Landing in Crimea. Crimean War: what to do? Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov
Russia's defeat in the Crimean War was inevitable. Why?
“This is a war between cretins and scoundrels,” F.I. said about the Crimean War. Tyutchev.
Too harsh? Maybe. But if we take into account the fact that for the sake of the ambitions of some others died, then Tyutchev’s statement will be accurate.
Crimean War (1853-1856) also sometimes called Eastern War is a war between the Russian Empire and a coalition consisting of the British, French, Ottoman Empires and the Kingdom of Sardinia. The fighting took place in the Caucasus, in the Danube principalities, in the Baltic, Black, White and Barents seas, as well as in Kamchatka. But the fighting reached its greatest intensity in Crimea, which is why the war got its name Crimean.
I. Aivazovsky "Review of the Black Sea Fleet in 1849"
Causes of the war
Each side that took part in the war had its own claims and reasons for the military conflict.
Russian empire: sought to revise the regime of the Black Sea straits; strengthening influence on the Balkan Peninsula.
The painting by I. Aivazovsky depicts participants in the upcoming war:
Nicholas I intensely peers at the formation of ships. He is being watched by the fleet commander, the stocky Admiral M.P. Lazarev and his students Kornilov (chief of fleet staff, behind Lazarev’s right shoulder), Nakhimov (behind his left shoulder) and Istomin (far right).
Ottoman Empire: wanted the suppression of the national liberation movement in the Balkans; return of Crimea and the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
England, France: hoped undermine Russia's international authority and weaken its position in the Middle East; tear away from Russia the territories of Poland, Crimea, the Caucasus, and Finland; strengthen its position in the Middle East, using it as a sales market.
By the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of decline; in addition, the struggle of Orthodox peoples for liberation from the Ottoman yoke continued.
These factors led the Russian Emperor Nicholas I in the early 1850s to think about separating the Balkan possessions of the Ottoman Empire, inhabited by Orthodox peoples, which was opposed by Great Britain and Austria. Great Britain, in addition, sought to oust Russia from the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and from Transcaucasia. The Emperor of France Napoleon III, although he did not share the British plans to weaken Russia, considering them excessive, supported the war with Russia as revenge for 1812 and as a means of strengthening personal power.
Russia and France had a diplomatic conflict over control of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem; Russia, in order to put pressure on Turkey, occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under Russian protectorate under the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople. The refusal of the Russian Emperor Nicholas I to withdraw troops led to the declaration of war on Russia on October 4 (16), 1853 by Turkey, followed by Great Britain and France.
Progress of hostilities
First stage of the war (November 1853 - April 1854) - these are Russian-Turkish military actions.
Nicholas I took an irreconcilable position, relying on the power of the army and the support of some European states (England, Austria, etc.). But he miscalculated. The Russian army numbered more than 1 million people. However, as it turned out during the war, it was imperfect, first of all, in technical terms. Its weapons (smoothbore guns) were inferior to the rifled weapons of Western European armies.
The artillery is also outdated. The Russian navy was predominantly sailing, while the European navies were dominated by steam-powered ships. There was no established communication. This did not make it possible to provide the site of military operations with a sufficient amount of ammunition and food, or human replenishment. The Russian army could successfully fight the Turkish one, but it was not able to resist the united forces of Europe.
The Russian-Turkish War was fought with varying success from November 1853 to April 1854. The main event of the first stage was the Battle of Sinop (November 1853). Admiral P.S. Nakhimov defeated the Turkish fleet in Sinop Bay and suppressed coastal batteries.
As a result of the Battle of Sinop, the Russian Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Nakhimov defeated the Turkish squadron. The Turkish fleet was destroyed within a few hours.
During the four-hour battle in Sinop Bay(Turkish naval base) the enemy lost a dozen ships and over 3 thousand people killed, all coastal fortifications were destroyed. Only 20-gun fast steamer "Taif" with an English adviser on board, he was able to escape from the bay. The commander of the Turkish fleet was captured. The losses of Nakhimov's squadron amounted to 37 people killed and 216 wounded. Some ships left the battle with severe damage, but none were sunk . The Battle of Sinop is written in golden letters in the history of the Russian fleet.
I. Aivazovsky "Battle of Sinop"
This activated England and France. They declared war on Russia. The Anglo-French squadron appeared in the Baltic Sea and attacked Kronstadt and Sveaborg. English ships entered the White Sea and bombarded the Solovetsky Monastery. A military demonstration was also held in Kamchatka.
Second stage of the war (April 1854 - February 1856) - Anglo-French intervention in Crimea, the appearance of warships of the Western powers in the Baltic and White Seas and Kamchatka.
The main goal of the joint Anglo-French command was to capture Crimea and Sevastopol, a Russian naval base. On September 2, 1854, the Allies began landing an expeditionary force in the Evpatoria area. Battle on the river Alma in September 1854, Russian troops lost. By order of Commander A.S. Menshikov, they passed through Sevastopol and retreated to Bakhchisarai. At the same time, the garrison of Sevastopol, reinforced by sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, was actively preparing for defense. It was headed by V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov.
After the battle on the river. Alma the enemy besieged Sevastopol. Sevastopol was a first-class naval base, impregnable from the sea. In front of the entrance to the roadstead - on peninsulas and capes - there were powerful forts. The Russian fleet could not resist the enemy, so some of the ships were sunk before entering the Sevastopol Bay, which further strengthened the city from the sea. More than 20 thousand sailors went ashore and stood in line with the soldiers. 2 thousand ship guns were also transported here. Eight bastions and many other fortifications were built around the city. They used earth, boards, household utensils - anything that could stop the bullets.
But there were not enough ordinary shovels and picks for the work. Theft flourished in the army. During the war years this turned out to be a disaster. In this regard, a famous episode comes to mind. Nicholas I, indignant at all sorts of abuses and thefts discovered almost everywhere, in a conversation with the heir to the throne (the future Emperor Alexander II), shared the discovery he made and shocked him: “It seems that in all of Russia only two people do not steal - you and me.”
Defense of Sevastopol
Admiral-led defense Kornilova V.A., Nakhimova P.S. and Istomina V.I. lasted 349 days with a 30,000-strong garrison and naval crews. During this period, the city was subjected to five massive bombings, as a result of which part of the city, the Ship Side, was practically destroyed.
On October 5, 1854, the first bombardment of the city began. The army and navy took part in it. 120 guns fired at the city from land, and 1,340 ship guns fired at the city from the sea. During the shelling, over 50 thousand shells were fired at the city. This fiery tornado was supposed to destroy the fortifications and suppress the will of their defenders to resist. However, the Russians responded with accurate fire from 268 guns. The artillery duel lasted five hours. Despite the enormous superiority in artillery, the allied fleet was severely damaged (8 ships were sent for repairs) and was forced to retreat. After this, the Allies abandoned the use of the fleet in bombing the city. The city's fortifications were not seriously damaged. The decisive and skillful rebuff of the Russians came as a complete surprise to the allied command, which had hoped to take the city with little bloodshed. The defenders of the city could celebrate a very important not only military, but also moral victory. Their joy was darkened by the death during the shelling of Vice Admiral Kornilov. The defense of the city was led by Nakhimov, who was promoted to admiral on March 27, 1855 for his distinction in the defense of Sevastopol.F. Rubo. Panorama of the defense of Sevastopol (fragment)
A. Roubo. Panorama of the defense of Sevastopol (fragment)
In July 1855, Admiral Nakhimov was mortally wounded. Attempts by the Russian army under the command of Prince Menshikov A.S. to pull back the forces of the besiegers ended in failure (the battle of Inkerman, Evpatoria and Chernaya Rechka). The actions of the field army in Crimea did little to help the heroic defenders of Sevastopol. The enemy ring gradually tightened around the city. Russian troops were forced to leave the city. The enemy offensive ended here. Subsequent military operations in Crimea, as well as in other regions of the country, were not of decisive importance for the allies. Things were somewhat better in the Caucasus, where Russian troops not only stopped the Turkish offensive, but also occupied the fortress Kars. During the Crimean War, the forces of both sides were undermined. But the selfless courage of the Sevastopol residents could not compensate for the shortcomings in weapons and supplies.
On August 27, 1855, French troops stormed the southern part of the city and captured the height dominating the city - Malakhov Kurgan.
The loss of the Malakhov Kurgan decided the fate of Sevastopol. On this day, the city’s defenders lost about 13 thousand people, or more than a quarter of the entire garrison. On the evening of August 27, 1855, by order of General M.D. Gorchakov, Sevastopol residents left the southern part of the city and crossed the bridge to the northern. The battles for Sevastopol are over. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. Russian armed forces in Crimea remained intact and were ready for further fighting. They numbered 115 thousand people. against 150 thousand people. Anglo-Franco-Sardinians. The defense of Sevastopol was the culmination of the Crimean War.
F. Roubo. Panorama of the defense of Sevastopol (fragment of "The Battle for the Gervais Battery")
Military operations in the Caucasus
In the Caucasian theater, military operations developed more successfully for Russia. Turkey invaded Transcaucasia, but suffered a major defeat, after which Russian troops began to operate on its territory. In November 1855, the Turkish fortress of Kare fell.
The extreme exhaustion of Allied forces in the Crimea and Russian successes in the Caucasus led to a cessation of hostilities. Negotiations between the parties began.
Parisian world
At the end of March 1856, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed. Russia did not suffer significant territorial losses. Only the southern part of Bessarabia was torn away from her. However, she lost the right of patronage to the Danube principalities and Serbia. The most difficult and humiliating condition was the so-called “neutralization” of the Black Sea. Russia was prohibited from having naval forces, military arsenals and fortresses in the Black Sea. This dealt a significant blow to the security of the southern borders. Russia's role in the Balkans and the Middle East was reduced to nothing: Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia came under the supreme authority of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.
The defeat in the Crimean War had a significant impact on the alignment of international forces and on the internal situation of Russia. The war, on the one hand, exposed its weakness, but on the other, demonstrated the heroism and unshakable spirit of the Russian people. The defeat brought a sad conclusion to Nicholas' rule, shook up the entire Russian public and forced the government to come to grips with reforming the state.
Heroes of the Crimean War
Kornilov Vladimir Alekseevich
K. Bryullov "Portrait of Kornilov on board the brig "Themistocles"
Kornilov Vladimir Alekseevich (1806 - October 17, 1854, Sevastopol), Russian vice admiral. Since 1849, chief of staff, since 1851, in fact, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. During the Crimean War, one of the leaders of the heroic defense of Sevastopol. Mortally wounded on Malakhov Kurgan.
He was born on February 1, 1806 in the family estate of Ivanovsky, Tver province. His father was a naval officer. Following in his father's footsteps, Kornilov Jr. entered the Naval Cadet Corps in 1821 and graduated two years later, becoming a midshipman. Richly gifted by nature, an ardent and enthusiastic young man was burdened by coastal combat service in the Guards naval crew. He could not stand the routine of parade parades and drills at the end of the reign of Alexander I and was expelled from the fleet “for lack of vigor for the front.” In 1827, at the request of his father, he was allowed to return to the fleet. Kornilov was assigned to M. Lazarev’s ship Azov, which had just been built and arrived from Arkhangelsk, and from that time his real naval service began.
Kornilov became a participant in the famous Battle of Navarino against the Turkish-Egyptian fleet. In this battle (October 8, 1827), the crew of the Azov, carrying the flagship flag, showed the highest valor and was the first of the ships of the Russian fleet to earn the stern St. George flag. Lieutenant Nakhimov and midshipman Istomin fought next to Kornilov.
On October 20, 1853, Russia declared a state of war with Turkey. On the same day, Admiral Menshikov, appointed commander-in-chief of the naval and ground forces in the Crimea, sent Kornilov with a detachment of ships to reconnoitre the enemy with permission to “take and destroy Turkish warships wherever they are encountered.” Having reached the Bosphorus Strait and not finding the enemy, Kornilov sent two ships to reinforce Nakhimov’s squadron sailing along the Anatolian coast, sent the rest to Sevastopol, and he himself transferred to the steam frigate “Vladimir” and stayed at the Bosphorus. The next day, November 5, Vladimir discovered the armed Turkish ship Pervaz-Bahri and entered into battle with it. This was the first battle of steam ships in the history of naval art, and the crew of the Vladimir, led by Lieutenant Commander G. Butakov, won a convincing victory. The Turkish ship was captured and towed to Sevastopol, where, after repairs, it became part of the Black Sea Fleet under the name “Kornilov”.
At the council of flagships and commanders, which decided the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, Kornilov advocated for the ships to go to sea to fight the enemy for the last time. However, by a majority vote of the council members, it was decided to scuttle the fleet, excluding steam frigates, in Sevastopol Bay and thereby block the enemy’s breakthrough to the city from the sea. On September 2, 1854, the sinking of the sailing fleet began. The head of the city's defense directed all the guns and personnel of the lost ships to the bastions.
On the eve of the siege of Sevastopol, Kornilov said: “Let them first tell the troops the word of God, and then I will convey to them the word of the king.” And around the city there was a religious procession with banners, icons, chants and prayers. Only after this did the famous Kornilov call sound: “The sea is behind us, the enemy is ahead, remember: do not trust retreat!”
On September 13, the city was declared under siege, and Kornilov involved the population of Sevastopol in the construction of fortifications. The garrisons of the southern and northern sides were increased, from where the main enemy attacks were expected. On October 5, the enemy launched the first massive bombardment of the city from land and sea. On this day, while detouring the defensive formations of V.A. Kornilov was mortally wounded in the head on Malakhov Kurgan. “Defend Sevastopol,” were his last words. Nicholas I, in his letter to Kornilov’s widow, indicated: “Russia will not forget these words, and your children will pass on a name that is venerable in the history of the Russian fleet.”
After Kornilov’s death, a will was found in his casket addressed to his wife and children. “I bequeath to the children,” the father wrote, “to the boys, having once chosen to serve the sovereign, not to change it, but to make every effort to make it useful to society... For daughters to follow their mother in everything.” Vladimir Alekseevich was buried in the crypt of the Naval Cathedral of St. Vladimir next to his teacher, Admiral Lazarev. Soon Nakhimov and Istomin will take their place next to them.
Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov
Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov was born on June 23, 1802 on the Gorodok estate in the Smolensk province into the family of a nobleman, retired major Stepan Mikhailovich Nakhimov. Of the eleven children, five were boys, and all of them became sailors; at the same time, Pavel’s younger brother, Sergei, finished his service as a vice admiral, director of the Naval Cadet Corps, in which all five brothers studied in their youth. But Paul surpassed everyone with his naval glory.
He graduated from the Naval Corps and, among the best midshipmen on the brig Phoenix, participated in a sea voyage to the shores of Sweden and Denmark. Upon completion of the corps with the rank of midshipman, he was appointed to the 2nd naval crew of the St. Petersburg port.
Tirelessly training the crew of the Navarin and polishing his combat skills, Nakhimov skillfully led the ship during the action of Lazarev’s squadron in the blockade of the Dardanelles in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828 - 1829. For excellent service he was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 2nd degree. When the squadron returned to Kronstadt in May 1830, Rear Admiral Lazarev wrote in the certification of the Navarin commander: “An excellent sea captain who knows his business.”
