

· Reason for leaving

· missing

· A source of information

· Fund number ist. information

· Inventory number information

· Case number ist. information

Memory of the people

The feat of the people

Central archive

Military Historical Library

Generalized databank "Memorial"

Heraldry

Military Encyclopedic Dictionary

Thanks to V.M. Melnikov for striving to achieve the intended noble goal. Thanks to A.M. Pivovarov for his seemingly tactless question, the answer to which revealed the whole human essence.
And what would Vladimir Mikhailovich answer if he were the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation for perpetuating the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland?
My uncle, Anikeev Grigory Trofimovich, born in 1922, is not a general, but I, Lyudmila Nikolaevna Saurina, already a disenfranchised old woman, but my soul wants to have time to perpetuate his memory. But...
Anikeev Grigory Trofimovich - sergeant
Date of Birth __.__.1922
Place of Birth Omsk region, Okoneshnikovsky district, Okoneshnikovsky s / s
Last duty station 133 s d
Date of disposal 09/30/43
Reason for leaving killed
Primary burial site Smolensk region, Smolensk district, Bobovo village
Source of information TsAMO
Fund number ist. Information 58
Inventory number Information 18001
Case number ist. Information 964
Unit order
No: 7/n dated: 08/12/1943
Published: 418 sp 133 sd
Archive: TsAMO
Fund: 33
Description: 682526
Storage units: 1592
Entry No: 17964320
That's all uncle's luggage.
After receiving the information, I was sure that the memory would be immortalized. But... I stumbled on the first step.
From the Smolensk region they reported that there is no such village and there is nowhere to perpetuate the memory.
The village of Bobovo ended up in the Vyazemsky district, but from there they reported that Vyazma was liberated on March 12, 1943, and my uncle died on September 30, 1943, so Bobovo cannot be the place of his death.
I applied to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to perpetuate the memory of the Zoo, I received a response indicating the place on the memorial "Field of Memory" in the village of Krasny Kholm, Vyazemsky district.
I'm glad that justice will prevail. But ... (I didn’t expect such a “but”)
Letters were sent from the Vyazemsky and Kaydakovskaya Administrations that the work on perpetuation had begun, the plaque had been ordered, I was invited to be an honored guest at the gala event on 09/25/2015. The summer passes, again letters with an invitation that "ALL WORKS TO PERMANENT MEMORY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED", etc.
I'm coming! .. Shock and tears! .. No work began or ended. Deception!!!
Teachers arrived with students and said that there was no sign. Again cheating!!!
Children read poems dedicated to the liberation of the Smolensk region. "Don't fall," I thought.
Suddenly I hear: "We will perpetuate the memory ...". "What is it? "More cheating?"
I was led to a white pedestal, on which, stuck with adhesive tape, lay a quarter of a printed sheet with the name of my uncle. This is a SCAM for the benefit of a fool!!!
I wrote to the President of the Russian Federation, forwarded to Smolensk.
From there they write to me that it is really 09/30/43. after Smolensk, they liberated the Krasninsky district and suggest either the village of Babinichi, or Bovshchevo, ... whoever is in what much.
Smolensk is the capital of all Smolensk villages, which means that this is the place of his memory, - I suggested, because he also liberated Smolensk.
The regional military commissar quickly recognized the date of death as incorrect so that I would not encroach on Smolensk.
Easily! - There is no tree. There is no area. The date is not correct. It remains only to guess that there was no person.
How to be? My case is extraordinary. It is not subject to any Law, because they do not clearly define how to perpetuate the memory of the fallen Defenders of the Fatherland, if there are documents, but it is impossible to determine the place of death.
Help with advice, documents on 418 sp 133 sd 31 of the Army of the Polar Front, finds.

Inventory number information

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Archive

Shirokov, Pyotr Petrovich From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pyotr Petrovich Shirokov

Date of Birth

March 22, 1917

Place of Birth

Tver region

Date of death

October 21, 1946 (aged 29)

Place of death

Krasnodar

Affiliation

the USSR

Years of service

1937-1945

Rank

Battles/wars

The Great Patriotic War

Awards and prizes

Pyotr Petrovich Shirokov(03/22/1917, Tver region - 10/21/1946) - company commander of the 665th rifle regiment of the 216th rifle division of the 51st army of the 4th Ukrainian front, senior lieutenant.

Biography

Born on March 9, 1917 in the village of Berezovka, Bologovsky District, Tver Region. He graduated from seven classes of incomplete secondary school. He worked as a turner at a factory in the city of Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad region of Ukraine.

In 1937 he was drafted into the Red Army. In 1941 he graduated from the Veliky Ustyug Military Infantry School. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War - from June 1941. Fought on the 4th Ukrainian Front. Member of the CPSU since 1943.