In 1832, Pavel Stepanovich was appointed commander of the frigate Pallada, built at the Okhtenskaya shipyard, on which the squadron included Vice Admiral F. Bellingshausen he sailed in the Baltic. In 1834, at the request of Lazarev, then already the chief commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Nakhimov was transferred to Sevastopol. He was appointed commander of the battleship Silistria, and eleven years of his further service were spent on this battleship. Devoting all his strength to working with the crew, instilling in his subordinates a love of maritime affairs, Pavel Stepanovich made the Silistria an exemplary ship, and his name popular in the Black Sea Fleet. He put the naval training of the crew first, was strict and demanding of his subordinates, but had a kind heart, open to sympathy and manifestations of maritime brotherhood. Lazarev often flew his flag on the Silistria, setting the battleship as an example for the entire fleet.
Nakhimov’s military talents and naval skill were most clearly demonstrated during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Even on the eve of Russia's clash with the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition, the first squadron of the Black Sea Fleet under his command vigilantly cruised between Sevastopol and the Bosporus. In October 1853, Russia declared war on Turkey, and the squadron commander emphasized in his order: “If we meet an enemy superior to us in strength, I will attack him, being absolutely sure that each of us will do our part. In early November, Nakhimov learned that the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha, heading to the shores of the Caucasus, left the Bosphorus and, due to a storm, entered Sinop Bay. The commander of the Russian squadron had 8 ships and 720 guns at his disposal, while Osman Pasha had 16 ships with 510 guns protected by coastal batteries. Without waiting for the steam frigates, which Vice Admiral Kornilov led to reinforce the Russian squadron, Nakhimov decided to attack the enemy, relying, first of all, on the combat and moral qualities of the Russian sailors.
For the victory at Sinop Nicholas I awarded Vice Admiral Nakhimov the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, writing in a personal rescript: “By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.” Assessing the Battle of Sinop, Vice Admiral Kornilov wrote: “The battle is glorious, higher than Chesma and Navarino... Hurray, Nakhimov! Lazarev rejoices at his student!”
Convinced that Turkey was not able to wage a successful fight against Russia, England and France sent their fleets into the Black Sea. Commander-in-Chief A.S. Menshikov did not dare to prevent this, and the further course of events led to the epic Sevastopol defense of 1854 - 1855. In September 1854, Nakhimov had to agree with the decision of the council of flagships and commanders to scuttle the Black Sea squadron in Sevastopol Bay in order to make it difficult for the Anglo-French-Turkish fleet to enter it. Having moved from sea to land, Nakhimov voluntarily entered into subordination to Kornilov, who led the defense of Sevastopol. Seniority in age and superiority in military merits did not prevent Nakhimov, who recognized Kornilov’s intelligence and character, from maintaining good relations with him, based on a mutual ardent desire to defend the southern stronghold of Russia.
In the spring of 1855, the second and third assaults on Sevastopol were heroically repulsed. In March, Nicholas I granted Nakhimov the rank of admiral for military distinction. In May, the valiant naval commander was awarded a lifelong lease, but Pavel Stepanovich was annoyed: “What do I need it for? It would be better if they sent me bombs.”
On June 6, the enemy began active assault operations for the fourth time through massive bombings and attacks. On June 28, on the eve of the day of Saints Peter and Paul, Nakhimov once again went to the front bastions to support and inspire the defenders of the city. On Malakhov Kurgan, he visited the bastion where Kornilov died, despite warnings about strong rifle fire, he decided to climb the parapet banquet, and then a well-aimed enemy bullet hit him in the temple. Without regaining consciousness, Pavel Stepanovich died two days later.
Admiral Nakhimov was buried in Sevastopol in the Cathedral of St. Vladimir, next to the graves of Lazarev, Kornilov and Istomin. In front of a large crowd of people, his coffin was carried by admirals and generals, a guard of honor stood seventeen in a row from the army battalions and all the crews of the Black Sea Fleet, the beat of drums and a solemn prayer service sounded, and a cannon salute thundered. Pavel Stepanovich’s coffin was overshadowed by two admiral’s flags and a third, priceless one - the stern flag of the battleship Empress Maria, the flagship of the Sinop victory, torn by cannonballs.
Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov
Famous doctor, surgeon, participant in the defense of Sevastopol in 1855. N.I. Pirogov’s contribution to medicine and science is invaluable. He created anatomical atlases that were exemplary in accuracy. N.I. Pirogov was the first to come up with the idea of plastic surgery, put forward the idea of bone grafting, used anesthesia in military field surgery, was the first to apply a plaster cast in the field, and suggested the existence of pathogenic microorganisms that cause suppuration of wounds. Already at that time, N.I. Pirogov called for abandoning early amputations for gunshot wounds of the limbs with bone damage. The mask he designed for ether anesthesia is still used in medicine today. Pirogov was one of the founders of the sisters of mercy service. All his discoveries and achievements saved the lives of thousands of people. He refused to help anyone and devoted his entire life to boundless service to people.
Dasha Alexandrova (Sevastopol)
She was sixteen and a half when the Crimean War began. She lost her mother early, and her father, a sailor, defended Sevastopol. Dasha ran to the port every day, trying to find out something about her father. In the chaos that reigned around, this turned out to be impossible. Desperate, Dasha decided that she should try to help the fighters with at least something - and, along with everyone else, her father. She exchanged her cow - the only thing she had of value - for a decrepit horse and cart, got vinegar and old rags, and joined the wagon train with other women. Other women cooked and did laundry for the soldiers. And Dasha turned her cart into a dressing station.
When the position of the army worsened, many women left the convoy and Sevastopol and went north to safe areas. Dasha stayed. She found an old abandoned house, cleaned it out and turned it into a hospital. Then she unharnessed her horse from the cart and walked with it all day long to the front line and back, taking out two wounded for each “walk.”
In November 1953, in the battle of Sinop, sailor Lavrenty Mikhailov, her father, died. Dasha found out about this much later...
The rumor about a girl who takes the wounded from the battlefield and provides them with medical care spread throughout the warring Crimea. And soon Dasha had associates. True, these girls did not risk going to the front line, like Dasha, but they completely took upon themselves the dressing and care of the wounded.
And then Pirogov found Dasha, who embarrassed the girl with expressions of his sincere admiration and admiration for her feat.
Dasha Mikhailova and her assistants joined the “exaltation of the cross.” Learned professional wound treatment.
The emperor’s youngest sons, Nicholas and Mikhail, came to Crimea “to raise the spirit of the Russian army.” They also wrote to their father that in the fighting Sevastopol “a girl named Daria is taking care of the wounded and sick, and is doing exemplary efforts.” Nicholas I ordered her to receive a gold medal on the Vladimir ribbon with the inscription “For zeal” and 500 rubles in silver. According to their status, the gold medal “For Diligence” was awarded to those who already had three medals - silver. So we can assume that the Emperor highly appreciated Dasha’s feat.
The exact date of death and resting place of Daria Lavrentievna Mikhailova’s ashes have not yet been discovered by researchers.
Reasons for Russia's defeat
- Economic backwardness of Russia;
- Political isolation of Russia;
- Russia lacks a steam fleet;
- Poor supply of the army;
- Lack of railways.
Over three years, Russia lost 500 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The allies also suffered great losses: about 250 thousand killed, wounded and died from disease. As a result of the war, Russia lost its positions in the Middle East to France and England. Its prestige in the international arena was badly undermined. On March 13, 1856, a peace treaty was signed in Paris, under the terms of which the Black Sea was declared neutral, the Russian fleet was reduced to minimum and fortifications were destroyed. Similar demands were made to Turkey. In addition, Russia lost the mouth of the Danube and the southern part of Bessarabia, was supposed to return the Kars fortress, and also lost the right to patronize Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia.
The history of the Crimean War is not deprived of the attention of domestic and foreign historians. However, for some reasons, certain issues have not received adequate coverage. This also applies to the issue of the participation of the Turkish army in hostilities in Crimea. As a result, a stereotype has emerged that does not seem to fully correspond to historical reality. It was generated by the tendency of a negative attitude towards the entire Turkish contingent, prevailing in the Anglo-French historical and memoir literature and, partly, in the domestic literature. According to established opinion, the role of soldiers of the Ottoman Empire was limited to their use in engineering and earthworks and carrying cargo. At the same time, they managed to loot and died in thousands from typhoid and dysentery. Taking into account that all of the above actually took place, it should be noted that it would be a mistake to reduce the participation of Turkish soldiers in the fighting in Crimea solely to this.
Before talking about the military campaign, it is necessary to give a brief description of the army of the Ottoman Empire.
It entered the Eastern War after implementing a number of reforms that began back in the 30s. XIX century on the initiative of Sultan Mahmud II. Their goal was to bring the army out of its state of backwardness and bring it as close as possible to European standards. As a result of the reforms, the infantry and cavalry were organized according to the French system, and the artillery according to the Prussian system. The replenishment of troops was carried out according to a recruitment system through drawing lots, as well as voluntary enrollment. Only persons of the Muslim faith were subject to conscription, and from 1850, Christian subjects who had reached the age of 20-25 were also subject to conscription.
In organizational terms, the Turkish army was divided into active (nizam) and reserve (redif). The term of service in the Nizam was five years. After this, the soldier went on indefinite leave and spent the next seven years in Redif. In peacetime, Redif military personnel were required to gather for several weeks of training each year. During all this time they received the same rations and salary as in the active army. In the event of war, upon first conscription, they were obliged to report for service, thus forming a reserve army.
On the eve of the war, the active army of the Ottoman Empire consisted of six infantry corps (Guards, Constantinople, Rumelian, Anatolian, Arabian or Syrian and Iraqi), an engineer brigade, two fortress artillery regiments, one reserve artillery regiment and the so-called Ottoman Cossack regiment. The infantry corps included two divisions - infantry (consisting of 6 regiments) and cavalry (4 light cavalry regiments), as well as one artillery regiment. The infantry regiment consisted of four battalions: three line and one rifle, but the division of infantry into light and line was in its infancy.
Ali Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Eastern War era(lithographs by de Maison, 1856)
Omer Pasha,commander of the Turkish army in the Crimean War
Each battalion had 8 companies with an established strength of 104 people. In turn, the cavalry regiment consisted of 6 squadrons, 120 people per squadron. The artillery regiment included 11 batteries (all had 6 guns), of which 2 were light cavalry. In wartime, one mountain battery was formed for each regiment.
Such an organizational structure most often did not reflect the existing state of affairs. In fact, the difference between the number of personnel in service and those assigned according to the staff was often enormous. This was explained both by economic reasons and by the unsatisfactory organization of recruitment.
An integral part of the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire were auxiliary troops of vassal states, recruited in the Danube principalities, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
In addition, at the beginning of hostilities, units of volunteer bashi-bazouks joined the active army. These are irregular units, mainly cavalry, from central Anatolia, Syria and Kurdistan. They were distinguished by a lack of discipline, a passion for robbery and looting, and as such did not represent an independent force. In this regard, they could only be useful if they were with the regular army and performing secondary tasks.
Omer Pashaphoto by R. Fenton, 1855
The Turkish military uniform was generally copied from the uniform of Western armies. The infantry and artillerymen of the line regiments wore blue uniforms with yellow metal buttons and red piping on the collars. On the shoulder straps were the numbers of the regiments in accordance with the corps. The Redif units were dressed in blue cloth uniforms with the same accessories. The trousers had the same color as the uniforms, but the cloth was much coarser and of lower quality. In the warm season, soldiers wore white wide trousers. In accordance with European tradition, Turkish soldiers were provided with overcoats, which were made of light gray coarse material and were equipped with a hood. Each soldier was entitled to a backpack - made of thick tanned leather or oilcloth. The ammunition, black or white, was worn over the shoulder under shoulder straps. The equipment was completed with a bread or cracker bag, a tin pan and a fairly heavy cartridge bag. The main difference between the Turkish soldier was his headdress - a red fez with a dark silk tassel and a small copper plaque attached to the top of his head.
The active infantry was armed with a smoothbore rifle with a bayonet and a cleaver. Some units had rifled guns. Redif was armed with outdated weapons, including flintlocks. The active cavalry was armed with rifles, pistols, sabers and pikes, while the reserve cavalry was armed mainly with pikes and bladed weapons. Artillery met the requirements of modern times most of all. In Constantinople there was a foundry run by the British in excellent condition. Even F. Engels, for whom only the Prussian military organization was the absolute authority, was forced to note the qualities of the Turkish artillery: “The artillery was at a higher level, its field regiments were excellent; the soldiers seemed born for this type of service."
Turkish infantry
Sultan Abdulmecid 1 continued the transformation of his predecessor. Thanks to the reforms carried out, the army of the Ottoman Empire overcame its backwardness to a certain extent, but was never able to become on par with the armies of the largest European states. A serious lag was felt in the administrative structure, supply and material support of troops, and weapons. The personnel issue was extremely acute.
As for the Turkish soldier, his qualities most often received a positive assessment not only from the Russians, but also from the allies. As the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, E.I. Totleben, later wrote, “thanks to the courage, understanding and ability for war of the Turkish soldier, the regular army of the Turks in the last war showed many good qualities, and its actions have repeatedly deserved quite fair praise.” However, the quality of training of the officer corps of the Ottoman Empire did not stand up to criticism.
The military schools of Constantinople, far from being of the highest level, were unable to train a sufficient number of educated officers. Most often, European officers acted as teachers there. However, training was conducted with the help of an interpreter. The listeners themselves looked at their teachers with distrust and contempt, as if they were “guys.” So the education of those who graduated from military schools left much to be desired. The situation was even worse with the senior command staff, who were distinguished by an extremely low level of training, incompetence, and even a complete lack of military education. When appointing command positions, a system of favoritism was widespread, in which the main attention was paid to personal loyalty, family ties, etc.
It should be noted that service in the Turkish army was attractive to many European officers from France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, and there were also Americans. They can hardly be called mercenaries, since the prospect of regular payment was doubtful. Some wanted to take part in the wars in which the Ottoman Empire was almost constantly involved. Others, most often Poles and Hungarians, were driven by a sense of revenge, a desire to fight the Russian Empire they hated. A certain proportion of the foreigners were military advisers and instructors in the modern sense of the word. Undoubtedly, the presence of foreign professional officers had a positive effect on the Turkish army, but overall it could not solve the problem.
Tl. also played an important role in the fact that the military reforms did not achieve the expected result. civilizational factor. As contemporaries noted, “European institutions in general are difficult to reconcile with the main basis of the social structure and morals of the Turks - the Koran.” And the Turks’ distrust and contempt for the “guiaurs” extended “even to the organization of the army after it took on a European look.” Often the uniform itself aroused a feeling of protest in them. Thus, the baldric and sword belt, thrown over the shoulders and intersecting crosswise on the chest and back, were associated among the soldiers with the fact that they wanted to be baptized in this way, which “amazed the minds of all Mohammedans.”
On September 5, the first group of the Anglo-French squadron left Varna and headed towards the Crimea. It also included 9 Turkish ships, which housed the Turkish expeditionary force. On September 14, 1854, Allied troops landed unhindered near Yevpatoriya. Together with them, a Turkish division of 7 thousand infantry with 12 field and 9 siege guns comes ashore.
In the first battle on Crimean soil, Alminsky, Turkish units played a minor role, but not as much as is commonly believed. Many authors’ interpretation of the participation of the Turkish contingent in the Battle of Alma comes down to being in the rear and guarding the convoys. A closer look reveals that this was not entirely true.
Indeed, two battalions of Turkish infantry remained on the northern bank of the Alma River throughout the battle, protecting the rear of the landing forces. The main mass
6 battalions, in accordance with the plan of the allied command, were assigned to the 2nd French division of General Vosquet and “... crossed the river behind the Bois brigade...”. Having advanced almost two kilometers, the Turks reached the flank of the Russian position and forced the 2nd battalion of the Minsk regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Rakovich, to retreat. During the subsequent battle, they fought both with this battalion and with the 4th battalion of the same regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, which later approached it. They gradually pushed them back, interacting with the French in the Ulukkul Valley. Armed primarily with smooth-bore rifles, the Turks relentlessly pursued these two battalions throughout the battle, engaging in intense firefight with them. The most fierce battle was near the village of Adzhi-Bulat, where the Russians suffered the greatest losses.
After Alma, having decided to begin the siege of Sevastopol, the allies divided their army into two corps: siege and observation. All the hardships of the siege fell on the shoulders of the British and French. The Turkish forces, consisting of twelve battalions, came under direct subordination to the French commander-in-chief and were placed in reserve with the intention of being used depending on the circumstances. Throughout the months of the siege, English and French batteries bombarded the city almost daily, and only “on major holidays did the French put the Turks in their places, and this did not give us a moment of peace.”
Indeed, for the first time the Turks crossed bayonets with the Russians only near Balaklava.
Balaclava
In the garrison of Balaklava itself and on the fortifications covering it there were about 3,350 British and 1 thousand Turks. Given the traditional tenacity of Turkish soldiers in defense, they were placed in four forward redoubts near the village of Kadikoy. Each redoubt, garrisoned by 250 Turkish soldiers, was assigned an English artilleryman. Early in the morning of October 25, Redoubt No. 1 was suddenly attacked by the Russians. The Turks were taken by surprise and did not have time to prepare for defense. After a short artillery bombardment, the Azov Regiment quickly approached and burst inside the redoubt. The Turkish soldiers defended stubbornly, but, despite their resistance, the Azov men captured the fortification with bayonets, cutting off most of its defenders in a fierce battle.
Following this, the Ukrainian Jaeger Regiment launched an attack on the second and third redoubts. At the same time, the Odessa Jaeger Regiment moved to redoubt No. 4. This time it did not come to hand-to-hand combat. Frightened by such a fleeting and bloody outcome of the struggle for the first redoubt, the Turks abandoned their fortifications without a fight and, pursued for some time by the Cossacks, hastily retreated to Kadykoy. Those of them who wanted to find salvation in Balaklava were met with fire and bayonets from British soldiers. In total, 11 guns, as well as gunpowder, tents and entrenching tools, became Russian trophies.
Meanwhile, the British began hastily preparing for defense. Sending for reinforcements, Brigadier Colin Campbell lined up the 93rd Scottish Regiment in front of Kadikoy. Several Turkish soldiers joined his right flank, but after an attack by four squadrons of hussars of the Saxe-Weimar (Ingria) regiment, they mostly fled.
The further development of events, which took such a tragic turn for the British army, took place without the participation of Turkish soldiers. Their behavior in this battle is assessed differently. Assessments of the British are, as a rule, extremely harsh and derogatory. The memoirs and notes of the English participants are full of accusations of the Turks of cowardice, unwillingness to fight, and looting. As one of the English newspapers of that time wrote, “when the Russians took the redoubts on the Balaklava road, the Turks rushed into Balaklava itself, but were immediately driven out of there with contempt. After this they began to plunder the tents of the Scots Guards while the latter were fighting. The Turks also took off boots and dresses without distinction from the British and Russian killed."
The assessments of Russian researchers and participants in the events are more balanced. In particular, they are quite skeptical about the claims of the British side that one of the reasons for the “cowardly behavior of the Turks” and the subsequent defeat of the English light cavalry is the desertion from Crimea of the commander of the Turkish troops, Suleiman Pasha, and his adjutant. In this regard, it is noted that “all actions in Crimea are controlled by the French and English commanders-in-chief, and that Turkish generals play a very unenviable role in this.” Regarding the Balaklava case, it is indicated that the first redoubt “was defended as much as possible, and that if the Russians took it so quickly, then it was not the Turks who were to blame for this, but the swift, unstoppable onslaught of the brave Azov regiment.”
In total, the losses of the Turkish army on this day amounted to up to one and a half thousand people killed and seriously wounded. Of these, 170 people died during the defense of the first redoubt.
Evpatoria
The main place of concentration of Turkish troops in Crimea was Yevpatoria, and it was here that they showed themselves most of all. Speaking about military operations near this city, researchers often limit themselves to the story of a failed assault under the leadership of General Khrulev. Meanwhile, from mid-October 1854 to the end of September 1855, almost the entire period of the “Sevastopol suffering”, Evpatoria was under blockade, but already by Russian troops. This was caused by the need to cover the communication of the Sevastopol garrison with the Empire.
Starting from the occupation of Yevpatoria by the allies and up to the event of February 17, the number of the city garrison was constantly changing. The fighting boiled down mainly to almost daily skirmishes at outposts and skirmishes with the enemy leaving the city. Most often, such exits were due to the need to protect the herds that belonged to the Crimean Tatars, who flocked in large numbers to Yevpatoria at the call of the Turkish commandant of the city, as well as fleeing from the Cossacks.
Until November 1854, Evpatoria was covered with a stone wall. Ahead of it were several batteries armed with small-caliber guns. But after the battle of Inkerman, the allies were constantly strengthening fortifications. As a result, by the day of the assault, the city was almost completely surrounded by an earthen rampart with a deep and wide ditch in front. The side of the city facing Rotten Lake was protected by a stone wall instead of an earthen fence. Some houses were put in a defensive position and surrounded by parapets. In the city itself, at the exit of the main street, a new battery was built. All city fortifications were armed with a total of 34 guns, mostly naval ones, and five rocket launchers. In addition, the city was covered from the sea by fire from Allied ships in the roadstead.
In January 1855, Turkish troops received new reinforcements. Under the command of Omer Pasha, two Turkish and one Egyptian divisions, two cavalry squadrons and two field batteries with a total of 21,600 people landed in Yevpatoria. In addition, the city contained the former Turkish garrison, up to a thousand armed Crimean Tatars, and a small number of French and British. To this we must add a team of 276 sailors from the French ship Henry IV, which was aground and was turned into a battery.
Since the Allies did not take any offensive actions, the Russian command decided to attack Yevpatoria. On the eve of the assault, one uhlan (Pole) crossed over from the location of the Russian troops to the enemy. It was obvious that the defector would tell the Allies everything he knew about the fighting forces and intentions of the Russians. Nevertheless, limiting themselves to some changes in the disposition, they decided not to postpone the assault.
All night before the assault, the besieged prepared to repel the attack. The forces of the garrison repaired and strengthened the fortifications. In addition, a large number of local residents were involved in the work. As a result, already during the attack, the Russians discovered that the fortifications had changed significantly since the last reconnaissance.
The Allies thoroughly prepared to repel the attack. Most of the fortifications were occupied by Turkish troops. The regiment of Selim Pasha's Egyptian division with a field battery occupied a separate fortification in front of the mills. All guns and rocket launchers were placed in batteries. Their servants were French and Egyptians.
On February 17, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at dawn, the first shot was fired towards the Russian troops, followed by cannonade and rifle fire.
Under the cover of cannonade at 8 o'clock in the morning, the first to rush to the city fortifications was a battalion of Greek volunteers and dismounted Cossacks consisting of three hundred of the 61st and one of the 55th regiments. Having run to the closest distance to them, they lay down behind the walls of the cemetery and in quarry pits at a distance of about 100 steps from the fortifications, from where they opened well-aimed rifle fire.
By order of General Khrulev, 24 battery and 76 light guns were put into action. Most of them were placed in a row opposite the Evpatoria fortifications, thanks to which a colossal density of fire was achieved.
In the artillery duel that began, the Russians were confronted by about 30 large-caliber guns, several field guns and 5 rocket launchers. In addition, the city’s defenders were supported by artillery from ships stationed in the Yevpatoria roadstead. In general, Turkish artillery had superiority in calibers. Nevertheless, the Russian artillery acted quite successfully, silencing many of the enemy guns. Its fire blew up five charging boxes or cellars, which caused some confusion among the Turkish troops occupying the forward fortifications. The success of our artillery was facilitated by the artillery units, who took positions in the recesses between the guns and fired accurately at the Turkish artillerymen. Taking advantage of the weakening of enemy fire, General Khrulev at 9 o'clock in the morning ordered the left column to attempt an assault. By this time, both artillery and weapons fire from the fortifications had weakened significantly. This circumstance made it possible to move our artillery a little further forward, setting up opposite the enemy redoubts. At a distance of about 150 fathoms from the city fortifications, grapeshot fire was opened on them.
At this time, the Turks attempted a sortie. Under the cover of rifle guns and artillery fire from the steamships, their infantry and cavalry set out from the city. Horse-light battery No. 20, as well as the Novoarkhangelsk Uhlan Regiment and Cossacks, were advanced to meet the enemy who had come out to fire grapeshot. The Turks did not dare to attack and retreated to their previous positions.
Russian troops were in full readiness to begin the assault. In order to further weaken the resistance of the defenders in the attack area, the light 4th battery of the 11th artillery brigade and a light cavalry battery were brought up to a distance of about 100 fathoms from the city fence. From this distance grapeshot fire was opened again.
Under the cover of artillery fire, the 3rd and 4th battalions of the Azov Infantry Regiment, led by Major General Ogarev, launched an assault. To their left followed a battalion of Greek volunteers, reinforced by a battalion of dismounted dragoons.
The attackers were met with dense rifle fire and grapeshot from the fortifications and two steamships. Our two batteries, in order not to hit their own, were forced to stop firing. Already at the beginning of the attack, the Azovites suffered significant losses in officers and lower ranks. They managed to approach the ditch itself, near which they were forced to stop. The ditch was full of water, and the assault ladders were short. It became obvious that continuing the attack would entail serious losses. And even if the attackers had broken into Yevpatoria, weakened by the casualties they had suffered, they would not have been able to hold out in the city. General Khrulev gave the order to retreat.
These photographs, taken by the English photographer R. Fenton in 1855, depict the commander of the Turkish troops in Crimea, General Omer Pasha.
The withdrawal of the Russian right and middle columns took place in the absence of opposition from the enemy. The Turks sent a force of three cavalry squadrons and an infantry battalion to pursue the left column. To repel the attack, the 1st and 2nd Azov battalions, covering the withdrawal of the main forces of the column, formed a square. The 4th Battery positioned itself in the intervals between the battalions, preparing to meet the enemy with grapeshot. The Turkish cavalrymen approached within gunshot and opened fire, however, completely harmless. But they did not dare to go on the attack further. As for the Turkish infantry battalion, having left the fortifications, it scattered across the battlefield, finishing off the wounded whom the Russians did not have time to pick up during the retreat. They were joined by a number of local residents from among the Crimean Tatars. In fairness, it should be said that when two of the Turkish soldiers then approached Omer Pasha, holding severed heads in their hands, they were immediately arrested and flogged, as a warning to the rest of the army. However, the reputation-damaging incident was widely publicized.
As soon as the Turkish squadrons returned to the city, General Khrulev ordered the retreat to continue, which was carried out under fire from steamboats and several guns from the city fence. By 11 o'clock in the morning there was a lull.
During the assault on Yevpatoria, Russian losses amounted to 168 people killed and about 600 wounded. As for the losses of the defenders, the numbers here vary. According to various sources, the Turks lost from 87 to 114 people killed and up to 300 wounded. Among the dead was the commander of the Egyptian division, Selim Pasha; Egyptian Colonel Rustem Bey and Turkish Colonel Alibey were mortally wounded. In addition, several French and 13 Crimean Tatars who watched the battle were killed. It can be assumed that the Allies deliberately underestimated their casualty figures, since Russian artillery fired concentrated fire at close range.
The assault on Evpatoria is given little space in historical works. At the same time, this was not an ordinary combat episode. For the allies, possession of the city meant that they could continue the siege of Sevastopol without hindrance. The Russians, in turn, could not concentrate all their forces near Sevastopol due to the threat of an allied attack from Yevpatoria in order to cut off communications with the Empire. As for the Turks, “their army regained respect and to some extent restored its reputation.” After this, many French and English people changed their attitude towards her for the better. However, in the future the Allied high command preferred to refuse to involve Turkish units in hostilities
On February 21, a small skirmish occurred. Turkish cavalry with a force of 8 squadrons left the city and attacked Russian outposts. The attack was carried out immediately after the shift, so the replaced units did not have time to move far from the outposts. Hearing a firefight ensuing, they returned and helped repel the attack, capturing four Turkish cavalrymen in the process.
In March 1855, the Evpatoria garrison was replenished with new units arriving from Turkey and Egypt. According to information received from defectors, by this time there were up to 50 thousand Turkish soldiers in the city, including 43 thousand infantry, 3.5 thousand cavalry and 3 thousand artillery.
After the fall of Sevastopol, the importance of Evpatoria increased, since from here the allies could act on the communication of Russian troops with the mainland. Until September, the fighting near Yevpatoria was limited to small skirmishes and skirmishes at outposts. On September 9, the allies launched a serious attack against the Russian detachment besieging the city. The attack was carried out from two directions. One column with a force of 8 infantry battalions with 4 guns went towards Sak. Being under the cover of steamers, she remained in sight of the Russian vanguard until the evening, without ever entering into battle. The main forces moved in a northern direction against the detachment of General Korf. Here the Russians were opposed by 3 regiments of French infantry and 22 battalions of Turks and Egyptians, a Turkish cavalry division, 500 bashi-bazouks and several field batteries. Overall command was exercised by the French General d'Allonville.
As a result of a series of mistakes, General Korf's detachment was suddenly attacked. A fierce battle ensued between the lancers of the regiment of Grand Duchess Catherine Mikhailovna and the Turkish cavalrymen, who were supported by the bashi-bazouks. At the same time, the Turks rushed at the Russian field guns. The artillerymen managed to fire only one shot each. Following this, the servants, horses and the traces of three guns were chopped up. By launching a counterattack, the Uhlan division recaptured the guns, but due to the lack of mounts, horses and harnesses, it could not take them away. The Russians were forced to begin a retreat. Meanwhile, the Turks brought all their cavalry into action and continued the pursuit, accompanied by fierce hand-to-hand fighting. As a result, the Russians lost 3 more guns and 12 ammunition boxes. Our losses turned out to be very significant: 38 lower ranks were killed, 3 chief officers and 32 lower ranks were wounded, 1 chief officer and 153 lower ranks were captured. The losses of the Allies are unknown, but judging by the ferocity of the battle, we can assume that they were also great.
Subsequently, until November, attacks from Evpatoria by the Turks and French were repeated several times. They boiled down mainly to the destruction of surrounding villages and skirmishes with Russian outposts.
Expedition to the East of Crimea
Another place in Crimea “where the Turkish soldier set foot” was Kerch. In order to capture the city, a joint allied expedition was organized to the east of Crimea. The expeditionary force under the command of the English General Brown consisted of the French division of General d'Otmar numbering 7 thousand people with 18 guns, Cameron's English brigade with 6 guns and a half-squadron of hussars numbering 3 thousand people, as well as the Turkish detachment of Reshid- Pasha, numbering 6 thousand soldiers.
On May 24, 1855, the allied fleet, having previously shelled the shore, landed troops and captured Kerch. Due to a lack of forces and weak coastal artillery, practically no resistance was offered to him. The fleet went on a raid across the Sea of Azov, shelling and ravaging coastal cities. The landing troops, having not met the enemy and being idle, indulged in robbery and looting. The city was completely plundered. Churches were desecrated, ancient mounds and active cemeteries were dug up in search of treasures. Everyone was gripped by the excitement of unbridled robbery and violence - the Turks, the British, the French. In order to somehow protect the local residents, the commander of the French detachment ordered the organization of a patrol service. Sometimes, in order to prevent outrages, friendly fire was opened. There were even more serious incidents. So, while “carrying out excavations” in one of the city cemeteries, a group of Turkish soldiers suddenly began shooting at a picket of the 71st Scottish Regiment passing by. The Scots responded with friendly fire, killing one Turkish officer. The commanders of the units participating in the skirmish had to sort it out, and in rather harsh statements.