The company commander of the 665th Infantry Regiment, Senior Lieutenant P.P. Shirokov, especially distinguished himself during the liberation of Sevastopol. The assault on Sapun Mountain, a key hill near Sevastopol, is one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The soldiers of the 51st and Primorsky armies, after an hour and a half of artillery and aviation training, on May 7, 1944, went on the offensive against a powerful fortified enemy center. Opponents, hiding in reinforced concrete pillboxes, among boulders, desperately fought back. Our soldiers, unfurling red flags, stubbornly, step by step, moved forward. The next day the fortress fell.

Among those who stormed Sapun Mountain was the company of Senior Lieutenant P.P. Shirokov. The soldiers of P.P. Shirokov completed the task and entrenched themselves in the area of the old cemetery. Early in the morning of May 9, 1944, the opponents, who did not want to accept the loss of commanding heights, launched a counterattack on the positions of the company. P.P. Shirokov understood the enemy’s intention: to take our position with a strong blow, go into the flank of the 8th and 9th companies, cut off the entire regiment and break through to Sapun Mountain, return what was lost.

Having let the counterattacks come very close, at 50-60 meters, P.P. Shirokov ordered to open fire. The opponents running ahead fell. Behind them appeared other chains, other columns. The Germans lay down. Taking advantage of this, the company commander rose to his full height and shouted: “For the Motherland. Give me Sevastopol. Behind him, the fighters rose and went on the attack on the enemy. Senior Lieutenant P.P. Shirokov ran ahead and shot the fleeing fascists from a machine gun. The left flank of the company lagged somewhat behind, as it was hindered by a German light machine gun mounted behind a pile of gravestones. Noticing this, P.P. Shirokov was fifteen meters from the machine gun, but then five opponents rose to block his path. Having shot three fascists point-blank, he, having no more cartridges, killed two with the butt of a machine gun.

Another swift throw, and P. P. Shirokov, having killed the enemy machine gunner with the butt, turned the machine gun and fired heavily at the remnants of the enemy chains. The regiment developed an attack launched by a company of senior lieutenant P.P. Shirokov, and a few hours later was at the walls of the city of Sevastopol. A company in this area was the first to break into the city. At the height of the historical panorama of the defense of Sevastopol in 1854-1855, at the monument to General Totleben, the soldiers of P. P. Shirokov hoisted a red flag.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 24, 1945, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command in the battles for the liberation of Sevastopol and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Senior Lieutenant Shirokov Petr Petrovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of Lenin's Morden and the Gold Star medal.

On June 24, 1945, P.P. Shirokov participated in the historic Victory Parade in Moscow on Red Square.

Since 1945, Captain Shirokov P.P. has been in reserve. Lived in Krasnodar. Died October 21, 1946. He was buried in Krasnodar at the All Saints Cemetery.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, and medals.

Literature[edit | edit wiki text]

· Heroes of the Soviet Union: A Brief Biographical Dictionary / Prev. ed. Collegium I. N. Shkadov. - M.: Military Publishing, 1988. - T. 2 / Lyubov - Yashchuk /. - 863 p. - 100,000 copies. - ISBN 5-203-00536-2.

· Dolgov I. A. Golden Stars of Kalinin. Book. 2. - M.: Moscow worker, 1984.

Shirokov Petr Petrovich

Shirokov Petr Petrovich
genus. 22.3.1917 in the village. Berezovka is now the Bologovsky district of the Kalinin region. in a working family.
Russian. Member of the CPSU since 1943.
Graduated from 7 classes. He worked as a turner at a factory in Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad region.
In the Soviet Army since 1937. In 1941 he graduated from the Veliky Ustyug Military Infantry School.
Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941.
The company commander of the 665th Infantry Regiment (216th Infantry Division, 51st Army, 4th Ukrainian Front), Senior Lieutenant Shirokov, distinguished himself during the liberation of Sevastopol.
On May 9, 1944, his company, having repelled an enemy counterattack in the area of the Old Cemetery, was the first in the regiment to enter the city.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded on March 24, 1945.
Since 1945, Captain Shirokov has been in reserve. Lived in Krasnodar.
He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class, and medals.
Died 11/14/1946.

Lit.:
Dolgov I.A. Golden Stars of Kalinin. 3rd ed., add. and reworked. M., 1984, book 2. / pp. 49-50.

SHIROKOV PETER PETROVICH

Born in 1917 in the village of Kursky Ryadok, Bologovsky district. Russian. Member of the CPSU. In the Soviet Army since 1937. At the front since June 1941. Senior lieutenant, commander of the 7th company of the 665th rifle regiment of the 216th Red Banner rifle division. He distinguished himself during the liberation of Sevastopol. Member of the Victory Parade in Moscow. Died in 1946. Buried in Krasnodar.