By the beginning of June, the allied fleet left the Sea of Azov. Leaving one English and French regiment in Kerch, as well as the entire Turkish detachment, General Brown put the remaining troops on ships and returned to Sevastopol.
This, perhaps, can complete the review of the actions of Turkish troops in Crimea. Of course, there were other battles and clashes in which Turkish soldiers were involved. However, their participation was so insignificant that it hardly makes sense to dwell on them. For example, in the battle on the Black River, the Turkish army consisted of 17 battalions, 1 squadron, 36 guns (9,950 people in total). However, the brunt of the battle fell on the British and French, while the Turks lost only 7 people wounded.
After the conclusion of peace and until the evacuation, Turkish troops were stationed mainly in Yevpatoria and Kerch, with a small part near Sevastopol.
Troop position
The story about the actions of the Turkish army in the Crimean campaign will be incomplete without mentioning the conditions in which Turkish soldiers lived and fought. Undoubtedly, they had the hardest time as part of the Allied Expeditionary Force. The organization of supplies in the Turkish army was at an extremely low level, so the French commissary undertook to supply it. And if in the warm season living conditions were relatively normal, in the winter from 1854 to 1855. can be described in one word - disaster. There was a shortage of everything - food, uniforms, shoes, medical care, tents. Muslim hospitals, according to an eyewitness, were more like cemeteries than places built to alleviate suffering. As a result, during the most difficult winter period, the decline in the ranks of the Turkish army sometimes reached 300 people per day. The Western press, letters and diaries of war participants were full of descriptions of the suffering that befell Turkish soldiers.
Thus, one of the letters published in the Momming Chronicle said: “...the unfortunate Turkish soldiers suffer cruelly from typhus. The houses in Balaklava are filled with dead and dying Turks, deprived of all medical benefits and all means. They help each other with the zeal that is the hallmark of the Turkish character.
Our doctors are too busy with their sick and wounded Russians; they don’t have time to help the Turks.” The Times newspaper regularly published letters from Crimea. In November 1854, lines like these could often be read on its pages: “Turkish soldiers are dying like flies from bloody diarrhea, fever, typhus, etc. They have no paramedics, and our surgeons are not sufficient even for the needs of our own army. The Turks are very kind to their sick; often one encounters on the road long lines of people carrying sick or dying people on their backs, who are laid up in Balaclava, in a miserable barn that serves as their hospital, where they almost always die.”
The Allied reports most often did not indicate Turkish losses. The relevant departments of the Turkish army also, apparently, did not keep strict statistics. However, when assessing the losses of Turkish troops in Crimea, it is customary to proceed from the figure of 40 thousand dead.
Regarding the reasons for the insignificant participation of Turkish troops in the Crimean campaign, their poor effectiveness and the plight in which they found themselves, it seems appropriate to highlight the following aspects.
From the very beginning it was obvious that the Ottoman Empire was not considered by London and Paris as an equal participant in the coalition. The English historian Lord Kinross noted: “it was a war waged against Russia by Britain and France, and Turkey, which gave rise to it and could ultimately benefit from it, was assigned only a minor military role.”
But even militarily, the Turks were not able to appear as the formidable force that they were in the 16th - 17th centuries. Despite the transformations, the army of Sultan Abdul-Mejid was seriously inferior in its characteristics to the armies of advanced European states, as mentioned earlier. Moreover, to help the allies, the Turkish commander-in-chief Omer Pasha sent not the best units to the Crimea. The most combat-ready units remained to protect the borders of the Ottoman Empire itself - on the Danube and in the Caucasus. In a letter from Balaklava in October 1854, a British officer complains: “Instead of sending Omer Pasha’s veterans to the Crimea, the Turkish government sent us 8 thousand recruits of the latest batch, taken from barbers, tailors and petty shopkeepers.”
The low morale of Turkish military personnel did not contribute to military feats. And this is explained not only by the harsh weather conditions in which the allied troops had to live and fight. After all, snow and frost were nothing new to the Ottomans. Winters in the Balkans and the Caucasus are no milder than in Crimea. Already the war of 1877-1878. demonstrated the ability of Turkish soldiers to fight in frost and snowstorm. It was hard for everyone in Crimea, but, in addition to the weather, the attitude of the allies towards them had a depressing effect on the Turkish soldiers. “It was customary to feed the Turks very little, beat them to death for infractions, not allow them to communicate, and not even seat Turkish officers at the table with them.” And if the French helped the Turks as much as they could, they nevertheless did not consider them their colleagues, comrades in arms. The British used them everywhere for excavation work, and, due to the lack of pack animals, for transporting shells and various cargoes.
Taking into account the above, one can take a different look at the behavior of Turkish soldiers at the beginning of the Battle of Balaklava. Firstly, the allegations, mainly from the British, about the widespread cowardice and incapacity of the Turks are controversial. After all, this is a good way to shift the blame for the subsequent unsuccessful course of the battle and the heavy losses of the light cavalry. The memories of the Russian participants testify to a fierce hand-to-hand fight for the first redoubt. And then, how serious were the motives for the Turkish soldiers to display heroism? Behind is Balaclava, occupied by the British, who are so unkind to them. By this time, there were not yet numerous wounded and sick compatriots, protecting whom one could “live with bones.”
Factors that had a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Ottoman army include its national heterogeneity. The infantry was organized on an ethnic basis and therefore varied greatly in its qualities. The Turks themselves, especially those from the central regions of Anatolia, were good and fearless soldiers. They hated the Russians, were fanatical and perceived this war as jihad. In terms of combat and moral qualities, the Egyptians can be brought closer to them. The rest, especially the Tunisians, “accustomed to a different, fiery sky,” were completely unprepared for the war in Crimea. It should also be added that soldiers drafted from various parts of the vast Ottoman Empire often themselves hated the Turks.
In religious terms, the Turkish army in Crimea was overwhelmingly represented by Muslims. However, there is reason to believe that it also included a certain percentage of Christians, which also did not contribute to the strengthening of military brotherhood. Thus, in the memoirs of one of the participants in the defense of Sevastopol, who visited the Turkish camp after the announcement of the truce, it is written: “... When I was leaving the camp, 3 or 4 Turks ran up to me, and, baring their chests, pointed to a small copper cross hanging on it. A Frenchman who happened to immediately explain that the Turks wanted to say by this that they, too, are Christians... It is remarkable that at this scene the other Turks, who were not Christians, remained completely indifferent to the expressions that their Christian comrades showed me.”
Despite the significant backwardness and numerous vices that were eating away at the army from within, it would be wrong to regard the Turkish troops in the Eastern War in general, and the Crimean expedition in particular, as demoralized and incompetent masses. Indeed, Turkish soldiers not only did not cover themselves with glory, but often found themselves in an unenviable and even pitiful position. However, this did not stop a British officer observing the Romanian campaign of 1853 from writing: “The Turks are soldiers to the roots of their hair... if they were controlled and armed as they should be, they could make Europe tremble again.”
ABOUT.Shkedya(Simferopol)
Military history magazineMilitaryCrimea, No. 1, 2005
List of sources used
1. Totleben E.I. Description of the defense of Sevastopol. Part 1.-SPb, 1863. -P.25.
2. Marx K., Engels F. Works. T.11. - M., 1958. - P. 493.
3. Totleben E.I. Description of the defense of Sevastopol. Part 1. - St. Petersburg, 1863. -P.26.
4. Ibid., p. 26.
5. Collection of news relating to the present war. Book 14.- St. Petersburg, 1855.-C67.
6. Prikhodkin F.I. Almin with some battle/Military collection. -1870 -S. 9.
7. Collection of manuscripts presented to His Imperial Highness the Sovereign Heir Tsarevich about the defense of Sevastopol by the Sevastopol residents. T.1. - St. Petersburg, 1872. - P.30.
8. Materials for the history of the Crimean War and the defense of Sevastopol. -SPb, 1872.-P.91.
9. Ibid., p. 203.
10. Ibid., p. 201.
11. www.suitel01.com John Barham, Bono, Johnnu Turk.
12. www.suitel01.com John Barham, Turkish Army in 1854.
13. Totleben E.I. Description of the defense of Sevastopol. Book 2. Part 2. - St. Petersburg, 1872.-P.284.
14. Materials for the history of the Crimean War and the defense of Sevastopol, St. Petersburg, 1872.-P.292.
15. Ibid., p. 293.
16. Lord Kinross. The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire. - M.1989- P.539.
17. Collection of news relating to the present war. Book 21. - SP6.1855.-P.409.
18. Tarle E.V. Crimean War. T. 2. - M., 2003. - P. 169.
19. Tarasenko-Otryshkova N.I. A visit to the Allied armies in the Crimea and calculation of the losses in people and money suffered by France, England and Piedmont in their current war against Russia.-SPb, 1857.-P. 4.
20. www.suite 101.com John Barham, Tukish Army in 1854
LANDING OF THE ALLIES IN THE CRIMEA. ALMA
The Allies made a special bet on Sevastopol and Crimea, as the place of the main deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, one of the main counterweights to their global strategic plans. English newspapers, feeding on facts and their assessments from government circles, predicted: “The capture of Sevastopol and the occupation of Crimea will cover all the costs of the war and provide us with favorable peace conditions.” Moreover, due to their overwhelming military-technical superiority, the allies counted on quick success.
The newspapers wrote: “In a few weeks, Russia will lose the fruits of monetary expenditures, gigantic labors, and enormous sacrifices of more than one generation. The fortresses that she erected at great cost... will be razed to the ground, blown up and destroyed by the fire of the united squadrons of France and England.”
Not only the newspapers, but also the Allied military leaders were filled with such rosy hopes. “In 10 days, the keys to Sevastopol will be in our hands!” - reported one of the commanders of the coalition forces, French Marshal A. Saint-Arnaud.
Biography
Saint-Arnaud Armand-Jacques-Leroy (08/20/1796–09/29/1854)
In 1820, with the rank of lieutenant, he entered military service in the detachment of bodyguards of Louis XVIII, but was soon dismissed for bad behavior at the request of his own company.
Saint-Arnaud tried to seek his fortune in England, then in France, trying to get a job as an actor on the stage under the name Floriville, and finally came to Greece for this purpose, but he suffered failures everywhere.
In 1827, with great difficulty, Arno's relatives managed to reinstate him in the army. But when the regiment in which he was supposed to serve was assigned to the island of Guadeloupe off the coast of America, Arno did not show up. He was persecuted as a deserter and showed up only after the July Revolution of 1830, posing as a victim of his liberal beliefs.
He was assigned as an officer in the 64th Regiment. In 1836, at his own request, Saint-Arnaud was transferred to the Algerian Foreign Legion. Having proven himself a brave soldier in Africa, he was promoted to captain in 1837 and, having received a battalion, returned to France to serve in the Metz garrison. He later returned to Africa, where he served under the command of General Coveniac.
In 1842, Saint-Arnaud was already a lieutenant colonel of the 53rd regiment, and in 1844.- colonel and commander of the Orleansville subdivision. In 1847, for the capture of an Arab elder, he was promoted to brigadier general.
In 1848, Saint-Arnaud was on vacation in Paris when the revolution began in February. He was appointed commander of the brigade, with which he stormed the barricades on Richelieu Street, and then occupied the police prefecture. However, during the retreat of government troops, Saint-Arnaud was captured by a crowd, but was soon released and returned to Africa.
Here he commanded the Mostaganem subdivision, then- Algerian, and in 1850 took command of the Constantine province. In 1851, Saint-Arnaud was appointed chief of the expedition to Lesser Kabylia and, having successfully completed it, was promoted to division general. Subsequently, Saint-Arnaud was summoned to Paris and appointed commander of the 2nd Infantry Division of the Paris Army. On October 26, 1851, Prince-President Auy Napoleon Bonaparte appointed Saint-Arnaud Minister of War, choosing him as his instrument, as a man ready for anything.
Saint-Arnaud prepared a coup d'etat for Louis Napoleon on December 2, 1851, and exactly a year after the restoration of the empire he was made marshal of France, then the emperor's chief of horsemen.
When France formed an alliance with the Porte against Russia, Saint-Arnaud was given overall command of the French Army of the East. He commanded it at the very beginning of hostilities in the Crimea, but on September 26, 1854, due to completely disturbed health, he transferred command of the troops to General Canrobert and left the army. On September 29, 1854, while moving to Constantinople, Saint-Arnaud died.
The main strategic goal of the troops of the anti-Russian coalition was now the capture of Sevastopol and the destruction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The further military-political plans of the allies in the Black Sea basin depended on the solution of these tasks.
At the beginning of September 1854, the Allied fleet approached the Crimean shores. In total, about 400 pennants arrived - 89 warships and over 300 transport ships. They carried a 62,000-strong coalition army for the invasion of Crimea. French, British and Turkish soldiers and officers were preparing to land on the shore.
Having examined the fortifications of the coastal side of Sevastopol from ships, the Anglo-French command did not dare to land here. Allied ships followed north to Evpatoria. The landing troops captured the city. The main forces of the fleet moved slightly south of Evpatoria, where the allied army began to land on the shore on September 2, 1854. The coalition army was commanded by the French Marshal A. Saint-Arnaud and the English General F. Raglan.
Biography
Raglan Fitzroy James Patrick
Henry Somerset
(1788–1855)
The youngest son of the Duke of Beaufort, Raglan, from his youth connected his fate with military service, which he began in 1804. He soon found himself in Spain, where British troops under the command of Duke A. Wellington fought against Napoleon. After some time, Raglan became the Duke's aide-de-camp. In 1809, Wellington appointed him head of his military chancellery. However, Raglan distinguished himself not only in clerical work. On the battlefield, he proved himself to be a fearless and skillful commander. Thus, he received another rank and award during the assault on Badajoz, being the first to break into a hole in the fortifications made by artillery. Raglan also distinguished himself in the Battle of Waterloo, the last battle with Napoleon. During the battle he was seriously wounded, as a result of which he lost his right arm.
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars and his recovery, Raglan remained under the Duke of Wellington, who became a leading politician in England. For many years, Raglan served as Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. He accompanied the Duke on a number of his diplomatic trips, including being with him at the Congress of Vienna. Together with Wellington, he also participated in the Verona Congress of the Holy Alliance, and in 1826 he visited St. Petersburg, where the Duke signed the Russian-British declaration on the Greek issue. Subsequently, Raglan was for some time a member of the House of Commons of the British Parliament.
The Duke of Wellington died in 1852. Raglan received the rank of Feldzeichmeister General and was elevated to the peerage with the title of Lord. In 1854 he was appointed commander of British troops in Crimea. He experienced the most difficult period of the siege of Sevastopol for the allies. However, Raglan was not destined to learn about the outcome of this siege. Died from cholera (according to other sources - out of chagrin) ten days after the unsuccessful assault on Sevastopol on July 6 (18), 1855.
These events were still very far away. The Allies were confident of their early success. After all, their forces significantly exceeded those of the enemy. Nicholas I appointed Prince A.S. as commander of the Russian military and ground forces in Crimea. Menshikov, Under his command, the ground forces at that moment numbered 37.5 thousand people. The forces of the Black Sea Fleet were also subordinate to him (about 20 thousand naval crews on ships and about 5 thousand on the shore).