GIVE SEVASTOPOL!

The assault on Sapun Mountain, a hill near Sevastopol, is one of the most brilliant pages of the war. It was the hot days of early May 1944. Warriors of the 51st and Primorsky armies, after an hour and a half of artillery and aviation training, on May 7 went on the offensive against a powerful fortified enemy center. The Nazis, hiding in reinforced concrete pillboxes, among boulders, desperately fought back. Soviet soldiers, unfurling red flags, stubbornly, step by step, moved forward. The standard-bearer fell, - he was replaced by another. There were fierce hand-to-hand fights. The next day, the stronghold, which seemed impregnable, fell.

Among those who stormed Sapun Mountain was the company of Senior Lieutenant Shirokov. The warriors boldly followed their commander. They knew him for a long time and believed him. What was difficult when crossing the Sivash! Still, the company overcame a dangerous line. The commander, for that hot deed, was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

And in these two days it was not easier, but the fighters of Shirokov completed the task and entrenched themselves in the area of the old cemetery. Early in the morning of May 9, the Nazis, who did not want to accept the loss of commanding heights, went on a counterattack on the positions of the company. Pyotr Petrovich understood the enemy's intention: to take our position with a strong blow, go into the flank of the 8th and 9th companies, cut off the entire regiment and break through to Sapun Mountain, return what was lost. "No, it won't work! - Shirokov mentally vowed - we won't give back the Sapun Mountains."

Having let the counterattacks come very close, at 50-60 meters, Shirokov ordered to open fire. The Nazis running ahead fell. Behind them appeared other chains, other columns. Their ranks quickly melted, thinned. And, finally, unable to withstand a friendly rebuff, the Germans lay down. Taking advantage of this, the company commander rose to his full height and shouted: - For the Motherland! Give me Sevastopol! - How he acted in these decisive moments is recorded in the award list signed by the deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front S. With Biryuzov: The left flank of the company lagged behind somewhat, as the German light machine gun mounted behind a pile of gravestones interfered with it. Noticing this, Shirokov was 15 meters from the machine gun in a few moments, but then five Nazis rose to block his path. having shot three fascists, he, having no more cartridges, killed two with the butt of his machine gun.Another swift throw, and Shirokov, having killed the enemy machine gunner with the butt, turned the machine gun and fired heavy fire at the remnants of the enemy chains.

The regiment developed an attack launched by the company of Senior Lieutenant Shirokov, and a few hours later was at the walls of the city of Sevastopol. hoisted a red flag.

Date of birth __.__.1906 Place of birth Vyatka province, Nelinsky district, Elganskaya volost Date and place of conscription 09/01/1941, Belovsky RVC, Novosibirsk region, Belovsky district .1944 Reason for departure killed Primary burial place Byelorussian SSR, Vitebsk region, Vitebsk district, Voroshily village, to the west, 100 m, regimental cemetery, grave No. 48 Source of information TsAMO Fund number ist. information 58 Inventory number ist. information 8002 Case number ist. information 165

Information about the report

Report number: 15698

Report Type: Dead Loss Reports

Reporting date: 03/20/1944

Unit name: Headquarters 179th Rifle Division

Date of birth __.__.1906 Place of birth Vyatka province, Nelinsk district, Engal Vol. Date and place of conscription Belovsky RVC, Novosibirsk region, Belovsky district Last place of service 259 joint ventures (259 joint ventures) Date of departure 03/02/1944 Reason for departure died Primary burial place grave No. 49, 1st from the left Source of information TsAMO Fund number ist. information 6747 Inventory number ist. information 198449s Case number ist. information 2

Information about the report

Report type: Burial book

Reporting date: 08/26/1943 - 01/30/1945

Part name: 259 sp

Images

Events from a person's life

Event	the date	Place	Description
Was born	1906	(Falyonsky district, Kirov region) - does not currently exist	Father - Tselousov Ivan Konstantinovich, mother - Tselousova Ustinya Nikolaevna
Changed place of residence	-	Belovo Kemerovo (Novosibirsk) region
perished	02.03.1944	Byelorussian SSR, Vitebsk region, Vitebsk district, village Voroshily	According to a report, 179 joint ventures died and were buried in the Byelorussian SSR, Vitebsk region, Vitebsk district, the village of Voroshily, to the west, 100 m, a regimental cemetery, grave No. 48. According to the Burial Book, 259 joint ventures were buried in the Byelorussian SSR, Vitebsk region, Vitebsk district, Voroshily village, to the west, 100 m, regimental cemetery, grave No. 49, 1st from the left. Reburied in a mass grave in the village of Zaronovo, Vitebsk region, r. Belarus