The first events of the confrontation that unfolded on the peninsula seemed to confirm the hopes of the allies. First of all, they brilliantly succeeded in the landing operation, which is always considered a complex and dangerous matter. It was then that for the first time those qualities of Menshikov the military leader were clearly revealed, which subsequently caused first surprise, then indignation, and even later accusations against him.
Menshikov positioned his troops on the southern left bank of the Alma River, which flowed into the Black Sea near Sevastopol. One of the officers, a participant in the events, wrote: “The landing of the enemy began without any hindrance on our part! Two or three regiments with artillery could have given a good beating to the enemy landing at sea!” But ours looked at this landing with indifference, and did not even make any order to stop the transportation of goods across Crimea! But the enemy, the very next day after the landing, recaptured 400 pairs of oxen carrying flour and alcohol to Sevastopol!..” Of course, the reason for the Russian commander’s indecisiveness was, first of all, the numerical superiority of the enemy. As a result, the landing of allied troops in Crimea was extremely successful for them.
On September 8 (20), the first battle took place between Russian troops (33 thousand people with 96 guns) under the command of Menshikov and the combined forces of the British, French and Turks (55 thousand people with 112 guns) on the Alma River. The Russian left flank was attacked by the French, the right - by the British. The allied fleet also fired on the left flank. Superiority in forces and weapons, as well as gross mistakes of the Russian command, led to the fact that the attempt to stop the Allied advance failed.
On the left flank by the sea, the Russians occupied a very convenient position on the heights to the left of the Sevastopol road. General Kiryakov, who was placed there at the head of the Russian troops by Menshikov, declared that with one battalion he would “throw his hats at the enemy” (contemporaries believed that it was this general who put this dubious expression into circulation in the Crimean War). However, at the very beginning of the battle, Kiryakov unexpectedly and completely without reason left his positions, which were soon occupied by the French. In other directions, the Russians launched counterattacks, but the French, entrenched on the heights, could shoot Russians from long distances with cannons and rifled rifles with impunity. The troops, who held back the enemy's onslaught in other places for about 7 o'clock, were finally forced to retreat on the orders of Menshikov along the Sevastopol road to the city. The Allies lost about 4.5 thousand people in the Battle of Alma, the Russians - about 6 thousand.
The lost battle on Alma opened the way for the enemy to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet.
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The departure of the Russians could have been predicted as early as mid-July. Actions in Moldova and Bessarabia, together with the Austrians and Turks, represented a goal that was of no interest to England at all, and difficult to achieve due to the lack of sufficient convoys. England sought, first of all, to consolidate its power at sea and to damage Russia's naval power. The latter's base on the Black Sea was Sevastopol. The idea of landing in Crimea and capturing Sevastopol, which had been floating around since the beginning of the war, began to take shape on July 18; On August 8, the decision was finally made.
Only on September 7, the English, French, and Turkish squadrons were able to sail to Crimea. The allied landing force consisted of 23 thousand French, 7 thousand Turks, 27 thousand British. Due to the lack of transport, one French infantry division remained in Varna, which could only be transported in the second place, and one cavalry. division. The Turkish division was included in the landing mainly for political reasons. The bulk of the population of Crimea in 1854 were 257 thousand Muslim Tatars, in whose eyes the Turks represented a well-known religious and political authority. And indeed, during the Allies’ stay in Crimea, up to 30 thousand Tatars went over to their side, which facilitated food supply, reconnaissance and provided the Allies with labor for rear work. In addition, the Turks under the Allies were intended to play the role of white blacks and were divided between the British and the French. It was especially bad for the English Turks, who were not fed by their owners and who soon died out.
French troops were transported on 55 military and 17 commercial ships; Turkish division - on 9 Turkish battleships; British troops - on 150 transports; on the English squadron, which consisted of 10 battleships and 15 frigates, there was no landing force, so as not to interfere with its combat activities. Facilities for transporting troops ashore were carefully prepared, and troops were trained in loading and unloading ships. The French siege artillery did not have time to assemble at the beginning of the Crimean expedition: there were only 24 guns out of the intended 56; had to borrow 41 heavy guns from the Turks. Since an accelerated attack on Sevastopol was planned, the allies also carried siege engineering equipment with them; Thus, the French loaded 8 thousand tours and 16 thousand fascines with them, had 20 thousand pieces of working tools and 100 thousand earthen bags in stock.
Napoleon III and the commander of the French army, Saint-Arnaud, proposed to land the allied armies at Feodosia, where there was a good harbor, and move them from there to Simferopol. The Russian army would be forced to give battle, moving no further than Simferopol. A victory at Simferopol would give the entire Crimea to the allies, and would force the Russians to evacuate Sevastopol without a fight. But this conquest of the Crimea in the style of crushing did not smile at all on the British; Raglan had no convoy at all, had very little confidence in the English army's ability to maneuver, and flatly refused to go further inland. At the insistence of the British, the landing strike was aimed not at the Russian field army and communications of Sevastopol, but directly at Sevastopol; Allied armies were not supposed to move away from the coast.
The landing took place on a beach near Evpatoria; On September 12 and 13 she was hampered by excitement; On September 14, most of the infantry and field artillery were landed, but the further course of the landing was again delayed by unrest; The British were especially delayed, and were able to finally get ready on the shore only on the 5th day of the landing, in the evening of September 18.
The appearance of an enemy fleet of 256 ships was discovered by the Russians already on September 11. Despite the fact that in August the entire foreign press was full of articles about the upcoming attack on Sevastopol, the number of our troops in Crimea was increased only to 50 thousand, since, according to the views of the crushing strategy, this secondary theater should not have been strengthened to the detriment of the main one - on the Austro-Russian border: 38 thousand Menshikovs were scattered throughout Crimea, with the exception of its eastern tip, where 12 thousand Khomutovs were collected near Kerch, to defend the entrance to the Sea of Azov. Menshikov did not dare to actively prevent the landing of the Allies, which was associated with exposing Russian troops, on the flat Evpatoria coast, to the fire of powerful naval artillery; he hastily began to concentrate troops on the high plateau of the left bank of the river. Alma to block the Allies' path to Sevastopol. Some Russian units covered up to 150 kilometers in three days.
The European powers were more interested in the struggle for national interests rather than the ideas of monarchy. Emperor Nicholas continued to view Russia as a guarantor of the preservation of the previous order in Europe. Unlike Peter the Great, he underestimated the significance of technical and economic changes in Europe. Nicholas I was more afraid of revolutionary movements there than of the growth of the industrial power of the West. In the end, the desire of the Russian monarch to ensure that the countries of the Old World lived in accordance with his political convictions began to be perceived by Europeans as a threat to their security. Some saw in the policy of the Russian Tsar the desire of Russia to subjugate Europe. Such sentiments were skillfully fueled by the foreign press, primarily the French.
For many years, she persistently created the image of Russia as a powerful and terrible enemy of Europe, a kind of “evil empire” where savagery, tyranny and cruelty reign. Thus, the ideas of a just war against Russia as a potential aggressor were prepared in the minds of Europeans long before the Crimean campaign. For this, the fruits of the minds of Russian intellectuals were also used. For example, on the eve of the Crimean War, articles by F.I. were readily published in France. Tyutchev about the benefits of uniting the Slavs under the auspices of Russia, about the possible appearance of a Russian autocrat in Rome as the head of the church, etc. These materials, which expressed the personal opinion of the author, were announced by the publishers as the secret doctrine of St. Petersburg diplomacy. After the revolution of 1848 in France, Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew, Napoleon III, came to power and was then proclaimed emperor. The establishment on the throne in Paris of a monarch who was not alien to the idea of revenge and who wanted to revise the Vienna agreements, sharply worsened Franco-Russian relations. The desire of Nicholas I to preserve the principles of the Holy Alliance and the Viennese balance of power in Europe was most clearly manifested during the attempt of the rebel Hungarians to secede from the Austrian Empire (1848). Saving the Habsburg monarchy, Nicholas I, at the request of the Austrians, sent troops into Hungary to suppress the uprising. He prevented the collapse of the Austrian Empire by maintaining it as a counterweight to Prussia, and then prevented Berlin from creating a union of German states. By sending his fleet to Danish waters, the Russian emperor stopped the aggression of the Prussian army against Denmark. He also sided with Austria, which forced Prussia to abandon its attempt to achieve hegemony in Germany. Thus, Nicholas managed to turn wide sections of Europeans (Poles, Hungarians, French, Germans, etc.) against himself and his country. Then the Russian emperor decided to strengthen his position in the Balkans and the Middle East by putting hard pressure on Turkey.
The reason for the intervention was a dispute over holy places in Palestine, where the Sultan gave some advantages to Catholics, while infringing on the rights of Orthodox Christians. Thus, the keys to the Bethlehem Temple were transferred from the Greeks to the Catholics, whose interests were represented by Napoleon III. Emperor Nicholas stood up for his fellow believers. He demanded from the Ottoman Empire a special right for the Russian Tsar to be the patron of all its Orthodox subjects. Having received a refusal, Nicholas sent troops into Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the nominal authority of the Sultan, “on bail” until his demands were met. In response, Turkey, counting on the help of European powers, declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. In St. Petersburg they hoped for the support of Austria and Prussia, as well as the neutral position of England, believing that Napoleonic France would not dare to intervene in the conflict. Nicholas counted on monarchical solidarity and international isolation of Bonaparte's nephew. However, European monarchs were more concerned not with who sat on the French throne, but with Russian activity in the Balkans and the Middle East. At the same time, Nicholas I's ambitious claims to the role of an international arbiter did not correspond to Russia's economic capabilities. At that time, England and France sharply moved forward, wanting to redistribute spheres of influence and oust Russia into the category of secondary powers. Such claims had a significant material and technical basis. By the middle of the 19th century, Russia's industrial lag (especially in mechanical engineering and metallurgy) from Western countries, primarily England and France, only increased. So, at the beginning of the 19th century. Russian cast iron production reached 10 million poods and was approximately equal to English production. After 50 years, it grew 1.5 times, and the English one - 14 times, amounting to 15 and 140 million poods, respectively. According to this indicator, the country dropped from 1st to 2nd place in the world to eighth. The gap was also observed in other industries. In general, in terms of industrial production, Russia by the middle of the 19th century. was inferior to France by 7.2 times, to Great Britain - by 18 times. The Crimean War can be divided into two major stages. In the first, from 1853 to the beginning of 1854, Russia fought only with Turkey. It was a classic Russian-Turkish war with the already traditional Danube, Caucasian and Black Sea theaters of military operations. The second stage began in 1854, when England, France, and then Sardinia took the side of Turkey.
This turn of events radically changed the course of the war. Now Russia had to fight a powerful coalition of states that together exceeded it by almost twice the population and more than three times the national income. In addition, England and France surpassed Russia in the scale and quality of weapons, primarily in the field of naval forces, small arms and means of communication. In this regard, the Crimean War opened a new era of wars of the industrial era, when the importance of military equipment and the military-economic potential of states increased sharply. Taking into account the unsuccessful experience of Napoleon's Russian campaign, England and France imposed on Russia a new version of the war, which they had tested in the fight against the countries of Asia and Africa. This option was usually used against states and territories with an unusual climate, weak infrastructure and vast spaces that seriously hampered progress inland. The characteristic features of such a war were the seizure of coastal territory and the creation there of a base for further actions. Such a war presupposed the presence of a strong fleet, which both European powers possessed in sufficient quantities. Strategically, this option had the goal of cutting off Russia from the coast and driving it deep into the mainland, making it dependent on the owners of coastal zones. If we consider how much effort the Russian state spent in the struggle for access to the seas, then we must recognize the exceptional significance of the Crimean War for the fate of the country.
The entry of the leading powers of Europe into the war significantly expanded the geography of the conflict. The Anglo-French squadrons (their core consisted of steam-powered ships) carried out a grandiose military attack on the coastal zones of Russia (on the Black, Azov, Baltic, White Seas and the Pacific Ocean) at that time. In addition to capturing coastal areas, such a spread of aggression was intended to disorient the Russian command regarding the location of the main attack. With the entry of England and France into the war, the Danube and Caucasus theaters of military operations were supplemented by the Northwestern (the area of the Baltic, White and Barents seas), the Azov-Black Sea (the Crimean peninsula and the Azov-Black Sea coast) and the Pacific (the coast of the Russian Far East). The geography of the attacks testified to the desire of the warlike leaders of the Allies, if successful, to tear away from Russia the mouth of the Danube, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Finland (in particular, this was envisaged by the plan of the English Prime Minister G. Palmerston). This war demonstrated that Russia has no serious allies on the European continent. So, unexpectedly for St. Petersburg, Austria showed hostility, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Wallachia. Due to the danger of expanding the conflict, the Danube Army left these principalities. Prussia and Sweden took a neutral but hostile position. As a result, the Russian Empire found itself alone, in the face of a powerful hostile coalition. In particular, this forced Nicholas I to abandon the grandiose plan of landing troops in Constantinople and move on to the defense of his own lands. In addition, the position of European countries forced the Russian leadership to withdraw a significant part of the troops from the theater of war and keep them on the western border, primarily in Poland, in order to prevent the expansion of aggression with the possible involvement of Austria and Prussia in the conflict. Nikolaev's foreign policy, which set global goals in Europe and the Middle East without taking into account international realities, was a fiasco.
Danube and Black Sea theaters of military operations (1853-1854)
Having declared war on Russia, Turkey advanced a 150,000-strong army under the command of Omer Pasha against the Danube Army under the command of General Mikhail Gorchakov (82 thousand people). Gorchakov acted passively, choosing defensive tactics. The Turkish command, using its numerical advantage, took offensive actions on the left bank of the Danube. Having crossed at Turtukai with a 14,000-strong detachment, Omer Pasha moved to Oltenitsa, where the first major clash of this war took place.
Battle of Oltenica (1853). On October 23, 1853, the troops of Omer Pasha were met by a vanguard detachment under the command of General Soimonov (6 thousand people) from the 4th Corps of General Dannenberg. Despite the lack of strength, Soimonov resolutely attacked Omer Pasha's detachment. The Russians had almost turned the tide of the battle in their favor, but unexpectedly received an order to retreat from General Dannenberg (who was not present on the battlefield). The corps commander considered it impossible to hold Oltenica under fire from Turkish batteries from the right bank. In turn, the Turks not only did not pursue the Russians, but also retreated back across the Danube. The Russians lost about 1 thousand people in the battle near Oltenica, the Turks - 2 thousand people. The unsuccessful outcome of the first battle of the campaign had an adverse effect on the morale of the Russian troops.
Battle of Chetati (1853). The Turkish command made a new major attempt to attack on the left bank of the Danube in December on the right flank of Gorchakov’s troops, near Vidin. There, an 18,000-strong Turkish detachment crossed to the left bank. On December 25, 1853, he was attacked near the village of Chetati by the Tobolsk infantry regiment under the command of Colonel Baumgarten (2.5 thousand people). At the critical moment of the battle, when the Tobolsk regiment had already lost half of its strength and shot all the shells, General Bellegarde’s detachment (2.5 thousand people) arrived in time to help it. An unexpected counterattack by fresh forces decided the matter. The Turks retreated, losing 3 thousand people. The damage to the Russians amounted to about 2 thousand people. After the battle at Cetati, the Turks made attempts at the beginning of 1854 to attack the Russians at Zhurzhi (January 22) and Calarasi (February 20), but were again repulsed. In turn, the Russians, with successful searches to the right bank of the Danube, managed to destroy the Turkish river flotillas in Ruschuk, Nikopol and Silistria.
. Meanwhile, a battle took place in Sinop Bay, which became the most striking event of this unfortunate war for Russia. On November 18, 1853, the Black Sea squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov (6 battleships, 2 frigates) destroyed the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha (7 frigates and 9 other ships) in Sinop Bay. The Turkish squadron was heading to the Caucasus coast for a large landing. Along the way, she took refuge from bad weather in Sinop Bay. Here it was blocked by the Russian fleet on November 16. However, the Turks and their English instructors did not allow the thought of a Russian attack on the bay protected by coastal batteries. Nevertheless, Nakhimov decided to attack the Turkish fleet. The Russian ships entered the bay so quickly that the coastal artillery did not have time to inflict significant damage on them. This maneuver also turned out to be unexpected for the Turkish ships, which did not have time to take the correct position. As a result, the coastal artillery could not fire accurately at the beginning of the battle for fear of hitting its own. Undoubtedly, Nakhimov took risks. But this was not the risk of a reckless adventurer, but of an experienced naval commander, confident in the training and courage of his crews. Ultimately, the decisive role in the battle was played by the skill of the Russian sailors and the skillful interaction of their ships. At critical moments of the battle, they always bravely went to help each other. Of great importance in this battle was the superiority of the Russian fleet in artillery (720 guns against 510 guns on the Turkish squadron and 38 guns on coastal batteries). Of particular note is the effect of the first-time bomb cannons that fire explosive spherical bombs. They had enormous destructive power and quickly caused significant damage and fires on the wooden ships of the Turks. During the four-hour battle, Russian artillery fired 18 thousand shells, which completely destroyed the Turkish fleet and most of the coastal batteries. Only the steamship Taif, under the command of the English adviser Slade, managed to escape from the bay. In fact, Nakhimov won a victory not only over the fleet, but also over the fortress. Turkish losses amounted to over 3 thousand people. 200 people were captured (including the wounded Osman Pasha).
The Russians lost 37 people. killed and 235 wounded."The extermination of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by the squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet... I express my sincere gratitude... to the gentlemen commanders of ships and frigates for the composure and precise ordering of their ships according to this disposition during heavy enemy fire... I express gratitude to the officers for their undaunted and precise performance of their duty, I thank the teams who fought like lions,” these were the words of the Nakhimov order dated November 23, 1853. After this, the Russian fleet gained dominance in the Black Sea. The defeat of the Turks at Sinop thwarted their plans to land troops on the Caucasus coast and deprived Turkey of the opportunity to conduct active military operations in the Black Sea. This accelerated the entry of England and France into the war. The Battle of Sinop is one of the most striking victories of the Russian fleet. It was also the last major naval battle of the sailing ship era. The victory in this battle demonstrated the powerlessness of the wooden fleet in the face of new, more powerful artillery weapons. The effectiveness of Russian bomb guns accelerated the creation of armored ships in Europe.
Siege of Silistria (1854). In the spring, the Russian army began active operations beyond the Danube. In March, she moved to the right side near Brailov and settled in Northern Dobruja. The main part of the Danube Army, the general leadership of which was now carried out by Field Marshal Paskevich, was concentrated near Silistria. This fortress was defended by a 12,000-strong garrison. The siege began on May 4. The assault on the fortress on May 17 ended in failure due to the lack of forces brought into the battle (only 3 battalions were sent to attack). After this, the siege work began. On May 28, 72-year-old Paskevich was shell-shocked by a cannonball under the walls of Silistria and left for Iasi. It was not possible to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. The garrison could receive help from outside. By June it had grown to 20 thousand people. On June 9, 1854, a new assault was planned. However, due to the hostile position of Austria, Paskevich gave the order to lift the siege and retreat beyond the Danube. Russian losses during the siege amounted to 2.2 thousand people.
Battle of Zhurzhi (1854). After the Russians lifted the siege of Silistria, the army of Omer Pasha (30 thousand people) crossed in the Ruschuk area to the left bank of the Danube and moved to Bucharest. Near Zhurzhi she was stopped by Soimonov's detachment (9 thousand people). In a fierce battle near Zhurzha on June 26, he forced the Turks to retreat across the river again. The damage to the Russians amounted to over 1 thousand people. The Turks lost about 5 thousand people in this battle. The victory at Zhurzhi was the last success of Russian troops in the Danube theater of military operations. In May - June, Anglo-French troops (70 thousand people) landed in the Varna area to help the Turks. Already in July, 3 French divisions moved to Dobruja, but an outbreak of cholera forced them to return. Disease caused the heaviest damage to the allies in the Balkans. Their army was melting before our eyes not from bullets and grapeshot, but from cholera and fever. Without taking part in the battles, the Allies lost 10 thousand people from the epidemic. At the same time, the Russians, under pressure from Austria, began evacuating their units from the Danube principalities and in September finally retreated across the Prut River to their territory. Military operations in the Danube theater ended. The main goal of the Allies in the Balkans was achieved, and they moved on to a new stage of military operations. Now the main target of their onslaught has become the Crimean Peninsula.
Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations (1854-1856)
The main events of the war unfolded on the Crimean Peninsula (from which this war got its name), or more precisely on its southwestern coast, where the main Russian naval base on the Black Sea was located - the port of Sevastopol. With the loss of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia lost the opportunity to control the Black Sea and pursue an active policy in the Balkans. The Allies were attracted not only by the strategic advantages of this peninsula. When choosing the location of the main attack, the allied command counted on the support of the Muslim population of Crimea. It was supposed to become a significant help for the allied troops located far from their native lands (after the Crimean War, 180 thousand Crimean Tatars emigrated to Turkey). To mislead the Russian command, the allied squadron carried out a powerful bombardment of Odessa back in April, causing significant damage to coastal batteries. In the summer of 1854, the allied fleet began active operations in the Baltic Sea. For disorientation, the foreign press was actively used, from which the Russian leadership drew information about the plans of its opponents. It should be noted that the Crimean campaign demonstrated the increased role of the press in the war. The Russian command assumed that the Allies would deliver the main blow to the southwestern borders of the empire, in particular Odessa.
To protect the southwestern borders, large forces of 180 thousand people were concentrated in Bessarabia. Another 32 thousand were located between Nikolaev and Odessa. In Crimea, the total number of troops barely reached 50 thousand people. Thus, in the area of the proposed attack, the Allies had a numerical advantage. They had even greater superiority in the naval forces. Thus, in terms of the number of warships, the allied squadron exceeded the Black Sea Fleet three times, and in terms of steam ships - 11 times. Taking advantage of significant superiority at sea, the allied fleet began its largest landing operation in September. 300 transport ships with a 60,000-strong landing party, under the cover of 89 warships, sailed to the western coast of Crimea. This landing operation demonstrated the arrogance of the Western Allies. The plan for the trip was not fully thought out. Thus, there was no reconnaissance, and the command determined the landing site after the ships went to sea. And the very timing of the campaign (September) testified to the Allies’ confidence in finishing Sevastopol in a matter of weeks. However, the rash actions of the allies were compensated by the behavior of the Russian command. The commander of the Russian army in Crimea, Admiral Prince Alexander Menshikov, did not make the slightest attempt to prevent the landing. While a small detachment of allied troops (3 thousand people) occupied Yevpatoria and was looking for a convenient place for a landing, Menshikov with an army of 33 thousand was waiting for further events in positions near the Alma River. The passivity of the Russian command allowed the allies, despite bad weather conditions and the weakened condition of the soldiers after the sea motion, to carry out a landing from September 1 to 6.
Battle of the Alma River (1854). Having landed, the allied army under the general leadership of Marshal Saint-Arnaud (55 thousand people) moved along the coast to the south, to Sevastopol. The fleet was on a parallel course, ready to support its troops with fire from the sea. The first battle of the Allies with the army of Prince Menshikov took place on the Alma River. On September 8, 1854, Menshikov was preparing to stop the Allied army on the steep and steep left bank of the river. Hoping to take advantage of his strong natural position, he did little to strengthen it. The inaccessibility of the left flank facing the sea, where there was only one path along the cliff, was especially overestimated. This place was practically abandoned by troops, also due to fear of shelling from the sea. The French division of General Bosquet took full advantage of this situation, which successfully crossed this section and rose to the heights of the left bank. The Allied ships supported their own with fire from the sea. Meanwhile, in other sectors, especially on the right flank, there was a hot frontal battle. In it, the Russians, despite heavy losses from rifle fire, tried to push back the troops who had forded the river with bayonet counterattacks. Here the Allied onslaught was temporarily delayed. But the appearance of Bosquet's division from the left flank created a threat to bypass Menshikov's army, which was forced to retreat.
A certain role in the defeat of the Russians was played by the lack of interaction between their right and left flanks, which were commanded by generals Gorchakov and Kiryakov, respectively. In the battle on Alma, the superiority of the Allies was manifested not only in numbers, but also in the level of weapons. Thus, their rifled guns were significantly superior to Russian smoothbore guns in range, accuracy and frequency of fire. The longest firing range from a smoothbore gun was 300 steps, and from a rifled gun - 1,200 steps. As a result, allied infantry could hit Russian soldiers with rifle fire while being out of range of their shots. Moreover, rifled guns had twice the range of Russian cannons that fired buckshot. This made artillery preparation for an infantry attack ineffective. Having not yet approached the enemy within the range of an aimed shot, the artillerymen were already in the zone of rifle fire and suffered heavy losses. In the battle on Alma, the Allied riflemen without much difficulty shot down the artillery servants in the Russian batteries. The Russians lost over 5 thousand people in battle, the allies ~ over 3 thousand people. The Allies' lack of cavalry prevented them from organizing an active pursuit of Menshikov's army. He retreated to Bakhchisarai, leaving the road to Sevastopol unprotected. This victory allowed the allies to gain a foothold in Crimea and opened the way for them to Sevastopol. The battle on Alma demonstrated the effectiveness and firepower of new small arms, in which the previous system of formation in closed columns became suicidal. During the battle on Alma, Russian troops for the first time spontaneously used a new battle formation - a rifle chain.
. On September 14, the allied army occupied Balaklava, and on September 17 approached Sevastopol. The main base of the fleet was well protected from the sea by 14 powerful batteries. But from land, the city was weakly fortified, since, based on the experience of past wars, the opinion was formed that a large landing in the Crimea was impossible. There was a 7,000-strong garrison in the city. It was necessary to create fortifications around the city just before the Allied landing in Crimea. The outstanding military engineer Eduard Ivanovich Totleben played a huge role in this. In a short time, with the help of the defenders and the population of the city, Totleben accomplished what seemed impossible - he created new bastions and other fortifications that surrounded Sevastopol from the land. The effectiveness of Totleben’s actions is evidenced by the entry in the journal of the city’s defense chief, Admiral Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, dated September 4, 1854: “They did more in a week than they previously did in a year.” During this period, the skeleton of the fortification system literally grew out of the ground, which turned Sevastopol into a first-class land fortress that managed to withstand an 11-month siege. Admiral Kornilov became the head of the city's defense. “Brothers, the Tsar is counting on you. We are defending Sevastopol. Surrender is out of the question. There will be no retreat. Whoever orders a retreat, stab him. If I order a retreat, stab me too!” were the words of his order. In order to prevent the enemy fleet from breaking through into the Sevastopol Bay, 5 battleships and 2 frigates were sunk at the entrance to it (later a number of more ships were used for this purpose). Some of the guns arrived on land from the ships. 22 battalions were formed from naval crews (24 thousand people in total), which strengthened the garrison to 20 thousand people. When the Allies approached the city, they were greeted by an unfinished, but still strong fortification system with 341 guns (versus 141 in the Allied army). The Allied command did not dare to attack the city on the move and began siege work. With the approach of Menshikov’s army to Sevastopol (September 18), the city garrison grew to 35 thousand people. Communication between Sevastopol and the rest of Russia has been preserved. The Allies used their firepower to capture the city. On October 5, 1854, the 1st bombardment began. The army and navy took part in it. 120 guns fired at the city from land, and 1,340 ship guns fired at the city from the sea. This fiery tornado was supposed to destroy the fortifications and suppress the will of their defenders to resist. However, the beating did not go unpunished. The Russians responded with accurate fire from batteries and naval guns.
The hot artillery duel lasted five hours. Despite the enormous superiority in artillery, the allied fleet was severely damaged and was forced to retreat. And here the Russian bomb guns, which had proven themselves well at Sinop, played an important role. After this, the Allies abandoned the use of the fleet in bombing the city. At the same time, the city's fortifications were not seriously damaged. Such a decisive and skillful rebuff of the Russians came as a complete surprise to the allied command, which had hoped to take the city with little bloodshed. The city's defenders could celebrate a very important moral victory. But their joy was overshadowed by death during the shelling of Admiral Kornilov. The defense of the city was led by Pyotr Stepanovich Nakhimov. The Allies became convinced that it was impossible to quickly cope with the fortress. They abandoned the assault and moved on to a long siege. In turn, the defenders of Sevastopol continued to improve their defense. Thus, in front of the line of bastions, a system of advanced fortifications was erected (Selenga and Volyn redoubts, Kamchatka lunette, etc.). This made it possible to create a zone of continuous rifle and artillery fire in front of the main defensive structures. During the same period, Menshikov's army attacked the allies at Balaklava and Inkerman. Although it was not able to achieve decisive success, the allies, having suffered heavy losses in these battles, ceased active operations until 1855. The allies were forced to winter in the Crimea. Unprepared for the winter campaign, the Allied troops suffered dire needs. But still, they managed to organize supplies for their siege units - first by sea, and then with the help of a laid railway line from Balaklava to Sevastopol.
Having survived the winter, the Allies became more active. In March - May they carried out the 2nd and 3rd bombings. The shelling was especially brutal on Easter (in April). 541 guns fired at the city. They were answered by 466 guns, which lacked ammunition. By that time, the Allied army in Crimea had grown to 170 thousand people. against 110 thousand people. among the Russians (of which 40 thousand people are in Sevastopol). After the Easter Bombardment, the siege troops were led by General Pelissier, a supporter of decisive action. On May 11 and 26, French units captured a number of fortifications in front of the main line of bastions. But they were unable to achieve more due to the courageous resistance of the city’s defenders. During the battles, ground units supported with fire the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that remained afloat (steam frigates “Vladimir”, “Khersones”, etc.). General Mikhail Gorchakov, who led the Russian army in the Crimea after the resignation of Menshikov, considered resistance useless due to the superiority of the allies. However, the new Emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on February 18, 1855) demanded that the defense be continued. He believed that the quick surrender of Sevastopol would lead to the loss of the Crimean Peninsula, which would be “too difficult or even impossible” to return to Russia. On June 6, 1855, after the 4th bombardment, the Allies launched a powerful assault on the Ship side. 44 thousand people took part in it. This onslaught was heroically repulsed by 20 thousand Sevastopol residents, led by General Stepan Khrulev. On June 28, while inspecting positions, Admiral Nakhimov was mortally wounded. The man under whom, according to contemporaries, “the fall of Sevastopol seemed unthinkable,” has passed away. The besieged experienced increasing difficulties. They could respond to three shots with only one.