GHQ DIRECTIVE No. 11014 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS

ON MEASURES TO DESTROY THE ENEMY SOUTHERN
LAKE VELENCE
January 23, 1945, 24:00
In order to combine efforts in the elimination of the enemy grouping,
broke through to the Danube south of Lake Velence, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-
Mandatory orders:
1. Hand over to the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front from 12.00
01/24/1945 to the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, 23rd Tank Corps
and the 104th corps (three divisions), having transported them to the west coast
Danube. Transferable hulls provide at least 1 BC of ammunition, 2
filling stations with fuel and lubricants and 5 days of food forage.
2. Preparation and conduct of a strike from the area northeast of the lake. Velence
in the direction of Sharashda (in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of 22.01
No. 11013)2 to be assigned to the commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
3. Establish from 24.00 25.01.1945 the next demarcation line between the 2nd
and the 3rd Ukrainian fronts: to Kecskemét - the former, then Laoshmizhe,
the southern tip of the island of Csepel, the eastern bank of the river. Danube, Budapest,
the eastern bank of the st [aritsa] Andrey-Dunaag and further along the river. Danube (all locations
for the 2nd Ukrainian Front inclusive).
4. To the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front withdraw to the reserve
front of the 27th army of Trofimenko, consisting of at least two corps (six
sd) to the area south of Budapest, entrusting it with the defense of Csepel Island.
The transfer of divisions 27 A to the island of Csepel should begin immediately.
5. The commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front should not be removed from the island
Chepel 155 sd before being replaced by units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
6. Report on the given orders.

I. STALIN
A. ANTONOV
TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 213. L. 15, 16. Original.
1 S. K. Timoshenko

"By January 27, the Russian offensive had reached an unprecedented pace. The day of the catastrophe was approaching faster and faster. Southwest of Budapest, the Russians launched a counteroffensive. The remnants of the German garrison in the Hungarian capital fought fierce battles. ....
On the same day, the transfer of the 6th Panzer Army to the Eastern Front began. As already mentioned, Hitler, returning to Berlin, ordered to go on the defensive on the Western Front. At the same time, he developed his own plan for the use of all troops arriving from the west on the Eastern Front. I suggested to Hitler that all forces be transferred to the eastern Berlin region, divided into two groups and concentrated in the Glogau (Glogow), Cottbus and in Pomerania east of the Oder. This would make it possible to counterattack the advanced enemy units that had penetrated deeply into our defense system and defeat them while they were still weak and while our eastern defensive fortifications were holding, preventing the enemy from organizing the supply of ammunition and food to this sector of the front. However, Hitler insisted on his plan - to use the main forces of these units not for the defense of Germany, in particular the capital, but for an offensive in Hungary. Jodl expected to transfer the first corps there within two weeks. However, it took several weeks before the deployment could be fully completed. Before the beginning of March, there was nothing to think about the offensive. ...."

"On January 24, under the same heightened secrecy, the SS Panzer divisions began to leave Central Germany. First, the SS Leibstandarte division arrived through Dresden and Prague in the vicinity of Vienna. The remaining three Panzer divisions followed it at certain intervals. Even then When the transport of all SS formations was completed, "disinformation measures" continued to be carried out east of Berlin. However, the Soviet command already knew that the 6th Panzer Army was heading "somewhere to the East", since the echelons with tanks were attacked by the Soviets pilots in the gap between Cottbus and Gouben. "...
"In a report on the events of the second half of January 1945, compiled for the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, Colonel Meyer-Detring noted the following:
“The position of Army Group South is characterized by a successful offensive launched by separate formations northeast of Lake Balaton. Yesterday (January 28) the offensive began on the southern flank. The concentration of enemy forces to launch an offensive on the northern bank of the Danube in the direction of Bratislava is not ruled out. Two tank corps are being brought into the Hungarian region from the west, and the 356th Infantry Division has already partially arrived from the southwest. These forces are supposed to crush the southern flank of the Russian troops, which will free up their own divisions from near Budapest. During this operation, about twelve divisions can be released, which will be able to take part in the battles on the Eastern Front.