After the victory on the Chernaya River (August 4), the allied forces intensified their attack on Sevastopol. In August they carried out the 5th and 6th bombings, from which the losses of the defenders reached 2-3 thousand people. in a day. On August 27, a new assault began, in which 60 thousand people took part. It was reflected in all places except the key position of the besieged ~ Malakhov Kurgan. It was captured by a surprise attack at lunchtime by the French division of General MacMahon. To ensure secrecy, the allies did not give a special signal for the attack - it began on a synchronized clock (according to some experts, for the first time in military history). The defenders of Malakhov Kurgan made desperate attempts to defend their positions. They fought with everything they could get their hands on: shovels, picks, stones, banners. The 9th, 12th and 15th Russian divisions took part in the frantic battles for Malakhov Kurgan, which lost all the senior officers who personally led the soldiers in counterattacks. In the last of them, the head of the 15th division, General Yuferov, was stabbed to death with bayonets. The French managed to defend the captured positions. The success of the case was decided by the firmness of General MacMahon, who refused to retreat. To General Pelissier’s order to retreat to the starting lines, he responded with the historical phrase: “I am here and I will stay here.” The loss of the Malakhov Kurgan decided the fate of Sevastopol. On the evening of August 27, 1855, by order of General Gorchakov, the residents of Sevastopol left the southern part of the city and crossed the bridge (created by engineer Buchmeyer) to the northern part. At the same time, powder magazines were blown up, shipyards and fortifications were destroyed, and the remains of the fleet were flooded. The battles for Sevastopol are over. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. The Russian armed forces in Crimea survived and were ready for further battles. "Brave comrades! It is sad and difficult to leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but remember what sacrifice we made on the altar of the fatherland in 1812. Moscow is worth Sevastopol! We left it after the immortal battle under Borodin.
The three-hundred-and-forty-nine-day defense of Sevastopol is superior to Borodino!” said the army order dated August 30, 1855. The Allies lost 72 thousand people during the Sevastopol defense (not counting the sick and those who died from diseases). Russians - 102 thousand people. In the glorious The chronicle of this defense includes the names of admirals V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov, engineer E.I. Totleben, surgeon N.I. Pirogov, General S.A. Khrulev, captain G.A. Butakov, sailor P.M. .Cats, officer A.V. Melnikov, soldier A. Eliseev and many other heroes, united from that time on by one valiant name - "Sevastopol". The first sisters of mercy in Russia appeared in Sevastopol. Participants in the defense were awarded the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol". The defense of Sevastopol was the culmination of the Crimean War, and after its fall the parties soon began peace negotiations in Paris.
Battle of Balaclava (1854). During the Sevastopol defense, the Russian army in Crimea gave the allies a number of important battles. The first of these was the battle of Balaklava (a settlement on the coast, east of Sevastopol), where the supply base for British troops in the Crimea was located. When planning an attack on Balaklava, the Russian command saw the main goal not in capturing this base, but in distracting the allies from Sevastopol. Therefore, rather modest forces were allocated for the offensive - parts of the 12th and 16th infantry divisions under the command of General Liprandi (16 thousand people). On October 13, 1854, they attacked the advanced fortifications of the Allied forces. The Russians captured a number of redoubts that were defended by Turkish units. But further onslaught was stopped by a counterattack by the English cavalry. Eager to build on their success, the Guards Cavalry Brigade, led by Lord Cardigan, continued the attack and arrogantly delved into the location of the Russian troops. Here she ran into a Russian battery and came under cannon fire, and was then attacked in the flank by a detachment of lancers under the command of Colonel Eropkin. Having lost most of his brigade, Cardigan retreated. The Russian command was unable to develop this tactical success due to the lack of forces sent to Balaklava. The Russians did not engage in a new battle with additional allied units rushing to help the British. Both sides lost 1 thousand people in this battle. The Balaklava battle forced the Allies to postpone the planned attack on Sevastopol. At the same time, he allowed them to better understand their weak points and strengthen Balaklava, which became the sea gate of the allied siege forces. This battle received wide resonance in Europe due to the high losses among the English guards. A kind of epitaph for Cardigan’s sensational attack were the words of the French General Bosquet: “This is great, but this is not war.”
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Encouraged by the Balaklava affair, Menshikov decided to give the Allies a more serious battle. The Russian commander was also prompted to do this by reports from defectors that the Allies wanted to finish off Sevastopol before winter and were planning an assault on the city in the coming days. Menshikov planned to attack English units in the Inkerman Heights area and push them back to Balaklava. This would allow the French and British troops to be separated, making it easier to defeat them individually. On October 24, 1854, Menshikov’s troops (82 thousand people) gave battle to the Anglo-French army (63 thousand people) in the Inkerman Heights area. The Russians delivered the main blow on their left flank by detachments of generals Soimonov and Pavlov (37 thousand people in total) against the English corps of Lord Raglan (16 thousand people). However, the well-conceived plan was poorly thought out and prepared. The rough terrain, lack of maps, and thick fog led to poor coordination between the attackers. The Russian command actually lost control over the course of the battle. The units were brought into battle in parts, which reduced the force of the blow. The battle with the British broke up into a series of separate fierce battles, in which the Russians suffered heavy damage from rifle fire. By firing from them, the British managed to destroy up to half of some Russian units. General Soimonov was also killed during the attack. In this case, the courage of the attackers was dashed by more effective weapons. Nevertheless, the Russians fought with unrelenting tenacity and eventually began to press the British, knocking them out of most positions.
On the right flank, General Timofeev’s detachment (10 thousand people) pinned down part of the French forces with its attack. However, due to the inaction in the center of General Gorchakov’s detachment (20 thousand people), which was supposed to distract the French troops, they were able to come to the rescue of the British. The outcome of the battle was decided by the attack of the French detachment of General Bosquet (9 thousand people), who managed to push the Russian regiments, who were exhausted and suffered heavy losses, back to their original positions. “The fate of the battle was still wavering when the French who arrived to us attacked the enemy’s left flank,” he wrote London correspondent of the Morning Chronicle - From that moment on, the Russians could no longer hope for success, but, despite this, not the slightest hesitation or disorder was noticeable in their ranks. Struck by the fire of our artillery, they closed their ranks and bravely repelled all the attacks of the allies... Sometimes a terrible battle lasted for five minutes, in which the soldiers fought either with bayonets or rifle butts. It is impossible to believe, without being an eyewitness, that there are troops in the world who can retreat as brilliantly as the Russians... This is the retreat of the Russians Homer would compare it to the retreat of a lion, when, surrounded by hunters, he retreats step by step. Shaking his mane, turning his proud brow towards his enemies, and then again continues on his way, bleeding from the many wounds inflicted on him, but unshakably courageous, undefeated." The Allies lost about 6 thousand people in this battle, the Russians - more than 10 thousand people. Although Menshikov was unable to achieve his intended goal, the Battle of Inkerman played an important role in the fate of Sevastopol. It did not allow the Allies to carry out their planned assault on the fortress and forced them to switch to a winter siege.
Storm of Evpatoria (1855). During the winter campaign of 1855, the most significant event in Crimea was the assault on Yevpatoria by Russian troops of General Stepan Khrulev (19 thousand people). In the city there was a 35,000-strong Turkish corps under the command of Omer Pasha, which threatened the rear communications of the Russian army in Crimea from here. To prevent the offensive actions of the Turks, the Russian command decided to capture Yevpatoria. The lack of allocated forces was planned to be compensated by a surprise attack. However, this was not achieved. The garrison, having learned about the assault, prepared to repel the onslaught. When the Russians launched an attack, they were met with heavy fire, including from the ships of the allied squadron located in the Yevpatoria roadstead. Fearing heavy losses and an unsuccessful outcome of the assault, Khrulev gave the order to stop the attack. Having lost 750 people, the troops returned to their original positions. Despite the failure, the raid on Yevpatoria paralyzed the activity of the Turkish army, which never took active action here. The news of the failure near Evpatoria, apparently, hastened the death of Emperor Nicholas I. On February 18, 1855, he died. Before his death, with his last order, he managed to remove the commander of the Russian troops in Crimea, Prince Menshikov, for the failure of the assault.
Battle of the Chernaya River (1855). On August 4, 1855, on the banks of the Chernaya River (10 km from Sevastopol), a battle took place between the Russian army under the command of General Gorchakov (58 thousand people) and three French and one Sardinian divisions under the command of Generals Pelissier and Lamarmore (about 60 thousand in total). people). For the offensive, which had the goal of helping the besieged Sevastopol, Gorchakov allocated two large detachments led by generals Liprandi and Read. The main battle broke out on the right flank for Fedyukhin Heights. The assault on this well-fortified French position began due to a misunderstanding, which clearly reflected the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian command in this battle. After Liprandi’s detachment went on the offensive on the left flank, Gorchakov and his orderly sent a note to Read “It’s time to start,” meaning to support this attack with fire. Read realized that it was time to start attacking, and moved his 12th division (General Martinau) to storm the Fedyukhin Heights. The division was introduced into battle in parts: the Odessa, then the Azov and Ukrainian regiments. “The swiftness of the Russians was amazing,” a correspondent of one of the British newspapers wrote about this attack. “They did not waste time shooting and rushed forward with extraordinary impetus. French soldiers.. "They assured me that the Russians had never before shown such ardor in battle." Under deadly fire, the attackers managed to cross the river and canal, and then reached the advanced fortifications of the Allies, where a hot battle began. Here, on the Fedyukhin Heights, not only the fate of Sevastopol was at stake, but also the honor of the Russian army.
In this final field battle in the Crimea, the Russians, in a frantic impulse, sought for the last time to defend their dearly purchased right to be called invincible. Despite the heroism of the soldiers, the Russians suffered heavy losses and were repulsed. The units allocated for the attack were insufficient. Read's initiative changed the commander's initial plan. Instead of helping Liprandi's units, which had some success, Gorchakov sent the reserve 5th Division (General Vranken) to support the assault on the Fedyukhin Heights. The same fate awaited this division. Read brought the regiments into battle one by one, and separately they also did not achieve success. In a persistent effort to turn the tide of the battle, Read led the attack himself and was killed. Then Gorchakov again shifted his efforts to the left flank to Liprandi, but the allies managed to pull up large forces there, and the offensive failed. By 10 o'clock in the morning, after a 6-hour battle, the Russians, having lost 8 thousand people, retreated to their original positions. The damage to the Franco-Sardinians is about 2 thousand people. After the battle on Chernaya, the allies were able to allocate the main forces for the assault on Sevastopol. The Battle of Chernaya and other failures in the Crimean War meant the loss for almost a whole century (until the victory at Stalingrad) of the sense of superiority previously won by the Russian soldier over Western Europeans.
Capture of Kerch, Anapa, Kinburn. Sabotage on the Coast (1855)
. During the siege of Sevastopol, the Allies continued their active attack on the Russian coast. In May 1855, a 16,000-strong Allied landing force under the command of generals Brown and Otmar captured Kerch and plundered the city. Russian forces in the eastern part of Crimea under the command of General Karl Wrangel (about 10 thousand people), stretched along the coast, did not offer any resistance to the paratroopers. This success of the allies cleared the way for them to the Sea of Azov (its transformation into an open sea zone was part of England's plans) and cut off the connection between Crimea and the North Caucasus. After the capture of Kerch, the allied squadron (about 70 ships) entered the Sea of Azov. She fired at Taganrog, Genichevsk, Yeisk and other coastal points. However, local garrisons rejected offers of surrender and repelled attempts to land small troops. As a result of this raid on the Azov coast, significant reserves of grain that were intended for the Crimean army were destroyed. The Allies also landed troops on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, occupying the Anapa fortress abandoned and destroyed by the Russians. The last operation in the Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations was the capture of the Kinburn fortress by General Bazin's 8,000-strong French landing force on October 5, 1855. The fortress was defended by a 1,500-strong garrison led by General Kokhanovich. On the third day of the bombing he capitulated. This operation became famous primarily for the fact that armored ships were used for the first time. Built according to the drawings of Emperor Napoleon III, they easily destroyed the stone Kinburn fortifications with gun fire. At the same time, shells from Kinburn’s defenders, fired from a distance of 1 km or less, crashed against the sides of the battleships without much damage to these floating fortresses. The capture of Kinburn was the last success of the Anglo-French troops in the Crimean War.
The Caucasian theater of military operations was somewhat in the shadow of the events that unfolded in Crimea. Nevertheless, actions in the Caucasus were very important. This was the only theater of war where the Russians could directly attack enemy territory. It was here that the Russian armed forces achieved the greatest successes, which made it possible to develop more acceptable peace conditions. The victories in the Caucasus were largely due to the high fighting qualities of the Russian Caucasian army. She had many years of experience in military operations in the mountains. Its soldiers were constantly in the conditions of a small mountain war, had experienced combat commanders aimed at decisive action. At the beginning of the war, Russian forces in Transcaucasia under the command of General Bebutov (30 thousand people) were more than three times inferior to Turkish troops under the command of Abdi Pasha (100 thousand people). Using their numerical advantage, the Turkish command immediately went on the offensive. The main forces (40 thousand people) moved towards Alexandropol. To the north, on Akhaltsikhe, the Ardagan detachment (18 thousand people) was advancing. The Turkish command hoped to break through to the Caucasus and establish direct contact with the troops of the mountaineers, who had been fighting against Russia for several decades. The implementation of such a plan could lead to the isolation of the small Russian army in Transcaucasia and its destruction.
Battle of Bayardun and Akhaltsikhe (1853). The first serious battle between the Russians and the main forces of the Turks marching towards Alexandropol took place on November 2, 1853 at Bayandur (16 km from Alexandropol). Here stood the vanguard of the Russians, led by Prince Orbeliani (7 thousand people). Despite the significant numerical superiority of the Turks, Orbeliani boldly entered the battle and was able to hold out until Bebutov’s main forces arrived. Having learned that fresh reinforcements were approaching the Russians, Abdi Pasha did not get involved in a more serious battle and retreated to the Arpachay River. Meanwhile, the Ardahan detachment of Turks crossed the Russian border and reached the approaches to Akhaltsikhe. On November 12, 1853, his path was blocked by a half-size detachment under the command of Prince Andronnikov (7 thousand people). After a fierce battle, the Turks suffered a heavy defeat and retreated to Kars. The Turkish offensive in Transcaucasia was stopped.
Battle of Bashkadyklar (1853). After the victory at Akhaltsikhe, Bebutov’s corps (up to 13 thousand people) went on the offensive. The Turkish command tried to stop Bebutov at a powerful defensive line near Bashkadyklar. Despite the triple numerical superiority of the Turks (who were also confident in the inaccessibility of their positions), Bebutov boldly attacked them on November 19, 1853. Having broken through the right flank, the Russians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish army. Having lost 6 thousand people, she retreated in disarray. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The Russian success at Bashkadiklar stunned the Turkish army and its allies in the North Caucasus. This victory significantly strengthened Russia's position in the Caucasus region. After the Battle of Bashkadyklar, Turkish troops did not show any activity for several months (until the end of May 1854), which allowed the Russians to strengthen the Caucasian direction.
Battle of Nigoeti and Chorokh (1854). In 1854, the strength of the Turkish army in Transcaucasia was increased to 120 thousand people. It was headed by Mustafa Zarif Pasha. Russian forces were brought to only 40 thousand people. Bebutov divided them into three detachments, which covered the Russian border as follows. The central section in the Alexandropol direction was guarded by the main detachment led by Bebutov himself (21 thousand people). On the right, from Akhaltsikhe to the Black Sea, Andronikov’s Akhaltsikhe detachment (14 thousand people) covered the border. On the southern flank, to protect the Erivan direction, a detachment of Baron Wrangel (5 thousand people) was formed. The first to take the blow were units of the Akhaltsikhe detachment on the Batumi section of the border. From here, from the Batum region, Hassan Pasha's detachment (12 thousand people) moved to Kutaisi. On May 28, 1854, his path was blocked near the village of Nigoeti by a detachment of General Eristov (3 thousand people). The Turks were defeated and driven back to Ozugerty. Their losses amounted to 2 thousand people. Among those killed was Hassan Pasha himself, who promised his soldiers to have a hearty dinner in Kutaisi in the evening. Russian damage - 600 people. The defeated units of Hassan Pasha's detachment retreated to Ozugerty, where Selim Pasha's large corps (34 thousand people) was concentrated. Meanwhile, Andronnikov gathered his forces into a fist in the Batumi direction (10 thousand people). Without allowing Selim Pasha to go on the offensive, the commander of the Akhaltsikhe detachment himself attacked the Turks on the Chorokh River and inflicted a severe defeat on them. Selim Pasha's corps retreated, losing 4 thousand people. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The victories at Nigoeti and Chorokhe secured the right flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.