From the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union
Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M. Olma-Press. 2002
“On January 26, when it became clear that the enemy would not be able to hold back our offensive on the fortifications on the outskirts of the Oder, we submitted a preliminary proposal to the Headquarters, the essence of which was as follows.
By January 30, the troops of the front must reach the Berlinchen (Barlinek)-Landsberg (Gorzow-Wielkopolski)-Gretz (Grudzisk) line, pull up the rear, replenish supplies, and continue the offensive from the morning of February 1-2 in order to force the Oder on the move.
In the future, it was supposed to develop a rapid offensive in the Berlin direction, concentrating the main efforts around Berlin from the northeast, north and northwest.
On January 27, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved this proposal. ....
In this regard, the front command gave the following orientation to the front troops:
“To the military councils of all armies, the commander of the armed forces and the head of the rear of the front. I present approximate calculations for the next period and a brief assessment of the situation:
1. The enemy in front of the 1st Belorussian Front does not yet have any large counterattack groups.
The enemy does not have a continuous front of defense. It is now covering certain areas and is trying to solve the problem of defense by active operations in a number of sectors.
We have preliminary information that the enemy has withdrawn four tank divisions and up to 5-6 infantry divisions from the Western Front and is transferring these units to the Eastern Front. At the same time, the enemy continues to transfer units from the Baltic states and East Prussia.
Apparently, in the next 6-7 days, the enemy will concentrate troops brought in from the Baltic states and East Prussia on the Schwedt-Stargard-Neustettin line in order to cover Pomerania, prevent us from reaching Stettin and prevent our access to the Pomeranian Bay.
The enemy is apparently concentrating a group of troops being transferred from the West in the Berlin area with the task of defending the approaches to Berlin.
2. The tasks of the front troops are to consolidate the success achieved in the next 6 days by active actions, pull up everything that is lagging behind, replenish supplies up to 2 fuel refueling, up to 2 ammunition loads and take Berlin with a swift throw on February 15-16.
When consolidating the success achieved, that is, from February 4 to February 8, it is necessary:
a) 5th, 8th, 69th, 33rd armies to seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the river. Oder. At the same time, it is desirable for the 8th Guards and 69th Armies to have one common bridgehead between Kustrin and Frankfurt. If possible, it would be good to connect the bridgeheads of the 5th and 8th armies;
b) The 1st Army of the Polish Army, 47, 61, the 2nd Panzer Armies and the 2nd Cavalry Corps must push the enemy behind the Ratzebur-Falkenburg-Stargard-Altdam-Oder River line. After that, leaving a barrier until the approach of the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, regroup on the river. Oder for a breakthrough;
c) on February 7-8, it is necessary to complete the liquidation of the Poznan-Schneidemuhl group of the enemy;
d) the means of reinforcement for a breakthrough will basically remain the same as the armies now have;
e) tank troops and self-propelled artillery to complete the current and medium repairs by February 10 and put the materiel into operation;
e) aviation to complete the deployment, having at least 6 refueling at the airfields;
g) the rear of the front, the army and military rear by February 9-10 to be fully prepared for the decisive stage of the operation.
Zhukov.
Telegin. Malinin."

From the memoirs of the former Chief of the General Staff of the High Command of the German Ground Forces:
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, Rusmch, 1999.
"In the first days of February, our position on both the Eastern and Western fronts became fatal. ...
And, finally, Army Group "South", located between the Carpathians and the river. Drava, consisted of nineteen infantry and nine tank divisions. It had its task: after the approach of reserves from the west, go on the offensive on both sides of Lake Balaton in order to capture the right bank of the Danube, strengthen the southern flank of the Eastern Front and cover the oil-bearing regions. ....
The SS divisions intended for the offensive in Hungary were located on vacation in two areas: Bonn, Ahrweiler and Wittlich, Traben, Trarbach. Some units were still on their way to these areas. All movements were extremely slow. The superiority of enemy aviation paralyzed not only transportation, but also the will of the command.
Approximately one hundred and three weak infantry divisions and thirty-two and a half similarly weak armored and motorized divisions were on the Eastern Front; The Western Front had about sixty-five infantry and twelve tank divisions, of which four were preparing to be sent to the east.

From the book: Vasilchenko A.V. Hitler's last offensive. The defeat of the tank elite of the Reich. - M.: Yauza-press, 2008.
/From April to May 2000, as part of the preparation of his Ph.D. thesis, he traveled to Germany at the invitation of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for an internship, where he worked in the historical archives of Bielefeld and the center for historical documentation of North Rhine-Westphalia./
"On February 10, 1945, an order came to the headquarters of the 1st SS Panzer Corps. The chief of staff, at that time Obersturmbannführer Waffen-SS Lehmann, had to urgently arrive at the command post of Army Group South. At 17 o'clock on the same day, Lehmann received everything from Grolmann necessary clarifications and instructions.If we stick to the text of official documents, then the following was recorded in the combat log of Army Group South on February 10, 1945:
“After the 1st SS Panzer Corps is put on alert, it should head for the positions of the 211th People's Grenadier Division. These forces, together with the 45th Infantry Division and the 44th Imperial Grenadier Division "Masters of the Teutonic Order", are to attack the enemy bridgehead located northwest of the Gran. The most likely is an offensive in the direction of Nemet Sheldin - Dol Makash - Nana. First, the offensive must be carried out by divisions subordinate to the command of the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Corps. Then units of the I Panzer Corps, which will be subordinate to the headquarters of the Feldherrnhalle corps, should go on the offensive. The purpose of the operation is to eliminate the enemy bridgehead northwest of Gran. In the proper course of events, the enemy should be driven back from Gran, and then destroyed to the east of the city. All this will force the enemy to withdraw part of his forces from Koenigsberg. The start of the offensive is scheduled for February 16.
The army group chief of staff demands that the most combat-ready units of the I Panzer Corps be transferred east of Neuhäusel by the night of February 13th. Units in need of replenishment should remain in their original positions. The Chief of Staff of the 1st SS Panzer Corps will receive more detailed orders later."
"The ratio of some German and Hungarian geographical names
German Hungarian (Russian)
Altsol Zvolen
Donau Duna (Danube)
Drau Drava
Aipel Ipoy (Ipel)
Funfkirchen Pecs
Grand (city) Esztergom
Gran (river) Chron
Komorn Komarom
Moore Moore
Neuhäusel Ershekuivar
Platensee Balaton
Raab (city) Gyor
Raab (river) Raba
Stulweissburg Szekesfehervar
Velencesee Velenza"

From the book: Vasilchenko A.V. Hitler's last offensive. The defeat of the tank elite of the Reich. - M.: Yauza-press, 2008.
The thaw that had begun considerably slowed down the transfer of tank divisions. On February 13, it was reported from the 8th Army and the headquarters of Army Group South that "the offensive may have to be postponed for one day." Lieutenant General Grolman immediately conveyed this news to Major General Gehlen.
At that time, the reconnaissance of the 8th Army managed to find out which Soviet forces were supposed to resist it in the upcoming offensive:
“We proceed from the fact that in the depths of the bridgehead there are forces of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps supported by tanks, while parts of the two operational corps of the 6th Guards Tank Army, the IX Guards Mechanized Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps are located east of Gran. With the outbreak of hostilities, it is very likely that these formations will also receive units of Pliev's army as reinforcements. The offensive will have to be launched in the conditions of the concentration of all available infantry and tank units, which will be supported by the redeployed I SS Panzer Corps, which, however, will lead to a weakening of positions on the remaining sectors of the front. The offensive is supposed to begin on day X at 5 o'clock in the morning with a powerful artillery bombardment of the enemy's positions in the northern sector of his bridgehead near the Gran. A concentrated strike will allow him to recapture the environs of Nana, Kitsinda, Kemend, and Bina from him.
Panzer Corps "Feldherrnhalle" together with the 44th Imperial Grenadier Division "Masters of the Teutonic Order" will launch an offensive in the northeastern sector. The 46th Infantry Division is to take Vel Ludince, the 211th Infantry Division is to take the vicinity of Ket, and the Panzer Group of the Feldherrnhalle Corps is to take the vicinity of Farnad. In the area of Nemeth-Sheldin and Bart, the enemy will be attacked from two flanks. The heights to the south and southeast of Nemeth-Scheldin, as well as part of the river near Barth, are under heavy cover of enemy infantry and anti-tank artillery, which must be destroyed by the forces of the 1st SS Panzer Corps. To do this, you need to go to them in the rear from the south. The offensive must be carried out quickly and unexpectedly. To do this, the I SS Panzer Corps will be located on the strategic bridgehead between Neuhäusel and just east of Nagyshurani on the night before the offensive. From there he will go to his original positions northwest of Farnad. In the second push, he must move the epicenter of the battle to the heights lying east of Köbölkut, in order to subsequently create tactical prerequisites for an offensive in the direction of the Gran. Fighting in Köbölküt itself should be avoided, but it should be taken by blocking the enemy forces from the southeast.
Then I Panzer Corps, with the support of infantry units, should attack on the Musla-Bela segment. At the same time, the infantry has the task of taking residential quarters located on the eastern and southeastern heights. After that, they must take possession of Libad and Belaya. As soon as the command comes from the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Corps, the divisions must go on the defensive to repel the enemy counteroffensive.
In addition, the following "parallel" events were envisaged:
“a) On the eve of the offensive, the 271st People’s Grenadier Division, together with several duty units, should occupy a small bridgehead along the Danube near Gran, thereby misleading the enemy about the actual place where the offensive began.
b) A reinforced regimental group from the army group Balka should, on the first night after the start of the offensive, create a bridgehead on the other side of the Danube, southwest of the Gran. This will make it possible to establish a direct link between the units fighting both to the north and immediately to the west of the Gran.
From a tactical point of view, the 1st tank corus should follow the instructions of the command of the 8th Army. But at the same time, both SS tank corps will continue to operate independently, not obeying each other. ...
At the same time, the headquarters of the army group from the army group Balka was informed that on the evening of the first day of the offensive, the most powerful regimental group of the 96th Infantry Division (Signal group) would be transferred to the northern bank of the Danube. “It should create a bridgehead, presumably in the vicinity of Abed, if by that time the advanced units of the 8th Army manage to occupy the territory of the bridgehead near the so-called Paris Canal.” If the offensive had been carried out at a less rapid pace, then "the army group would have waited for darkness to carry out its own operation."!