Battle at Chingil Pass (1854). Having failed to break into Russian territory in the area of the Black Sea coast, the Turkish command launched an offensive in the Erivan direction. In July, a 16,000-strong Turkish corps moved from Bayazet to Erivan (now Yerevan). The commander of the Erivan detachment, Baron Wrangel, did not take a defensive position, but himself stepped out to meet the advancing Turks. In the scorching heat of July, the Russians reached the Chingil Pass with a forced march. On July 17, 1854, in a counter battle, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Bayazet Corps. The Russian casualties in this case amounted to 405 people. The Turks lost over 2 thousand people. Wrangel organized an energetic pursuit of the defeated Turkish units and on July 19 captured their base - Bayazet. Most of the Turkish corps fled. Its remnants (2 thousand people) retreated to Van in disarray. The victory at the Chingil Pass secured and strengthened the left flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.
Battle of Kyuryuk-dak (1854). Finally, a battle took place on the central sector of the Russian front. On July 24, 1854, Bebutov’s detachment (18 thousand people) fought with the main Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Zarif Pasha (60 thousand people). Relying on numerical superiority, the Turks left their fortified positions at Hadji Vali and attacked Bebutov’s detachment. The stubborn battle lasted from 4 a.m. to noon. Bebutov, taking advantage of the stretched nature of the Turkish troops, managed to defeat them piecemeal (first on the right flank, and then in the center). His victory was facilitated by the skillful actions of the artillerymen and their sudden use of missile weapons (missiles designed by Konstantinov). The losses of the Turks amounted to 10 thousand people, Russians - 3 thousand people. After the defeat at Kuryuk-Dara, the Turkish army retreated to Kars and ceased active operations in the Caucasian theater of military operations. The Russians received a favorable opportunity to attack Kars. So, in the campaign of 1854, the Russians repelled the Turkish onslaught in all directions and continued to maintain the initiative. Turkey's hopes for the Caucasian highlanders also did not materialize. Their main ally in the Eastern Caucasus, Shamil, did not show much activity. In 1854, the only major success of the mountaineers was the capture in the summer of the Georgian town of Tsinandali in the Alazani Valley. But this operation was not so much an attempt to establish cooperation with Turkish troops as a traditional raid with the aim of seizing booty (in particular, princesses Chavchavadze and Orbeliani were captured, for whom the highlanders received a huge ransom). It is likely that Shamil was interested in independence from both Russia and Turkey.
Siege and capture of Kars (1855). At the beginning of 1855, General Nikolai Muravyov, whose name is associated with the greatest success of the Russians in this theater of military operations, was appointed commander of the Russian forces in Transcaucasia. He united the Akhaltsikhe and Alexandropol detachments, creating a united corps of up to 40 thousand people. With these forces, Muravyov moved towards Kars with the goal of capturing this main stronghold in eastern Turkey. Kars was defended by a 30,000-strong garrison, led by the English general William. The siege of Kars began on August 1, 1855. In September, Omer Pasha's expeditionary force (45 thousand people) arrived from Crimea to Batum to help Turkish troops in Transcaucasia. This forced Muravyov to act more actively against Kars. On September 17, the fortress was stormed. But he was not successful. Of the 13 thousand people who went on the attack, the Russians lost half and were forced to retreat. The damage to the Turks amounted to 1.4 thousand people. This failure did not affect Muravyov's determination to continue the siege. Moreover, Omer Pasha launched an operation in Mingrelia in October. He occupied Sukhum, and then got involved in heavy battles with the troops (mostly police) of General Bagration Mukhrani (19 thousand people), who detained the Turks at the turn of the Enguri River, and then stopped them on the Tskheniskali River. Towards the end of October it began to snow. He closed the mountain passes, dashing the garrison's hopes for reinforcements. At the same time, Muravyov continued the siege. Unable to withstand hardships and without waiting for outside help, the garrison of Kars decided not to experience the horrors of winter sitting and capitulated on November 16, 1855. The capture of Kars was a major victory for the Russian troops. This last significant operation of the Crimean War increased Russia's chances of concluding a more honorable peace. For the capture of the fortress, Muravyov was awarded the title of Count of Karsky.
Fighting also took place in the Baltic, White and Barents Seas. In the Baltic Sea, the Allies planned to capture the most important Russian naval bases. In the summer of 1854, an Anglo-French squadron with a landing force under the command of Vice Admirals Napier and Parseval-Duchenne (65 ships, most of them steam) blocked the Baltic Fleet (44 ships) in Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The Allies did not dare to attack these bases, since the approach to them was protected by minefields designed by Academician Jacobi, which were first used in combat. Thus, the technical superiority of the Allies in the Crimean War was by no means total. In a number of cases, the Russians were able to effectively counter them with advanced military equipment (bomb guns, Konstantinov missiles, Jacobi mines, etc.). Fearing the mines at Kronstadt and Sveaborg, the Allies attempted to seize other Russian naval bases in the Baltic. The landings in Ekenes, Gangut, Gamlakarleby and Abo failed. The only success of the Allies was their capture of the small fortress of Bomarsund on the Åland Islands. At the end of July, an 11,000-strong Anglo-French landing force landed on the Åland Islands and blocked Bomarsund. It was defended by a 2,000-strong garrison, which surrendered on August 4, 1854 after a 6-day bombardment that destroyed the fortifications. In the fall of 1854, the Anglo-French squadron, having failed to achieve its goals, left the Baltic Sea. “Never before have the actions of such a huge armada with such powerful forces and means ended with such a ridiculous result,” the London Times wrote about this. In the summer of 1855, the Anglo-French fleet under the command of Admirals Dundas and Pinault limited themselves to blockading the coast and shelling Sveaborg and other cities.
On the White Sea, several English ships tried to capture the Solovetsky Monastery, which was defended by monks and a small detachment with 10 cannons. The defenders of Solovki responded with a decisive refusal to the offer to surrender. Then the naval artillery began shelling the monastery. The first shot knocked out the monastery gates. But the attempt to land troops was repulsed by fortress artillery fire. Fearing losses, the British paratroopers returned to the ships. After shooting for two more days, the British ships set off for Arkhangelsk. But the attack on him was also repelled by the fire of Russian cannons. Then the British sailed to the Barents Sea. Joining French ships there, they mercilessly fired incendiary cannonballs at the defenseless fishing village of Kola, destroying 110 of the 120 houses there. This was the end of the actions of the British and French in the White and Barents Seas.
Pacific Theater of Operations (1854-1856)
Particularly worth noting is Russia’s first baptism of fire in the Pacific Ocean, where the Russians, with small forces, inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy and worthily defended the Far Eastern borders of their homeland. Here the garrison of Petropavlovsk (now the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky), led by the military governor Vasily Stepanovich Zavoiko (over 1 thousand people), distinguished itself. It had seven batteries with 67 guns, as well as the ships Aurora and Dvina. On August 18, 1854, an Anglo-French squadron (7 ships with 212 guns and 2.6 thousand crew and troops) under the command of Rear Admirals Price and Fevrier de Pointe approached Petropavlovsk. The Allies sought to capture this main Russian stronghold in the Far East and profit from the property of the Russian-American company here. Despite the obvious inequality of forces, primarily in artillery, Zavoiko decided to defend himself to the last extreme. The ships "Aurora" and "Dvina", turned by the city's defenders into floating batteries, blocked the entrance to the Peter and Paul harbor. On August 20, the Allies, having a triple superiority in cannons, suppressed one coastal battery with fire and landed troops (600 people) ashore. But the surviving Russian artillerymen continued to fire at the broken battery and detained the attackers. The artillerymen were supported by fire from guns from the Aurora, and soon a detachment of 230 people arrived at the battlefield, and with a bold counterattack they dropped the troops into the sea. For 6 hours, the allied squadron fired along the coast, trying to suppress the remaining Russian batteries, but itself received heavy damage in an artillery duel and was forced to retreat from the coast. After 4 days, the Allies landed a new landing force (970 people). captured the heights dominating the city, but his further advance was stopped by a counterattack by the defenders of Petropavlovsk. 360 Russian soldiers, scattered in a chain, attacked the paratroopers and fought them hand-to-hand. Unable to withstand the decisive onslaught, the allies fled to their ships. Their losses amounted to 450 people. The Russians lost 96 people. On August 27, the Anglo-French squadron left the Petropavlovsk area. In April 1855, Zavoiko set out with his small flotilla from Petropavlovsk to defend the mouth of the Amur and in De Castri Bay won a decisive victory over a superior British squadron. Its commander, Admiral Price, shot himself in despair. “All the waters of the Pacific Ocean are not enough to wash away the shame of the British flag!” one of the English historians wrote about this. Having checked the fortress of Russia's Far Eastern borders, the allies stopped active hostilities in this region. The heroic defense of Petropavlovsk and De Castri Bay became the first bright page in the annals of the Russian armed forces in the Pacific.
Parisian world
By winter, fighting on all fronts had subsided. Thanks to the resilience and courage of the Russian soldiers, the offensive impulse of the coalition fizzled out. The Allies failed to oust Russia from the shores of the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean. “We,” wrote the London Times, “have found a resistance superior to anything hitherto known in history.” But Russia could not defeat the powerful coalition alone. It did not have sufficient military-industrial potential for a protracted war. The production of gunpowder and lead did not even half satisfy the needs of the army. The stocks of weapons (cannons, rifles) accumulated in the arsenals were also coming to an end. The Allied weapons were superior to the Russian ones, which led to huge losses in the Russian army. The lack of a railway network did not allow for the mobile movement of troops. The advantage of the steam fleet over the sailing fleet made it possible for the French and British to dominate the sea. In this war, 153 thousand Russian soldiers died (of which 51 thousand people were killed and died from wounds, the rest died from disease). About the same number of allies (French, British, Sardinians, Turks) died. Almost the same percentage of their losses were due to disease (primarily cholera). The Crimean War was the bloodiest conflict of the 19th century after 1815. So the Allies’ agreement to negotiate was largely due to heavy losses. PARISIAN WORLD (03/18/1856). At the end of 1855, Austria demanded that St. Petersburg conclude a truce on the terms of the allies, otherwise threatening war. Sweden also joined the alliance between England and France. The entry of these countries into the war could cause an attack on Poland and Finland, which threatened Russia with more serious complications. All this pushed Alexander II to peace negotiations, which took place in Paris, where representatives of seven powers (Russia, France, Austria, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey) gathered. The main terms of the agreement were as follows: navigation on the Black Sea and Danube is open to all merchant ships; the entrance to the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles is closed to warships, with the exception of those light warships that each power maintains at the mouth of the Danube to ensure free navigation on it. Russia and Turkey, by mutual agreement, maintain an equal number of ships in the Black Sea.
According to the Treaty of Paris (1856), Sevastopol was returned to Russia in exchange for Kars, and the lands at the mouth of the Danube were transferred to the Principality of Moldova. Russia was prohibited from having a navy in the Black Sea. Russia also promised not to fortify the Åland Islands. Christians in Turkey are compared in rights with Muslims, and the Danube principalities come under the general protectorate of Europe. The Paris peace, although not beneficial for Russia, was still honorable for her in view of such numerous and strong opponents. However, its disadvantageous side - the limitation of Russia's naval forces on the Black Sea - was eliminated during the life of Alexander II with a statement on October 19, 1870.
Results of the Crimean War and reforms in the army
Russia's defeat in the Crimean War ushered in the era of the Anglo-French redivision of the world. Having knocked the Russian Empire out of world politics and secured their rear in Europe, the Western powers actively used the advantage they had gained to achieve world domination. The path to the successes of England and France in Hong Kong or Senegal lay through the destroyed bastions of Sevastopol. Soon after the Crimean War, England and France attacked China. Having achieved a more impressive victory over him, they turned this country into a semi-colony. By 1914, the countries they captured or controlled accounted for 2/3 of the world's territory. The war clearly demonstrated to the Russian government that economic backwardness leads to political and military vulnerability. Further lag behind Europe threatened with even more serious consequences. Under Alexander II, the reform of the country begins. The military reform of the 60s and 70s occupied an important place in the system of transformations. It is associated with the name of Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin. This was the largest military reform since the time of Peter, which led to dramatic changes in the armed forces. It affected various areas: organization and recruitment of the army, its administration and armament, training of officers, training of troops, etc. In 1862-1864. The local military administration was reorganized. Its essence boiled down to weakening excessive centralism in the management of the armed forces, in which military units were subordinated directly to the center. For decentralization, a military-district control system was introduced.
The country's territory was divided into 15 military districts with their own commanders. Their power extended to all troops and military institutions of the district. Another important area of reform was changing the officer training system. Instead of cadet corps, military gymnasiums (with a 7-year training period) and military schools (with a 2-year training period) were created. Military gymnasiums were secondary educational institutions, similar in curriculum to real gymnasiums. Military schools accepted young men with secondary education (as a rule, these were graduates of military gymnasiums). Junker schools were also created. To enter they were required to have a general education of four classes. After the reform, all persons promoted to officers not from schools were required to take exams according to the program of cadet schools.
All this increased the educational level of Russian officers. Mass rearmament of the army begins. There is a transition from smooth-bore shotguns to rifled rifles.
Field artillery is also being re-equipped with rifled guns loaded from the breech. The creation of steel tools begins. Russian scientists A.V. Gadolin, N.V. Maievsky, V.S. Baranovsky achieved great success in artillery. The sailing fleet is being replaced by a steam one. The creation of armored ships begins. The country is actively building railways, including strategic ones. Improvements in technology required major changes in troop training. The tactics of loose formation and rifle chains are gaining an increasing advantage over closed columns. This required increased independence and maneuverability of the infantryman on the battlefield. The importance of preparing a fighter for individual actions in battle is increasing. The role of sapper and trench work is increasing, which involves the ability to dig in and build shelters for protection from enemy fire. To train troops in methods of modern warfare, a number of new regulations, manuals, and teaching aids are being published. The crowning achievement of the military reform was the transition in 1874 to universal conscription. Before this, a recruiting system was in effect. When it was introduced by Peter I, military service covered all segments of the population (excluding officials and the clergy). But from the second half of the 18th century. it limited itself only to the tax-paying classes. Gradually, among them, buying off the army from rich people began to be an official practice. In addition to social injustice, this system also suffered from material costs. Maintaining a huge professional army (its number has increased 5 times since the time of Peter) was expensive and not always effective. In peacetime, it outnumbered the troops of the European powers. But during the war, the Russian army did not have trained reserves. This problem was clearly manifested in the Crimean campaign, when additionally it was possible to recruit mostly illiterate militias. Now young people who had reached the age of 21 were required to report to the recruiting station. The government calculated the required number of recruits and, in accordance with it, determined the number of places that conscripts were drawn by lot. The rest were enlisted in the militia. There were benefits for conscription. Thus, the only sons or breadwinners of the family were exempted from the army. Representatives of the peoples of the North, Central Asia, and some peoples of the Caucasus and Siberia were not drafted. The service life was reduced to 6 years; for another 9 years, those who served remained in the reserve and were subject to conscription in case of war. As a result, the country received a significant number of trained reserves. Military service lost class restrictions and became a national affair.
"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.
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