From the article "For the Liberation of Hungary and Austria"
S. P. IVANOV, General of the Army Hero of the Soviet Union. During the Great Patriotic War, the chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
Collection "May 9, 1945. Memoirs" M. Nauka. 1970
"Preparing for the Vienna operation, we closely followed the enemy. From mid-February, the scouts began to provide data on the concentration of a large enemy tank grouping in the Lake Balaton area. When this was reported to the General Staff, they initially reacted to this message with distrust. Even the chief General Staff General of the Army A.I. Antonov, talking on HF with the front commander F.I. Tolbukhin, asked in bewilderment: “Who can believe that Hitler removed the 6th SS Panzer Army from the west and sent it against the 3rd Ukrainian Front , and not near Berlin, where the last operation is being prepared to defeat the fascist troops?
Indeed, it was hard to believe that the enemy, in conditions when Soviet troops were 60 km from Berlin, would transfer their tank formations to Hungary and organize a counteroffensive there. However, the correctness of the report and intelligence data sent by us to the General Staff about the enemy was soon fully confirmed.
The Hitlerite command ordered the transfer of the 6th SS Panzer Army from the Ardennes region and a number of formations from Italy to Hungary as early as mid-January. And now our scouts daily reported new data on the movement and arrival of enemy units and formations.
The fascist leaders, despite the direct threat to Berlin, decided to stay in Hungary at all costs. By stubborn defense, they hoped to close the way for Soviet troops to Austria and South Germany - the last territories where the German military industry was concentrated. The Nazi command foresaw that the withdrawal of Soviet troops into these areas would pose a threat to their groupings in Yugoslavia and Northern Italy. The fascist leaders also believed that the successful operations of their troops in Hungary would help the British, who had landed in Greece, to gain a foothold in the Balkan Peninsula and "mate" with the Russians.
In the situation that had developed by mid-February 1945, the fascist German command decided to thwart the offensive of the Red Army in the Berlin direction by creating a solid defense. On the southern wing, it tried to carry out a counteroffensive in order to defeat the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on the western bank of the Danube, liquidate the bridgehead, retain the western regions of Hungary, and then defeat the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with a blow to the flank, thereby putting under flank attack on the central grouping of Soviet troops. Hitler's strategists hoped to force the Soviet Supreme High Command to withdraw significant forces from the Berlin direction to the south.

From the book: Vasilchenko A.V. Hitler's last offensive. The defeat of the tank elite of the Reich. - M.: Yauza-press, 2008.
“On the night of February 15-16, that is, the day before the start of Operation South Wind, a tank group from the Feldherrnhalle corps launched a “false” offensive northwest of Leva. The reinforced regimental group of the 271st People’s the grenadier division was able to gain a foothold almost immediately on the eastern bank of the Gran River (not to be confused with the city), cutting the railway line that connected the positions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with Leva, Timats and Kozmalovets. many German planes.

HQ DIRECTIVE No. 11027 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS
2nd AND 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONTS, TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF STATE1
ON THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION TO CONQUER VIENNA
February 17, 1945 20:15

1. Commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to prepare and pro-
conduct an offensive operation with the aim of striking north of the river. Danube in general
in the direction of Nowe Zamky, Malacky, Znojmo with a simultaneous offensive
left wing of the front along the southern bank of the Danube to occupy Bratislava, no later than
20th day of the operation to capture Brno, Znojmo and in cooperation with the troops of the 3rd
Ukrainian front to seize Vienna. Further develop the offensive in
general direction to Pilsen.
To complete this task:
a) strike north of the river. Inflict the Danube with the forces of the 9th Guards, 7th Guards. and the left flank of the 53rd
armies, reinforced by three breakthrough artillery divisions, heavy self-propelled brigade
ladies and shelves. In the breakthrough area, create an artillery density of at least
200 barrels (from 76 mm and above) per 1 km of the breakthrough front. To develop success
after breaking through the enemy defenses, use along the northern bank of the river. Danube
6th Guards a tank army and a cavalry-mechanized group of Pliev;
b) blow south of the river. Strike the Danube with the forces of the 46th Army, reinforced by an artillery division
RGK and 2nd Guards. mechanized corps.
2. Commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to prepare and conduct
offensive operation with the aim of striking from the Szekesfehervar area in general
in the direction of Papa, Sombatel to break up the enemy grouping north of the lake.
Balaton and no later than the 15th day of the operation to reach the Austro-Hungarian border.
At the same time, the left wing of the front advances north of the river. Draw and master
oil-bearing region of Nadkanizha.
In the future, the main forces of the front will develop a strike in the direction
Wiener Neustadt, St. Polten to assist the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian
front in the capture of Vienna.
Use the Bulgarian army to secure the left wing of the front,
deploying it along the northern bank of the river. Drava.
To complete this task:
a) strike from the Szekesfehervar area with the forces of the 4th Guards, 27th and 26th armies,
reinforced by three breakthrough artillery divisions. At the breakthrough site, create artillery
lerian density of at least 200 barrels (from 76 mm and above) and one km
breakthrough front;
b) blow south of the lake. Inflict Balaton with the forces of the 57th Army, consisting of nine
pages of divisions;
c) mobile formations (18th, 23rd tank corps, 1st mechanized corps, 5th
guards corps) to use to develop success after a breakthrough on the main
direction.
3. The offensive by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts will begin on March 15.
4. Report on the given orders.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN
A. VASILEVSKY
TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 213. L. 33-35. Script.

HQ DIRECTIVE No. 11028 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS
2nd AND 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONTS, TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF STATE1
TO RESUSCRIBE ARMIES
February 17, 1945 20:17
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. Transfer from 24.00 20.02 the 27th Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front to
composition of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Transfer the army as part of the 35th Guards, 33rd, 37th
lines of corps (a total of eight lines of divisions) with all army means of strengthening
leniya, rear units, institutions and cash reserves.
2. The 46th army, consisting of the 10th guards, 23rd, 68th corps (only eight corps)
divisions and page regiment of the 109th Guards. page divisions) and the 2nd Guards. transfer the mechanized corps
from the same time from the 3rd Ukrainian Front to the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian
front. Transfer the army with all army reinforcements, rear
parts, institutions and cash reserves.
3. Commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to take from the reserve
Headquarters in the composition of the troops of the front of the 9th Guards Army, arriving in the area
Szolnok.
4. Establish from 24.00 20.02 the next dividing line between
2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts: to Kecskemét - the former and further Budapest,
Mor, Kapuvar, Sopron, Vienna (all points, except for Sopron, for the 2nd Ukrainian
Indian front inclusive).
5. Responsibility for ensuring the junction between the fronts is left to
Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
6. Execution to convey.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN
A. VASILEVSKY
TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 213. L. 36, 37. Original.
1 S. K. Timoshenko.

GHQ DIRECTIVE No. 11036 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS
FRONTS ON IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS
Copy: to the Stavka representative
March 6, 1945 01:30
Recently, there have been cases of carelessness on some fronts.
and rotozeystvo, using which the enemy managed to inflict on us outside
zapnye and sensitive blows. As a result of these strikes, our troops
were forced to leave. The departure in these cases was unorganized,
the troops suffered heavy losses in manpower and especially in materiel.
For example:
1. 7th Guards. army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, defending east of Ko-
marno, being attacked by the enemy, failed to repulse his attack,
despite the sufficient amount of forces and means, she left the
its operationally important foothold<на западном берегу р. Грон), потеряв при
this personnel - 8194 people, guns of various calibers - 459 (out of
of them 76-mm and above - 374), tanks and SU-54.
2. Parts of the 26th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, advancing along the canal
Sherviz, went deep into the enemy defenses for 3-5 km. The enemy, having taken
counterattack, easily broke through the battle formations of our advancing units,
who did not have serious artillery support, because all their artillery
was simultaneously removed from positions and moved forward. As a result
two days of fighting, units 133 and 135 of the 26th army lost 42 mortars, 90
guns of different calibers and were thrown back to their original position.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers that these cases
could take place only as a result of criminal carelessness, bad
organization of defense, lack of intelligence and control by higher
commanders and their staffs over the position and actions of the troops.
The commanders of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts did not consider it necessary
timely report to the Headquarters about these shameful facts, apparently wanting to hide
nx, and the General Staff had to get these
information from the headquarters of the fronts.
The headquarters indicates the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front Mar-
Shalu of the Soviet Union Malinovsky and the 3rd Ukrainian Front Marshal
Soviet Union Tolbukhin on poor control over the actions of the troops,
satisfactory organization of intelligence and the inadmissibility of non-submission
to the rate of reporting the above losses.
Rate p r and y v a e t:
a) commander of the 7th Guards. army to Colonel-General Shumilov for demon -
scorching and poor organization of defense to announce a reprimand;
b) the commander of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts for the indicated
cases to conduct a rigorous investigation and bring the perpetrators to justice
ness.
0 report the results of the investigation and the measures taken.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN
A. ANTONOV
TsAMO. F-148a. Op. 3763. D. 213. L. 46-48. Script.
1 S. K. Timoshenko.

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